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Engage, Capture, and Kill Terrorists, but This Traditional Approach to Counterinsurgency Does Not Adequately Counter the Insurgents’ Information Environment Strategy

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Engage, Capture, and Kill Terrorists, but This Traditional Approach to Counterinsurgency Does Not Adequately Counter the Insurgents’ Information Environment Strategy 2 Theater Immersion: Postmobilization Training in the First Army Lieutenant General Russell Honoré, U.S. Army, and Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, U.S. Army During 2004, First Army mobilized multiple ARNG brigades at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for theater immersion, a CTC-like experience that thrust Reservists into a combat environment approximating that in Iraq. 9 Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View Major General Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army, Retired In Iraq, soldiers and Marines fight and die in brutal urban combat in which every tactical action has strategic consequences. 19 Political Management of the Military in Latin America David S. Pion-Berlin, Ph.D. Many Latin American political leaders have subordinated their militaries to civilian rule, but they have done so without a knowledge of, or interest in, defense affairs. InfInfInfororormamamationtiontion OperOperOperaaationstionstions 32 Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment Major Norman Emery, U.S. Army; Major Jason Werchan, U.S. Air Force; and Major Donald G. Mowles, Jr., U.S. Air Force U.S. forces find, engage, capture, and kill terrorists, but this traditional approach to counterinsurgency does not adequately counter the insurgents’ information environment strategy. 39 Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch Major George C.L. Brown, U.S. Army The Army should create an information warfare branch to help conduct the Global War on Terrorism. Current information operations training and force composition are inadequate to meet the challenge. CurCurCurrrrententent OperOperOperaaationtiontionsss/FuturFuturFutureee WWWaaarrrfffightingightingighting 44 The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army, Retired The stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only until the next U.S. soldier must answer formal charges for what happened there. The Army is ensuring what happened will not happen again. 51 Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center Brigadier General Mick Bednarek, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; and Stephen Florich As the U.S. Army’s premier training center for infantry and special operations forces, the JRTC reinforces joint and sister-service training opportunities in a COE-like setting. Colonel William M. Darley Vaughn Neeld Consulting Editors Supervisory Editor Editor in Chief Colonel Lieutenant Colonel John H. Garabedian Haroldo Assad Carneiro Dexter Q. Henson Associate Editor Brazilian Army, Lieutenant General Managing Editor Brazilian Edition Nancy Mazzia Lieutenant Colonel William S. Wallace Major Chris Lukasevich Books and Features Editor Commander, Hugo Alfredo Leonard Editor, Latin American Editions Winona E. Stroble Argentine Army, USACAC Hispano-American Edition Major Jeffrey L. Wingo Webmaster Lieutenant Colonel Production Manager Patricia L. Wilson Edmundo Villaroel D. M. Giangreco Secretary Chilean Army, Design Editor Hispano-American Edition Headquarters, Department of the Army U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Volume LXXXV — January- February 2005, No. 1 www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV z [email protected] Professional Bulletin 100-05-1/2 58 The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Woodmansee, U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Faulkner, U.S. Army; Major Wayne C. Blanchette, U.S. Air Force Assumptions are vulnerable to events during the deliberate planning process and crisis action planning. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the urgent need to validate planning assumptions. 63 Strength Maintenance: A Risk Management Approach Major Teresa Z. Taylor, U.S. Army National Guard, Retired, Ph.D. As Operation Iraqi Freedom intensifies and deployments lengthen, concerns are being voiced about soldier retention. Leaders should use a risk-management approach to retention issues. 69 Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and John P. Sullivan, ©AUSA, 2004 Typically, the killing or physical destruction of a target is less important than the terror the act generates. Statistics show an increase in such bombings, so U.S. forces must develop techniques to deal with these threats. FromFromFrom MyMyMy Bookshelf 80 U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker Professional Reading List RRReeevievieviewww EssaEssaEssayyy 83 Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy Almanac 85 Hyman Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army DigestDigestDigest 87 Geospatial Intelligence Ralph M. Erwin 88 BookBookBook RRReeevievieviewswsws contemporary readings for the professional 93 LettersLettersLetters tototo thethethe EditorEditorEditor 95 JJJan-Fan-Fan-Feeebbb 200520052005 IndeIndeIndexxx Military Review presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the By Order of the Secretary of the Army: official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army Peter J. Schoomaker publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material they provide. General, United States Army Military Review reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per 10 officers for Chief of Staff major commands, corps, divisions, major staff agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, Reserve commands, and Cadet Command organizations; one per 25 officers for medical commands, hospitals, and Official: units; and one per five officers for Active and Reserve brigades and battalions, based on assigned field grade officer strength. Military Review is available on-line at <www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV>. SANDRA R. RILEY Military Review (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army, CAC, Fort Administrative Assistant to the Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254. Paid subscriptions are available through the Superintendent of Documents Secretary of the Army 0430902 for $32 US/APO/FPO and $44.80 foreign addresses per year. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. Theater Immersion Postmobilization Training in the First Army Lieutenant General Russell L. Honoré, U.S. Army, and Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, U.S. Army We are in a war with no rear areas or front Dynamics changed during the summer of 2003. lines. We have to instill the Warrior Ethos into Entire ARNG-enhanced brigades were called up for the mobilized soldiers we train. Every soldier duty in combat zones. In the First Army AOR, the must be able to function as an infantryman. Sol­ 30th Brigade from North Carolina was the first such diers must have tough, realistic, hands-on, repeti­ formation mobilized for employment in Iraq. The tive training until their response is intuitive. When 30th Brigade began postmobilization training, with the soldiers get off the bus at the [mobilization] sta­ 24th Infantry Division (ID) in oversight. The 2d tion, they must feel they have arrived in Iraq or Training Support Brigade (TSB) of the 78th Divi- Afghanistan. sion, Training Support, heavily reinforced with train- We have a non-negotiable contract with the ers from the 78th and 87th Divisions, had the lead American people to prepare [our] sons and daughters for war. We must use imagination and for training. The 30th Brigade executed postmobili- innovation to do this better than we ever have zation training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort before. We cannot; we will not fail in this task.* Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Drum, New York. This was a historic mission; it was the first time an en- tire ARNG-enhanced brigade mobilized and deployed ETWEEN 11 September 2001 and the sum- to a war zone under the First Army’s auspices. The mer of 2003, the First and Fifth Continental effort was a success, but the First Army experi- UnitedB States Armies (CONUSAs) mobilized and enced challenges and learned significant lessons. deployed thousands of Reserve Component (RC) During the summer of 2004, the First Army mo- soldiers from the U.S. Army National Guard bilized multiple ARNG brigades in the form of (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve for the Glo- Tennessee’s 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) bal War on Terrorism. In the First Army’s area of and Mississippi’s 155th Brigade Combat Team responsibility (AOR) alone, some 77,924 RC soldiers (BCT). To avoid competing with active units for were trained and deployed from mobilization stations training resources on active posts, both formations east of the Mississippi River. By the fall of 2004, mobilized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. this number grew to 191,491. Some soldiers and units The 278th RCT trained at Camp Shelby from June were employed in the United States as part of Op- through September then executed a mission re- eration Noble Eagle; others deployed to combat hearsal exercise (MRX) at the National Training zones as part of Operations Iraqi Freedom and En- Center (NTC) in October. After completing the during Freedom. CONUSA mobilized additional MRX, the 278th RCT returned briefly to Camp ARNG and RC forces and deployed them to the Shelby then deployed to theater in November. Kosovo Force, the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and Similarly, the 155th BCT trained
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