2 Theater Immersion: Postmobilization Training in the First Army Lieutenant General Russell Honoré, U.S. Army, and Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, U.S. Army During 2004, First Army mobilized multiple ARNG brigades at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for theater immersion, a CTC-like experience that thrust Reservists into a combat environment approximating that in Iraq.
9 Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View Major General Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army, Retired In Iraq, soldiers and Marines fight and die in brutal urban combat in which every tactical action has strategic consequences.
19 Political Management of the Military in Latin America David S. Pion-Berlin, Ph.D. Many Latin American political leaders have subordinated their militaries to civilian rule, but they have done so without a knowledge of, or interest in, defense affairs.
InfInfInfororormamamationtiontion OperOperOperaaationstionstions 32 Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment Major Norman Emery, U.S. Army; Major Jason Werchan, U.S. Air Force; and Major Donald G. Mowles, Jr., U.S. Air Force U.S. forces find, engage, capture, and kill terrorists, but this traditional approach to counterinsurgency does not adequately counter the insurgents’ information environment strategy. 39 Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch Major George C.L. Brown, U.S. Army The Army should create an information warfare branch to help conduct the Global War on Terrorism. Current information operations training and force composition are inadequate to meet the challenge.
CurCurCurrrrententent OperOperOperaaationtiontionsss/FuturFuturFutureee WWWaaarrrfffightingightingighting 44 The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army, Retired The stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only until the next U.S. soldier must answer formal charges for what happened there. The Army is ensuring what happened will not happen again. 51 Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center Brigadier General Mick Bednarek, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; and Stephen Florich As the U.S. Army’s premier training center for infantry and special operations forces, the JRTC reinforces joint and sister-service training opportunities in a COE-like setting.
Colonel William M. Darley Vaughn Neeld Consulting Editors Supervisory Editor Editor in Chief Colonel Lieutenant Colonel John H. Garabedian Haroldo Assad Carneiro Dexter Q. Henson Associate Editor Brazilian Army, Lieutenant General Managing Editor Brazilian Edition Nancy Mazzia Lieutenant Colonel William S. Wallace Major Chris Lukasevich Books and Features Editor Commander, Hugo Alfredo Leonard Editor, Latin American Editions Winona E. Stroble Argentine Army, USACAC Hispano-American Edition Major Jeffrey L. Wingo Webmaster Lieutenant Colonel Production Manager Patricia L. Wilson Edmundo Villaroel D. M. Giangreco Secretary Chilean Army, Design Editor Hispano-American Edition Headquarters, Department of the Army U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Volume LXXXV — January- February 2005, No. 1 www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV z [email protected] Professional Bulletin 100-05-1/2
58 The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Woodmansee, U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Faulkner, U.S. Army; Major Wayne C. Blanchette, U.S. Air Force Assumptions are vulnerable to events during the deliberate planning process and crisis action planning. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the urgent need to validate planning assumptions.
63 Strength Maintenance: A Risk Management Approach Major Teresa Z. Taylor, U.S. Army National Guard, Retired, Ph.D. As Operation Iraqi Freedom intensifies and deployments lengthen, concerns are being voiced about soldier retention. Leaders should use a risk-management approach to retention issues. 69 Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and John P. Sullivan, ©AUSA, 2004 Typically, the killing or physical destruction of a target is less important than the terror the act generates. Statistics show an increase in such bombings, so U.S. forces must develop techniques to deal with these threats.
FromFromFrom MyMyMy Bookshelf 80 U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker Professional Reading List
RRReeevievieviewww EssaEssaEssayyy 83 Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy Almanac 85 Hyman Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army DigestDigestDigest 87 Geospatial Intelligence Ralph M. Erwin
88 BookBookBook RRReeevievieviewswsws contemporary readings for the professional
93 LettersLettersLetters tototo thethethe EditorEditorEditor
95 JJJan-Fan-Fan-Feeebbb 200520052005 IndeIndeIndexxx
Military Review presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the By Order of the Secretary of the Army: official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army Peter J. Schoomaker publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material they provide. General, United States Army Military Review reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per 10 officers for Chief of Staff major commands, corps, divisions, major staff agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, Reserve commands, and Cadet Command organizations; one per 25 officers for medical commands, hospitals, and Official: units; and one per five officers for Active and Reserve brigades and battalions, based on assigned field grade officer strength. Military Review is available on-line at
Lieutenant General Russell L. Honoré, U.S. Army,
and Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, U.S. Army
We are in a war with no rear areas or front Dynamics changed during the summer of 2003. lines. We have to instill the Warrior Ethos into Entire ARNG-enhanced brigades were called up for the mobilized soldiers we train. Every soldier duty in combat zones. In the First Army AOR, the must be able to function as an infantryman. Sol 30th Brigade from North Carolina was the first such diers must have tough, realistic, hands-on, repeti formation mobilized for employment in Iraq. The tive training until their response is intuitive. When 30th Brigade began postmobilization training, with the soldiers get off the bus at the [mobilization] sta 24th Infantry Division (ID) in oversight. The 2d tion, they must feel they have arrived in Iraq or Training Support Brigade (TSB) of the 78th Divi- Afghanistan. sion, Training Support, heavily reinforced with train- We have a non-negotiable contract with the ers from the 78th and 87th Divisions, had the lead American people to prepare [our] sons and daughters for war. We must use imagination and for training. The 30th Brigade executed postmobili- innovation to do this better than we ever have zation training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort before. We cannot; we will not fail in this task.* Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Drum, New York. This was a historic mission; it was the first time an en- tire ARNG-enhanced brigade mobilized and deployed ETWEEN 11 September 2001 and the sum- to a war zone under the First Army’s auspices. The mer of 2003, the First and Fifth Continental effort was a success, but the First Army experi- BUnited States Armies (CONUSAs) mobilized and enced challenges and learned significant lessons. deployed thousands of Reserve Component (RC) During the summer of 2004, the First Army mo- soldiers from the U.S. Army National Guard bilized multiple ARNG brigades in the form of (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve for the Glo- Tennessee’s 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) bal War on Terrorism. In the First Army’s area of and Mississippi’s 155th Brigade Combat Team responsibility (AOR) alone, some 77,924 RC soldiers (BCT). To avoid competing with active units for were trained and deployed from mobilization stations training resources on active posts, both formations east of the Mississippi River. By the fall of 2004, mobilized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. this number grew to 191,491. Some soldiers and units The 278th RCT trained at Camp Shelby from June were employed in the United States as part of Op- through September then executed a mission re- eration Noble Eagle; others deployed to combat hearsal exercise (MRX) at the National Training zones as part of Operations Iraqi Freedom and En- Center (NTC) in October. After completing the during Freedom. CONUSA mobilized additional MRX, the 278th RCT returned briefly to Camp ARNG and RC forces and deployed them to the Shelby then deployed to theater in November. Kosovo Force, the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and Similarly, the 155th BCT trained at Camp Shelby Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Initially, most of these from July through October, executed an MRX at the soldiers and units were combat support (CS) and NTC in November, and deployed to theater in De- combat service support (CSS) soldiers. cember. Leading the First Army effort was a 24th
* LTG Russell L. Honoré, quoted in “‘Theater Immersion ID command and control (C2) cell with the 3d Bri- Training’ New Watchword for First U.S. Army,” First U.S. Army gade of the 87th Division (heavily reinforced by el- in the News, Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Forest Park, Geor gia, on-line at
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This approach created an economy of scale that vidual- through brigade-level collective tasks. saved resources, particularly training support brigade See first. Theater immersion’s most important observer/controller-trainers (OC-Ts). Lessons component is a deliberate, continuous study of the learned during the 278th RCT’s training applied to contemporary operational environment (COE) in- the 155th BCT’s training. Both brigades mobilized theater, particularly a study of the threat. To facili- at a single location. First Army introduced a new tate this process and because of the evolving na- approach to postmobilization training—theater im- ture of the threat in Iraq, the First Army is refining mersion—a training concept that is now the watch- Web-based collaborative information sites and word for postmobilization training across the entire quickly disseminating the latest intelligence and tac- First Army AOR. tics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to trainers. Reserve Component units called up for mobiliza- The intelligence officer of the 3d Brigade of the 87th tion are of all shapes and sizes and perform myriad Division with the First Army G2 studied daily intelli- missions requiring varying training programs. For the gence reports from each brigade’s targeted employ- most part, the combined forces land component com- ment area, myriad unit after-action reports (AARs); mander (CFLCC) defines specific training require- Center for Army Lessons Learned products; and ments, but the list of CFLCC tasks is not all-inclu- Department of the Army (DA), G3, Improvised Ex- sive. Unit commanders often arrive at mobilization plosive Device (IED) Task Force products to repli- stations with specific mission essential task lists cate and update TTP in the training area. The intel- (METL) they want particular emphasis or additional ligence officer interviewed soldiers and leaders of training on. In general, battalions or smaller units re- all ranks and positions, from riflemen to brigade and ceive from 35 to 60 days of postmobilization train- division commanders, in-country to obtain the most ing, but the precise number of training days varies recent views of the COE. The 3d Brigade, 87th Di- based on the mission, destination, and latest arrival vision, S3 and the First Army G3 studied the latest date in-theater. TTP and operational patterns of coalition forces to The mobilization of brigade-size formations for determine the best methods to counter and defeat combat in Iraq demanded a different approach. In the threat. Having 20 of its own soldiers deployed wartime conditions, formations receive about 90 to Iraq as coalition military-assistance training teams days of intense training from the individual level greatly helped in this process. The teams provided through brigade operations at the mobilization sta- almost daily updates to help craft the training envi- tion. Postmobilization training covers a variety of ronment and, with 3d Brigade and First Army com- CFLCC-mandated tasks ranging from individual bat veterans, were employed as OC-Ts soon after to collective tasks and from stability- and support- returning from Iraq. focused operations through conventional combat mis- Understand first. The training environment was sions. Reserve Component brigade training con- grounded in an operational scenario updated with cludes with an intense MRX at one of the command fragmentary orders and intelligence summaries and training centers. subscenarios for specific training events. Employ- ing crawl-walk-run, eight-step, and multiechelon tech- Theater Immersion niques, soldiers, leaders, and units progressed from Theater immersion rapidly builds combat-ready individual to collective events and from vehicle and formations led by competent, confident leaders who squad to battalion- and brigade-level operations. Col- see first, understand first, and act first; battleproofed lective events culminated at brigade level with a field soldiers inculcated with the warrior ethos man the training exercise (FTX) and peaked at battalion level formations. Theater immersion places—as rapidly with a 5-day Army training and evaluation program as possible—leaders, soldiers, and units into an en- (ARTEP) that ended with a battalion live-fire coor- vironment that approximates what they will encoun- dination exercise (FCX). These events placed a pre- ter in combat. At the soldier level, training is tough, mium on battle command and decisionmaking in a realistic, hands-on, repetitive, and designed to illicit stability operations and support operations (SOSO) intuitive soldier responses. It thrusts formations into environment. a theater analog soon after they arrive at their mo- To approximate the environment in-country, the bilization station and places stress on the organiza- TSB commander and unit leaders executed two re- tion from individual to brigade levels. Theater immer- connaissance missions and predeployment site sur- sion is a combat training center-like experience that veys to confirm training practices were appropriate replicates conditions downrange while training indi- to each brigade’s sector. Key trainers, like the TSB
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 3 executive officer and the command sergeant major Iraqi-Americans portrayed linguists, mayors, police (CSM) traveled to Jordan and Kuwait to ensure ap- chiefs, religious leaders, terrorists, news reporters, propriate cultural awareness and reception, staging, and Iraqi National Guard, Army, and Border Police. and onward integration (RSOI) training. They spoke to soldiers only in their native tongue Act first. The most obvious manifestation of the- and wore clothing appropriate to their positions. ater immersion is the physical design of training sites. These COBs were given simulated identities, re- The Army constructed two fully functioning forward hearsed at COB academies, and routinely partici- operating bases (FOBs) for the 278th Armored Cav- pated in training events. Soldiers encountering the alry Regiment (ACR) and 155th Brigade, as well COBs communicated through translators to negoti- as four villages, a highway overpass, and roads lined ate, conduct bilateral meetings, gather intelligence, with guardrails. The villages included mosques, of- and react to civil disturbances. fices for civil authorities, markets, walled residences, A full-time opposing force (OPFOR) from the 3d tunnel complexes, traffic circles, and low-hanging Company of the 349th LSB, primarily mobilized re- telephone and electric cables typical of Iraqi villages. servists, rehearsed operations for weeks before the Joint Coalition Council facilities where soldiers in- brigades arrived. Dressed and equipped like anti-Iraqi terfaced with indigenous civil leaders replicated those forces (AIF) and with OPFOR academy training in-theater. The Army transformed cantonment ar- and daily S2 updates on the latest threat TTP, the eas into three FOB analogs with entry control points OPFOR designed and executed threat countertasks (ECPs), guard towers, and wire. FOBs and towns that immersed training leaders and warriors in the were named after existing locations in-country, and most realistic situations possible. IEDs such as booby road signs, police cars, and markets were created traps, mines, projectiles, bombs, and vehicle-borne based on recent photos from Iraq. To save time and IEDs (VBIEDs) were ubiquitous. Soldiers were con- conserve costs, 3d Brigade, 87th Division, soldiers stantly subjected to simulated sniper, rocket, and performed most of the construction work to build mortar attacks. these sites. For example, the 2d Company, 305th Instilling the Warrior Ethos Battalion TSB, built most of the two FOBs for de- To achieve success against the AIF OPFOR, sol- fense training and battalion ARTEPs and FCXs. diers and leaders conducted detailed troop-leading Within weeks of arrival at the mobilization station, procedures, issued doctrinally correct five-paragraph and after soldier readiness processing and dental and orders, conducted rehearsals, and performed rigor- medical examinations, units began operations as tac- ous precombat inspections and precombat checks. tical formations. Unit leaders planned, prepared, The Army treated every training event, including in- battle-tracked, and controlled their organizations dividual weapons qualification; military operations on while acclimating to the battle rhythm typical of units urban terrain (MOUT); combat patrolling; and cor- fighting in-theater. They had to accomplish some don and search, as a combat mission. classroom instruction, but training maximized time in The Army organized training events in 19 mod- the field. Soldiers averaged over 40 days operating ules, each focusing on 1 or more of 83 theater- from FOBs and camps while under constant threat specific CFLCC training tasks. These modules led of attack by a resourceful enemy. to new theater-specific METLs for each formation Because time is limited at the mobilization station, and echelon. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, validated immersing soldiers immediately into a replicated com- in writing that individuals and units had trained to bat zone enables focused training 24 hours a day and proficiency, and the commander of First Army ap- retraining as needed. Instead of living in a normal proved resulting training plans. The Army created a garrison environment, soldiers were surrounded by densely packed training matrix to ensure soldiers concertina wire, ECPs, and guard towers to simu- could accomplish all required training tasks to stan- late the FOB environment. In a FOB, small-unit lead- dard. Trainers tracked soldiers by name as they pro- ers trained theater-specific tasks, troop-leading pro- gressed through CFLCC-mandated individual tasks. cedures, and basic discipline. To accomplish this, the 3d Brigade of the 87th Divi- To populate the simulated villages, the Army hired sion was heavily reinforced by trainers from the 1st, 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) including 80 4th, and 5th Brigades of the 87th Division and ele- Iraqi–Americans. Under control of the 3d Company ments of the 4th Brigade, 85th Division. At its peak, of the 349th Logistics Support Battalion (LSB), the the effort employed some 750 First Army person- COBs, particularly the Iraqi-Americans, added a nel to train the 7,000 soldiers of the 278th ACR and powerful dose of realism to each training event. 155th BCT. The ratio of OC-Ts to soldiers was ap-
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Forward Operating Base “Hurricane Point” at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. (Inset) Field training at Camp Shelby. proximately 1 to 13. TSB commanders responsible of the latest lessons from the war zone. for various modules prepared detailed training plans, The trainers included key individual tasks that rehearsing, terrain–walking, and validating training cross-walked to collective tasks in tough, realistic, events in detail and preparing risk-management hands-on conditions to create intuitive soldier re- worksheets. sponses. They embedded IED threats in-theater in TSB commanders also put their training creativ- every training event possible from land navigation ity to the test in multiecheloned training events to to battalion ARTEPs and in every form conceivable, validate individual and collective tasks. Speed and from projectiles slung behind guardrails to booby- trust in absorbing the latest lessons learned and flex- trapped buildings and highway overpasses. Soldiers ible, adaptive, responsive trainers were the watch- repeatedly trained on multiple tasks. For example, a words for developing training plans. Theater-specific single simulated rocket attack trains soldiers how to tasks like FOB defense, ECPs, combat patrols and react to indirect fire, casualty evacuation procedures, ground assault convoys, raids, or cordon and search 9-line medical evacuation requests, damage assess- garnered significant attention in training for combat ment, crater analysis, counterbattery fire, and many in Iraq. But First Army trainers built many other tasks other procedures. into the training program, including METL-specific, Individual and collective training places emphasis branch, and specialty training. Gathering and updat- on first-line supervisors and junior-level leaders. ing the latest TTP for each task and developing ap- AARs focused on key leader skills and the warrior propriate threat countertasks were critical, and this ethos to develop initiative and aggressiveness in for- is a continuing process that lies at the heart of the- mations. At the heart of this approach were com- ater immersion. prehensive noncommissioned officer AARs led by As conditions changed in-theater, trainers rapidly TSB and brigade CSMs. As units progressed changed conditions on the training battlefield. This through training, gaining greater confidence, the re- approach placed a premium on agile, creative TSB sponsibility for conducting AARs passed to unit commanders and aggressive, streamlined acquisition leaders.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 5 The Army devised and executed a robust live-fire throughout Iraq, effective logistics, particularly main- program throughout the training matrix to ensure sol- tenance, is a key determinant of a unit’s ability to diers participated in live-fire events throughout train- effectively perform its mission and survive. The para- ing. Soldiers and units progressed through rigorous digm shift from “normal” operating procedures premarksmanship instruction to individual- and crew- practiced at armories and drill centers to the full ex- served-weapons qualification. Reflexive-fire and ploitation of the Standard Army Maintenance Infor- close combat assault courses included urban sce- mation System is a challenge. Rapidly immersing narios, IEDs, and moving-target arrays followed by leaders, operators, and units in the Unit Level Lo- live-fire FOB defense against a moving VBIED and gistics System (ULLS-G), with emphasis on “blast- squad and platoon live-fire assault courses. ing” to the Standard Army Supply and Maintenance After crew-served-weapons qualification, gunners Systems rather than the antiquated “disc-drop” sys- and assistant gunners qualified on weapons from tem, is imperative. vehicles such as HMMWVs, heavy expanded mo- A 2-day structured “ULLS-G Gunnery,” with all bile tactical trucks, 5-ton trucks or howitzers (day operators and maintenance leaders in attendance and and night), and on moving platforms engaging sta- outside subject matter experts brought in for train- tionary and moving targets. Crews formed into com- ing, included the U.S. Army Forces Command G4 bat patrols and ground-assault convoys for collec- and a III Corps Command Maintenance Evaluation tive live-fire events in day-and-night conditions, again Team. ULLS-G Gunnery laid the foundation for ef- from moving and stationary vehicles versus moving fective maintenance management and Class IX flow and stationary targets. Combat vehicle crews ex- throughout mobilization, into the MRX, and on to the- ecuted Bradley and Tank Tables through Table XII. ater. Enforcing attendance, oversight, and account- Paladin crews and platoons fired through Field Ar- ability at brigade-level maintenance meetings was tillery Table XV. Mortar platoons executed mortar instrumental to unit success. training and evaluation programs. A battalion/brigade Trainers issued DA activity codes to units and en- FCX combined fires from motorized companies, how- forced parts-ordering and tracking. Because time itzer platoons, mortar platoons, close air support, and was of essence, trainers inspected and validated all Army aviation. By the time they completed training unit equipment before deployment and training. Cre- at Camp Shelby, the 278th RCT and 155th BCT had ating accountability and confidence in the mainte- expended over 2.3 million rounds of ammunition and nance and supply system was imperative. Training more than 14,500 soldiers were qualified to use in- event OC-Ts habitually checked operators and dividual and crew-served weapons. equipment for proper licensing, dispatches, and pre- The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, and Camp Shelby ventive maintenance checks and services. Opera- also used training devices to enhance soldier weap- tors or equipment found wanting were frozen in ons proficiency. While tank and Bradley crews em- place until unit commanders corrected the problem. ployed traditional systems like the Mobile Conduct All of this was reported in tactical AARs. of Fire Trainer, the Army fielded new systems as Command maintenance, evaluation, and train- well, notably the Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer, ing teams and internal trainers, such as the TSB which soldiers used to good effect to practice and S4 and logisticians with recent theater experience, sustain convoy skills. Additional devices the Army focused on logistics management and unit ad- found useful in training squads and crew-served ministrative and logistical operation center (ALOC) weapons teams were the Engagement Skills Trainer- procedures. They stressed recent ALOC TTPs and 2000 and the Virtual Battlefield Simulator-1. The Fire CSS situational awareness, provided one-on-one Arms, Laser Marksmanship, and Beamhits Train- assistance, and distributed relevant logistics in- ing Systems were also superlative primary marks- formation, such as the “Mobilizing Unit Leader’s manship instruction tools. As the 278th RCT and Maintenance Management Smart Book and 155th BCT mobilizations drew to a close, the Army Baseline SOP” and “ALOC Smartbooks” from re- fielded mine simulators and training IEDs. These cent Combined Arms Support Command publica- new devices will see plenty of action in future mo- tions. Because some units received relatively brief bilizations. postmobilization training, immediately on a unit’s arrival trainers stressed a sense of logistical urgency Draconian Maintenance and recent doctrine and TTPs. Establishing a Whether soldiers are breaking through Normandy baseline of logistic fundamentals greatly improved hedgerows or operating from dispersed FOBs unit sustainment.
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Battle Command enemy weapons systems, IEDs, equipment, and tac- For ARNG leaders and staffs, steeped in legacy tics. Soldiers cannot absorb this knowledge in 2 days; battle command techniques designed for high-inten- the use of the classified computer network is criti- sity operations, counterinsurgency operations and cal to continued study of AIF tactics. SOSO presented a significant paradigm shift. Com- The second element in the training plan was analy- manders’ critical information requirements and the sis. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) military decisionmaking process were no longer easy defines success or failure for intelligence organiza- to apply to the operational environment. ARNG lead- tions. A 9-day training plan included the All-Source ers and staffs had to learn a whole new lexicon with Analysis System (Light), urban IPB, link-pattern supporting tasks and TTPs and apply them to the- analysis, collection management, and targeting and ater immersion so unit leaders could see first, un- analytical techniques. During the first 6 days, sol- derstand first, and act first. diers mixed classroom instruction with practical ex- Pattern analysis and sanitation, water, energy, aca- ercises. A 3-day intelligence exercise integrated all demics, trash-medical, and security charts replaced subjects taught during the first 6 days of training. watchwords like doctrinal and situational templates. The exercise and other brigade staff training, such Effects-based targeting, information operations, and as brigade and battalion CPXs and battalion force-protection working groups moved to positions ARTEPs, allowed brigades to develop intelligence of prominence in unit planning. ARNG trainers battle rhythms and become familiar with useful in- embraced new digital equipment and employed telligence products. Realistic, detailed threat sce- it throughout the formations, and soldiers learned narios reinforced the analytical procedures learned new battle rhythms similar to those encountered previously. Intelligence training was aggressive and in-theater. mentally taxing. A robust Battle Command Training Plan (BCTP) Because of the Army’s dependence on Army included the Leader Training Program at the NTC; Tactical Command and Control Systems, battle com- cultural awareness training in Jordan; pre-deployment mand requires competent signal units. Theater im- site surveys; staff and leader IED training; a BCTP mersion means experiencing theater-like conditions command post exercise (CPX); a signal exercise; in all collective signal-specific training events. Sig- and company, battalion, and brigade CPXs. Both bri- nal elements set up voice and data communication gades participated in CPX-based MRXs with each backbones in FOBs, base camps, and remote sites; of their go-to-war divisional headquarters. moved them; then set them up again. Signal train- The 1st (Simulations) Brigade, 87th Division, was ing posed several challenges. A TSB does not pos- the primary trainer for the capstone CPX conducted sess divisional or area signal asset trainers or tacti- at Camp Shelby based on the Brigade/Battalion cal network engineers. A garrison support unit does Simulation System. Equipped with a digital division not possess signal-asset maintainers. Contracting tactical operations center, 1st Brigade, 87th Division, support for technical and maintenance expertise; became a simulated higher headquarters and pro- tasking a signal battalion for tactical network sup- vided digital links for all key Army Tactical Com- port; and creating a signal specific OC-T team from mand and Control System (ATCCS) devices across across the 87th Division solved this problem. brigades. Battalion ARTEPs exercised battalion and Under the 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S6’s over- brigade C2 with the brigades issuing orders and sight, training began before units arrived at the mo- tracking each battalion. bilization station. Contractors arrived at unit home To paraphrase Sun Tzu, knowing the enemy is stations and provided initial operator proficiency as- critical to battlefield success; in battling the AIF, this sessments, operator training, and equipment assess- principle is amplified. Simply put, actionable intelli- ment and maintenance. Contractors provided assess- gence drives operations. To build unit proficiency, the ments to the TSB S6 and helped refine training plans. First Army developed a rigorous 11-day training plan, Once at Camp Shelby, the signal company partici- which incorporated knowledge of the enemy, to build pated in CPXs and polished unit-collective tasks. The intelligence products and analysis of the enemy to signal company participated in all digital CPXs, and develop predictive analysis for future operations. Camp Shelby provided additional digital C2 training A 2-day knowledge-based training plan gave bri- during battalion ARTEPs. gades necessary knowledge to understand the en- Both brigades transformed from heavy, mecha- emy and how he organizes. Soldiers studied insur- nized formations to agile, motorized organizations gency operations, AIF organizations operating in Iraq, with HMMWVs and a mechanized infantry task
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 7 force. The Army fielded new equipment in these for- Immersion: An Evolving Concept mations, such as ATCCS devices like Blue Force First Army did not rest with the success of the Tracker, Maneuver Control System-Light, and the 278th RCT and 155th BCT’s missions. Trainers from All-Source Analysis and Advanced Field Artillery across the First Army descended on Camp Shelby Tactical Data Systems, which many Active Com- and lessons, techniques, and methods spread rapidly ponent units have yet to receive. New tools of war to mobilization stations across the eastern United such as M4 carbines (soldier favorites in the Rapid States. Trainers improved theater-immersion initia- Fielding Initiative); the Raven Unmanned Aerial Ve- tives at each mobilization station and tailored them hicle; and the PROPHET intelligence system facili- for combat, CS, and CSS formations. Many train- tated unit training. ers also brought their own innovative methods to Transformation does not apply only to digital sys- Camp Shelby. Today, the Army is building FOBs at tems and new pieces of equipment. Soldiers trans- every major mobilization station, and many theater- form as well. In the case of members of mobilizing immersion tools pioneered in the 278th RCT and brigades, many soldiers were cross-leveled to flesh 155th BCT mobilizations are omnipresent. out changing formations. Combat soldiers like tank- The most significant lesson learned in the 278th ers and scouts gained an additional military occupa- ACR and 155th BCT effort was the need for more tion specialty (MOS) as infantrymen; CS and CSS sophisticated and rigorous training in battalion and personnel attended a 20-day 91W course to meet brigade battle command; in particular, effects-based the Army’s latest MOS standards. Phased mobili- targeting and information operations. Here time is zation allowed the Army to call up selected person- the enemy, as are the multitude of training and trans- nel in advance of unit mobilizations and assign them formation requirements that compete for leader time to MOS qualification-producing institutions. These and attention. To mitigate the problem, the Phased soldiers arrived at the mobilization station at approxi- Mobilization Concept was expanded to provide more mately the same time as their parent units. time for leaders, headquarters, and CSS elements The MRX was the culminating event in the First to mobilize in advance of the main bodies, which Army training program. The brigades debarked from would allow them to complete individual and some planes and trains and flowed into Fort Irwin in simu- collective training requirements before their units lated RSOI operations—as if they were moving mobilized and to better prepare them to guide their trough the aerial and sea ports of debarkation in Ku- organizations. This approach created more time to wait en route to Camps Arifjan and Buehring. As focus on critical battle command training events, in- they would have to do in Kuwait, the brigades battle- cluding multiple brigade-level command post exer- tracked the build of combat power, force-protected, cises as well as a brigade FTX with multiple ma- and planned and prepared for a long, contested move neuver battalions in the field. into the Mojave Desert. At the NTC, brigades con- Finally, it was determined that an OC-T team, cre- ducted combat road marches into the AOR and oc- ated along lines analogous to the NTC Bronco Team, cupied FOBs, faced myriad force-protection, SOSO, was necessary to coach, teach, and mentor brigade and combat tasks prevalent in-theater—all under and battalion leaders and staffs throughout constant attack from the AIF. Training included ro- postmobilization training. In the future, these initia- bust live-fire MOUT and live-fire and live-counterfire tives will be put to the test with the mobilization of missions by Paladins from the FOBs. Because free the 48th Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the elections in-theater are crucial in the strategy for vic- 2d Brigade, 28th Division, at Camp Shelby, Missis- tory in Iraq, election-support missions at the NTC sippi, as well as other mobilizing units across the First were the units’ graduation exercise. Army AOR. MR
Lieutenant General Russell L. Honoré, U.S. Army, is Commander, First Continental U.S. Army. He received a B.S. from Southern University A&M College, an M.S. from Troy State University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Air War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the con tinental United States (CONUS), Europe, Saudi Arabia, and Korea. Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, U.S. Army, is Commander, 3d Battalion, 87th Division (Train ing Support). He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. from the Uni versity of Louisville, an M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies, CGSC, and is a graduate of the Army War College. He has held various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, Croatia, Bosnia, Egypt, and Kuwait.
8 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View
Major General Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army, Retired
HE AMERICAN DEFENSE establishment Recent experience also suggests urban warfare has grown up in a big-war culture where big will challenge the American military for many de threatsT were met with big-ticket programs. Yet, cades to come. The complexity of the challenge will throughout the Cold War era in Korea, Iraq, Afghani only grow as cities in developing countries (the stan, and elsewhere real soldiers were compelled to Middle East in particular) continue to gather in the fight unpleasantly real wars against enemies who poor and disaffected. Removed from traditional cul watched the battles carefully. These enemies tural, religious, and social bonds that hold their ag learned with each combat encounter that the surest gression in check, restless young males will add more way to gain advantage is to negate American big- human kindling to the growing fires of urban, fun war technologies by moving the fight into complex damentalist insurgencies. terrain such as jungles, mountains, and most recently, A city is the greatest challenge to any tactical cities. The enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure force. In cities the red zone—the space separating American forces into terrain where Information-Age friendly from enemy forces—compresses. The zone knowledge, speed, and precision give way to the is often thousands of meters in open battle, but only more traditional warfighting advantages of mass, will, tens of meters in the urban maze of densely aggre patience, and the willingness to die. gated buildings, streets, and back alleys. The tradi These enemies realize they will never effectively tional advantages of fighting outside the red zone dis develop, integrate, and employ sophisticated weap appear as cities compel soldiers to fight the enemy ons systems. A tradition of tribalism within Islamic close. The compartmented nature of the urban jungle militaries impedes their ability to create large, cohe fragments forces. Short lines of sight limit the ef sive, well-bonded, structurally sound fighting orga fective ranges of organic weapons and allow the nizations. They are willing to accept that they can enemy to “hug” U.S. forces, obviating the effective best achieve success against the United States by use of precision-guided weapons launched from fighting in small, relatively untrained groups using In- aerial platforms. Compartmented urban terrain less dustrial-Age weapons such as rocket-propelled gre ens to a significant degree the advantages of supe nades (RPGs) and assault rifles. rior situational awareness and electronic-communi In Somalia, Lebanon, and Iraq, the enemy also cations dominance. learned that America’s vulnerable center of gravity Soldiers and Marines fight and occasionally die in is dead American soldiers. Thus, killing Americans brutal, close, and intimate tactical combat in cities, has gravitated from merely a means to an end to and every tactical action has strategic consequences. an end itself, and the most efficient killing ground is Each time a soldier or Marine dies, the United States in cities, where urban clutter allows the enemy to loses another bit of strategic initiative, and probabili hide. Familiar terrain, the presence of supporting ties for success diminish. Each soldier’s death raises populations, and a useful infrastructure gives the en public clamor to bring U.S. soldiers and Marines emy the advantage of sanctuary in the midst of the home. Only a fool would conclude the enemy is un occupying power, an advantage impossible to achieve aware of these connections. in open terrain. He can literally hide in plain sight If dead soldiers are America’s most vulnerable and become indistinguishable from the indigenous center of gravity, putting aside for a moment the hu urban masses that shield, protect, and sustain him. manitarian aspects of the issue, it seems obvious the
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 9 Soldiers watch over a traffic control point near the Fallujah suburb of Al Kharma, Iraq. US Army welfare of our soldiers should be the number-one sire of each soldier to prove himself in hazardous priority for defense planners and policymakers. Per circumstances is common. In sum, close-combat haps it is a number-one priority, but nothing in today’s soldiers do not choose to join the services for the policies, budgets, priorities, and strategic doctrine sug money or to get an education. gests this is the case. Russian dictator Vladimir Lenin reportedly said Let us be clear about who does the dying. Since that in war “quantity has a quality all its own,” in the end of World War II, four out of five American ferring that technology, training, and leadership can dead have been infantrymen—not just soldiers and only do so much to overcome the inherent advan Marines—but infantrymen. Infantrymen constitute tage that mass brings to battle. Close combat has less than 5 percent of all servicemen, but they do always been manpower-intensive. Technology can virtually all the killing and dying. The United States make the job safer and more efficient, but the battle has not suffered a single soldier death from enemy and the enemy set the standards for density on the air action since Korea and none from enemy sea battlefield. As a rule, the more complex the terrain, action since World War II. The last serious air-to the greater the number of soldiers required to fight air combat action was Linebacker II in 1972. The there. Cities are notorious for soaking up great quan last major ship-to-ship action was in Leyte Gulf in tities of soldiers. 1944. The last soldier to die in action died yester The small number of close-combat soldiers and day. Marines in the Armed Forces today is all the more Remembering how small, undemanding, and difficult to justify given the fact they have skills that underserved our population of infantrymen really is cannot be bought off the street or contracted out. is important. America’s treasure-house of close-com In virtually every conflict since the end of World bat soldiers is only marginally larger than the New War II, a shortage of first-rate, professional infan York City Police Department. Every Army and Ma trymen has threatened the success of military cam rine infantryman, tanker, and Special Forces soldier paigns. A protracted campaign drains the supply of gathered in one place would not fill FedEx Stadium. “intimate killers,” prompting the inevitable response: These men (and they are virtually all men) come quicken the training, hasten the building of units, and predominantly from the white middle class with a replace those killed or wounded in combat. The re disproportionately small representation of minorities. sult of such haste and lack of foresight is a tragic While motives to join the warrior ranks vary, the de increase in needless deaths and maimings.
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Comparing the costs for equipping warriors in the services reveals a di
chotomy. A first-rate pi US Marine Corps lot takes several years and at least $8 million to train, and he fights with a weapon that costs be tween $50 and $150 mil lion. Many infantrymen go into close combat with about 4 month’s preparation, and the to tal cost for equipping them is considerably less than $100 thousand. Yet, infantrymen die every day, while fighter pilots Marines and sailors are rarely seriously tend wounded threatened. Today there Marines in Fallujah, are fewer Marine and November 2004. Army infantry squads than first-line fighter aircraft in active service. Initiatives for Close Combat This state of affairs has been accepted because Several initiatives are likely to help close-combat of a belief that distant fires and strategic intelligence soldiers win and survive in direct tactical engage so attrit an enemy that a close fight between op ments. The key word is “direct.” Remember the sta posing close-combat forces would be uneven and tistics cited above and focus on who does the real anticlimactic. However, recent experience conclu fighting and killing. We begin at the intimate, visceral sively proves this premise no longer holds. Science level where direct killing takes place and the science is not responsible for shaping the premise; the en of war gives way to myth, anecdote, and supposi emy is. He has adapted his style of war to draw us tion. Gradually, we will elevate our aim and evalu in close to the point on the battlefield where big sci ate less-direct factors. We must keep in mind that ence yields to small science. He has developed an the farther we move from the firing line, the less operational fighting doctrine that greatly reduces his relevant systems are to the warrior’s needs and the vulnerability to being killed from great distances. His more expensive they become. effectiveness begins at the point of contact and di Knowledge of the enemy. In urban operations, minishes quickly beyond the red zone. the one commodity a close-combat soldier or Ma To gain a fresh perspective on the Nation’s mili rine demands most is knowledge of the enemy wait tary needs, we must look at warfare from the bot ing around the street corner in ambush. Strategic tom up (metaphorically at least) by walking point in systems such as orbiting satellites, high-flying drones, Baghdad or Fallujah in the company of those sol and aircraft can sometimes pick up the presence of diers and Marines who do most of the dying. By such an intimate, immediate threat but they have no thinking about their tasks from the ground up we can means for getting information to the soldier in time better appreciate what they consider important. By for him to act on it. The close-combat soldier must watching close-combat soldiers in action, we can find the enemy the old-fashioned way—by expos connect what they do at the tactical level to strate ing himself to fire to flush out, spot, fix, and kill the gic essentials. What should we do to allow close- enemy. combat soldiers and Marines to succeed in today’s The close-combat soldier gets advance warning new, dangerous, and obscure era of warfare? How principally through reconnaissance by scouts who put can we put American technology, intellect, and or “eyes on” the objective to verify the enemy’s pres ganizational abilities to work to ensure the safety and ence. Occasionally, back-alley payoffs to snitches success of the young people who perform these dif and spies augment reconnaissance. Crowded cities ficult jobs? compound the difficulties in finding an enemy who
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 11 Stryker Brigade soldiers prepare to enter and clear a house during a joint operation with the Iraqi National Guard. US Army hides in plain sight by blending in with the popula field’s detailed ground’s-eye view of the battlefield tion. Often, the enemy uses civilians as shields and, would yield a resolution and definition of the enemy on occasion, sacrifices them to American firepower unprecedented in modern warfare. to gain a psychological advantage. Maintaining contact. Colonels and generals rely While technology can help the soldier find the en on sophisticated command and control systems to emy in the close fight, soldiers have long sought a help orchestrate the battle, but soldiers and Marines device that displays in real time all threats in their in close-combat units still require some system to proximate area—information from all sources, stra help them maintain contact with each other and their tegic to tactical, filtered so they receive only infor superiors. The urban battlefield is lonely and intimi mation pertaining to the immediate situation. In two- dating. Enemies appear everywhere, often in unfore dimensional, urban warfare, the enemy has the seen circumstances, and buddies within a squadron information advantage because of his intimate are often out of touch with each other. Rifle squads knowledge of the terrain and the help he receives must rely on eye contact, hand-and-arm signals, and from civilians. Our soldiers will regain the informa shouted commands. These soldiers should have a tion advantage only by making the fight three-dimen system of virtual touch to give them the confidence sional. Looking down from a low air perch using to fight effectively without having to gather in vul aerial drones or hovering aircraft can even the odds nerable groups. by allowing the soldier or Marine to see behind street Leaders at the squad level should also be able to corners and into buildings. The enemy can hide in see their soldiers virtually. Individual monitors at side urban structures, but aerial dominance robs him tached to every soldier could keep a leader informed of the ability to move about freely and mass. of each soldier’s position. Combat polygraphs relay Astronomers learned the value of linking radio ing biofeedback information could provide informa telescopes into a cohesive array to gain a greater tion about a soldier’s physical and emotional condi resolution of objects than that achieved by individual tion and help squad leader decide which soldiers are telescopes. The technique applies to tactical war best prepared emotionally to perform specific com fare as well. Available technology can link soldiers bat tasks. Collectively, data would tell higher com so each is a sensor in a field of sensors that collec manders when a small unit reached its emotional, tively becomes an expansive sensor array. Such a physical, and psychological point of exhaustion.
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In a perfect world, soldiers or Marines walking that airmen, sailors, and Marines have. Weapons on point should be able to read their commander’s tac tanks and other armored vehicles are effective from tical intent. If we expect tactical leaders to make about 50 to 200 meters—the ranges most likely to strategic decisions when alone, they should be given be encountered in the urban fight. The challenge is a window on their commanders’ decisionmaking pro to give that lethality to dismounted soldiers, who are cesses. The essence of indirect leadership is the the ones most likely to engage in firefights. The U.S. ability of subordinates to observe and become part military needs new small arms that are highly lethal of the decisionmaking process as plans develop and and easy to wield inside urban spaces. Soldiers and change. A device that allows soldiers to listen to and Marines need the ability to shoot first in surprise en add to command and staff discussions would give gagements using some form of reflective sighting. them a window on their leaders’ thinking and help They need a system that can kill the enemy behind them understand the intent and logic behind orders. walls or around corners. A soldier-portable weapon Signature reduction. During the Persian Gulf that can detonate over the enemy’s heads would be War, close-combat soldiers succeeded in large mea helpful, as would a light, wall-buster weapon that kills sure because they “owned the night.” Light-intensi an enemy inside urban structures. fication and infrared night-vision devices allowed sol Protection. Too many soldiers and Marines die diers to consistently engage the enemy without being needlessly because they enter tactical fights with seen. Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq out adequate protection. What threatens them the suggest the American advantage in fighting at night most? Since the end of World War II, the greatest is eroding, particularly in urban combat. Middle East killers of American close-combat soldiers have been ern cities are dense and cluttered. Streets and dwell mortars and small arms. In the Global War on Ter ings are often brightly lit, eliminating any advantage rorism (GWOT), the weapons most feared are accrued from wearing night-vision devices. Light- RPGs and roadside bombs. The RPG is a simple, intensification technologies are now available world diabolical weapon the Germans developed during wide. Even the poorest insurgent can avail himself World War II and the Soviets adapted to give in of these devices by buying or stealing them. In the fantrymen a chance against enemy armor. As its future, we must own more than just the night. Small name implies, the RPG is nothing more than a gre units should be able to hold the spectral advantage nade detonated by a piezoelectric contact fuze and across a much broader span of the sensor spectrum propelled from an iron tube by a small rocket. Our from visible light to infrared, and they must own it soldiers are most afraid of simple roadside mines absolutely—even when urban noise, light, and close because of their unpredictability and the horrific ef ness degrade these advantages. fect they have on the body. Close-in killing. The closer technology moves Recent experience in Iraq reinforces the truism to the firing line, the less useful it becomes. The last that in limited wars a mounted soldier’s chance of mile of the battlefield has always been a place of dying in the close fight is less by almost an order of mystery, folklore, and misunderstanding. Historically, magnitude than that of a soldier fighting on foot. Ar our enemies have (proportionately at least) paid mored vehicles are particularly useful when fight greater attention to their soldiers’ effectiveness when ing in cities. A layer of relatively impenetrable steel fighting close. American close-combat weapons, prevents all but the most powerful explosive devices principally small arms and antitank guns and missiles, from causing harm. Speed of movement and the have sometimes been inferior to the enemy’s. The ability to carry communications equipment and last original U.S. Government design for a small arm weapons gives mounted soldiers dominance in an was the 1903 Springfield rifle, which was essentially encounter with back-alley thugs armed with RPGs, a knock-off of the German Mauser designed 7 years mortars, and automatic weapons. earlier. All other American small arms were either The enemy and circumstances demand that some designed by private citizens or purchased abroad. fighting be done dismounted. Exposed soldiers must With the possible exception of night-vision devices, be better protected, and the best protection is a shield Global Positioning Systems, and shoulder-fired mis of knowledge. If a soldier knows with relative cer siles, an American infantryman has no appreciable tainty what or who is behind the next building, he technological advantage in a close battle against even needs little additional protection. But, in the GWOT, the poorest, most primitive enemy. as in past wars, if he so chooses, the enemy will We must give our soldiers the same overwhelm find ways to restore the fog of war. There are no ing dominance in killing the enemy inside the red zone guarantees of perfect situational awareness for even
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 13 Marines secure a truck loaded with Iraqi soldiers who fired at them during the U.S. drive to Baghdad. US Marine Corps the best-informed soldier walking point in the urban lethal, it also becomes lonelier and enormously fright jungle. That soldier will need better personal armor ening for those obliged to fight close. Most recent to shield him from small-arms fire at close range. American campaigns have been fought in unfamil Once in contact, he will require additional means for iar and horrifically desolate terrain and weather. We limiting an enemy’s ability to maneuver around him. must pay greater attention to selecting, bonding, and He should be able to engage the enemy without ex psychologically and physically preparing close-com posing himself to fire. Finally, when he opens fire, bat soldiers to perform well in this new era of war. he must have some ability to discriminate between Modern science offers promising solutions. Soldiers the enemy and innocent civilians. can be better tuned psychologically to endure the Tactical medicine. The survival rate for soldiers stresses of close combat. Written tests, assessments, wounded in combat today is unprecedented, and role-playing exercises, and careful vetting reduces more must be done to keep them alive. Our most the percentage of soldiers who suffer from stress vulnerable center of gravity is dead Americans. disorders after coming off the firing line. Timely evacuation of the wounded is the greatest The biological sciences offer promise that older, challenge in urban combat. We must get a wounded more mature soldiers will be able to endure the physi soldier away from the enemy’s close embrace and cal stresses of close combat for longer periods, through (or above) narrow streets before he bleeds which is important because experience supports that to death or dies from shock. The enemy’s embrace older men make better close-combat soldiers. They on occasion foils even the best evacuation efforts. are more stable in crisis situations, less likely to be Soldiers fighting in cities will often find themselves killed or wounded, and far more effective in per stranded much like the U.S. Army Rangers in forming the essential tasks that attend close-in kill Mogadishu, Somalia. We must find better ways to ing. stabilize a wounded soldier stranded on the firing line. War is a thinking man’s game. Senior officers re Perhaps a portable protective wrap could be devel turning from Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded oped that would reduce a soldier’s heart rate and it is better to out-think than out-equip the enemy. slow his metabolism for several hours without caus They tell us that wars are won by creating alliances, ing serious injury. leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, Physical, intellectual, and psychological fit- building trust, converting opinions, and managing per ness. As the battlefield becomes more uncertain and ceptions—tasks that demand the ability to under
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An Iraqi woman and her children cover their faces while their house is searched by New York Guardsmen. US Army stand the changing nature of war. Yet increasingly, Cultural awareness. The American soldier’s military leaders subordinate this ability to the more humanity occasionally gets him killed. Many past en pressing demands of routine day-to-day operations. emies have remarked on the naiveté of U.S. sol Today’s military has become so overstretched it is diers new to close combat. Thanks to the oceans too busy to learn at a time when the value of learn that surround the United States, we are relatively ing has never been greater. well protected and have rarely faced massive inva We ask soldiers and Marines to make judgments sions or traumatic intrusions into our homeland. That and command decisions that in previous wars were explains why many U.S. soldiers in a firefight at first reserved for senior officers. A corporal standing do not believe someone unknown really wants to kill guard in Baghdad or Fallujah can make a decision them. American soldiers like to befriend strangers that affects the strategic outcome of an entire cam and even enemies. German and Japanese veterans paign. In Afghanistan, sergeants decided where to were astounded at how quickly American soldiers deliver precision munitions. Their decisions had enor sought to bond with them and forgive their aggres mous consequences for the strategic mission, yet the sions once the battle ended. Children in particular intellectual preparation of these junior leaders is no were often the objects of this innate propensity to more advanced today than during the Cold War. make friends. Thankfully, these soldiers’ innate creativity, Unfortunately, the gulf between West and East innovativeness, and initiative belie their lack of for has never been greater than that between Ameri mal intellectual preparation. Even so, it seems clear can soldiers and Iraqis. A barrier of cultural differ they could do even better if service institutions edu ences between American and Islamic societies cated them earlier and with greater rigor. blocks the American soldier’s proclivity to connect Today’s close-combat soldiers or Marines need with alien societies. Few soldiers speak Arabic or more time to develop to peak fighting efficiency than have spent any time in Arab countries or even in their predecessors did. Years, not months, are re the presence of Middle Eastern peoples. Close-com quired to produce a close-combat soldier with the bat forces cannot again be sent into a tactical envi skills and attributes to perform the increasingly more ronment where they are forced to fight as complete difficult and dangerous tasks that wait in the future. strangers. In the war in Iraq, Iraq’s strategic center At least a year is necessary for small units to devel of gravity is the will of the Iraqi people. Our sol op the collective skills necessary to fight as teams. diers cannot hope to win such a war without better
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 15 Special Forces supple- partmentalized affairs where ment U.S. Embassy small units must be self con security during an evacuation of foreign tained, autonomous entities that nationals from Liberia. perform complex tasks without external help. Soldiers and Ma rines will have to be proficient in the many tasks supporting units, such as intelligence, medicine, fire support, and communications units, once performed. In Vietnam, two-thirds of all small-unit combat deaths oc curred during the first 2 months in the field because the train ing system of that era mass- produced soldiers unprepared for the complex, difficult task of close-in killing. In the future, US Air Force small units must undergo far knowledge of how the enemy thinks and acts. more rigorous precombat conditioning. No unit should Every American soldier should receive cultural go into a shooting situation until leaders as well as and language instruction, not to make him a linguist followers have experienced bloodless battles first. but to make him a diplomat in uniform who has the Soldiers and Marines will also have to transform sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and con themselves from close-combat specialists to provid verse with indigenous citizens on the street. Soldier ers of humanitarian assistance and social services. acculturation is too important to be relegated to last- Often, they will have to shift between the two op minute briefings before deployment. The military posite roles several times during a deployment. Such should devise, monitor, and assess acculturation soldiers and Marines cannot be mass-produced. policy as a joint responsibility. Training regimens for tasks such as these might take The military spends millions to create urban com years rather than months. Think of tomorrow’s bat sites to train soldiers how to kill an enemy in cit close-combat soldiers or Marines as moving from ies. Urban sites optimized to teach small units how apprentice to skilled close-combat journeyman un to coexist with and cultivate trust among indigenous der the tutelage of master craftsman squad leaders. peoples might be equally useful. Such centers could Taking a close look at its custom of keeping young expose young soldiers to a simulated Middle East Marines in the ranks only through a few deploy ern urban crisis, perhaps near a mosque or busy ments before mustering them out might be in the marketplace. Expatriate role-players could incite lo Marine Corps’ best interest. The Corps might find cal mobs to violence. The services and joint agen it more productive to keep Marines in the force cies, with State Department, CIA, or allied observ longer. ers calling the shots during an exercise, would Small-unit effectiveness. U.S. soldiers are more provide an interagency and international presence. effective than those from other cultures because they Training. The quality of performance among fight for their buddies rather than for fractured ide today’s close-combat soldiers is high. Enemy soldiers ologies, twisted theologies, failed symbols of alle run about shooting wildly while American soldiers giance, or discredited leaders. No one disputes that move in tightly formed groups and carry their rifles fighting in cities today demands a great deal more with fingers outside the trigger wells. No one ques training and collective bonding. The isolation inher tions the value of rigorous training, and no one ap ent in urban fighting puts greater demands on small preciates first-rate training more than close-combat units and requires a degree of small-unit cohesion soldiers. They know good training is better than pay never before seen in the American military. A and benefits because they, more than anyone, un soldier’s bond to his buddy often lasts long after the derstand that first-rate preparation for war is the best danger has passed, sometimes for a lifetime, but little life insurance they can buy. is known about how to generate this bonding, and Past performance in combat provides no guaran commanders are not terribly skillful at creating con tees for the future, however. The unforgiving nature ditions for it to occur. of today’s urban battlefield demands a new set of The one ingredient all agree is necessary for cre close-combat skills. Urban battles are isolated, com- ating a closely bonded unit is time. The aging of a
16 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW UUURBANRBANRBAN WWWARFAREARFAREARFARE good unit, like a good wine, can not be hurried. Platoons need at 82d Airborne least a year to develop full body Division soldiers and character. The Army’s ef search a sus- pected weapons fort to create individual soldier storage site in stability is admirable, but keep Afghanistan. ing a soldier stable is meaning less if he goes into combat a stranger within his unit. Perhaps we need to recast the definition of stability to embrace the cen trality of small-unit stability, specifically in close-combat squads and platoons. The pipe line is long and the probability of death is great. Conventional logic demands that the Army and Marine Corps create many more close-combat units, of US Army which we can never have too many. External Support The challenge for the future is to develop doc With the essentials provided, a close-combat trine and technology to allow small units to regain soldier’s need for additional support diminishes in the advantage in the close urban fight and defeat a proportion to the cost and proximity of resources diabolical enemy who owns the home-field advan coming from outside his immediate control. The pres tage. To be successful, small units must be able to ence of outside help rarely contributes significantly connect with each other inside urban canyons, over to improving soldiers’ circumstances, and we should come isolation, and mass and concentrate the force treat external sources of support with caution. Most as much as possible. Small units must find ways to close-combat soldiers would gladly trade all the extend the red zone to regain the advantage of kill bombers and fighters in the universe for the sure ing the enemy outside the range of his organic weap knowledge of who is around the next corner. ons. Only after achieving these objectives can Firepower. The sources of external killing power American forces enter a city with confidence that soldiers favor are not the most expensive, sophisti they will defeat the enemy while incurring losses cated items in the service arsenals. First choice goes acceptable to the American people. to systems the soldier or Marine commands person Supply. Paradoxically, as the American way of ally, such as the low-tech and ubiquitous mortar, a war has become more technologically complex, non- weapon that is both simple and responsive. Next is technological stressors on fighting units have grown. close support artillery to respond to calls for fire from Infantry and special operations soldiers in Afghani soldiers in contact. Outside sources of killing power stan and Iraq carry far heavier loads on their backs that soldiers and Marines prefer are aerial systems. than soldiers did during World War II. A soldier to Most favored are older, slower, low-tech killing ma day is virtually a pack animal, carrying as much as chines that can deliver intimate killing power, such 120 pounds of gear into the battle area. Even this as attack helicopters; the ubiquitous, trustworthy, low load gives him less than 24 hours of sustainability. and slow-flying A10 attack aircraft; the Marine Har Batteries alone weigh more than 20 pounds. A close- rier; and the deadly AC130 aerial gunship, deriva combat soldier must become unburdened if he is to tive of a 1950s-era Air Force transport aircraft. fight effectively. His needs must be met just when Whatever the source of killing power, close-com needed and in the right proportions. bat soldiers judge its effectiveness on four crucial Aerial vehicles on call can provide dismounted characteristics: precision, discrimination, proximity, soldiers in cities with the essentials of close combat and latency. The precision problem is virtually by dropping supplies directly to units in contact. solved. One-meter accuracy is perfectly fine. The Close-combat soldiers must have the discretion to problems of discrimination and proximity arise from expend whatever is necessary to win and that re the difficulties in placing air-delivered fires on the supply will follow without enemy interference. Only right target, particularly a tactical, close-in target. then will soldiers and Marines chance unburdening Soldiers and Marines might prefer 2-ton bombs for themselves and focus on fighting rather than hump collapsing bridges and buildings, but big bombs are ing loads that inhibit their ability to fight effectively. of little use when the target is small, just around the
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 17 corner, and on the move. Smaller, rather than more best be accomplished by transporting close-combat precise, bombs are the necessary next step in weap soldiers and Marines in light, swift, armored vehicles. ons development if aerial killing power is to meet However, the maneuver challenge changes when the demands of urban close combat. relatively static urban warfare begins. In cities, the The ground warrior’s greatest firepower need is enemy can only move about in small groups with a solution for the latency problem. Simply stated, the out risking annihilation by fires from aircraft watch closer in the target, the greater the time needed to ing overhead. Mounted maneuver allows armored deliver firepower to kill it. Technology can help solve vehicles to establish a cordon around a city quickly this problem, but the greatest impediment to respon without exposing ground soldiers to enemy ambush. sive fires is bureaucracy. Too many eyes and hands The speed of vehicle movement permits small are involved and too many decisions made before units to strike deep into the urban mass to take out aircraft are cleared to deliver a weapon to friendly critical targets and return unharmed. The soldier’s forces in contact. greatest concern when fighting mounted is the Unresponsive firepower systems are taxed most disorientation and isolation he feels once he leaves severely when attacking targets on the move. Even the vehicle. the most advanced bombing system cannot kill any object, even a large one, on the move. Of course, Getting the Proportions Right the enemy is aware of this weakness and has learned Big science and technology produced the world’s the surest way to avoid destruction from American best aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles and are precision is to disperse and hide or keep constantly still essential to the Nation. To neglect these pro on the move. The enemy knows a safe period al grams now would only encourage other potential ways follows being spotted because American com enemies, such as China and perhaps Russia, to re manders and soldiers use that time to choose the kindle a needless, fiscally damaging conventional right weapon, gain permission to deliver the muni arms race. tion, and decide the proper method to deliver it. Un One can also argue that certain aspects of big- fortunately, these impediments lessen the ability of war technologies devoted to winning wars at sea, supporting fires to kill the most dangerous enemy in the stratosphere, and in space provide useful systems. The task is left to the man inside the red capabilities for prosecuting tactical battles in ur zone using shoulder-fired missiles, tanks, and infan ban jungles. The argument is simple. If you believe try fighting vehicles. events in Afghanistan and Iraq are anomalies Maneuver. The freedom to move about the that, once ended, are unlikely to be repeated, then battlefield is essential for success in the open today’s defense priorities are about right. If, how battlespaces and closed urban battlespaces of a ever, you believe the military faces decades of in campaign. The more quickly a ground force defeats tense conflict against active, adaptive, and fanatical an enemy arrayed conventionally in the open, the enemies who consider killing soldiers a viable stra less likely the enemy can retreat into the urban tegic end, then you must agree a rebalancing of jungle to establish a cohesive defense there. Imag defense priorities is of utmost importance. Current ine the consequences if Army and Marine forces events appear to prove proportions are not right. We in Operation Iraqi Freedom would have had com must adjust priorities immediately to improve the bined armored and aerial-delivered forces to pass chances of keeping American ground forces alive through and over Iraqi forces and surround and en in the close tactical fight. More resources for indi ter urban areas. Had American forces possessed vidual soldiers and Marines will mean fewer deaths that operational speed, the enemy never would have and maimings. Paying more attention to those been able to create today’s organized havoc inside who do most of the fighting and dying will have Iraq’s cities, and the task of destroying both the strategic consequences. Limiting the cost of pros fedayeen and Ba’athist infrastructures would have ecuting wars increases the likelihood we can been far easier and considerably less costly in lives. achieve victory at a cost the American people are Sweeping, rapid maneuver in open warfare can willing to accept. MR
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, is an independent consult- ant for defense matters. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Duke University. He has served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Korea. With Williamson Murray, he is the co-author of The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
18 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW Political Management of the Military in Latin America David S. Pion-Berlin, Ph.D.
ATIN AMERICAN political leaders have had military in political-, not defense-, oriented terms. In considerable success at subordinating their this respect, Latin America is in better shape than militariesL to civilian rule, but they have done so with we might think, but we would never know that within out a fundamental knowledge of or interest in de the confines of current intellectual constructs. fense affairs. But, our own definitions of civilian con trol, which almost uniformly stipulate that civilians The Problem must be well versed on defense if they are to lead, An overwhelming consensus exists within the preclude us from comprehending these positive community of Latin American scholars that civilians trends. The definitions, which are normative and inside and outside defense ministries and legislative based largely on standards imported from North committees suffer from an appreciable deficit in America and Western Europe, are exacting, and knowledge of defense affairs. Such knowledge is they erect hurdles that Latin America not only has vital if political leaders are to command the respect not cleared but cannot clear. among military officers necessary to fully achieve Consequently, a great disjuncture exists between civilian control. It is significant that in the one coun what we posit must happen to achieve civilian con try where some case arguably could be made for trol and what actually happened. If we were to hy civilian competence (Argentina), a leading civil-mili pothesize that a central pillar of civilian control hinged tary scholar insists that, as of 2 years ago, a signifi on the ability of civilian politicians and their appointed cant absence of civilian defense knowledge, with officials to show they could lead informatively on few resources or institutions committed to training defense, we would be left with a null set: no Latin civilians in defense, still existed.1 American states would qualify because there has What is it that civilians do not know, and for how never been the kind of permanent security-threat long have they not known it? Latin American civil environment that warrants investing the resources ians within defense ministries (and legislative com and talent necessary to create sophisticated war missions) seemed unprepared to lead on questions machines nor to equip civilian overseers with an un pertaining to national-defense objectives, priorities, derstanding of how they work. threats, strategies, implementation, budgeting, By and large, militaries of the region do not have doctrine, and education. They consistently duck to worry about the threat of invasion from foreign questions on if and how defense forces are needed militaries, and thus, civilians do not have to worry to achieve national security. What foreign and about investing the necessary time to understanding domestic policy objectives of the nation, if any, defense, strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, de would entail the use of defense forces? Under what ployment, doctrine, or training. Internal threats conditions? At what cost? And, are the militaries (narcotraffickers, terrorists, guerrillas) do not pose ready to defend? Then there is the question of challenges that warrant great military preparedness prioritization of goals. What are the most critical and sophistication. security and defense objectives? Which ones are Unlike the U.S., Latin American military spend less critical? Assuming clear goals were laid out, ing does not generate great amounts of civilian em how does the nation get from here to there? Ci ployment, and thus, politicians cannot benefit from vilian ministers and their staffs do not seem to diverting defense resources to their districts. Con be up to speed on national security and defense sequently, they have no incentive to learn about de strategies. fense. Still, the military must be managed. What Latin Civilians within the defense community should be America needs are civilians who can manage the well versed in implementation problems, even if the
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 19 responsibility lies more with the military itself. How Europe insisted countries there had already moved will the military be readied, organized, trained, and from first-generation issues of institutional restruc deployed to meet the challenges it faces? There are turing to second-generation challenges of control of also budgetary matters. Are civilians helping to con defense policy.5 Why, then, has Latin America not struct budgets correlated with strategic objectives? yet met second-generation challenges? Are they allocating funds needed to fulfill missions The first, most basic question to ask is, Are civil that have been carefully conceived and assigned by ians in charge of the defense ministries in Latin civilian leaders? There is scant evidence they have. America? If not, and if they are not in a position to Finally, there are questions about doctrine and edu exert authority or to hire other civilians into key min cation. How are militaries oriented to fight? How isterial positions, it matters little whether they have should their orientation change to fit national priori defense wisdom. ties? What are the military schools teaching? Are Not surprisingly, the military dominated the posi lessons consistent with democratic values? How do tion of defense minister during the 1980s when the they relate to the overall objectives of the nation? region was in the infancy of its democratic rebirth. Civilians have a hands-off policy when it comes to By the early 1990s, that domination eased, but if we ideological and intellectual preparation of soldiers. look at the figures over the last decade, there is no Another way of viewing the defense-knowledge trend at all toward civilianizing defense cabinet po deficit in Latin America is to note what kind of sitions. In 1994, 44 percent of all ministers were from knowledge surplus exists within the U.S. Depart the military. In 2004, the figure was 46 percent. It ment of Defense. The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s is also disturbing to note the military’s thorough mo 2003 “Annual Report to the President and the Con nopolization of the defense portfolio in some of the gress” maps out new operational goals and speci region’s largest and most important countries: Ven fies the budgetary request to fulfill each.2 Within the ezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Mexico. Those coun report, the section on operational risk asks four ba tries have had military defense ministers between sic, essential questions Latin American civilian de 90 to 100 percent of the time over the last 21 years. fense ministers and ministries seldom pose: Do we Based on these data, Latin America is not moving have the right forces available? Are our forces pos steadily in the direction of civilianized defense min tured to succeed? Are our forces currently ready? istries. Are our forces employed consistent with our stra What about civilians currently in charge? How tegic priorities?3 The report answers each question much defense education and on-the-job experience in detail: we are still waiting for answers from Latin do they have? Data were examined to see if minis American Defense Ministers. ters had taken courses or obtained degrees at mili tary or civilian academic institutions in Latin America Historical Timing or elsewhere and if they had previously served in Historical timing is important. Certainly, if this the defense ministry in any capacity or had occu were the period of democratic transition, or even the pied any relevant defense- or security-related post early post-transitional period, it would be presump elsewhere in government. Of the eight civilian de tuous to raise such concerns. But now, some 20 to fense ministers (out of 15) currently in power, only 25 years after the democratic wave washed ashore, two, possibly three, have some defense-relevant edu enough water has passed under the bridge to allow cation, and only one has a defense career back us to take stock of Latin America’s condition. In ground. Thus, only 13 percent of all defense minis deed, comparisons with Spain permit such evalua ters are civilians with some defense expertise, and tion. Just 15 years after the fall of the Franquist re only 7 percent are civilian defense ministers with a gime, Felipe Agüero could declare that civilian defense background. supremacy had been fully attained.4 His definition Naturally, these findings do not begin to get at the of supremacy is quite demanding, insisting that ci problem of the poorly trained civilian staff that mans vilians have an active presence in defense spheres, subordinate posts within these ministries. The find including their own defense project; a set of well ings also do not touch on the subject of legislative thought-out views on military organization; profes defense commissions and whether congressmen, or sional norms and education, and allocation of re staff assigned to them, have fundamental defense sources. If Spain had succeeded in meeting most understandings. Unfortunately, I could not obtain in of its goals after 15 years of democracy, certainly it formation on those variables. But, if civilians are to is time to ask hard questions about Latin America’s lead on defense, leadership must begin at the top. lack of progress after 20 to 25 years. Few civilian defense ministers in the region, let alone Similarly, just a decade after the fall of commu the presidents they answer to, can exert authority nism, civil-military scholars of Eastern and Central over the military based on expertise, irrespective of
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Colombian Finance Minister Roberto Junguito (center) and President Alvaro Uribe meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Department of Defense whether they are in the formal chain of command own criteria, there is little if any civilian control any or not (and most are). where in Latin America. Why should this dearth in defense knowledge If civil-military relations in the region are in such matter? That the knowledge gap will be closed any a precarious state, then given the importance of ci time soon is not likely. Powerful historical, structural, vilian control to the survival and consolidation of de and self-interest reasons exist as to why this is so. mocracy, it follows that democratic governments are Latin America is not a region where politicians have also in a precarious state. Neither is the case. The ever had or will ever have the incentive to get up to reasonable alternative is to adjust the definitions so speed on defense issues. However, that is not to say they are relevant and in tune with Latin American civilians cannot be effective handlers of armed for realities. And, they must be adjusted primarily by ces. Presidents and their defense ministers have had separating civilian control of the military from civil (with a few obvious exceptions) relative success at ian control of defense. subduing military rebellions, calming civil-military ten sions, and building stable, generally respectful rela Civilian Control and tions predicated on military subordination to civilian Defense Wisdom control. The balance of political power has unques That it is hard to guide the military without know tionably tilted in favor of civilians over the course ing something about defense has long been argued. of 15 to 20 years, but the balance of competence Obedience implies command, so the argument goes. has not. Civilians still are at a decided disadvantage Soldiers can only be expected to faithfully comply vis-à-vis their military counterparts when it comes with orders if they have confidence their political to understanding the ins and outs of defense. overseers can lead on the issues that matter most Yet, nearly every definition of civilian control as to them. Absent that leadership, soldiers can lose re sumes managing the military is part of managing spect for civilian handlers, the chain of command can defense—that they are inseparable. While Latin weaken, and military insubordination can result.6 American politicians have every incentive to man Of course command authority can imply many age the military in a way that subordinates them to things, but the literature on civil-military relations civilian authority, they have few incentives to develop leaves little doubt command is strongly tied to de expertise on defense issues. In suggesting, however, fense wisdom, in which civilians (at least in Latin that the former cannot be accomplished without the America) are lacking. The requisites of knowledge latter, as almost all definitions do, we are left to con begin with Samuel Huntington, the author of The template the absurd proposition that according to our Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 21 A Uruguayan soldier takes control via oversight of mil notes during a briefing. itary activities and military professionalism.12 To accom plish this they would need to demonstrate substantial commitments of government resources and expertise. Trinkunas acknowledges there are lesser cost-control methods that hinge on strate gies of appeasement and di vide and rule, as well as those that rely much less on exper tise and oversight. He warns, however, that these are risky and result, at best, in weakly institutionalized control.
US Army In commenting on the need for defense reform, I argue of Civil-Military Relations.7 Even within the no that the “broad strokes of institutional reorganization tion of objective control, which relies heavily on the must be painted by the president and his defense military’s professionalization, a strong need exists for staff,” but this was not done in the case of Argen civilian competence in defense affairs. The Secre tina. I also blame the armed forces because they tary of Defense must be able to integrate fiscal and have “grasped tenaciously to defense planning as if defense information into an overall policy design. To it were a subject only they could touch.”13 With de do this, he would have to rely on a military and ci fense perceived to be off limits, civilians have never vilian staff to help develop a comprehensive military been able to prove their worth. Instead, they have program.8 developed a kind of inferiority complex that just re The National Security Council (NSC), composed inforces their dependency on the military. mainly of civilians, is charged with advising on overall Rut Diamint focuses on the issue of educating ci national security policy.9 Huntington found it incon vilians in defense, noting there is an unwillingness ceivable for such an agency to function if its civil of states to invest resources into creating institutional ian members were in the dark about defense. The training grounds for civilians in those areas, as there failure of Latin American NSC members to become is for the diplomatic corps or for economics.14 Juan sufficiently informed about defense might be one Rial points out that civilian graduates of various in reason presidents from the region so seldom con stitutes of higher studies in Latin America rarely head vene their NSCs. for the ministries of defense.15 Those who do are More recent scholarship has essentially heeded almost always uniformed personnel. Thus, there is Huntington’s call. According to Agüero, civilian con no real career path laid out for aspiring defense ad trol involves the ability of civilians to define goals and ministrators and managers. The results are predict the organization of defense, formulate conduct of de able. Diamint has combed Latin America’s defense fense policy, and monitor implementation of policy ministries for clues of civilian defense wisdom. In to avert military perceptions of civilian incompetence every case she has come up short. and to overcome military corporate resistance to Why have questions of defense—in Diamint’s democratic leadership.10 In commenting on the req words—“always been the private concerns of the uisites for democratic civilian control, J. Samuel Fitch armed forces and just a handful of civilians associ notes that civilians must be able to identify threats ated with them?”16 Why have civilians not “taken that would warrant military force; assign the mili back defense” from the military? Why, after more tary its defense- or security-related missions; devise than two decades of democratic rule, have so few a sensible budget; set defense policy; and exert over resources been devoted to equipping civilians with sight on military education and socialization. Absent the skills they need to conduct defense affairs within these elements, military subordination to civilian rule the ministries and legislative committees? And why could become conditional—no longer absolute.11 has our criteria for civilian control been so seem According to Harold Trinkunas, in “Crafting Ci ingly out of sync with Latin American realities? The vilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela,” the key fact is, civilians have not and will not become suf is for civilians to attempt to institutionalize their ficiently well versed on defense matters anytime
22 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW LLLAAATINTINTIN AAAMERICANMERICANMERICAN DDDEFENSEEFENSEEFENSE AAAFFAIRSFFAIRSFFAIRS soon. They will always have a significant knowledge In the last 100 years, only six wars have been fought deficit because there is no incentive for them to and there have been only three since 1935.21 Latin learn defense. For several important reasons, de America lags behind Europe, Asia, and the Middle fense has not been and will not be a priority for Latin East in terms of the number of wars fought during American governments. the 20th century. Only Africa had fewer. Border skirmishes have been plentiful, but according to Historical Legacies Centeno, only 5 percent of these erupted into full- and War Avoidance scale war, compared to 65 percent in Europe. David Latin American armies were neither created for Mares refers to militarized interstate disputes (MID), nor called on to serve in ways commensurate with where military violence is threatened, displayed, or West European armies during the formative stages used without producing wars, as being plentiful in of state creation. With few exceptions, Latin Ameri Latin American history, numbering in the hundreds.22 can armies were never state builders. They never Yet, of 237 MIDs in South and Central America used offensive power to enlarge national territories over the course of a century, a mere 2.5 percent at the expense of others. They were mainly involved developed into full-scale combat. in internal, internecine conflicts between caudillos— The percentages reflect both an unwillingness and political party bosses and other power brokers—all inability to wage external wars.23 Latin American within boundaries set by Spain and Portugal. Con militaries are not trained or equipped to fight sus sequently, they did not have to grow to a size or tained international battles. Thus, when they do en achieve a readiness consonant with the huge tasks gage the enemy, they look for quick exits rather than of state formation and, hence, did not inherit the criti decisive victories. cal legacies European armies inherited. In January 1995, sensing that a conflict was im Strip away the myths armies have built about their minent between his country and Peru, Ecuadorian indispensable roles in defense of “la Patria” and you President Duran-Ballen Cordovez requested the at will find these institutions, with one or two excep tention of the guarantor states 3 days before hostili tions, never succeeded at expanding the reach of ties began. Three weeks later, the guarantor states states, or even consolidating the territories they had secured a cease fire, and 11 days later, the brief had.17 But, if they have seldom used offensive ca war ended with the Declaration of Montevideo. pabilities to project power and seize territory, neither Monica Herz and João Pontes Nogueira comment: have they readied themselves for defensive pur “Fear of general escalation certainly contributed to poses. Latin American nations have fought few in limiting the scale of violence and to attempts to end terstate wars. The region has been and remains one the war quickly.”24 of the most pacific on earth, and militaries have Yes, there have been many protracted internal never had to be effective deterrents to invasion. wars fought between armies and guerrillas and civil In the absence of war or the threat of war, there wars between political factions and their militias, but has been less demand for strong fighting machines the resource and organizational and logistical de as well as less demand for defense expertise among mands of such conflicts cannot compete with those civilians. In his exhaustive study of wars and nation- required for interstate conflicts. With the exception states in Latin America, Miguel Centeno finds that of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the Revolu civilian elites, military officers, the masses, and the tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), most media alike largely reject interstate war as a fea guerrilla units in South America have been defeated sible option to addressing political problems.18 with relative ease, never testing the armed forces’ Politicians seldom voice the rhetoric of war and warfare capabilities. In Peru, dogged police-intelli usually have more to fear from internal mass move gence work, not decisive battlefield victories by the ments than from invasion by foreign countries. Na armed forces, finally vanquished the Sendero. tional leaders do not see a rational gain in war and Centeno argues that Latin American militaries do not include war as part of their behavioral rep sought internal missions because they could handle ertoire. Society routinely rejects war or war prepa them. In constructing its defensive Cold War archi ration as an option. Two-thirds of those polled in tecture, the United States knew it would never 1998 opposed U.S. weapons sales to Latin America rely on Latin American forces to contribute to for fear doing so would generate an arms race.19 the Hemisphere’s defense, because it justifiably be Centeno says, “Latin American states and their lieved Latin American militaries were unable to lend populations do not appear to have had the histori a hand in fighting major international wars. Thus, the cally forged institutional or political appetite for the United States relegated Latin American states to in type of organizational insanity of modern war.”20 ternal policing and oriented its military aid and sales Latin America is gun-shy of war, and it shows. programs toward inducing an inward look.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 23 An Argentine soldier stands guard at a 2001 peacekeeping exercise in Salta, Argentina. US Army
Avoiding War the military in ways that would allow it to effectively When Latin American countries occasionally do fight an interstate war and lowered the need for ci engage in war, their capacities, not to mention their vilians to preoccupy themselves with defense pre will to fight, are quickly depleted, as evidenced by paredness.25 Argentina’s defeat by Great Britain in the Malvinas Argentina is not alone in desiring to avoid priori War in 1982 and by the brevity of the Peru-Ecua tizing military war preparedness. As a region, Latin dor conflict of 1995. The lessons learned from these America spends less on the military than any other brief, unsuccessful encounters are quite distinct from region on earth. Latin America’s average military those learned in the Northern Hemisphere where expenditures as a percent of the gross domestic civilian and defense experts endlessly review past product trails behind Western Europe, Asia, Africa, performances, looking at how tactics, strategies, and North America. Its military expenditure as a per equipment, and men combined to either win or lose cent of central government expenditures is signifi to better prepare for the next war. cantly less than any other regions. Few politicians In the South, governments and militaries usually devote the time, resources, and political capital nec devise means of avoiding the next war. Argentina essary to build their armed forces into effective fight quickly discovered how thoroughly ill-prepared it was ing units. for an armed engagement against a first-rate world What politicians and armies have been doing with power. The lesson learned was not to develop a great relish is to forge cooperative security agree larger, more sophisticated fighting machine but to, in ments that make the need or risk of armed engagement a phrase, “downsize with diplomacy.” between neighbors more remote. It might seem like de Argentina’s military has been reduced to a shell fense business as usual when we note the countless ef of what it once was. There are fewer men under forts on the part of Southern Cone states to forge re arms, fewer installations, less weaponry, and less gional security cooperation. An impressive array of training time. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have defense-related activities, ranging from mutual visi solved countless disputes with Britain and with tations to joint training and simulations, has occurred. Argentina’s neighbors—Brazil and Chile. Diplomacy But the principal motive behind these efforts is not has so reduced tensions between these states as to to construct better defenses against an unknown or make armed conflict between them practically un undefined enemy, but to increase trust and transpar thinkable, which in turn, made it unnecessary to equip ency between them to avoid the temptation to go to
24 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW LLLAAATINTINTIN AAAMERICANMERICANMERICAN DDDEFENSEEFENSEEFENSE AAAFFAIRSFFAIRSFFAIRS war and the need to worry about defense.26 And, good is employment. Millions of North Americans— this means civilian overseers can devote less atten often entire communities—depend on defense ex tion to defense preparedness. penditures for their livelihoods. Military bases and The more-relaxed security environment through munitions plants, which employ civilians, are spread out most of South and Central America reduces the throughout the nation and motivate legislators to care need to maintain force posture and readiness, let and know about defense, procurement, and the de alone the need to build larger, stronger, more so fense budget and its enlargement. Key congressmen phisticated militaries, especially in the context of and their highly trained staffs sit on the Armed Ser huge economic and social problems, with cash- vices Committees where they wield considerable strapped governments struggling to cope with so clout. many other pressing priorities. While there is no By contrast, in Latin America, military installations permanent security threat environment that warrants and defense contractors provide few civilian jobs and the investment of the resources, time, and talent nec are normally concentrated in select areas. Defense essary to create sophisticated militaries, there is a is not a huge pork-barrel opportunity.27 Thus, only a near-permanent economic and social threat environ few lawmakers gain by diverting expenditures to ment, which includes the threats of widening pov defense. If there is little to gain in terms of extend erty, unemployment, declining social welfare ser ing patronage and resources to their districts, legis vices, and so on, that begs for governmental lators, as members of their respective parties, might attention. Defense can never compete for this kind still have an incentive to deliberate on defense policy. of attention, and the truth is it never has. But, political parties in Latin America rarely include defense issues in their platform statements, and they Disincentives do not make defense an issue either in the cam to Learn Defense paigns or thereafter.28 Defense is a public good, and it is rarely con Within Latin American congresses, defense com sumed. Not a week goes by when the average missions (where they exist) are poorly equipped to Latin American citizen does not rely on power, wield authority and oversight. Only 10 Latin Ameri transportation, communication, sewage, and school can countries have committees dedicated solely to systems, and medical facilities, many needed on a defense. The others have committees with overlap routine basis. But defense lies in waiting; it is almost ping jurisdictions. In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, never used, and it is seldom visible. If it is in a state and Paraguay, defense shares the agenda with for of disrepair, as roads, phones, electrical grids, and eign affairs, public order, development, or general trains invariably are, citizens do not mind. Defense governmental operations, which means focused at does not directly affect their lives. Thus, it is diffi tention to defense and the military is attenuated.29 cult for politicians to promote defense spending as Congressional members of these commissions sel a political issue. dom stay long and thus do not gain the necessary Were military-related threats to national security experience and expertise. The scope of military- and more common, visible, and imminent, and were the defense-related tasks assumed by these defense need to deploy military force more apparent, it would commissions is restricted. be less difficult. But this is not the case. To be sure, A review of defense committee work for 13 coun there are various threats to security (narcotraf tries in recent years shows they most often deal with ficking, terrorism, contraband, other criminal activ granting permission for deployment of national troops ity, and illegal migration), but they do not compel abroad; for the entrance of foreign troops into na wholesale military responses. In this not-so-new se tional territory; promotion and retirement rules; pen curity environment, police, internal security forces, sions and social security benefits for officers and immigration authorities, and intelligence units are at families; judicial matters, including military court ju the front line. Militaries occupy rearguard positions, risdictions; and decorative or symbolic acts, includ waiting for the occasional call to assist other forces. ing conferring medals, honors, and so on.30 These Even when they do engage, they do so in a limited functions correspond closely to what the national way, whether for logistical support, aerial surveil constitutions stipulate for the legislative branch in lance, or conducting anti-crime sweeps through a general. In other words, defense commissions have drug-ridden barrio. These are not the kind of mis not carved out their own unique, more-detailed de sions that test the military’s mettle. fense agendas. Of course, even in the absence of threat, defense Reflecting on what these commissions are not could still be relevant were it to provide important doing on a regular basis is instructive. They are not private goods to its citizens. In the United States that reviewing the defense portion of the budgets, and
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 25 for good reason: they have no access to them. Con Civilian Control gressmen are not privy to the itemized details of the That civilian control in Latin America, by any rea defense ledger. sonable measure, hinges on civilians gaining defense In most Latin American societies, national secu proficiency is unlikely. During the past two decades, rity trumps the congressional right to review and ana while the balance of competence still tilts heavily lyze, let alone change, defense allocations. Neither in favor of the military, the balance of power has the defense nor budget and finance commissions are moved in favor of civilians. With some exceptions, empowered to reopen, examine, or rewrite the pack civilians have gained the upper hand over the mili aged defense budget. There is no item-by-item re tary despite considerable gaps in defense-related view, no markup, and thus, no real capacity to as knowledge—gaps which have not closed apprecia sign or reassign resources to defense accounts, bly. The balance of power has moved decisively in which impairs the committee’s ability to carry out favor of democratic governments in Argentina, Uru another vital function: oversight. guay, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Defense commissions are not exerting informed El Salvador. oversight on defense operations, other than to de To a lesser extent, but still visible, is a movement cide troop exits and entrances. They occasionally in favor of civilians in Chile and Guatemala. Even weigh in on defense production and procurement and in Colombia, where a brutal civil war continues to military judicial matters. Without the necessary ex rage, there is no talk of the civilian government los penditure information, congress cannot take the mili ing control over its armed forces. Only in Ecuador, tary to task for misallocations, wasteful spending, or Paraguay, and Venezuela have efforts to apprecia fraud. The commissions have no auditors to exam bly reduce military political power fallen short. Gen ine military accounts. At best, commissions can call erally speaking, armies have less political influence the defense minister to testify. If there is any effort, in Latin American democratic systems than they however limited, to exert budgetary oversight, it ap once had. Coup avoidance is practiced regularly but pears to be controlled by the services themselves. so, too, is the threat of a coup or other provocative Aside from information, another central issue is warnings that militaries typically issued to civilian expertise, which is also needed for oversight. Un overseers in the past. In a legal and practical sense, like the fields of medicine, education, or health, few most militaries remain subordinate to civilian authori Latin American countries have communities of ex ties. Presidents have legal command over their perts who can inform the debate or help staff com forces, and militaries honor that command. missions. The venue for defense-related discussions Some of the successes throughout Latin America is the military academy, not a think tank or civilian during the course of two decades include— university. And, there are few ongoing institutional z Creating or re-creating defense ministries, most ized channels of communication or revolving doors of which are in the chain of command. to link committees with an external defense estab z Significant military downsizing, in terms of size lishment to help make more informed decisions.31 and budgets. In sum, the public pays no heed to defense un z Losing military prerogatives, including shrink less there is a clear external threat that warrants an ing military court jurisdictions; loss of cabinet and organized, military response. Because such threats other positions of vertical governmental authority; rarely materialize in Central and South America, leg and loss of control over police and other internal se curity forces. islative politicians cannot prioritize defense because z Losing the military’s clandestine civilian sup doing so would serve no electoral purpose. Defense, porters (especially within right-wing and business as opposed to the dozens of other more pressing is circles) and, thus, its praetorian leverage outside the sues, will not deliver tangible benefits. state. Political parties do not fashion major defense po z Greater civilian autonomy over the making of sitions in their platforms for the same reasons, and national policies and, concomitantly, fielding virtually those in the executive branch of government do not no military interference (with the exception of Ven give precedence to defense. All of this leads to the ezuela). predictable result that civilians in and out of govern z Military noninterference in selecting and elect ment do not have the necessary expertise to lead ing civilians to political posts (with Ecuador and Ven on defense. Yet, civilians must exert political author ezuela the exceptions). ity over the military and pay attention to civil-mili z Presidentially authorized, wholesale purges of tary affairs. How can they do so without a firm grip top commanders (in Argentina, Guatemala, and Hon on defense? The fact is they have been doing so duras) and military acquiescence to those moves. for many years. z Military missions (internal or external) under
26 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW LLLAAATINTINTIN AAAMERICANMERICANMERICAN DDDEFENSEEFENSEEFENSE AAAFFAIRSFFAIRSFFAIRS taken at the behest of civilian authorities, not autonomously. Despite these improvements, the region seems light years away from institutionalized democratic civilian control, if that means extensive civilian un derstandings and supervision of defense affairs within well-oiled defense institutions. The dis juncture between these expec tations and the reality on the ground is sizeable. Take Central America for example. Central America is emblematic of so much of what has occurred in U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Latin America. Mark Ruhl ac Rumsfeld and Chilean curately portrays the situation, Defense Minister Mario Fernandez.
noting how, contrary to every Department of Defense expectation, “democratically chosen leaders in [Guatemala, Honduras, El Salva tral American presidents successfully reestablished dor, and Nicaragua] have largely subordinated the civil-military order, they lost interest in further talk military to civilian control and curbed its political in of military reforms presided over by themselves or fluence.”32 their defense ministers. Evidence of this trend is clear. The militaries have In short, in Central America, there is a complete accepted “major reductions in their budgets and absence of civilian defense-related insight, influence, structures”; lost control of police forces; watched and expertise, yet military subordination to civilian as their courts have lost jurisdiction over human rule has been largely achieved. That no discernible rights cases; accepted, despite their displeasure, trend toward greater civilian expertise in defense abrupt and sweeping personnel changes; and, in affairs exists is important to note. Not even a hint general, been obedient to executive orders and thus is present that they have any interest in the subject. refrained from interference in governmental policy The result, at least for El Salvador (and Honduras), making.33 is greater institutional autonomy for the military within a framework Ruhl characterizes as being Military Control “close to democratic civilian control.”35 The militaries operate within the bounds of the law, So what is the rub? The common reaction to and the laws have been strengthened to clarify the these trends is, yes, Central American governments, prerogatives of the president and his defense minis like most Latin American governments, have tries. Still, in every case, the militaries enjoy autonomy achieved a semblance of civilian control. But, to com over institutional and defense matters civilians will plete and institutionalize the task, they must clear the not touch. Whether in a country like El Salvador, hurdle of defense wisdom, and they must fortify their which arguably has made the greatest strides toward ministries and legislative commissions by staffing civilian control, or Guatemala, which has lagged them with knowledgeable civilian defense special behind, the pattern is the same: when it comes to ists. This is where one must part ways with con defense planning, operations, budgeting, training, ventional wisdom and say, What we see is about as doctrine, or education, civilians are nowhere to be good as it is going to get. We should dispense with found. the “musts” and the “oughts” and spend more time El Salvador, where the military was once so domi trying to construct definitions and analyses that con nant, “now accepts civilian control.”34 Yet, the de form to Latin American, not North American or Eu fense ministry is totally overrun by military person ropean, realities. nel from top to bottom. The armed forces completely The requirements for civilian control, in a secu control all facets of defense planning, budgeting, rity environment where the threat of war is remote; operations, and intelligence gathering. And, legisla demands for great military prowess is low; and the tive defense commissions, lacking all expertise and material payoff to society of defense buildups is mea interest in defense, fail to monitor the military’s use ger, should be different than requirements where of resources. As soon as Salvadoran and other Cen- the threats, demands, and payoffs are great. That
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 27 is, civilian governments need ministers who can man qualms about those positions. Presidents promote age military affairs—not defense affairs. They need officers with whom they are familiar, have known specialists who can interface with the military on po via political party or familial connections, or who they litical and personal levels rather than technical ones. surmise will be loyal to them. At the least, they try There is less need to invest appreciably in defense to purge from the top ranks those they calculate experts when critical issues have less to do with war might cause them trouble. In doing so, they might preparation or defense readiness and more to do have to upset rules of seniority to find officers who with the military as a self-interested, corporate in demonstrate maximum compliance, forcing those stitution. Civilian management of military affairs must above to retire. be separated from civilian management of defense Even in Argentina, the country presumed to be affairs. Once having done so, we can construct a closer to institutionalized civilian control than any less exacting but empirically more realistic definition other, the personal dimension remains critical. Soon of civilian control. after assuming office, President Nestor Kirchner dramatically cashiered nearly half the military’s high Political Civilian Control command—officers Kirchner surmised had been too Although civilians are reluctant to deal with de close to President Carlos Menem, had disreputable fense issues, they must still manage the military. The human-rights records, or who might have interfered armed forces form the coercive arm of the state as with human-rights inquiries. First to go was General well as a self-interested corporation with needs that Ricardo Brinzoni, who had voiced political views at must be addressed. Civilian leaders have managed odds with official policy. Kirchner reached down 20 the military, largely through a form of political civil places on the army’s seniority list and chose Gen ian control, which is a low-cost means of achieving eral Roberto Bendini, someone he knew and trusted, a relative calm in civil-military affairs without invest to replace Brinzoni.36 The new retirees walked ing in extensive institution building, expertise, legis away without a fight. lative oversight, and large budgets. This has been Presidents appoint ministers adept at managing the the modus operandi for the majority of presidents military and who usually come to the job without de and defense ministers in Latin America for some fense experience or education. They are not knowl time. edgeable about defense, but they are politically adroit. Political civilian control is to be distinguished from They know how to keep the military off the front classical notions of civilian control whether or not pages of newspapers, smooth over rough edges, put they are objective, subjective (penetration model), out brush fires, calm jittery nerves, make pledges of democratic, or more recent reinventions of these support, reinterpret political messages in a positive terms. The concept has several dimensions. For ex light, and so on. This does not imply acquiescence ample, it is a means of avoiding undesirable military to military preferences; rather, it implies a willing behavior, be it intense pressure, provocation, coup ness to convey those preferences up the chain of threats, or actual coups. Certainly coup avoidance command. on its own does not solidify a hierarchical relation Skilled civilian managers of the military are those between civilian leaders and their militaries, but in a who are willing to represent military interests to the region marked historically by coups, it is an impor administration while conveying administration pref tant accomplishment in itself. erences and commands to the military in a diplo Also, political civilian control is personal. Unlike matic yet firm manner, which is especially impor Huntington’s notion of subjective civilian control, ci tant when the government’s policy priorities diverge vilian control does not mean the bulk of the military from the military’s. Governments must be able to is socialized to a civilian or political party point of make decisions that are unpopular with the military, view. Unlike penetration models practiced in com yet retain the military’s compliance. But govern munist states, the civilian control model presumes no ments are unlikely to gain the military’s cooperation effort to indoctrinate officers and the rank and file by proving their defense credentials; rather they do to a political philosophy, nor does it presume soldiers so by reminding the military that they and their ad will have fully absorbed and internalized the princi ministration are the ones who make policy; it is the pal of democratic civilian control. Rather, the con military’s firm constitutional obligation to fulfill policy cept suggests a more modest effort to ensure con in a subordinate manner. Thus, civilian authority and formity with policy, first and foremost, at higher the military’s respect for that authority do not stem echelons of the service. Selected key officers are from civilian defense knowledge. predisposed to fall in line with the preferences of Presidents and their civilian defense ministers try politicians in power. They are officials who best can to avert, hold the line against, or channel and routin sell political positions to subordinates or soothe ize military protestations, ultimately prevailing in those
28 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW LLLAAATINTINTIN AAAMERICANMERICANMERICAN DDDEFENSEEFENSEEFENSE AAAFFAIRSFFAIRSFFAIRS difficult circumstances. Fail A Chilean soldier guides ure to do so simply invites in a helicopter to pick up Peruvian troops during future protestations and runs a combined exercise. the risk of weakening the government’s sphere of in fluence, which is not to say the military never registers its displeasure. When it does, it does so privately, within of ficial channels. The military avoids taking public issue with civilians and refrains from overt provocations and threats, observing the rules of the civil-military game. By hon oring procedures, the mili tary helps solidify political civilian control, but it does US Army not forsake its right to exert influence, which might and its civilian overseers are political actors. take the form of advice and advocacy. The military is the coercive arm of the state and In the realm of spheres of influence, political ci a politically minded corporate interest group seek vilian control adheres to the maxim “live and let live.” ing benefit for itself. Its civilian overseers are politi Civilian leaders do not meddle in core military inter cal because they influence military behavior in ways ests if the military observes similar rules about the conducive to subordination and by getting the mili government’s core interests. The military’s core per tary to ascribe to behaviors they might otherwise not tains to administering its services but, more impor prefer. Simply occupying formal positions of author tant, to planning, preparing, and programming de ity is not enough; they must interface with military fense, which separates the Latin American model commanders on a weekly or daily basis, striking a from the North American one, where the secretary balance between firmness and flexibility, but they of defense and his largely civilian staff are in charge must do so inside the corridors of power. Hence, of defense policy and strategy. civil-military relations are not political as in a polemi In Latin America, questions concerning defense cal discharge of opposing views into the stream of strategy and tactics as they relate to force training, public opinion. After all, it is vital for subordinate mili structure, and deployment have been left completely tary actors to keep political opinions to themselves. to the military to decide. Meanwhile, the armed While civilians interface, they do not intervene. forces observe limits to their own influence, leaving The government stays out of the military’s defense civilians to make policies outside the realm of sphere of influence principally because of its lack defense. The military also does not have a say of knowledge and staff. In virtually all Latin Ameri about the choice of political leaders and cabinet can governments, legislatures, and defense ministries, appointees. there exists an overwhelming sense that the armed If this sounds like objective civilian control, well, forces have a near-monopoly on defense wisdom not quite. Huntington certainly maintains there and that civilians’ own defense-knowledge deficit can must be a strict division of labor between things never be adequately overcome. This deficit differ military and things civilian, but he also argues that entiates the Latin American situation from that of the military’s subordination hinges on its pro North America, where civilian defense secretaries, fessionalism. This is not the case here. Levels of especially their staff members, are well versed in professionalism might vary considerably among defense-related issues and routinely delve into mili forces that plainly adhere to political civilian con tary affairs. trol. Moreover, objective civilian control presumes, According to recent scholarship, civilian “med as a consequence of greater professionalism, dling” has not only been a historically common oc the military will become apolitical. The heart of currence in developed countries, it has been useful— political civilian control is politics; the military even essential—to the proper management of
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 29 defense and the conduct of war.37 Civilian immer to the defense table is to their credit. They are not sion in the details of defense planning (intermingling by any stretch purely military documents, although with soldiers at every level and carefully monitoring it is impossible to tell who has informed which com their actions for evidence of shirking responsibilities) ponents of the reports. Still, the documents’ super has, according to North American experts, improved ficiality is revealing, indicating just how little defense defense functioning overall, but civilian meddling in expertise there is. With all the consultation, collabo core Latin American military affairs has usually ration, and discussion, the majority of the White proven counterproductive. Without first establishing Books still amount to little more than superficial their defense credentials and credibility, civilians who reflections and sterile generalizations. Virtually have intervened in this way have bred military an nothing can be gleaned of the actual state of de tipathy rather than compliance. fense affairs in these countries. In fact, one can eas ily transpose from one country’s White Book to an White Books and Whitewash other and not fundamentally alter the intended Civilian control of the military, in the absence meaning. of defense wisdom, is certainly not an idyllic for But the White Books reveal exactly what we mula. In an ideal world, it would be vastly pref might expect from nations in a region that does not erable to have executive and congressional officials prioritize defense. Thus, remarkably little is said about who could inform and oversee military defense plan war or defense preparation, strategy, or scenarios. ning and strategizing, but Latin America is not an Some of the subjects we might have liked the White ideal world, and these improvements have not and Books to address are national objectives, threats, and will not come to pass any time soon. The region’s strategy. historical, contextual, and political landscape pre National objectives. National objectives are tied cludes such developments. Regions removed from to the use of military force. What foreign and do international geopolitical flashpoints (such as the mestic policy objectives of the nation would entail Middle East, Near East, North Asia, and South use of defense forces? Under what conditions? Asia) pose no threat to nations outside themselves; Threat. What are the principal military-related face virtually no risk of war within their areas; threats facing the nation? How probable is it these have actively avoided war and built cooperative re threats will materialize in the short, medium, or long lations via diplomatic means; cannot provide appre term? ciable material benefits to society via military spend Strategy. Once having identified threats and ing; and are not regions that have or will prioritize points of vulnerability, what are the specific strate defense. gies the nation has pursued or would pursue in re Why civilians see little payoff to earning creden sponse? How do military and other security forces tials in defense-related affairs is easy to understand. figure in those strategies, or would they? Even when countries profess interest in defense, z Strategic priorities. What are strategic priori their interest is remarkably shallow, as can be seen ties, and how would defense relate to these? What in the defense White Books of Argentina, Chile, Co is the overall defense strategy of the nation? lombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala that have z Organization, deployment, and readiness. If or been published over the last decade or so.38 These ganization, deployment, and readiness are to be used, are exercises in what I call “transparent obfusca how are the nation’s defense forces organized, tion.” Their purposes are ostensibly to make defense equipped, and deployed to respond to specific objectives, capabilities, and strategies of each nation threats? If they are not configured to be threat sen visible to others in the region and beyond. But these sitive, then on what criteria are they configured? amount to long treatises replete with generalizations z Training. How is training oriented toward equip that say little about any given state’s defense reali ping the military to confront a given threat? If there ties. The analogy would be a once boarded-up house are deficiencies, what needs to change? now being refurbished with a newly installed win z Doctrine. What is the assessment of how the dow. When we peer in, we see a poorly lit room military is oriented to fight? How should this change sparsely furnished. There is little there and what is to fit national priorities? there is of little interest. z Education. What are military schools teaching? The White Books advertise they are the product How does this relate to the nation’s strategic pri of wide consultation with an assortment of civilian orities?39 and military groups. That they have brought many The White Book whitewash is symptomatic of an
30 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW LLLAAATINTINTIN AAAMERICANMERICANMERICAN DDDEFENSEEFENSEEFENSE AAAFFAIRSFFAIRSFFAIRS ongoing problem; it is incumbent on scholars to or more of democracy without defense leadership? catch up to that reality. Our definitions and analy Why are civil-military relations almost universally ses should be less normative and more analytical. recognized to be more stable and suitable to civilian Civilian control definitions, which impose unfair stan control than they were in the past? Why do repu dards on a region not able to meet them, should be table scholars of specific countries insist military sub stripped of their most exacting requirements. If not, ordination has been achieved even as they admit in we have created a hypothesis with a null set: no state nearly the same breath that civilians have no clue in the region can qualify to help us test the proposi how to analyze or oversee defense strategizing, plan tion—if there are these conditions (x), then there is ning, budgeting, or deployment? civilian control (y). Yes, international forces are at work (economic We must come to grips with what Latin America and diplomatic sanctions for military coups or other has achieved as well as the limits to those achieve democratic interruptions, for example) that make the ments. To suggest countries of the region are at a task of subordinating the military easier than in the significant deficit and, therefore, at risk because they past, but we should not discount the political skills do not have governments that can lead on defense of presidents and their defense ministers to manage begs essential questions. Why, with one or two ex military affairs. As long as the armed forces are ceptions, have democratic governments not suc adroitly managed politically, civilian control can sur cumbed to military intervention after two decades vive without defense. MR
NOTES 1. Rut Diamint, Democracia y Seguridad en America Latina [Democracy and secu Pittsburg Press, 1998), 3-28. rity in Latin America] (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Nuevohacer, 2002), 49, 53. 27. Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers 2. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Wash (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2003). 28. Diamint, Democracia. 3. Diamint, Democracia, 41. 29. Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL) [Security and De 4. Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Com fense Network of Latin America], “Parlamento y Defensa, Comisiones Parlamentar parative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 215. ias en América Latina Abocadas en la Defensa Nacional” [Paliament and Defense, 5. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Foster, “The Second Generation Parliament Commissions in Latin America Dedicated to the National Defense], on Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & So line at
David S. Pion-Berlin is professor of political science at the University of California, Riverside. He received a B.A. from Colgate University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Denver. His most recent publication is Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005 forthcoming).
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 31 Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment
Major Norman Emery, U.S. Army; Major Jason Werchan, U.S. Air Force; and Major Donald G. Mowles, Jr., U.S. Air Force
And let there be no doubt, in the years ahead tional forces such as China or North Korea, it does it is likely that we will be surprised again by new not sufficiently consider nonstate threats such as ter- adversaries who may also strike in unexpected rorists and insurgents.2 The joint staff is currently ways.—Donald H. Rumsfeld1 updating JP 3-13 by incorporating the October 2003 revised Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy, N ISKANDARIYAH, Iraq, approximately 30 informally known as the secretary of defense’s miles south of Baghdad, a bomb exploded at a (SECDEF’s) “IO Roadmap.”3 To succeed in the policeI station, killing 50 Iraqis applying for the new new security environment, JP 3-13 must provide an police force. U.S. forces conducted operations to IO approach that better defines and shapes opera- seek out and defeat those responsible. Often, U.S. tions in the information environment (IE) to enable forces are successful in finding, engaging, captur- victories over nonstate actors in the physical envi- ing, or killing insurgents who instigate terrorist at- ronment (PE). tacks. However, this traditional attrition-based ap- proach to counterinsurgency does not adequately Current and Future address its strategy and secondary effects. Security Environments By attacking the police station, Iraqi insurgents The United States is facing a drastically different hoped to achieve their strategic objectives of influ- security environment than it faced before 11 Sep- encing Iraqi perceptions about security and safety; tember 2001. In the past, adversaries confronted the contributing to the delay or cancellation of free elec- United States with conventional armed forces tions; de-legitimizing an interim Iraqi government; and backed by the industrial capabilities of a nation-state. degrading domestic support for U.S. policy in Iraq. Today, a single nonstate actor or terrorist group can This scenario demonstrates the limitation of U.S. joint attack the Nation and create untold destruction. information operations (IO) doctrine in addressing The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) de- a new approach to warfare. Nonstate actors such fines a new security environment that includes these as terrorists and insurgents will likely be the major terrorist organizations and the nation-states and or- threat to U.S. national security and its interests for ganizations that harbor them: “[T]he United States years to come. Because these actors cannot directly and countries cooperating with us must not allow the confront the U.S. militarily, they must rely on an in- terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we formation advantage to marginalize U.S. capabilities. will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.”4 Over the past decade, various high profile terror- Terrorism took many forms after 11 September ist groups have demonstrated a sound knowledge and 2001, but the United States is primarily concerned coordinated use of information operations. Their abil- with terrorists who possess a global strike capabil- ity to successfully achieve objectives by shaping their ity and whose global reach makes them extremely battlespace in the information environment, coupled elusive and difficult to define or engage. In response with willingness to conduct nontraditional warfare, to this new security environment, SECDEF Donald make them a significant threat to the United States. H. Rumsfeld changed the military strategy in the Although the initial Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) from Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, ad- a threat-based approach to a capabilities approach dresses a traditional IO approach against conven- to better respond to the numerous threats the United
32 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW IIINFORMANFORMANFORMATIONTIONTION OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
States faces.5 By adopting this approach, defense while protecting our own.”9 The “IO Roadmap” planners can concentrate on how a potential enemy groups IO elements in the following categories: might engage the United States rather than concern- z Core capabilities (EW, CNO, OPSEC, military ing themselves with who that enemy is or where deception, PSYOP). he will attack. z Support capabilities (information assurance, physical security, counterintelligence, physical attack). Joint IO Doctrine z Related capabilities (public affairs, civil-military Numerous documents provide direction of over- operations).10 all joint IO strategy, including JP 3-13, Joint Vision Although current and draft IO doctrine encom- (JV) 2010, JV 2020, and the recently published “IO passes many aspects of warfare, the ability to deal Roadmap.”6 Joint Publication 3-13 provides doctri- with the new security environment still needs scru- nal guidance for joint forces information operations. tiny. The new definition focuses offensive informa- The 1996 JV 2010 defines information operations tion operations against the adversarial decisionmaker, as “[a]ctions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while US Army defending one’s own infor- mation and information sys- tems.” Joint Vision 2010 sets forth “a vision for how the United States military will operate in the uncertain fu- ture” and achieves the ulti- mate goal of full-spectrum dominance.7 Information superiority is a key element of full-spectrum dominance. Joint Vision 2010, which states that in- Iraqi police search for clues after detonation of a car bomb formation superiority will near Baghdad’s Al-Rasheed mitigate the effect of the Hotel, 4 December 2004. friction and fog of war, ad- vocates ensuring an uninterrupted flow of informa- ignoring that there are many valuable targets in the tion and nontraditional actions. Joint Vision 2020 information environment that are not critical adds: “The combined development of proliferation decisionmakers. The 1998 definition of information of information technologies will substantially change operations was so broad that it was everything and the conduct of military operations. These changes yet nothing.11 The new draft definition limits itself in the information environment make information su- in applying information operations to the listed core periority a key enabler of the transformation of the capabilities. operational capabilities of the joint force and the evo- Joint Publication 3-13 poorly defines and applies lution of joint command and control.”8 the concept of information superiority as it would The “IO Roadmap” provides strategic-level IO apply to a nonstate actor. Information superiority is guidance for the current security environment de- an imbalance in one’s favor in the information do- fined in the latest QDR and NSS. The draft update main with respect to an adversary. The power of of JP 3-13 incorporates the “IO Roadmap” and a superiority in the information domain mandates the new DOD IO definition: “The integrated employ- United States achieve it as a first priority, even be- ment of the specified core capabilities of Electronic fore hostilities begin. However, superior technology Warfare [EW], Computer Network Operations and equipment fuels hubris to have information su- (CNO), PSYOP [psychological operations], Military periority over inferior adversaries. Deception, and Operations Security [OPSEC], in A nonstate actor can decisively possess informa- concert with specified supporting and related capa- tion superiority and an information advantage be- bilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp cause he can remain unseen in his own environment, adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, yet see U.S. forces, and choose when to attack.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 33 U.S. information superiority can be finite and fleet- which military operations are planned and executed ing; its forces must recognize this and take direct or recognize that success depends on U.S. forces and indirect action to reduce the adversary’s infor- gaining and maintaining information superiority.17 mation advantage and operational efficiency. Infor- However, previous IO doctrine and U.S. operations mation superiority in the new security environment have traditionally sought to achieve finite victory in must include denying information helpful to a the PE battlespace and ignore the concurrent residual nonstate actor by reducing OPSEC violations and effects in the IE battlespace. information the population can provide. Current and draft joint IO doctrine fails to ad- equately explain and emphasize the information en- Physical Environment vironment and the art of its application against U.S. vvv. Information Environment adversaries. The key to preparedness against cur- Nothing is more important when conceptualizing rent and potential security threats, such as nonstate joint IO doctrine in the new security environment actors, lies in the art of information operations, not than understanding the relationship between the just the science. The science of information opera- physical environment and the information environ- tions can be the application of systems and capa- ment and how the United States should approach bilities to support the goal of affecting adversary information operations in these areas against a decisionmaking at a specific moment in time and nonstate actor. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for space, while the “art focuses on the fundamental Joint Operations, defines the physical environment methods and issues associated with synchronization by the dimensions of land, sea, air, and space.12 Hu- of military effort” in the information environment.18 mans live, breathe, and walk in the physical environ- Draft JP 3-13 says: “Operational art is the use of ment, and they see, hear, and touch objects that are military forces to achieve a strategic goal through real.13 Leaders generally conceive and measure gains the design, organization, integration, and conduct of and losses in the physical environment by the metrics strategies, campaigns, major operations, and of terrain, equipment, forces, and engagements. battles.”19 To fight a nonstate actor whose opera- According to the draft JP 3-13, the information tional actions are planned to achieve strategic goals, environment consists of information that resides in the United States must operate similarly. U.S. plan- the mind, physical world, and electromagnetic spec- ners must apply all facets of operational art in the trum.14 Boundaries are “not limited to the linear information environment and the physical environ- battlespace that military commanders conceptualize, ment. There is more to information operations than [and] activities in the information environment often just affecting adversary decisionmaking as proposed shape a commander’s understanding of the battle in the draft definition; coordinated military actions and can profoundly affect his decisions in the physi- must affect the information environment as a whole. cal environment.”15 For example, forces providing Although draft JP 3-13 establishes the IE’s con- security to a population is an act in the physical en- ceptual context and military operations related to it, vironment, but the population’s perception of secu- it does not address the need to shape that environ- rity is in the information environment. Military lead- ment because of friendly or adversary actions in the ers and planners must understand that the PE and physical environment. The United States enjoys a IE domains exist in simultaneous yet separate force advantage over most of its adversaries and, battlespaces. Nonstate actors operate mainly in the therefore, seeks objectives and victories in the physi- information environment to leverage their advantage, cal environment using actions in the information en- and states tend to operate in the physical environ- vironment as an enabler. ment to achieve their goals. The United States must In contrast, terrorists and insurgents, who lack adapt its approach to conflict to maximize its results military parity, seek to achieve their ultimate objec- while diminishing the adversary’s. tives by being successful in the information environ- Another key IE and PE characteristic is that ment. They cannot successfully engage a superior “wherever human activity occurs physically, such force in the physical environment, so they conduct activity [also] takes place simultaneously in the in- selected acts in the physical environment (bombings formation dimension.”16 This is important in recog- and small-scale attacks, for example) to shape the nizing those residual effects from actions taken in information environment (that is, perceptions). These the physical environment that will shape the infor- acts can help achieve objectives in the information mation environment. Draft JP 3-13 fails to address environment and, ultimately, in the physical environ- factors that shape the information environment in ment. Therefore, a nonstate actor might choose to
34 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW IIINFORMANFORMANFORMATIONTIONTION OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
Terrorist organization conducts attack to gain publicity
Media is Terrorist Complete control: Target of attracted organization High percentage of attack to terrorist influence success violence
3d-order Measure 1st-order effect of success Direct message so effect media shapes properly Cannot control z Target of influence how event will z State be reported z State constituents FREE MEDIA z Would-be supporters Conduit to (international domes- mass audience tic group members) 2d-order effect
Figure 1. McCormick Influence Process Model. avoid a decisive fight with U.S. forces, selecting in- How TTHow errorists and stead a more advantageous time and location for engagements. Nonstate actors will avoid direct con- Insurgents Pursue Victory frontation in a state’s PE battlespace, but a state ac- Terrorists and insurgents adopt a much different tor can defeat them by reshaping their information approach to achieving victory through the use of a environment. complex IO strategy. They develop the IE battlespace because of the benefits gained from its How to Pursue Victory residual effects. In The Terrorist Approach to In- Current doctrine directs U.S. forces to achieve a formation Operations, Norman Emery and Rob decisive victory in the physical environment while Earl say: “Terrorists act in the physical environment using the information environment to support “ob- not to make tactical gains in the physical environ- jectives and reduce costs of war.”20 Although U.S. ment, but to wage strategic battle in the information information operations might often affect the environment; therefore the physical environment en- adversary’s perception or will to fight, the United ables many of the activities in the information envi- States normally relies on victory in the physical en- ronment to occur.”22 vironment to win the battle, which is a typical strat- Figure 1 shows the model nearly all terrorists fol- egy of a military with a force advantage over the low to achieve objectives by indirectly influencing a majority of its adversaries.21 decisionmaker.23 The process applies to select in- Joint doctrine supports this by orienting on affect- surgencies. The model’s four steps and three orders ing adversary decisionmaking to influence decisions of effects begin with a bombing or attack in the in the United States’s favor and to prevent the ad- physical environment that the media or members of versary from influencing U.S. forces. While this ap- a population report. The interpretations can shape proach is adequate for a conventional adversary perceptions of a populace or government in the in- such as North Korea, it is inadequate for nonstate formation environment. Terrorists then determine fol- threats such as insurgents and terrorists. The United low-on actions in the physical environment depend- States might understand how to strategically shape ing on the measure of success in the information the information environment, but at the operational environment. Perceptions once developed can en- level it often relies on its superior military might or dure for days, months, or decades and are difficult its force advantage to achieve victory in the physi- to change. cal environment, neglecting the efficient, effective The model demonstrates that a specific act in the use of the information environment. physical environment produces residual effects and
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 35 offers an approach for U.S. forces to interdict the The Art of Information Operations adversary’s information environment to reduce or re- Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the U.S. military’s cur- verse the effectiveness of PE actions. Therefore, rent approach to state and nonstate conflict, which any operation to eliminate nonstate actors and their works when engaging a similarly structured adver- influence must also employ forces operationally to sary such as North Korea or Iraq in linear conven- counter the potential strategic effect and results of tional warfare. Figure 2 shows conventional-force previous nonstate operations. Having effective actions in the information environment, such as counteroperations to current and previous acts in the PSYOP campaigns, EW, deception, and OPSEC information environment, not just attrition warfare in measures supported by media messages and civil- the physical environment, is important. Shaping the military operations to achieve victory in the physi- cal environment. The problem with the approach Information Environment (IE) in figure 2 is it does not work against such nonstate actors as in- surgents or terrorists, who operate IE IE by design in a different battlespace. supports supports Figure 3 concerns the Iraqi police action Victory action in PE in PE in PE station bombing vignette and shows how state and nonstate forces can U.S. Iraq operate in different battlespaces with the nonstate force gaining the Baghdad long-term advantage. U.S. forces conduct operations in the physical environment to de- Physical Environment (PE) feat or deter Iraqi insurgents re- Figure 2. Application of information operations in conventional conflict. sponsible for a series of bombings; however, that is only a portion of information environment is not merely denying in- the insurgent’s battlespace because they shaped the formation to adversary decisionmakers; it is deny- information environment with residual effects from ing them results from their actions. previous attacks. The attacks on Iraqi supporters of The big difference between what current U.S. U.S. programs perpetuate insecurity in the fearful doctrine is and should be is in its approach to con- population, a perception which does not dissipate with flict. As long as U.S. forces are denying a state foe a few U.S. force victories against insurgents. The his ability to make a decision, they are shaping his perception reaches audiences in the information en- information environment. The United States might vironment, which ultimately supports insurgents’ stra- not be able to affect a nonstate foe’s ability to make tegic objective in the physical environment, such as a decision if he maintains an in- formation advantage, but it can affect his results in the information environment, his chosen battle- IE Unsafe perceptions Insurgents space. As long as the United States lead to conceptualizes all victories in the fearful IO population physical environment through de- supports cisive engagement rather than IE strategic PE more lengthy action in the infor- supports objectives supports action action mation environment, it might not in PE Insurgents in IE succeed as quickly. If the United UN abandons States adjusts its approach to holding elections; Bombing U.S. withdraws nonstate conflict, it can beat insur- U.S. of U.S. gents and terrorists at their own supporters PE Iraqi in Iraq game in their own battlespace, insurgents which requires a new approach to modern conflict. Figure 3. Strategy for nonstate conflict.
36 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW IIINFORMANFORMANFORMATIONTIONTION OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS forcing the UN to cancel elections or the United information superiority or the ability to directly in- States to withdraw prematurely. fluence adversarial decisionmakers to shape the in- To win, the United States must realize and em- formation environment. To achieve information su- ploy the art as well as the science of information periority, IO doctrine should address actions in the operations. The United States must also understand information environment to enhance U.S. objectives that when its forces react negatively and kick down against nonstate actors who rely on the information doors in night raids, they are helping the enemy environment as their primary battlespace. improve his own information environment. Their We also recommend emphasizing the art of in- actions will annoy and alienate citizens who might formation operations as one of the core concepts of no longer cooperate or who might begin actively offensive information operations. The joint commu- supporting the insurgents. A silent population is de nity has a prime opportunity to shape a new approach facto support to insurgents, who maintain or increase to warfare by addressing actions and effects in the their information advantage in the information envi- information environment, not just in the physical en- ronment. vironment, to enhance effects against nonstate ac- The effect insurgents have on the information en- tors who rely on the information environment as their vironment is comparable to the ripples that dropping primary battlespace. a large stone into a lake causes. Long after the stone Last, we recommend IO doctrine change its ap- has hit the bottom, the residual effects expand in all proach to nonstate threats by conducting find, fix, directions, are difficult to stop, and ultimately crash and finish actions in the physical environment while into the banks of the lake. Current U.S. counterin- shaping residual effects from previous actions in the surgency strategy focuses on the splash of the stone information environment. An adversary’s residual ef- (the PE), and not enough on stopping the ripples (the fects might persist from previous actions in the in- IE) before they reach the bank—the enemy’s stra- formation environment following some act in the tegic PE objective. physical environment. To counter this, U.S. IO doc- trine should adopt a simultaneous two-pronged ap- Recommendations proach against nonstate threats through physical at- Revisers of the next draft of JP 3-13 should con- tacks as well as through disrupting and minimizing sider the recommendations in the following para- their current and previous influence in the informa- graphs to improve the U.S. military’s ability to tion environment (figure 4). counter nonstate threats. Draft JP 3-13 briefly addresses principles that The doctrinal definition of IO needs to be modi- would support the two-pronged approach but insuf- fied to better reflect operations in the information ficiently emphasize it as a core concept and says environment. The proposed IO definition in the draft the focus of offensive information operations is to JP 3-13 limits what we can accomplish by limiting directly affect information to indirectly affect what capabilities we can use. Information operations decisionmakers “by taking specific psychological, are the effects sought, not just tools to get these ef- electronic, or physical actions to add, modify, or fects. The new definition should emphasize using all remove information itself from the environment of available capabilities in full-spectrum operations to various individuals or groups of decisionmakers.”24 affect the information environment instead of focus- The simultaneous approach reduces nonstate actors’ ing solely on the adversary’s decisionmaking capability in the IE PE and IE disrupt physical environment. The IO defi- action in IE nition we recommend is: “The U.S. timely employment of specified Unsafe capabilities to influence, disrupt, cor- perceptions IO lead to fearful Insurgents rupt, or usurp the adversarial infor- IE supports population mation environment and decision- supports strategic making while protecting our own.” action objectives in PE The next recommendation is to Insurgents PE emphasize information operations supports UN abandons action to influence and obtain information holding elections; in IE superiority. The United States must U.S. withdraws break the mindset that information U.S. superiority is an inherent part of Iraqi Bombing of U.S. supporters in Iraq combat superiority. The most pow- PE insurgents erful force might not always have Figure 4. Proposed strategy for nonstate conflict.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 37 operational effectiveness and support, causing them while shaping residual effects in the information en- to either decrease operations or take greater risks vironment from current and past adversary and in their activity, thereby increasing their exposure to friendly actions in the physical environment. defeat in the physical environment. Shaping the information environment requires a new way of thinking and a new staff approach to Succeeding in the warfare, with planners and leaders conceptualizing Security Environment nonstate conflict differently than traditional conflict. Current published or draft joint IO doctrine insuf- The military should not continue to inadequately ad- ficiently addresses nonstate conflicts the United dress an important dynamic in current and future States now faces. To succeed in the new security warfare. Planners must not get caught up in seeking environment, the new JP 3-13 must better define IO- immediate effects while ignoring the value of gain- and IE-shaping operations to enable ultimate victo- ing effects in the information environment, because ries in the physical environment. Military leaders and the results there are slow in coming and difficult to planners must understand that while PE and IE do- quantify. Military operations do not always produce mains coexist, they are separate battlespaces. tangible, visible, or immediate effects. By shaping the Nonstate actors operate mainly in the information information environment, military forces can affect environment to leverage their advantages, while the the enemy decisionmaker by influencing his environ- United States often chooses to leverage its force ment without changing his perception or decision. advantage in the physical environment. This battle of ideas requires more bytes than bul- Fighting nonstate actors such as terrorists and in- lets. The military can achieve this by using the sci- surgents requires an understanding of the residual ence of information operations to focus on effects of gains and losses in the information envi- decisionmaking in the physical environment and us- ronment based on actions in the physical environ- ing the art of information operations to shape the in- ment. The benefit of the residual effects in the in- formation environment; this synchronization achieves formation environment from actions in the physical the victory in the physical environment and counters environment are far greater than the physical result results in the information environment from current from the act (that is, deaths from a bombing). To and previous actions in the physical environment. As combat these residual effects, the United States long as U.S. information operations orient solely on should seek to shape the information environment the PE victory, the U.S. cannot successfully engage in its favor by conducting simultaneous operations and defeat the wide range of threats in the ever- to find, fix, and finish in the physical environment changing security environment. MR
NOTES 1. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Joint Operations Concepts (Wash- (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002). ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], November 2003). 12. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001). 2. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Infor- 13. Rob Earl and Norman Emery, Terrorist Approach to Information Operations mation Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998). (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2003). 3. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy (“IO Roadmap”), Washington, D.C., 14. JP 3-13 (draft), I-2. October 2003. 15. Earl and Emery, 19. 4. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, 16. JP 3-13 (draft), I-2. DC: GPO, 2002). 17. Ibid., I-4, I-5. 5. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 September 2001). 18. Ibid., I-10. 6. JP 3-13; JCS, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996); Joint Vision 2020 19. Ibid. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), 28; “IO Roadmap.” 20. Earl and Emery, 44. 7. JV 2010. 21. Janos Radvanyi, ed., Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term 8. JV 2020, 3. Planning (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 121. 9. JP 3-13 (draft), I-6. 22. Earl and Emery, 44. 10. “IO Roadmap.” 23. Ibid., 11-12. 11. Edwin Armistead, ed., Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power 24. JP 3-13 (draft), I-9.
Major Norman Emery, U.S. Army, is a Functional Area 30 information operations planner assigned to Multinational Forces-Iraq. He received a B.A. from Illinois State University, an M.S. from the Na- val Postgraduate School, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Joint Forces Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the 3d Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, and Special Operations Command. His article “Information Operations in Iraq” appeared in the May- June 2004 issue of Military Review. He can be contacted at [email protected]. Major Jason Werchan, U.S. Air Force, is an instructor with the Air Force Element at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M, an M.A. from Oklahoma Univer- sity, and is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College. Major Donald G. Mowles, Jr., U.S. Air Force, is the Chief, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Strike Team, Combat Plans Division, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. He received a B.S. from Arkansas State University, an M.S. from Central Michigan University, and is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College.
38 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch
Major George C.L. Brown, U.S. Army
Do not say, “Why were the old days better than Roadmap” also states: “IO specialists should pos- these?” For it is not wise to ask such questions. sess specialized expertise on a certain IO core ca- —Ecclesiastes 7:101 pability, but gain experience in [planning and execut- ing] the broader construct of IO.”6 O BUILD the correct blend of capabilities necessary to conduct the Global War on Ter- Courses of Action rorismT (GWOT) during the information age, the To achieve the joint “IO Roadmap’s” objectives, Army should create an information warfare (IW) I propose two courses of action (COAs) for DOD branch. Current information operations (IO) train- and the Army. Currently, FA30 resides within the IO ing and force composition are inadequate to meet support career field, while key elements like FA39 the GWOT challenge. (PSYOP) reside in the operations career field. Core Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and pillars such as deception and CNO do not exist in Plans, General Richard A. Cody, recently released an associated branch or functional area other than “The Army IO Intent” to provide guidance for the introductory training in the Army IO course. Cur- Army IO campaign plan and to amplify and supple- rently, EW officers (EWOs) are in FA35G (Signal ment IO capabilities.2 Cody advocated creating “a Intelligence [SIGINT]/EW) within the military intel- proponency capable of integrating with joint and ligence (MI) branch, also in the operations career Army IO and resourced for ‘branch-like’ advo- field. Few are available to serve as EWOs in divi- cacy.”3 Cody’s use of the phrase “branch-like ad- sion and corps IO cells because of their duties as vocacy” reveals high-level Army leaders realize the SIGINT officers. need for an IO or IW branch. What qualities should Delays in initiating the Army’s 4-week IO train- fully trained IW branch officers have, and what ing program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and in- knowledge and understanding should they possess? sufficient personnel available in the training pipeline During the Army 2003 World Wide PSYOP [psy- compound the difficulties in producing trained IO of- chological operations] Conference, senior leaders ficers. Many officers are thus forced into on-the- discussed the future combined education path and job (OJT) training. Can we really expect IO offic- the need for merging IO-related functional areas ers with only 4 weeks of IO training to fully (FAs). In a paper titled “Merging IO, PSYOP, and understand the complexities of 12 IO elements and FAO [foreign area officer], Concept for the New 2 related activities and successfully employ the 5 Foreign Officer,” Major Fredric W. Rohm, Jr., pro- core IO pillars? posed such a merger.4 The current FA30 (IO) pro- Recognizing this inability, commanders have of- gram attracts officers from across the basic ten drafted officers from the most closely related branches; however, most have little experience in specialties to carry the brunt of the IO burden. Public core IO elements such as PSYOP, computer net- affairs (PA), PSYOP, or civil affairs (CA) officers work operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), often serve as IO officers, even when an untrained military deception, and operational security (OPSEC). IO warrior is on station. Emphasizing this fact, Cody The Department of Defense (DOD) “IO Roadmap” suggests the need for “specific marketing and recommends developing “IO specialists who would international media skills to familiarize IO staff be functional experts in one or more of the highly officers on how civilian entities plan, prepare, ex- specialized core capabilities. . . .”5 The “IO ecute, and influence activities. Furthermore . . . , IO
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 39 their basic combat arms, combat support, or com- bat service support branches. Instead, future IO of- US Army ficers would first be trained and serve as captains and majors in one of the IO-related functional ar- eas, such as PSYOP (FA39B), PA (FA46), CA (FA39C), FAO (FA48), strategic intelligence (FA34), or information systems engineer (FA24). These IO- related functional areas would coexist with IO FA30, but only lieutenant colonels and colonels from these functional areas would become FA30 IO officers. This would ensure a level of understanding and ex- pertise in one of the supporting IO-related fields. PSYOP personnel mingle Even so, some might say this COA is only another among a crowd of Iraqis form of OJT instead of a solution to the Army’s IO while handing out leaflets, An Najaf, Iraq, April 2003. education and experience problem. (See figure 1.) Creating an IW branch. A bolder COA would officers should have cross-cultural communications be to immediately create an IW branch by merging and awareness.”7 These are the traits and charac- the IO (FA30) and PSYOP (FA39B) career fields, teristics that comprise the backgrounds of current drawing personnel from the strategic intelligence PA, PSYOP, and CA officers, and FAOs. (FA34), information systems engineer (FA24), and The IO community loses credibility by not having SIGINT/EW (35G) career fields. CNO, deception, trained IO warriors. Because of this deficiency, and EW core IO subspecialties and training would PAOs and PSYOP or CA officers often perform be created within FA30 specialties. IO duties instead of their primary duties, resulting in A future structure could be comparable to the MI mediocre performance in those areas as well be- branch where several intelligence-related specialties cause they must split their focus. I recommend two exist under one umbrella, although the expertise COAs to correct the problem: within each subspecialty (such as human intelligence 1. Create a system that feeds related functional [HUMINT] or SIGINT) is drastically different. Or, areas into FA30. a future IW branch might be compared to the Spe- 2. Create an IW branch. cial Forces (SF) Branch, which contains various spe- FA feeder system. Using officers from IO- cialties, such as weapons, communications, medical, related FA specialties as IO officers is the norm. and engineer specialists, but only in the noncommis- Commanders fill the void caused by the lack of sioned officer (NCO) realm under one branch. The trained IO planners with officers from related spe- officer composition of the IW branch would be simi- cialties. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior lar to SF or MI branches, composed of IO (30A), PSYOP officers were primary IO planners for the PSYOP (30B), EW (30C, CNO (30D), deception Central Command IO staff, the Third Army/Com- (30E), and strategic intelligence (formerly FA34) as bined Force Land Compo- nent Command, the V IO Corps IO staff, and the Joint All FA30 assessed Special Operations Task from FA, not basic FA30 branches, with the Force-North. In all these FA 39B 35G exception of 35G commands, PSYOP offic- (SIGNIT/EW). All existing FAs ers served quite capably as PSYOP SIGINT/EW coexist. IO planners during the first FA39C FA24 Only personnel 8 from IO-related three phases of combat. FA48 FA34 FA assessed CA Info Sys into FA30. Based on this, the Army Engineer should establish a formal FAO Strat Intel system that identifies, tracks, and feeds FA30 with indi- Basic branches viduals from IO-related spe- must first serve in a Basic Branches related FA before cialties to produce well- entering FA30. rounded IO officers. CA – civil affairs FAO – foreign area officer SIGINT – signals intelligence Officers who want to en- EW – electronic warfare INTEL – intelligence STRAT – strategic ter the IO field would no FA – functional area IO – information operations SYS – system longer do so directly from Figure 1. Functional Area 30 feeder system of IO-related disciplines.
40 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW IIINFORMANFORMANFORMATIONTIONTION OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
FA30F, with an officer and NCO corps composi- and targeting.”9 According to Meyers: “Improvement tion for each IW subspecialty. Officers would only will require not only technological solutions, but also enter the IW branch after they completed captain cultural change—a williness to challenge standard basic-branch qualification. practices, and question current organizational patterns All FA30-series branch officers would be 30B, and command practices.”10 30C, 30D, 30E, or 30F before being designated as The new IW branch would break down barriers 30A information operations, the overall synchroniz- of communication by doing away with traditional bu- ers and coordinators of information operations. Only reaucratic FA stovepipes. The new, close associa- lieutenant colonels and colonels would become 30A tion of key IO-related core components within one officers to ensure the officers would have had time branch would increase understanding and enable in- to complete their joint professional military educa- novative approaches to targeting enemy forces, tion and can fully comprehend the complexities of decisionmakers, and key systems or networks. joint operations and interagency coordination. Offic- Although many might oppose these ideas, DOD ers could continue their careers in one of the vari- and the Army must determine what is best for na- ous IO specialties or cross train in an additional core tional security, not what is best for maintaining indi- IO subspecialty within the IW branch. Many offic- vidual branch or FA fiefdoms. The major source of ers could then become 30As on promotion to lieu- opposition to these proposals will most likely come tenant colonel. from within the special operations or PSYOP com- Although not part of the IW branch, FAOs and munities on the grounds the merger of functional ar- CA and PA officers would be offered the chance eas would cause a dilution of the PSYOP message; to transfer to 30A and cross train in one of the IO that PSYOP units or task forces would no longer subspecialties after becoming lieutenant colonels. exist; or that PSYOP might be removed from the (See figure 2.) special operations community. The opposite is more likely. Synchronization and Advantages of a Merger coordination will improve when core IO pillars re- Creating an IW branch containing PSYOP, EW, side within the same branch. The merger would also CNO, and deception would increase the ability to improve PSYOP dissemination by providing direct conduct effects-based operations (EBO), which access to CNO and EW means and planning ex- former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen- pertise to ultimately facilitate precision-influence tar- eral Richard B. Meyers says is “a way of thinking geting of key decisionmakers. PSYOP units would about and solving military problems [that] incorpo- not cease to exist, but could actually be structured rates effects-based thinking, processes, operations, to more fully support full-spectrum information op- erations. Joint PSYOP task forces IW Branch and PSYOP units could be manned All 30-series branch officers are with PSYOP, IO, EW, CNO, and 30A IO Officer assessed at the captain level after deception officers to enable a more branch qualification, minus 30A holistic approach to PSYOP sup- officers. port to IO. Because the PSYOP FA39B 30B PSYOP Officer All 30A officers must be 30B, 30C, community is already well estab- lished, the merger might also result 35G 30C EW Officer or 30D before being 30A. CNO and deception core IO in many officers, primarily with FA24 30D CNO Officer subspecialties created within the 30 PSYOP backgrounds, assuming branch. mantles of leadership within the Basic Deception new IW branch. Branches 30E Officer An officer might remain in branch specialties (30B, 30C, 30D, or The merger would not affect FA34 30F Strategic become 30A). strategic intelligence because it Intelligence would have the same function Officers might cross train in two or as FA30F, drawing this intelli- more core IO subspecialties within IW Branch. gence field close to support IO CA needs. The information systems FA48, PA and CA officers, and FAOs engineer functional area would 30A IO officers might become 30A officers at the FAO at LTC rank continue to coexist separately, but lieutenant colonel level, but remain many of its personnel would be- separate and distinct. PAO come FA30Ds to jumpstart a viable Army CNO capability. Officers Figure 2. Proposed Army information warfare (IW) branch. currently in Army CNO billets
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 41 An Iraqi responsible for choosing families in need of food in Baghdad’s Al Thawra district speaks with a 1st Cavalry Division IO officer, December 2004. US Army
should be permanently transferred to FA30D (CNO) understanding is paramount. The “Army IO Intent” regardless of their basic branch. The MI branch outlines the need for IO officers who understand would benefit from the merger, with its officers fo- “human factors and [possess] cultural awareness at cused solely on SIGINT, while officers with an EW the tactical level.”11 Within the PSYOP, CA, and focus would be part of the IW branch as FA30Cs FAO fields, officers are regionally oriented and to provide much needed EW planners. trained with foreign-language training especially es- Public affairs, CA, or FAO functional areas sential for FAOs and PSYOP and CA officers. To should not oppose the plan because these functional truly understand a region and its culture and to in- areas would continue to coexist as separate, distinct fluence foreign audiences, proficiency in the target’s specialties. Such a separation would ensure PA, CA, native language is essential. Understanding inter- and FAOs’ efforts were not tainted by the stigma agency processes is also essential. Information war- an IW branch insignia might carry with foreign au- fare officers must be able to think, plan, and com- diences. However, because of their close relation- municate at the operational and strategic levels. Any ship to information operations, many PAOs and CA future IO training path should include the opportu- and FA officers should be offered transfers to the nity for attaining advanced degrees in related disci- new IW branch as lieutenant colonels. plines. Information operations are inherently joint and are Professional Education planned, coordinated, and approved at the strategic What type of knowledge and understanding level. The “Army’s IO Intent” states training and should a fully trained IW branch officer possess? education for IO officers must ensure officers are Producing a fully trained PSYOP or CA officer or “capable of integrating (plan, prepare, execute, and an FAO requires 18 to 24 months. An IO officer assess) and executing to achieve desired effects must understand not just one, but five, core capa- [and understand] joint, interagency, and multinational bilities and two related activities and be able to ap- interdepend[ence].”12 The Army must train IW ply these in a particular region. branch officers in joint planning and operations, EBO, The Army cannot conduct successful information and interagency roles and capabilities. To be truly operations without planners who are regionally ori- effective contributors to the IO process, they must ented and culturally attuned. Regional focus and become joint-qualified.
42 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW IIINFORMANFORMANFORMATIONTIONTION OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
The Army should carefully examine the current fields should feed future WO and NCO IO MOSs training path for FA30 IO officers. If it takes from and ease of transfer should be the norm. 18 months to 2 years to produce a fully trained PSYOP officer or FAO, can we train an IO officer TTThe FutureFuturehe We are in a period of Army Transformation and in 4 weeks? Information warfare branch training development of IO as part of warfare not unlike that should include a 24-month program to create region- of the transition from the horse cavalry to armor. ally oriented, culturally attuned IW officers who un- However, America’s enemies will not wait for us derstand joint and interagency processes. Training to ponder, train, reorganize, and act. The American should consist of the following: people face a real psychological threat, as demon- z Information operations specialty training strated by the al-Qaeda terrorist attack on 11 Sep- (PSYOP, EW, CNO, or deception), including from tember 2001; the current carnage in the streets of 1 to 3 months of training focused on one of the core Iraq; and the Web-based propaganda insurgents and IO elements. After initial qualification and utilization, terrorists employ. The enemy’s message is present each 30-series officer would be trained in depth in daily on the Internet and other media. We have no an additional core specialty. choice but to produce a force trained in the art of z OPSEC training. All 30-series officers would influence, operating and serving from the tactical to receive one week of OPSEC planning, but it would strategic levels. Army IW officers must fully under- not be a separate branch-specialty area. stand the pillars of information operations; be able z Regional orientation. Officers would receive to integrate them into joint planning processes; be from 4 to 5 months of focused regional orientation regionally oriented and culturally attuned; and be able and cross-cultural training on a primary region and to interact and coordinate with government agencies. an overview of Europe, Africa, Asia, Middle East, In “The Way Ahead: Our Army at War— or South and Central America. Relevant and Ready,” Chief of Staff of the Army z Interagency orientation. Officers would have a General Peter J. Schoomaker says: “Transformation 1-month assignment in Washington, D.C., with a pri- during a time of sustained campaigning will not mary focus on agencies such as the Joint Staff’s be easy; but it is a practice that appears many Deputy Director for Global Operations and key de- times in the history of our great Army. We must ex- partments and agencies like DOD, National Secu- amine, design, and develop new solutions for a new rity Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the and dangerous world, as we have done so success- CIA, with temporary duty as interns in these depart- fully in our past.”13 The Global War on Terrorism ments or agencies. makes the creation of an Army IW branch an ur- z Language training (mandatory for PSYOP of- gent necessity. MR ficers). Officers should receive from 4 to 6 months training at the Defense Language Institute focused NOTES on a language from the officer’s target region. 1. The Bible, New International Version, on-line at
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 43 TTThe RRhe oad totooad AbAbAbu GhrGhru aib:aib:aib: UUU.S.S.S... ArArArmmmyyy DetaineeDetaineeDetainee DoctDoctDoctrrrineineine andandand ExpeExpeExperrrienceienceience
Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army, Retired
HE NAKED, STARK images from Abu Article 4 defines who is entitled to prisoner-of-war Ghraib prison fade from the news only to be (POW) status under the convention and who, Tdisplayed again as the next U.S. soldier is called for- thereby, is afforded additional protections. Article 4 ward to answer formal charges for what happened includes a four-part test that applies to members of there. Meanwhile, the Army is ensuring it will not militias and volunteer corps: happen again—there, or anywhere else. Part of the 1. They must be commanded by a responsible repair process is determining the path that led to the person. situation at Abu Ghraib prison. 2. They must have a fixed sign visible at a dis- tance. Geneva Conventions 3. They must carry arms openly. In an effort to address shortcomings in the inter- 4. They must conduct operations in accordance national law of land warfare exposed by the rav- with the laws and customs of war. ages of World War II, the International Committee Article 5 mandates that a tribunal determine the of the Red Cross (ICRC) submitted four Geneva status of a detainee when a status question arises. Conventions for delegates’ approval on 12 August Part II, “General Protection of Prisoners of War,” 1949. These conventions are titled and abbreviated consists of five articles (12 through 16) that list spe- as follows: cific protections and rights accorded to qualifying 1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the persons who are POWs under article 4. Article 12 Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces stipulates that a capturing power can transfer cus- in the Field (GWS). tody of POWs to another power only if the receiv- 2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the ing power also observes the Geneva Conventions. Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem- Transfer of custody does not transfer responsibility. bers of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS Sea). Part III, “Captivity” (articles 17 through 108), 3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment regulates every aspect of the treatment of POWs of Prisoners of War (GPW). during captivity. Soldiers often quote the portion of 4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection article 17 that requires them to give only name, rank, of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC).1 and serial number when questioned. Another por- The third convention, GPW, consists of 143 ar- tion of that same article prohibits the use of physi- ticles divided topically into six parts. Part I, “Gen- cal or mental torture or coercion against any detainee eral Provisions,” contains 11 articles. Articles 3, 4, who refuses to give more than the required infor- and 5, bear special mention. Article 3 establishes a mation. basic standard of treatment rendered to persons no Part IV, “Termination of Captivity” (articles 109 longer actively participating in hostilities because of through 117), directs the repatriation of seriously sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause dur- wounded and sick prisoners during hostilities; the re- ing armed conflict not of an international character. lease and repatriation of prisoners at the conclusion At the convention’s signing, article 3 was viewed as of hostilities; and the disposition of remains of pris- an attempt to offer a basic minimum standard of pro- oners who die while in captivity. tection to those fighting in civil wars and insurrec- Part V, “Information Bureau and Relief Societies tions. for Prisoners of War” (articles 118 through 125),
44 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS helps the parties of a conflict establish offices and agencies for tracking POWs and authorizes the ICRC to set up an inter- national clearing house to receive and pass such information. Part VI, “Execution of the Convention” (articles 126 through 143), pro- vides tools for imple- menting the convention and also for denouncing it if a party wishes to do so. Although the United States was one of 54 nations that had signed North Korean EPWs who all four of the Geneva asked not be returned to Conventions by Decem- communist control, 1952. ber 1949, the U.S. Sen- War in Korea ate did not ratify them until 2 February 1956. rice, fish, and other staples of Asian cuisine. Pris- Korean War, 1950-1953. On 23 July 1950, a oners had access to a sophisticated medical treat- month after the North Korean Army invaded South ment regime and were offered cultural and educa- Korea, U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur an- tional services. But political strife between the nounced that the United Nations Command (UNC) various factions of prisoners led to physical assaults, had adopted and would observe the provisions of murder, and large-scale rioting. The North Korean GPW. Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee Government infiltrated political agitators into the made a similar commitment on behalf of his gov- camp system to instigate and control prisoner un- ernment.2 These were tough promises to keep. By rest, to embarrass the UNC in the international po- mid-1951, the UNC had captured approximately litical arena, and to tie down as many UNC troops 165,000 enemy prisoners of war (EPW), who were as possible. North Korea was nearly successful in a mixed lot. Some were North Korean communists; all aspects. Several times, the UNC had to commit some South Korean anti-communists conscripted by infantry and armor units to camp duty to restore or- North Korea during its forward march down the der. peninsula; some Chinese communists; and some The single prominent lesson in examining the Ko- Chinese nationalist anti-communists forced into mili- rean War experience is “no forced repatriation.” tary service after their defeat in the recent civil war. Thousands of prisoners did not desire repatriation to For a number of political and practical reasons, a homeland they did not claim as their own. These the UNC decided EPWs would remain in-theater were primarily, but not exclusively, South Koreans and be contained in camps administered by the U.S. forced into North Korean Army service and former Army using Republic of Korea Army guard units. Nationalist Chinese soldiers who preferred to be re- Camps, including a hospital camp in Pusan, were patriated to Taiwan rather than mainland China. On constructed on the mainland and on Koje-do, a large the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. off-shore island. Prisoners were evacuated to this President Harry S. Truman established “no forced camp network from holding facilities using ground repatriation” as a principle of the armistice on which transportation. The ICRC regularly visited UNC there would be no negotiation, except how to imple- EPW camps and reported its findings to the UNC ment it.4 North Korea’s refusal to submit to this and the ICRC headquarters in Geneva.3 principle extended the talks, and the war itself, by Life in the camps was difficult on both sides of approximately 2 years. In the end, the other side the wire. Prisoners were kept in crowded tents and caved, and the principle was established. About hastily constructed wooden barracks. The prisoner 85,000 EPWs were repatriated to North Korea at diet was “politically correct” in modern parlance— the end of hostilities in 1953, half of the total
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 45 A Cuban doctor speaks with 82d Airborne Division Joint Chiefs of Staff guards as detained construction workers await (JCS), General Earle G. transportation home from Grenada, 1983. Wheeler, ordered that article 3 of the GPW would be the treatment floor for all battlefield- captured detainees. Mil- itary Assistance Com- mand, Vietnam (MACV), quickly drafted and is- sued implementing di- rectives, including pro- visions for article 5 tribunals to determine detainee status.6 No de- tainee would be turned over to South Vietnam- ese custody before a status determination US Air Force had been made. prisoner population. The remaining prisoners stayed With American materiel and advisory support, the in South Korea or were repatriated to Taiwan. South Vietnamese Government began constructing Another important lesson learned in Korea was five camps—one in each corps tactical zone, the that international shame or pressure did not compel fifth in the Saigon area. U.S. Army Military Police North Korea to observe the provisions of GPW (MP) advisory teams were assigned to these camps when handling UNC prisoners. Although nearly to ensure the South Vietnamese observed the pro- 13,000 UNC prisoners were released by the North visions of GPW. By December 1971, the South Viet- Koreans at war’s end, thousands of others died in namese held over 35,000 prisoners in six camps, al- captivity because of malnourishment and mistreat- most a third of those captured by U.S. forces. ment or are otherwise unaccounted for. The United States and South Vietnam also com- Vietnam War, 1965-1973. Because in many bined their intelligence interrogation efforts, placing quarters the Vietnam War was viewed as an insur- combined interrogation facilities in each U.S. sepa- gency, early on the U.S. Government had to take a rate brigade and division base camp and at a cen- position on how and when to apply GPW. The South tral location near Saigon.7 These facilities held Vietnamese Government regarded captured Viet sources for 1 to 7 days and up to 4 months in ex- Cong as political prisoners, not EPWs, and im- ceptional cases. By MACV directive, all interroga- prisoned them in civil jails, sometimes without tions were conducted according to GPW standards, due process. South Vietnamese military units also particularly those prohibiting maltreatment. But, as did not observe GPW on the battlefield and often in Korea, in Vietnam the United States could not ob- tortured or executed Viet Cong prisoners. Having tain reciprocal treatment of its personnel held cap- made a policy decision at the highest levels of tive by North Vietnam or its proxies throughout the government to turn all detainees captured on the jungles of Southeast Asia. battlefield over to the custody of the South Vietnam- Grenada, October 1983. In Operation Urgent ese Government, and faced with the reality of more Fury, a small contingent of U.S. Army Rangers and Americans becoming POWs as the level of troop U.S. Marines landed on the island of Grenada to commitment escalated, the United States announced unseat a pro-Cuban government and protect several in August 1965 it would apply the provisions of hundred American students at a medical training fa- GPW in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Gov- cility there. During several days of military opera- ernment followed suit. The execution in September tions U.S. forces took control of 1,500 detainees, half of two U.S. advisers in retaliation for South Cuban nationals, the remainder, members of the Vietnam’s execution of Viet Cong prisoners further People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA). pressured the U.S. Government.5 Initially, combat units guarded their own prison- In early 1966, after studying the issue, Chairman, ers; soon though, a small Caribbean peacekeeping
46 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS force (CPF) of policemen from Barba- Water is given dos and Jamaica arrived, followed by to Panamanian XVIII Airborne Corps MP elements Defense Force soldiers shortly from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. First after their cap- the CPF and then U.S. Army MPs ture, 1989. became responsible for detainees.8 The JCS and State Department decided to treat all detainees as EPWs with- out granting them that formal status.9 The predominant descriptor for EPW operations on Grenada is “makeshift” (housing, feeding, clothing, medical treat- ment, classification). The soldiers and their leaders made the best of a diffi- cult situation.10 If resources were limited, so were the number of prisoners and the operation’s duration. When hostili- ties ended just days later, the Cubans were repatriated to Cuba with the US Army ICRC’s help. The PRA members were turned tribunal consisting of the MP camp’s commanding over to the new government of Grenada. officer, the ranking MI officer, and the assigned judge Panama, December 1989. XVIII Airborne advocate, who ruled on detainee status.13 Corps planners for Operation Just Cause took note GPW provisions were applied to all detainees of lessons learned in Grenada and included deten- early in the operation. They were afforded due medi- tion operations in their planning. They selected the cal treatment and permitted to notify and communi- Empire Range training complex as a detention fa- cate with relatives, receive visitors, and in other ways cility and pre-positioned the necessary logistical sup- exercise their rights under the Convention. As the plies to build and operate a camp.11 Approximately new Panamanian Government took control, detain- 4,000 detainees cycled through this camp in late 1989 ees were turned over to it for disposition. In Janu- and early 1990 under the watchful eyes of U.S. ary 1990, only a few remained in custody. Some Army MP units from Fort Bragg, bolstered by MPs were brought back to the United States for civil pro- from Fort Lee, Virginia, and the Missouri Army Na- ceedings. The remainder stayed in custody in tional Guard.12 A military intelligence (MI) interro- Panama. gation facility, also operated by a Fort Bragg unit, Saudi Arabia, 1991. During Operation Desert was collocated at the camp. An informal article 5 Storm, the EPW detention mission was assigned to Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions In the case of armed conflict not of an international (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out character occurring in the territory of one of the High of executions without previous judgment pronounced Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be by a regularly constituted court affording all the judi- bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: cial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, by civilized peoples. including members of armed forces who have laid (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and down their arms and those placed hors de combat by cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any its services to the Parties to the conflict. adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion, or The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. to bring into force, by means of special agreements, (a) Violence to life and person, in particular, murder all or part of the other provisions of the present Con- of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. vention. (b) Taking of hostages. The application of the preceding provisions shall (c) Outrages on personal dignity, in particular hu- not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. miliating and degrading treatment [emphasis added]. Reprinted from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 3, Appendix E.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 47 Iraqi EPWs being processed during the operation began. ICRC rep- Operation Desert Storm, 1991. resentatives visited the facility early and often. During the operation, several MPs complained to the MI unit’s judge advocate about cer- tain interrogation tactics ob- served inside the warehouse. The judge advocate counseled both sides on their application of the articles of GPW. Analysis in an after-action report from the Judge Advocate Legal Center and School attributed the “dust-up” to a clash of cultures between MP and MI interro- gators.16 The MP company commander, Captain Edward US Army Armstrong, later observed: the 800th MP Brigade, whose U.S. Army Reserve “It was an MP-run mission, despite the attempts of (USAR) headquarters was in New York.14 The bri- the MI to direct and provide orders to the MP gade and its supporting MP units were assigned to guards.”17 Looking back now with new perspective the 22d Support Command soon after arriving in because of the actions at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, the Saudi Arabia. Using their own supplies as well as detention operation in Haiti might have been the those purchased by the Saudi Arabian Government, “canary in the mine.” the units constructed four large EPW camps along Common themes. Several common themes main supply routes in two zones, east and west, and emerge from an analysis of these case studies. First, two joint interrogation facilities collocated with two GPW applied to every case, with the ICRC’s inspec- camps in each zone. tion and reporting assistance. Second, sensitive, criti- Early in the operation, MP advisory teams trained cal decisions were always made at theater- and na- the Saudi Army to take over the EPW mission. The tional command-authority levels. Every case study, war lasted only 100 hours but produced 70,000 except that of Panama, showed a lack of logistic EPWs, many of whom were taken into custody af- preparation for EPW operations. All the case stud- ter the cease-fire agreement was signed. The GPW ies demonstrate the importance of Geneva Conven- was applied to all of these detainees. The 800th MP tions training for those who administer or guard a Brigade conducted informal article 5 tribunals for detention facility. All EPW and detention operations, many detainees who claimed to be Iraqi civilians. no matter how seemingly small or insignificant, have Saudi Arabia bore all the expenses of logistically high international visibility. Finally, the Armed Forces’ supporting the EPW operation. All the prisoners and strict adherence to GPW provisions never guar- some of the camps were turned over to Saudi con- anteed reciprocal treatment of U.S. personnel in trol. Other camps were disassembled and hauled enemy captivity. away. After the war, approximately 13,000 Iraqis who refused repatriation to Iraq were reclassified Army Regulations as refugees with the Saudi Government’s coopera- Three Army regulations (ARs) on EPW and de- tion and the ICRC’s assistance. tainee operations were promulgated during the pe- Haiti, September 1994. Military police from the riod studied: AR 633-50, Prisoners of War Admin- XVIII Airborne Corps operated a joint detention fa- istration, Employment and Compensation, in August cility (JDF) at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during Opera- 1963; AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War—Admin- tion Uphold Democracy.15 Collocated with the JDF istration, Employment, and Compensation, in was a joint interrogation facility operated by an MI June 1982; and AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, unit from Fort Bragg. The joint facility was con- Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other structed inside an empty warehouse and housed Detainees, in November 1997.18 The 1963 regu- up to 200 detainees. GPW provisions applied when lation, which assigned staff responsibility to the
48 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and Iraqis detained during a 173d Provost Marshal General, contained no statement of Airborne Brigade cordon and a general protection policy of the United States and search operation, 2003. gave responsibility for control and treatment of in- terned EPWs to the EPW camp commander. The entire regulation had a World War II look and feel, showing great foresight as to how EPWs might be employed in various domestic, industrial, and agri- cultural enterprises. In 1982, the Army became the Department of Defense executive agent for EPW and detainee matters, with DCSPER retaining staff responsibil- ity. The new regulation contained a general protec- tion policy statement that applied to “all persons cap- tured, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Army custody.”19 The statement was based on article 3 and other GPW articles, but the AR assigned no spe- cific responsibility for “handling and treatment” of EPWs and detainees; it also recognized the ICRC as a protecting power. The 1997 version of AR 190-8 is a multiservice regulation. The Department of the Army (DA) re- tains executive responsibility, with staff responsibil- ity residing with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Op- erations and Plans. The AR states that combatant commanders, task force commanders, and joint task US Army force commanders must “ensure compliance with Both FM series strongly link violations of the Geneva the international law of war.”20 The general protec- Conventions to the Uniform Code of Military tion policy statement contains article-3 words and Justice.23 phases, along with text from other GPW articles. If MI doctrine regarding MP personnel. MI in- there is conflict or discrepancy between the AR and terrogation field manuals consistently acknowledged the Geneva Conventions, the AR concedes prece- the MP detention mission. MP guards have always dence to the Geneva Conventions. played important roles as reporters on detainee be- haviors, attitudes, knowledge, and contact with other Doctrinal Publications detainees. The 1992 interrogation manual subtly ex- Field Manual (FM) 19-40, Handling Prisoners panded the MP guard role from that of a passive of War, published in November 1952 (updated or reporter to an active facilitator of detainee screen- revised in 1964, 1967, 1976, and 2001 under various ing, stating: “Screeners coordinate with MP holding titles) contained the basic MP doctrine on EPW op- area guards on their role in the screening process. erations during the Korean War.21 FM 30-15, Ex- The guards are told where the screening will take amination of Personnel and Documents, pub- place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought lished in September 1951, which contained the basic there from the holding area, and what types of be- MI interrogation doctrine during the Korean War, havior on their part will facilitate the screenings.”24 was updated or revised in 1960, 1967, 1969, 1973, In his Detainee Operations Inspection report, the 1978, 1987, and 1992 under various titles.22 DA inspector general cited this passage in pointing A careful examination of these five MP deten- out the disconnect between MP detention and MI tion FMs and seven of the eight MI interrogation interrogation doctrine.26 FMs reveals that, over time, the American soldier Particularly since 1978, MI interrogation FMs has been increasingly well-schooled in the general have placed MI interrogation prisoner-of-war (IPW) protection articles of GPW. Article 3 first appeared teams in MP battlespace, at EPW holding areas and as an explicit treatment floor in early 1967 and re- at detention facilities. MI doctrine has consistently mained so in all the studied manuals of both branches required IPW teams to coordinate with MP com- until 1992 for MI and 2001 for MP respectively. manders in charge of these areas, listing specific
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 49 matters in which coordination will facilitate the in- ken so much as disjointed. MP guards and MI in- terrogation mission. Based in part on experience terrogators, if they are trained according to current gleaned from Operation Desert Storm, the 1992 in- branch doctrinal manuals and competently led and terrogation manual suggests that MI unit command- supervised, will treat detainees and sources with due ers seek joint training opportunities with MP EPW respect to the Geneva Conventions. An inherent units to work out coordination issues.26 conflict exists between guarding and protecting the MP doctrine regarding MI interrogators. rights of detainees (the MP mission) and extracting Before 1976, MP FMs posited “acquisition of maxi- the maximum intelligence from a source under the mum intelligence information” as the basic principle law (the MI mission). Those who seek to repair the of EPW operations.27 In the 1976 manual, this prin- damage done by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal must ciple was supplanted by “implementation of the seek to resolve this conflict. Geneva Conventions.”28 The 1976 manual also Having acknowledged the problem, the next step contained a strong general protection statement, is to develop a clear general treatment policy at the eliminated references to guards observing and Army staff level based on the Geneva Conventions. reporting detainee behavior to IPW teams, and Then the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- dropped a section describing support to external mand (TRADOC) can ensure the GPW and GC intelligence agencies. Since 1976, MP manuals have content of MP detention and MI interrogation doc- consistently acknowledged the MI interrogation trinal publications is nested in approved DA policy. mission, the passive role of MP guards with IPW TRADOC must also take steps to deconflict the MP teams, and admitted the presence of MI interro- and MI EPW and detention mission and battlespace. gators in MP battlespace at EPW holding areas Finally, new doctrinal publications should more and detention facilities. But MP detention manuals, clearly define command responsibility for GPW and even the 2001 version, do not address the details of GC compliance for all levels of MP and MI com- or coordination MI activities require in MP mand. With the recent publication of the DA De- battlespace. Interrogation activity is the “elephant tainee Operations Campaign Plan, this work has in the room” that MPs do not want to talk about. already begun and will continue until the problem Current U.S. Army detention doctrine is not bro- is resolved. MR
NOTES 1. The full text of all the articles of the Geneva Convention can be found at Depart- tions from Vietnam to Haiti (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Office of the Judge Advocate ment of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare (Washington, and Center of Military History, 2001), 104. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1956), chaps 4 through 7. 14. The most complete and detailed description of EPW operations in Operation Desert 2. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) Storm is in John R. Brinkerhoff, Ted Silva, and John Seitz, United States Army Reserve (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 262. in Operation Desert Storm, Enemy Prisoner of War Operations: The 800th Military Po- 3. For a sensing of the International Committee of the Red Cross inspection regime, lice Brigade (Washington, DC: Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, 1992). see William L. White, The Captives of Korea (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957), 15. For a description of the joint detention facility at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and its op- 25, 33. eration, see CPT Edward R. Armstrong, “Detainee Operations in Haiti During Opera- 4. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: U.S. Army tion Uphold Democracy,” Military Police (Winter 1995): 16-19. Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 151. 16. See Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-95: Lessons Learned for Judge 5. The two U.S. advisers the Viet Cong executed were U.S. Army CPT Humbert R. Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General School, 1995), 59-62. Versace and MSG Kenneth M. Roraback. See Neil Sheehan, “‘Reds’ Execution of 2 Ameri- 17. MAJ Edward R. Armstrong, E-mail interview, 4 August 2004. cans Assailed by U.S.,” New York Times, 28 September 1965, A1. Versace was posthu- 18. U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 633-50, Prisoners of War—Administration, Employ- mously awarded the Medal of Honor by President George W. Bush on 8 July 2002. ment and Compensation (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 August 1963); AR 190-8, Enemy Pris- 6. See Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directive 381-11, “Military oners of War Administration, Employment, and Compensation, (Washington, DC: GPO, Intelligence: Intelligence Procedures for Handling, Processing, and Exploitation of Cap- 1 June 1982); AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Intern- tives, Returnees, Suspects, and Documents,” 5 March 1966; and MACV Directive 20-5, ees and Other Detainees (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 November 1997). “Inspections and Investigations: Prisoners of War—Determination of Status,” 17 May 1966. 19. AR 190-8, 1 June 1982. 7. For a discussion of the combined intelligence effort, see MG Joseph A. 20. AR 190-8, 1 November 1997. McChristian, Vietnam Studies: The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 (Washing- 21. FM 19-40 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952). The subsequent titles for FM 19-40 ton, DC: DA, 1974), 26-32. are Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees (21 August 1964 and 11 December 8. Ronald H. Cole describes the Caribbean peacekeeping force mission in Opera- 1967); Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons (27 Febru- tion Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 Octo- ary 1976); and Internment/Resettlement Operations (1 August 2001). In 2001, DA renum- ber-2 November 1983 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of bered FM 19-40 to FM 3-19.40. Staff), 37. SP5 Jerry Healy gives the 82d Airborne Division perspective in “MPs Pro- 22. FM 30-15, Examination of Personnel and Documents (Washington, DC: GPO, cess Detainees,” Military Police Journal (Spring 1984): 37. See also LTC Allen Gibbs 1951). Subsequent titles for FM 30-15 are Intelligence Interrogation (26 September 1960, and MAJ Allen Grammer, “Grenada, Chronology of 82d MPs,” Military Police Journal 27 July 1967, 7 March 1969, 1 July 1973, and 29 September 1978). In 1987, the number (Spring 1984): 34-35. and names changed to FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (8 May 1987 and 28 Sep- 9. Cole, 53-54. tember 1992). At the time of this writing, a copy of the 1960 field manual was not avail- 10. For a description of the early confusion during Operation Urgent Fury, see Mark able for analysis. Adkins, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 23. U.S. Code, Title 10–“Armed Forces,” Subtitle A–“General Military Law,” Part II– 219-20. “Personnel,” Chapter 47–“Uniform Code Of Military Justice,” on-line at
Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army, Retired, is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Idaho and an M.A. from the University of Washington. He is the author of several articles and studies on Soviet Army tactics.
50 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center
Brigadier General Mick Bednarek, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; and Stephen Florich
HE 2004 JOINT Readiness Training Center’s combat commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq re- (JRTC’s) Operations Group vision statement peatedly emphasize that CTCs offer the most ac- Treads: “Create an organization that shapes the fu- curate portrayal of today’s battlefield, an accuracy ture battlespace within realistic, demanding scenarios not always appreciated by those struggling with a that capture the ‘fog and friction’ of the [contem- demanding, arduous rotation at one of the CTCs. porary operational environment (COE) and the joint Even as U.S. forces contend with improvised ex- operational environment (JOE)]. Our team will act plosive devices (IEDs) abroad, they do so, at least as the engine of change to drive our future leaders— in part, with knowledge gained on recent rotations joint leaders—to think from the ‘tactical fight’ at a CTC where IEDs, terrorism, insurgency, con- through the operational level of warfare. Our ob- voy ambushes, and urban combat are the norm. server controllers [OCs] will possess a joint and ex- In looking to the future and seeking to expand joint peditionary ‘mindset’ that reflects a greater level of tactical and operational capabilities, the JRTC Op- flexibility, joint doctrinal understanding, and versatil- erations Group will continue to build on that histori- ity with a vision that a joint solution to a tactical prob- cally embedded experience. By incorporating ser- lem or mission will be better than a single service vice and joint lessons learned from the ever-evolving solution. Collectively, we will continue to coach, training environment at maneuver CTCs, joint forces teach, and mentor future leaders to achieve an ef- and joint leaders will become more proficient. The fects-based approach to synchronizing and integrat- most effective tactics, techniques, and procedures ing combat capabilities that includes systems visu- (TTP) gleaned from combat operations will continue alization and connectivity with our joint partners as to be included in the training of U.S. military for- well as current and future coalition and multinational mations. partners. We will achieve this by developing future joint training scenarios built around an adaptive, cred- Where WWWhere e are TTe odayodayoday ible, and complex opposing force [OPFOR] that cre- The statement, “The United States is a Nation at ates the chaotic, ambiguous, and demanding envi- War,” is a primer for U.S. Armed Forces, a direc- ronments associated with today’s battlefield. Our tive to all, and a challenge for future forces. People cornerstone assessment tool—our after-action re- remain the centerpiece of successful joint operations, view [AAR] process—remains our bedrock.”1 and leaders are the focus of successful training for The JRTC promulgated this vision statement to those operations. Although capabilities associated guide combat training centers (CTCs) as they train with the tools of warfare will change, the dynamics U.S. soldiers for current and future conflicts. In ad- of human interactions instilled through innovative dressing the Operations Group, we key on the joint leadership will remain the driving force in all the U.S. leaders needed to protect the Nation. military does. As the U.S. Army’s premier training center for Fundamental to the full exploitation of improved infantry and special operations forces (SOF), the capabilities is the capacity of soldiers, sailors, airmen, JRTC reinforces joint and sister-service training op- Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of portunities in a COE-like setting. Indeed, ground Defense (DOD) civilians to learn and adapt to new
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 51 missions and requirements. Tactical- through opera- future joint leaders, they must be evaluated and tional-level planners and ground force commanders transformed in JRTC AAR fashion. The strategic must meet these demands, bear the hardships of setting makes that transformation requirement clear. combat, and work diligently to synchronize service The JRTC is a premier joint training center for all and coalition efforts. Conflicts in Iraq and Af- types of military formations—brigade- and regimen- ghanistan underscore this reality. The fog and tal-level equivalents. The ongoing structural trans- friction of war randomly affect military operations formation within the Army, as part of the expedi- and decisionmaking at all levels. Our Army’s com- tionary mindset, is critical to maintaining relevance bat training centers are first and foremost leader- within the joint force. development centers; how operations groups shape Current doctrinal constructs, which lay out the the future battlespace within realistic, demanding Operations Group’s COE, are based on the ability scenarios to capture this fog and friction will be to “see first, understand, decide, and act” faster than its legacy. an adversary in any situation. Decisions predi- The strategic setting as expressed in the current cated on better understanding of the battlespace U.S. National Military Strategy uses several te- precede these actions, allowing commanders to nets to provide a general azimuth in thinking differ- act simultaneously or sequentially to achieve the de- ently toward broad-based scenario development in sired end state at the least cost in lives. The tactical the context of future warfare and stability operations objective is to win the close fight while shaping op- and support operations (SOSO) for joint forces.2 erational battles for future strategic success. The The tenets are— Army is engaged in such operations in Afghanistan, z Manage risks. Iraq, and the Balkans, thus validating this training z Use a capabilities-based approach. model. z Defend the United States and project U.S. JRTC mission-rehearsal exercises (MRXs) in military power. support of all three areas of responsibility achieve z Strengthen alliances and partnerships. unprecedented fidelity to the war environment in pre- z Maintain favorable regional balances. paring units for deployment. These are “sustains” z Develop a broad portfolio of military capa- in AAR parlance, but what areas need improve- bilities. ment? In the past, the JRTC, like all service cen- In short, military strategy applies a set of ters of excellence, has approached jointness as a overarching principles—agility, decisiveness, and in- matter of deconfliction rather than integration. The tegration—to guide future commanders in achiev- JRTC must build seamless jointness into the CTC. ing their supporting objectives. For the majority of The destination is clear. We must move forward. battalion task force and brigade and regimental com- bat team commanders who rotate through Army The Road to Jointness CTCs, adhering to these principles is often an af- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provides some les- terthought. As strategic parameters, they are cer- sons for future joint training. Forces now participat- tainly distant from tactical commanders’ collective ing in OIF come from around the world. Many did consciousness. In the operational linkages between not take part in a joint or coalition training exercise strategy and tactics, joint training promises—and tailored to their expected tasks before they deployed. must deliver—enhanced U.S. military power. Many individuals in theater are not even military; With the advent of the joint national training ca- they belong to an array of government, nongovern- pability (JNTC), DOD will not fully implement its ment, private, international, and commercial organi- initiative to train forces jointly until Fiscal Year (FY) zations. 2009. Joint training opportunities at tactical and op- While some U.S. forces might have participated erational levels offered between now and FY 2009 in joint training, most did not train as a joint force in fall short in supporting the Nation’s needs. support of a regional combatant commander. Rec- The Nation is at war just as its military is trans- ognizing this, DOD mandated the JNTC, which is a forming. How, then, can Army CTCs act as engines far-reaching, transformational, joint training program of change to help future leaders become joint lead- at the Joint Warfighting Center, a directorate within ers? The first step forward is to look inward. The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). AAR remains the CTCs’ cornerstone for leadership The JNTC is a cooperative collection of development through self-evaluation. If CTCs are interoperable training sites, nodes, and events that to be engines of change driving the development of synthesizes combatant commander and service train-
52 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
A C-17 is loaded during a JRTC airlift exercise, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, 20 August 2004. US Air Force ing requirements within the appropriate joint context. combined elements were integrated, the increase Training includes live events and simultaneous simu- was again measurable. lation-driven scenarios at many locations to replicate With such benefits already proven, does it make joint operations. Training addresses tactical-to-opera- sense to wait another 5 years to fully implement and tional tasks, including staff planning for a joint task optimize joint capacities? Is it logical to continue ser- force (JTF) encompassing services and combatant vice-centric training over a timeframe that does not commander training requirements. now meet joint combatant commanders’ needs? The A single facility is not conducive to diversity. To answer to both questions is a resounding “No.” train all services at one center requires a land area Therein lies the impetus for the JNTC; it will bridge large enough for maneuver; sufficient air space for that gap in the interim. The JNTC, having already joint close air support (CAS), attack aviation, and achieved its initial operating capability, will be at full unmanned aerial vehicles; a littoral environment per- operating capability by FY 2009. mitting live fire; and a blue-water area for naval re- Multiple ground and air “training centers of ex- sources. But even such a superb single range would cellence” have already been linked and used in the not replicate the extremely dispersed global environ- emerging initiative of “joint context.” The JNTC’s ment in which U.S. forces currently fight. That lack western test range; the Army’s National Training of fidelity would negatively affect training. Center, Fort Irwin, California; the U.S. Marine The road to JNTC’s full operating capability be- Corps’ (USMC’s) training facility at Twentynine gins with deconflicting service capabilities, stitching Palms, California; and the U.S. Air Force’s together (vetting) those capabilities, allowing the ser- (USAF’s) training facility at Nellis Air Force Base vices to integrate those capabilities, and producing (AFB), Nevada, held a horizontal training exercise full-spectrum, capabilities-based joint forces. We (HTX) in January 2004. A combined JTF exercise have already tested the road in Afghanistan where recently completed the first JNTC integration event, more integration increased capabilities exponentially enhancing an existing joint exercise to address joint rather than linearly. There, a fully integrated joint interoperability training in a joint context. force enjoyed a tenfold increase in capabilities. As In an August 2004 HTX, the JRTC JNTC tested interagency integration proceeded, the force saw and validated prototype architectures (command, another significant increase in capabilities, and as control, communications, computers, and intelligence
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 53 and modeling and simulation). In October 2004, a exploiting the training materials the JRTC Center for joint exercise control group refined selected accredi- Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Cell offered, and tation and certification processes and set conditions demonstrating a truly professional approach in learn- for the JNTC’s initial operating capability. The JRTC ing as it trained. Several other USMC units have JNTC HTX integrated a JRTC rotation at Fort Polk, voiced a desire to expand their strong service core Louisiana, and a USAF Air Warrior II integration capabilities within a more joint context at the JRTC. at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. USMC and SOF par- ticipation occurred in virtual and live scenarios. The Future Joint Force JFCOM objectives for the exercise included joint tac- Who could have foreseen 5 years ago that Army tical task training and analysis to improve the fol- or Marine company commanders would be charged lowing collective joint capabilities: with establishing the security and social conditions z Integration of joint tactical fire support (includ- to allow a safe, secure, legitimate electoral process ing CAS), with emphasis on fires within an urban to begin in hundreds of villages and cities across environment. Iraq? If we had thought that possible, would we have z Development and implementation of tactical been willing to commit to the changes necessary to information operations plans to support operational- train those commanders for such a mission? DOD and strategic-level information operations plans or recognizes that the JNTC has a commitment to do guidance. better. z Employment of joint tactical airlift load proce- People remain the centerpiece of successful joint dures with emphasis on assault zone preparations operations. To fully benefit from these increased ef- and combat control team control measures in a hostile forts in joint training, the Army’s maneuver CTCs environment. and other service training centers and facilities must z Coordination of joint ground maneuver between continue to foster a joint and expeditionary mindset Army, USMC, and SOF organizations at the tacti- reflecting a greater level of flexibility, joint doctrinal cal level (brigade and below). understanding, and versatility. On the ground, soldiers Is the above task list complete? Will accomplish- and Marines must understand the core capabilities ing the tasks replicate a truly joint operation in OIF each service brings to the fight. or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)? The loss Core capabilities provide fundamental attributes of two friendly fighters because of fratricide during the Nation’s future joint forces must possess. They OIF reminds us there are clear challenges ahead. must be fully integrated, network-centric, adaptable, The JRTC and the Air Defense Artillery Center are expeditionary, lethal, and able to perform decentral- pushing integration of air-defense assets (air missile ized operations. We must acknowledge that a joint defense teams) with ground maneuver forces in of- solution to a tactical or operational problem, mission, fensive operations for future rotational scenarios. or task is better than a single service solution. The Other joint training exercises (the joint Red Flag/Blue joint force must also be able to swiftly defeat an ad- Flag series, Roving Sands, and so on) are also inte- versary, engage in sustained combat, and conduct grating these critical enablers. simultaneous operations to reestablish order, stabil- The JNTC and JRTC’s purpose is to stitch to- ity, and local governance, if necessary. gether service capabilities in a joint training environ- The U.S. military must be fully capable of joint, ment to achieve seamless operations when called interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational to fight. Today, a commander’s common operational (JIIM) operations. Regardless of theater or conflict, picture (COP) is three-dimensional. The joint fight the joint force commander must coordinate, integrate, must look the same in American service training ex- and cooperate with other U.S. Government agen- ercises as it would in Karbala or Kabul. cies, such as the U.S. Department of State, the CIA, Joint maneuver training centers reinforce these the U.S. Agency for International Development, or initiatives. In May 2004, the JRTC hosted the 2d the FBI. Such complex operations must be con- Marine Division, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, in a ducted with great fidelity even though inter- or rotation focused on situational training exercise lanes. intraagency cooperation might not always be “co- Army OCs coached, taught, and mentored sister ser- operative.” vice brethren in emerging TTPs and lessons learned In equipping, training, and fielding joint forces, the from OIF and OEF within a joint context. The re- military must inculcate the reality of coalition war- sults were gratifying. The 2d Reconnaissance Bat- fare. The United States has not engaged in a “pure” talion took advantage of the JRTC’s expertise, fully U.S. military operation since the Spanish-American
54 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
A 2d Infantry Division Engineer stands watch as a Marine D-9 bulldozer clears a path for other troops, Fallujah, Iraq, 13 November 2004. US Army War. We can no longer look at coalition warfare as As the military integrates joint-force capabilities, a secondary or adjunct function to joint warfighting. it also ensures the collective processes needed to Today, company commanders must face the com- successfully maximize those capabilities to ensure plexities and challenges of coalition warfare. they are taught to an acceptable standard, as can Adhering to JIIM guidelines ties directly to the be seen in the area of information management. Fo- current OIF/OEF mission set of SOSO as well as cusing on information-management training in a JIIM the Global War on Terrorism. Those missions might environment would do much to improve rotational include operations to ensure the safety of U.S. citi- units’ warfighting effectiveness in all situations. zens and interests while maintaining and improving JRTC is a premier warfighting training center that the ability to operate with multinational partners to can significantly affect training and develop infor- deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. They mation management skills. As one of the Army’s might include an array of tasks, from combat op- “dirt” CTCs, the JRTC can do so with a fidelity and erations to remove isolated pockets of resistance, to realism impossible to achieve elsewhere. Human peace enforcement, to security cooperation activi- factors, such as fatigue and confusion, coupled with ties. the friction of a realistically arrayed battlefield ac- If the military is to conduct the Global War on Ter- curately portraying the JIIM environment facing an rorism in an effects-based campaign, then all mili- equally realistic OPFOR, will continue to be the best tary operations must become part of that plan. Con- way to prepare joint leaders for tomorrow’s fight. sider, for instance, the secondary effects of a Collectively, joint training opportunities have moved humanitarian relief operation. As part of the Global closer to the effects-based approach to synchroniz- War on Terrorism, such an operation well executed ing and integrating lethal and nonlethal combat serves the campaign plan. On the other hand, an in- power. In partnership with the CALL cell and le- effective response would work against us, which is veraging input from Joint Warfighting Center lessons directly tied to the full spectrum of JIIM operations. learned, the JRTC has captured the lessons of that The military must continue to challenge rotational journey in publications like the Effects-Based Op- units with a free-thinking, adaptive OPFOR capable erations Handbook, the Stability Operations and of providing the friction, disruption, and reactions Support Operations (SOSO) Handbook, and the common to current battlefields. Cordon and Search Handbook.3 The CTCs will
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 55 continue to pursue future enhancement of leading, COP, and achieve the desired end state. In the JRTC influencing, and at times, writing emerging doctrine Operations Group, the key to increasing relevant ca- as we prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Fully pabilities is organizational, procedural, and mindset committed to the lessons-learned process and re- changes, versus additional manpower growth and maining proactive in ongoing OIF/OEF activities is infrastructure procurement. a priority mission. The Army has taken lessons We must think differently, work to achieve the learned, coupled with JFCOM’s lessons learned, and good-enough solution, and be willing to experiment. reinforced collective team efforts in areas critical to An example is the future concept for joint command maneuver commanders. and control (C2). We must think through the capa- JRTC’s charter to train joint leaders stresses we bility that allows commanders and staffs to tailor C2 must do more than simply assess what works and systems as needed, rapidly, and with appropriate C2 what does not. We must be willing to identify fixes procedures of born-joint systems suited to each tac- to long-established problems and suggest initiatives tical or operational mission. We can no longer rely to capitalize on new technologies and the exponen- on a one-size-fits-all process. tial benefits of JIIM operations. We must continue A networked joint force can maintain a more ac- that drive and expand its connections to the joint curate presentation of the battlespace built on the community, which includes selected joint experimen- ability to integrate intelligence, surveillance, recon- tation and an Army Concept Technology Demon- naissance, information, and total asset visibility. An strator applicable to regional combatant command- increased degree of integration and synchronization ers. As we do, we will key on systems visualization, will also be required among appropriate service which develops a shared understanding of causal forces to conduct joint tactical tasks and actions at relationships and provides critical tools that help com- appropriate levels. This is the essence of the JNTC. manders at all levels and their staffs plan, execute, Joint training, more interoperable systems, and elimi- assess, and adapt. Recent JRTC rotations of Ac- nating seams between JTF service components will tive Component and Reserve Component formations enhance integration. and enhanced brigade combat teams have highlighted this crucial need. An established classified local area The Desired End State network/Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, The future will see each physical rotation as a allowing commanders to collaborate and facilitate mini-JNTC, with joint tasks linked to service train- timely employment of appropriate joint capabilities, ing objectives that maximize each service’s core com- is essential to support the networked, adaptive plan- petencies, all within a joint context. Continued net- ning and execution effort. working with joint, coalition, and multinational Collaborative planning and execution will include partners is vital for CTCs’ training transformation to considerations for personnel tempo and coordination reduce the challenges of dissimilar training, equip- with other combat capabilities and future JIIM part- ment, technology, doctrine, culture, and language as- ners. By integrating joint capabilities at increasingly sociated with multinational operations. When sce- lower echelons and enhancing connectivity among narios and schedules allow, the military must elements, combat formations and future joint forces integrate multinational partners into dynamic, COE can better conduct distributed, decentralized opera- rotations. tions. These factors enable commanders to match Joint training and rotational scenarios are essen- capabilities more precisely to specific tasks and pur- tial to building a joint team with interagency and mul- poses within an assigned battlespace or joint opera- tinational partners. Tough, realistic training will be tional area. necessary to forge teams and foster a joint mindset The JRTC and service training centers must re- in leaders and staffs the JRTC coaches, teaches, and view their collective legacy equipment and systems mentors. The JRTC Operations Group’s future will (simulations, computer networks, staff processes, include capabilities-based force packages of Army and so on) to ensure future expansion or life-cycle brigade combat teams conducting combat rotations replacement will be compatible and “made joint” to and current MRX scenarios within live, virtual, con- the extent possible until replacement by “born joint” structive training environments in a joint context. equipment and systems allows dispersed forces to We must build future joint training scenarios more efficiently communicate, maneuver, share a around an adaptive, complex OPFOR, with dynamic
56 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS tactical-to-operational situations. The
OPFOR should continue to portray US Navy adversaries who intermingle with noncombatants in a noncontiguous, COE battlespace. To achieve this, we must develop and expand a deployable, distributable, exportable capability to outlying sites or home stations that can replicate the COE/ JOE battlefield. Equally important is continued fo- cus on reinforcing the basics of rifle squads, teams, crews, sections, pla- toons, and so on. We must integrate these fundamental strengths within
CTCs to tie directly to future joint Army, Air Force, and civilian personnel monitor a Joint Semi-automated Forces Ground Truth display during tactical tasks within the JNTC, simi- a Joint Force Command exercise, January 2004. lar to the familiar crosswalk of a unit mission essential task list (METL), and emerging Guard or police demonstrates our tardiness. We must service joint METLs or universal joint task lists. remember that some of the Nation’s greatest joint Centralized joint planning and decentralized ex- successes occurred at junior-leader levels in Af- ecution in an uncertain operating environment re- ghanistan when SOF, conventional, and coalition quires adaptive, innovative, decisive leaders. Leader forces coordinated, integrated, and synchronized a development remains the foundation of military rapid campaign to unhinge and topple the Taliban. transformation and innovation. Leadership education We have long recognized the CTCs’ true func- and training must focus on developing skilled, knowl- tion as leader development. We must embed edgeable leaders who can meet increasingly com- jointness as a leadership trait from sergeant to plex requirements in all environments—tactical, op- colonel. CTCs are the key to reinforcing that goal. erational, strategic, and joint. We all must expand our Over the years, the U.S. military has had limited understanding of individual, service, and joint core success with schoolhouse exchange programs. competencies, and education and leadership devel- Successes have been too limited and the need too opment must prepare leaders to succeed in chaotic, pressing to wait until FY 2009 for a full joint op- ambiguous, and demanding environments. erational capability. MR
Final Thoughts NOTES Full joint integration at the military’s collective 1. Policy Paper, “Vision Statement,” U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Operations Group, Fort Polk, Louisiana, 2004. CTCs has not been a high priority. Military institu- 2 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], December 1999). tions have waited too long to create joint leaders. 3. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CALL Handbook 04-14, Effects-Based Operations—Brigade to Company Level (GPO, July 2004); CALL Handbook 03-20, Army Maneuver commanders struggling to coordinate op- and USMC TTP—Stability Operations and Support Operations (SOSO) (GPO, July 2003); CALL Handbook 04-16, Cordon and Search Handbook (GPO, July 2004), avail- erations with a coalition partner or the Iraqi National able on-line at
Brigadier General Mick Bednarek, U.S. Army, is the commander of the Joint Readi- ness Training Center (JRTC) Operations Group, Fort Polk, Louisiana. He received a B.S. from Old Dominion University, an M.S. from Troy State University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the U.S. Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS) and Italy. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired, is a civilian military ana- lyst with the JRTC Center for Army Lessons Learned Cell. He received a B.A. from Texas A&M, an M.A. from the Naval Postgraduate School, and an M.M.A.S. from CGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Africa, and the Middle East. His book, Journey to Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, is forthcoming. Stephen Florich is a Future Operations Planner, Operations Group, JRTC. He re- ceived an M.S. from the Defense Intelligence College.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 57 The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Woodmansee, U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Faulkner, U.S. Army; and Major Wayne C. Blanchette, U.S. Air Force
OINT PUBLICATION 1-02, The Depart- Assumptions are Vulnerableulnerableulnerable Jment of Defense Dictionary of Military and Assumptions are more vulnerable to events from Associated Terms, defines an assumption as “a sup- the time the deliberate planning process begins to position on the current situation or a presupposition crisis action planning (CAP). The current treatment on the future course of events, either or both as- of planning assumptions, or the overreliance on as- sumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, sumptions, has turned the planning process into necessary to enable the commander in the process assumptive planning. of planning to complete an estimate of the situation Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the urgent and make a decision on the course of action.”1 But, need to amend the current planning process to ad- this definition of planning assumptions is incomplete. dress validating assumptions. According to the Na- A key word—validation—is missing. val Institute Proceedings article,“You Can’t As- We need to rewrite the current joint definition and sume ‘Nothin’,” only 4 of 12 assumptions made the planning doctrine on assumptions to stress the before Operation Iraqi Freedom remained rock importance of continually validating assumptions. In solid.2 Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the addition, current doctrine needs to stress the impor- need to validate assumptions early and continuously; tance of how to validate assumptions, and the joint establish a validation matrix with validation points; community should address the following issues con- and vigorously validate assumptions based on access. cerning planning assumptions. Assumptions based on access and U.S. diplomatic First, planners must address assumptions concern- success carry more of a burden to validate than all ing U.S. access to a foreign country. Diplomatic con- other assumptions. According to the U.S. National siderations are crucially important given the expedi- Security Strategy of the United States, “[M]ilitary tionary focus of the U.S. Armed Forces and the capabilities must ensure U.S. access to distant the- need for access to basing or overflight. aters.”3 Second, no formal mechanisms are in place early The Armed Forces’ expeditionary focus puts a in the planning process for validating planning as- premium on access agreements to facilitate deploy- sumptions. We recommend using a validation ma- ments, military operations, logistical support, and re- trix that provides a forcing function to visually fo- deployment. When referring to the future asymmet- cus planners’ intellectual energy to establishing ric threat, U.S. “access to theaters is going to be assumptions and revisiting them. increasingly difficult to come by.”4 Joint planners Third, planners should establish validation points must identify access assumptions and, as events for every assumption to test the assumption’s valid- dictate, revisit them continually in the planning pro- ity. We define a validation point as an event that di- cess. Planners can become committed to assump- rectly affects an assumption the commander must tions and never revisit them. To avoid this pitfall, validate or invalidate. Changes in such events re- planners must continually validate planning assump- quire a revalidation of the assumption, branch plan, tions even after initial assumption development or change in the plan. and into CAP.
58 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
To develop successful op- eration plans, military plan- ners rely heavily on political planning assumptions, espe- cially assumptions tied to ac- cess, by understanding the uncertain nature of the as- sumptions and the need to revalidate them. Most joint planners tend to develop apo- litical assumptions. The diffi- culty arises when planning Equipment being assumptions at the operational unloaded at Isken- level are so dependent on derum, Turkey, for strategic and diplomatic as- a pre-Iraqi Freedom exercise, 1998. surances. Without a change in the way we validate as- sumptions, fallacies in op- USMC erational planning and inefficiencies in CAP and Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Op- operations orders will continually plague us. erations, states: “The detailed analysis and coordi- Successful planning requires continual validation nation accomplished in the time available for delib- of planning assumptions. Developing a validation erate planning can expedite effective decisionmaking matrix and using validation points helps planners jus- and execution during a crisis. As the crisis unfolds, tify the continued use of an assumption early in the assumptions and projections are replaced with facts planning process and throughout CAP. This matrix and actual conditions.”9 forces planners to focus their efforts to continuously Assumptions in the gray zone pose the most risk validate or revisit assumptions. to the plan: “U.S. defense planners explicitly iden- Military planners seldom revisit planning assump- tify assumptions made in the development of war tions after initial planning development. Current plans. While the process for explicitly identifying doctrine and guidance at the Joint Forces Staff planning assumptions is neither scientific nor fool- College state: “Assumptions given by the higher proof, it is extremely valuable because it makes war headquarters must be treated as facts by the sub- planners and decisionmakers more cognizant of at ordinate commanders.”5 Because of this definition, least some of the plan’s inherent risks.”10 To miti- planners must further validate assumptions because gate risks, planners can identify some areas as ge- “a poor assumption may partially or completely neric validation points. invalidate the entire plan.”6 The director of strate- When identifying points that might validate an as- gic studies at the Strategic Studies Institute notes: sumption, planners must carefully consider events “Correcting faulty assumptions may require re- that might influence an assumption. National and working the fundamental concept entirely.”7 If world events have tremendous influence on an the plan is not reworked in its entirety, at a mini- assumption’s validity. The deliberate planning pro- mum, planners must develop a branch plan. Using cess “relies heavily on assumptions regarding the validation points for assumptions forces planners to political and military circumstances that will exist verify assumptions and possibly initiate branch plan- when the plan is implemented.”11 At the operational ning. An invalid assumption can cause a requirement level, many planners use political assumptions. Mili- for a branch plan. Therefore, “continuous and re- tary planners should not shy away from political as- lentless validation of assumptions throughout the sumptions; they should be more aggressive in vali- deliberate planning process and at the start of dating them. CAP is a must.”8 Political and diplomatic affairs are usually tied to A gray zone exists between the start of the de- basing assumptions. To further develop validation tailed deployment plan and the beginning of crisis points for these assumptions, interagency personnel action planning in which assumptions made during should advise military planners on world and the deliberate planning process are carried over into economic events that might influence assumptions. crisis action planning without being validated. Joint Not only will this broaden the planners’ view, it
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 59 of Turkish deputies. Wolfowitz returned with the message that the “Turks will not let us down” even though a vote of no confidence had passed and new elections were to be held in November 2002.14 The vote of no confidence in July should have been a clear in- dication that events had changed the status of one vali- dation point (a supportive Turkish Government). The new vote took place on 3 November 2002. The Jus- Undersecretary of Defense tice and Development Party Paul Wolfowitz meets with a Turkish delegation at the (AKP) defeated Turkish Pentagon, November 2003. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s
DOD party and installed a new anti- will also ensure viable validation points are set for establishment government with roots in political Is- every assumption. lam.15 The election of a new, untested government In accordance with the National Security Strat- should have been a validation point for CAP plan- egy, U.S. reliance on foreign basing is contingent on ners. Turkey’s once powerful military and political assurances from foreign governments. That said, it elite would now have less of a voice in political and is not prudent to assume a sovereign country will strategic decisions—a development for which U.S. allow U.S. forces to stage and base an attack from decisionmakers were unprepared. The installation of its soil unless its national interests are at stake. the new government was an important change that could have invalidated the planning assumption. Turkey and the Northern Front Based on the state of affairs in Turkey, the Turk- The recent experience with Turkey leading up to ish Government had every reason to express its con- Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates assumptions con- cern for a war with Iraq. Any of the following events cerning longtime allies might not always hold true. should have triggered a status change of a valida- The plan called for the use of a northern front in tion point, possibly invalidating the assumption: Turkey for air refueling operations, special opera- First, 96 percent of the Turkish people did not sup- tions forces, a logistical base, and 4th Infantry Divi- port a U.S.-led war with Iraq.16 sion (ID) and joint personnel recovery operations. Second, the 1991 Persian Gulf War emboldened Three dozen ships loaded with tanks and heavy Kurdish separatists who began using northern Iraq equipment for the Army’s 4th ID waited off the to attack Turkey. By the time a 1999 cease-fire coast of Turkey for permission to offload.12 The ended the fighting, 30,000 people had died, perhaps equipment and the 60,000 soldiers represented a sig- as many as half of them Turkish soldiers.17 In 2003, nificant portion of our combat capability that did not the Turkish people did not want a repeat of the blood- participate in the start of combat operations in Iraq. shed of the 1990s. Many events in Turkey (changing political situations, Third, the United States failed to deliver on most diminishing public support, economic woes, and a of its promises of economic aid in return for Turkey’s newly elected government) should have been vali- support of the Persian Gulf War. Because Turkey dation points even though U.S. Army Central Com- was Iraq’s largest trading partner, the Persian Gulf mand was well into crisis action planning. War had weakened Turkey’s economy, which In July 2002, Undersecretary of Defense Paul caused Turkey’s currency to collapse in 2000.18 Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of State for Political Fourth, in February 2003, Turkey refused the Affairs Marc Grossman met in Ankara with Turk- final U.S. economic aid package of $26 billion. ish Government officials seeking permission to base Turkey sought twice that sum and let it be known an attack from Turkey.13 Unfortunately, internal that without it there would be no new vote in Turkish political events resulted in mass resignations parliament to allow U.S. troops into Turkey.19 In
60 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS the end, a new vote was never taken, and the ships sumptions]. Many are pointless and some assume carrying the 4th ID turned south on 17 March 2003, away problems.”24 2 days before the decapitation attack on Saddam Second, planners must validate assumptions as Hussein. early as possible by using a validation matrix and es- The initial course of events should have been an tablishing validation points. indication that Turkish cooperation was not assured: Third, combatant commanders must incorporate “In deliberate plans, there is a rule that no assump- the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) tion about allies’ cooperation should be made unless and the Coalition Interagency Coordination Group the commitment is clear [in the form of agreements (CIACG) into the planning process. Active partici- or alliances in place, for example].”20 The events pation by military and interagency planners must take should have been enough to cast doubt on whether place in developing assumptions and the validation Turkey would support a northern front. process. In retrospect, it is clear the United States quickly Our proposed definition of assumption is: “A sup- reached several validation points that invalidated a position of current or future events that is continu- basing assumption. Indeed, the political dialogue lead- ally validated during the planning process to enable ing to the March 2003 vote to allow troops to base the commander to complete an estimate of the situ- in Turkey seemed to put the assumption in jeopardy ation and make a decision on the course of action.” as early as July 2002, when Wolfowitz seemed con- This definition, used with validation points and the vinced of Turkish support even though a vote of no validation-point matrix, would provide direction to confidence was pending. planners throughout the planning process. In December 2002, Wolfowitz flew to Anakara Before explaining where to insert the validation- for talks with the new Turkish leaders; he emerged point matrix into the planning process, it is neces- saying, “Turkish support is assured.”21 Whether sary to review the five phases of the deliberate plan- Washington received positive signals from the Turk- ning process: initiation, concept development, plan ish leaders or U.S. leaders refused to believe the development, plan review, and supporting plans. The Turks would put their own national interests ahead second phase, concept development, is where we of U.S. desires is unclear. Leading up to the March can insert validation points. Concept development vote in the Turkish Parliament, the events and vali- consists of six steps: mission analysis, planning guid- dation points seemed clear. ance development, staff estimates, commander’s On 1 March 2003, the Turkish parliament voted estimate, CINC’s strategic concept, and Chairman not to approve U.S. troops in Turkey. Still, the ships of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review.25 of the 4th ID stayed off Turkey’s coast for an addi- Planners identify valid assumptions during the plan- tional 16 days after the vote. U.S. officials did not ning guidance development step of the concept de- alter initial assumptions, although new dynamics re- velopment phase (step 2 of phase 2). Initial staff brief- quired reevaluation by civilian and military planners ings must include a validation matrix and validation and leaders.22 points in the concept development phase. Possible Turkey had loyally backed U.S. military actions since the Korean War.23 What was different now? Validating Assumptions: Why did the 1 March 2003 vote in parliament au- Turkey WillAllow U.S. Forces Basing Rights thorizing 60,000 U.S. troops to use Turkey as a northern front fail? Jan Feb 2002 2003 Validation Points Recommendations S N 1.Vote of no confidence (July ’02) Access to other countries will continue to prove critical to U.S. war plans. Emplacing the following S N 2.Turkish government change (Nov.’02) recommendations will allow planners to continually Q Q 3.Fear of Kurdish state validate planning assumptions: First, the joint community must recast the current Q Q 4.Potential economic effect of war definition of assumptions to stress the importance of Q Q 5.Turkish public support continually validating assumptions. U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni said: “I would always S N 6. Economic support from U.S. (Turkey eventually refused challenge assumptions very vigorously as the [com- U.S. economic aid package.) mander in chief] CINC. We have too many [as- N – No Support Q – Questionable Support S – Support
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 61 validation points for the matrix should include events departments and agencies that will improve planning such as national and international political events, and coordination within the coalition.”27 Coalition public opinion, and economic conditions. partners have tremendous insight into validation The validation point matrix includes events spe- points within their country that could change the sta- cific to Turkey leading up to Operation Iraqi Free- tus of an assumption. Also, validation points might dom. (See figure.) The letter codes applied to the become less ambiguous in developing assumptions validation points in the matrix provide planners a tool with expertise from coalition partners. to assess the validity of current assumptions. If em- Developing good assumptions at the beginning of ployed properly, the validation point matrix can be a the planning process is crucial, but more important visual tool to help military and interagency planners is the continuous validation of assumptions. We have throughout the entire planning process. redefined the definition of assumptions, established Interagency coordination is conducted through validation points, introduced the validation point ma- groups such as the JIACG and CIACG. According trix, and included the JIACG and CIACG in the com- to Joint Forces Command, the JIACG “seeks to es- batant commander’s staff. Our definition of an as- tablish operational connections between civilian and sumption directs planners to continually validate military departments and agencies that will improve assumptions throughout the planning process. Apply- planning and coordination with the government. ing the validation point matrix to the assumption of Functions of the JIACG include participating in using Turkey as a northern front demonstrates the combatant command staff crisis planning and assess- matrix’s usefulness. Including the JIACG and ment; civilian agency campaign planning; and pre- CIACG on the combatant commander’s staff would senting unique civilian agency approaches, capabili- help planners establish validation points and use the ties, and limitations to the military campaign validation point matrix. planners.”26 If planners had used the tools we have outlined, The JIACG’s value is in identifying validation they might have invalidated the use of Turkey as a points during the planning process and reporting the northern front. Planners must be cognizant of chang- status of validation points. The CIACG “establishes ing events throughout the planning process so as to operational connections between civilian and military continuously validate assumptions. MR
NOTES 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense 11. JP 5-0, III-9. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print- 12. Glenn Kessler and Philip P. Pan, “Missteps With Turkey Prove Costly,” The Wash- ing Office [GPO], 2001), 39. ington Post, 28 March 2003, A1. 2. John M. Collins, “You Can’t Assume Nothin’,” Proceedings, The Naval Institute, 13. Barak A. Salmoni, “Strategic Partners of Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United 2003, on-line at
Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Woodmansee, U.S. Marine Corps, is the executive officer of Ma- rine Air Group-14, Cherry Point, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from Embry-Riddle Aero- nautical University, an M.S. from Auburn University, and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS) and Israel. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Faulkner, U.S. Army, is Division Chief, Capabilities Program Of- fice, at the National Security Agency. He received a B.A. from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, an M.S. from Central Michigan University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Com- mand and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Italy, and Germany. Major Wayne C. Blanchette, U.S. Air Force, is a student at CGSC. He received a B.A. from South- west Texas State University, an M.S. from Troy State University at Montgomery, and he is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College. He has served in various staff positions in CONUS and Germany.
62 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW Strength Maintenance A Risk Management Approach
Major Teresa Z. Taylor, U.S.Army National Guard, Retired, Ph.D.
HE U.S. ARMY MUST accomplish many while enhancing retention of trained soldiers. At- evolving missions, encompassing everything trition rates vary between Army components. A fromT disaster relief to prosecuting the Global War recent General Accounting Office (GAO) analysis on Terrorism. An all-volunteer multi-component of Active Army attrition rates found a first-term force performs these missions. As Operation Iraqi attrition rate of 39 percent for enlistees entering Freedom intensifies and deployments lengthen, Army the service in 1995.5 In fiscal year (FY) 2003, the organizations are experiencing recruitment prob- Department of Defense (DOD) met its Reserve lems, and concerns are being voiced about soldier Component (RC) attrition goals, in the aggregate, retention. with an overall attrition rate of 18.4 percent—the Until recently, all Army components have been lowest since 1991. This lower rate is attributed to successful in achieving recruiting goals.1 In 2004, the the Reserve Component’s support of the Global War Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) on Terrorism and the post-11 September 2001 im- met their recruiting mission. However, the U.S. plementation of stop-loss programs that minimize Army National Guard (ARNG) did not: it fell 5,000 attrition in certain military positions.6 However, as short of its recruiting goal for the year.2 To help meet the Army struggles to meet all the demands placed its 2005 recruiting objectives, the Army’s recruiting on it, concerns are being raised about the percent- command has lowered some standards for recruits.3 age of soldiers who might leave the military rather Some have also raised the issue of reinstating the than face further deployments.7 draft. While that might be an option, most Americans still support an all-volunteer Army. Strength-Maintenance Management Model The Army’s strength-maintenance pro- gram is designed to recruit quality soldiers, re- tain military occupation specialty (MOS)- Recruiting Retention/Attrition z Analyze requirements z Analyze soldier qualified soldiers, and reduce first-term soldier satisfaction 4 z Define demographics losses. The strength-maintenance manage- z Market to population z Follow up on feedback ment model offers a balanced approach to the z Invest knowledge in unit development of initiatives aimed at recruit- ing quality soldiers. Its programs are designed to retain the maximum number of trained sol- diers. Figure 1 shows the essential elements of the strength-maintenance program. Equally important to strength maintenance are programs that would reduce attrition Figure 1. Strength-maintenance management model.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 63 Operation Iraqi Freedom adds additional pressure ment, outlines, the Army’s philosophy is to integrate to Army leaders who were already reexamining the risk-management process into all activities.10 their terms of service to the Army. In 2001, the Army Risk management is the continuous process of iden- completed its Training and Leader Development tifying and controlling hazards to conserve combat Panel (ATLDP) study that identified concerns about power and resources. The six steps of risk manage- elevated attrition rates for commissioned, noncom- ment are— missioned, and warrant officers.8 The ATLDP study 1. Identify hazards. identified that Army downsizing, with the concurrent 2. Assess hazards to determine risks. shift and increase in mission requirements, contrib- 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions. uted to a zero-defects, micromanagement climate.9 4. Implement controls. Some specific findings of the study that have af- 5. Supervise and evaluate. fected retention rates include— 6. Assess reduced hazards. z High operational tempo (OPTEMPO). z The officer assignment process. The process Applying Risk-Assessment focuses on personnel management rather than quality Strategies for Retention professional development. The science of risk assessment and management z Attrition of captains. Because junior officers was developed to reduce unnecessary risk to sol- are rushed through developmental leadership posi- diers during training and operations. The Army’s tions to fill personnel shortages, their ability to mas- policy of “training the way you will fight” is inher- ter tactical and leadership skills is affected nega- ently dangerous. Identifying potential or actual haz- tively. ards as well as steps leaders can take to minimize z Junior officer job satisfaction. Junior officers are or eliminate the risk of those hazards produces man- concerned about their duties and the imbalance be- ageable danger. Applying the same risk-assessment tween the Army’s needs and their family’s needs. thinking to unit-retention programs means under- While each component participates in recruitment, standing the risks to retention associated with Army leaders are responsible for implementing re- key factors that research has found most influences tention and attrition programs in their units. Because retention. attrition management is essential to force readiness, Controls are actions taken to eliminate hazards or retention and attrition programs must be focused, reduce risk. The commander initially evaluates con- appropriate, and productive. I propose applying the trols already in place to verify if they adequately ad- Army’s risk-management process to a unit’s reten- dress the risk. These controls take different forms, tion and attrition program to achieve a more mea- and each answers a question: sured and consistent approach to the process. z Support provided. Is the type of support ad- As Field Manual (FM) 100-14, Risk Manage- equate to control the hazard?
Leadership Style Group and Job Satisfaction Organized Unit Team Dynamics and Training Operations
Positive; experienced1 Social atmosphere2 Job satisfaction and variety3 Family or job conflicts managed4
Uses leadership principles5 Pride in unit6 Quality training conducted by Operational and personnel competent instructors7 tempo managed8
Moderate discipline, fair Group cohesion10 Shared responsibility for training11 Equipment shortages treatment9 addressed12
People v. task orientation13 Family involvement14 Personnel used appropriately15 Pay problems addressed16
1. R. Budin, Trends in Attrition of High-Quality Military Recruits (Santa Monica, CA: 2000; Michael D. Matthews and John R. Hyatt, Research Report 1760, “Factors Affect- RAND Corp., August 1988). ing the Career Decisions of Army Captains” (Washington, DC: ARI, June 2000). 2. McGovern. 9. Timothy N. Martin and M. Shawn O’Laughlin, “Predictions of Organizational Com- 3. Martin and O’Laughlin. mitment: The Study of Part-Time Army Reservists,” Journal of Vocational Behavior 4. Mark M. Eisley and Myron P. Viner, Technical Report 861, Nationwide Survey of (1984); Hayder A. Lakhani, ARI Technical Report 907, The Determinant of Job Satis- Soldier Perceptions of Reserve Component (RC) Training (Washington, DC: ARI, Sep- faction in U.S. Army Reserve/National Guard Units: A Multidiciplinary Analysis (Wash- tember 1989); Burke K. Burright, David W. Grissmer, and D. Doering Zahava, RAND Study ington, DC: U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), August 1990). R-2866-MRAL, A Model of Reenlistment Decisions of Army National Guardsmen (Santa 10. Martin and O’Laughlin. Monica, CA: RAND Corp., October 1982). 11. Glenda Y. Nogami and David K. Horne, Research Report 1499, Perspectives on Re- 5. J.M. McGovern, Report RA-202, Non-ETS Attrition: Case Studies of Ten Army Se- serve Attrition (Washington, DC: ARI, October 1988). lected Reserve Companies (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 12. Nogami and Horne. of Defense [Reserve Affairs], 1983). 13. Ralph Katerberg and Peter W. Hom, “Effects of Within-Group and Between-Groups 6. Faris R. Kirkland, James L. Raney, and James M. Hicks, U.S. ARI Technical Re- Variation in Leadership,” Journal of Applied Psychology (1981). port, Reenlistment in the U.S. Army Reserve (Washington, DC: ARI, July 1984). 14. McGovern 7. Ibid. 15. Kirland, Raney, and Hicks. 8. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-110, “Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD’s 1999 Sur- 16. Kenneth K. Thomas, NPS-SM-95-006, Leadership and Retention in TPU’s: A Frame- vey of Active Duty Members,” statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Secu- work (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, August 1995), ii. rity Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, March Figure 2. Variables influencing retention.
64 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
z Standards. Is the guidance or procedure ad- these into four categories: equately clear to control the hazard? 1. Leader style, which relates to how positive a z Training. Is training thorough and recent enough leader’s attitude is toward soldiers and how much to control the hazard? experience the leader has. Retention is influenced z Leaders. Are leaders ready, willing, and able by how closely the leader adheres to well-established to enforce standards to control the hazard? leadership principles; how discipline is applied; and z Unit self-discipline. Is unit performance and the balance a leader maintains between being people- conduct sufficiently self-disciplined to control the focused and mission-focused. hazard? 11 2. Group and team dynamics, which encompass Commanders then determine how adequately ex- how satisfying unit social relationships are; how isting controls reduce the risk the hazard poses. Fol- proud unit members feel to be a part of the organi- lowing that determination, they might impose addi- zation; how cohesive unit members feel the organi- tional controls. To help identify hazards to retention, zation is; and how successful unit programs are in I summarize the relevant research that has been con- making soldier families feel a part of the team. ducted in the last 20 years. 3. Job satisfaction and training, which includes whether soldiers are in the occupations for which Retention Research they were trained and how well initial and skill As figure 2 shows, research sponsored by many maintenance training is conducted. different agencies and individuals identified reasons 4. Organized unit operations, which address soldiers choose to leave or stay in the Army. I group the soldier’s perception of how efficiently and
Leadership Style Hazards
General z The organization’s culture emphasizes one type of leadership style over another. z Senior leaders do not understand differences and the effect of different leadership styles. z Leader training outside the institution is not considered necessary.
Contingent Reward z Because behavioral and performance expectations are based on a negotiated contract involving rewards for successful performance, commitment to the organization might be limited. z Trust might be degraded if the performance contract is not honored.1 z Leaders might become overly reliant on this leadership style.
Management by Exception z Under constant threat of punishment, subordinates’ stress will increase. z Individuals will experience increased job “burnout.”2 z This leadership style contributes to attrition.3 z This leadership style is associated with a higher intent to leave the organization.4 z Leaders might be reluctant to try another leadership style if short-term results are required.
Transformational z Leaders might be unfamiliar with this leadership style and unsure how to employ it. z Misapplication (when another leadership style would be more appropriate).
Hazard Controls
Support z Knowledge-sharing about the appropriate application and employment of different leadership styles is made available and its use encouraged.
Standards z There is a published standard about the appropriate application of different leadership styles to which leaders are held accountable. z Criteria by which to evaluate different leadership styles are developed and applied in units.
Training z Training, modeling, and mentoring are available to leaders for the express purpose of developing a wide range of leadership styles.
Leader z Commanders at all levels of an organization form a primary team, acquire knowledge of all leadership styles, and develop an organizationwide philosophy about employing specific leadership styles within each unit in the organization.
Unit Self-Discipline z Unit leaders develop an understanding of the implications of short- versus long-term thinking and its effect on leadership styles and organizational culture.
1. Peter Bycio, Joyce S. Allen, and Rick D. Hackett, “Further Assessments of Bass’s sources Administration (1989). (1985) Conceptualization of Transactional and Transformational Leadership,” Journal 3. Kenneth K. Thomas and Bob Barrios-Choplin, NPS-SM-96-002, Effective Lead- of Applied Psychology (1995). ership in TPU’s: Findings from Interview at 16 Units (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgradu- 2. J. Seltzer, R.E. Numerof, and Bernard M. Bass, “Transformational Leadership: ate School, July 1996). Is it a Source of More or Less Burnout or Stress?” Journal of Health and Human Re- 4. Bycio, Allen, and Hackett. Figure 3. The risk-management process and leadership style hazards and controls.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 65 consistently the unit is run, problems are solved, and leadership styles can be grouped into three broad how OPTEMPO is managed. categories: Army leaders are acculturated to be decisive, ag- 1. The contingent reward, based on positive re- gressive, and to seize control. The Army has a bias wards for negotiated behavior. for action. Army leaders who get things done quickly 2. Management-by-exception, based on threat of are valued for the results they can achieve. How- punishment. ever, “going with the 80-percent solution” might not 3. Transformational management, which fosters always be the best choice when crafting solutions commitment to leader and organizational goals, to retention problems. Applying the deliberate, me- greater trust, innovativeness, and the ability to man- thodical risk-assessment approach to managing the age stress; higher performance levels in garrison and variance within the factors I identified can help a combat training centers; greater unit cohesion, this leader manage this important problem. leadership style is related to subordinate satisfaction Leader style. Different leader styles have dif- and a reduction in the intent to leave the organiza- ferent effects on short- and long-term goal accom- tion.13 plishment, the development of trust, how cohesive Figure 3 identifies leadership style hazards as well a unit might be, and the quality of unit perfor- as controls a leader might use to mitigate the risk mance.12 Research conducted in the last 25 years of these hazards to retention. has begun to define specific leadership styles and Group and team dynamics. Research indicates the effects of those styles on followers. Although military teams perform more successfully when some defining characteristics are still being debated, team members have an equal understanding of what
Group/Team Dynamics Hazards
z The type of people assigned to the team is inappropriate for the team’s task or function.1 z There is a lack of communication between team members and others outside the team.2 z Task parameters are unclear or too broad.3 z Team members are unclear as to their purpose; the team is not guided by an implementation plan.4 z The organizational culture does not support the team’s mission or team processes.5 z Managers and management policies, procedures, and work practices do not support the team’s efforts or impede the team’s efforts.6 z There is a lack of commitment by senior leaders to support the team’s efforts.7 z Rewards systems support practices that degrade team efforts.8 z Insufficient time or money is allotted to support team efforts.9 z Resources are not made available to support team efforts.10 z Training or education is not provided or required for leaders and team members about group and team dynamics.11
Hazard Controls
Support z Recognition is provided in a sincere, timely manner.12 z Teamwork is encouraged.13
Standards z Faultfinding and competition are discouraged.14 z Trust is established and maintained.15 z People-building is balanced with a concern for tangible results.16
Training z Appropriate training on team and group dynamics is provided at all levels.17
Leader z Leaders plan and study before starting and expanding team activities.18 z Leaders up and down the chain of command understand and support team efforts to build, maintain, and sustain the team.19
Unit Self-Discipline z People-building is balanced with a concern for tangible results.20
1. Diane D. Bandow, “Time to Create Sound Teamwork,” Journal for Quality & Partici- 9. Ibid. pation (Summer 2001). Teams might be members of a command group, staffs, temporary 10. Ibid. task-organized groups, or soldiers and their families. 11. Nickol. 2. Becky Nickol, “Dysfunctional Teams,” Executive Excellence (March 2000). 12. Ichak Adizes, “Managing: The Business of Mutual Trust and Respect,” Personnel 3. Bandow. Management (July 1993). 4. Nickol. 13-18. Ibid. 5. Bandow. 19. Bruce S. Sterling and Kathleen A. Quinkert, Research Report 1730, “Review of Battle 6. Ibid. Staff Training Research at Brigade and Battalion Levels” (Washington, DC: ARI, Decem- 7. Nickol. ber 1998). 8. Bandow. 20. Adizes. Figure 4. The risk-management process and group/team dynamics hazards and controls.
66 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS the task is and how they should interact to perform soldier is in the job is related to how effectively the successfully.14 How cohesive a team is contributes training he received prepared him to perform the to the team’s effectiveness, its ability to withstand job.19 A related retention factor is whether individu- stress, and its ability to sustain itself in the face of als are performing the role for which they were change.15 Although some teams are able to self- trained.20 Active Component (AC) and RC units organize and perform successfully, teams achieve ef- must perform a variety of missions, and units in all fectiveness more rapidly when a leader provides components face challenges that can degrade a unit team and group dynamics training.16 leader’s training program. Figure 5 identifies job sat- Healthy teams are building blocks to effective isfaction and training hazards and the controls a units; they foster and are fostered by cohesion. The leader might use to mitigate the risk of these haz- desire to be part of a cohesive organization is an el- ards to retention. ement important to the retention of soldiers.17 Many Organized unit operations. Unit leaders bal- external factors can influence Army team develop- ance providing effective leadership for unit members ment: rank, branch, component, full- and part-time with making effective, timely, appropriate manage- status, gender, race, family support, and so on. All ment decisions to maintain unit operations. In AC can have an effect on how successful a team might units, leaders have more time to spend on unit-man- be. Figure 4 identifies group and team dynamics haz- agement issues. The necessary staff members are ards and controls a leader might employ to mitigate present and resources are close by. Reserve units the risk of these hazards to retention. face additional management challenges because full- Job satisfaction and training. A military unit’s time support staffs vary between units, units might readiness to perform a mission depends on its mem- be geographically dispersed, or resources might not bers’ individual and collective proficiencies and ca- be available. Figure 6 identifies organized unit op- pabilities. A key factor cited in a number of reten- eration hazards and controls a leader might employ tion studies was job satisfaction.18 How satisfied a to mitigate the risk of these hazards to retention.
Job Satisfaction and Training Hazards
Training z Training is not offered in a soldier’s military occupational speciality.1 z Equipment or training areas are not available.2 z Trainers are poorly prepared.3 z Adult-learning principles are not employed to develop training programs.
Utilization z Soldiers do not perform the job for which they were trained.4 z Plans are made, then not followed; there is an atmosphere of crisis management.5 z Last-minute changes interrupt planned training.6
Hazard Controls
Support z Support plans for training are routinely developed and enforced.7 z Soldiers feel like they are achieving competence.8
Standards z Training is realistic in terms of what can be realistically learned in the time available as well as accomplished in realistic battlefield conditions.9
Training z Training is meaningful.10 z Soldiers feel as if they make progress.11 z Soldiers have a choice in what tasks they are trained in.12
Leader z Unit leaders communicate training goals to senior leaders.13 z Training goals are mutually established and respected.14 z Unit leaders are provided the latitude to accomplish the goals.15
Unit Self-Discipline z Unit trainers employ adult-learning principles when developing training. z Appropriate planning is accomplished to schedule resources and coordinate training support.16 z Individuals are used appropriately in the occupations for which they trained.17
1. Kenneth K. Thomas and Bob Barrios-Choplin, NPS-SM-96-002, Effective Lead- 1988); FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 September 1990). ership in TPU’s: Findings from Interview at 16 Units (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgradu- 10. Thomas and Barrios-Choplin. ate School, July 1996). 11-15. Ibid. 2-8. Ibid. 16. FM 25-100; FM 25-101. 9. U.S. Army FM 25-100, Training the Force (Washington, DC: GPO, 15 November 17. Thomas and Barrios-Choplin. Figure 5. The risk-management process (job satisfaction and training hazards).
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 67 Job Satisfaction and Training Hazards
Reserve Component z Full-time technician or Active Guard Reserve support staff withholds information from (RC) Units or Multi- part-time leaders. Composition Units z Bad attitudes are allowed to spill over onto drill weekends. with RC Soldiers z Employers are not provided information about unit-training activities. z Last-minute changes are made, and soldiers are penalized for not being able to take time off from civilian jobs.
All Units z New soldiers are ignored; no “new-soldier” training or orientation programs exist. z Policies and procedures are outdated; there are conflicting versions; last-minute changes are made before major events. z Unit administrative support personnel are allowed to lose track of administrative and pay problems. z Equipment requirements and supply requests fall through the cracks; no one seems to know where the request went. z Unit gains a reputation for being chronically tardy in submitting reports.
Hazard Controls
Support z Family and employer programs active and supported. z Soldiers have the right equipment and uniforms for the job.
Standards z There are clear procedures to solve pay and administrative problems; status of problems being solved is routinely provided to soldiers.
Training z New soldiers oriented and integrated smoothly. z Multi-composition units’ leaders are trained on unique RC soldier issues.
Leader z Leaders recognize the importance of professional, respectful attitude and insist on maintaining a positive, supportive command climate.
Unit Self-Discipline z Information about unit activities published well in advance. z Clear policies and procedures are published and adhered to routinely. z Reports are submitted in a timely manner.
Kenneth K. Thomas and Bob Barrios-Choplin, NPS-SM-96-002, Effective Leadership in TPU’s: Findings from Interview at 16 Units (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1996). Figure 6. The risk-management process and organized unit operations hazards and controls.
10. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 100-14, Risk Management (Washing- Successful Strength Maintenance ton, DC: GPO, 23 April 1998). 11. Ibid. A successful strength maintenance formula com- 12. Bernard M. Bass, “Leading in the Army After Next,” Military Review (March-April 1998): 46. bines thoughtful analysis with the establishment of 13. A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry into Transformational Leadership (Al- appropriate goals. Many factors affect a soldier’s exandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute [ARI], February 1996), 5-7; Jane M. Howell and Bruce J. Avolio, “Transformational Leadership, Transactional Leadership, Locus of decision to stay committed to the Army. While some Control and Support for Innovation: Key Predictors of Consolidated-Business Unit Per- formance,” Journal of Applied Psychology (1993); Walter O. Einstein and John H. factors might be beyond the control of individual com- Humphreys, “Transforming Leadership: Matching Diagnostics to Leader Behaviors,” Journal of Leadership Studies (Summer 2001); Peter Bycio, Joyce S. Allen, and Rick D. manders, a number of factors that influence reten- Hackett, “Further Assessments of Bass’s (1985) Conceptualization of Transactional and Transformational Leadership,” Journal of Applied Psychology (1995). tion and attrition are under the control of unit lead- 14. Bruce S. Sterling and Kathleen A. Quinkert, Research Report 1730, Review of Battle Staff Training Research at Brigade and Battalion Levels (Washington, D.C., Army ers. By applying the risk-management process to a Research Institute (ARI) December 1998). unit’s retention program, leaders might identify more 15. Jonathan Shay, “Commandant of the Marine Corps Trust Study,” Quantico, Vir- ginia, 2000. hazards to retention, and they might develop addi- 16. M.P.W. van Berlo, TNO-Report TM-960B010, Systematic Development of Team Training: A Review of the Literature (Soesterberg, The Netherlands: TNO Human Fac- tional controls to mitigate risks to retention. In an tors Research Institute, June 1996). 17. Kenneth K. Thomas, NPS-SM-95-006, Leadership and Retention in TPU’s: A Army of One, every soldier counts. MR Framework (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, August 1995), ii. 18. Timothy N. Martin and M. Shawn O’Laughlin, “Predictions of Organizational Com- mitment: The Study of Part-Time Army Reservists,” Journal of Vocational Behavior (1984); NOTES Hayder A. Lakhani, Technical Report 907, The Determinant of Job Satisfaction in U.S. Army Reserve/National Guard Units: A Multidisciplinary Analysis (Washington, DC: 1. Joe Burlas, “Army Meets Recruiting, Retention Goals Early,” Army News Ser- ARI, August 1990). vice, Washington, D.C., 26 August 2002. 19. Mark M. Eisley and Myron P. Technical Report 861, Nationwide Survey of Sol- 2. Eric Schmitt, “Its Recruitment Goals Pressing, The Army Will Ease Some Stan- dier Perceptions of Reserve Component (RC) Training (Washington, DC: ARI, Septem- dards,” New York Times, 1 October 2004. ber 1989); Burke K. Burright, David W. Grissmer, and D. Doering Zahava, RAND Study 3. Ibid. R-2866-MRAL, A Model of Reenlistment Decisions of Army National Guardsmen (Santa 4. U.S. Army National Guard Regulation 601-2, Personnel Procurement Army Na- Monica, CA: RAND Corp., October 1982). tional Guard Strength Maintenance Program (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print- 20. Faris R. Kirkland, James L. Raney, and James M. Hicks, Technical Report, Re- ing Office [GPO], 1 October 1996), 3. enlistment in the U.S. Army Reserve (Washington, DC: ARI, July 1984). 5. General Accounting Office (GAO)/National Security and International Affairs Di- vision (NSIAD)-00-146, “Military Personnel Services Need to Assess Efforts to Meet Recruiting Goals and Cut Attrition,” June 2000. Major Teresa Z. Taylor, U.S. Army National Guard, 6. Department of Defense, “FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report, Part Retired, is a Research Psychologist at the U.S. Army 2, Performance Information,” Washington, D.C., on-line at
68 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and John P. Sullivan © Copyright 2004 AUSA
This article, reprinted with permission of the Associa- military force, but that early prototype form of sui- tion of the United States Army (AUSA), is adapted from cide bombing has not been used for almost 60 the original copyrighted article published in September years. 2004 by the Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) as Land Persistent suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Warfare Paper No. 46W. AUSA and ILW publications are available on the AUSA web page at
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 69 The USS Bunker Hill was struck by two Kamikaze suicide aircraft within 30 seconds killing 372 crew- men and wounding 264, 11 May 1945. US Navy War II. In rare instances, uninjured individuals he- Western military tradition, which in no way views roically sacrifice their lives against hopeless odds in such action as heroic. defense of their comrades, as did two Delta snipers Oriental tradition. Suicide operations within the in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, who chose to help Oriental tradition have occurred sporadically across a downed Black Hawk crew.3 various cultures. In the 13th century, Mongol light At the unit level, desperation in war can result in cavalry “suicide troops” (mangudai) were used as suicidal or near-suicidal operations. The holding ac- bait. They charged the enemy then retreated, hop- tion of King Leonidas and his Spartan bodyguards ing the enemy would break ranks and pursue them at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. forms the into a well-coordinated trap.6 However, Mongol sui- basis of what might be considered a “heroic” activ- cide or near-suicide operational concepts did not ex- ity. More than a millennium and a half later, the tend into the modern world. Those of the Japanese battles of Verdun and The Somme during World War did, however. I were clearly suicidal operations as opposing forces The Japanese military drew on principles of repeatedly attempted to break the trench stalemate Bushido—“the way (do) of the warrior (bushi).” with massed human-wave attacks. In the early days These ideas were based on a fusion of Zen Bud- of the Korean War, Task Force Smith’s hasty block- dhism and later Confucianism and were described ing action was almost suicidal but required by dire in the Hagakure written in 1716 and Inazo Nitobe’s circumstances.4 Bushido: The Soul of Japan, translated into En- Even so, U.S. soldiers do not strap explosive vests glish in 1900.7 The Bushido warrior code contained to their bodies or purposefully ram cars or trucks the provision for ritual suicide (seppuku) and made laden with explosives into buildings.5 The suicide death preferable to the dishonor of being taken pris- bombings taking place in Iraq are totally alien to a oner. This tradition resulted in the prevalence of sui-
70 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS cide operations when Japan went on the defensive operations. Hezbollah exploited the images of the during World War II. Sword-wielding officers led cult of Hussein ibn Ali to inculcate self-sacrifice and suicide charges, and Kamikaze (divine wind) suicide martyrdom as an ideal for its fighters. This Shi’ite bomber aircraft units, midget submarine units, and group, which uses both terrorist and guerrilla tech- explosive motorboat units were born.8 niques, conducted its first large suicide bombing in Suicide bombings also occurred during the Viet- April 1983 against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. That nam War. The Viet Cong used sappers (demolition bombing was directly influenced by the first docu- commandos) who would carry or wear satchel mented vehicular suicide bombing (in December charges and purposefully blow themselves up to de- 1981) against the Iraqi Embassy in Lebanon. The stroy U.S. and Republic of Vietnam equipment and Shi’ia Amal group, which had links with Hezbollah fortifications. on the latter’s formation, conducted the 1981 bomb- Special commando “Black Tiger” units of the Lib- ing. eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) also conduct Suicide bombings remained solely a Shi’ia activ- suicide bombings in Sri Lanka and India. The Tamils ity for a decade until Hamas (Islamic Resistance are unique because they possess a hybrid Western Movement), a Sunni terrorist group, conducted a sui- and Oriental tradition that “advocate[s] a Tamil na- cide bombing within Israel in April 1993 against Is- tionalism that is expressed by its leaders in religious raeli Defense Forces soldiers. This ideological trans- terms referring to the cult of martyrs.”9 The group ference from Shi’ia to Sunni came about through is innovative, having copied the Hezbollah suicide- two circumstances. The first was Israel’s exiling of bombing concept of operations in 1987 years before more than 400 Islamic activists, many of them non-Shi’ia Palestinian terrorist groups used such Hamas members, to southern Lebanon in Decem- methods. About 200 Tamil suicide bombings oc- ber 1992. Hezbollah befriended these activists based curred from 1987 to late 2001, resulting in the group’s on the simple rationale that “the enemy of my en- status as preeminent user of the technique. Currently, emy is my friend.” While in exile, Hamas members the Tamil Tigers are in a state of “strategic pause” were influenced by Hezbollah’s suicide bombing with regard to suicide bombings but are capable of techniques and took them back to the West Bank starting them again at any time. when they were repatriated. Islamic tradition. Islamic suicide bombings are The second event was the fatwas (religious of interest because they provide the philosophical edicts) created by fundamentalist Sunni scholars to context in which such operations in Iraq are being rationalize how Shi’ia concepts of selfless sacrifice conducted. Raphael Israeli’s article, “A Manual of could fit into Sunni thinking about martyrdom and Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism,” is the best over- punishing one’s enemies. Suicide bombings spread view of suicide bombing’s Islamic philosophical ori- to other fundamentalist Sunni terrorist groups then gins.10 He notes that the conceptual basis for the to secular, nationalistic terrorist organizations such Shi’ite cult of martyrdom is a tradition that originated as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which emerged with Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the prophet in 2000 as an offshoot of Yassar Arafat’s Fatah fac- Muhammad. Hussein ibn Ali, sacrificed himself for tion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Allah when he and his followers were annihilated The migration of suicide bombings from the reli- by Caliph Yazid’s army at Karbalah in 680. gious to the secular set the stage for Saddam The idea of individual “selfless sacrifice” was Hussein’s use of this technique against allied inva- used during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s when sion forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and explains units of Iranian children, wearing the “keys to para- why any combination of former Iraqi Ba’ath party dise” around their necks, cleared Iraqi minefields loyalists (to a limited extent) and fundamentalist Shi’ia with their bodies. These Shi’ia sacrifices were im- and Sunni terrorists now operating in Iraq could con- mortalized with blood-red colored water in a foun- duct suicide bombings.11 Suicide bombers look for- tain dedicated to martyrs in Tehran. ward to death because, as martyrs, they expect Al- In 1982, the Iranian revolution under the Ayatol- lah to reward them in paradise, and they and their lah Ruhollah Khomeini was exported to Lebanon, families will gain social status. where the Islamic Resistance, a precursor of Economic benefits such as monetary payments Hezbollah (Party of God), launched suicide attacks might also come to family members as an addi- against American, French, and Israeli targets. Thus, tional bonus for completing a successful operation. Hezbollah, created in 1982 as a counter to the Is- During the Second Intifada, Saddam Hussein pro- raeli invasion, was the impetus for modern suicide vided cash payments of $25,000 to the families of
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 71 Operational and A jagged piece of the Strategic Context World Trade Center hangs precariously Suicide operations, which over the street after are more inclusive than sui- shearing through a neighboring building. cide bombings, have histori- cally occurred in all three dominant military traditions. However, only in the Islamic tradition are suicide bombings currently employed. The Tamil Tigers have not en- gaged in suicide bombings for the past few years. Modern suicide bombings were first operationally em- ployed during the early 1980s in southern Lebanon by the Amal and Hezbollah groups. The technique spread to the Tamil Tigers in 1987 and to Hamas in 1993. Over the en- suing decade, an increasing number of terrorist groups have engaged in suicide bombings: Palestine Islamic Jihad in 1994, Kurdistan Workers Party in 1996, al- Qaeda in 1998, Chechens in 2000, and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in 2002.13 With the exception of the Kurdistan Workers Party, this pattern has been part of a radical Islamic global insurgency against the United States and its allies since 1993. We can analyze major groups engaging in suicide bombings by delivery modes (figure 1) and target sets (figure 2). The Tamil Tigers and al-Qaeda top the list in FEMA suicide-bombing sophistica- Palestinian insurgents killed in suicide attacks against tion, followed by the Chechens and Hezbollah. Less Israeli targets.12 Suicide operations range in organi- sophisticated groups are Hamas, Palestine Islamic zational sophistication as well. A single suicide Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, although bomber might act individually against a target; two they have engaged in a greater number of suicide or three might coordinate the bombings; or a larger bombings than some of the other major groups. The number of suicide bombers might participate as for Kurdistan Workers Party is at the bottom of the example, the 19 al-Qaeda members who hijacked sophistication scale. 4 U.S. airliners on 11 September 2001 and who co- More sophisticated groups use larger, higher or- ordinated their activities as part of a strike force der explosive devices and engage in simultaneous against multiple targets. (multiple suicide bombers or targets) or sequential
72 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS attacks (secondary and tertiary suicide bombers at get. Escape routes and avoidance of capture after- the same target), often using other weapons. They ward are not a consideration. can engage “hard,” rather than solely “soft,” targets, z No one is left alive to interrogate. Because sui- partially because they have larger bombs and bet- cide bombers are not typically captured, terrorist ter explosives, and they have access to more deliv- groups can better maintain operational security. ery methods. Triggering methods (fuzes, pull cords, The Tamil Tigers use poison capsules as a fail- cell phones) also increase with sophistication, and safe method in this regard. Some Palestinian groups explosive devices are more difficult to detect by sen- use a redundant, cell-phone-activated detonator that sors (x-rays, metal detectors, dogs, soldiers).14 can be set off by calling the cell-phone number if Operational advantages of suicide bombings over the bomber attempts to back out of the mission. normal terrorist bombings include the following: z No burden of wounded comrades exists. In- z The device is precisely delivered to the target. jured comrades create a logistical strain on a group. The suicide bomber functions as a precision weapon taking the Group Personnel Vehicular Aircraft Vessel explosive device right to the tar- Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Yes Yes No No get, which is a standoff attack in the sense that the terrorist is Al-Qaeda Yes Yes Yes Yes “invisible” (stealth-masked) until Chechens Yes Yes No No the device is detonated, which Hamas Yes Yes No No helps overcome the Western advantage of standoff targeting Hezbollah Yes Yes No No based on physical distance. PKK Yes No No No z Harder targets can be at- PIJ Yes Yes No Yes tacked. Targets that cannot nor- mally be attacked can now be LTTE Yes Yes No Yes reached. Normal terrorist bomb- PIJ – Palestine Islamic Jihad PKK – Kurdistan Workers Party LTTE – Tamil Tigers Source: Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement and ings will not damage heavily for- Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC)–West ©2003 tified compounds that have Figure 1. Major groups by suicide-bomber delivery mode. proper standoff distances, but suicide bombers can crash through the front gate of z The horror factor increases the attack’s psy- a fortified compound and reach the desired target. chological effect. Suicide bombers wearing bomb z The device has no window of vulnerability. The vests are blown to pieces, and typically, their heads explosive device cannot be found and moved or ren- are separated from their bodies. Individuals look at dered safe before detonation. one another with suspicion in areas where suicide z No planned egress is required. A person sim- bombings occur frequently, which creates higher ply has to deliver the explosive charge to the tar- levels of anxiety for U.S. troops: they must scan
Civilian Military/LE Buildings/ Group (Personnel) (Personnel) VIP Transit Aircraft Vessel Infrastructure Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Al-Qaeda Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Chechens Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Hamas Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Hezbollah Yes Yes No No No No Yes PKK Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes PIJ Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes LTTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIJ – Palestine Islamic Jihad PKK – Kurdistan Workers Party LTTE – Tamil Tigers Source: Counter-OPFOR Program, NLECTC–West ©2003 Figure 2. Major groups by suicide-bomber target set.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 73 everyone in a crowd for bulky clothing and unusual vehicles packed with explosives sped down the behavior. offramp toward U.S. forces.16 The vehicles were z Blood-borne pathogens can be delivered. Sui- destroyed before they could complete their attack. cide bombers infected with hepatitis and HIV can However, according to Zucchino, suicide vehicles create a “hazmat” incident by spreading disease to loaded with explosives intermingled with Fedayeen, targeted personnel. Bone fragments and blood-cov- Arab volunteers, and Republican Guards. One par- ered bolts and nails might directly transmit patho- ticular vehicle, an orange-and-white taxi, attempted gens from the bomber to nearby victims. to ram a mechanized U.S. column.17 Such events Another strategic consideration is that suicide have become increasingly familiar to U.S. and coa- bombings create martyrs for the society from which lition forces in Iraq. the group recruits. As more suicide bombers kill We attempt here to place suicide operations in themselves and gain prestige in the eyes of their so- context by describing them in the premajor combat ciety, the cycle of violence can escalate into a “reli- buildup, during major combat operations (transmajor gious movement.” Already, Palestinian society is tak- combat), and during the postmajor combat phase of ing on characteristics of a death cult with young Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, we divide the children preferring to grow up to be suicide bomb- postmajor combat phase into two segments: pre- and ers rather than engineers and doctors. Recruitment postcapture of Saddam Hussein. We also identify of new suicide bombers is not difficult. attacks occurring during Ramadan 2003, basing our Radical Islamic networks, including al-Qaeda, are analysis exclusively on open-source intelligence. We engaging in a global insurgency against the West. relied on media reporting from multiple sources, in- Martyrdom is one of the common bonds that hold cluding wire services, news websites, and newspa- the insurgency together, and it is increasing in strength pers. We consulted several chronologies and data- as more terrorist groups engage in suicide bombings. bases and attempted to deconflict reports and The Roman Empire faced a similar strategic di- casualty figures. Not all sources agreed on details, lemma with Christian martyrs. The radical Islamic but the major trend is consistent.18 For example, on link to martyrdom, now more than 20 years old, must 19 March 2004, 1 day before the 1-year anniver- be broken before it becomes too fully entrenched. sary of the end of major combat, the Associated Press (AP) reported that at least 660 persons were OIF Statistical Findings killed in 24 suicide bombings that year. The AP re- Suicide operations have become emblematic of port began its tally on 29 March 2003 and ended it terrorism and war. Human-, vehicle-, and vessel- on 18 March 2004 and counted 18 vehicle- and 6 borne suicide bombers are a continuing concern to human-borne bombings. The article also noted that military, police, and security forces. This concern this frequency was greater than the Israel-Palestin- extends to Iraq and has been seen in all phases of ian toll over the previous 3-1/2 years.19 operations in the Iraqi theater. The account of “ma- We recorded 49 entries for the same period jor combat” operations in David Zucchino’s Los (some were potential incidents, some were attempts, Angeles Times Magazine article “The Thunder and others were multiple strikes). We identified a Run” mentions suicide bombers during that phase total of 54 entries, some of which were multiple at- of operations and covers the prelude to the fall of tacks during a single coordinated assault. The 54 15 Baghdad from 4 to 8 April 2003. entries yielded total casualties of approximately 813 Zucchino, who was embedded with Task Force killed and 2,154 injured. The figures include suicide 4-64 of the 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mecha- bombers in the totals. When we divided by phase nized), describes attempted suicide attacks against we found two events during the premajor combat U.S. forces. While traversing Highway 8 toward phase (5 killed in 1 vehicle- and 1 human-borne as- Baghdad on 5 April 2003, a mechanized column en- sault), 9 events during the transmajor combat phase, countered small arms and rocket-propelled grenade (17 killed, 33 injured in 5 vehicle- and 4 human-borne fire. Intermingled with Iraqi military vehicles were assaults); and 43 events during the postmajor com- civilian cars, taxis, buses, and motorcycles. Some bat phase (791 killed, 2,121 injured in 35 vehicle-, 8 Iraqi combatants wore military uniforms, some wore human-borne, and 1 unknown-mode assaults). civilian clothes, and others wore the black attire of When we subdivided the postmajor combat phase the Fedayeen Saddam. During this encounter, Task into the periods before and after Saddam Hussein’s Force 1-64, a battalion known as “Rogue,” was tak- capture, we documented 18 events before capture ing heavy fire. Zucchino describes how two suicide (totaling 274 killed and 749 injured in 16 vehicle- and
74 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS US Air Force
Air Force Explosive Ordnance and Devices specialists demonstrate a captured bomb vest during a briefing on suicide bombers.
2 human-borne attacks) and 25 events postcapture U.S. forces. His call was echoed on 23 February (517 killed, 1,372 injured in 18 vehicle- and 6 human- 2003 by Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who borne attacks, and 1 unknown mode). We noted 5 urged Iraqis and Muslims worldwide to carry out events during the so-called “Ramadan Offensive” suicide attacks against the United States. By 12 in 2003 (102 deaths and 354 injuries). March 2003, Saddam Hussein was calling for Ar- Our first entry occurred on 26 February 2003 dur- abs seeking martyrdom to join the struggle and con- ing the buildup to the war. The combat phase be- duct suicide bombings against the U.S. military. The gan on 20 March 2003, and the first entry in this British Navy expressed concerns about potential phase was recorded on 22 March 2003. We began Iraqi suicide vessels, and reports of Iraqi suicide the postmajor combat period on 2 May 2003, when training camps began to surface. major combat operations ended. Our last entry was Transmajor combat. The first attack in the on 18 March 2004 because analysis ended on transmajor combat phase occurred against a 20 March 2004, 1 year from when major combat Kurdish military checkpoint at Khurmal, Kurdistan. began. In addition to the suicide bomber, at least three Kurds Premajor combat. The premajor combat phase and an Australian news cameraman were killed. By includes entries on 26 February 2003 and 13 March 21 March, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 2003 when Ansar al-Islam attacked Kurdish inter- had joined the call to employ suicide bombings, urg- ests. Iranian hard-liners called for Palestinian suicide ing Iraqis to prepare suicide belts and confront bombers to target U.S. forces in the region.20 And, America with martyrdom operations. In response, by 11 February 2003, Iraqi officials were threaten- U.S. forces were advised to strip enemy prisoners ing suicide operations should the war begin, with Iraqi of war to counter potential suicide bombings.22 Ira- Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan asserting that nian naval forces reportedly intercepted an explo- Iraq would deploy thousands of suicide attackers.21 sive-laden Iraqi fast boat, and claimed to have spot- On 11 February 2003, Osama bin-Laden joined ted at least four additional suicide vessels.23 the information campaign with an audiotape aired on On 26 March 2003, an expatriate Ansar leader Qatar’s Al-Jazeera television network in which he told Dutch television that Ansar suicide commandos called on Iraqis to carry out suicide attacks against would attack U.S. troops, a claim that had to be
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 75 taken seriously given the Ansar attacks in Kurdistan. The first attack in this phase was the 7 August Information began to surface that foreign fighters, 2003 truck bombing of the Jordanian Embassy. Com- including Hezbollah, were en route to join the ing after a lull in operations, the attack signaled the war.24 start of a concerted suicide bombing campaign in The first successful attack against U.S. forces support of an Iraqi insurgency. An attack on the UN occurred on 29 March 2003 in Najaf. Four U.S. sol- headquarters in Baghdad followed on 19 August. diers were killed in an Iraqi vehicular suicide attack. Employing a suicide-initiated, vehicle-borne impro- Iraqi leaders claimed this was the beginning of a vised explosive device, the truck-borne assault tar- “routine military policy,” and the attacker was post- geted the front of the UN headquarters located in humously awarded two medals by Saddam Hus- the former Canal Hotel and killed 25 and injured 100. sein.25 In the aftermath of this attack, information Intended to erode public and international support for operations supporting use of suicide operations in- U.S. reconstruction of Iraq, the attack severely cur- creased. These propaganda actions were supported tailed UN operations. In what appeared to be a re- by an “affinity” attack in Netanya, Israel, on 30 inforcing action aimed at eroding coalition stability March 2003, which injured 49 Israelis in what the efforts, a second attack against the UN occurred Islamic Jihad called “Palestine’s gift to the heroic on 22 September. people of Iraq.”26 The Al-Quds Brigades deployed An apparent resurgence of anti-coalition sui- suicide operatives to Baghdad, and Islamic leaders, cide attacks began when Ramadan began. The websites, and newspapers across the Middle East “Ramadan Offensive,” from 26 October to 24 No- and elsewhere took up the call to join the jihad and vember 2003, accounted for six suicide events, two encouraged suicide martyrs to defend Iraq.27 of which were of major symbolic and strategic im- U.S. Marines found a cache of suicide vests in a portance. On 27 October, suicide bombers attacked Baghdad school on 13 April 2003. The vests, lined the Red Cross offices. The attack was coordinated with C4 plastic explosive and containing ball bear- with attacks on five Iraqi police stations where 40 ings, were believed to people were killed and have been secreted Actor/Group Personnel Vehicle Aircraft Vessel more than 200 injured. by paramilitary fight- The 12 November at- Ansar al-Islam Yes Yes No No ers associated with tack against the Italian the Fedayeen Sad- Jihad/al-Qaeda Yes Yes No Yes Carabinieri base in dam. U.S. forces also Fedayeen/Iraqi Yes Yes No Yes Nasiriya killed 31 and found evidence of Source: Counter-OPFOR Program, NLECTC–West ©2003 injured 80. The at- suicide training and Figure 3. Suicide-bomber delivery modes in tacks caused the sus- recruitment efforts. Operation Iraqi Freedom. pension of humani- Suicide attacks dur- tarian operations by ing the transmajor combat phase were limited in many nongovernmental relief organizations and pro- scope and sophistication. Most assaults were di- voked political discussion worldwide on the presence rected against U.S. military convoys, columns, or of coalition forces. Attacks on Shi’ite religious lead- checkpoints. While suicide attacks during major com- ers, mosques, and shrines also occurred during this bat had little military significance, they were an time, fueling lack of confidence in the coalition’s re- emerging force-protection concern and a precursor construction plans. for suicide operations in the insurgency that followed. Suicide bombings were increasingly used as a tool Postmajor combat. Suicide operations gained to stimulate insurgency during this phase. Their so- momentum during the postmajor combat phase with phistication increased, and they began using larger more than 43 suicide events after major combat bombs, fuel tankers, and—particularly perfidious— ended. The events have yielded many casualties and ambulances and police cars, in combination assaults. demonstrate an increased sophistication in targeting Suicide operations also augmented armed assaults. and coordination. The attacks continue to focus on Foreign jihadi fighters apparently also played crucial U.S. military targets but include other targets of in- roles. creasing strategic importance. New targets included Premajor combat information operations seem to the Italian Carabinieri, the International Committee have resonated. Some accounts suggest al-Qaeda of the Red Cross, Iraqi police, Shi’ia religious ven- links, including the infusion of Lashkar-e-Toiba, ues, political figures, and diplomatic sites such as the Chechen members of Bin Laden’s International Is- Jordanian and Turkish Embassies and UN facilities. lamic Front, and Pakistanis, Saudis, and Jordanians.28
76 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS
Aftermath of a car bomb that killed Ezzidin Salim, the head of the Iraqi Governing Council, 17 May 2004. US Army As noted in a 14 December 2003 Los Angeles in sophistication demonstrated in the UN, Red Cross, Times account, insurgents demonstrated increasing and Carabinieri attacks before Saddam Hussein’s sophistication in terms of tactics, strategy, and intel- capture carried over into the postcapture period, with ligence operations with suicide operations being cen- an increase in events, casualties, and sophistication. tral to this mix. The article says: “A menacing wild Suicide bombings had become firmly embedded in card in the war is the corps of suicide bombers, the Iraqi insurgent armamentarium. mostly believed to be foreign born jihadis, whom the insurgent forces appear to be able to call on for pre- The FutureFutureThe cision attacks, such as the bombings at the United Suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom Nations’ headquarters in Baghdad and a strike at Ital- began with a series of low-key, preconflict indica- ian military police headquarters in the southern city tors. A couple of successful bombings occurred in of Nasiriyah.”29 Kurdistan followed by calls from Saddam Hussein’s By 29 November 2003, media reports detailed al- Ba’athist regime to use martyrdom operations to Qaeda links to the Iraqi insurgency, noting that Iraq thwart U.S. intentions. Then Islamist leaders made was central to its global insurgency efforts. Euro- Saddam Hussein’s call their own to stimulate their pean jihadis were being recruited for Iraq, and the vision of an anti-U.S., anti-Western global jihad. importance of Abu Musab Zarqawi’s network, as During major combat operations, a relatively small well as a Zarqawi-Ansar alliance in staging suicide number of tactically insignificant suicide attacks operations against military, diplomatic, and humani- were directed against U.S. military forces. These tarian targets in Iraq, emerged.30 In early February attacks did not delay the collapse of Saddam 2004 in Palestine and Iraq, Islamist leaders pro- Hussein’s regime or affect the outcome of combat claimed martyrdom operations were a religious ob- operations. ligation.31 These attacks—as with any attack employing By 29 February 2004, the jihadi suicide-bombing suicide operations by irregular forces cloaked in imperative had “taken root in the ravaged landscape civilian attire—were clear violations of interna- of postwar Iraq.”32 This phase of operations is sig- tional law. As such, they constituted perfidy or “acts nificant for the rising number of suicide attacks within inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead an increasing insurgent operational tempo. The gains him to believe that he is entitled to, or is accorded,
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 77 protection under the rules of international law.”33 The suicide bombers employ evolve, and the best solu- United States did not ratify the 1977 protocols, but tion for dissecting evolving TTPs is through real-time customary prohibitions of such conduct still apply. In intelligence collection, assessment, and dissemination. addition, targeting civilians is clearly terrorism and As soon as a suicide operation occurs or is inter- constitutes a war crime. International humanitarian dicted, TTP should be documented and an advisory law absolutely prohibits intentional targeting of civil- on the equipment used and the bomber’s previous ians (including police forces). behavior should be disseminated to friendly forces While traditional Islamic law explicitly proscribes immediately. Quick, tactical assessments must not suicide and the targeting of innocent civilians, Bin be delayed; the OPFOR will evolve its tactics for Laden’s al-Qaeda, the International Islamic Front, subsequent targets. Palestinian insurgents, and “secular” groups, such as Suicide bombers in Iraq (or anywhere else, for Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, sidestep that matter) will conduct operations based on local these prohibitions by referring to suicide bombers as conditions and capabilities. For example, vehicle- martyrs and interpreting their actions as a religious borne attacks frequently rely on a high-speed ap- duty. The tactic of “extreme revenge” has been proach to circumvent tactical security measures. transported to Iraq and perhaps in the future will ap- Multiple attacks are designed to overwhelm opera- pear elsewhere.34 tional-level coordination and force allocation. TTPs The suicide bombings in Iraq, particularly against used in Palestine and by the LTTE in the Indian sub- U.S. troops, then against the UN, Red Cross, po- continent provide good background information, as lice, and civilian targets, demonstrated a new chap- do the events we recount here. However, the cur- ter in global terrorism and insurgency. Martyrdom rent and future OPFOR will adapt TTPs to local operations signal an escalation in the conflict because context, capabilities, and countermeasures. they seek maximum casualties and destruction. Sui- Strategically, suicide bombings erode the public’s cide attacks are low-cost, precision means that yield confidence and that of the expeditionary force’s a high symbolic return. At the tactical level, suicide home audience. In Iraq, attacks stimulate the insur- operations allow precise targeting through manipu- gency and undermine attempts to build a secure civil lation of organic stealth: the bomber is masked until society. International organizations, such as the UN the operation occurs, barring accurate tactical intel- and Red Cross, and humanitarian entities are now ligence derived from human sources within the com- reluctant to operate in the contested theater, which batant cell. hinders attempts to restore stability. Perhaps most Because many suicide operations, particularly in important, the experience of suicide bombings and Israel and Palestine, involve secondary or twin at- their role in nurturing and sustaining an insurgency tacks, an awareness of secondary attack potentials provides key strategic lessons. Like much of the must be ingrained in all military and constabulary Arab world, Iraq has little historical tolerance for forces involved in counterinsurgency, peacemaking, occupation (especially by non-Muslims). This, com- peacekeeping, and stability operations and support bined with the contemporary appeal of radical jihad, operations. Once the first bomb goes off, forces must creates an incendiary political mixture that provides always look for the potential secondary or tertiary Iraqi insurgents motivation, legitimacy, and a global attack. Tactical response should include separating support network. suspicious persons from crowds and massed forces. The infusion of foreign jihadi fighters and the in- Such police operations require increased training in fluence of transnational organized crime also make constabulary operations and a higher number of con- paramount the need for intelligence and law-enforce- stabulary forces being integrated into future military ment components in the military counterinsurgency.35 force structures. The jihadi-criminal-insurgent mix challenges civil gov- Because checkpoints are frequently targeted, ernance and the rule of law. Military forces alone solid standoff distances at checkpoints and dur- cannot reconstruct a civil society. The Iraqi experi- ing intervention with suspicious persons are key. ence demonstrates the need for expanded con- Countering suicide attacks demands enhanced in- stabulary forces and the integration of military telligence; appropriate offensive military and con- units, intelligence, police forces, and operations in stabulary operations; effective defensive and force- concert with (or supporting the formation of) civil protection measures; and a force structure tailored authorities. to the counterinsurgency environment. As the United States seeks stability in Iraq and, The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) potentially, in other states targeted by radical Islam-
78 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW CCCURRENTURRENTURRENT OOOPERAPERAPERATIONSTIONSTIONS ists, such interaction is essential. Suicide bombings ing suicide tactics. We hope to capture those les- continue in Iraq and elsewhere with regularity, sons learned as the United States continues its fueling insurgency and stimulating jihadi support. struggle against extremists who use the suicide of U.S. soldiers and Marines continue to find indica- their warriors as the ultimate sign of their resolve tors of future suicide potentials, including new and as a rejection of a global civil society built on caches of bomb belts and jihadi propaganda promot- the rule of law. MR
NOTES 1. See the bond-relationship targeting section of Robert J. Bunker’s article, “Higher 16. Ibid. Dimensional Warfighting,” Military Review (September-October 1999): 57–59. 17. Ibid. While Zucchino’s account chronicles several attempted suicide attacks 2. Suicide bombings are known by different terms depending on the group in ques- against U.S. forces on 5 and 7 April 2003 during the battle for Baghdad, the chronol- tion. Jihadi and other radical Islamic groups call these bombings “martyrdom operations,” ogy contains several others. Needless to say, media reporting of the situation in Iraq and those who blow themselves up are “martyrs.” Many officers in U.S. law enforcement is clouded by the fog of war. Undoubtedly, accounts of these attacks vary, some not commonly use the imprecise term “homicide bombers.” Some academics, such as reported, and details are often sketchy. Therefore, all these events should be viewed Raphael Israeli, refer to suicide bombers as “Islamikazes.” For simplicity, we use “sui- as representative rather than definitive. cide bombings” and “suicide bombers.” 18. Media reports surveyed include the wire services Reuters, Agence France 3. SFC Randy Shughart and MSG Gary Gordon were posthumously awarded the Press, Associated Press, and United Press International. Websites include BBC, CNN, Medal of Honor. For more on their heroic actions, see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down Fox News, Reuters Alertnet, “The Agonist,” and the Royal United Services Institute (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). (RUSI) Iraq Information Portal. Print media sources (including on-line versions) in- 4. GEN Douglas MacArthur viewed Task Force Smith as an “arrogant display of clude the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science strength.” Initially, it was thought this ad hoc, 540-man force might fool the North Kore- Monitor, Times of London, Asia Times, Times of India, Sydney Morning Herald, and ans into thinking a larger force was present or even make them retreat when they found Manchester Guardian. The Terrorism Research Center’s premium Content Terrorist out they were engaging U.S. soldiers. Neither event occurred. After two valiant tactical Attack database and Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement and Cor- engagements at the Battle of Osan on 5 July 1950 what was left of the small task rections Technology Center (NLECTC)-West, Suicide Bomber Web-base were also force withdrew in the face of advancing Korean People’s Army units. See Maurice reviewed. We sought to use the most recent, corrected reports when available, yet am- Matloff, ed., American Military History, 2: 1902–1996 (Conshohocken, PA: Combined biguity remains. Books, 1996), 207. 19. Tarek al-Issam, “Suicide attacks ravage Iraq,” Toronto Star, 19 March 2004. 5. Despite the tradition that soldiers do not conduct suicide attacks, isolated events 20. “Iran and Threats to U.S. Forces in Middle East,” Strategic Forecasting, Inc. have occurred. Some late 19th- and early 20th-century anarchists (the terrorists of their (STRATFOR), 21 January 2003. day) conducted suicide attacks. For example, in 1892 Russian anarchist Alexander 21. “Iraq Threatens Suicide Attacks Against U.S. Troops,” Reuters, 1 February 2003. Berkman tried to ignite an explosive capsule in his teeth while being subdued by police 22. Oliver Poole, “POWs to be stripped in suicide bomb fears,” The Telegraph, 22 during the botched assassination attempt of industrialist Henry Clay Frick. See Caleb March 2003. Carr, The Lessons of Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 148. So, even in West- 23. “Four Iraqi suicide speedboats spotted, one intercepted,” World Tribune.com, ern tradition terrorists have the potential to engage in suicide attacks. Early Christianity 27 March 2003, on-line at
Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., is a Counter-OPFOR and Less-Than-Lethal-Weapons Programs consultant at the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Cen- ter-West, El Segundo, California. He is a member of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group and a past Fellow of the Institute of Land Warfare (ILW), Association of the United States Army (AUSA). Most recently he edited Non-State Threats and Future Wars (New York: Frank Cass: 2003). He is currently involved in a multiyear suicide bomber research project. He is a frequent contributor to Military Review. John P. Sullivan is a researcher specializing in terrorism, conflict, urban operations, intelligence studies, and the intersection between war and crime. He is currently a ser- geant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, where he serves as officer-in-charge of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group. He has written for various law- enforcement and military publications.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 79 MRFromFrom MyMy BookshelfBookshelf
U.S. Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Peter J. Schoomaker, has released an extensive reading list to help military professionals further develop confidence, military knowledge, habits of reflection, and intellectual growth, whether they are officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The following synopses are adapted from those found in the CSA’s Field-Grade Officers, CW4-CW5, Senior NCOs, and Senior Leaders above Brigade professional reading lists available on-line at
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 17 September 2002, 31 pages, (available at
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, Washington, D.C., GPO, February 2003, 30 pages, (available at
Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Rohan Gunaratna, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2003, 304 pages, $14.00. Based on over 5 years of research, Inside al Qaeda is the definitive story be hind the rise of this small, mysterious group to become the notorious organization making headlines today. The book is essential reading for senior officers and NCOs in the Global War on Terrorism.
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, James M. McPherson, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 944 pages, $18.95. Battle Cry of Freedom is James M. McPherson’s brilliant account of the war that made the country what it is today—the American Civil War. In clear, incisive detail, he discusses the causes of the war, military operations, soldiers, and leaders, as well as the political, economic, and so cial aspects of life in the Union and the Confederacy before and during the war. Numerous historians have pronounced Battle Cry of Freedom the best one-volume book on the Civil War ever written. The book is essential reading for senior officers and NCOs wanting to understand this important conflict.
Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Martin Van Creveld, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, 295 pages, $29.99. In his survey of four centuries of military history, noted historian Martin Van Creveld points out clearly the reasons “amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics.” Most battlefield results would not have been possible without the careful organization and allocation of logistical resources. Field-grade officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs who fail to consider logistics in their plans and operations do so at their peril.
George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century, Mark A. Stoler, Twayne Publish- ers, New York, 1989, 252 pages, $22.00. General George C. Marshall played a pivotal role in U.S. history between 1939 and 1951. In this fascinating book, Mark A. Stoler integrates an extensive variety of primary and secondary sources, including Marshall’s private papers, in the story of the frustrations and successes of Marshall’s attempts to forge a workable military policy during World War II consistent with the basic principles of U.S. democracy. Best remembered for the Marshall Plan, Marshall is made comprehensible as a strategist at the center of the most destructive conflict in world history.
The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Back Bay Books, New York, 1995, 576 pages, $18.95. Drawing on interviews with senior offi
80 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW BBBOOKSHELFOOKSHELFOOKSHELF cials, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor provide a behind-the-scenes look at the highest levels of military decisionmaking that determined the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. The General’s War is an excellent primer for all senior leaders about the importance of personality in politics and war. On Becoming a Leader, Warren Bennis, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, Revised edition, 2003, 256 pages, $17.50. Management expert Warren Bennis shows how individuals develop leadership traits and how organizations encourage or stifle potential leaders. He profiles dynamic figures from diverse busi ness arenas to demonstrate how all leaders share distinctive characteristics. This provocative examination will encourage all aspiring leaders to take risks, embrace change, and transform their visions into reality. The Art of War, Sun Tzu, Samuel Griffith, trans., Oxford University Press, New York, New edition 2003, 222 pages, $9.95. Written in China over 2,000 years ago, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War provides the first-known attempt to formulate a rational basis for planning and conducting military operations. These wise, aphoristic essays contain timeless principles acted on by such 20th-century Chinese generals as Mao Tse-tung. On War, Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., Princeton University Press, NJ, 1976, 711 pages, $14.95. This edition of On War, the third English version published, is easily the best. In this indexed edition, editors Michael Howard and Peter Paret provide an accurate translation from the original 1832 version. On War represents one of the greatest works on military thought and strat egy ever written and contains ideas and concepts that apply at either the operational or the national level. Carl von Clausewitz remains essential reading for all senior leaders. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, Michael I. Handel, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 2001, 425 pages, $34.95. Masters of War is a comparative analysis of the classical works on war and strategic thought by Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Atonine Henri Jomini, and Niccolo Machiavelli. The book illuminates the many similarities between the works of these authors and highlights the continuity in the logic of war through the ages. As such, it is a valuable compendium of military thought all senior offic ers and NCOs should read. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Samuel Huntington, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, 560 pages, $24.95. Blending the disciplines of history, sociology, and political science, Samuel Huntington’s study should be required reading for Army officers. Huntington develops a theoretical framework with which to analyze civil-military relations. Particularly noteworthy is the preliminary discussion, “Officership as a Profession.” The arguments Huntington sets forth in this sec tion have colored the military’s self-perception for an entire generation. The Future of the Army Profession, Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, Project Directors, McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, Highstown, NJ, 2002, 576 pages, $28.75. Who are the future members of the Army profession, and how is their competence to be certified to their client, the American people? The Future of the Army Profession is a contemporary analysis of the Army profession and its knowledge and expertise, with conclusions and policy recommendations. This book is important reading for all senior offic ers and NCOs who care about their Army. For Senior Leaders above Brigade
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Free Press, New York, 1988, 329 pages, $18.95. History is a valuable tool for decisionmakers, but if used without careful consideration, it can blind the unwary with false analogies. This classic book offers senior leaders suggestions on how to use and avoid misusing the valuable experience history provides. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington, Simon & Schust- er, New York, 1998, 368 pages, $15.00. In this incisive book, the renowned political scientist, Samuel Huntington, explains how “civilizations” have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force behind global politics. While not everyone would agree with Huntington’s main thesis, one cannot afford to ignore this important, persuasive book.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 81 The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Thomas Friedman, Anchor, New York, 2000, 512 pages, $15.95. Thomas Friedman, the well-traveled New York Times foreign-affairs columnist, peppers The Lexus and the Olive Tree with engaging stories illustrative of his central theme—that global ization (the Lexus) is the central organizing principle of the post-Cold War world, although many individuals and nations resist by holding on to what has traditionally mattered to them (the olive tree). This book is an important primer on the modern world for all leaders.
War in European History, Michael Howard, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, 176 pages, $17.95. In this slim but important book, one of England’s most distinguished historians brilliantly summa rizes the evolution of warfare in Europe from the Roman Empire to the nuclear age. For U.S. senior lead ers, Howard’s book offers an excellent, thought-provoking introduction to the broader history of the profes sion of arms and the role war has played in the evolution of Western civilization.
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret and Gordon Craig, eds., Princeton University Press, NJ, 1986, 950 pages, $35.00. Makers of Modern Strategy is a won derful anthology on the evolution of strategic thought. Moving from Niccolo Machiavelli to the present in 28 insightful essays, editors Peter Paret and Gordon Craig examine nuclear strategy. This book is a primer for all senior leaders who must think strategically on various issues.
The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Berstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, New edition, 1996, 704 pages, $27.99. Some of the most respected scholars in the field of strategic studies examine the formulation of strategy in all its complexity in The Making of Strategy. Senior leaders will find useful insight into the cultural, social, politi cal, and organizational dimensions of strategic decisions in cases ranging from the Peloponnesian Wars to the formulation of 20th-century U.S. nuclear policy. The 17 cases display continuities in the principles of strategic thinking and breaks the 700-page book into convenient individual readings.
The Peloponnesian War, Donald Kagan, Viking Books, New York, 2003, 511 pages, $29.95. Senior leaders will want to read this valuable account of coalition warfare on land and sea in Ancient Greece. The book focuses on Athens’ and Sparta’s strategic planning, of their shifting alliances, and the effect individual leadership and civil-military relations had on implementing those plans. After 24 centuries, the lessons of this great war between two powerful city-states are still valid: economic strength does not guarantee vic tory, nor does military might ensure the ability to make peace. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, H.R. McMaster, Perennial, New York, Reprint edition, 1998, 480 pages, $16.00. In this important book, H.R. McMaster argues persuasively that President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war on poverty, not the war in Vietnam. But, Johnson made decisions he believed would allow him to do both, which was a recipe for disaster. The Joint Chiefs of Staff exacerbated this by failing to provide Johnson with their best advice. Dereliction of Duty is a cautionary tale about how the military and its civilian leadership failed at the highest levels.
Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon, James R. Locher III, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2002, 524 pages, $34.95. Victory on the Potomac is a fascinating story of how Congress forced the Pentagon to undergo major reform during the mid-1980s. James R. Locher III, who was a major participant in the process, tells the inside story of the 1986 Goldwater- Nichols reforms that set the stage for increased jointness in the services. The book is an excellent primer on the creation of public policy and the interface between the Pentagon and Congress.
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., Cam- bridge University Press, New York, 2001, 208 pages, $30.00. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray provide a conceptual framework and historical context for understanding the patterns of change, innova tion, and adaptation that have marked war in the Western world since the 14th century. Case studies and a conceptual overview offer senior leaders an indispensable introduction to military change.
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The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941, Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2000, 247 pages, $29.95. The Challenge of Change examines how military institutions attempted to meet the demands of the new strategic, politi cal, and technological realities of the turbulent era between World Wars I and II. The contributors chose France, Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as focus countries because those countries’ military institutions endeavored to develop both the material capacity and the conceptual frame work for conducting modern industrialized warfare on a continental scale. Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights, Douglas A. Macgregor, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2003, 320 pages, $34.95. In Transformation Under Fire, Douglas A. Macgregor builds on the success of his first book, Breaking the Phalanx, and lays out a blueprint for revolutionary change in how the U.S. Army is organized and how it fights. Macgregor argues that America needs a radically different military force to fight the global joint expeditionary warfare the Global War on Terrorism requires. This book is an interesting, if controversial, prescription that has many followers in today’s Army. Transformation Under Fire, which is important reading for senior Army leaders, provides a start ing point for any discussion on Transformation. MRReviewReview EssayEssay Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto Lieutenant Commander Youssef H.Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy
To understand al-Qaeda, one must towards our generation and future young men in Arab prisons around read the books of Ayman Al- generations. Perhaps I will be unable the Middle East. Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s principal ideo to write afterwards in the midst of Al-Zawahiri says the jihad has not logue and chief strategic thinker. Af these circumstances and changing stopped, and the movement is either ter Osama bin-Laden, Al-Zawahiri is conditions.” According to Al- attacking or preparing an attack. He the most-wanted Middle Eastern ter Zawahiri, the 11 September 2001 ter asserts Egyptian President Hosni rorist. The FBI has a $25 million re rorist attacks were just an opening Mubarak’s replacement of six interior ward for information leading to his salvo against the Christian and Jew ministers is proof of jihadist success. capture or arrest. ish “infidels.” He also says acts of violence, begin In 2001, Al-Zawahiri published Al-Zawahiri sees the United ning with the Egyptian Islamic jihad Knights under the Prophet’s Banner States, Israel, and Israel’s Western attack on the Military Technical Col (Fursan Taht Rayah Al-Nabi) even and Arab allies as the “first force” lege in 1974 and the agitation in as the empire he built with Bin- and Islamic militant movements that Southern Egypt of the early 1980s, Laden, and Taliban leader Mullah depend on God alone the “second were poorly planned, emphasizing Omar crumbled under the weight of force.” He believes the United States that deriving lessons from mistakes U.S. air, special operations forces, as is removing Islam from power and improving the potency of jihadic well as the Northern Alliance as through rigged elections, brutality, operations should be hallmarks of saults.1 Initially serialized in the Al- and force. He views treaties, peace Islamic militant movements. Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper in 12 in negotiations, and bans on weapons From a U.S. military force-protec stallments beginning in early Decem as steps in the direct occupation tion perspective, Part Seven of Al ber 2001, Knights under the of Muslim land by U.S. forces. To Zawahiri’s book reveals that the 1999 Prophet’s Banner can now be found Al-Zawahiri, jihad is an ideological joint U.S.-Arab military exercise, in the back alleys of any major Arab struggle for survival—a war with no Bright Star, was designed to keep city.2 The word “knights” in the title truce. He believes the Islamic jihadist fundamentalists from seizing political refers to the members of the jihadist movement should strike Islam’s en power, equating the exercise to the movement while evoking the image emies, using the Luxor incident of Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in of the knights of the crusades. 1997 as the means and as an example.3 1798.4 He claims the timing of Bright The book begins with Al-Zawahiri He supports the growth of jihad star was not an accident; it was timed saying: “I have written this book . . . among youths and numbers his suc to observe the 200th anniversary of to fulfill the duty entrusted to me cess in the tens of thousands of the French occupation of Egypt. To
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 83 him, U.S. troop commitments are evi vision cannot be fully understood tion, counterterrorism, and counterin dence of a victory for jihad forces. He without first reading Al-Zawahiri’s surgency tactics. MR combines his interpretation of Islam, book. Creating a serious psychologi Egyptian history, and news reports cal operations campaign without NOTES on U.S.-Egyptian military exercises to delving into his book would be diffi 1. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Fursan Taht Rayah Al-Nabi (Knights under the Prophet’s Banner) (Casablanca, Morocco: weave his own conspiratorial web to cult. Dar-al-Najaah Al-Jadeedah, 2001). Egyptian Islamic Jihad became so 2. I prepared this review essay by collecting the 11 install- encourage youth to embrace his po ments of the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in Arabic that first appeared litical objectives through violence unpopular in Egypt in the late 1990s in December 2001. The translation represents my understand- ing of the material. Any errors or omissions are my own. and terror. that Al-Zawahiri developed the strat 3. In November 1997, the Egyptian Islamic extremist Al-Zawahiri dreams of a future egy of striking the enemy (the United group al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG) staged a brutal attack that left 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians dead. The jihad in the southern Russian Repub States) afar instead of near (Arab attack, which occurred at Hatshepsut’s Temple in Luxor, be- lics, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to governments). Refuting Al-Zawah came the worst attack on tourists in Egypt’s history. See U.S. Department of State Publication 10535, Patterns of Global Ter- unite a nuclear Pakistan and the gas- iri’s theories and selective use of rorism (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), on-line at
84 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW MRAlmanacAlmanacAlmanac Hyman G. Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army Excellence is being good at some signs of qualities of leadership.”3 submarines because diesel-powered thing. Greatness is when you are the In May 1929, Rickover graduated generators charged the batteries, and best at something. And, heroism from Columbia University (where he the diesel engines used up the air comes as a result of a struggle that also met his future wife, Ruth Mas in submarines. Nuclear generators requires courage and personal sacri ters) with a master’s degree with dis greatly extended the time a subma fice. So, was U.S. Navy Admiral tinction in electrical engineering. He rine could stay submerged. Hyman G. Rickover a hero? then attended submarine school in In August 1946, President Harry S. Born in Russian-occupied Poland, New London, Connecticut, where he Truman signed the Atomic Energy Rickover immigrated to the United graduated fourth in his class in June Act, creating the Atomic Energy Com States at an early age with his mother 1930.4 mission to develop nuclear energy for and older sister, who fled anti-Semitic Assigned to engineering duty on military and peaceful uses. In July pogroms of annihilation to join a submarine, the S-48, Rickover did 1948, Vice Admiral Earle W. Mills Rickover’s father, a tailor and deserter well and qualified for command. Be chose Rickover to lead a group of from the Russian army, who had pre cause no submarines were available, engineers in developing nuclear- viously immigrated to America. The however, his next assignment was in propelled submarines. family fled to Belgium, where they the Office of the Inspector of Naval The group answered to the Navy, boarded the Finland to cross the Material in Philadelphia. He was later the Atomic Energy Commission, and Atlantic to the United States. Once assigned to engineering duty on the the Joint Committee on Atomic En in America, the family moved to Chi battleship New Mexico. ergy, a congressional committee with cago, and at age 9 Rickover began In July 1937, Rickover was pro responsibility for all legislation deal working to help support the family. moted to the rank of lieutenant com ing with atomic energy. Rickover’s Rickover characterized his childhood mander and became the commander group, the Nuclear Power Branch, as one of “hard work, discipline, and of the minesweeper, Finch, an old known as “Naval Reactors,” made a decided lack of good times.”1 ship well past its prime. Three technical decisions, set technical During the 1916 Republican Na months later he became an engineer standards, and supervised the pro tional Convention, Rickover skipped ing duty officer (EDO), a technical gram. Rickover was ruthless, “threat school, where he was not doing well specialty that barred him from com ening, cajoling, and insulting those academically, to deliver messages for manding ships or submarines. Rick who stood in his way.”5 politicians, stationing himself next to over’s first EDO assignment was to In 1951 and 1952, Rickover was the speaker’s platform to get as many the Cavite Navy Yard in the Philip passed over for promotion to rear deliveries as possible. One delivery pines. In August 1939, the Navy as admiral. The Navy selection board for was to a U.S. Congressman who later signed him to its Bureau of Ships EDO admirals was composed of nine nominated him to the U.S. Naval (BuShips) in Washington, D.C. officers: six line and three engineer Academy. Rickover, who developed a repu officers. The six line officers usually Rickover barely met the height tation as a talented troubleshooter deferred to the three engineer offic and weight requirements at the Acad and effective problem-solver, en ers in EDO selections, but the engi emy but passed the tough entrance sured education and training were neers on the board did not like examination. His poor academic back priorities and achieved impressive Rickover. ground and the prevailing anti- results. Working days, nights, and With over 30 years in service, Semitism of the time were his major weekends and expecting his staff to Rickover faced mandatory retirement obstacles at the Academy. He over do the same, he refused to compro unless he was promoted to rear ad came the first with determined study, mise when it came to standards and miral. Rickover’s workers at Oak the second by not drawing attention quality. He expected sacrifice from Ridge lobbied the Senate on his be to himself. He made few friends, was those who worked for him—and half, and Clair Blair, Jr., a submariner considered a loner and a “grind,” and from their families. He became com during World War II, wrote articles in graduated 106th out of a class of mander in January 1942 and captain Time and Life describing Rickover as 539.2 in June 1943. an officer who “had declared war on Rickover spent the next 6 years at When World War II ended, the naval indifference.”6 As a result, the sea. His supervisors described him as Navy sent Rickover to the Oak Armed Services Committee held up forceful, industrious, reliable, and ex Ridge, Tennessee, Manhattan Engi the Navy board’s selections for rear tremely able. He was seen as an ef neer District to study the feasibility admiral and investigated the Navy’s fective leader, despite being taciturn of using nuclear power to propel promotion system. The Navy con and uncongenial. One supervisor submarines. Battery-powered electric vened another promotion board and even wrote that he had “no outward motors limited underwater time in promoted Rickover to the rank of
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 85 admiral. Breaking with tradition, the as the safety czar for the Atomic Mary Parker Follett, a Radcliff-edu six line officers outvoted the three Energy Commission, he relieved of cated social worker, wrote about engineer officers on the board. ficers or shut down entire projects if management in the early 20th cen On 25 June 1953, in the Idaho he felt safety was being jeopardized. tury. Considered a “prophet of man desert, Rickover brought the Mark Eventually Rickover’s support in agement” and a keen student of I—the first nuclear-powered reactor Congress waned, and problems with group behavior, Follett understood designed for a submarine to full contractors were blamed on him. In that relationships within a group mat power. Over his fellow engineers’ 1977, the Atomic Energy Commission tered because they affected the objections, he kept the reactor at full was abolished and the Department group’s accomplishments. Emphasiz power for 96 hours, the length of time of Energy absorbed its functions. ing mutual problem-solving, she ad it would take to propel a submarine The Joint Committee on Atomic vocated sharing power with workers across the Atlantic Ocean. Energy was also abolished, its func instead of exercising power over them On 17 January 1955, the first tions split between several other and originated the concept of “hori nuclear-powered submarine, the Nau- committees.10 zontal management.”14 Rickover tilus, embarked on its first sea trial. Bitterness grew between Rickover shared Follett’s belief in the need for Rickover was onboard when “under and the industries that built the lifelong learning and the importance way on nuclear power” became a part ships because of his high standards of education, but he did not believe of naval history. The next day the and their cost overruns. Rickover in Follett’s horizontal-management Nautilus made its first dive, setting was far too rigid to compromise with theory. numerous high-speed records while industry—or anyone for that matter. In the book, Good to Great, Jim submerged, and later, crossed under His career survived until 1982 when Collins says the CEOs of 11 compa the polar ice cap.7 Another nuclear President Ronald Reagan forced him nies that consistently outperformed submarine, the Triton, circumnavi to resign. the stock market over a 15-year pe gated the world in 84 days while sub riod had only two consistent traits: merged, a record that still stands. Leadership “compelling personal modesty” and The lethality of nuclear submarines In a speech in 1973, Rickover said: “intense professional will.”15 The would ultimately be awesome. “Organization doesn’t really accom CEOs also invariably gave the people Rickover was promoted to vice ad plish anything. Plans don’t accom they worked with credit for their miral in 1958 and admiral in 1973. plish anything, either. Theories of company’s success. Charismatic lead Congressional action once again management don’t much matter. En ership was not required for great prompted these promotions.8 deavors succeed or fail because of ness. Great leaders did not stand out; A superb public relations man, the people involved. Only by attract what they accomplished stood out.16 Rickover arranged for congressmen ing the best people will you accom I am reminded here of Rickover’s ef to ride on nuclear submarines and plish great deeds.”11 ficiency reports. He got results de saw to it that submarines were Rickover envisioned himself a spite of having “no outward signs of named for congressmen who sup savior and martyr: “Most of the work qualities of leadership.”17 Certainly ported him. He also wrote letters to in the world today is done by those Rickover was highly motivated to congressmen from submarines dur who work too hard; they comprise a succeed and had incredible will, but it ing sea trials, giving them updates nucleus of martyrs.”12 He was also was a stretch to say he was modest. they could pass along to the press; complex and unpredictable. Report Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., Chief he answered telephone inquiries, edly he sent an officer whose wife of Naval Operations from 1971 to made himself available for interviews, was sick on a trip then appeared at 1974, said: “Rickover is paranoid. . . . and made sure the press was on the man’s home and cooked food for He [has turned] the world into an hand when he gave submarine rides the family. Compassionate when trag asylum. . . . The enemies of the U.S. to congressmen. Lloyd Norman, a edies struck those who worked for Navy are the Soviet Union, the U.S. Pentagon reporter, said: “Every him, he sent personal handwritten Air Force, and Rickover. His Division service academy and war college letters of condolence to widows and of Nuclear Propulsion [is] a totalitar should include a course in public parents when submariners were lost ian mini-state.”18 and Congressional relations with lec at sea. The highly stressful interviews to tures and textbooks by [Secretary of In 1911, mechanical engineer and which Rickover subjected candidates State] Henry Kissinger and Admiral systems analysis advocate Frederick for the nuclear propulsion program Rickover, both of whom are out Taylor proposed the use of scientific were controversial. Rickover covered standing experts in those fields.”9 measurements to determine the most a broad range of subjects including Because of Rickover, a “nuclear” economical and accurate way of get “professional background, profes Navy grew within the “real” Navy. ting work done.13 Taylor believed sional interests, family background, Officers on nuclear-powered ships managers and workers should share extracurricular affairs, and outside had two chains of command: the the work, and it was a manager’s re reading.” Although candidate Zum usual chain to the Chief of Naval sponsibility to look for the best sci walt described his interview as “thor Operations, the second to Rickover. entifically-proven methodology. ough, searching, and friendly,” his Rickover made it clear he wanted to Rickover, although probably influ brief initial interview with Rickover be called first. With representatives enced by “Taylorism,” did not share was insulting. Rickover told Zumwalt in the field at civilian construction Taylor’s obsession with efficiency; he had no imagination or initiative facilities and naval facilities who re Rickover was obsessed with perfec and berated him for trying to con ported problems directly to him, and tion and safety. duct the interview himself.19 Rickover
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then dismissed Zumwalt to wait in and “greasy.” Zumwalt describes membered more for being the man another room until Rickover thought Rickover as “sneering” and “shout who should have quit when he was he was “ready to be interviewed ing.”22 ahead. properly.”20 Zumwalt waited about 30 In Good to Great and Built to Last, Rickover was not a Navy organi minutes in what he described as a Collins notes Rickover placed zation man, but he was most certainly “barren room.” During Zumwalt’s great importance on the right people “a Rickover” organization man, and next interview, Rickover asked Zum for the job—“only those that fit planning and organization were es walt questions and digressed to a extremely well. . . .”23 Rickover bi sential to him, but they had to be his discussion of Clarence Darrow. When ographers Norman Polmar and Tho plans and his organization. He recog Zumwalt disagreed with Rickover mas Allen suggest Rickover used nized the importance of having not on the subject, Rickover directed such tactics to weed out those who only the best people, but the best Zumwalt to leave, referring to him as took the “victim” role.24 people in the right job. The Navy an “aide that tries to pretend he Sacrifice sent him the best; he selected those knows everything.”21 Rickover’s limited ability to com who would fit into his organization During the third session, Rickover promise gave him a strong need to and would accept his philosophy discussed the Naval Academy and sacrifice one thing for another. When and style. asked Zumwalt what he would do he left Poland, he saw the need for Rickover certainly achieved great with the curriculum if he were the sacrifice, sacrificing family time with ness, but was he a hero? We expect superintendent. Again the two men his first job, sacrificing people to get real-life heroes to engage in some disagreed and again Rickover in the job done, sacrificing the Navy behavior that places them at personal sulted Zumwalt. Rickover asked when he stopped wearing the uni risk or to make personal sacrifices Zumwalt questions about philosophy form, and sacrificing his religion primarily for the benefit of others. and Plato. More disagreement and when he got married. Rickover did Did Rickover’s sacrifices for nuclear more insulting comments followed not appreciate the vast expanse of propulsion qualify him to be a hero? and back Zumwalt went to the “bar gray that exists between extremes. Did he make those sacrifices for ren room.” Rickover was ultimately driven out the benefit of the American people? During the final session, Rickover of the Navy because of a faulty vi Did he make them because he was asked questions about high school sion. His vision to build a nuclear- internally driven? And, did he mathematics, nuclear power, leader powered submarine was great; his make America a safer place for ship, Zumwalt’s father, his marriage, vision to build an all-nuclear-pow democracy? Some would say yes; and his children. When the interview ered Navy was not. Although Rick- some would say no. MR was over, Zumwalt says Rickover over is considered the father of the referred to him as “stupid,” “a jerk,” atomic submarine, he might be re- NOTES 1. Duncan F. Rickover, The Struggle for Excellence (An- napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover: Controversy and Genius: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1982), 34. M 2. Polmar and Allen; Rickover. R 3. Rickover, 25; Rickover Papers, Fitness Reports, 1 Oc- tober 1925-31 March 1926, 1 April 1925-11 June 1926. DigestDigestDigest 4. Polmar and Allen; Rickover. 5. Ibid. 6. Rickover, 139. 7. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (New York: Quad- Geospatial Intelligence rangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976). 8. James C. Collins, Good to Great (New York: HarperBusiness, 2001), vii. Ralph M. Erwin 9. Polmar and Allen; Rickover. 10. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 167. 11. Powell. The National Geospatial-Intel name describes the agency’s new 12. Polmar and Allen. 13. Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Man- ligence Agency (NGA) provides mission—ensuring the Nation’s agement (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1919). timely, relevant, accurate geospatial warfighters and senior policymakers 14. Pauline Graham, ed., Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management: A Celebration of Writings from the 1920s (Bos- intelligence (GEOINT) to support receive the best geospatial intelli ton: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). 15. Collins, Good to Great. national security objectives. Geo gence possible in support of national 16. Ibid. spatial intelligence, which provides security. 17. Polmar and Allen. 18. Zumwalt, Jr., 85; Polmar and Allen, 102. unique knowledge not available by GEOINT’s doctrinal definition in 19. Zumwalt, Jr., 86. 20. Ibid. other means, is critical for informed cludes the exploitation and analysis 21. Ibid. national security decisions. Geo of imagery and geospatial information 22. Ibid. 23. Collins, Good to Great; Collins with Jerry I. Porras, spatial-Intelligence also provides to describe, assess, and visually de Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (New York: HarperBusiness, 1994), 9. objective, precisely measurable infor pict physical features and geographi 24. Polmar and Allen, 639. mation about the environment and cally referenced activities on Earth. potential adversaries, especially in GEOINT provides the framework for Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army, remote or inaccessible regions. intelligence preparation of the battle is currently assigned to a unit in Iraq. He On 24 November 2003, when Presi field and planning before, during, received a B.S. from the University of South Dakota; an M.D. from the Univer- dent George W. Bush signed the 2004 and after a conflict. GEOINT ana sity of Nebraska Medical School, and is a Defense Authorization Bill, the Na lysts help make strategic- to tactical- graduate of the U.S. Army Command and tional Imagery and Mapping Agency level decisions every day based on General Staff College. He has served in officially became the National Geo accurate and timely GEOINT. various positions in the continental United spatial-Intelligence Agency. The new (continued on following page) States, Korea, Germany, and Iraq.
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 87 When an NGA support team de vasion route before entering Iraq. General Staff College, and other ma ployed in support of operations in Wallace “came away from that ses jor TRADOC offices. Afghanistan and Iraq, it took with it sion confident that the route would Integrating knowledge of the ad a reachback capability to NGA’s ex present no problems,” the report versary and the environment pro tensive staff and production ele states. vides a better understanding of the ments in the United States. Accord NGA is moving from a hardcopy security situation and represents ing to “America at War: Technology “product” orientation to a data-cen GEOINT’s unique contribution to the Lessons Learned,” a March 2004 re tric digital environment. Customers Nation’s overall intelligence picture. port by the National Technology will have ready access to GEOINT GEOINT efforts draw from all sources Alliance, NGA’s “use of direct sup databases through an open architec of intelligence and information to port teams provides a large success ture of interoperable, commercial sys meet the needs of the Nation’s civil in Afghanistan and Iraq.” The report tems, and a robust communications ian and military decisionmakers states: “The teams were not simply infrastructure. NGA’s geospatial by reducing uncertainty. NGA’s an NGA liaison; rather NGA fielded intelligence feature database is the mandate is to provide timely, rel many of its skilled analysts and tech foundation for the Theater Geospatial evant, accurate GEOINT in support nicians together with fully geo Database in support of U.S. Army of joint and expeditionary warfight graphic information systems, imagery Europe and Pacific. ers who must remain relevant and processing computers, workstations, The NGA Support Team-Army, ready. MR and field equipment. . . .” based in Reston, Virginia, provides direct support to all Army activities Ralph M. Erwin is the NGA Staff One successful example was Officer to the U.S. Army Training and NST’s ability to download high-reso and the U.S. Army Training and Doc Doctrine Command. He received a lution imagery less than a week old, trine Command (TRADOC). A staff B.A. from Cameron University and which allowed U.S. Army Lieutenant officer is stationed at Fort Leaven an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College. The public Website for NGA General William S. Wallace, V Corps worth, Kansas, to support the Com is at
UNEASY BALANCE: Civil-Military nationbuilding and foreign adven policy level, there is no clear consen Relations in Peacetime America tures while stretching the military sus on what the military posture Since 1783, Thomas S. Langston, over the globe. Because there is nei should be or what roles it should The Johns Hopkins University Press, ther consensus nor cooperation, cur serve. Not only is there a civil-mili New York, 2003, 198 pages, $39.95. rent U.S. military policy is unbal tary split, there is disunity within the After every war the U.S. military anced, if not dysfunctional. military as well. Because there is no has to realign itself by taking stock Postwar realignments have two consensus, the post–Cold War re of and reorienting to society’s peace components: service and reform. alignment is stalled. time needs. The realignment that Service is the reestablishment of con Langston identifies the problem, should have occurred at the end of nection to the peacetime role of help and as a good political scientist, has the Cold War has not yet happened. ing the populace rather than fighting at least the beginnings of a solu Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Re- wars. Reform is the introspective tion—to get on with reform; reestab lations in Peacetime America Since component, the studying of the fail lish civil-military communication and 1783 tracks previous realignments ures and success of just-finished consensus; make the military capable and discusses the implications of the wars and making appropriate adjust of fighting old-style and new-style failure to complete the one currently ments in capabilities—training and wars while also building nations at overdue. retooling. For civilian and military home or abroad—the way the Coast Contrary to popular belief, the U.S. components to be successful, both Guard handles war and peace mis military has not yet put Vietnam be must agree on the desired end prod sions simultaneously. More impor hind it, says author Thomas S. uct. This happened fully only twice: tant, the military should stop hiding Langston, professor of political sci after the War of 1812 and after the from Vietnam-style wars and learn to ence at Tulane University. For that Spanish-American War. In other post win them instead. matter, neither the military nor the war eras, one side or the other was These recommendations are not civilian population have adjusted to dominant, and the results were me bombshells; they are mostly com the end of the Cold War. While the diocre to awful. Fortunately, none mon sense. But the consequences of military and the populace look into was disastrous. letting this reform period drift can be their rearview mirrors, civilian de The current era might see the first dire—armed isolationism, if civilians fense leaders push forward, using the disaster. Civil-military relations are dominate; perhaps unchecked milita military as a social laboratory for dismal; the military is more contemp rism, if the military prevails. Langston changes too radical for society at tuous of a civilian society from which is not totally optimistic the drift will large or jumping vigorously into it is increasingly isolated. At the be checked in time.
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Although brief, the book is a sen invasion in November, subject or not AFGHANISTAN: A Military History sible mix of description, analysis, and to the atomic bomb. from Alexander the Great to the Fall prescription. At a minimum it de Nitze certainly did not hold, as of the Taliban, Stephen Tanner, Da serves a quick reading and extended others would, that Truman was strik Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, contemplation. ing a blow against the Kremlin. In 351 pages, $17.95. John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., deed, Nitze compiled a record criticiz There have been several excellent Tinker AFB, Oklahoma ing government policy as being too military histories written about Af soft on the Soviet Union. While in ghanistan, including A.E. Snesarev’s vestigating the bombing of Germany, Afghanistan: A Military History from ENOLA GAYAND THE COURT OF before the bombing of Japan, Nitze Alexander the Great to the Fall of HISTORY, Robert P. Newman, Peter concluded that leveling cities was the Taliban, published in Russian in Lang Publishing, New York, 2004, 201 virtually useless as opposed to tak 1921; Percy Sykes’ two-volume A pages, $24.95. ing out transportation networks, a History of Afghanistan, published in Show me where someone stood tactic that could compel surrender. He English in 1940; Ali Ahmad Jalali’s on the nuclear-freeze movement in applied this European Theater para three-volume Military History of Af- 1985, and 9 times out of 10, I will show digm to the Pacific, where he con ghanistan, published in Dari in 1976; you where they stand on the bomb cluded conventional bombing and a and Yu V. Gankovskiy’s A History of ing of Hiroshima in 1945. Robert P. naval blockade was sufficient to win the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Newman, professor emeritus of po the war. For data, Nitze cited pur published in Russian in 1985. Unfor litical communication, is a noted ex ported testimony from Japanese of tunately, all are difficult to find today ception. He was an outspoken critic ficials, something Newman has never and only one is published in English. of nuclear weapons during the Cold been able to find in the records and Stephen Tanner has done well pro War and a fierce critic of the fierce the archives of the USSBS. ducing a quick English-language critics of President Harry S. Truman’s Whether Nitze’s conclusions history about an obscure area of use of the atomic bomb. Newman stood on fact or what Newman calls the world that suddenly is vitally is one of the select people who “fraud,” it had the imprimatur of an important. want to learn about the past to sim official report. It hence became argu Afghanistan sits at the crossroads ply learn about the past, not to dis mentative gold for people who nor of empires and has long been a tort it for political ammunition. In mally would dismiss any government battleground. The Greeks, Indians, 1995, Newman published Truman publication as a coverup, prima facia. Persians, Mongolians, British, and and the Hiroshima Cult (Michigan In the 1960s and 1970s, New Left his Russians have tried to hold Afghani State University Press, East Lansing, tory cites the USSBS as definitive stan. Internal strife has been con 1995), a book that devastated the proof, another case where contempo stant, and Afghan forces have always contention that Japan was already rary “peace movement” politics been better prepared to fight an in prepared to surrender but that Wash slanted views on events regarding ternal threat than an external inva ington had hidden agendas, such as Hiroshima. The USSBS was to have sion. Afghanistan’s warring moun scaring the Soviet Union by flexing made up much of the story line in tain tribes have always proven the its atomic muscle against this third captions for the Enola Gay at the invaders’ ultimate test. Today, as the party. National Air and Space Museum. United States and other coalition Newman reiterates why Truman Because the Smithsonian Institution forces are sitting in Afghan cities and was correct—that he had to use the is semi-government, conservatives airfields, there is a pressing need for bomb or face perhaps a million Ameri in Congress aborted the exhibit. a book that provides the history and can casualties during the invasion One of Truman’s critics wrote, “It background of this land-locked moun and the subsequent ground war to was a humiliating spectacle, scholars tainous country. be waged in Japan. The six subse being forced to recant the truth.” Tanner has produced a history of quent chapters are a history of the Newman replies (although he was no a remote and little-understood region critique of Truman from its origins in political fan of the conservative in record time. Unfortunately, as with the United States Strategic Bombing bloc): “Scholars who confuse the any rapid effort, there are a few prob Survey (USSBS) in 1945 to its culmi fraudulent Nitze narrative with truth lems. Tanner perpetuates mistaken nation in an exhibit at the Smith deserve humiliation.” information the West put out early in sonian’s National Air and Space Newman and company might have the Soviet-Afghan War: misidenti Museum in 1994 of the airplane that won the battle of the Smithsonian, fication of the divisions used in the dropped the atomic bomb. but time does not seem on their side. invasion, inflation of the number of The chief villain in the narrative is According to the Gallup Poll, 10 per tanks involved, and misidentification the chairman of the USSBS, Paul cent of Americans disapproved of of weapons systems. He also per Nitze, a man Newman seems to loathe Truman’s decision in 1945, 35 percent petuates the myth of the poor qual from the left or from the right. He in 1995; young adults were divided ity of the Central Asian reservists and says that subsequent to 1945, Nitze 46 percent in favor, 49 percent op the myth that the Stinger knocked inflated the Soviet military threat in posed. One can only hope the citi hundreds of aircraft from the sky. an irrational pursuit of nuclear over zenry reads Newman to discover the (The Soviets changed their aviation kill. His summary report in the USSBS origins and the development of the tactics quickly to avoid this very was equally fallacious, but this time fallacious thesis many now hold. scenario.) From a historian’s per for holding that Japan would surren Michael Pearlman, Ph.D., spective, the book’s biggest problem der before the prospective American Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is a lack of footnotes or endnotes,
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 89 making it almost impossible to sub events and decisions on both sides, shifted to Southeast Asia. Buckley stantiate Tanner’s claims. he focuses on the operational level briefly outlines the events leading up Is this book useful to the profes of war but also gives his thoughts to the 1954 Geneva Conference and sional soldier or statesman inbound on actions taken at the tactical level. its results for Indochina; British in for Afghanistan? Yes. The book pro Glantz has the rare ability to discuss terests in Malaya; the Taiwan Straits vides a rapid introduction to a his what happened and, more important, Crises; and the ways they affected torically complex region in an easy- why it happened. U.S. policy. The chapter on the Viet to-read style. This book will not be This book is not for everyone; nam War is a straightforward sum the textbook on Afghanistan’s mili it is written for those with experi mary of events, dealing with the ma tary history 100 years from now, but ence on the subject who desire to jor interpretive issues surrounding who cares? It fills an immediate need take that experience to a higher level. U.S. commitments, the conduct of the and provides background informa The reader must be ready to stay fo war, and eventual U.S. withdrawal. He tion for the professional to consider cused and devote energy to its concludes that “the result of the Viet while maneuvering through Afghan pages. One of my friends said, nam disaster . . . was a harvest of politics and an incipient guerrilla war. “Glantz can make your head hurt!” rancor.” LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, But, what is a little pain when you Buckley follows with a description Fort Leavenworth, Kansas can read a definitive history on the of the consequences of the Vietnam struggle for Leningrad. War, events that occurred during the LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA, last part of the Cold War, and the rise THE BATTLE FOR LENINGRAD, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and relative decline of Southeast 1941-1944, David M. Glantz, Univer Asia as an economic power. He re sity Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2002, lates how the Association of South 704 pages, $39.95. THE UNITED STATES IN THE ASIA- east Asian Nations (ASEAN) became David M. Glantz has been called PACIFIC SINCE 1945, Roger Buck an organization that stresses eco by some the foremost authority on ley, Cambridge University Press, New nomic cooperation and mutual Russia’s “Great Patriotic War.” His York, 2002, 258 pages, $65.00. benefit. previous works, including (The Bat- The United States in the Asia-Pa- The chapter on the region since tle of Kursk, Zhukov’s Greatest De- cific Since 1945 could have been an the end of the Cold War emphasizes feat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster exercise in academic absurdity and U.S. policy continuity, and although in Operation Mars [University Press cruelty, but instead enlightens and the Soviet Union collapsed, none of of Kansas, Lawrence, 1999] and When educates. In seven chronologically Asia’s Communist states show signs Titans Clashed: How the Red Army organized chapters, Roger Buckley of disappearing. In fact, China has Stopped Hitler [University Press of outlines U.S. policy in East and become a regional economic power. Kansas, Lawrence, 1998]) were ac Southeast Asia since 1945 when Ja Buckley outlines alternatives for claimed among the finest books writ pan surrendered. future U.S. policy, including power ten about the Eastern Front. Glantz’s In 1945, Asia was defined by co and influence, to encourage a greater latest effort, The Battle for Lenin- lonial powers trying to reassert do sense of cooperation among allies. grad, 1941-1944, continues the tra minion over their colonies with na He believes Japan remains an Ameri dition. tionalist movements in armed can dependency because of its own Of the many books written about struggle with them, and a prostrate problematic relationships with the the fight for Leningrad, most focus Japan—the object of Soviet and U.S. region as well as its public disinter on the tactical fights and civilian situ interest. The United States was the est in foreign affairs. He points out ations inside the city and are from paramount power, but initial U.S. ac that the era that began with the sur purely Russian or German points of tions were hesitant. This apparent render in Tokyo Bay is far from over; view. Glantz uses many recently re irresolution was caused by the re the events since 1945 show a U.S. leased documents (particularly from solve to support anticommunist determination to remain committed in Russia) to provide details rarely seen forces in Europe and Asia while also the region. Buckley’s conclusion re elsewhere and correct some miscon trying to keep the Cold War from flects his optimism about the U.S. ceptions concerning the battle. Such spreading to the region. Although presence in Asia. U.S. influence is the detail separates The Battle for Len- there were differences between Eu result of its open society rather than ingrad from other books on the ropean and Asian policies, they were merely being a factor of economic subject. matters of degree, not substance. and military power. Glantz blends personal accounts, The Korean War chapter empha Asians might think some of field orders, and excerpts from the sizes Soviet and U.S. confusion over Buckley’s judgments of U.S. policies Leningrad War Diary to tell the story. Korea and the complexity of its in are too complimentary, while many For each battle and campaign, he ternal politics and rivalries. The ef Americans might find his evaluations describes key decisions and orders fects of the war included a peace overly critical, but that is one of the of battle, and provides a wealth of treaty with Japan, increased Japa work’s benefits; it is written by an statistics, giving the reader a total nese economic growth, a clarification outsider. I recommend this book to perspective on the Battle of Lenin of U.S. interests in China and Taiwan, all who wish to quickly gain a basic grad and its significance. and a new alliance, the Southeast understanding of how U.S. policies Glantz’s superb analysis is the Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). affect the Asia-Pacific region. strongest aspect of the book. Using In the postwar period (1953-1960), Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., his vast military experience to analyze the gravity of international rivalry Huntsville, Alabama
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CANNAE: The Experience of Battle life with this new work. ested in Civil War history, diplomatic in the Second Punic War, Gregory Peter Bridges seeks to present history, European history, and of Daly, Routledge, New York, 2002, 253 Daniel in three ways: Daniel the course, as a biographical work. Over pages, $35.00. man— a consistent treatment all, it is well written and well re With Cannae: The Experience of throughout the book that seeks to searched. Battle in the Second Punic War, Gre reveal “who” Daniel was; Daniel the David Schepp, gory Daly forges one of the most editor—a role that applies only to Fort Benning, Georgia comprehensive analytical studies of those times when Daniel was the fi the battle ever attempted. Drawing on ery editor for which he is purportedly ancient and modern source material, well known; Daniel the diplomat— SUNBURST: The Rise of Japanese Daly crafts an account of the battle and herein lies the treasure of the Naval Aviation 1909-1941, Mark R. that explores in detail the field armies book. While Daniel might be attrib Peattie, Naval Institute Press, An arrayed against one another at uted a certain importance for his role napolis, MD, 2002, 392 pages, $25.81. Cannae. as an editor and producer of Civil Almost 15 years ago Mark R. Daly, in his description of the War-era polemics, it is his role as a Peattie and the late David C. Evans detailed composition of forces and diplomat that allows for new histori were asked to collaborate on a study the intricacies of operational plan cal relationships and new concep of Japanese Naval Strategy during ning, spares no effort in producing tualizations. World War II. As their work pro a scholarly account without paral In the late 1840s, Europe was a gressed, their topic expanded and lel. The result is a thoroughly en hotbed of “almost” revolutions. In changed into a technical, strategic, gaging, captivating battle study— the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, and institutional history of the Impe supremely analytical, yet at times nationalism was a force to be reck rial Japanese Navy (IJN) from its be reminiscent of Basil Liddell-Hart or oned with and one that would, not ginnings to the outbreak of war with General George C. Marshall in his far down the road, see its day in the the United States in 1941. The result treatment of the human dimension sun. The unification movements tak was the publication in 1997 of the of conflict. Although the book is ing place in Italy and Germany in the definitive English-language work on heavily laden with references, Daly late 1840s, up until their successful the IJN. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, unhesitatingly draws his own conclu resolution in the 1870s, are a source and Technology in the Imperial sions while evolving a uniquely per of interest even today. Count Camillo Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Naval sonal perspective on the classic Cavour, Prime Minister of the King Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, battle. dom of Sardinia, was the spearhead 1997) includes four chapters on na Daley presents a refreshingly of the Italian unification movement. val aviation that, for reasons of comprehensive analysis and brings Based on his position, his role was length and size, were removed for facts and references into a single central until his dismissal by Vittorio publication as a separate work at a volume worthy of any bookshelf Emmanuelle II—a relationship worth later date. Sunburst: The Rise of dedicated to warfare in the classical exploring. Japanese Naval Aviation 1909- world. Military professionals will Daniel was appointed minister resi 1941 is the continuation of Kaigun. appreciate the scholarly effort re dent to the Kingdom of Sardinia at Author Mark R. Peattie makes it quired to catalog the myriad details the capital of Turin in 1853. After a clear that, for issues of institutional of the battle. Students of history few minor setbacks, he established and even strategic context, reference will welcome a single-source ref himself successfully and remained at to Kaigun is required. With this re erence for this monumental battle the post until 1861. His dealings with quirement understood, one finds Sun- that so shaped events of our own the Sardinian Government are most burst an extremely informative, in time. interesting, and much is made of the sightful book. If the book has a the MAJ Steven Leonard, USA, roles of Cavour, Giuseppe Mazzini, sis, it is that Japanese naval air power Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Giuseppe Garibaldi. Of signifi was among the most fearsome tools cance is the relationship between ever fashioned and that in great Daniel and these three men who measure the success of the Pacific PEN OF FIRE: John Moncure shared a completely different orbit blitzkrieg in the first 6 months of the Daniel, Peter Bridges, The Kent State than that of a pro-slavery editor. Pacific war is directly attributable to University Press, Kent, OH, 2002, 284 The only criticism with the book this elite body of warriors. Peattie is pages, $28.00. is that occasionally Bridges tries to a wonderful scholar and has made Arguably, there is nothing as sat create drama where none exists. One outstanding use of the archival Japa isfying to read as a biography with example is Daniel’s various attacks on nese War History Series he has so an easy-to-follow story and focused Confederate President Jefferson successfully mined in the past. material. Stretched even further, you Davis. Bridges concludes with a pas As with Kaigun, Sunburst’s major might say there is nothing as satis sage that leads the reader to believe drawback is it ends too soon. The fying to read as a biography about Davis might have been angry about wonderful institutional insight of an obscure historical character. John Daniel’s attack. While this might be fered after the outbreak of war with Moncure Daniel, onetime fiery editor valuable in fostering a sense of the United States need not have of the polemic Richmond Examiner, drama or furthering the story, as a overly lengthened the book, espe is just such a character. Daniel, who tool of history it has no value. cially since almost half of its 400 has been treated tangentially in Pen of Fire is definitely worth pages consist of appendices. In other historical works, is given fresh reading. It is valuable for those inter stead, Peattie summarizes this period
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 91 in an all-too-brief final chapter. Hav z British Field Marshal Claude concludes that the opposing alli ing an institutional history that com Auchinleck experienced an opera ances were the basis for Sino-Ameri prehensively covers the entire period tional pause after Rommel reached can relations in the 1950s. Zhang of the Japanese naval aviation to Alamein. Baijia reviews the Chinese-American 1945 would have been nice, especially z Air and maritime campaigns were confrontation in Asia and concludes in terms of understanding the prob needed to complement a ground that mutual fear governed bilateral lem of Japanese-pilot replenishment campaign to achieve overall strategic relations during the period. after the air battles over the Coral goals. In the next three chapters, Ronald Sea, Midway, and especially, Guad z Fog and friction were endemic on W. Preussen, Robert Accinelli, and alcanal. the battlefield. Gong Li discuss the relatively un On the other hand, Peattie in z Deception activities had to be known Taiwan Straits crises during cludes a number of valuable and lav integrated with the operational plan. the 1950s. All concentrate on crisis ishly illustrated appendices that z Coalition warfare took time and management and diplomatic maneu range from biographical sketches to patience. vering, their conclusions dovetailing air group composition to tactics. I appreciate Latimer’s comments with each other. Gong writes that These make this book not only good about British Army command prob Mao Tse-tung’s goal was to “punc to read but also a handy and easy- lems, such as the placement of Brit ture the arrogance of the KMT to-use resource. John Parshall again ish officers in command of more se [Kuomintang] army” while avoiding contributes his wonderful graphics nior Commonwealth officers; the mis a war with the United States. Preus work in illustrating the various plat trust between services; key leaders sen and Accinelli show that U.S. forms. Overall, Sunburst is a wonder who were incommunicado at critical President Dwight D. Eisenhower and ful contribution to the literature times; the faulty planning that led to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster about the Imperial Japanese Navy fratricide or tactical failure; and the Dulles retained tactical flexibility by and a valuable resource for scholars use of brevity codes subordinates avoiding extreme measures that and history buffs alike. did not understand. would result in a war. CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, I believe this book would be easier Authors Zhang Baijia, Jia Qing Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to follow if there were more maps and guo, and Steven M. Goldstein focus if they were better integrated within on the ambassadorial-level talks be the text. At times, I was unsure where tween China and the United States— ALAMEIN, Jon Latimer, Harvard the battle was in relation to the maps, a neglected topic because no signifi University Press, Cambridge, MA, or I found the appropriate map either cant agreements were reached. How 2002, 338 pages, $17.95. too small or lacking needed detail. ever, the authors believe the meet Jon Latimer’s Alamein is an excel Aside from this shortcoming, over ings were noteworthy because they lent companion to Rick Atkinson’s An all, this was a great book. offered the two powers a communi Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA, cation channel that helped moderate 1942-1943 (Henry Holt & Co., New Charlottesville, Virginia disagreements and indirectly laid the York, 2002). Latimer does not focus groundwork for U.S. President Rich on the battle per se, instead he places ard M. Nixon’s opening to China. the battle in the overall strategic and RE-EXAMINING THE COLD WAR: Essayist Robert D. Schulzinger reas operational context. In a fair and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, sesses China’s policy during U.S. judicious manner, he discusses Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ad Field Marshall Bernard Law Mont eds., Harvard University Press, Cam ministration. He states that a differ gomery’s role and analyzes Mont bridge, MA, 2002, 504 pages, $25.00. ent view of China, in which it was not gomery’s preparation for battle and Re-Examining the Cold War is a a relentlessly expansionist power, the decisions he made during the collection of essays resulting from a undermined one of the premises for battle. partnership between the China For American involvement in Vietnam. Latimer also extensively discusses eign Affairs College and the John Rosemary Foot and Li Jie analyze the British fight in North Africa that King Fairbank Center for East Asian the role domestic politics played in led up to Alamein and includes back Research at Harvard University. forming foreign policy in both coun ground material on doctrine, organi Editors Robert S. Ross and Jiang tries. Foot asserts the reexamination zation, training, and material. He also Changbin examine the ways na of American life and society that oc discusses the complementary air and tional interests, security concerns, curred in the 1960s forced a review naval interdiction campaigns in the economic interests, and domestic of China policy. Li recounts a similar Mediterranean, the role of intelli politics affected Cold War Sino- process taking place in China. The gence, the contributions of Common American relations and have fash border conflicts with the Soviet wealth allies, the constraints political ioned a mosaic that brings still- Union, along with the chaos engen leaders imposed, and the British relevant patterns of confrontation, dered by the Cultural Revolution, Army’s command problems. communication, and negotiation into forced Mao to revise his views on The book illustrates the following sharp relief. domestic radicalism and relations important theoretical constructs, The chronologically arranged with the United States. Gong Li con such as when— book begins with William C. Kirby’s tinues this discussion, pointing out z German Field Marshall Erwin succinct description of the origins of there was a contradiction between Rommel reached a culminating point Sino-American conflict. He limns the Mao’s radical domestic agenda and in his advance to Alamein. events in post-World War II Asia and his pragmatic foreign policy. This
92 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW contradiction and the fear of a war dent Harry S. Truman’s administra policy was formed, scholars have with the Soviet Union led to an open tion policy of preventing Chinese raised questions about the sources ing to the United States. Finally, expansion into Southeast Asia by they used. Their essays are based on Michael Schaller shows how détente driving a wedge between Russia and recently released material compiled in the early 1970s had unforeseen China to destroy their alliance. and published by the Documents consequences for all three parties. The essays illustrate that rational Research Office of the Chinese Com The essays present mirror images ity in foreign policy is relative, and munist Party Central Committee. of Chinese and American policy. One rationality and irrationality exist on a Documents that would show previ sees that each power was frustrated continuum with no sharp breaks. ous leaders in an unflattering light by its inability to shape the other’s Above all, they show that foreign have been excluded, and the Central foreign policies and international policies are encounters between cul Party Archives are closed to Chinese behavior. Hostility reached a high tures and a confrontation among researchers. Until scholars working in point during the Taiwan Straits crises values. Both China and the United China have the same access to ma where both sides glared at each other States had foreign policies driven by terial that scholars working in the but purposely avoided an armed con “soft” culture-bound factors (beliefs, United States have, a complete, bal frontation. While Eisenhower and moral values, and historical con anced history of the period cannot Dulles worked to restrain Chinese sciousness) as well as so-called be written. Despite its shortcoming, General Chiang Kai-shek, the Com “hard realities” (economic and mili this book opens new research pan munist goal was to demonstrate to tary power). oramas and vantage points for the him the impossibility of reconquering There is one caveat. While the pa interested reader. the mainland. pers of Chinese scholars are intrigu Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., In addition, Eisenhower’s admin ing and provide needed and neces Huntsville, Alabama istration worked to continue Presi sary insight into the ways foreign MRLettersLettersLetters
Redefining the also say the FAO assignment system speak it well enough to function en Foreign Area Officer’s suffers from a “Cold War mentality,” tirely in English. In such instances, Role: A Response even now, more than a decade after it is critical for the FAO to speak the Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. the fall of the Soviet Union. I want foreign language competently. Friedenberg, U.S. Army, Ashburn, to stress here the importance of the A FAO’s ability to get the mes Virginia—In the May-June 2004 FAO foreign-language ability and sage across in a foreign language Military Review, Major General discuss Vane and Fagundes criti could affect mission success, Michael A. Vane and Lieutenant Colo cisms regarding the FAO assignment whether in an operational environ nel Daniel Fagundes’s article, “Rede process. ment or in support of a training exer fining the Foreign Area Officer’s What exactly does “enabler” cise. In many Latin American coun Role,” analyzed the current state of mean? Merriam-Webster’s on-line tries, FAOs function as much in the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) dictionary defines enabler as “one Spanish or Portuguese as they do in program (FA48). The FAO commu [who] enables another to achieve an English. A FAO’s competence in nity and the U.S. Army benefit from end.” Never specifically defined in speaking a foreign language opens colleagues taking an interest in how Vane and Fagundes’s article, the doors and builds relationships that FAOs fit within the framework of the word in this context seems to mean might not be possible if the officer Army and also in the conduct of language ability is a skill that helps spoke only English or saw the study national security policy. The U.S. FAOs do their job. This definition of foreign language merely as an “en Army is in transition, and the FAO would be difficult to dispute. How abler.” Host-country officials appre functional area will likely undergo ever, Vane and Fagundes say for ciate when foreigners, especially changes to reflect emerging require eign-language ability is over-empha Americans, take time to study the ments. sized as a critical FAO skill, and as host country’s language. Improved Vane and Fagundes made several an “enabler,” it should occupy a rapport is the inevitable result. suggestions for improving how lower priority than skills such as Vane and Fagundes say within FAOs function; however, some of knowledge of strategic issues. some regions there are too many lan their statements need to be corrected. Why is language ability important guages to master for FAOs to com They say foreign-language ability is to a FAO? While serving overseas municate effectively in every coun an “enabler” for FAOs. For them to tours, FAOs (whether as attachés or try. They believe the current FAO identify language ability merely as an security assistance officers) most construct views the world from a lan enabler mischaracterizes and deval often meet English-speaking host- guage-centric view rather than a geo ues what is arguably one of the most country officials. However, in many political perspective. Perhaps there critical assets FAOs bring to their host countries, members of the mili are too many languages for the FAO commanders. Vane and Fagundes tary do not speak English or do not to fully master in Western Europe
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 93 and Northern Asia. No one can be tion sources risks a generalization riety of assignments to develop their come a regional expert overnight; it about such a diverse culture. Read regional expertise. Repetitive attaché takes years of studying a region and ing or listening to foreign media in its assignments are officially discour its language to attain expertise. How original language lends a perspective aged. ever, having competence in even one translations do not always provide. When Vane and Fagundes criti language within a region where there U.S. Department of the Army Pam cize FAO assignments as Eurocen are many different languages can phlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer tric, they seem to be suffering from have huge payoffs in understanding Development and Career Manage- the same Cold War mentality they the region. ment (U.S. Government Printing Of themselves decry. For them to say Languages such as Chinese, Rus fice, Washington, D.C., 1 October FAO positions are “over billeted sian, and Arabic are difficult to mas 1998) says FAOs should “develop within plush assignments in Euro ter, and students must invest signifi skills required for conducting and pean Capital cities” is inaccurate and cant time and effort to attain even a analyzing military activities that have focuses only on what is going on in moderate level of ability. To become economic, social, cultural, psycho a small part of the world. FAOs also remotely competent, FAOs might logical, or political impact.” Lan serve as political military advisers to spend a year or more at the Defense guages people speak shape how commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, Language Institute, continue study they think and how they view their and the FAO assignments list in ing on their own and take refresher world. FAOs cannot hope to under cludes such countries as Uzbekistan, courses simply to maintain language stand foreign cultures or provide Djibouti, Cambodia, Yemen, and nu proficiency. useful analyses without devoting merous other places besides West Although FAOs do not need to time and effort to language study. ern European cities. The Cold War is be as proficient as translators or in Vane and Fagundes have three over and FAO missions are chang terpreters, they do need to focus primary criticisms of FAO assign ing. enough effort on language study to ments: assignments are skewed to Vane and Fagundes correctly say be able to communicate effectively ward the attaché system; assign a large number of Eurasian FAOs with host-nation military representa ments reflect a Eurocentric Cold War (48E) serve in Germany. Three of the tives. When FAOs view language mentality; and the FAO development six 48E colonels are serving at capabilities as of secondary impor model is outmoded. The first point is EUCOM, which is headquartered in tance they relegate the study of for a criticism that also exists within the Germany, and six 48Es (three majors, eign language to a lower priority and, FAO world; repetitive attaché assign two lieutenant colonels, and one inevitably, invest less time and effort ments can take FAOs out of the main colonel) are assigned to the Marshall to it than to other professional-devel stream of the Army. It is incumbent Center in Garmisch, which is respon opment objectives. on the FAO community to show sible for supervising most Eurasian During the approximate year-long attachés doing work critical to U.S. FAO trainees. Given the projected in-country training phase, some FAO foreign policy, not simply “riding the number of FAO trainees at the trainees attend host-country military cocktail circuit.” Marshall Center (six to eight slots schools equivalent to the U.S. Army By interacting with militaries in the per year), this might be an excessive Command and General Staff College Middle East, the Far East, and South number. However, Vane and or the Captain’s Career Course. At Asia, attachés are making critical Fagundes’ article implies the high tending host-nation military courses contributions to fighting the Global number of 48E officers in EUCOM is allows FAO trainees to train and work War on Terrorism. And, far from be because HRC FAO proponents or closely with host-nation officers in ing out of the mainstream, FAOs FAO career managers make unilateral their own environments and to com serving in embassies in security- determinations of structure and re municate with them in their own lan assistance assignments are working quirements. guages. Trainees learn about the directly for respective regional uni Major or joint commands (in this host country’s military culture and fied commanders. case EUCOM) determine how many how its army fights, which is a criti Vane and Fagundes’s statement FAOs are assigned and where they cal asset when FAOs are advising that attaché assignments equate to will serve. Arguably, the number of policymakers or commanders. These battalion command in importance is 48E FAOs in Germany is larger than training benefits would not be pos not substantiated in any written necessary and likely will change as sible without extensive language Army policy. FAO branch analyses Department of Defense (DOD) refo training. consistently show that promotion cuses priorities and changes are re In my experience as a Middle East boards do not favor attaché assign flected in EUCOM manning docu FAO (48G), language has been more ments more than other types of FAO ments. (The FAO Branch Chief at the than an enabler, it has been a critical assignments. U.S. Army Human Resource Center tool in understanding the compli The Human Resources Command provided information on the cated Arab culture. Simply reading (HRC) FAO Website says FAOs Marshall Center staffing and other analyses of history and political sci should rotate between overseas as Germany Army FAO assignments.) ence books in English, reading En signments as attachés and security- Vane and Fagundes correctly call glish news sources, or depending on assistance officers with assignments for the Defense Intelligence Agency English translations of Arabic texts in Washington, D.C., and major com (DIA) and theater commanders to does not allow us to understand what mands such as U.S. Central Com review the number of attaché billets Arabs are saying or thinking. An mand or U.S. European Command within Western Europe. However, over-dependence on English-transla (EUCOM). FAOs should have a va when they criticize DIA priorities for
94 January -February 2005 z MILITARY REVIEW attaché assignments they include level staffs will continue to make selection. The photograph was se other than Army assignments, such great contributions to national secu lected because it seemed to display as Navy or Air Force attachés. The rity and will make these contributions the face and body language of an in criticisms might be valid, but address by developing regional expertise. dividual who had just received a blis ing them is beyond the scope of the Developing and maintaining a foreign tering surprise phone call from some Army FAO assignments system. language capability is a primary skill, one in authority. Updating manning documents to re not merely an enabler. Most of us in the military have at flect changing strategic realities is a one time or another been on the re function of joint commands such as Controversial Photo ceiving end of what we regard as an EUCOM or DIA, not Army FAO as Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Hall, unwarranted “dressing down,” either signment officers. U. S. Army, Retired—You published personally or by phone call. It cer I am puzzled why Vane and an article entitled “Toxic Leadership” tainly was not meant to imply that Fagundes would criticize the current in your JUL-AUG ’04 edition of Mili- Lieutenant Colonel Hall was an ex FAO development model as incom tary Review. The article was written ample of someone guilty of a “toxic” patible with the Army policy of dual by a LTC George Reed. My beef is leadership style. We regret any em tracking. Officer Personnel Manage over the photo of me that appears barrassment this photograph may ment System (OPMS)-3 was imple within the article. The implication is have caused either Lieutenant Colo mented 7 years ago to end the dual- that I am the prime example of some nel Hall or Colonel Reed. Greater care tracking policy for officers. FAOs one with a “Toxic Leadership” style. will be exercised in the future to avoid now occupy their own career fields, I dispute that. photographs that have substantial have their own professional develop I was never contacted regarding potential for needlessly causing em ment models, and compete against use of my photo for any reason. I did barrassment to the individuals in the other FAOs for promotion. Without not know the photo even existed. photographs or authors of articles. the promotion requirement to serve The photo appears to be taken of —wmd in operational branch-qualifying as me during CGSC, probably during the signments, FAOs can serve in jobs spring of 1996 Prairie Warrior. Bio Correction that develop them as regional special I’ve already emailed the author of Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson ists. the article and requested a retraction III, U.S. Army National Guard—Dur The Army must continue to as and apology for this bit of libel. I ing the editing process of my article, sess the FAO training program and believe you owe me the same. “Winning the Nationbuilding War,” assignments system and make ad which appeared in the September- justments as required. In the near Editor’s Reply October 2004 Military Review, I at term, DOD leaders are likely to make The photograph of Lieutenant tempted to clarify several times that significant changes to the organiza Colonel Hall used in the article “Toxic I was not a Ph.D. but, rather, study- tion, training, and resourcing of the Leadership” was selected from the ing for my Ph.D. Although it was a military. Army FAO programs must library at Military Review. The final complimentary distinction next to my develop to support these changes or decision to use the article was mine, name, it was not accurate. Would risk irrelevance. FAOs who serve in and the author of the article, Colonel you be kind enough to ensure it is embassies worldwide or on high- George Reed, had nothing to with its corrected in the Spanish version? MRIndexIndexIndex
Author Index Emery, MAJ Norman, USA; MAJ Jason Friedenberg, LTC Robert E., USA, Rede Aboul-Enein, LCDR Youssef H., USN, Werchan, USAF; and MAJ Donald G. fining the Foreign Area Officer’s Role: A Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the Mowles, Jr., USAF, Fighting Terrorism and Response: LETTERS, 93 Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Mani Insurgency: Shaping the Information En Gebhardt, MAJ James F., USA, Ret., The festo: REVIEW ESSAY, 83 vironment, 32 Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Bednarek, BG Mick, USA; LTC Thomas Erwin, Ralph M, Geospatial Intelligence: Doctrine and Experience, 44 P. Odom, USA, Ret.; and Stephen Florich, MR DIGEST, 87 Hall, LTC Michael B., USA, Ret., Con Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness troversial Photograph: LETTERS, 95 Training Center, 51 Evans, COL Gerald D., USA, Hyman Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism: Honoré, LTG Russell, USA, and COL Blanchette, MAJ Wayne C., USAF; LTC ALMANAC, 85 Daniel L. Zajac, USA, Theater Immer Peter D. Woodmansee, USMC; and LTC sion: Postmobilization Training in the Timothy L. Faulkner, USA, The Need to Faulkner, LTC Timothy L., USA; LTC First Army, 2 Validate Planning Assumptions, 58 Peter D. Woodmansee, USMC; and MAJ Mowles, MAJ Donald G., Jr., USAF; MAJ Brown, MAJ George C.L., USA, Do We Wayne C. Blanchette, USAF, The Need to Norman Emery, USA; and MAJ Jason Need FA30? Creating an Information Validate Planning Assumptions, 58 Werchan, USAF, Fighting Terrorism and Warfare Branch, 39 Florich Stephen; BG Mick Bednarek, USA; Insurgency: Shaping the Information En Bunker, Robert J., Ph.D., and John P. and LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Ret., vironment, 32 Sullivan, Suicide Bombings in Operation Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Odom, LTC Thomas P., USA, Ret.; BG Iraqi Freedom, ©AUSA, 2004, 69 Training Center, 51 Mick Bednarek, USA; and Stephen Florich,
MILITARY REVIEW z January -February 2005 95 Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Subject Index Military History Training Center, 51 Hyman Rickover: Excellence, Great Foreign Area Officer Pion-Berlin, David S., Ph.D., Political ness, Heroism, COL Gerald D. Evans, Redefining the Foreign Area Officer’s USA: ALMANAC, 85 Management of the Military in Latin Role: A Response, LTC Robert E. Fried America, 19 enberg, USA: LETTERS, 93 Professional Reading List U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN Peter J. Scales, MG Robert H., USA, Ret., Urban Information Operations/The Media Schoomaker Professional Reading List: Warfare: A Soldier’s View, 9 Do We Need FA30? Creating an Infor BOOKSHELF, 80 Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., U.S. Army mation Warfare Branch, MAJ George C.L. Terrorism/Counterterrorism Chief of Staff Professional Reading List: Brown, USA, 39 Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the BOOKSHELF, 80 Intelligence Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Mani Sullivan, John P., and Robert J. Bunker, Geospatial Intelligence, Ralph M. Erwin: festo, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, Ph.D., Suicide Bombings in Operation MR DIGEST, 87 USN: REVIEW ESSAY, 83 Iraqi Freedom, ©AUSA, 2004, 69 Joint Operations Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment, Taylor, MAJ Teresa Z., ARNG, Ret., Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readi ness Training Center, BG Mick Bednarek, MAJ Norman Emery, USA; MAJ Jason Ph.D., Strength Maintenance: A Risk Werchan, USAF; and MAJ Donald G. Management Approach, 63 USA; LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Ret.; and Stephen Florich, 51 Mowles, Jr., USAF, 32 Werchan, MAJ Jason, USAF; MAJ Nor The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army The Need to Validate Planning As Detainee Doctrine and Experience, MAJ man Emery, USA; and MAJ Donald G. sumptions, LTC Peter D. Woodmansee, Mowles, Jr., USAF, Fighting Terrorism and James F. Gebhardt, USA, Ret., 44 USMC; LTC Timothy L. Faulkner, Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Insurgency: Shaping the Information En USA; and MAJ Wayne C. Blanchette, vironment, 32 Freedom, Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and USAF, 58 John P. Sullivan, ©AUSA, 2004, 69 Woodmansee, LTC Peter D., USMC; LTC Latin America Training Timothy L. Faulkner, USA; and MAJ Political Management of the Military Theater Immersion: Postmobilization Wayne C. Blanchette, USAF, The Need to in Latin America, David S. Pion-Berlin, Training in the First Army, LTG Russell Validate Planning Assumptions, 58 Ph.D., 19 Honoré, USA, and COL Daniel L. Zajac, Zajac, COL Daniel L., USA; and LTG Leader Development/Leadership USA, 2 Russell Honoré, USA, Theater Immersion: Strength Maintenance: A Risk Manage Urban Warfare Postmobilization Training in the First ment Approach, MAJ Teresa Z. Taylor, Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View, MG Army, 2 ARNG, Ret., Ph.D., 63 Robert H. Scales, USA, Ret., 9
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