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Marxist Economics: How Capitalism Works, and How It Doesn't
MARXIST ECONOMICS: HOW CAPITALISM WORKS, ANO HOW IT DOESN'T 49 Another reason, however, was that he wanted to show how the appear- ance of "equal exchange" of commodities in the market camouflaged ~ , inequality and exploitation. At its most superficial level, capitalism can ' V be described as a system in which production of commodities for the market becomes the dominant form. The problem for most economic analyses is that they don't get beyond th?s level. C~apter Four Commodities, Marx argued, have a dual character, having both "use value" and "exchange value." Like all products of human labor, they have Marxist Economics: use values, that is, they possess some useful quality for the individual or society in question. The commodity could be something that could be directly consumed, like food, or it could be a tool, like a spear or a ham How Capitalism Works, mer. A commodity must be useful to some potential buyer-it must have use value-or it cannot be sold. Yet it also has an exchange value, that is, and How It Doesn't it can exchange for other commodities in particular proportions. Com modities, however, are clearly not exchanged according to their degree of usefulness. On a scale of survival, food is more important than cars, but or most people, economics is a mystery better left unsolved. Econo that's not how their relative prices are set. Nor is weight a measure. I can't mists are viewed alternatively as geniuses or snake oil salesmen. exchange a pound of wheat for a pound of silver. -
1- TECHNOLOGY Q L M. Muniagurria Econ 464 Microeconomics Handout
M. Muniagurria Econ 464 Microeconomics Handout (Part 1) I. TECHNOLOGY : Production Function, Marginal Productivity of Inputs, Isoquants (1) Case of One Input: L (Labor): q = f (L) • Let q equal output so the production function relates L to q. (How much output can be produced with a given amount of labor?) • Marginal productivity of labor = MPL is defined as q = Slope of prod. Function L Small changes i.e. The change in output if we change the amount of labor used by a very small amount. • How to find total output (q) if we only have information about the MPL: “In general” q is equal to the area under the MPL curve when there is only one input. Examples: (a) Linear production functions. Possible forms: q = 10 L| MPL = 10 q = ½ L| MPL = ½ q = 4 L| MPL = 4 The production function q = 4L is graphed below. -1- Notice that if we only have diagram 2, we can calculate output for different amounts of labor as the area under MPL: If L = 2 | q = Area below MPL for L Less or equal to 2 = = in Diagram 2 8 Remark: In all the examples in (a) MPL is constant. (b) Production Functions With Decreasing MPL. Remark: Often this is thought as the case of one variable input (Labor = L) and a fixed factor (land or entrepreneurial ability) (2) Case of Two Variable Inputs: q = f (L, K) L (Labor), K (Capital) • Production function relates L & K to q (total output) • Isoquant: Combinations of L & K that can achieve the same q -2- • Marginal Productivities )q MPL ' Small changes )L K constant )q MPK ' Small changes )K L constant )K • MRTS = - Slope of Isoquant = Absolute value of Along Isoquant )L Examples (a) Linear (L & K are perfect substitutes) Possible forms: q = 10 L + 5 K Y MPL = 10 MPK = 5 q = L + K Y MPL = 1 MPK = 1 q = 2L + K Y MPL = 2 MPK = 1 • The production function q = 2 L + K is graphed below. -
Dangers of Deflation Douglas H
ERD POLICY BRIEF SERIES Economics and Research Department Number 12 Dangers of Deflation Douglas H. Brooks Pilipinas F. Quising Asian Development Bank http://www.adb.org Asian Development Bank P.O. Box 789 0980 Manila Philippines 2002 by Asian Development Bank December 2002 ISSN 1655-5260 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank. The ERD Policy Brief Series is based on papers or notes prepared by ADB staff and their resource persons. The series is designed to provide concise nontechnical accounts of policy issues of topical interest to ADB management, Board of Directors, and staff. Though prepared primarily for internal readership within the ADB, the series may be accessed by interested external readers. Feedback is welcome via e-mail ([email protected]). ERD POLICY BRIEF NO. 12 Dangers of Deflation Douglas H. Brooks and Pilipinas F. Quising December 2002 ecently, there has been growing concern about deflation in some Rcountries and the possibility of deflation at the global level. Aggregate demand, output, and employment could stagnate or decline, particularly where debt levels are already high. Standard economic policy stimuli could become less effective, while few policymakers have experience in preventing or halting deflation with alternative means. Causes and Consequences of Deflation Deflation refers to a fall in prices, leading to a negative change in the price index over a sustained period. The fall in prices can result from improvements in productivity, advances in technology, changes in the policy environment (e.g., deregulation), a drop in prices of major inputs (e.g., oil), excess capacity, or weak demand. -
Unfree Labor, Capitalism and Contemporary Forms of Slavery
Unfree Labor, Capitalism and Contemporary Forms of Slavery Siobhán McGrath Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School University Economic Development & Global Governance and Independent Study: William Milberg Spring 2005 1. Introduction It is widely accepted that capitalism is characterized by “free” wage labor. But what is “free wage labor”? According to Marx a “free” laborer is “free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale” – thus obliging the laborer to sell this labor power to an employer, who possesses the means of production. Yet, instances of “unfree labor” – where the worker cannot even “dispose of his labor power as his own commodity1” – abound under capitalism. The question posed by this paper is why. What factors can account for the existence of unfree labor? What role does it play in an economy? Why does it exist in certain forms? In terms of the broadest answers to the question of why unfree labor exists under capitalism, there appear to be various potential hypotheses. ¾ Unfree labor may be theorized as a “pre-capitalist” form of labor that has lingered on, a “vestige” of a formerly dominant mode of production. Similarly, it may be viewed as a “non-capitalist” form of labor that can come into existence under capitalism, but can never become the central form of labor. ¾ An alternate explanation of the relationship between unfree labor and capitalism is that it is part of a process of primary accumulation. -
The Discontents of Marxism
Munich Personal RePEc Archive The discontents of Marxism Freeman, Alan London Metropolitan University 30 December 2007 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48635/ MPRA Paper No. 48635, posted 27 Jul 2013 14:16 UTC The discontents of Marxism Alan Freeman London Metropolitan University Abstract This is a pre-publication version of a full-length review of Kuhn, R. (2007) Henryk Grossman and the Recovery of Marxism. Urbana and U of Illinois. Please cite as Freeman, A. 2008. ‘The Discontents of Marxism’. Debatte, 16 (1), April 2008 pp. 122-131 Keywords: Economics, Marxism, Value Theory, Marxist political economy, Marxist Economics, Kondratieff, Grossman JEL Codes: B14, B31, B51 2008j Grossman Review for MPRA.doc Page 1 of 9 Alan Freeman The discontents of Marxism Review of Kuhn, R. (2007) Henryk Grossman and the Recovery of Marxism By Alan Freeman, London Metropolitan University In 1977, volumes 2 and 3 of Capital and Class, journal of the seven-year old Conference of Socialist Economists, carried Pete Burgess’s translation of Henryk Grossman’s 1941 review article Marx, Classical Political Economy and the Problem of Dynamics. Of this Kuhn (p190) justly remarks ‘It was and remains one of the most impressive critiques of the methodological underpinnings of the body of ideas known as economics in most universities and the media’. The second part of this article offers a devastating dissection of the approach known as ‘general equilibrium’, which now dominates not only orthodox but ‘Marxist’ economics. Had the participants in the next thirty years of debate around Marx’s economic theories treated this article with even normal professional diligence, most of what passes for ‘theory’ in this field would probably never have been written. -
Marx, Historical Materialism and the Asiatic Wde Of
MARX, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND THE ASIATIC WDE OF PRODUCTION BY Joseph Bensdict Huang Tan B.A. (Honors) Simon Fraser University 1994 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE SCHOOL OF COMMUN ICATION @Joseph B. Tan 2000 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY July 2000 Al1 rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. uisitions and Acguiiiet raphii Senrices senrices bibiiihiques The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Li'brary of Canada to BibIiothèque nationale du Canada de reproduceYloan, distriiute or sel1 reproduireyprêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microh, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous papa or electronic formats. la fome de micro fi ch el^ de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author tetains ownership of the L'auîeur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis*Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts iÏom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT Historical materialism (HM), the theory of history originally developed by Marx and Engels is most comrnonly interpreted as a unilinear model, which dictates that al1 societies must pass through definite and universally similar stages on the route to communism. This simplistic interpretation existed long before Stalin and has persisted long after the process of de-Stalinization and into the present. -
The “Ill Kill'd” Deer: Poaching and Social Order in the Merry Wives of Windsor
The “ill kill’d” Deer: Poaching and Social Order in The Merry Wives of Windsor Jeffrey Theis Nicholas Rowe once asserted that the young Shakespeare was caught stealing a deer from Sir Thomas Lucy’s park at Charlecote. The anecdote’s truth-value is clearly false, yet the narrative’s plausibility resonates from the local social customs in Shakespeare’s Warwickshire region. As the social historian Roger Manning convincingly argues, hunting and its ille- gitimate kin poaching thoroughly pervaded all social strata of early modern English culture. Close proximity to the Forest of Arden and nu- merous aristocratic deer parks and rabbit warrens would have steeped Shakespeare’s early life in the practices of hunting and poaching whether he engaged in them or only heard stories about them.1 While some Shakespeare criticism attends directly or indirectly to the importance of hunting in the comedies, remarkably, there has been no sustained analysis of poaching’s importance in these plays.2 In part, the reason for the oversight might be lexicographical. The word “poaching” never occurs in any of Shakespeare’s works, and the first instance in which poaching means “to take game or fish illegally” is in 1611—a decade after Shakespeare composed his comedies.3 Yet while the word was not coined for another few years, Roger Manning proves that illegal deer killing was a socially and politically explosive issue well before 1611. Thus, the “ill kill’d deer” Justice Shallow refers to in Act One of The Merry Wives of Windsor situates the play within a socially resonant discourse where illegal deer killing brings to light cultural assumptions imbedded within the legal hunt. -
The Impacts of Technological Invention on Economic Growth – a Review of the Literature Andrew Reamer1 February 28, 2014
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC POLICY The Impacts of Technological Invention on Economic Growth – A Review of the Literature Andrew Reamer1 February 28, 2014 I. Introduction In their recently published book, The Second Machine Age, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee rely on economist Paul Krugman to explain the connection between invention and growth: Paul Krugman speaks for many, if not most, economists when he says, “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it’s almost everything.” Why? Because, he explains, “A country’s ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker”—in other words, the number of hours of labor it takes to produce everything, from automobiles to zippers, that we produce. Most countries don’t have extensive mineral wealth or oil reserves, and thus can’t get rich by exporting them. So the only viable way for societies to become wealthier—to improve the standard of living available to its people—is for their companies and workers to keep getting more output from the same number of inputs, in other words more goods and services from the same number of people. Innovation is how this productivity growth happens.2 For decades, economists and economic historians have sought to improve their understanding of the role of technological invention in economic growth. As in many fields of inventive endeavor, their efforts required time to develop and mature. In the last five years, these efforts have reached a point where they are generating robust, substantive, and intellectually interesting findings, to the benefit of those interested in promoting growth-enhancing invention in the U.S. -
Adam Smith: Founder of Economics
Adam Smith: Founder of Economics Robert M. Coen Professor Emeritus of Economics Northwestern Alumnae Continuing Education January 5, 2017 Adam Smith, 1723-1790 John Rattray, 1707-71 Signatory of First Rules of Golf (1744) Ways of Coordinating Economic Activity Traditional Structures Authoritarian Structures Market structures Reasons for Slow Development of Markets Popularity of Mercantilism Government promotes exports, stifles imports Favored industries get subsidies, protection, monopoly franchises Establish and exploit foreign colonies Accumulate riches (gold) for royalty Reasons for Slow Development of Markets Popularity of Mercantilism Avarice regarded as sin False Principles of Trade Boston Minister John Cotton, 1639 A man might sell as dear as he can and buy as cheap as he can If a man lose some of his goods, say by accident at sea, he may raise the price of the rest He may sell at the price he bought, even though he paid too much Reasons for Slow Development of Markets Popularity of Mercantilism Avarice regarded as sin Indifferent attitudes toward personal betterment Prevalence of local taxes on movement of goods Lack of standardization of weights and measures Multiple currencies Resistance to innovation Land, labor, and capital not developed concepts Factors Promoting Development of Markets Enclosure of commons Ringleaders of the Enclosure Movement Rural Life After Enclosure of the Commons Factors Promoting Development of Markets Enclosure of commons Political consolidation and centralization Decay of religious spirit Bernard Mandeville, -
DEMOPOLIS Democracy Before Liberalism in Theory and Practice
Trim: 228mm 152mm Top: 11.774mm Gutter: 18.98mm × CUUK3282-FM CUUK3282/Ober ISBN: 978 1 316 51036 0 April 18, 2017 12:53 DEMOPOLIS Democracy before Liberalism in Theory and Practice JOSIAH OBER Stanford University, California v Trim: 228mm 152mm Top: 11.774mm Gutter: 18.98mm × CUUK3282-FM CUUK3282/Ober ISBN: 978 1 316 51036 0 April 18, 2017 12:53 Contents List of Figures page xi List of Tables xii Preface: Democracy before Liberalism xiii Acknowledgments xvii Note on the Text xix 1 Basic Democracy 1 1.1 Political Theory 1 1.2 Why before Liberalism? 5 1.3 Normative Theory, Positive Theory, History 11 1.4 Sketch of the Argument 14 2 The Meaning of Democracy in Classical Athens 18 2.1 Athenian Political History 19 2.2 Original Greek Defnition 22 2.3 Mature Greek Defnition 29 3 Founding Demopolis 34 3.1 Founders and the Ends of the State 36 3.2 Authority and Citizenship 44 3.3 Participation 48 3.4 Legislation 50 3.5 Entrenchment 52 3.6 Exit, Entrance, Assent 54 3.7 Naming the Regime 57 4 Legitimacy and Civic Education 59 4.1 Material Goods and Democratic Goods 60 4.2 Limited-Access States 63 4.3 Hobbes’s Challenge 64 4.4 Civic Education 71 ix Trim: 228mm 152mm Top: 11.774mm Gutter: 18.98mm × CUUK3282-FM CUUK3282/Ober ISBN: 978 1 316 51036 0 April 18, 2017 12:53 x Contents 5 Human Capacities and Civic Participation 77 5.1 Sociability 79 5.2 Rationality 83 5.3 Communication 87 5.4 Exercise of Capacities as a Democratic Good 88 5.5 Free Exercise and Participatory Citizenship 93 5.6 From Capacities to Security and Prosperity 98 6 Civic Dignity -
John Clare, Poems Against Enclosure 1 John Clare (1793-1864)
John Clare, Poems Against Enclosure 1 John Clare (1793-1864) The Mores Far spread the moorey ground a level scene Bespread with rush and one eternal green That never felt the rage of blundering plough Though centurys wreathed spring’s blossoms on its brow Still meeting plains that stretched them far away In uncheckt shadows of green brown, and grey Unbounded freedom ruled the wandering scene Nor fence of ownership crept in between To hide the prospect of the following eye Its only bondage was the circling sky One mighty flat undwarfed by bush and tree Spread its faint shadow of immensity And lost itself, which seemed to eke its bounds In the blue mist the horizon’s edge surrounds Now this sweet vision of my boyish hours Free as spring clouds and wild as summer flowers Is faded all - a hope that blossomed free, And hath been once, no more shall ever be Inclosure came and trampled on the grave Of labour’s rights and left the poor a slave And memory’s pride ere want to wealth did bow Is both the shadow and the substance now The sheep and cows were free to range as then Where change might prompt nor felt the bonds of men Cows went and came, with evening morn and night, To the wild pasture as their common right And sheep, unfolded with the rising sun Heard the swains shout and felt their freedom won Tracked the red fallow field and heath and plain Then met the brook and drank and roamed again The brook that dribbled on as clear as glass Beneath the roots they hid among the grass While the glad shepherd traced their tracks along Free as the -
Department of Economics
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Working Paper Problematizing the Global Economy: Financialization and the “Feudalization” of Capital Rajesh Bhattacharya Ian Seda-Irizarry Paper No. 01, Spring 2014, revised 1 Problematizing the Global Economy: Financialization and the “Feudalization” of Capital Rajesh Bhattacharya1 and Ian J. Seda-Irizarry2 Abstract In this essay we note that contemporary debates on financialization revolve around a purported “separation” between finance and production, implying that financial profits expand at the cost of production of real value. Within the literature on financialization, we primarily focus on those contributions that connect financialization to global value-chains, production of knowledge- capital and the significance of rent (ground rent, in Marx’s language) in driving financial strategies of firms, processes that are part of what we call, following others, the feudalization of capital. Building on the contributions of Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff, we problematize the categories of capital and capitalism to uncover the capitalocentric premises of these contributions. In our understanding, any discussion of the global economy must recognize a) the simultaneous expansion of capitalist economic space and a non-capitalist “outside” of capital and b) the processes of exclusion (dispossession without proletarianization) in sustaining the capital/non-capital complex. In doing so, one must recognize the significance of both traditional forms of primitive accumulation as well as instances of “new enclosures” in securing rent for dominant financialized firms. Investment in knowledge-capital appears as an increasingly dominant instrument of extraction of rent from both capitalist and non-capitalist producers within a transformed economic geography. In our understanding, such a Marxian analysis renders the separation problem an untenable proposition.