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Taiwanese Independence Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: CHN34732 Country: China Date: 1 May 2009 Keywords: China – Taiwanese nationals – Right of return – Taiwanese Independence This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please advise if a Chinese citizen married to a Taiwanese national would have the right to return to Taiwan. 2. Is there evidence of mistreatment of Taiwan independence supporters within China? RESPONSE 1. Please advise if a Chinese citizen married to a Taiwanese national would have the right to return to Taiwan. A foreign national holding a visa containing the following stipulation: “The bearer of this permit is permitted to enter or exit the District of Taiwan, Republic of China if the entry or exit validity remains valid”, would appear not to have permanent residency in Taiwan and, based on the information presented below, would not have an automatic right of return to Taiwan. The National Immigration Agency of Taiwan reports that a foreign national holding an expired visa with the above condition may be able to enter Taiwan on a landing or tourist visa then apply for resumption of their resident status. Otherwise it might be necessary to apply for another resident visa. To confirm what an individual in these circumstances would need to do in order to return to Taiwan, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Melbourne (http://www.teco.org.au/contact.htm) could be consulted. According to Vice Minster of the Interior Chien Tai-lang, and reported in The Taipei Times on 4 March 2004, it takes eight years of residency before a Chinese spouse can apply for permanent residency. The process is as follows: “First, after getting his or her unification visa (依親簽証), the Chinese spouse can stay for two years in Taiwan. Then the spouse can apply for short-term residency as a relative, which grants him or her four more years of residency. Finally, the spouse can apply for long-term residency which grants him or her another two years of residency. At the end of the two-year period, the Chinese spouse can apply for permanent residency,” Chien said (Yiu, Cody 2004, ‘MOI raises bar for Chinese spouses’, Taipei Times, 4 March http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/03/04/2003101034/ – Accessed 6 April 2006 – Attachment 1). The most recent US Department of State’s 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, published on 25 February 2009 also states that “PRC-born spouses must wait eight years to apply for Taiwan residency” (US Department 2009, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Taiwan, 25 February, Section 5 ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ – Attachment 2). Chinese spouses of Taiwanese citizens are subject to The Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, effective from 25 June 2008. Article 16 allows people of the Mainland Area, defined as “the territory of the Republic of China outside the Taiwan Area”, to enter Taiwan for the purpose of tourism. According to Article 17, a Mainland Area spouse may apply to enter Taiwan for family reunion. A spouse may apply for spouse residency if they have been married for two years or have a child. If the spouse stays in Taiwan for no less than 183 days a year for at least four years they can then apply for long-term residency. After two years of long-term residency the spouse can then apply for permanent residency. The relevant articles follow: Article 16 Any of the people of the Mainland Area may apply to enter into the Taiwan Area for the purpose of business visit or tourism; regulations thereof shall be prescribed by the competent authorities. In any of the following situations, any of the people of the Mainland Area may apply for permanent residency in the Taiwan Area: 1. Being a lineal relative by blood or the spouse of any of the people of the Taiwan Area, and of the age of no less than seventy or no more than twelve. …An annual quota may be imposed on the number of permanent residency in the Taiwan Area to be granted to the people of the Mainland Area who apply in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 1 of the preceding paragraph. …Article 17 Any of the people of the Mainland Area being the spouse of any of the people of the Taiwan Area may apply to enter into the Taiwan Area for family reunion in accordance with laws and regulations; in either of the following situations, it may apply for spouse residency in the Taiwan Area: 1. Being married for at least two years. 2. Having given birth to a child. …Any person having a spouse residency in the Taiwan Area, which is permitted in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1, for at least four years, and during which its lawful residency in the Taiwan Area each year is no less than 183 days may apply for long- term residency. …For any person permitted to have a long-term residency in the Taiwan Area in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, its period of residency is indefinite; it may apply for permanent residency in the Taiwan Area provided that it has a long-term residency for at least two years and complies with the following provisions: 1. The period of its lawful residency in the Taiwan Area being no less than 183 days annually. 2. Being of the age of no less than twenty. 3. Having a character of integrity and with no criminal record. 4. Submitting a proof of losing its original household registration. 5. Having certain amount of properties for self-sufficiency or living upon reliable support. 6. Being in the national interests. The Ministry of Interior may impose and publish after approval by the Executive Yuan the quota and categories for spouse residency, long-term residency and permanent residency (Act Governing Relations between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (Effective 25 June 2008), Law and Regulations Database of The Republic of China website http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/Fnews/FnewsContent.asp?msgid=3896&msgType=en&keyword= mainland+area – Accessed 29 April 2009 – Attachment 3). According to the National Immigration Agency of Taiwan, “Nationals living in the Taiwan Area with registered permanent residence (hereinafter called registered nationals) may freely enter and/or exit the ROC with their passports from 21st May 2000” (‘A.ROC Nationals’ 2008, National Immigration Agency website, 14 February http://www.immigration.gov.tw/immig_eng/aspcode/main7.asp – Accessed 1 May 2009 – Attachment 4). An entry on the National Immigration Agency’s website dated 19 January 2009 provides information on what foreign nationals should do if their re-entry permits have expired: What should foreign residents in the ROC do when entering the nation if they fail to apply for “reentry permits” in advance or if their single trip reentry permits already expired? I People qualified for visa exemption and landing visas (not including Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) presently may enter the ROC visa free. They should go directly to the local service center of National Immigration Agency to apply for the resumption of resident status. II People not qualified for visa exemption or landing visas should apply for visitor visas to enter the ROC at the ROC’s embassies, consulates or representative offices stationed in foreign nations. After having entered the ROC, they should go to the local service center of National Immigration Agency to apply for the resumption of resident status. III Those applying for the resumption of resident status should complete the procedures within the valid period of their landing visa, visa-exemption program, resident visa, or ARC (‘FAQ – What should foreign residents in the ROC do when entering the nation if they fail to apply for “reentry permits” in advance or if their single trip reentry permits already expired?’ 2009, Information for Foreigners, National Immigration Agency website, 19 January http://iff.immigration.gov.tw/enfront/faq.php?tr_id=3&id=580 – Accessed 29 April 2009 – Attachment 5). The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) provides the following information on resident visas: Eligible Foreign nationals, who hold ordinary passports or other legal travel documents, who Persons intend to stay in the Republic of China for more than six months for the purpose of joining family, pursuing studies, accepting employment, making investments, doing missionary work, or engaging in other permissible activities. Requirements 1. A passport valid for at least six months; 2. A duly completed application form with two 2x2 inch color photos taken within from the last six months. 3. Supporting documents or official letters of approval from a competent authority of the ROC; and 4. Other relevant documents. 5. Health Certificate if applicable Visa Validity A Resident Visa is valid for three months. Duration of Resident Visa holders are required to apply for the Alien Resident Certificate and Re- stay entry Permit at local service centers of the National Immigration Agency within 15 days starting from the next day of their arrival. They may stay in the ROC as long as the Alien Resident Certificate remains valid.
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