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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2004 2009 Delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council DRAFT REPORT by Kyriacos Triantaphyllides Chairman of the Delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council 8th European Parliament / Palestinian Legislative Council Inter-parliamentary Meeting 31 October to 3 November 2008 Jerusalem/Ramallah/Gaza CR\756963EN.doc PE401.195v01-00 EN EN 8 Inter-parliamentary Meeting EP-PLC INTRODUCTION From 31 October to 3 November 2008 a working group from the European Parliament Delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council visited East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza. The delegation was headed by Kyriacos TRIANTAPHYLLIDES (GUE, CY), accompanied by Margrethe AUKEN (Greens, DK), Frieda BREPOELS (PPE-DE, BE), Chris DAVIES (ALDE, UK), Proinsias DE ROSSA (PSE, IRL), Jamila MADEIRA (PSE, POR), Luisa MORGANTINI, Vice-President of the European Parliament (GUE, IT) and Georgios TOUSSAS (GUE, GR). The last official contact between the two assemblies had been a visit from a European Parliament delegation two years earlier, in November 2006. The 2008 visit (the 9th inter-parliamentary meeting) took place at a particularly sensitive time in view of events in the region: - the political and geographical partition of Palestine with the isolation (and siege) of Gaza; - the difficulties in implementing the peace process (Annapolis and the 'roadmap’); - the visit to the area in June 2008 by a delegation from the Working Party on the Middle East, which came to discouraging conclusions and was very critical of the behaviour of Israel; - the resolution adopted on 4 September 2008 by the European Parliament on the situation of Palestinian prisoners, particularly elected members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, but also the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Aware of these difficulties and of the short time available to it, the delegation tried to draw up a programme which could do justice to both aspects of its mandate: ascertaining the situation of the Palestinian prisoners, and establishing and maintaining the dialogue with the democratically elected representatives of an assembly split between two locations. To that end, the delegation gathered the necessary information from the Commission’s representatives in East Jerusalem (ECTAO) and from the current and forthcoming Council Presidencies. It then inquired into the situation of the Palestinian prisoners, by meeting – through the good offices of local NGOs – some freed prisoners and their families, and going to the prison where the Speaker of the PLC was held with a request to meet him (this was refused). Not without some difficulties, the delegation was able to hold its 8th inter-parliamentary meeting with the PLC in two sittings, in Ramallah and Gaza. Following a meeting with the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, the delegation was able to ascertain, by means of two on-site visits, the exact nature of relations between Palestinians and the Israeli authorities in the territories specifically recognised by the international community as belonging to Palestine. PE401.195v01-00 2/24 CR\756963EN.doc EN 8 Inter-parliamentary Meeting EP-PLC In a general way, the delegation noted the lack of support given by the Israeli authorities to the running of the mission, particularly in connection with access to Gaza (entry and departure), in spite of their having been supplied with information before the delegation set off. I – INFORMATION MEETING WITH THE COMMISSION (ECTAO) AND THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY (Legacy Hotel, East Jerusalem , 31 October 2008) On the evening of its arrival, the delegation met first the representatives of the Commission (ECTAO) in East Jerusalem, then representatives of France and of the Czech Republic as holders of the current and forthcoming Presidencies of the Council of the EU. 1 – Meeting with the Commission: Present: The EP delegation, Roy Dickinson, chargé d'affaires, Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, Ryan Nieland (ECTAO) and Hervé Caiveau (ECHO). - On the general situation, Roy Dickinson stressed the changes which had taken place since the EP delegation's meeting in May 2008: At administrative level, the Palestinian Authority (PA) had shown an ability to manage relations with the Union, particularly by implementing itself the various payments of funding from the EU. PEGASE (the successor to TIM) had transformed the system into a genuine partnership and centralised the payment of contributions from all sources (EU and Member States). All expenditure was covered: infrastructure (water, roads, schools), training, education, judicial system, security / police equipment, officials’ pay and pensions, supply of fuel oil to Gaza to produce electricity. It was the PA which determined, internally, the allocation of appropriations among the various projects. Some 50% of the budget was devoted to Gaza, in an economic environment which was suffering particularly since the blockade. Growth, which had been 4% in 2007, was expected to fall. The EU was the biggest contributor, with EUR 1.8 billion, expected to be cut to EUR 1 billion in 2009. It was the only donor to make its payment in January of the year in question. Precise figures broken down by sector appeared in the progress report of 10 October 2008 and in PEGASE bulletin no. 32 for the period from 29 September to 10 October 2008. The members of the delegation (the chairman, F. Brepoels, L. Morgantini) were concerned at the seriousness of the situation in Gaza, deprived of essentials (building materials, water, food) and resorting to smuggling (via tunnels), and wondered what action was being taken. CR\756963EN.doc 3/24 PE401.195v01-00 EN 8 Inter-parliamentary Meeting EP-PLC Chris Davies confessed he could not understand why European taxpayers should have to foot he bill rather than the Israelis. - On behalf of ECHO, Hervé Caiveau gave a detailed analysis of the situation: Context: • The situation remained one of unceasing fragmentation and isolation in the West Bank and continued blockade in Gaza. • Core principles of IHL were continually being neglected / violated, with most humanitarian indicators evolving negatively, thus placing protection of civilians as a central issue in this crisis. • Access to food remained an essential factor of the crisis, economic access in particular, with 38% of the population food-insecure (25% in the West Bank and 56% in Gaza). Rising commodity prices and the weather shocks of last winter, further compounded by the blockade of Gaza and restrictions on access and movement, led to the Occupied Territories being among the top 30 countries affected by global rise in food / fuel prices. Protection of civilians: • 428 Palestinians killed as a direct consequence of the conflict with Israel between January and August 08 (vs. 230 over the same period of 2007, i.e. an 86% increase)1 • 1775 Palestinians injured over the same period (+ 37% compared to the same period of 2007)2 • However, there had been a sharp decrease since the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel was put in place on 19 June. • Inter-factional fighting decreasing (from 2007) with 94 Palestinians killed by the end of August 2008 (80 of them in Gaza), + 22 in handling explosives + 50 "tunnel connected" deaths. Access and movement: • Further deterioration in spite of commitments made at Annapolis one year ago. • Tight blockade on Gaza leading to severe restrictions in imports and movement of people, and a continued ban on exports, with an increasing tightening since 4 November. • Main entry crossings to Gaza remained closed (Erez, Karni, Rafah). Alternative crossings such as Kerem Shalom were operating on an erratic basis (Sofa had been closed since August); 1 Source: OCHA Protection of civilians, October 2008. 2 Source: OCHA Protection of civilians, October 2008. PE401.195v01-00 4/24 CR\756963EN.doc EN 8 Inter-parliamentary Meeting EP-PLC • Quantities imported were well below needs: by August 2008 they had decreased to pre- ceasefire levels. In August 2008, imports were 4 times less than in May 2007, before Hamas takeover. • In the West Bank, freedom of movement was severely constrained. Last UNOCHA count: 630 physical obstacles in September 2008, a 67% increase over the Access and Movement Agreement (AMA) baseline (August 2005). • The barrier was now 57% completed, with a further 9% under construction. When completed, 9.5% of the West Bank and 385,000 settlers (85% of them) would lie west of the barrier. • 35,000 Palestinians with West Bank IDs living in 35 communities, and most of the 250,000 Palestinians with East Jerusalem IDs would lie between the barrier and the armistice "green" line of 1949. Over 150,000 Palestinians would be surrounded by the barrier on 3 sides or more. • In the Northern West Bank, the barrier was now completed. The enclave between the green line and the barrier had been declared a closed military area, with a tight permit regime. Settlements: • The number of building starts on new housing units between January and June 2008 had increased by 42% over the same period last year (source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics). The population of West Bank settlements had increased by 4.6% in the first 6 months of the year, i.e. a 3 times higher rate than population growth in Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics). Humanitarian access: • The ability of humanitarian workers and UN staff to reach vulnerable areas and isolated zones had deteriorated. UN personnel had also lost thousands of working hours at checkpoints in the West Bank in particular. • New procedures for the passage of goods between Israel and the West Bank would be enforced in 2009, bringing down the number of checkpoints from 12 currently to 6 and possibly putting in place a back-to-back system. CR\756963EN.doc 5/24 PE401.195v01-00 EN 8 Inter-parliamentary Meeting EP-PLC Conclusions: • Unhindered access for humanitarian personnel to Gaza should be guaranteed. Security and administrative arrangements must be clearly established and predictable. Under international humanitarian law, humanitarian operators should be entitled to positive discrimination.
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