The Future of Islamic Extremism in Pakistan
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Open Letter on CIA MDR Regs- Final.Pdf
To: Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, David Petraeus Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, John Fitzpatrick February 23, 2012 Re: CIA Regulation change to 32 CFR Part 1908 allowing the Agency to charge requesters as high as $72 per hour for Mandatory Declassification Review requests. To whom it may concern: We the undersigned would like to call to your attention an alarming regulation that the Central Intelligence Agency entered into the Federal Register on 23 September 2011. Finalized without any notice for public comment, this regulation could cut off access to the most effective tool the public can use to request declassification of the CIA’s secret documents, the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) program. The regulation states that declassification reviews will now cost requesters up to $72 per hour, even if no information is found or released. The public must now also agree to pay a minimum of $15 in duplication fees. Throughout the government, and previously at CIA, MDR fees are commensurate to FOIA fees. Under FOIA, Congress stipulated that public interest, educational, journalism, and other fee waivers must be granted, when applicable under the statute. Furthermore, agencies must forfeit their right to collect some FOIA processing fees when they miss their processing deadline. The effect of the CIA’s new policy will be to price the public out of submitting MDR requests, a result not at all consonant with Obama Administration transparency policy in general or its declassification policy under Executive Order 13,526 in particular. The MDR process is a popular and successful tool for researchers, historians, public interest advocates and others, in part because of the independent accountability and oversight the program provides. -
Gen. David H. Petraeus on Withdrawing US Troops from Afghanistan Featuring General David H
The Dangers of Disengagement: Gen. David H. Petraeus on Withdrawing US Troops from Afghanistan Featuring General David H. Petraeus MARCH 16, 2021 Civil war and an unrestrained al Qaeda are all but certain should the US withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in May per the US-Taliban deal signed over a year ago. American disengagement will only embolden revisionist powers and create an even more dangerous security situation for the region and beyond. On this episode of Overwatch, Frederick W. Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and General David H. Petraeus sit down to discuss the US-Taliban agreement, the consequences of a US withdrawal, and a sustainable way forward that protects not only American interests, but also advances those of the Afghan people. Jacob Taylor: This is Overwatch, a podcast presented by the Institute for the Study of War. Just over one year has passed since the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that commits US forces to leave Afghanistan this May if the Taliban has met certain conditions. On this episode of Overwatch, Freder- ick Kagan, Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, sits down with General David H. Petraeus, to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, the state of the US-Taliban deal and the dangers for American national security of withdrawing US Forces from Afghanistan under the circumstances. General Petraeus is the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His 37-year career in the US Military included command of the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq, Multinational Force Iraq, in which capacity he de- veloped and executed the Surge Strategy, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the US Central Command. -
Kelley.V..Fbi.Amended.11-22-13.Pdf
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Gilberte Jill Kelley, and ) Scott Kelley, M.D. ) 1005 Bayshore Blvd. ) Tampa, Florida 33606 ) ) Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No: 13-cv-825 (ABJ) ) v. ) ) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, ) 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. ) Washington, D.C., 20535-0001, ) ) United States Department of Defense ) 1400 Defense Pentagon ) Washington, D.C., 20301, ) ) United States Department of State ) 2201 C Street NW ) Washington DC, 20520 ) ) The United States of America ) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW ) Washington DC, 20530, ) ) Leon Edward Panetta ) ) Sean M. Joyce ) ) George E. Little ) ) Steven E. Ibison ) ) Adam R. Malone ) ) John and Jane Does 1 through 10 ) individually, ) 1 Defendants. ) 1 By agreement with counsel for the FBI, DOD State Department and United States, home addresses for the individual defendants have been suppressed out of respect for the privacy and security of the current and former government officials named. 1 VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 1. Plaintiffs Mrs. Gilberte Jill Kelley and Scott Kelley, M.D., bring this action to vindicate their legal rights to privacy and dignity that were infringed by the government’s improper searches, maintenance, and disclosures of their personal, private, and confidential information. While the government’s investigation led to the resignation of Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) Director David Petraeus (“Director Petraeus”) and abrupt retirement of General John Allen, the government was not legally entitled to treat the Kelleys’ like criminals, pry into and disclose their personal communications, violate their privacy, and disseminate confidential records as well as false information about them. 2. Therefore, Mrs. -
The Situation in Afghanistan Hearings Committee On
S. HRG. 111–867 THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JUNE 15 AND 16, 2010 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 64–545 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Feb 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64545.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Feb 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64545.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN JUNE 15, 2010 Page Flournoy, Hon. -
A Tale of Two Manuals
A Tale of Two Manuals BY RAPHAEL S. COHEN n January 13, 2009, in the waning days of the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and U.S. Agency for O International Development (USAID) Administrator Henrietta Fore unveiled the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. The guide was the first of its kind—an attempt at an inter- agency doctrine reaching across civilian and military agencies in the U.S. Government. It sought to create unifying principles for the counterinsurgency fight and to unite the involved agencies through a common game plan to “achieve synergy among political, security, economic and informa- tion activities.”1 Coordinated by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, the guide was coauthored by all the major government stakeholders in the counterinsurgency fight: USAID; the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Moreover, the guide’s creation brought together some of the leading counterinsurgency strategists from across the U.S. Government and drew upon current experience. Seemingly, the finished product was well poised to shape the way the U.S. Government thinks about and conducts counterinsurgencies. And yet, more than a year and a half after its publication, the guide has languished in relative obscurity with little apparent impact on interagency planning, strategy, or operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or elsewhere. The result is particularly surprising in historical context, given the great success of two other doctrinal guides in shaping counterinsurgency strategic thought. -
Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Enduring War on Terror 3
A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY ON A US STRATEGIC VISION IN A CHANGING WORLD Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Enduring War on Terror HAL BRANDS Strategy, in national security as in other fields, consists of using the available means to accomplish some important end. Grand strategy requires, among other things, incorporating a nation’s various strategies into a coherent—and solvent—whole. There can be, then, an inherent tension between the demands of successful strategy and those of sustainable grand strategy, for the requirements of maintaining solvency across the range of national programs may limit the amount of resources made available to accomplish some particular objective or meet some pressing threat. This is precisely the challenge the United States faces today in dealing with the problem of jihadist terrorism: the demands of strategy and the demands of grand strategy are Islamism and the International Order International the and Islamism becoming progressively harder to reconcile. The United States has now been fighting a global war on terror (GWOT) for nearly two decades, but the threat posed by extremist groups—particularly those capable of creating geographic safe havens and mounting significant external attacks— remains. The confrontation with al-Qaeda’s “core” after 9/11 led to a struggle against the al-Qaeda “affiliates” in Iraq and elsewhere. That struggle continues, even as the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (often referred to as ISIS) has taken pride of place in American counterterrorism strategy since 2014. No sooner has the United States suppressed or even defeated one terrorist organization, it often seems, than a new and dangerous successor or group of successors takes its place. -
The New Insurgents: a Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency
The New Insurgents: A Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency George Michael US Air Force Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama THE NEW INSURGENTS: A Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency by George Michael USAF Counterproliferation Center 325 Chennault Circle Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 March 2014 Disclaimer The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air University, Air Force, or Department of Defense. ii Contents Chapter Page Disclaimer .............................................................................................. ii About the Author..................................................................................... v Introduction ........................................................................................... vii 1 Domestic Extremism and Terrorism in the United States ....................... 1 J.M. Berger, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam ................................................................................................ 3 Catherine Herridge, The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda’s American Recruits ........................................................................... 8 Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics ........................................................................................... 11 2 Jihadist Insurgent Strategy .................................................................... -
Introduction an End to ISIS?
1 Introduction An End to ISIS? Feisal al- Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly he Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS throughout this volume) Tseemed to rise dramatically in 2014, taking over Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, in four hours. A frenzy of activity and hand-wringing en- sued, both amongst the ranks of policymakers in vari ous capitals and in the media. Indeed, no major observer of the region, in or out of govern- ment, had seen this rise coming, and U.S. officials, starting with the pres- ident, had been openly dismissive of ISIS while touting what they deemed to be their far more impor tant success against al Qaeda. Yet here was ISIS achieving what al Qaeda had never even aspired to do in the course of its existence: taking over territory through military means from two governments that had previously controlled it. Overnight, ISIS erased the internationally recognized border between Iraq and Syria and pro- claimed the existence of its so- called caliphate and named its amir al- muminin— commander of the faithful—an Iraqi, Ibrahim Awad al- Badri, known by his nom de guerre, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. The backdrop to these events, however, was far less dramatic. ISIS had been building for years. Particularly in Iraq, as the Sunni insurgency was 3 01-3216-7-ch01.indd 3 04/17/18 12:46 am 4 al-Istrabadi and Ganguly largely defeated—or at least reduced in size—in the wake of the surge of U.S. troops in 2007 and subsequently, what was then known as the Is- lamic State in Iraq rose to displace al Qaeda. -
3096102Attachmenta
Division of Adult Institutions (DAI) RELIGIOUS PROPERTY CHART Attachment to DAI Policy 309.61.02 – Religious Property Effective: 10/01/21 INMATE PERSONAL RELIGIOUS PROPERTY: Any/all inmate personal religious property may be subject to review according to relevant DAI policies to assess potential prohibited content. Restriction/approval/denial shall include review by at least two “subject matter expert” employees (e.g. DAI Security Chief, DAI STG Committee Chair, DAI Religious Practices Coordinator, facility Security Director, facility Chaplain). Items containing religious symbols with potential dual meaning (e.g. STG identifiers) may be permitted on a case-by-case basis. For religious accommodation in the least restrictive means, DAI may require additional limitations (e.g. in-cell/room use only; not openly displayed) on a case-by-case basis above-and-beyond the generalized specifications established in this document. Any individualized accommodations established in this manner shall be documented in DOC-2075. *RESTRICTIVE HOUSING (RH) USE ITEMS: Personal religious property shall be allowed consistent with DAI 303.00.02 and 309.20.03. Least restrictive accommodation shall be assessed by the Chaplain/designee and Restrictive Housing supervisor, based upon the individual’s behavior and safety (to include clinical or medical observation). PASTORAL VISIT ITEMS: Inmates shall not take any personal property to pastoral visits. With prior approval, pastoral visitors may bring religious books/publications (including tarot cards) and other selected items (e.g., sacramental wine/beverage, sacramental bread, oil, etc.) for the purpose of providing spiritual counsel and rituals. All items are subject to security inspection. INMATES IN TEMPORARY STATUS (A&E/BARRACKS/DORMITORY/DCC HOLD): Facilities may limit total property, including religious property, due to space constraints and/or inmate transfer procedures. -
Shari'ah | Islamic Law | Religion
Ethics Theses 30 Ijtihād Maqāsidi The Interconnected Maslahah-Based Reconstruction of Islamic Laws A. Halil Thahir Interconnectedness The Prophet Muhammad | Aurat | al-Hadith | Monot Tradition | Jilbab | Muslimah Clothing | Al- Islamic Culture | Mujtahid | Khimār | Equality The Qur’an | Ijtihād | The Sunnah | In Hijāb | Judisprudence | Women | Hanafi | Justi Shari’ah | Islamic Law | Religion Ijtihād Maqāṣidi The Interconnected Maṣlaḥah-Based Reconstruction of Islamic Laws Ijtihād Maqāṣidi The Interconnected Maṣlaḥah-Based Reconstruction of Islamic Laws A. Halil Thahir Globethics.net Theses No. 30 Globethics.net Theses Director: Prof. Dr. Obiora Ike, Executive Director of Globethics.net in Geneva and Professor of Ethics at the Godfrey Okoye University Enugu/Nigeria. Series editor: Ignace Haaz, Ph.D Globethics.net Theses 30 A. Halil Thahir, Ijtihād Maqāṣidi: The Interconnected Maṣlaḥah-Based Reconstruction of Islamic Laws Geneva: Globethics.net, 2019 ISBN 978-2-88931-220-7 (online version) ISBN 978-2-88931-221-4 (print version) © 2019 Globethics.net Managing Editor: Ignace Haaz Assistant Editor: Samuel Davies English Translation: Maufur Globethics.net International Secretariat 150 route de Ferney 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland Website: www.globethics.net/publications Email: [email protected] All web links in this text have been verified as of January 2019. This The electronic version of this book can be downloaded for free from the Globethics.net website: www.globethics.net. The electronic version of this book is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY- NC-ND 4.0). See: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. This means that Globethics.net grants the right to download and print the electronic version, to distribute and to transmit the work for free, under the following conditions: Attribution: The user must attribute the bibliographical data as mentioned above and must make clear the license terms of this work; Non- commercial. -
The World Is a Catwalk!
T@rget 14 | Passion for fashion It’sIntercultural still leisure Target time! Intercultural Target Hawai The traditional costume for women to wear is a coconut-shell top Japan PROFESSOR and a grass skirt or a flowery In Japan the Reading dress and, of most traditional outfit Como Thatividade de pré-leie- course, a colourful is the Kimono. It means tura, os alunos identificam e falam acerca das personali- headband made “a thing to wear”. It is dades das fotografias. Em of flowers. always combined with princípio, os alunos devem manifestar-se de forma wooden shoes. muito ativa relativamente C a algumaswo personalidades.rld B Este facto pode ser aprovei- Arab world tado para o professor siste- matizar melhor os gostos Women use a Hijab, dos alunos, que já foram a veil that covers the head enunciados anteriormente. is a and chest, and an Abaya, a long O professor explica que os cloak. In some Arabic countries textos que os alunos vão ler são posts que os seis adoles- women wear a Burqa, a type centes colocara no mural da of veil that covers all the body, rede social, agradecendo por terem sido adicionados à lis- even the eyes. ta de amigos/conhecidos.catwalk! Men use a Thawb, a long tunic, and a Kufiyawith a round black D piece of cloth called the Agaal, ÁudioRead – Track the 3 following to find to keep the Kufiya in place out more about traditional Israel on the head. Orthodox Jew F Animaçãocostumes all over the women can’t wear world. trousers. They can only wear skirts or dresses falling below the knees and in dark colours. -
Battle Against the Thawb Syndrome: Labor Nationalization, Industrial
II. Analysis Battle against the Thawb Syndrome: Labor Nationalization, Industrial Diversification, and Education Reform in Saudi Arabia by Makio Yamada he attitude of Saudi nationals towards private sector jobs was once termed the Mudir Syndrome. Coined by Daryl Champion in his paper “The Kingdom in Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability in Stability” (1999), the term referred to Saudi nationals’ propensity to want only managerial positions in pri- vate firms—the Arabic wordmudir means a “manager.” Saudi nationals considered that only managerial positions offered the authority, status, and respect equivalent to what they could gain from public sector employment. Now 16 years have passed since Champion’s paper, and the Mudir Syndrome has become an outdated con- cept. As a result of Saudi authorities’ continuous efforts to “Saudize” private sector jobs, especially through the Nitaqat policy introduced in 2011 which legally required private firms to employ national workers, around 1.5 million Saudi nationals work in the private sector today. This accounts for 15 percent of all private sector workers, many of whom hold non-managerial positions. Labor nationalization (called “Saudization,” or sa‘wada in the Arabic language) in the Saudi private sector has witnessed a gradual but certain increase. However, what is salient today is the unevenness of the in- crease across types of jobs. For instance, no less than 97 percent of administrative jobs have already been filled by Saudi nationals. Labor Market Dynamics in the GCC States | Autumn 2015 17 II. Analysis But the proportion of national workers among engi- While a handful of qualified national in- neers is less than 10 percent.