DOCSLIB.ORG

Problems with Swinburne's Argument from Religious Experience

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Problems with Swinburne's Argument from Religious Experience Chapter 5 – Problems with Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal In Chapter 4 I described how Swinburne uses religious experience to argue in favour of theism. We saw that his strategy was to employ the principles of credulity and testimony so that he could claim that the hypothesis of theism is by far the best explanation for the phenomenon of religious experience. Applied to religious experiences, the principle of credulity would allow us to say that, unless there are reasons to believe otherwise, if a subject S seems to have perceived God, then S has perceived God. In other words, other things being equal, the fact that many claim to have perceived God is a powerful piece of evidence in favour of the hypothesis of theism, since this is the best explanation for that phenomenon. In the present chapter, I will challenge Swinburne’s conclusion that religious experience provides an objective, acceptable for all and forceful piece of evidence in favour of theism. In this critical discussion, three main issues will be stressed: 1) the disanalogies between religious experience and sense perception that can damage Swinburne’s argument, 2) the challenge posed to his proposal by naturalistic explanations of religious experiences, 3) problems posed by religious pluralism to his argument, especially as regards the identification of God in religious experiences. 1. The Analogy between Religious Experience and Sense Perception Swinburne’s efforts to argue that religious experience has evidential value are centred in the idea that since the way we perceive objects through our normal senses provides grounds for believing that the respective objects exist, perceptions of God should be taken as evidence of His existence. In other words, there is a strong analogy between religious experience and sense perception, one that permits him to say that scepticism regarding the former is as irrational as to the latter (see Swinburne 1991: 254 footnote). As a result, a crucial point to be addressed in a criticism of his position here at issue is the correlation between religious experience and sense perception. Michael Martin holds, however, that it is possible to be sceptical of the evidential value of religious experience without having the same attitude towards sense perception. To ground his assertion, Martin points out that when we do not perceive the presence of a sensory object this is prima facie reason for us to believe it does not exist, or that it is not in the particular place we surveyed. He calls this the ‘negative principle of credulity’ or NPC, which reads ‘if it seems (epistemically) 1 to a subject S that x is absent, then probably x is absent’ (see Martin 1986: 83). Swinburne does not agree that the perception of God’s absence can be grounds for believing that God does not exist, because we cannot control the conditions under which God will manifest Himself (see Swinburne 1991: 249). In addition, Swinburne claims that the fact that one person does not see an object O while another one does is not enough to say that O is not present and we can still maintain that O was there (see Swinburne 1991: 263). In fact, when there is a disagreement about a perceptual belief of this kind, the result can be exactly the opposite of what Swinburne proposes, that is, it may be more sensible to believe that O was not present. As McKim correctly observes, the resolution of this kind of disagreement will depend on the context of observation, on the relative expertise of the observers and on some other circumstantial elements (see McKim 2001: 212). In other words, if the person who claims O was not present had a better functioning perceptive apparatus or was an expert in that type of object or was better placed for observing O, then we had better believe O was not present, despite the fact that another person has affirmed he saw the object. Martin’s point, however, is that if we do not know the conditions under which we could expect to perceive God, then this affects the evidential value of purported experiences of both God’s absence and presence (see Martin 1986: 84). So, if we do not know in which circumstances God will manifest himself to someone then how can we ascertain that that experience was really of God? According to Martin, the inductive inference from the appearance to me of a table, to the hypothesis that the table was present given certain conditions C only becomes strong if we can assume that if the table were really not present and conditions C obtained, then the table would not appear to me. In sum, the inference from the perception of an object O to the existence of O is only inductively strong if we know the sufficient conditions for the appearance of O so that we can determine whether the perception was authentic. William Rowe has a similar point to Martin’s when he says that Since we don’t know what circumstances make for delusory religious experiences and we don’t know what the conditions are which, if satisfied, one would have the 1 ‘Epistemically’, as we saw in Chapter 4, means a use of verbs like ‘seem’, ‘look’ and ‘appear’ according to which they describe what the subject is inclined to believe on the basis of his experience (see Swinburne 1991: 245-6). experience of God if there is a God to be experienced, we can’t really go about the process of determining whether there are or are not positive reasons for thinking religious experiences to be probably delusive (Rowe 1982: 90-1). As a result, Rowe concludes, the application of the principle of credulity is not warranted in the case of religious experiences, and if the argument from religious experience depends on the application of credulity principle, as Swinburne claims, then this argument fails as evidence for the existence of God (see Rowe 1982: 91) 2. This important distinction between sense perception and religious experience is spelt out by Richard Gale when he argues that the latter does not fulfil the ‘epistemological requirement’ that he believes is crucial for the evidential value of any sensory claim. This prerequisite for considering a perceptual statement genuine is basically that in order to have an initial plausibility conferred by the principle of credulity, experiences ‘[…] must be subject to defeaters, tests or checks, failure of which lowers this prima facie probability’ (Gale 1994c: 59). According to Gale, there are three tests that are crucial for the evidential value of a sense perception claim that religious experiences cannot meet. The first one is what he calls the ‘causal test’, which requires that in order to generate rational belief, a perceptual claim must have been caused in the right way to the perceiver. In other words, the perceiver must have been positioned in the correct place and with his perceptual apparatus working properly. We can only claim that there is a table in the room based on our perception if we are correctly positioned for discerning that and if our capacity for observing it is in good order. This test, however, does not apply to religious experiences, because, since God is by definition a non-spatial being and is said to appear to anyone He chooses, it does not matter where the perceiver is or whether his perceptual mechanism is working well, for God can overcome any of a perceiver’s limitations (see Gale 1994c: 60). The second test is the agreement among different observers, by means of which a perceptual claim can be falsified by either a better positioned and trained witness or by a larger number of observers with the same capability. The position and the number of 2 Jerome Gellman has interesting replies to both Martin and Rowe (see Gellman 1997: 59-60 and 68-9). However, since Gellman does not ground his case in the idea that scepticism directed to theistic experience is as irrational as scepticism directed to sense perception (see Gellman 1997: 49-50), his arguments do not apply to the point I am discussing here. people standing in the same place where a purported religious experience occurred, as we saw above, cannot disconfirm the authenticity of an experiential claim of this kind, because God can choose to appear to only one person in a group of people standing in the same place. As to the level or type of training required for testing a statement like this, Caroline Franks says: […] we have little idea of the sort of training which would enable one to have veridical experiences of God or other supernatural forces. The kind of training which might seem appropriate – theological training, engaging in religious rituals, guidance in meditation by a spiritual master or guru – does not by any means guarantee that one will have veridical experience of God, if he exists; and theists agree that genuine religious experiences may occur spontaneously to theologically naïve and even irreligious subjects (Franks 1985: 28). The problem for religious experiences, Gale argues, is that the agreement of other observers regarding the content of a purported theistic perception cannot be used as confirming it either. We cannot rationally admit the very employment of a criterion that is only useful to prove but not to disprove (see Gale 1994c: 60). This asymmetry observed in religious experience but not in sense perception is another important difference between them, Gale claims. The third type of test that is fundamental for ascribing veridical status to religious experience is what Gale calls ‘the prediction test’. According to this criterion, a sense perception claim is considered authentic as long as we can predict who will have the experience and the circumstances that will confirm the content of that mental occurrence.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Credibility and Credulity: How Beliefs About Beliefs Affect Entry Incentives Alan C
    Vassar College Digital Window @ Vassar Faculty Research and Reports 11-13-2006 Credibility and credulity: how beliefs about beliefs affect entry incentives Alan C. Marco Vassar College Kieran J. Walsh Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalwindow.vassar.edu/faculty_research_reports Citation Information Marco, Alan C. and Walsh, Kieran J., "Credibility and credulity: how beliefs about beliefs affect entry incentives" (2006). Faculty Research and Reports. 68. https://digitalwindow.vassar.edu/faculty_research_reports/68 This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Window @ Vassar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Research and Reports by an authorized administrator of Digital Window @ Vassar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Credibility and Credulity: How Beliefs about Beliefs affect Entry Incentives Alan C. Marco1 Kieran J. Walsh2 November 13, 2006 1 Department of Economics, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604-0708, USA. [email protected], 845- 437-7669. 2 Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The views expressed here arethoseoftheauthors,anddonot necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Vassar College Economics Working Paper # 80 Abstract In this note we investigate the infringement (entry) decision for a firm facing an incumbent patent holder with uncertain patent rights. The entrant risks a dispute by entering, resulting in either a settlement (licensing) or litigation and trial. Using the litigation model described by Priest and Klein, we investigate the expected dispute resolution and its impacts on the entrant’s pre-dispute behavior. The primary contribution is to show that the entrant’s expectations about the patent holder’s beliefs about patent enforceability are a driving factor behind the entry decision.
    [Show full text]
  • Fessler Et Al PONE-D-14-02721 Revised Ms
    1 2 3 Negatively-Biased Credulity and the Cultural Evolution of Beliefs 4 5 6 7 8 Daniel M.T. Fessler,1* Anne C. Pisor,2 and Carlos David Navarrete3 9 10 1 Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution, and Culture 11 University of California, Los Angeles 12 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553 USA 13 14 2 Department of Anthropology 15 University of California, Santa Barbara 16 Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210 USA 17 18 3 Department of Psychology 19 Michigan State University 20 East Lansing, MI 48824-1116 USA 21 22 23 * To whom correspondence should be addressed: E-mail: [email protected] 24 25 26 27 PAPER ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN PLOS ONE, MARCH 24, 2014 28 1 29 Abstract 30 The functions of cultural beliefs are often opaque to those who hold them. Accordingly, to 31 benefit from cultural evolution’s ability to solve complex adaptive problems, learners must be 32 credulous. However, credulity entails costs, including susceptibility to exploitation, and effort 33 wasted due to false beliefs. One determinant of the optimal level of credulity is the ratio between 34 the costs of two types of errors: erroneous incredulity (failing to believe information that is true) 35 and erroneous credulity (believing information that is false). This ratio can be expected to be 36 asymmetric when information concerns hazards, as the costs of erroneous incredulity will, on 37 average, exceed the costs of erroneous credulity; no equivalent asymmetry characterizes 38 information concerning benefits. Natural selection can therefore be expected to have crafted 39 learners’ minds so as to be more credulous toward information concerning hazards.
    [Show full text]
  • As Above, So Below. Astrology and the Inquisition in Seventeenth-Century New Spain
    Department of History and Civilization As Above, So Below. Astrology and the Inquisition in Seventeenth-Century New Spain Ana Avalos Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute Florence, February 2007 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE Department of History and Civilization As Above, So Below. Astrology and the Inquisition in Seventeenth-Century New Spain Ana Avalos Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute Examining Board: Prof. Peter Becker, Johannes-Kepler-Universität Linz Institut für Neuere Geschichte und Zeitgeschichte (Supervisor) Prof. Víctor Navarro Brotons, Istituto de Historia de la Ciencia y Documentación “López Piñero” (External Supervisor) Prof. Antonella Romano, European University Institute Prof. Perla Chinchilla Pawling, Universidad Iberoamericana © 2007, Ana Avalos No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author A Bernardo y Lupita. ‘That which is above is like that which is below and that which is below is like that which is above, to achieve the wonders of the one thing…’ Hermes Trismegistus Contents Acknowledgements 4 Abbreviations 5 Introduction 6 1. The place of astrology in the history of the Scientific Revolution 7 2. The place of astrology in the history of the Inquisition 13 3. Astrology and the Inquisition in seventeenth-century New Spain 17 Chapter 1. Early Modern Astrology: a Question of Discipline? 24 1.1. The astrological tradition 27 1.2. Astrological practice 32 1.3. Astrology and medicine in the New World 41 1.4.
    [Show full text]
  • Exigency of Intellectuality and Pragmatic Reasoning Against Credulity
    © 2019 JETIR May 2019, Volume 6, Issue 5 www.jetir.org (ISSN-2349-5162) EXIGENCY OF INTELLECTUALITY AND PRAGMATIC REASONING AGAINST CREDULITY. (COUNTERFEIT PROPHECY, SUPERSTITION, ASTROLOGY AND VIGILANT GLOBE) Bhaskar Bhuyan India, State- Assam, Dist- Lakhimpur, Pin-787023 ABSTRACT Along with advancement and technology, still some parts of the globe are greatly affected by fake beliefs. Future is unpredictable and black magic is superstition. Necessity lies in working for future rather than knowing it. Lack of intelligence is detrimental for a society. Astrology is not a science, Astronomy is science. Astrologers predict by the influence of planets and they create a psychological game. In other words they establish a perfect marketing and affect the life of an individual in every possible way. Superstition is still ruling and it is degrading the development. Key words: Superstition, Astrology and black magic. 1.0 INTRODUCTION: The globe is still not equally equipped with development, advancement and intellectuality. Some 5000 years ago, superstition started to merge out from the ancient Europe and got spread to entire Globe. Countries like China, Greece, India, United Kingdom, Japan, Thailand, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal etc are influenced by black magic, superstition, astrology and fake Beliefs. Almost 98 countries out of 195 are affected by credulity. Orating the scenario of ancient time and comparing it with the present arena, it is still not degraded. The roots of this belief starts from the village and gets spread socially due to migration and social media across the entire district, state and country. 2.0 SUPERSITION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES: 2.1 JAPAN: 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Is the Critical Trust Approach to Religious Experience Incompatible with Religious Particularism: a Reply to Michael Martin and John Hick
    Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 20 Issue 2 Article 2 4-1-2003 Is the Critical Trust Approach to Religious Experience Incompatible With Religious Particularism: A Reply to Michael Martin and John Hick Kai-man Kwan Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Kwan, Kai-man (2003) "Is the Critical Trust Approach to Religious Experience Incompatible With Religious Particularism: A Reply to Michael Martin and John Hick," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 20 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200320229 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol20/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. IS THE CRITICAL TRUST APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE INCOMPATIBLE WITH RELIGIOUS PARTICULARISM? A REPLY TO MICHAEL MARTIN AND JOHN HICK Kai-man Kwan In contemporary philosophy of religion, many philosophers, e.g., William Alston, argue that we should treat religious experiences as prima facie reli­ able unless we have reasons to doubt them. I call this a Critical Trust Approach to religious experience. John Hick and Michael Martin have argued that this approach is incompatible with a particularist solution to the problem of religious pluralism. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the Critical Trust Approach. I further explore how a religious particular­ ist who accepts this approach can deal with conflicts between presumptive data, and argue that the particularist approach to religious experience is not necessarily inferior to atheistic and pluralist approaches.
    [Show full text]
  • British Humour Satirical Prints of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
    British Humour Satirical Prints of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries Comics and caricatures were born in eighteenth-century Europe. While the Enlightenment8 gave rise to a culture of criticism, the bolder art of ridicule can be credited to innovative artists responding to great social changes of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This exhibition focuses on three generations of British satirists pioneering this new form: William Hogarth, James Gillray and Thomas Rowlandson, and George Cruikshank. Hogarth, the “grandfather of the political cartoon,” lampooned the mores and behaviors of the ruling class, but no class, station, or profession was above his reproach. Following his example, Gillray and Rowlandson became thorns in the sides of aristocratic and public leaders by styling a new form of caricature with exaggerated features and proportions. Cruikshank, from a family of satirists, was able to imitate the style of Gillray so closely that Gillray’s publisher, Hannah Humphrey, hired him to complete projects the older artist left unfinished, and he was hailed in his lifetime as a “Modern Hogarth.” But comedy is serious business, because it speaks truth to power. These artists were at turns threatened, bullied, and bribed; they became part of the very debates they depicted and derided. Each succeeded because they created and then fulfilled the demands of a highly engaged citizenry, which is part of any democratic society valuing freedom of debate and expression. Modern counterparts, from editorial cartoons to The Daily Show, continue their tradition. William Hogarth (British, 1697–1764) The complete series Marriage à la Mode, 1745 Etching and engraving on paper Prints made by Gérard Jean-Baptiste Scotin II Gift of Museum Associates (2008.16.1-6) Hogarth’s Marriage à la Mode was his first series of satirical images that focused on elite British society.
    [Show full text]
  • You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 1993 by the American Psychological Association August 1993 Vol. 65, No. 2, 221-233 For personal use only--not for distribution. You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read Daniel T. Gilbert Department of Psychology University of Texas at Austin Romin W. Tafarodi Department of Psychology University of Texas at Austin Patrick S. Malone Department of Psychology University of Texas at Austin ABSTRACT Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Experiments 1 and 2) or a college student (Experiment 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Experiments 1 and 2) or time pressure (Experiment 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during comprehension. This article was written while Daniel T. Gilbert was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. The fellowship was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by a Research Scientist Development Award (1—KO2—MH00939—01) from the National Institute of Mental Health. The research reported in this article was supported by grants to Daniel T.
    [Show full text]
  • Pseudoscience and Antiscience in an Age of Science*
    THE OHIO JOURNAL OF SCIENCE VOL. 58 SEPTEMBER, 1958 No. 5 PSEUDOSCIENCE AND ANTISCIENCE IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE* WALTER C. KRAATZ Department of Biology, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio This paper is about an unpleasant subject, pseudoscience and antiscience. In this age of enlightenment and of a far-reaching public press, it seems incredible that these are so widespread. Possibly it is as we might expect from the perversity of human prejudice and the lag of the mind of the multitude behind the conceptions of the scientists. Pseudoscience and antiscience are not so distinct as they might seem. The old pseudoscience astrology and the strong antiscientific, antievolution movement which culminated in the antievolution law of Tennessee in 1925 and two other states shortly thereafter, will be cited. Astrology is still rampant. Daily astrological horoscopes are found in our newspapers and in the large magazine stores there are many astrological magazines. They do not appear antiastronomical and may seem to be a harmless absurdity. But try to show this absuridity to a confirmed believer and you will recognize the antiscience which animates him. In the antievolution movement there developed a strong pseudoscience. I refer not to the view of a large number of people, who, unaware of the nature and evolution of man and the universe, more or less feel they do not care about evolution or feel that evolution is irreligious. Instead, I refer to a relatively small number who write plausible tracts and books to be read by the aforementioned large group. For the most part these writers understand only a few of the facts.
    [Show full text]
  • Credulity”? Find 17 Synonyms and 30 Related Words for “Credulity” in This Overview
    Need another word that means the same as “credulity”? Find 17 synonyms and 30 related words for “credulity” in this overview. Table Of Contents: Credulity as a Noun Definitions of "Credulity" as a noun Synonyms of "Credulity" as a noun (17 Words) Usage Examples of "Credulity" as a noun Associations of "Credulity" (30 Words) The synonyms of “Credulity” are: gullibility, credulousness, naivety, naiveness, blind faith, trustfulness, lack of suspicion, innocence, ingenuousness, lack of experience, lack of sophistication, greenness, callowness, childlikeness, simpleness, simplicity, ignorance Credulity as a Noun Definitions of "Credulity" as a noun According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, “credulity” as a noun can have the following definitions: A tendency to be too ready to believe that something is real or true. Tendency to believe readily. Synonyms of "Credulity" as a noun (17 Words) blind faith A protective covering that keeps things out or hinders sight. callowness Wind moving at less than 1 knot; 0 on the Beaufort scale. childlikeness The quality of being childlike. GrammarTOP.com The written body of teachings of a religious group that are credulousness generally accepted by that group. greenness An environmentalist who belongs to the Green Party. Tendency to believe too readily and therefore to be easily gullibility deceived. You can never underestimate the gullibility of people. The lack of knowledge or education. ignorance He acted in ignorance of basic procedures. ingenuousness Openly straightforward or frank. A state or condition of being innocent of a specific crime or offense. innocence The healthy bloom in her cheeks gave her an aura of innocence. lack of experience The state of needing something that is absent or unavailable.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Orientation Predicts Credulity Regarding Putative Hazards
    1 2 Political Orientation Predicts Credulity Regarding Putative Hazards 3 4 Daniel M.T. Fesslera,1, Anne C. Pisor,b,c and Colin Holbrooka 5 a Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution, & Culture 6 University of California, Los Angeles 7 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553 USA 8 b Department of Anthropology 9 University of California, Santa Barbara 10 Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210 USA 11 c Department of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture 12 Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology 13 04103 Leipzig, Germany 14 15 16 1 To whom correspondence should be addressed: 17 Department of Anthropology 18 341 Haines Hall 19 University of California, Los Angeles 20 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553 USA 21 Tel.: 310 794-9252 22 Fax: 310 206-7833 23 E-mail: [email protected] 24 25 26 27 The instruments described in this paper are included in the Supplementary Online Materials, and 28 are also archived at osf.io/qqq82. The complete datasets, lists of variables, and analytic code are 29 archived at osf.io/qqq82 and http://escholarship.org/uc/item/82j5p9r3 30 Abstract 31 To benefit from information provided by others, people must be somewhat credulous. However, 32 credulity entails risks. The optimal level of credulity depends on the relative costs of believing 33 misinformation versus failing to attend to accurate information. When information concerns 34 hazards, erroneous incredulity is often more costly than erroneous credulity, as disregarding 35 accurate warnings is more harmful than adopting unnecessary precautions. Because no 36 equivalent asymmetry characterizes information concerning benefits, people should generally be 37 more credulous of hazard information than of benefit information.
    [Show full text]
  • The Challenge for Lawyers in the Age of Credulity, Superstition, and Fanaticism
    Tulsa Law Review Volume 10 Issue 4 1975 The Challenge for Lawyers in the Age of Credulity, Superstition, and Fanaticism Rennard Strickland Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Rennard Strickland, The Challenge for Lawyers in the Age of Credulity, Superstition, and Fanaticism, 10 Tulsa L. J. 565 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Strickland: The Challenge for Lawyers in the Age of Credulity, Superstition, FORUM THE CHALLENGE FOR LAWYERS IN THE AGE OF CREDULITY, SUPERSTITION, AND FANATICISM Rennard Strickland* This essay is adapted from a speech given by Dr. Strickland at the Tenth Circuit Roundtable of the Law Student Division of the American Bar Association, in October, 1974. There is a marvelous Hogarth Illustration entitled Credulity, Superstition, and Fanaticism which seems to me to be every bit as de- scriptive a title for the twentieth century as for the eighteenth century. At the top of the print, just above the altar, are witch and devil symbols supported by the church and a figure pointing to "St. Money Trap." There is a scale of justice for measuring "Ravings" and the whole mad scene is presided over by the clergy in their robes and British justices, barristers, and solicitors in their wigs.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Religious Experience Provide Justification for the Belief in God? the Debate in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy Kai-Man Kwan* Hong Kong Baptist University
    Philosophy Compass 1/6 (2006): 640–661, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00037.x Can Religious Experience Provide Justification for the Belief in God? The Debate in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy Kai-man Kwan* Hong Kong Baptist University Abstract In recent analytic philosophy of religion, one hotly debated topic is the veridicality of religious experience. In this paper, I briefly trace how the argument from religious experience comes into prominence in the twentieth century. This is due to the able defense of this argument by Richard Swinburne,William Alston, and Jerome Gellman among others. I explain the argument’s intuitive force and why the stock objections to religious experience are not entirely convincing. I expound Swinburne’s approach and his application of the Principle of Credulity to religious experience. Then I critically examine four major objections to Swinburne. I conclude that the argument from religious experiences is not likely to be conclusive but it should not be dismissed either. The Experiential Roots of Religion Religion is characterized by the passion that it can arouse. Why is religion capable of such enormous effects on human life? Apart from the fact that religion is about the ultimate concern of human beings, we also need to bear in mind that religion often has an experiential basis. God is not just a hypothesis for the religiously devoted. He is a Living Reality who permeates all their lives. Those people who experience God will echo with Job: “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee” (Holy Bible, Job 42.5).
    [Show full text]