1 2 Political Orientation Predicts Credulity Regarding Putative Hazards 3 4 Daniel M.T. Fesslera,1, Anne C. Pisor,b,c and Colin Holbrooka 5 a Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution, & Culture 6 University of California, Los Angeles 7 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553 USA 8 b Department of Anthropology 9 University of California, Santa Barbara 10 Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210 USA 11 c Department of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture 12 Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology 13 04103 Leipzig, Germany 14 15 16 1 To whom correspondence should be addressed: 17 Department of Anthropology 18 341 Haines Hall 19 University of California, Los Angeles 20 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553 USA 21 Tel.: 310 794-9252 22 Fax: 310 206-7833 23 E-mail:
[email protected] 24 25 26 27 The instruments described in this paper are included in the Supplementary Online Materials, and 28 are also archived at osf.io/qqq82. The complete datasets, lists of variables, and analytic code are 29 archived at osf.io/qqq82 and http://escholarship.org/uc/item/82j5p9r3 30 Abstract 31 To benefit from information provided by others, people must be somewhat credulous. However, 32 credulity entails risks. The optimal level of credulity depends on the relative costs of believing 33 misinformation versus failing to attend to accurate information. When information concerns 34 hazards, erroneous incredulity is often more costly than erroneous credulity, as disregarding 35 accurate warnings is more harmful than adopting unnecessary precautions. Because no 36 equivalent asymmetry characterizes information concerning benefits, people should generally be 37 more credulous of hazard information than of benefit information.