ReportNo. 48'oCCRG CaribbeanGroup CurrentSituation and Prospects

January5, 1984 Public Disclosure Authorized LatinAmerica and the ( arihbeanRegional Office

FOR OFFICIAL. USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Document of the

Thisdocument has a restricteddistribution and may be used by recipients Public Disclosure Authorized only in the performanceof their officia; duties.its contentsmay not otherwise be disclosedwithout World Bankauthorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

I. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION in 1982-83 ...... 1

It. REGIONAL PROGRAMS ...... 4

A. Energy ...... *.*...... a.a...... *....a....*...... 4 B.- ...... C. ...... **... *...... 66....**...** D. Private Sector Development ...... 7 E. Export Promotion *...... 8 F. Transportation...... a...... a..e..e. 10 G. Regional Payments Support Fund ...... 11

II1 . THE OECS COUNTRIES . .****...... #*.. L2

A. The Inter-Agency Resident Mission ...... 12 B. The Staffing Gap ...... aa.aaa.a. aaaaaaaaaa... aaa. *a .. 12 C. The East Caribbean ...... 13

IV. EXTERNAL FINANCING ...... 15

V. FUTURE CGCED ACTIVITIES ...... e 19

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Country Notes .aaa...... *...... 20 2. Statistical Appendix ...... 27

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oMcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. 1. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 1982-83

1. The international recession continues to generate serious problems for the of the Caribbean. Although world market prices of key exports such as /aljumina,., and appear to have stabilized and even, risen slightly frox the historically low levels of 1982, demand for these commodities,aad thus export earnings by the countries of the Caribbean remain weak with little prospect of a dyaamic recovery. Sugar prices remain below the costs %:t; production,often by a considerable margin, for virtually all countries in the region. Even the subsidized markets that exist in the and EEC are sat'pliedat a loss to the exporting countries. Bauxite markets appear extremely bleak as the decline in world steel demand has severely dampened the demand for Guyanese calcined bauxite, while the export volume of Jamaican bauxite fell by over 25% in 1982 in spite of significant stockpiling by the US Government. Only tourism held its own in 1982 as a result of a significant iLcrease in which has now wore than recovered the sharp faLl in the Late i970s. 0ost other destinationsexperienced declines and have had to institute significant price cutting in order to maintain their tourist industries. Until early 1983, internationaLiafLation and escalating oil prices slowed the region's once relentless growth. 2. The linkage of the currencies of the Caribbean countries to the US dollar has further exacerbated the situation. It has driven real prices of Caribbean exports In EEC markets to new lows and has had a strong negatLve effect on tourism from these countries and Canada to the Caribbean. The fact that most of the imports of Caribbean countries are from the US has meant that the terns of trade have continued to decline. Sharp devaluations in major Latin American countries,moreover, have served to reduce further the competitiveness of Caribbean exports. Foreign financial assistance to the Caribbean has increased substantially since the CGCED was established in December 1977. It should be noted, however, that assistance requirementsincreased even faster, owing to the effects of the international economic situation. The recession has created pressures on the foreign assistance budgets of major donor countries, raLsing increasingly acute questions about the future supply of assistuace to the Caribbean. Aid programs to the Caribbean also now face--after the 1983 decline in oil prices--veryuncertain futures in both and .

3. The adverse trend in the balance of payments of the Caribbean Countries was reflected in the growth performance of these economies. Real per capita income growth rates were lower In 198Z than In 1981; for , , Jamaica, and , they were negatlve. While the world appears to have turned up slightly in 1983, this has been reflected very unevenly in Caribbean economies and for many of them 1983 may have been even worse than 1982. The fact that most of the Caribbean countries have stable, well-managed governments and that many of them embarked on the process of adjusting to a changed world economy several years ago, has mitigated somewhat the worst effects of the current internationaleconomic situation. Unlike the Latin American economies, most of the countries of the Caribbean do not have heavy burdens of commercial bank indebtedness. Nevertheless, significant problems of internationalliquidity, brought on by the virtual collapse of the -2- internationalmarkets for bauxite and alumina, have become manifest in Jamaica and Guyana.

4. Some signs of improvement irLthe economic situation of the Caribbean appear to have taken place in 1983. With the revival of the economy of the United States and price moderation in the tourist sectors of many Caribbean countries,has come some increased US demand for Caribbean tourisu. Tourist arrivals thus far indicate that 1983 may be a new peak for tourism. Ahtthe sane time, markets for other Caribbean exports are still in the doldrums. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) of the United States has provisions for stimulatinga great number of new exports from the region, but generally does not affect traditional exports. It ia of great importance that the countries of the reg.on draw up their respective plans of action for taking advantage of the CBI. Little if any results will come from passively waiting for trade to develop on its own.

5. While the CBI holds promise for the future, protectionismis rising in the United States. The number of cases now before the InternationalTrade Commission is ten times the level of just five years ago. While in the past most litigation concerned cases of obvious d4mopiigfrom Large industrialized countries, a finding was made in early 1983 against ISCOTT, the Trinidad and Tobago steel company, for dumping wire rods. The sane petitioners are now asking for very large countervailingduties to be levied against ISCOTT exports. The grounds for the petition include all types of government assistance,loan guarantees,pioneer status, industrialestates, and import duty relief. If the petition is granted, the implicat1onsfor Caribbean trade to the United States would be far reaching and would seriouslyjeopardize the potentiaL gains from the CBI.

6. Of great concern during the past two years has been the apparent weakening of the CARICOM system. There is now significantlyLess trade among the members of the community than there was in 1980 in spite of the trade preferences and the ready availabilityof supply inside the market. The general cause lies in the severe recession in the Caribbean, but three specific events have been dominant. First, as part of the plan to revive the Jamalcan economy in 1981, that country shifted from purchasing Guyanese to US PL480, presumably for reasons of price, quality, and, most importantly,financing. This exacerbated the deficit position of Guyana in the CARICOM4,greatly hampering the clearing facility. Second, significantviolations of the "rules of origin" (i.e., relabelling of non-CARICOMgoods) led to an increase in the inspectionand documentationrequirements, particularly in Trinidad. As many LDCs have always experiencedproblems in preparing adequate documentation,this has led to a sharp drop in their exports to Trinidad. Finally, in early 1983 Jamaica instituted policies which were considered discriminatory against imports from CARICOM by some other CARICOM countries. Such countries reacted initiaLly by adopting retaliatorymeasures. While this issue was settled by negotiationsin May 1983, it made clear the need for high-level agreement among all CARICOM countries about the future of their regional cooperationschemes. After many years of having no formal meeting, the heads of Government have met twice in the past year, including a meeting on the Tenth Anniversary of the Treaty in Trinidad in July 1983. While the trying economic situation makes it more difficult to make substantial progress, it is absolutely essential that the system be made to function properly. 7. The system of exchange rates that prevails among the member states is of great importance to the future of CARICOM. It is now generally recognized that CARICOM currencies are on the whole overvalued with respect to their major trading partners. In the case of the OECS countries, this overvaluationis estimated to be about 20-25%. In the case of the other countries, the overvaluationis also severe, but quantificationof the extent of the overvaluationis more complex, because of a plethora of quantitative restrictionsand price controls. Certainly some of this overvaluationstems from the currenciesbeing tied to the US dollar and its own overvaluation,but there is significant evidence of exchange rate distortions beyond those of the dollar. Because of the close economic and cultural links of the members of CARICOM, exchange rate adjustment is a regional probLem, especially in the case of the OECS countries, where unanimous agreement is required for adjustment. Given the persistent balance of payments disequilibrLa which have characterized the region in the past few years, high priority should be placed in the region upon reaching agreement on exchange rate adjustments as expeditiously as possible.

8. Previous reports to the Caribbean Group have noted the importance of improved public sector project preparation as a tool for increasi'g the efficiencyof public sector investment programs. Significant progress has been made in the last few years towards this goal in many countries. Not only are individual projects increasinglywell documented, but the programs are nore realistic and reflect more accurately the economic developaent priorities of the governments. One side effect of this, however, is that governments now experience some frustration because donor funding is not available for all of their priority projects. While this may be true, the excess of fundable projects over available resources does not indicate that the process of improved public sector planning has beea in vain. Quite the contrary, this excess of projects suggest that receiving countries can now place greater emphasis fin increasing the efficiencyof public investment by strengthening their own capabilitiesto execute priority projects. Strengtheningof local institutions would have the dual effect of both increasing absorptive capacity--whichin the past has frequently been strained resulting in project delays--and increasing the efficiency of external contributions. Likewise, increasing public sector savings in order to provide more locaL counterpart funding is also an important step countries themselvescan take in order to maximize the impact of external investment funding. Donor agencies and recipient countries need to work together towards achieving these goals. -4-

It. REGIONAL PROGRAHS

9. The Caribbean Group has operated on three principal levels--the country level, the subregionallevel and the regional level. At the country level, it has tried to help individualcountries to formulateand execute appropriateeconomic programs,and to obtain the required external financial and technical assistance. In this regard, country economic reports have been issued and subgroup meetings have been held. Comments on individual countries are contained in the "Country Notes" of Attachment 1. At the subregionallevel, the CaribbeanGroup has identified the special problems of the very small countries of the OECS and promoted programs to deal with them. A summary of some of the efforts it has engaged in is contained in Part III of this report. This Part Il describes regional programs which complement country and subregional programs. In some cases, the details of programs are described in separate reports that are to be tabled at the sixth meeting of the Group. For some programs, funds are being sought, or policy decisions are required. Sonieother programs are operating well and their inclusion in this report is presented for information purposes only. The programs described are not intended to include all Caribbean regional programs, but only those which have been associated with the Caribbean Group, or where the coordinatingeffort of the Group could be effective.

A. ENERGY

(1) On-going Programs

10. The Project Document for the Caribbean Regional Exploration Promotion Project was signed by the UNDP and the World Bank in April 1983 and, following approval by the DominicanRepublic, , Guyana and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, became operationalthe following October. The project, for which the Bank is Executing Agency, is designed, to assist governments in the region, over a period of 24 months to evaluate geologic and geophysical data, to upgrade their petroleum legislation,to introduce improved contractual arrangementsfor exploration,to train technical and legal personnel in the area of petroleum explorationand contracts, and to investrigateknown, but uadeveloped,hydrocarbon resources, Under the Project, the UNDP will provide $5OO,OOO to finance a total of about 26 man months of consultant services, together with group and inservice training. A mission to countries approving the Project iB planned shortly to identify the timing and scope of the initial assistance to be provided under the Project, after which consultantswill be retained and project implementationwill commence.

11. PetroCanada InternationalAssistance Corporation (PCIAC) plans, in coordinationwith the Bank as Executing Agency for the UNDP Project, to contribute about Can$3.0 million in the form of parallel financing for technical services in the region. Moreover, PCIAC has also authorizedgrants of Can$6.8 million to Jamaica for offshore seismic services and other assistance, and of Can$7.5 million to Barbados for exploration and productionsupervisory services. In addition, offshore seismic surveys, also to be financed by PCIAC, in and in Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 12. In the ae,eaof energyconservation, UNDP, in cooperationwith UNESCO and tnieGovernment, has financeda projectdesigned to installenergy saving devicesin a numberof hotelsin Jamaica.-Work in this area is proceeding satisfactorily.Similar activities are plannedin Barbadosand possiblyin Antiguaand Barbudaand Grenada,to be financedfrom the nationalUNDP IndicativePlanning Figures of the countriesinvolved and from the UNDP Energy Account. 13. Assessmentsof the energysector are being carriedout under the joint World Bank/UNDPEnergy SectorAssessment Programme, financed from the UNDP EnergyAccount, in Jamaica,St. Lucia,St. Vincentand the Grenadines,and Grenada. These assessmentswill seek to identifyspecific problems in the sectorand make appropriaterecommendations for dealingwith them. (1i) ProposedRegional Energy Action Plan 14. The third CARICOMHeads of GovernmentMeeting in November1982 called for the preparationof a regionalenergy actionprogram, which was to be prepared by the CDB and CARICOMwith the cooperation of governments. The program has been prepared and will be tabled at the Caribbean Group meeting. It envisages donor financing for a US$22.6million programover a five-year period. The programcontains the followingmajor components: (a) Couservation.A US$7.5million revolving fund would be established which would financeretrofitting. The programwould also include energyaudits and technicalassistance. The programenvisages savings of US$30 millionover four years.

(b) Electric Utilities. Approximately US$1.2 million would be allocated to study power losses,tariff problems, pricing issues,and the provisionof commonmanagerial and technicalservices for utilitiesin the region. (c) Petroleum. A study of refineryrationalization would be undertaken, with a view to the possibleclosure of smalland inefficientplants. A studywould also be made about the'possible extension of the Trinidadand Tobagooil facility,as well as one which would analyze the logisticsof petroleumocean transport. (d) InstitutionalStrengthening. A programwould be directedat the LDCs for strengtheninginstitutions In the energysector. (e) AlternativeEnergy Sources. The programwould includewind resource assessment,establishment of pilot windfarmsand evaluationof biogas, biomassand geothermalpotential. B. AGRICULTURE 15. It was agreedat the Fifth CaribbeanGroup Meetingto establishan inter-agencyAgricultural Task Force for the Caribbean(ATFC). The initial mandate of ATFCwas for borrowers and donors to gather and exchange data and to improve their coordination with the objectivesof more effectiveimplementation - 6-

of ongoing projects and better selection and design of future projects. The IDB agreed to provide the services of an executive secretariat for ATFC. 16. The ATFC has obtained data on over 300 ongoing agriculturalprojects in the region from the followingdonor agencies: USAID/USDA,CDB, CIDA, EEC, FAO, IAF (Inter-AmericanFoundation), IBRD, IDB, IICA, IDRC (International DevelopmentResearch Center), OAS, and ODA. Of the identified external investment total of US$1.8 billion, the four major donors (IDB, USAID, CDB and IBRD) account for US$1.3 billion, or 72%. Estimated annual investment flows for these projects of around US$400-500million represent about 3-4% of the GNP of the region. In addition, there are at least 150 technical cooperation operations for preinvestmentwork, institutionalstrengthening and hutan resource development. The total budgets for these projects are over US$60 million. FAO and IICA are the major donors.

17. ATFC found that there has been a lack of coordinationamong donors, resulting in overlapping and sometimes conflicting activities. The large flow of resourceshas also challengedthe region's absorptive capacity. As a result, three areas of future activity have been identified by the ATFC:

(a) creation and maintenance of a Caribbean agricultural project clearing house, including collection, editing, tabulationand disseminationof project data;

(b) establishment of a joint country-donor consultatioa system on a selective basis for ongoing as well as proposed investmentand technical cooperation projects; and

(c) a human resources survey of the supply/demandfor critical skills, which would identify training and institutionaldevelopment requirements at country and regional levels.

These ATFC proposals will be presented in more detail in a report which will be tabled at the Caribbean Group meeting.

C. TOURISM

18. The EEC has agreed to finance two region-wide prograus to assist the tourism sector. The first covers research and technical assistance needs for tourism development,while the second deals with tourism marketing.

19. The first project contains the following components: training and education; tourism statistics;tourism links to agriculture;handicraft development;an update of the European marketing study; a feasibility study of a hotel reservatioa system for the European market; and a feasibility study of tour operations from a European source.

20. The second project establishes a Caribbean tourism marketing office in Frankfurt for a period of two years. Funds will be included for research to support the marketing effort. Total EEC financing for both projects is ECU$12 million. 21. Financing is still required for the tourism promotion and marketing program for the North American market, which was identified in the study financed by IDB before the last Caribbean Group meeting. The study pointed out the special needs of the LDCo. A financing proposal prepared by the Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre (CTRC) will be tabled at the Caribbean Group meeting.

22. UNDP continues to provide support for the project on tourism development in the Caribbean, designed to assist iaembersof the CTRC in the compilation of tourism statistics as a basis for affectivetourism promotion. D. PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

(i) The Caribbean Project Development Facility (CPDF)

23. The Caribbean Project Development Facility was establishedunder the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme during October 1981. It is managed by the InternationalFinance Corporation and its mandate is to assis'. business in 21 countries of the Caribbean 1/ to raise money for new productive investments--usuallyin the size range between US$500,000 and US$5.0 million.

24. The creation of the Facility was the major recommendationof the Task Force on Private Sector Activities of the Caribbean Group in Its report, "Measures to Promote the Role of the Private Sector in Caribbean Development" dated June 1980.

25. Financing for the Facility's activities has been obtained from the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, the United States Agency for International De lopment, UNDP, the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency, the Kingdom of the and the Caribbean.Development Bank. The InternationalFinance Corporation provides office space, supplies and administrativeaupport. To date, US$3.1 million has been contributed to the project, and a further US$1.4 million will be required to cover the Facility's operating expenses during the remaining 18 months of the three and one-half years of the project period.

26. The Facility operates with a permanent staff of seven professionals and utilizes consulting specialists from time to time. During its brief existence, all member states have been visited, most repeatedly. Over 120 business proposals have been reviewed. Of these, 21 projects received extensive scrutiny, and 11 have been financed or are in the final stages of negotiations. The project pipeline includes some two dozen proposals of which five are at an advanced stage of preparation. CPDF also plays a significant role in providing 'technicalassistance to governments and businessmen in the region. An analysis of.the Facility's activities will be tabled at the Caribbean Group meeting, and donors will be invited to consider proposals for continued funding of the Facility.

1/ , , , Barbados, Belize, , , Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, , St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, , , Trinidad and Tobago, ffetherlandsAntilles, and the . - 8 -

(ii) The Caribbean Fi,ancial Services Corporation

27. The Caribbean Financial Services Corporation (CFSC) is a private financial institution which came into existence In 1983 for the purpose of promoting the development of the private sector in the Caribbean. Its principal sponsor has been the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC). Its equity is held by leading Caribbean private industrial and commercial organizations,who have subscribed to about one third of its share capital, and commercial banks, who have subscribed to the remaining share capital. An additionalinvestment in CFSC equity is being considered by IFC. Share capital subscriptions amount to US$2.3 million and USAIb has provided US$12 million of long-term loans and US$400,000 of grant funds for techlnicalassistance.

28. The CFSC is located in Barbados and is scheduled to begin operations in the near future. It plans to offer US$-denominated term loans to clients, to discount term loans made by commercial banks and to enter the equipment leasing business.

29. Because of their complementarynature, a close cooperationbetween CFSC and CPDF is envisaged. CPDF is expected to bring svitably documented project proposals and financing requests to the attention of CFSC. CPDF's project preparationwork should provide CFSC with sufficientinformation and analysis to permit it to make investment decisions in a timely manner. Likewise, close cooperation will be required between these two institutionsand CDB, which is also increasingits support of private investment.

E. EXPORT PROMOTION

30. Over the past several years, there has been a growing concern with the need to increase exports as a means of addressing the persistent balance of payments problems of the Region. In last year's report ("CaribbeanGroup: Current Situation and Prospects," Report No. 3937-CRG, dated May 24, 1982) the main trends in regional and extra-regionaltrade in CARICOM member countries were reviewed, and assessment was made of the likely impact of the current structure of trade and industrial incentive policies on the future development of the region. This assessment observed that:

(a) Despite a substantial increase in regional trade since 1967, the trade structure of Caribbean countries is still overwhelminglydirected towards the outside world. The vast preponderanceof what is not domesticallyproduced but imported is still being procured from outside CARICOM. The strong external orientation of the CARICOM countries reflects the high level of competitivenessof members' factor endowmentsand productive structures;

(b) The average level of effective protection is high in all countries and there is a wide variation in effective protection rates among products in each country and across products among countries; - 9-

(c) The high protectionrates are gsneratedmainly by the tariff exemptionson raw materialsand other inpute,combined with low percentagesof value added by mazy firms. Effectiveprotection would be lowerand more evenlydistributed If the tariff exonerationswere reduced; (d) The QRs (particularlyon consumergoods) have also been an Importantfactor in determiningthe high effectiveprotection levels prevailing in some countries; and (e) The income tax exemptions hr.ve had only a limited impact in encouraging new investments.

31. Based on this assessment the 1982 World Bank report to the Caribbean Group concludedthat the promotionof efficientindustries--able to competein marketsoutside of CARICOH--whichwould increasethe use of domesticresources and generateincreased employment, would requirechanges in the structureof incentives.Recommended steps to removethe currentanti-export bias included, in a first stage,the gradualremoval of countryleveL quantitative barriers to importsand the reviewat the regionallevel of raw materialand capitalgoods tariffexemptions. The reportalso recommend,in a secondstage, the reviewof CARICOMfinal producttariffs to avoid too high protectionlevels, and the establishmentof harmonizedexport incentives. 32. The gradualelimination of quantitativerestrictions on importsand the reductionof effectivetarriff protection would go a long way towards reducingthe currentanti-export bias in CARICOMcountries and would generate additionalfiscal revenues. However,the processwould have to span a periodof severalyears, in order to avoid suddendislocations in economicactivity. In the interim,the existenceof an anti-exportbias would continueto be a severe limitationto exportgrowth, unless other measuresare taken to increasethe profitabilityof nontraditionalexports to countriesoutside CARICOM. 33. The currentsystem of incentivesfor nontraditionalexports outside CARICOHis centeredaround the conceptof "enclave"industries which ganerally import all their inputs and export mostly to the US under the 806 and 807 categoriesof the US CustomsLaw. Such fully export-orLentedindustries, often establishedin Free Zones,operate under a systemthat approximatesfree-trade, generateconsiderable employment, and shouldcontlnue to be stronglysupported by the countries. Rowever,there are a large numberof other industries--existingand potential--thatmight contributesubstantially to furtherindustrial development of the regionby selllngpartly within the countrywhere they are located,partly within CARICOM and also to third countries. These "local'Lndustries are the ones which have in the past benefittedfrom protectionon CARICOMand domesticsales and which shouldbe encouragedto reorientpart of their proe'uctionto new markets. 34. The establishmentof additionalexport incentives for such industries is alreadyunder considerationin some countriesand it would be desirablethat they be undertakenby all CARIC0Mcountries in the contextof an overallreview of industrialand trade policies. One of the main instruments(already in use in a large numberof countriesoutside the region)is the establishmentof tax - 10 -

credit certificatesfor nontraditionalexports outside CARICOM. These certificateswould amount to a certain percentage of the value of the exports, would be acceptable for payment of any tax liability to the government and woule. be fully transferable, Thus, they would result in an immediate increase In the profitabilityof exports.

33. The main objective of such incentive would be to compensate,at least partially, for the anti-exportbias created by the protectionsystem. This anti-export bias will continue to be important for several years even if a gradual program of eliminating quantitative barriers to imports ard reducing effective tariff protection is adopted. The combination of, for example, a 20Z tariff on imported inputs and a 20% tax certificate on the F.O.B. value of exports would reduce substantially,and automatically,the anti-export bias prevailing up to now in these countries' incentive systems. 36. Member governments of CARICOMhave shown a strong interest in the various studies and recommendationsand have responded actively. A Working Party of officials from member states was formed in September, 1982 to develop a set of CARICOM proposals for stimulating production and exports in the region. In its deliberations, the Working Party agreedon the need to increasethe profitabilityand attractivenessof investments in the productive sectors and to improve the cothpetitiveness of regional products in Internationalmarkets. Accordingly, the Working Party prepared in April, 1983, a detailed set of recommendationswhich were reviewed by both the Ministers of Industry and the Ministers of Finance of the member states. The recommendationswere then considered at the Fourth meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the in July 1983, in the context of a search for measures for structural adjustment in the regional economy. An action program for export expansion, suitable to serve as a basis for donor support, is under review by CARICOM. Completion of the review and adoption of such a program is a matterof urgency, because of tht importance of encouraging extra-regional exports as a principal means of achieving economic growth in the region. F. TRANSPORTATION

37. It will be recalled that ICAO, with financing from tJNDP, had carried out a comprehensivereview of the requirements for improved airport operations and maintenancein the Caribbean. At the Fourth Meeting of the Caribbean Group, held in Washington, D.C. in June 1981, the Canadian delegation pledged the sum of Can$50 million equivalent to finance high priority capital and technical assistance needs identified in the ICAO report. Further consultations among CIDA, Transport Canada, ICAO, and UNDP have taken place since then, with a view to identifyingthe most suitable modalities for proceeding with the implementationof activities under the program.

38. Based on discussions among the parties in Ottawa at the end of 1983 a number of options for carrying out the program were considered. In this connection, it was felt that consideration should be given to the de-irability of establishinga small coordtinatinggroup comprising interested donors and sponsoringinstitutions of the Caribbean Group to carry forward the initiatives In this area. During the donors meeting in Paris in April 1983, an initial exchange of views took place among representativesof CIDA, the EEC, the - 11 -

Netherlandsand UNDP, on the basis of which lt was agreed to hold further consultationsduring the Ad Hoc Advisory CommitteeMeeting to be held in Cartagena in May 1983 with other interesteddonors. No such consultationstook place because of lack of progress to report.

39. Since the Canadian contributionexcludes the requirementsof Bahamas, Belize, , , Curacao, St. Maarten, DominicanRepublic, Haiti and the Cayman Islanda, it was estimated that an eaditionalUS$20-25 milliUa equivalent would be required to cover engineering^ d constructionequipment and technical assistance,including training,for these countries.

40. On the basis of the consultationsin Paris and in keeping with the decision of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee, a UNDP-sponsored mission visited Europe during September/Octoberto discuss with potential bilateraland multilateraldonors the additional financingrequirements of the program. The mission also dlscussedtechnical assistanceand training requirements. The findings of the mission are encouragingand it is proposed that e round-tablesession of interesteddonors and institutionsbe arranged during the forthcomingmeeting of the Caribbean Group. The mission_s report will be made available to the Caribbean Group meeting.

G. REGIONALPAYMENTS SUPPORT FUND

41. CARICOMMinisters of Finance agreed in June 1983 that a Regional Payment Support Fund was required to complement the clearing/payments function of the CARICOM MultilateralClearing Facility (CMCF). Such a fund would provide assistance to countries experiencingbalance of payments difficulties. The CARICOM secretariatis preparingdocumentation in support of a proposal to establish such a Fund and is expected to lead discussionson the matter at the CaribbeanGroup meeting. - 12 -

III. THE OECS COUNTRIES

42. The seven LDCs of the Eastern Caribean--Antigtvand Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines--sharesimilar problems of small size and limited resource base. The countries themselves, through the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and their other efforts, as well as the Caribbean Group itself, have attempted to deal with these problems on a subregional basis. This report describes three of subregional activities that are of interest to the Caribbean Group at this time: the Inter-AgencyResident Mission (IAKM); the staffing gap analysis prepared by the IARM; and the East Caribbean Central Bank.

A. THE INTER-AGENCYRESIDENT MISSION

43. The Inter-AgencyResident Mission became operationalin January 1983. The IARM is a creation of the Caribbean Group, in response to the special assistanceneeds of the small countries of the OECS in the preparationand execution of investment programs and development policies, and In the identificationof needs and sources for external technicaland financial assistance for specific projects and other development activities. The mission has established close links with the OECS Economic Affairs Secretariat,with the goal of eventually transferring a substantial part of its functions to that organization.

44. The IARM is located in Antigua and is financed and furnished personnel by the CDB, IDB, IMF, OAS, UNDP, the World Bank, and three bilateral donors--the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. It has a staff of six professionals and is able to call on the short-term services of consultants. In accordancewith its mandate, it has done work of a general nature oriented to the whole OECS group, as well as more specificallybilateral programs responding to problems of individualterritories. Among the more general activities have been:

(a) an evaluation of information systems for economic management;

(b) an assessment of the Implementation of public investment programs; and

(c) a study of public sector manpower requirementsand the implications for training.

45. A more extensive report on the activities of the LAgM will be tabled at the Caribbean Group meeting.

B. THE STAFFING GAP

46. The IARM has prepaired,at the requeat of donor countries and in consultationwith recipient countries, a paper which will be tabled at the Caribbean Group meeting, analyzing the staffing gap for economic policy and management in the OECS countries and in the Ecomomic Secretariat of the OECS. The analysis points to a severe shortage of high level manpower in the key policy formulationsections of member governments and of skilled personnel in the OECS Economic Secretariat. - 13 -

47. The preliminary findings of the IARM have been that the;e are an esti- mated sixty five unfilled professionalstaff positions i. OECS governments. It has also been noted that this may understate the problem, since governments are reluctant to create additional positionswhen existing positions have been un- filled and some positions have been filled with persons who are not fully quali- fied or adequately trained. The report addresses the proiblp, of training needs and salaries and comments on the situation in the ,soms of whom have less serious problems than others. It also discusses the problems of inadequate staffing and salaries at the OECS Economic Secretariatand the limitation that this places on developing a satisfactorypool of experts to assist countries.

C. THE EAST CARIBBEANCENTRAL BANK

48. Following several years of discussions among the OECS countries regarding the need for broadening the authority of the East Caribbean currency issuing institution,an agreement was signed on September 15, 1983 by the Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominicat,Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts- Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines establishingthe East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). The new Central Bank started operations on October 1, 1983, and supersedes the East Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA), acquiring all of ECCA's assets and liabilitiestogether with all its rights and obligations.

49. The establishmentof ECCB represents a clear vement toward regional haLmonization of financial systems. While ECCB, like LiCA, is obliged by statute to maintain a foreign exchange cover equivalent to no less than 60% of the value of its demand liabilities,ECCB's scope for the exercise of monetary policy has been widened compared with ECCA's limited regulatory powers. ECCA's lending operations to member Governmentswill continue under the same procedures and regulations;each Government'sannual borrowing from the ECCB is limited to the equivalent of 5% of its average annual revenues during the proceding three years. ECCB is also empowered to impose reserve requirementson commercial banks, set minimum and maximum interest rates for liabilities,and maximum interest rates on loans. ECCE has also been given a new supervisoryrole in the regulation of commercial banks, and is in the process of creating a new depart- ment of banking supervisionwith technical assistance from the IMF. The exten- sion of the ECCA's authority to a central bank is designed to allow ECCB to regulate the availabilityof money and credit in a manner consistent with balanced growth and developmentof member countries.

50. The success of the new Central Bank will depend largely on the ability of the governing bodies of the Bank, the Monetary Council and the Board of Governors, to act upon regional financial issues in a decisive manner. Two crucial external finance issues require unanimous approval of member govern- ments: the setting of the external exchange rate and the size of the foreign exchange cover. To the extent that the new institutionfacilitates agreement by member governments in a timely fashion on an exchange rate which will allow stable economic growth without the persistent balance of payments disequilibria which have characterizedthe region, ECCB will represent an improvement on the previous structure. Given the unanimous consent requirement,this may not be - 14 -

easy. In the area of regional monetary policy, however, more f1l-xibilityin the exercise of powers is given in the ECCB articles of agreement. Only a simple majority of member governments is required on the M4onetaryCouncil to define the Bank's regional monetary policies. However, the implementationof Bank regulations remains in the hands of the member governments. Thus, the effectivenessof the ECCB will depend critically on the willingness of participatinggovernments to take necessary actions. - 15 -

IV KETERNALFINANCING

51. The recipientmember countries of the Caribbean Group have received over US$6.0 billion In external capital flows since the founding of the Group in 1978. This amount includesconventional project financing,as well as foreign exchange financing for essential imports and, through the use of the local currency generated by the financing of these imports, the financing of the local costs of development projects and programs. The latter type of financing has gone under the name of CaribbeanDevelopment Facility, or CDF financing. It has, as indicated in Table 1, totalled US$2.0 billion and filled a critical need in assisting vouv.tries in dealing with the turbulent economic changes that have occurred over Urhe last several years. The Caribbean Group has attempted to evaluate and quantify the annual CDF and project financing neads of countries and coordinate the assistance of donors. The analyses of particular country needs are contained in the country economic reports. This presentation describes what has taken place with respect to CDF financing and presents the global quantitative requirements for the coning year for such financing. Por those new to the Group It should be made clear that the CDF is not an institu- tion which actually receives and disburses funds, but rather a conceptual framework for providing financial assistance. Donors make .heir own arrange- ments with recipient countries for the commitment and disbursement of funds. 52. Table 1 indicatesthat CDF financing commitmentsrose, in nominal terms, from US$205.5 million in 1978/79 2/ to US$663.2 aillion in 1982183. This increase occurred principaLly in the earlier years of the Caribbean Group and the rate of increase slowed significantly in 1982/83, when there was a nominal increase of only 3Z in commitments. An even more marked declining trend occurred in disbursements, where the nominal level of disbursements actually declined by 9X between 1981/82 and 1982/83. 53. An examinationof the data on CDF financingalso indicates significant differences in country experience with commitmentsand disbursements, as well as a dominant influence of some of the larger countries in the global figures. There have been a number of factors which have influenced external aid flows, some of which have been within the control of recipientcountries, others which have not. Country size, external market demand for export products and absorptive capacity have probably not been within the coatrol of countries--at least in the short run. On the other hand, structuraladjustment, stabilization and investmentprograms, as well as other econoaic policy matters have been. Donor response to country financing requests have been sensitive to all of these variables and cam probably explain many of the differences and fluctuations in response to financing requests. In addition, the global economic recession has placed restrictionson some donor financing programs. Historical and cultural relationships,as well as political ties have also been determinants of external aid flows.

54. Table 2 presents estimates of public sector external capital requirements of member countries. These figures have been taken from country economic reports and indicate a global requirement over the next 18 months for CDF financing of an estimated Us$1.32 billion. It Is evident then, that despite earlier assumptions that CD? financlng was not meant to be a permanent

2/ Year defined from July lst to June 30. - 16 - main focus of the Caribbean Group, such financing has remained one of the priority concerns of the members of the Group and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

55. early in the life of the Group, it had been assumed that the principal basis for CDF financing was to respond to the adjustment requirementsof the 1974 energy crisis. It was reasoned that once those adjustmentswere made, financing needs would be met through the more traditional project route. Events and experience have modified these assumptions. The first energy crisis was followed by the 1979 energy shock, and falling world market prices for traditionalCaribbean exports--bauxite/alumina,sugar and rice. In the difficult atmosphere of global recession, major economic adjustmentshave become necessary. Some of these have required politicallydifficult stabilization efforts and export promotion activities likely to cause economic dislocation before benefits are realized. The estimates of external financing requirements that have been made are based on the assumption that appropriate developmentand stabilizationpolicies are set in place and that coherent, realistic, and properly formulated investment programs are executed. Large CIF financing requirementswill probably exist for the next several years, but with the best efforts of recipients and donors, and in the absence of major new economic shocks, the countries of the region should subsequentlyhave a decreased need for this type of financial assistance.

56. It is quite possible that, for several countries, the need will emerge for additional CDP-type financial assistance before the Seventh CGCED, which probably will take place in June 1985. Such cases will be dealt with through ad-hoc meetings of donors or country subgroups, as has already been done in some past instances (see para. 58 below). Tim 1: CARhA ffl FAVMYP fmY a/a,D V (Us* W~u

n78-79 n79i nW-8 FM81- h Ttal !T7-79 fl9-0 F- Ml-& F&-8 TtAaL 613W183

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S .65.8 262 9.0 792 3.5 118. 145.0 65.1 210.1 13.3 15.9 36.5 .5 5 5i.0 a ht1in1a bx!b 8.5 2.9 11.4 12.9 4.4 17*3 21.4 7.3 28J. 1.9 1.7 3.7 3.0 6.7 IN1m- 10.0 5.9 9 12.3 7.2 19.5 22.3 13.1 35.4 3.0 3.4 6.7 6.0 19.7 Qimk 15. 5.0 2D.0 22. 15. 35.0 35.0 2D.0 55.0 3.0 3.5 13.5 3.0 16.5 1.8 0.6 2.4 2.9 0.9 3.8 4.7 1.5 6.2 -0.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.8 t. tt -m1dw1s 3.7 1.2 4.9 4.2 1.4 5.6 7.9 2.6 10.5 0.2 0.7 1.7 1.0 27 St LUda 14.2 4.1 19.0 13.3 b.4 11.1 27.5 9.2 36.7 2.4 2.8 4.0 3.0 7.U S. Mmt 52.0 5.8 184 13.6 6.2 19.8 26.2 12.0 38.2 2.5 3.4 6.1 3.5 9.6

-urn 17.5 6.0 23.5 17.0 6.0 23.0 3.5 12.0 46.5 4.0 3.5 4.5 5.0 9.5 lgpulic Yl M.O 210 3.5.0 X3.0 MU0 4.00.0 1O 5404 725.0 00 M. 440.0 10.0°°.0 Ibid el 10.0 40.0 140.0 115.0 45.0 160.0 215.0 85.0 310D 2.0 21.0 59.0 5.0 66.0

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p1N1d f4 az an dy be. mhaIee *Lmfivg-cypefk - 19 -

V. FUTURECGCED ACTIVITIES

57. While all membersof the CaribbeanGroup have not alwaysbeen fully satisfiedwith the activitiesor resultsof the Group,few, if any, would deny the utility of periodicallybringing together donors and recipLentcountries of the regionto coordinateeconomic development and assistanceof forts. The CaribbeanGroup has provideda mechanismfor accomplishingthic and for calling attentionto the needs of the region. CountryEmphasis 58. A major focusof the Group has been the preparationof individual countryeconomic reports and investmentprograms, and the holdingof country subgroupmeetings which addressthe policyissues identified In the reportsand allowdonors to identifyprojects and programsto which they can furnish financialsupport. Countrysubgroup meetingshave generallybeen timedto coincidewith the CaribbeanGroup meeting, but they have also been scheduled betweenmeetings, when economicreports have been completed,and on special occasionswhen it becomesnecessary for promotingexternal assistance to cope with naturaldisasters, or to undertakevery large investmentprojects, or to promotethe externalfinancing required for the economicprograms agreed upon with the IMF. This flexiblescheduling of aid-coordinatingactivities has provedto an effectiveway to help the Caribbean countries to obtain the required external financing in a tinely fashion, and should be continued in the future. Regionaland Subregional i9. On the regionaland subregional(OECS countries) level the Caribbean Group has directed its efforts at a diversegroup of activities.Some of these activitiesare being followedup by donoreoutside of the Group. Some activities may still requirethe attention of the Group and other activities are being suggested for the first time by some of the donors and recipients. The discussionof regionalmatters at the forthcomingmeeting will identify prioritiesand those activities that will require additionalwork, resources or policy decisions. As noted in Part II of this report, various papers to help in thesedeliberations will be tabledat the forthcomingmeeting of the Group. The Next CGCEDMeeting

60. The experienceof the last year and a half has sbown that it is not necessary to hold the CGCEDplenary meetings every 12 monthsto ensure the timely availabilityof foreignassistance to the Caribbeancountries. Provided that the flexible scheduling of ad-hoc aid-coordinatitgactivities referred to in para.58 above is maintained,there Is no need to convoke the plenary meetingsmore often than every 18 months. It is proposed,therefore, that the SeventhCGCED meeting be held in June 1985. - 20 -

ATTACHMENT1

COUNTRYNOTES - 21 -

Country Notes

1.1 Antigua and Barbuda. Real economic growth picked up slghtly in 1982 in Antigua and Barbuda to reach 3.3Z because of an increase in stayover visitors. Public sector finances deterioratedas the Central Government accumulated sizeable arrears on current payments and debt amortization. On the other hand, the country's balance of payments position improved; the current account deficit of the balance of payments narrowed from 452 of GDP in 1981 to 19% in 1982, largely because of lower manufactured and capital goods Imports, in addition to higher receipts from tourism and manufacturedexports. The Central Government'sdirect and guaranteed external debt (less loan proceeds sterilized in foreign currency deposit accounts) more than doubled from 1978 to 1981. A further 142 increase in 1982 brought net debt outstanding at the end of the year to US$58.8 million, 43X of GDP, about half at market rates of interest. Modest economic growth is expected to continue through 1983.

1.2 The Bah&,mas. The economic performance improved slightly in 1982, though it ventinvad weak by comparison with the 1978-80 period. Demonstrating the resllienceof the tourism industry, tourist activity pic'&edup moderately in the face of the world recession,apparently in response to an intense promotion campaign. With tourist activity increasing about 2%, GDP growth is estimated at l.5% in 1982. The generally weak performance of the economy was reflected in a marked slowdown in the growth of tax revenue, which in turn reflected in a reduced budget surplus. Good performanceon merchandise trade, however, generated a narrowing of the balance of payments current deficit and an enhanced accumulationof net Internationalreserves by comparisonwith 1981, Reflecting continued improvementsin the tourism sector, real GDP growth is expected to be 3% in 1983.

1.3 Barbados. The suffered a sharp decline in 1982, precipitatedby the deepening international recession in that year. Tourist arrivals were particularlyaffected, dropping by 14X or three and a half times as fast as the decline experlenced in the 1974/75 recession. Most manufacturing subsectorswere adversely affected by weak demand in the domestic and regional markets and sustained output declines which more than offset strong growth in the enclave electronics and garments subsectors. production continued to experience the effects of adverse weather in the preceding year and value added in the sugar industry declined 7.42. In sum, with the exception of nonsugar agriculture and fishing, all sectors of the economy recorded output declines in 1982, and real GDP contracted by 4.62. With the widespread output declines, unemploymentworsened to 13.7% from 10.82 in 1981. The Government's adherence to the stringent program of demand management measures introduced in 1981 and 1982 and supported by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement, enabled it to contain further deterioration - 22 -

in the public finances and the balance of payments. This result was achieved by sharp cuts in government capltal expenditures,tight control of current spending including restraint on public sector wage increases,and controls on the expansion of bank credit including interest rate increases. The US economic recovery in l9b3 has contributedto an upturn in tourist arrivals, but the performance of sugar and manufacturing continues to be weak. GDP in 1983 can be expected to increase marginally at best, but given that controls on domestic expenditurewere maintained during the year, the balance of payments might be expected to improve. Economic prospects are more favorable for 1984, however, iV the internationalrecession continues to abate.

1.4 Belize. The suffered from the international recession in 1982. Although sugar production increased 8%, production in all other sectors stagnated or declined, resulting in a GDP decline 0.3% in 1982. The decline in prices of sugar and citrus and the adverse impact on the industry of the depreciationof the pound sterling resulted in a fall in real gross domestic income of 4.5%. Because of the fall in export earnings, the balance of payments current account deficit was 16% of GDP in 1982, and government tax collections for the trade sect,, fell. This revenue shortfall,combined with increases in current expenditures (particularlywages), caused public finances to deteriorate. The introductionof expenditurecontrols in October 1982, however, has increased public savings in FY1982/83. Only a marginal improvementin the economy has been estimated for 1983.

1.5 Dominica. After two years of strong economic growth stimulated by intensive hurricane rehabilitation,the economy grew a modest 3.3% in 1982. Constructionactivities slowed, and the agriculturalsector registeredonly modest production increases. Output Increases in bananas, the island's main export crop were marginal, and other agriculturalcrops continued to recover slowly primarily because of the longer gestation period required. Manufacturing performed well, however, with output increasing9.62 in 1982 as traditional industries revived and two new foreign-ownedlight assembly industries began production. Fiscal and external accounts improved markedly, however, as Dominica adhered to the financial discipline of its extended arrangement with the IMP. On the basis of the massive reconstructioneffort and improved public finances, prospects for continued economic growth over the medium term are favorable.

1.6 Dominican Republic. 1982 was a disappointingyear for the Dominican Republic, as economic growth was 1.6X compared with real rates of 3.4> in 1981 and 5.4% in 1980. Per capita growth was negative by 1.4X and unemploymentis high at about 252 and still rising. The slowing of the economy reflected a sharp drop in international terms of trade of 26% over 1981, a year when the purchasing power of exports was already only one-half its 1975 value. Increases in the volume of sugar productionwere offset by 332 declines in mining because of substantial reductions in bauxite export volume. Manufeturing grew a disappointing 3.1%, constructionwas off by 0.9Z, and agriculture grew only 1.22. The economic slowdown precipitated a financial crisis when in 1982 the balance of payments on current account deficit reached 5.5X of GDP and the consolidated public sector deficit - 23 -

reached5.6Z of GDP. The new administrationtook immediateaction and it enteredinto an arrangementwith the IMF in January1983 to curb the growth in the Governmentdeficit and externaldeficits through major policy changes. The Governmenthas met the March and June 1983 IMF targets and the externaldeficit Is projectedto be reducedto 1.9% of GDP in 1983, while the public sectordeficit is forecastto be 3.9%. 1.7 Grenada. Growthin Grenadahas averagedaround 3% during 1979-82,compared to higherle'vels of growthin previousyears. The relativelylow growthresulted from weather-relatedproduction difficulties in agricultureand a coctractionin tourismcaused by politicaland social dLsturbancesand the generaldecline in Caribbeantourism. As a resultof the generaldecline in the economyand capltalexpenditures for the new airport,public sector finances have exhibitedincreasing deficits. Also affectedby the fall in exportearnings and the largecapital expenditures of recentyears, the currentaccount deficit of the balanceof payments rose rapidly,to 33% of GDP in 1982. The deficithas been largelyfinanced from externalcapital grants and loans at highlyconcessionary terms, thus Grenada'sdebt serviceratio is low at about 5% of exportsof goodsand nonfactorservices. In 1981,the Governmentconcluded a Stand-By Arrangementwith the IMF, but the programwas interruptedand not fully drawnbecause of failureto reach understandingon ceilingscovering the final five monthsof the Arrangement.The Governmentagreed in mid-1983 with the IMF on an ExtendedFund Facility(EFF), which was approvedlast August. The politicaLand militarydevelopments which took place in October-November1983 have far-reachingeconomic implications which have not been examinedyet, as of this writing,by Bank staff.

1.8 Guyana. The economic crisis in Guyana, which began to develop in 1981, intensifiedduring 1982 and into 1983 as a critical foreignexchange shortage contributedto about 13% declinein real GDP at marketprices in 1982. The foreignexchange shortage resulted from a sharp fall in export earningsby nearly30% in 1982 owing to the sharp declinein bauxite expolts and falling sugar prices. In spite of a decline in Government expenditure,the publicsector current account deficit widened to 15% of GDP in 1982 becauseof a fall in Governmentrevenues, reflecting a decline in importsand economicactivity, and largerlosses of publicsector enterprises,particularly the bauxiteand sugar industries.The sharp drop in exportvalues and the absenceof significantcapital inflows caused a sharp drop in the level of merchandiseimports in 1982 by about US$290 million. As a consequence,the tradegap declinedfrom about 15% of GDP in 1981 to 7% in 1982,while the resourcegap and currentaccount deficit improvedby a similar magnitudeto respectively15% and 24% of GDP. The currentaccount deficit nevertheless reached about US$133million. The criticalforeign exchange crisis has resultedin a severeshortage of consumer goods, of imported inputs required to maintain production, and to increasing debt servicing problems. 1.9 Haiti. Haiti'seconomy stagnated in 1982. GDP fell by 0.4%, and with 1.7% populatlongrowth, average per capitaconsumption fell by 5.4% over the past two years. This economicrecession was accompaniedand aggravated by financialdisequilibrium. Foreign reserves fell, external paymentarrears accumulated, capital flight occurred, and the gourdewas tradedfor a dollarat 10-12%discount in an informalforeign exchange - 24 -

"rket. Xn mid-1982, the Haitian authorities prepared an economic and fiuancial stabilizationprogram which was implementedwith the support of an IMF Stead-By Arrangement. The program has thus far been successful. 7he fiscal deficit declined from 17.3X of GDP in 1981 to 9.4Z of GDP in 1982, the use of Central Bank deficit financing was reduced almost by half, while the current accounc deficits of the balance of payments improved from US$159.l million in 1981 to US$63.7 million in 1982. Foreign revenues fell for tr.ethird consecutive year in 1982 but by only 1/3 of the 1981 amount, and the premium on US currency in the informal market fell to 7X. Finally was almost cut in half from its 1981 level of 15X. In spite of the continuing recession, both Increases in fiscal revenues and tight control of recurr6nt expenditures produced fiscal savings for the first time since 1979. With the success of the stablizationprogram, the confidence of the business community returned, inflatlon went further down to 6.5Z, the arrears in foreign exchange payments virtually disappeared, and the discount on the gourde was reduced to almost nil. Encouraged by this success, the IMF and the Government negotiated in September 1983 a new Stand-By arrangement for FY84 and FY85, The Government expects a 3% expansion of GDP in 1984 which could result in the first per capita increase since 1980. However, because of the depth of the international recession, it may be difficult to reach the Government's target.

1.10 Jamaica. Jamaics has experienced mixed fortunes in the last 18 months. After growing by 3.3X in 1981, the economy grew by only 0.22 in 1982 and apparently declined somewhat in 1983. The major reason for this was the impact of the internationalrecession on the bauxite/alumina industry, whose output fell by 30X. This also affected the balance of payments,andexport earnings fell heavily, even though tourism has recovered rapidly. Although the overall balance of payments showed a surplus in FY82, there was a large overall deficit in FY82/83, which is the IMP program year. This reflected primarily a shortfall in expected capital flows. The current account deficit in the balance of payments in 1982 was still at a level of 11.92 of GDP. Owing mainly to the decline in bauxite/aluminaand sugar exports little improvement occurred in the fiscal situation until mid-1983. Corrective measures were taken in June 1983, with an expected reduction of the overall fiscal deficit from 15.7X of GDP in FY82/83 to 11% in FY83/84. In November 1983 the Jamaican dollar was devalued and a system for possible future exchange adjustmentswas instituted. Additionally, the import licensing aystem was further liberalized. Although there are some signs of recovery, the economic situation of Jamaica remains very difficult, and will require both continued improvements in policies and sustained growth in OECD countries before a major recovery can be expected. 1.11 Montserrat. Real economic growth in Montserrat slowed in 1982 to 2%, a result of a stagnation in tourist arrivals, declines in construction, agricultureand manufacturingoutput, and lower levels of public investment. In recent years the Government'sfiscal performance has been strong; in 1982 a surplus equivalent to 2.4X of GDP was recorded on the current account of the Central Government. In order to achieve a small surplus on current operations in 1983, the Government raised several taxes in July. The resource balance deficit of the balance of payments averaged US$11 million in 1980-81, but rose to US$14 million in 1982 (482 of GNP). The deficit was financed by remittances from abroad (US$6.5 million), private capital (US$5.0 million), and net public capital (US$2.7 million). -25 -

Montserrat's outstanding and disbursed external debt rose slightly to US$2.7 million in 1982, equivalent to less than 10% of GDP. However, external debt payments were only 2.5% of export of goods and non-factor services. Economic stagnation is expected to continue through 1983, but prospects for improved performance in 1984 are favorable.

1.12 St. Kitts and Nevis. After a relative high growth in 1982, real GDP in St. Kitts and Nevis is projected to decline by 4% in 1983. The main reason for this decline is the drop in sugar production caused by the drought at the beginning of 1983, as all other sectors, with the exception of tourism, have been growing at satisfactory rates. Public sector finances have been adversely affected by the losses of the Government-owned sugar industry and by the rapid increases in the wage and salary bill. The public sector registered current account deficits since 1981, and the deficit increased from 2.1% of GDP in 1982 to an estimated 5% in 1983. The current account balance of payments deficit reached 21% cifGDP in 1982 and is projected to continue at that level for 1983. Prospects for 1984 look more favorable as sugar productionand prices are projected to increase while the Government continues to enforce a policy of restraint on the wages and salaries bill Initiated in 1983.

1.13 St. Lucia. A modest economic growth took place in 1982 in St. Lucia as a result of some recovery in agriculture, touarism,and industry. Public finances remained weak as the wage bill continued to increase owning to wage increases inherited by the present Government. The balance of payments performancehas been adversely affected by reduced export earnings from bananas (associatedwith the relative depreciation of the pound sterling) and sharp increases in imports of durable consumption goods. Economic recovery is estimated to continue through 1983 although somewhat slower than originally expected due to the tropical storm that destroyed 40% of the banana crop in September 1983. Some improvement in public finances is expected to take place during the present as a result of expenditure controls enforced by the Government.

1.14 St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The economy of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, following a strong recovery in 1981 after two years of stagnation caused by a natural disaster, slowed down in 1982 with GDP growing by about 2%. Howeter, as a result of increased revenue collection and tight expenditure control, central government finances did not deteriorateand overall public sector finances Improved in 1982. The current account of the balance of payments deterioratedin 1982, mainly because of lower export prices and volumes and the decline in tourism. In spite of the negative domestic savings, the level of gross domestic investment in 1982 was high as a result of the continuing high inflows of project-relatedexternal public assistance. Growth for the medium-term is expected to be favorable provided sound policies are followed in agriculture,industry and public finances. Continued growth of the economy will also depend on the inflow of external capital, largely on concessionaryterms.

1.15 Suriname. The has been sluggish in recent years with the real GDP growing at approximately 1.0% In 1982. The poor economic performance resulted from adverse axternal and domestic factors - 26 -

affecting th* key sectors of the economy. The weak internationaldemand for h.hecountry's main export commodity, baux;ite,has resulted in output decline in the sector, a sharp drop in export revenue and subsequent deteriorationin public finances. The problem was exacerbatedby the failure of the rest of the domestic sector to respond positivelyas a result of uncertaintiesderiving from the change of Governmentin 1980. Public investment, reflectinga sharp increase in expenditure on social infrastructure,rose significantlyin 1981-82 as did the recourse by the Government to financing by the Central Bank. The above developmentswere reflected in the balance of payments. The current accoust of the balance of payments detcrioratedconsistently during 1980-82 as export receipts declined, especially through a sharp reduction in the value of bauxite in 1981-82, while the value of imports of goods increased owing to higher fuel bills. However, net capital flows--primarilydevelopment grants from the Netherlands (which were suspended in December 1982) and private flows associatedwith the ongoing upgrading investment and stock accumulationin the bauxite sector--were suffic%ylzt to both cover the deficit and avoid a drastic reduction in net forei%n exchange reserves.

1.16 Trinidad and Tobago. Although the economy of Trinidad and Tobago maintained a moderate (4%) level of growth in 1982, the balance of payments and fiscal position sharply deteriorated,primarily because of the continued drop in petroleum production and the softening in oil prices. The increase in was a result of higher output in construction and other services, sustained by continued high government spending. Real output declined in the agriculture, manufacturing and petroleum sectors. The current surplus of central governmentoperations was only a sixth of the previous year's level. A sharp drop in petroleum revenue was only partially compensated for by higher receipts from other taxes; current expendituresrose by 50% primarily because of a retroactlve salary increase for civil servants and a continued rise in subsidy pay- ments. The overall central governmentbudget deficit reached 18.5% of GDP in 1982, compared to a small surplus of 2% in 1981. Fiscal measures which should begin to redress this imbalance,including the eliminationof a number of consumer subsidies,were taken in early 1983. The current account of the balance of payments recorded a deficit in 1982 of US$756 million, the first since 1973, except for a small deficit in 1979. Foreign exchange reserves fell by 7% in 1982 and continued to decline, but at a more rapid rate, during the first half of 1983. The Governmenthas begun to take some steps to promote exports and tourism, and in addition, work has been completed on a draft national development plan which should lay the groundwork for broadening the sources of growth and for economic adjustment. However, only marginal economic growth is projected for 1983 and 1984. - 27 -

ATTACHMENT2

STATISTICAL APPENDIX - 28-

Table 2.1: CARIBBEAN - GROWTH OF GDP (X)

(Constant Prices)

Estimated 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda 7.5 9.1 7.8 7.2 2.8 3.3 Bahamas 3.4 8.0 8.0 4.0 -2.5 1.5 Barbados 3.7 4.8 7.9 4.9 -2.8 -4.6 Belize n.a. 7.9 -1.3 4.3 2.6 -0.3 Dominica 3.4 12.0 -17.2 17.0 8.0 3.3

Grenada 5.8 5.1 2.1 3.0 3.4 3.3 Guyana -3.0 -2.5 -1.2 2.1 1.3 -13.0 Jamaica -1.9 -0.3 -1.4 -5.4 3.3 0.2 Montserrat -1.4 6.4 11.4 10.3 2.9 1.4 St. Lucia 5.9 13.5 9.0 -0.1 3.0 2.1

St. Kitts-Nevis 0.0 0.8 6.7 1.7 3.9 4.1 St. Vincent & 3.5 12.2 3.0 2.2 11.7 2.3 the Grenadines Suriname 14.2 13.2 -2.8 2.9 -4.9 n.a. Trinidad & Tobago 7.8 6.5 6.1 6.4 4.6 3.9

Dominican Republic 5.0 2.2 4.7 5.8 3.5 1.6 Haiti 1.0 4.1 7.4 6.1 -3.0 -0.4 - 29 -

Table 2.2: CARIBBEAN - PUBLIC SECTOR SAVINGS a/ (US$ millions)

Estimated 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 19T

Antigua & Barbuda -2.2 -0.6 -2.6 -3.5 -7.3 -8.9 Bahamas 23.1 41.0 63.0 92.0 78.0 59.0 Barbados 15.1 36.4 38.5 41.9 30.1 45.2 Belize 2.9 6.7 6.6 8.9 4.4 5.4 Dominica -1.6 -1.9 -10.7 -8.5 -4.1 -0.6

Grenada 2.7 -1.5 0.3 -0.3 -0.7 2.9 Guyana -12.2 21.6 21.2 14.9 -85.7 -86.3 Jamaica -103.2 -59.7 -10:.0 -205.6 -76.0 -127.9 Hontserrat -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 St. Lucia 3.3 5.1 3.6 3.5 4.0 0.2

St. Kitts-Nevis 2.7 1.4 1.4 2.1 -0.9 -3.5 St. Viecent & 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.0 n.a. the Grenadines Suriname -26.8 13.0 4.4 11.2 -24.1 56.0 Trinidad & Tobago 755.3 653.8 743.3 1,564.7 1,616.8 487.1

Dominican Republic 335.8 165.0 27.4 97.8 31.6 -135.8 Haiti 23.9 34.1 32.5 -1.1 -44.2 -12.9

As X of GDP

Antigua & Barbuda -3.6 -0.1 -3.1 -3.3 -5.9 -6.5 Bahamas 3.9 6.0 7.7 9.9 5.8 4.2 Barbados 3.0 6.5 5.7 4.9 3.2 4.5 Belize 1.4 6.3 5.3 5.9 2.7 3.5 Dominica -4.5 -4.1 -25.7 -14.7 -6.1 -0.8

Grenada 5.4 -2.3 0.4 -0.3 0.7 2.7 Guyana -2.8 4.4 4.1 2.5 -14.1 -15.4 Jamaica -6.4 -2.8 -4.2 -7.7 -2.6 -4.0 Montserrat -2.5 -3.3 -2.0 1.8 3.1 2.4 St. Lucia 4.7 6.1 3.5 3.1 3.2 0.1

St. Kitts-Nevis 11.2 5.0 4.7 5.9 -2.1 -8.2 St. Vincent & 0.3 -0.2 -1.4 0.0 0.0 n.a. the Grenadines Suriname -3.6 1.5 0.5 1.1 -2.2 n.a. Trinidad & Tobago 24.1 18.1 16.2 25.6 23.8 7.6

Dominican Republic 7.4 3.5 0.5 1.5 0.4 -1.7 Haiti 2.5 3.5 2.9 -0.5 -2.9 -0.8

at Data are uniform for a given country but are not completely comparable across countries due to differences in scope (some data are for central government only) and timing of fiscal year. - 30 -

Table 2. 3: CARIBBEAN - BALANCE OF PAYMVETS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT (US$ million)

Estimate- 1977 1978 19 79 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda -9.6 -3.7 -25.2 -42.7 -56.1 -25.9 Pahanas 19 .5 -L5.8 -52.2 -50.9 -92.3 -40.7 Barbados -21.8 11.3 -3.2 39.5 -74.4 -96.7 Belize -8.8 -31.1 -24.5 -12.2 -22.2 -25.2 Dominica -5.5 -6.9 -14.7 -32.5 -21.6 -13.3

Grenada 5.3 -0.5 -5.2 -13.3 -23.2 -35.7 Guyana -98.8 -31.7 -83.5 -106.0 -187.0 -133.0 Jamaica -28.9 -86.8 -142.6 -166.2 -375.2 -380.3 Montserrat 1.1 -0.3 -2.6 -5.9 -6.3 -8.0 St. Luicia -L1.4 -25.5 -31.5 -36.8 -44.9 -38.5

St. Kitts-Nevis -1.2 1.0 -3.5 -9.6 -7.8 -8.7 St. Vincent 6 -6.7 0.0 -7.1 -10.1 -5.1 -11.9 the Grenadines Suriname -81.1 -46.0 -37.0 -58.3 -119.3 -112.0 Trinidad & Tobago 214.8 35.9 -29.2 345.0 366.4 -735.4

Dominican Republic -264.5 -3L1.9 -331.3 -669.8 -405.9 441.9 Haiti -38.6 -25.4 -60.7 -85.2 -159.1 -63.7

As 2 of GDP

Antiglua & Barbuda -15.9 -5.4 -29.7 -40.0 -45.3 -18.9 Bahamas 3.3 -2.3 -6.5 -5.5 -6.9 -2.9 Barbados -4.4 2.0 -0.5 4.6 -7.8 -9.6 Belize -9.4 -10.4 19.8 -8.1 -13.5 -16.3 Dominica -15.4 -15.4 -35.2 -56.1 -32.1 -18.5

Grenada 10.7 -0.8 -6.9 -15.5 -24.2 -33.2 Guyana -22.4 -6.4 -16.0 -17.9 -30.7 -23.7 Jamaica -0.9 -3.3 -5.9 -6.2 -12.8 -11.9 Montserrat 9.7 -6.9 16.2 -24.3 -23.2 -27.8 St. Lucia -16.3 -30.7 -30.5 -32.4 -35.4 -28.7

St. Kitts-Nevis -5.0 3.6 -L1.8 -26.8 -17.9 -20.3 St. Vincent 6 -19.2 0.0 -L3.9 -18.0 -7.3 -15.3 the Grenadines Surinane -11.0 -5.3 -4.0 -5.6 -11.1 n.a. Trinidad 6 Tobago 6.9 1.0 -1.0 5.3 5.2 -9.8

Dominican Republic -5.8 -6.6 -6.0 -10.l -5.4 -5.5 Haiti -3.8 -2.5 -5.3 -6.2 -10.5 -4.0 - 31 -

Table 2.4: CARIBBEAN - TOURISM

(US$ Millions)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 198^

Antigua & Barbuda 24.7 29.5 38.7 42.5 46.6 49.5 Bahamas 37L.2 445.2 5D5.5 577.6 632.2 687.8 Barbados 111.5 138.6 207.8 253.7 264.L 225.0 Belize 3.9 4.5 6.7 7.0 7.5 M.a. Dominica 3.0 . 3.1 2.6 2.9 3.2 4.C.

Grenada 11.6 14.4 15.3 L6.5 13.9 13.0 Guyana nr.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.e. - Jamaica 105.6 L46.8 195.4 240.5 284.0 336.2 Montserrat 2.8 3.0 3.7 4.3 5.4 5.B St. Lucia 17.8 27.7 33.4 40.5 38.5 40.6

St. Kitte-Nevis 2.0 5.0 6.8 7.9 9.6 9.4 St. Vincent & 5.9 11.1 18.2 24.0 25.2 25.9 the Grenadines Suriname n.a. n.a. n.a. in.a. '.a. n-a.. Trinidad & Tobago 91.2 109.2 119.7 151.1 151.9 137.6

Dominican Republic 92.3 92.3 123.9 172.5 206.3 266.1 Haiti 36.7 42.0 60.6 76.5 74.9 81.2

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Infornation. - 32 -

Table 2.5: CARIBBEAN - TOURISM a/

('000 of visitors)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Akntigua & Barbuda L04.1 128.8 169.8 205.0 209.1 169.3 Bahamas 1,381.4 1,706.9 1,789.4 1,904.6 1,763.3 1,947.4 Barbados 372.4 442.9 481.0 526.4 488.4 414.6 Belize 55.1 60.6 61.7 63.7 62.3 n.a. Domitiica 31.0 35.6 28.1 24.8 22.6 22.8

Grenada 115.2 125.4 143.2 145.9 87.2 72.9 Guyana n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Jaaaica 386.5 532.9 593.7 543.0 552.0 670.2 Momtserrac: 12.7 15.4 16.9 20.5 21.4 24.9 St. Lucia 149.0 145.7 140.5 140.3 89.6 106.1

St. Kitts-Nevis n.a. 37.1 40.8 38.5 46.3 45.7 St. Vincent & 32.3 48.8 56.2 77.2 71.6 67.4 the Grenadines Suriname n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Trinidad & Tobago 202.0 208.4 170.8 155.6 n.a. n.a.

Dominican Republic 442.0 460.0 537.9 566.4 613.6 602.2 Haiti 291.1 301.8 303.0 306.1 314.1 n.a.

a/ These data correspond to total arrivals including cruise ship passengers.

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 33 -

Table 2.6: CARIBBEAN - VOLUME OF BANANA EXPORTS ('000 Tone)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda - - - - Bahamas Barbados ------Belize 10.4 9.9 16.0 15.0 10.5 7.9 Dominica 30.4 37.0 16.0 8.1 27.1 27.5

Grenada 14.0 14.2 14.6 12.9 10.6 10.2 Guyana ------Jamaica 74.9 72.7 63.9 33.1 18.1 21.2 Montserrat ------St. Lucia 41.4 47.8 48.2 32.8 42.7 41.7

St. Kitts-Nevis ------St. Vincent & 28.8 33.8 24.6 20.7 32.0 29.4 the Grenadines Suriname 27.3 29.0 27.3 34.0 36.5 38.0 Trinidad & Tobago - - - -

Dominican Republic - - - - - Haiti

(-) Not applicable

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 34 -

Table 2.7: CARIBBEAN - VALUE OF BANANAEXPORTS

(US$ Hillion)

Eatimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda ------Bahamas Barbadoe - - - - - Belize 1.5 1.7 3.4 3.5 2.2 2.3 Dominica 6.9 9.2 4.4 3.0 9.1 10.0

Grenada 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.1 3.7 3.4 Guyana - - - - Jamaica 13.9 17.3 18.2 9.2 4.3 4.7 Montserrat - - - - - St. Lucia 9.5 12.1 13.5 10.5 14.6 15.6

St. Kitts-Nevis - - - St. Vincent & 5.6 7.3 5.7 5.9 9.4 9.2 the Grenadines Suriname 3.4 3.9 4.1 5.9 7.3 8.3 Trinidad & TobagRo - - - - -

Dominican Republic - - - - - Haiti

(-) Not applicable

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 35 -

Table 2.8: CARIBBEAN- VALUEOF BAUXITEEXPORTS a/ (US$ Million)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda ------Bahamas ------Barbados ------Belize ------Dominica ------

Grenada ------Guyana 99.1 98.2 107.1 144.3 120.1 92.6 Jamaica 205.3 234.0 213.5 197.4 172.1 170.0 Montserrat ------

St. Lucia ------

St. Kitts-Nevis ------St. Vincent & ------the Grenadines Suriname 65.6 72.1 65.6 73.6 63.2 31.4 Trinidad & Tobago ------

Dominican Republic 22.0 23.1 20.9 18.5 15.7 5.3 Haiti 17.3 17.2 18.1 19.6 15.5 21.4

a/ Includes calcined bauxite.

(-) Not applicable.

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 36 -

Table 2.9: CARIBBEAN- VOLUME OF BAUXITE EXPORTS a/ ('000 tons)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda ------Bahamas ------Barbados ------Belize ------Dominica

Grenada ------Guyana a/ 1,575.0 1,577t0 1,553.1 1,587.8 1,483.3 1,057.1 Jamaica7 6,400.0 6,400.0 6,400.0 6,100.0 5,370.0 4,080.0 Montserrat ------St. Lucia - - - - -

St. Kitts-Nevis ------St. Vincent & - - - - _ - the Grenadines Suriname 2,172.0 2,241.0 1,737.0 1,775.0 1,268.0 505.0 Trinidad & Tobago ------

DominicanRepublic 774.1 756.7 634.7 605.8 457.2 140.6 Haiti 701.0 629.5 613.0 519.0 480.0 622.0

a/ Includes calcined bauxite. / Long tons.

(-) Not applicable.

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 37 -

Table 2.10s CARIBBEAN- VALU13OF ALUMINAEXPORTS

(US$ Million)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua EmBarbuda ------Bahamas - - - - - Barbados - - Belize - - - - - Dominica -

Grenada ------Guyana 30.8 31.9 21.1 43.7 32.7 12.0 Jamaica 323.2 348.3 368.2 534.7 588.1 343.8 Mo5ntserrat ------St. Lucia - - - . - -

St. Kitts-Nevis - - - - St. Vincent & ------the Grenadines Suriname 151.9 175.9 200.9 279.5 264.7 249.7 Trinidad & Tobago ------

Dominican Republic - - - Haiti - - - -

(-) Not applicable.

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 38 -

Table 2.11: CARIBBEAN - VOLUME OF ALUMINA EXPORTS

('000 tons)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1.980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda ------Bahamas ------Barbados ------Belize ------Dominica ------

Grenada ------Guyana a/ 263.0 248.0 145.0 226.0 150.0 64.0 Jamaica 2,000.0 2,100.0 2,100.0 2,360.0 2,550.0 1,750.0 Montserrat ------St.Lucia - - - -

St. Kitts-Nevis - - - - - St. Vincent & ------the Grenadines Suriname 1,059.0 1,125.0 1,185.C 1,329.0 1,165.0 1,112.0 Trinidad & Tobago ------

Dominican Republic ------Haiti -

a/ Long tons.

(-) Not applicable.

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. - 39 -

Table 2.12: CARIBBEAN - VALUE OF SUGAR EXPORTS

(US$ Million)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda ------Bahamas ------Barbados 25.3 23.4 28.8 54.4 25.6 30.8 Belize 23.9 32.9 31.5 47.7 42.6 31.0 Dominica ------

Grenada - - - Guyana 72.8 92.0 90.4 120.8 108.8 86.5 Jamaica 63.4 59.5 56.9 54.7 46.5 49.3 Montserrat ------St. Lucia ------

St. Kitts-Nevis 9.4 11.8 11.3 14.4 14.7 11.1 St. Vincent & ------the Grenadines Suriname - - - - Trinidad & Tobago 34.8 22.4 35.2 26.0 27.1 21.9

Dominican Republic 218.6 172.0 190.9 290.2 513.2 265.5 Haiti 0.0 2.3 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0

(-) Not applicable.

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information. 40 -

Table 2.13: CARIBBEAN - VOLUME OF SUGAR EXPORTS

('000 Long Tons)

Estimate 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Antigua & Barbuda ------Bahamas ------Barbados 99.5 77.8 83.0 113.0 58.6 68.5 Belize n.a. 111.6 91.6 97.2 90.4 98.5 Dominica - - - - -

Grenada ------Guyana 207.7 280.4 264.0 248.1 264.6 252.5 Jamaica 209.8 193.0 187.7 131.8 121.3 138.3 Montserrat ------St. Lucia - - - - -

St. Kitts-Nevis n.a. 36.3 36.8 31.5 28.9 31.5 St. Vincent & ------the Grenadines Suriname ------Trinidad & Tobago 141.7 102.9 88.1 64.0 67.1 41.2

Dominican Rep, a/ 1,098.7 904.7 992.4 802.0 847.5 833.3 Haiti a/ 0.0 5.3 0.0 19.2 0.0 0.0

a/ Metric tons.

(-) Not applicable

Sources: IBRD Economic Memoranda and Central Bank Information.