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On Transcendental and Non-Transcendental Id ealism in H u sserl: A R esp o n se to D e Palma and Loidolt

Ju lia Jan sen KU Leuven* ju lia .ja n s e n @ k u le u v e n .b e

* Correspondence: Husserl-Archives: Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 - box 3200 3000 Leuven, Belgium.

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Husserl never understood why his championing of a phenom enological “transcendental idealism ” caused such strong objections and, at its m ost extrem e, resentm ents. H e considered the dispute between idealism and realism , w hich ignited over the publication of his Id eas I, « s te rile (unfruchtbar)» and «unphilosophical» 1 (HUSSERL 1 9 3 0 , 5 6 3 ) . A nd yet, it seem s that the reception of H usserl’s work goes through regular cycles of this very dispute. We are therefore left w ith the qu estion: w hy d oes it seem im p ossible to settle this issu e? One answer lies in the very nature of Husserl’s thought. On the one hand, H usserl’s am bitions paralleled those of K ant w ho, as Mendelssohn famously claimed, was a «total crusher (der Alleszermalmer)», refuting rational psychology, philosophical cosm ology, an d ration al theology in on e fell sw oop (an d , in fact, in on e book). O n the other hand, Husserl proceeded m ore like a “total syn th esizer”, con tinu ou sly incorp orating alread y available ideas an d fram ew orks (historical or contem porary) and “turning” them into moments of his phenomenology. This eclecticism, however, was not arbitrary. H usserl seem s to have genuinely believed that the greatest minds of the past and present tended to get it right in certain respects, but that their notions (m ostly because of deeply entrenched prejudices that obscured their view s) w ere still in need of phenom enological clarification, by m eans of w hich the fundam ental insights lying dormant in their positions could be unlocked and put to proper use. It is th erefore n ot at all su rp risin g th at realists an d id ealists sh ou ld both find them selves confirm ed, or, perhaps m ore significantly, con trad icted in H u sserl’s w ritings. That said, the accusation of idealism has always been more cutting and m ore dam ning than that of realism . Being called a “realist” just does not sound like much of an insult – this was true at Husserl’s time, and it rem ains true today. This is no trivial point. H usserl insisted on

1 Unless I give the translation in the bibliography, the English translations of the German te x ts re fe rre d to in th is a rticle a re m in e .

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his idealism largely against realist com m on sense, w hich paradoxically had been, at least in part, responsible for the success of his “realist” Logical Investigations. H ow ever, w h en th e Logical Investigations were first p u b lish e d , p h ilo so p h ica l d isco u rse w a s still m o stly e n ta n g le d in different (even opposing) view s that all could be considered “psychologistic” in the sense that they advocated either a priori m ental or em pirical psychological foundations for logic and the other scien ces. By th e tim e Id eas I was published, the landscape had shifted. Husserl increasingly saw the general attitude of “objectivism”, or “naturalism ”, as his m ain target, as it w as rapidly and relentlessly gaining m om entum in all areas of life. M ore specifically, his “transcendental idealism ” was m eant to deny (as Kant’s had done) the bivalence of the idealism -realism debate, which Husserl dism issed as still m ov ing «o n th e level o f n atu ralism (auf dem natürlichen Boden )» (HUSSERL 1 9 3 0 , 5 6 3 ). T h a t H u sserl’s p ro fessed id ea lism ca n still, m o re th a n 1 0 0 y e a rs a fte r th e p u b lica tio n o f Id eas I, a ttra ct p h ilo so p h ica l interest likely has to d o w ith the fact that tod ay realism reigns m ore pow erfully than ever. That the qualification of idealism by the term “transcendental” has left m any unconvinced of its pow er to eradicate the problem s associated w ith idealism , likely has to do w ith this realism 's n atu ralist ben t, w h ich co n sid ers tran scen d en tal id ealism just as “anti-realist” as idealism sim pliciter. That Husserl claimed the title “transcendental idealism ” for his phenom enology is not at issue, even though he did not wish to have his phenom enology reduced to simply a new version of idealism . As he rem arked sternly, «transcendental phenom enology is no theory merely there to provide answers to the historical problem of idealism” (HUSSERL 1930, 419). Yet, the self-sufficiency of phenomenology notwithstanding, he also insisted that the label “transcendental idealism ” w as not just one of expediency (let’s say, to ease-in the audience, for w hom his phenom enology w as so radically new , w ith con n ection s to trad ition al, m ore fam iliar m od els). It clearly w as no matter of “pedagogy” or “public relations” (and how ill chosen the label w ould have been for that purp ose).

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Husserl is genuinely convinced that there is an in trin sic relation between phenom enology and transcendental idealism . In his 1930 epilogue to Id eas I, th a t is , a fte r 1 7 y e a r s o f p u b lic o b je c tio n s a g a in s t h is tra n sce n d e n ta l id e a list p o sitio n , H u sse rl in sists:

I m ay n o t h ere n eg lect (… ) to d eclare exp ressly th at I retract nothing w hatsoever as regards transcendental- phenom enological idealism and that I still consider, as I did before, every form of the usual philosophical realism nonsensical in principle, no less so than that idealism which it sets itself up against in its argum entations and w hich it ‘re fu te s ’. (H u s s e rl 1 9 3 0 , 5 6 0 )

In th e Cartesian Meditations (p u blished in French ju st one year later) he is even more adamant and even claims that …

(…) phenomenology is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism’, th o u g h in a fu n d a m e n ta lly a n d esse n tia lly n e w se n se . (… ) T h e proof of this idealism is therefore phenom enology itself. Only som eone w ho m isunderstands either the deepest sense of intentional m ethod, or that of transcendental reduction, perhaps both, can attem pt to separate phenom enology from transcend ental id ealism . (H u a 1, 118 f.)

I ta k e it th a t it is p recisely th ese k in d s o f fo rm u la tio n s th a t irk V itto rio De Palma. Why call it “transcendental idealism” if one gives it “a fu n d a m e n ta lly a n d e sse n tia lly n e w se n se ” ? In p a rticu la r, w h y ca ll it “transcendental idealism ” and hence w hy pledge allegiance to som e form of K antianism if the fundam ental differences to K ant’s transcendental idealism are all too apparent? Both D e Palm a and Sophie Loidolt, in their contributions to Metodo (2015, Sp ecial Issu e I/1), identify som e of these fundam ental differences w ith great precision. Loidolt sees Husserl’s transcendental idealism first and forem ost as an idealism , w hich rides on the «radical distinction of the m odes of

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2 being ‘consciou sn ess’ an d ‘reality ’» (LOIDOLT 2015, 117). A lthough Loidolt acknow le d g e s th a t th is d u a lism is « re v e a le d b y th e phenom enological reduction» (IB ID ., 117), she believes that it «can hardly be traced back to a transcendental argum ent, but is [instead] ro o ted in an o n to log ical in sig h t, v iz., rests on on to log ical arg u m en ts» (IBID ., 118 f.). T his assessm ent resonates w ith a relatively w id e-spread perception, one that is shared also by De Palma, nam ely that Husserl’s assertion of the prim acy of consciousness over reality is not part of a “transcendental” register, but in fact betrays «the legacy of Brentano which Husserl never overcame», ultimately a non-transcendental idealism that as such is no m ore than «a residue of psychologism » (DE PALMA 2015, 42). In this respect, De Palma argues that the transcendental reduction is in fact dispensable because an eidetic red u ction alread y d o es th e trick (IBID . 1 8 ). Such an eidetic reduction by itself already yields the fundam ental difference between the being of consciousness and the being of reality. I w ou ld even ad d that it also provides an insight into the relation between these two distinct kinds of being. The being of consciousness, as H usserl points out in Id eas I and then repeats throughout his oeuvre, is “absolute”; while the being of reality is “relative”, nam ely insofar as it is d ep end ent on consciousness, w hich intend s w hat is real and posits it as real. In oth er w o rd s, alread y an eid etic red u ction gives us what Loidolt, with Uw e M eixner, calls the «supervenience of the real, in particular of the physical, on consciousness», w hich she id e n tifie s a s w h a t id e a lis m ju st is (LOIDOLT 2 0 1 5 , 1 1 9 ; c f. MEIXN ER 2 0 1 0 , 186). In other w ords, an eidetic reduction already discloses both the dependency o f th e r e a l o n c o n s c io u s n e s s a n d th e irred u c ib ility o f b o th . One way of addressing the proper function of the transcendental red u ction (o r its d isp en sab ility ) is to ask w h at it p ro v id es th at w e d o not already get by means of the eidetic reduction. In the first instance,

2 Although I follow Loidolt in the use of the term, one must keep in mind that the term “reality (Realität)” is a m b ig u o u s. F irst o f a ll, co n scio u sn e ss ca n b e sa id to h a v e its o w n “reality” w ith its ow n m odalities (possible, actual, necessary); and “reality” in this broad sen se is obv iou sly n ot red u cible to “real” objects in th e n arrow sen se of “objects of possible sense experience”, but includes all p o s s ib le o b je c tiv itie s , r e a l o r id e a l.

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th e tra n sce n d e n ta l re d u ctio n e n a b le s th e co n firm a tio n o f th e e id e tic distinction by phenom enological ev id en ce. T ru e to th e p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l method, the distinction between the absolute being of consciousness and the relative being of reality yielded by an eidetic reflection can, from the transcendental point of view , serve as no m ore than an hypothesis until it is confirm ed by concrete phenom enological in v estig a tio n s.3 This is w hy H usserl says, in the passage from the Cartesian Meditations I q u oted ab ove, th at «the proof of this idealism is (…) phenomenology itself». Secondly, the transcendental reduction opens up further transcendental-phenom enological investigations of both consciousness and reality as well as of the relation between the tw o. In the cou rse of these investigations, H u sserl find s evid ence that dem ands an important qualification of the supervenience claim. This evidence show s that the relation of su p ervenience does not entail that the being of consciou sness « tota lly d eterm in es (v o llstä n d ig fe stle g t)» th e being of reality (w hich w ould result in a strong version of su p erven ien ce, cf. MEIXN ER 2010, 188; cited by LOIDOLT 2015, 110, fn . 24), even though no objectivity is thinkable and, w hat’s m ore, no objectivity can be independently of consciousness.4 This is a point worth dwelling on. The irred u c ib ility th esis (i.e., th e th e sis th a t co n scio u sn e ss a n d re a lity refer to tw o irred u cib ly d ifferen t m o d es of bein g ) gain s stren g th in its su p p ort of H u sserl’s an ti-p h en om en alism , as it receives con firm ation fro m th e noematic in v estig a tio n s b eg u n in Id eas I. T h e s e in v e stig a tio n s sh ow th at reality is not d issolvab le into con ten ts of con sciou sn ess, or red u cib le to m en tal or p sych ical co n ten ts, fo r th e sim p le reaso n th at a material thing «is intrinsically not an experience but instead a totally different kind of being» (Hua 3/1, 71). As Husserl’s later genetic and

3 In fa ct, its a p o d icticity req u ire s y e t a n o th e r ste p , n a m e ly a n “ a p o d ictic critiq u e ” e n a b le d by an “apodictic reduction” like the one H usserl advances in his 1922/23 “Introduction to Philosophy” lecture course. C f. H ua 35, esp. part 4. This m eans that even the tra n sce n d e n ta l id e a list p o sitio n is in itia lly a h y p o th esis. T h is, b y th e w ay, is a lso tru e o f Kant’s transcendental idealism, only that Kant and Husserl seek to confirm this hypothesis by very different means (cf. Jansen 2014). 4 Husserl does not make here a claim concerning the subjective limits of conceivability, but th e o n to lo g ica l cla im th a t th e re ca n b e n o o b jectiv itie s in d e p e n d e n tly o f co n scio u sn e ss.

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generative investigations demonstrate, this irreducibility cannot be understood as a lin ea r em erg en ce, in w h ich all o b jectivities co u ld b e “traced back to” and are ultim ately “determ ined” by subjective acts. Thus, these findings link up with a phenom enological clarification of th e dependency thesis (i.e., the thesis that reality depends on consciou sn ess). H u sserl’s research confirm s that objectivities dep en d on subjective acts, but also that they do so only in a very specific sense. Only subjective acts can “constitute” objectivities as objective, and objectivities can only show them selves as objective to con sciou sn ess.5 Consciousness does not depend on objectivities in this regard; it can sh ow itself to itself: «no real being, n o b e in g w h ich is p re se n te d a n d legitimated in consciousness by appearances, (…)is necessary to the being of consciousness itself (in the broad est sense, the stream of m ental processes)» (Hua 3/1, 92)6. T h ere is su ch a th in g a s reflectiv e self- aw areness, w hich constitutes im m ed iate (thou gh, su bstantially, by and large neither apodictic nor adequate) eviden ce of the being of consciousness itself – even in the case in w hich the acts of consciou sn ess fail to ach ieve the con cord an t un ity “w orld” (i.e., even if the “w orld ” is annihilated , as H usserl’s notorious thou ght experim ent in § 4 9 o f Id eas I is m eant to dem onstrate). In this sense, then, consciou sn ess is absolute (i.e., non -relative), both epistem ologically and ontologically. H ow ever, the independence of consciousness from reality qua objectivity does not m ake consciousness strictly self-sufficient; nor is reality epistemologically or ontologically redundant. When Husserl claim s that «object, objective being, an d con sciou sn ess belon g a priori inseparably together» (H ua 36, 73), this does not mean that objectivities are m ere “correlates” of consciousness (a claim that can easily be interpreted in an anti-realist, subjectivist fashion). Rather, as Husserl states very clearly, for example, in his writings on

5 This requires not only a possible consciousness, but an actual consciousness (cf. Hua 36; cf. M elle 2010). 6 The point is not that, in ord er to sh ow itself, con sciou sn ess d oes not d ep en d on any objectivity that is “real” (in the narrow sense of not being fictional), but that it does not depend on any real o b jectivity (in th e w id e sen se o f b ein g an o b ject o f possible sen se exp erience).

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in te rs u b je c tiv ity ,

(…) the concrete Ego (Ich) has in its life as life of consciousness (Bew usstseinsleben) alw ays a core of hyle, of non-Ego, but essentially belongin g to th e E g o . W ith o u t a re a lm o f pregivennesses (Vorgegebenheiten), a realm of constituted unities, constituted as non-Ego (nicht-Ich), no Ego is possible (H u a 1 4 , 3 7 9 ).

As this quote makes clear, hyle is s p e c ific a lly not m eant in an em piricist sen se, as an im m an en t object of introsp ection , bu t – and here w e find yet another insight gained by the tran scen den tal redu ction – as an insep arable, by itself non-intentional m om ent of the intentional sense experience in 7 virtue of w hich an object m ay be intend ed (cf. JANSEN 2014, 82). A s Michel Henry, who is known to be in many ways critical of Husserl, and of his treatm ent of hyle in particular so aptly put it: for H usserl hyle is a m om ent of the «totality of noetic processes in w hich it is in c lu d e d » (HEN RY 2008, 9). It is not “m ere” m atter, w hich would receive apprehension by the subject only secondarily 8, b u t « it is th e matter of the act that informs it, a matter for this act» (HEN RY 2008, 10; original em phasis). A s such, it is im m anent and by itself non- in te n tio n a l, i.e ., “subjective”, a n d a t th e s a m e tim e , a s th e q u o te a b o v e fro m th e in te rsu b jectiv ity w ritin g s sp e cifie s, a lso not of the “subject”. What might appear contradictory in the constitutive analyses of Id eas I is further clarified in H usserl’s genetic account w here H usserl enters into the depths of the very em ergence of content, w hich is originarily

7 Mark Rowlands also has recently pointed out how empiricist assumptions that reduce con sciou sn ess to (the p h en om en al con ten t) of m en tal states, w h ich are th em selves con stru ed as objects of introspection or thought, m ake it im possible to conceive of con sciou sn ess in term s of m en tal acts (and their m om ents) that are them selves not accessible as objects, but in v irtu e o f w h ich w e can access any objects at all. H ow ever, Rowlands does not consider the ways in which, correlatively, objectivities also condition (“afford” or “illicit”) the acts. H is analysis thus only addresses the, to speak w ith Husserl, “noetic” side of this complex dynamic (cf. ROW LANDS fo r th c o m in g , 2 0 -2 7 ). 8 This is why Husserl gives up, or at least fundam entally revises his matter-apprehension- sch em a (cf. H u a 23, text 8 [1909], 265-269; JANSEN 2 0 0 5 , 1 2 5 ; HOLENSTEIN 1 9 7 2 , 8 6 -1 1 7 ).

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correlation al. B y d e s c rib in g th e p h e n o m e n o n o f “ o rig in a l” , o r “ p rim a r y association” (H ua 11, 151, 273), as part of his ex p ressis verbis “tra n sce n d e n ta l” account (H ua 1, 114), H usserl arrives at an id e n tific a tio n o f th e correlation “affection – affectin g n o n -E g o ” as th e concrete phenom enological clarification of the form al “prim al im p re s s io n (Ur-impression)” (cf. JANSEN 2015, 66-69). T h e «associative ‘U rstiftung’… plays out as the dynam ic back-and-forth of the object’s ‘a ffe c tiv e fo rc e (affective Kraft)’ a n d th e e g o ’s ‘re sp o n siv ity (antw ortende Tätigkeit)’ (H u a 1 1 , 5 0 )» (JANSEN 2015, 68). C onsequently, as Rudolf Bernet has sum m arized it: «There is no original phenom enon without som ething objective that gives itself and w ithout a dative of this 9 givenness» (BERN ET 2 0 1 5 , 1 1 7 ). Thus, the transcendental reduction is indispensable in at least three different ways: First, it delivers the phenom enological confirmation of th e v a lid ity o f th e e id e tic in sig h t th a t th e b e in g o f co n scio u sn e ss a n d the being of reality are fundam entally different. Second, the tra n sce n d e n ta l re d u ctio n o p e n s u p fu rth e r tra n sce n d e n ta l- phenom enological investigations of both consciousness and being as well as of the relation between the two. These, in turn, lead to im portant qualifications of both the irreducibility thesis and the dependence thesis, w hich can be won by m eans of the eidetic reduction alone. Third, the transcendental reduction enables a “transcendental stance” (cf. JANSEN 2014), w hich considers m om ents of consciou sn ess as that in v irtu e o f w h ich o b jects m ay b e in ten d ed , an d not as them selves objects apprehended in introspection. I ag ree w ith D e P alm a an d L o id o lt th at it is im p o rtan t n o t to cov er over the distinct and crucial differences betw een im portant aspects, em phases, and even the fund am ental trajectories of the H usserlian and th e K a n tia n a cco u n ts. T o a d d to th e ir v e ry h e lp fu l d istin ctio n s, I w o u ld

9 This also means that similarity (besides contrast, fusion, prom inence, etc., one basic mode of association) indeed allows “for a transcendental interpretation”, although it can not, as D e Palm a righ tly observes, be red u ced to su bjectivity. A ccord ing to H u sserl, sim ilarity is not red u cible to a subject that recogn izes tw o item s as sim ilar according to a tertium com parationis, b u t a s a m a n ife st q u a lity it still depends on consciousness to show its e lf.

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also say that H usserl’s analyses, unlike K ant’s lin ea r “top dow n” deduction, attem pt a com plex account of w hat H usserl recognizes as a com plex nexus of m om ents, dimensions, interdependencies, and feedback loops, in w hich rigid bivalence is suspended and in w hich instead relational term s (“subjective”/“objective”, noetic/noem atic, active/passive, ideal/real, etc.) are required. H ere, Loidolt’s (2015) em phasis on H usserl’s “transcend ental id ea lism ” has the distinct advantage of rem inding us that this idealism is, unlike K ant’s “tran scen d en tal id e a lis m ” , irre d u c ib le to a c o n s e q u e n c e o f a “transcendental stance”. For H usserl’s idealism contains not only the eidetic distinction betw een “consciousness” and “reality”, but also his in sisten ce on a d im en sion of id eality that p erm eates all layers of reality (in the broad sense of the w ord), w hich is thus m odalized into its actualities, possibilities, and necessities. However, I see no reason not to recognize H usserl’s ow n use of the “transcendental stance” as an overturning (Umwälzung), o r radicalization of K ant’s transcendental philosophy (cf. HEINÄ M A A , HARTIMO, MIE T T IN E N 2 0 1 4 , 8 ), w h o se ra d ica lity su rely w o u ld b e lo st if we simply called it by another name. What’s more, the insistence on too rigid a notion of transcend ental philosophy strikes m e as not w ell in tune w ith H usserl’s ow n approach to the history of philosophy. For his notion of Besinnung, perform atively dem onstrated in the Crisis, seem s to m e to be advocating a m uch m ore open attitude that id e n tifie s , fro m o n e ’s o w n e x p lic it h isto ric a l a n d c u ltu ra l sta n d p o in t, salien t ph ilosop h ical “m otifs” to clarify an d en rich on e’s ow n accou n t. That’s why Husserl not only permits, but encourages us to …

(…) use the word ‘transcendental’ in the broadest sense for the motif (…) of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the form ations of know led ge, the m otif of the know er’s reflecting (B e sin n u n g ) u p o n h im se lf a n d h is k n o w in g life (H u a 6 , § 2 6 , 97 f.).

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