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Practical Principles and the Foundations of Kant's Moral Theory UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles The Form of Law: Practical Principles and the Foundations of Kant’s Moral Theory A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by William Leland Reckner 2017 © Copyright by William Leland Reckner 2017 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Form of Law: Practical Principles and the Foundations of Kant’s Moral Theory by William Leland Reckner Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Los Angeles, 2017 Professor Barbara Herman, Chair Immanuel Kant argued that morality requires us to act on principles that we can will as universal laws. However, there has always been profound disagreement about how to apply this requirement, and about why this demand should be morally fundamental. This dissertation offers new answers to these questions, by developing a deeper understanding of the “practical” principles that Kant wants us to be able to will as universal laws. My primary thesis is that practical principles state three things: a reason to act, the end or goal that this reason requires us to accomplish, and the means that we must use to achieve that end. Several crucial lines of Kant’s thought require this structure for practical principles, I argue. Primarily: practical principles, as principles for action, must also be causal principles, and Kant’s views on causation require practical principles to have the structure I propose. ii I use this structure to answer some venerable problems: first, why can’t we will any principle whatsoever as a universal law, especially if we make each principle unique to each case? Because Kant requires causal relations to be rule-governed, I argue, in a way that prevents practical principles from being unique to each situation. Next, why isn’t morality satisfied when everyone could follow our principles? Under my interpretation, practical principles say how we are required to act. As rational beings, though, we cannot be required to contradict ourselves. Everyone could contradict themselves in order to follow a principle, but we cannot be required to do so. So I argue that “willing” our principles as universal laws is supposed to capture how principles cannot require us to contradict ourselves. Last, why must we act on principles that we can will as universal laws? Kant answers: to act that way is to give laws to ourselves, and we must think of ourselves as laws to ourselves. That is autonomy. But if I give a law to myself, couldn’t I release myself from that law, too? I conclude by using my interpretation to explain how laws that we give to ourselves can also impose genuine requirements on us. iii The dissertation of William Leland Reckner is approved. William Fred Bristow C. T. Burge Barbara Herman, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2017 iv To all my teachers, especially Mom and Dad v Table of Contents 1. Practical Principles and Laws of Freedom ................................................................................... 1 2. Freedom, Causation, and the Structure of Practical Principles ................................................ 38 3. The Structure of Practical Principles ........................................................................................ 78 4. Alternative Views of Practical Principles ..................................................................................117 5. Deriving the Formula of Universal Law ................................................................................... 155 6. An Empty Formalism? ............................................................................................................. 193 7. The Form of Law and the Idea of Freedom ............................................................................. 258 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 323 vi List of Abbreviations Works by Kant CJ Critique of the Power of Judgment CP Critique of Practical Reason CR Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood FI First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals JL Immanuel Kant’s Logic, edited by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche P Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics MF Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science MM Metaphysics of Morals R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Works by Hegel EL Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part I PR Elements of the Philosophy of Right PS Phenomenology of Spirit Please see the Bibliography for full citations. vii Acknowledgements I have strived to include specific acknowledgments throughout the text of the study here, but I have many, many people to thank for their help and support, both with this dissertation and more generally. First, I would like to thank Barbara Herman, for modeling and helping to shape the approach and the temperament that I have taken to reading Kant, but mainly for always striking the perfect balance between trusting me to figure things out on my own and nudging me in the right direction. I have learned from her tremendously, and I could not have asked for a better advisor. I am also grateful to Tyler Burge, for many illuminating conversations and comments, and whose teaching and thinking about Kant has exemplified for me the analytical depth, rigor, and systematicity that I have sought to achieve here. Helping to teach his class on the Critique of Pure Reason has been invaluable to me. I began the work that led into this dissertation as an MA student under Bill Bristow at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, so I would also like to thank Bill for helping me to start out on the path that has led to this work, and especially for his continued support and many valuable suggestions. I have been honored to have had him along throughout this project. I have also benefitted greatly from conversations and comments from John Carriero and Sheldon Smith, without whom the scope and detail of this project would have been much impoverished. I am grateful to them for their help with Kant himself, but also with the broader historical and scientific contexts for the issues discussed here. I would also like to thank Margaret Atherton, whose Berkeley seminar will always stand out to me as a model of close textual analysis, and Julius Sensat, without whom Chapter Six would not have been possible at all. I owe much of my understanding of Kant’s historical context to all four of them. I am grateful viii as well to Pamela Hieronymi for running UCLA’s Ethics Writing Seminar, which was of great help in developing Chapter Five in particular. Last, I do not think that I can adequately express my gratitude and appreciation for all of my colleagues at UCLA and at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and for all of my students as well. They have been an endless source of inspiration and philosophical stimulation. This dissertation was also supported by a Dissertation Year Fellowship from the Graduate Division of UCLA, and I am exceedingly grateful for that support. I expect that I have forgotten some people, and I am certain that I have not thanked everyone fully. For that, I apologize. ix Curriculum Vitae Education M.A. in philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 2007-2009 Thesis: Incentives and Goodness in Kant’s Ethics Chair: William Bristow Committee: Julius Sensat, Blain Neufeld B.A. in philosophy magna cum laude, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota 2001-2005 Thesis: Phenomenal Holism Chair: Roy Elveton Conferences and Colloquia Presentations: A Problem of Racism for Kant University of Texas, Austin November 2016 Kant’s Negative Equality Kingston University, London, United Kingdom May 2016 The Structure of Kant’s Maxims University of Colorado, Boulder April 2016 The Structure of Kant’s Maxims Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge April 2016 The Value of Reason APA Central Div. Society for Student Phil. February 2009 The Value of Reason Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa October 2008 Invited Comments and Panels: USC ZYGO Series on Ethics in Medicine: The Rights of Refugees February 2016 USC ZYGO Series on Ethics in Medicine: Medicine in the Media February 2015 UCLA/Antwerp Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference October 2014 USC/UCLA Graduate Philosophy Conference February 2014 UC Riverside Conference in Ancient Ethics and Moral Psychology April 2013 Organization: UCLA Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference April 2016 UCLA/Antwerp Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference October 2014 USC/UCLA Graduate Philosophy Conference February 2013 UCLA Albritton Society Graduate Conference May 2011 UCLA Albritton Society September 2010 to June 2011 Academic Awards and Honors UCLA Graduate Division Dissertation Year Fellowship Winter to Fall 2016 Finalist, Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship 2015 UCLA Departmental Graduate Fellowship Spring, Fall 2015, Fall 2014 UCLA Graduate Student Summer Research Mentorship Summer 2011 UCLA Foundation Doctoral Scholar Fellowship Fall 2010 to Spring 2011 UCLA Departmental Graduate Fellowship Fall 2009 to Spring 2010 UWM Distinguished Graduate Student Fellowship Fall 2008 to Spring 2009 x UWM Chancellor’s Graduate Student Award Fall 2007 to Spring 2008 Teaching Experience Primary Instructor: History of Greek Philosophy UCLA Summer 2015 Philosophy of Mind Johns Hopkins Center for Talented Youth Summer 2013 Philosophy of Mind Johns Hopkins Center for Talented Youth Summer 2012 Ethics Johns Hopkins Center
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