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Journal of Contemporary European Research Irrelevant Player? The Journal of Contemporary European Research Volume 11, Issue 3 (2015) Research Article Irrelevant player? The Commission’s role during the Eurozone crisis Isabel Camisão University of Coimbra Citation Camisão, I. (2015). ‘Irrelevant player? The Commission’s role during the Eurozone crisis’, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 11 (3), pp. 268-286. First published at: www.jcer.net Volume 11, Issue 3 (2015) jcer.net Isabel Camisão Abstract Under the EU treaties, provisions For collective (or institutional) Forms of political leadership prevail over those made For leadership perFormed by individuals. Thus, an important leadership input From the EU’s institutions, namely the European Commission, would be expectable, particularly in times of crisis. Although not having the Formal power oF decision, the monopoly oF initiative gives the Commission a considerable ability to inFluence the course oF EU policymaking and overall the integration process. Moreover, the Commission has learned to maximize (and to create) windows of opportunity to act by cleverly using its resources (for example, its privileged access to information and expertise). However, during the current Eurozone crisis, the role oF the Commission was overshadowed by the visibility and prominence oF some national leaders and other institutions. What was the role oF the Commission in the economic and Financial crisis? Did the Commission inFluence the crisis responses agreed by the Member States? This article will answer these questions by analysing the European Commission’s main crisis response activities between 2008-2013. The central hypothesis oF this paper is that the Commission actually played an important role in crisis response. Keywords European Commission; Eurozone crisis; institutional leadership; economic governance In the literature on European integration one oF the major discussions focus on the role of the diFFerent actors in the policy-making process. In simple terms, the debate could be summarized between intergovernmentalist perspectives that stress the predominance of the member states in the decision-making process (Moravcsik 1994; 1998; 1999) and institutionalist approaches that emphasize the importance oF the supranational institutions, namely the Commission. For the later, the Commission has frequently been the central political driver oF the EU (Nugent 2000: 6; Drake 2000b: 235; Nugent 2001: 203; Cisotta 2013: 1). Even though the Commission is well positioned to exercise a range of Formal and informal roles with impact in the EU integration, in the literature on the Financial and economic crisis the institution and its President came across as secondary players. The numerous meetings oF the Heads oF State and Government attracted media attention and there was an almost generalized perception that some national leaders (namely Chancellor Angela Merkel) captured political decisions. Accordingly, the main Focus oF the crisis literature has been on member states. The intergovernmental approach experienced a major comeback, namely in the Form oF the so-called “new intergovernmentalism” (Puetter 2011; bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015). Several analyses confirmed that during the Eurozone crisis the European Council became the principal decision-maker and has assumed several roles that traditionally belonged to the Commission, namely agenda-setting, coordination and brokering deals (Ondarza 2011; Puetter 2012; Beach 2013; Fabbrini 2013, 2014; De Schoutheete and Micossi 2013). As a consequence, the Commission was relegated to an ancillary part. However, such an intergovernmental Focus risks ignoring a potentially very important actor. In Fact the Commission has the opportunity and arguably the responsibility to provide leadership and, expectably, it represents the Union as a whole. Indeed, the EU treaties assign the Commission diFFerent tasks and powers that include initiating, supervising and implementing EU policy. Being entrusted with the crucial duty oF promoting the “general interest” of the EU, the Commission has a normative Function that is particularly relevant to Further integration, especially in times of crisis. There are, however, very Few analyses Focusing speciFically on the Commission’s role and its impact on the responses agreed to manage the crisis1. This paper aims to Fill this gap by asking what was 269 Volume 11, Issue 3 (2015) jcer.net Isabel Camisão the role of the Commission in the economic and financial crisis. Did the Commission influence the solutions agreed by the member states? The central hypothesis of this paper is that the Commission actually played an important role in the crisis response. METHODOLOGY This article examines the European Commission’s main activities to cope with the crisis (mainly between 2008 and 2013) and their input on the solutions actually agreed by member states. I am particularly interested in seeing whether the Commission was able to use its resources to help shaping crisis response, in a domain that is still chieFly intergovernmental. The Focus oF the study thus is the Commission’s actions. However, the interplay with other actors is also considered. In order to assess the Commission’s role in the crisis response process I have Focused on European institutions crisis-related official documents, namely proposals, conclusions of meetings, resolutions, and speeches From the Commission, the European Council, the Council, and the European Parliament (EP). Since the oFFicial documents oF the diFFerent institutions normally are not per se indicative oF their difFerent positions, I also relied on press releases From the Commission and the Council. As regards speciFically the Commission’s documents I have tried to determine, among other aspects, when the Commission started to refer to the management of the crisis as a priority, what role the Commission attributed to itself in the crisis response, and what the proposed solutions were. In doing so I have taken into consideration not only the crisis-related content of the diverse documents, but also the regularity of the Commission’s proposals, and how oFten these proposals were in Fact requested by the other institutions. I acknowledge the difFiculties oF analysing the Commission’s inFluence. In Fact, if providing an indicative list oF the activities that the Commission is expected to perform in order to check which actions the institution actually perFormed is a relatively straightForward exercise, measuring the Commission’s influence raises a number of methodological diFFiculties. The Fact that the Commission could be (and has been at diFFerent times) an influential actor in the decision-making process is not in dispute. but, in a complex, multi-layered, multi-actor negotiation Forum such as the EU who inFluences and who is inFluenced along the process is an idea always sharply challenged. My purpose though is not to establish which actor was more influent, but if and how the Commission was able to inFluence the crisis response. In the next section I put Forward a Framework For the analysis oF the Commission’s role in the crisis response, by summarizing the expected Commission Functions (emphasising the ones related to leadership) and the resources that the institution could use to inFluence decision-making. In the following section, I trace the Commission’s activities in order to see iF and how the Commission has used its resources in the crisis response. Although this analysis only focuses on the economic governance dimension, it is here important to note that the Commission’s strategy to deal with the crisis, as presented in the institution’s oFFicial documents, lied in Fact in a two-tiered response: reinforced financial markets supervision and stronger economic policy coordination on the one hand, and the strengthening of the Single Market2 to increase competitiveness and boost economic growth on the other. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The EU has become a polity in its own right (Peterson and bomberg 1999; Hix 2005; 2008) with a complex multi-level system oF governance, which means that it involves a cluster oF actors all with an interest or stake in a given EU policy sector and with the capacity to influence the final 270 Volume 11, Issue 3 (2015) jcer.net Isabel Camisão agreement. Thus, EU decision-making arises From interinstitutional bargaining (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 8). The literature on European Integration generally oFFers two alternative views oF the Commission’s role in the decision-making process: an intergovernmentalist one that portrays the Commission as an institution that serves the Functional needs oF member states (Moravcsik 1993; 1995; 1998; HoFFmann 1966; Grieco 1995); and a supranationalist one that acknowledges the Commission’s ability to provide leadership and, therefore, to inFluence the course oF European integration, namely by using its Formal monopoly on the right of initiative (Coombes 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Arguably these two opposing positions encapsulate the ambiguity of the Commission’s hybrid essence, being simultaneously a bureaucracy and a political body capable oF wielding inFluence beyond the strict control of member states. Indeed, even though the Commission reveals many of the features of a “traditional bureaucracy”, it is also intended to be a source oF political leadership (Coombes 1970: 102). The Commission therefore perForms several Functions that are substantially diFFerent in type (ranging From the bureaucratic to the political), each granting the institution
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