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Philosophie antique Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages 19 | 2019 L’épicurisme antique Édition électronique URL : https://journals.openedition.org/philosant/3013 DOI : 10.4000/philosant.3013 ISSN : 2648-2789 Éditeur Éditions Vrin Édition imprimée Date de publication : 31 octobre 2019 ISBN : 978-2-7574-2534-3 ISSN : 1634-4561 Référence électronique Philosophie antique, 19 | 2019, « L’épicurisme antique » [En ligne], mis en ligne le 31 octobre 2020, consulté le 24 mai 2021. URL : https://journals.openedition.org/philosant/3013 ; DOI : https://doi.org/ 10.4000/philosant.3013 Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 24 mai 2021. La revue Philosophie antique est mise à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International. 1 Ce numéro rassemble des recherches récentes sur l'épicurisme. Ses principaux représentants antiques sont abordés : Epicure, Lucrèce, Philodème. Les grands domaines de la doctrine : canonique (rapport entre sensations et vérité), physique (composition de l'âme), éthique et politique (amour, thérapie des émotions), pédagogie (résumés de la doctrine). Les échanges et débats avec d'autres philosophies antiques sont abordés par trois articles (Aristote et son école, néoplatonisme et néopythagorisme). Philosophie antique, 19 | 2019 2 SOMMAIRE Epicurus on the false belief that sense-impressions conflict James Warren La tetrapharmakos, formule authentique ou résumé simpliste de l’éthique épicurienne ? Quelques éléments sur le statut des abrégés et des florilèges dans la pédagogie du Jardin Julie Giovacchini Sexe, amour et politique chez Lucrèce Pierre-Marie Morel Entre peripatos et kepos Le quintum genus aristotélicien chez Cicéron et la quarta natura épicurienne chez Lucrèce Giulia Scalas In search of an epicurean catharsis Epicurus’ treatment of pity and fear Enrico Piergiacomi Ancient Biographies of Pythagoras and Epicurus as Models of the Philosophical Life Dominic J. O’Meara Comptes rendus André LAKS, The Concept of Presocratic Philosophy. Its Origins, Development and Significance, translated by Glenn Most Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford 2018, 152 p., ISBN pb 978-0-69119-148-5 / E-book 978-1-40088-791-0. Roberta Ioli Jaap MANSFELD, Studies in early Greek philosophy : a collection of papers and one review Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2018 (Philosophia antiqua, volume 151), IX-428 p., ISBN 978-90-04-38205-3 Mathilde Brémond Mathilde BRÉMOND, Lectures de Mélissos. Édition, traduction et interprétation des témoignages sur Mélissos de Samos Berlin/Boston, Walter De Gruyter, 2019 (Studia Praesocratica), 595 p., ISBN 978-3-11-054288-2. Benjamin Harriman Lorenzo FERRONI, Arnaud MACÉ (éd.), Platon : Ion Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2018 (Commentario, 11), LXIV + 187 p., ISBN 978-2-25144-828-2 Carlotta Capuccino Chad JORGENSON, The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018 (Cambridge Classical Studies), 217 p., ISBN 978-1-107-17412-2 Olivier Renaut L. BRISSON & O. RENAUT (éd.), Érotique et politique chez Platon. Erôs, genre et sexualité dans la cité platonicienne Sankt Augustin, 2017 (Academia Philosophical Studies, 58), 276 p., ISBN 978-3-89665-725-1 Sandrine Alexandre Francesca PENTASSUGLIO, Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze Turhout, Brepols (Paperback), 2017, 672 p., ISBN 978-2-503-57774-6. Claudia Mársico David LEFEBVRE, Dynamis. Sens et genèse de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2018 (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), 607 p., ISBN 978-2-7116-2765-3 Fabienne Baghdassarian Philosophie antique, 19 | 2019 3 Andrea FALCON & David LEFEBVRE (éd.), Aristotle’s Generation of Animals : A Critical Guide Cambridge / New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018 (Cambridge Critical Guides), xiv-288 p., ISBN 978-1-107-13293-1 Claire Louguet Diana QUARANTOTTO, L’universo senza spazio. Aristotele e la teoria del luogo Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2017 (Elenchos, 64), 279 p., ISBN 978-88-7088-648-1 Annick Stevens Esther ROGAN, La Stasis dans la politique d’Aristote. La cité sous tension Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2018 (Les Anciens et les Modernes. Études de philosophie, 30), 430 p., ISBN 978-2-406-06225-7 Pierre Ponchon Enrico PIERGIACOMI, Storia delle antiche teologie atomiste Roma, Sapienza Università Editrice, 2017 (Collana Studi e Ricerche, 64), 431 p., ISBN 978-88-9377-040-8 Giulia Scalas Simone VEZZOLI, Arcesilao di Pitane. L’origine del platonismo neoaccademico Turnhout, Brepols, 2016 (Philosophie hellénistique et romaine), 300 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55029-9 Thomas Bénatouïl Jula WILDBERGER, The Stoics and the State. Theory – Practice – Context Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2018 (Staatsverständnisse, 105), 263 p., ISBN 978-3-8487-2843-5 Christelle Veillard Anthony A. LONG, How to Be Free: An Ancient Guide to the Stoic Life. Epictetus: Encheiridion and Selections from Discourses, trad. et introd. A. A. Long Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2018, 232 p., ISBN 978-0-6911-7771-7 Rodolphe Le Penru A. GIAVATTO & R. MULLER (éd.), Julien l’Empereur, Contre les Galiléens, texte, introduction, traduction et notes Paris, 2018 (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques), 248 p., ISBN 978-2-7116-2759-2 Marie-Odile Boulnois Frédéric FAUQUIER, Le Parménide au miroir des platonismes. Logique-Ontologie- Théologie Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2018 (Collection d'études anciennes. Série grecque, 157), 546 p., ISBN 978-2-251-44827-5 Gwenaëlle Aubry Fulvia DE LUISE (éd.), Cittadinanza. Inclusi ed esclusi tra gli antichi e i moderni Trento, Università degli Studi di Trento, 2018 (Studi e Ricerche, 17), 297 p., ISBN 978-88-8443-798-3 Étienne Helmer R. GOULET (éd.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, VI. De Sabinillus à Tyrsénos ; VII. D’Ulpien à Zoticus Paris, CNRS éditions, 2016, 1330 p., ISBN 978-2-271-08989-2 et 2018, 1472 p., ISBN 978-2-271-09024-9. Pierre Pontier Bulletin bibliographique Bulletin Bibliographique Philosophie antique, 19 | 2019 4 Epicurus on the false belief that sense-impressions conflict James Warren An early version of this paper was presented in Cambridge to the 2016 BPPA Masterclass : Perception and Perceptual Appearances in Ancient Philosophy. I would like to thank all the participants for their comments and, in particular, Cristóbal Zarzar for organising the conference and inviting me to speak. It also benefited from helpful comments from Thomas Bénatouïl and the journal’s referee. 1 1 Epicurus says that all sense-impressions are true and that all of our general concepts are based on these sense-impressions.1 But some people believe that some sense- impressions are false. More worryingly, some people even go on to base various wild epistemological and metaphysical theories on the conviction that not all sense- impressions are true. My question for the Epicureans, therefore, is : Why would anyone ever come to form such a belief and do so, what is more, on the basis of true perceptions on which—so the Epicureans say—all reason depends (Diogenes Laertius, 10.32) ? Although I will concentrate on this particular question about the formation of false beliefs about perceptions on the basis of true perceptions, there is also a similar question in the case of values which I will not pursue here, namely : the Epicureans are clear that we all are equipped with the ability to detect unerringly what is good and what is bad since the pathe of pleasure and pain are criteria of truth. The question arises : why is it that anyone should ever come to think that some pleasures are bad or that something other than pleasure is good ? Again, there must be some explanation that accounts for such errors given that the Epicureans insist that our basic apparatus both for perceiving how things are and also for perceiving what is good and bad is always truth-telling.2 2 One way to diagnose the error that generates these unfortunate mistakes is to look for reasons why people might come to think, for example, that a given sense-impression may be false. Most commonly, arguments that attempt to show this are based on cases Philosophie antique, 19 | 2019 5 of purported perceptual conflict.3 If there are two sense-impressions that are in conflict then, of course, it cannot be the case that both of them are true. There is no need to determine which of the conflicting sense-impressions is not true because the conflict alone is sufficient to show that at least one of them must be. So we can imagine that occasionally people come to hold the false opinion that the two members of a pair of sense-impressions are in conflict and that therefore at least one of the impressions must be false. This is sufficient to show that not all our sense-impressions can be relied upon. Various forms of what we might label scepticism but ancient sceptics like the Pyrrhonists and Academics might think of as a form of ‘negative dogmatism’ may then emerge from the conviction that our senses cannot be relied upon for truths about the world around us. Perhaps all of them are false. Or perhaps some of them are true but it is impossible to ascertain which of them are true and which are false. Either way, these thinkers will begin with an initial conviction that sense-impressions may be in conflict with one another and end with a generally negative assessment of our senses as useful sources of truths about the world. When they go on to form these disastrous general metaphysical and epistemological views and even—heaven forbid—become sceptics of some kind or other, therefore, it may often be in part because of their being convinced of the possibility of such conflicts. 3 Then we might ask : why would anyone ever come to have the opinion that there are cases of perceptual conflict of this kind ? The problem of conflicting appearances cannot even begin, we might say, unless it is plausible that there might be such conflicts. Perhaps more precisely, the problem of conflicting appearances can begin only if it seems reasonable ever to hold the opinion that two sense-impressions are in fact in conflict.

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