Small Country, Big Player

Small country, big player

The Netherlands and synthetic drugs over the past 50 years Small country, big player

The Netherlands and synthetic drugs over the past 50 years

Pieter Tops Judith van Valkenhoef Edward van der Torre Luuk van Spijk

Politieacademie Apeldoorn 2019 Contents

1 Introduction 6 1.1 Central questions 7 1.2 Perspective 8 1.3 Structure of the document 9

2 A synthetic drugs network in action 11 2.1 The network’s working method 11 2.2 The preparations: chemicals, hardware and locations 16 2.3 The production 20 2.4 The aftermath: cleaning up and distribution 23

3 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs 27 3.1 Limited information 28 3.2 What is available? 30 3.3 Early-stage seizures 31 3.4 Seizure rate 33 3.5 The wholesale turnover 35 3.6 Trade Proceeds 36 3.7 Share of Dutch criminals 39 3.8 Conclusion 40

4 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands 42 4.1 ‘The King of Speed’: the emergence of amphetamine 42 4.2 Can you feel it?!: the emergence of ecstasy 44 4.3 The Netherlands as a source country 47 4.4 Intensifying the action 49 4.5 Meanwhile in synthetic drugs circles 58 4.6 The Netherlands Police: further fragmentation 60 4.7 Conclusion 63

5 The original Brabant-Limburg synthetic drugs criminals 65 5.1 From brute force to synthetic drugs 65 5.2 From small-time criminals to top criminals 70 5.3 Conclusion 81

Small country, Big Player 4 Contents

6 The national and international arenas 82 6.1 The United Nations conventions 83 6.2 The EU precursor regulations 85 6.3 Three arenas 89 6.4 The relationship with China 93 6.5 Complexity 98 6.6 Conclusion: a double battle 100

7 The top X and beyond 101 7.1 A top 35 101 7.2 Why does a Brabant-Limburg top 35 emerge? 103 7.3 Beyond the top X 109 7.4 Conclusion 114

8 Barriers and criminal innovation 115 8.1 The barrier model 115 8.2 PMK: substitute raw materials 117 8.3 BMK: substitute raw materials 118 8.4 The disillusion: criminal innovation 120 8.5 Break with the established system 128 8.6 Conclusion 129

9 Organized anarchy 131 9.1 ‘Lack of organization’ as strength 131 9.2 An eye-opener: the Party King 133 9.3 The situation as described by a criminal 136 9.4 Conclusion 140

10 Criminal flows 141 10.1 Raw materials and chemicals 141 10.2 The production process 144 10.3 Transport and smuggling 153 10.4 Financial flows 156 10.5 Conclusion 160

11 Violence 161 11.1 Why synthetic drugs violence remained limited for a long time 161 11.2 Violence as a public problem 168 11.3 Conclusion 172

Small country, Big Player 5 Contents

12 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use 173 12.1 Ecstasy and the dance culture 173 12.2 Monitoring the drugs market in the Netherlands 174 12.3 Effects and risks of psychostimulants 176 12.4 Use and developments of psychostimulants in the Netherlands 182 12.5 Acute incidents with psychostimulants 188 12.6 Conclusion 192

13 Concluding observations: a painful balance 194 13.1 The scope 194 13.2 The system 200 13.3 The approach 202 13.4 Conclusion: why the Netherlands? 206

The twelve most important findings 210

Appendix 1 Notes on the search for the unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs 213

Appendix 2 Overview of synthetic drugs seized in the Netherlands in 2017 227

List of abbreviations 244

Literature and documents 246

Conversations overview 251

Supervisory committee 253

About the authors 254

Small country, Big Player Introduction1 1

International studies have shown that the Netherlands has a questionable reputation as a source country of synthetic drugs. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), for instance, reports that criminal groups from the Netherlands and Belgium are the main producers and traffickers in the field of synthetic drugs in Europe (2016, p.126). Produc- tion of amphetamine (speed) in Europe mainly takes place in Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland, while MDMA (ecstasy) production is concentrated in Belgium and the Netherlands (EMCDDA, 2017, p. 29-31). In addition, much of the production in Belgium and Poland takes place under the direction or supervision of Dutch nationals (crime-as-a-service).

Other international reports present a similar picture. Europol’s 2017 Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) mentions the Netherlands as: – main producer of MDMA and amphetamine, together with Belgium; – main producer of and distribution hub for cannabis; – main entry point for cocaine in the EU, together with Belgium and Spain; – main entry point and distribution hub for heroin.

In other words, the Netherlands is not just a worldwide leader in the production of MDMA and amphetamine, but is also the hub where various other drugs flows come together. This is why the Netherlands can be considered the main European logistical hub for cross-border drugs trafficking. The charts appended to the SOCTA report clearly illustrate the Netherlands’ pivotal role.

More than ever, this message appears to sink in in the Netherlands. At the International Drugs Enforcement Conference (IDEC) held in the Netherlands in 2018, which is a joint project of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Netherlands Police, F. Grapperhaus, Minister of Justice and Security, stated in his opening speech that he was fully aware of the embarrassing Dutch position in the international list of drugs producing countries. As far as we know, no other minister or state secretary has ever made such a statement.

1 This report was published at the same time as an abbreviated analysis. This analysis, The Netherlands and synthetic drugs: an inconvenient truth, is based on the underlying report, but can be read independently, and includes an interpretation of the facts. To be found at www.politieacademie.nl/syntheticdrugs.

Small country, Big Player 7 Introduction

Figure 1.1 Clockwise, starting from the top left: SOCTA charts indicating the prominent role of the Netherlands in synthetic drugs, cannabis, heroin and cocaine, respectively (source: Europol, 2017, slightly edited).

Main producers Export / Main destinations

Amphetamine SYNTHETIC DRUGS AND CANNABIS HERB NEW PSYCHOACTIVE MDMA SUBSTANCES distribution

NETHERLANDS Main distribution hub

CZECH REP. NETHERLANDS Distribution hub POLAND BELGIUM

to UNITED STATES to AUSTRALto AUSTRALIA IA

ALBANIA Main source

SOURCE: EMCDDA & EUROPOL EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT 2016 SOURCE: EMCDDA & EUROPOL EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT 2016

NOR COCAINE Main entry points in the EU THERN ROUTE HEROIN distribution NETHERLANDS distribution CAUCASUS ROUTE BELGIUM

SPAIN AFGHANISTAN BALKAN ROUTE Main producer

PAKISTAN Main producer

COLOMBIA 2016 T R EP O R

SOUTHERN ROUTE S T MA RK E

PERU G U R D U U E L O

Main producers BOLIVIA P O R EU & A D D EM C : E C R U O

SOURCE: EMCDDA & EUROPOL EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT 2016 S

1.1 Central questions

In this report we focus on synthetic drugs, with an emphasis on amphetamine and MDMA (ecstasy), but we also pay attention to New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). It is based on three central question: 1. What is a plausible and credible estimate of the minimum scope of synthetic drugs production and trafficking in the Netherlands, both in terms of persons involved and financial turnover?

Small country, Big Player 8 Introduction

2. How does the synthetic drugs system operate:2 who does what, what raw materials are required, where do they come from, what are the mutual relationships in criminal circles, and what developments have been identified? What is the international dimension of the system? 3. What do we know about the effectiveness of the approach to and fight against the phenomenon? What appears to work, what doesn’t?

In the course of the study, a new question came to the fore: how can it be that since the 1980s, the Netherlands has been playing such a prominent role in the worldwide production of synthetic drugs?

The world of synthetic drugs has local and international aspects. Take, for instance, the production of synthetic drugs, for which the raw materials are shipped in from all over the world, particularly the precursors BMK and PMK and their preprecursors, mainly originate in China and Southeast Asia. Or the final product – the pills and sometimes powders or crystals – shipped to countries all over the world, within Europe mainly to Scandinavia, Spain and Great Britain, but also to Australia, Turkey, Southeast Asia and the United States of America. The Netherlands is often the place where the various flows meet.

At first sight, this is a logistically cumbersome and complex process in which many things can go wrong. And things do indeed go wrong in the sense that raw materials or final products are sometimes intercepted, but apparently production in the Netherlands and Belgium is still lucrative. There are reasons for this, and for the long-standing prominent position of the Netherlands; both key elements in our analysis.

1.2 Perspective

This report was written from an investigative point of view, with the development of enforcement and investigation with respect to synthetic drugs in the Netherlands as central perspective. Of course there are other perspectives that we will describe: a health perspective – the influence of synthetic drugs on public health – an economic perspective – what is the effect of synthetic drugs and the fight against them on the legal economy – and a diplomatic perspective – the consequences of synthetic drugs for the international position and the international reputation of the Netherlands. All these perspectives are important and have their own relevance, but our analysis focusses on the investigative relevance is its starting point.

2 In this study we will sometimes use this abbreviated form of the subject – syndru system instead of synthetic drugs system, syndru crime instead of synthetic drugs crime, etc.

Small country, Big Player 9 Introduction

The report was drawn up at the request of the various authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of synthetic drugs crime: the Central Unit of the Netherlands Police (CU), the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) and the Brabant-Zeeland Taskforce (BZT). There was a supervisory Committee, the composition of which is presented in Appendix 5. The researchers were free to the set up and carry out of the study as they saw fit. The study was conducted in the research time of the Police Academy and Tilburg University, without direct funding from third parties.

The study is largely based on document analysis and in-depth interviews; for calculation of the financial turnover in the world of synthetic drugs (Chapter 3), we used source data from the Dutch Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), the Customs Service, and the Police. The study provides a critical overview of the information and knowledge about the world of synthetic drugs available in the Netherlands, identifies cohesion, and creates overview. It also identifies inadequacies and blind spots.

The study was conducted between February 2017 and May 2018, and was supported by persons who were, in one way or another, involved in the world of synthetic drugs, as part of their work for the police, the PPS, the FIOD, the Customs Service, the ministries, and other organizations, such as the Bra- bant-Zeeland Regional Information and Expertise Centre (RIEC). With many of them we had long consultations and interviews. We also extensively interviewed various persons from criminal circles involved in synthetic drugs – a total of four persons, one of whom several times. On condition of anonymity they were willing to share their insights into the ins and outs of the criminal world of synthetic drugs. For that reason, the condition of anonymity also applied to most people from the legal world.

At the end of the book, an overview will be provided of the documents and literature consulted, and the interviews conducted.

1.3 Structure of the document

The report is based on extensive analysis of the history and workings of the world of synthetic drugs. It outlines the operations in this world through a description of a fictitious, though realistic, network in Chapter 2, and, in Chapter 3, offers an estimate of its financial turnover that is as accurate as possible. The two following chapters give a more historical point of view, also providing relevant conclusions about the current situation: Chapter 4 contains a brief history of amphetamine and ecstasy, and the fight against these drugs in the Netherlands, while Chapter 5 zooms in on the emergence

Small country, Big Player 10 Introduction

of synthetic drugs criminals in the provinces of Limburg and North Brabant. Chapter 6 sheds light on the national and international arenas connected with synthetic drugs, especially the field of forces in which decisions are made about attempts to limit and reduce the phenomenon. Chapter 7 to 11 are dedicated to the most important recent developments in synthetic drugs-related criminal circles. These chapters will discuss the expansion of the criminal ‘top X’ in these circles, which now exceeds the traditional synthetic drugs criminals from the provinces of North Brabant and Limburg (Chapter 7), the capacity for innovation in criminal circles (Chapter 8), the organized anarchy in these circles, where the barrier model must be supplemented by the ‘flows model’ (Chapter 9), the characteristics of these flows and main developments in this field (Chapter 10), and the role of violence in criminal synthetic drugs circles (Chapter 11). We will subsequently briefly discuss the use of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands (Chapter 12), as described by employees of Trimbos Institute; the Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and Addiction, and take stock in the final chapter. We will then list the twelve main findings of the study.

Finally: of course this book describes the history and workings of a specific criminal phenomenon. But while writing it, we gradually felt that it amounts to more than this alone. In a sense, the report also describes a history of the Netherlands seen through lens of synthetic drugs production. This history tells us much about ‘who we are’, about the essential features of the Nether lands, and about what we consider to be important and admissible. It also sheds light on the position of the Netherlands in the international field of forces. In this context, the Netherlands is no more than a small country, but it is a big player when it comes to specific activities. A much more extensive role than one would expect given its size. This especially applies to the trafficking in and production of synthetic drugs.

Small country, Big Player A synthetic drugs network in action 2

Introduction This chapter provides insight into the world of synthetic drugs production. How are synthetic drugs produced: Who are involved? What goods and resources are required? How does the logistics process work? What modi operandi do synthetic drugs producers use?

To gain insight into, a view of, and feeling for this complex matter, we will describe a fictitious, but realistic, synthetic drugs network. The information the description is based on derives from legal cases and interviews with professionals, and respondents from criminal circles. The quotations printed in italics come from these interviews.

2.1 The network’s working method

Kees1 was born in Breda, and has been a major player on the synthetic drugs market since the 1990s. Originally, his father was a butter smuggler, who later applied himself to the illegal distilling of alcohol, and switched to amphetamine production by the end of the 1970s. This is how son Kees learned about amphetamine production. When the mind-expanding substance MDMA not only became highly popular, but also illegal by the end of the 1980s, he switched to the production of MDMA; the substance required for the production of ecstasy pills.

Kees has access to the accumulated illegal family fortunes, the smuggling expertise built up, and the criminal contacts. He uses this to gain control of all steps of the production and trafficking of amphetamine and MDMA, or in other words, the entire chain: from importing the chemicals to producing and trafficking the synthetic drugs. In the Netherlands, he manages several amphetamine and MDMA labs.

‘The criminal entrepreneurs are especially active in the South of the Netherlands, and are involved in logistical processes on a daily basis. All day long they are busy sustaining their criminal enterprises: arranging funding, finding the right person for the job, etc. (…) The actual activities take place far away from them, which makes them ellusive. ’

1 At the end of this chapter you will find a list of the people involved and their roles in the drugs network.

Small country, Big Player 12 A synthetic drugs network in action

Export Kees sells some of his stuff in the Netherlands, but export to other countries is the most lucrative option. He does business with drugs criminals from Spain, the US, the UK, and Australia, though he barely speaks anything but Dutch. He usually works through agents, but he sometimes engages in direct contact. Export requires an extensive and complicated logistical process, in which Kees cooperates with many others. But he is the linchpin. Kees prefers MDMA, because its profit margin is much higher than that of amphetamine. But he is also involved in the large-scale production of amphetamine.

The process starts with the import of chemicals from source countries like China and Poland, and the purchase of production vessels and other hardware. Then locations must be found and furnished and ‘cooks’ must be hired for the production of the drugs. Finally, the drugs waste must be discharged or dumped, and products must, of course, be sold to national or international buyers.

We will give you two examples of Kees’ business: an ecstasy order and an amphetamine order.

John, drugs dealer and business partner from Australia, wants to buy two million ecstasy pills. Orders from Australia are immensely lucrative, as production costs in the Netherlands are €0.20 per pill, while the Australian user pays about 27 Australian dollar for a pill. How much of the profit flows into his own pockets is a secret Kees keeps close to his heart. He not only receives the wholesale price of €0.60, but, as linchpin, also receives an unknown amount for organization and transport.

James, an acquaintance from the UK, also requires Kees’ services. In the near future, he wants to have 200 litres of amphetamine oil at his disposal. Ini- tially, the wholesale price, i.e. the price of the drugs immediately after production in the labs, is €240,000, but for this, too, Kees receives more money, also because the buyer is in a hurry.

‘How do you decide what you will produce? That depends on the demand from abroad: from the UK, Australia, the US, Spain.’

‘Everything is based on demand. There is no such thing as a large stash where they store the pills year in, year out, waiting for things to happen.’

Now that the deals have been concluded, Kees needs to arrange certain things. He can immediately start the production of MDMA. Kees can obtain the raw materials via his network, and Hans, his wife’s cousin, is his main cook, who

Small country, Big Player 13 A synthetic drugs network in action

also arranges a production location. Until a few years ago, Hans worked for a chemical company at a large industrial estate in Limburg. He has a senior secondary vocational education degree in chemistry and process technology. After his divorce he hit financial rock bottom. Kees then lent Hans a hand. Not without self-interest, because unlike the production of amphetamine, the production of MDMA requires a degree of expertise to accurately complete the process without wasting any chemicals. So he can put Hans’ chemical experience to good use.

Kees has another right hand for the production of amphetamine. He is called David, and arranges the cooks, the locations and the raw materials for him. Until recently, Johan was his main cook for amphetamine production, but Johan died, together with an assistant. One of them lit a cigarette in the lab, which made the lab blow up. They were bunglers, which is not unusual in this business.

David’s criminal contacts lead him to cooks Dobry and Marcin. They are frequently hired by criminal groups to produce amphetamine, which, by the way, is not all that complicated. David does not have a bond of trust with Dobry and Marcin, but needs must. David knows Polish nationals for their strong work ethic and discretion. In addition, Marcin – a boxer with a violent reputation, and member of a criminal motor gang – will keep an eye on the new cooks.

‘Ecstasy is a difficult process that you cannot learn in the blink of an eye. You will need real lab technicians. You cannot simply do it yourself; it’s not like whipping up some amphetamine. It is work for a lab technician, involving several production stages. ’

‘There are sloppy cooks, good cooks, some are bunglers some are not. There is a lot of variety. The recipe has fixed proportions. The yield will not always be the same for everyone. In general, cooks know the proportions of the chemicals, but some fail to boil them for long enough, there is spillage, do not let the oil settle for long enough when washing, throwing out half of it.’

The production process of synthetic drugs For the large MDMA order from Australia, Hans needs to fully train two new assistant cooks: Ad and Chiel. Neither of them has ever obtained a diploma, both have an extensive criminal record, and Ad has a drugs addiction. It is a challenge to teach them how to produce MDMA, but Hans will receive a percentage of the production for his efforts.

‘People should be available who know how to do it and can train others. Some- times we even find the stages of the production process on a beer coaster.’

Small country, Big Player 14 A synthetic drugs network in action

‘He taught young guys how to get things going, and then received 30% for it.’

At the start of the MDMA training, Hans explains to his two pupils in simple terms how MDMA works and what the purpose of the various chemicals is.2 His two apprentices, both resident in Limburg, are big fans of Roda JC football club. In his explanation, Hans makes use of this fact, as it may help them to better understand what he is saying.

Say Roda JC wins the premier league! The fans will then experience an intense feeling of happiness, which in itself is a natural process. The reward centre in the brain sends messages via your nerve cells to your spinal cord. These messages are passed along via so-called neurotransmitters; the messengers of the brain. These messengers include adrenaline, dopamine, and serotonin. When they are released, they send a specific impulse to the brain. This impulse fits like a key in the lock of the reward centre in the brain. The lock springs and a blissful feeling comes over you.

If Roda JC does not win the premier league, yet you wish to experience similar feelings, you can use an artificial product. This product should resemble the key that fits the lock of your reward system in the brain. In MDMA, this feeling is created by the combination of the basic raw materials PMK and a pnictogen. PMK ensures that the key fits the lock of the reward system in the brain. But the key is not turned yet; this requires the pnictogen. To achieve this, the basic substance must be combined with a few essential chemicals in the lab. This is called synthesis. Together they form the pnictogen, which makes the lock in the brain spring. The door to the reward system opens, which leads to the release of neurotransmitters. This is what causes the feeling of bliss.

Ad and Chiel obediently nod their heads. They may get it, but there is no guarantee. What they do remember is that synthesis between two substances is required for the production of ecstasy: a basic raw material and an essential chemical.

The substances required for the production of synthetic drugs differ, depending on the final product. The basic raw material is called a precursor. Essential chemicals are substances that are linked to this precursor during synthesis. In addition, ‘other’ chemicals are needed for the production process, such as solvents and acids, which enable the various production stages. These chemicals are more easily available and can be substituted.

2 You will find a more technical description in Chapter 12.

Small country, Big Player 15 A synthetic drugs network in action

Table 2.1 Chemicals required for MDMA and amphetamine

precursor + essential chemical = finished product PMK + methylamine = MDMA BMK + formamide = amphetamine

The precursor for MDMA is PMK; for amphetamine this is BMK. BMK has a number of legal applications and is, for instance, a raw material for the production of rat poison and essential oils. To a lesser extent, this is also the case for PMK. Worldwide there are only a few universities that need tiny quantities of PMK for research purposes. In addition, there is a legal application in the perfume industry. The substance has no other legal applications. The production of PMK and BMK takes place at chemical plants in China, and previously in Russia. These substances have been included in the list of registered substances because of the risk of abuse.3 This means that possession and marketing of these substances is subject to strict rules.4

Kees still remembers clearly that China and Russia, two important source countries, started to tighten up checks around 2007 and 2008. The effects were visible over the subsequent years: for a long time there was a shortage of basic raw materials, which cost him a lot of money. Without these precursors, production of amphetamine or MDMA was impossible, and there was a serious dip in production, especially of ecstasy.

But Dutch criminals were sure to find more than one hole to creep out of, and so was Kees. Soon he, in cooperation with Chinese contacts, was able to obtain preprecursors. A preprecursor is the basis for a precursor, and, by adding acid, can easily be converted into the precursor itself.

This discovery had major consequences. An extra stage in the production process was developed, the conversion stage, which produces large quantities of waste. In addition, preprecursors were much cheaper than the original precursors, which only increases the profitability of the illegal drugs production. Their availability is practically unlimited, which meant the shortage of precursors is as good as over. And for the authorities, all these new substances – there are numerous options – are harder to check than the traditional PMK and BMK. As a result, production was back at the former level after a few

3 Chapter 4 will discuss this in more detail. 4 Marketing should be taken to include: production, storage, processing, distribution, trade brokerage, and import and export (Customs Service, 2018).

Small country, Big Player 16 A synthetic drugs network in action

years – and maybe even higher – and even more money was made, also by Kees. A new specialization entered the scene: criminals who solely focus on the import and conversion of preprecursors.

‘There were a couple of smart guys who thought let’s turn the preprecursor APAAN into BMK, together with the Chinese. One of them initiated it and six months later everyone had figured it out, and they started ordering these preprecursors themselves. Maybe it emerged in the press at some stage or they talked to each other in prison.’

‘We didn’t realize this would have major consequences for the production of ecstasy and amphetamine, for instance. The substitutes and replacements of BMK and PMK have only increased the problem. Extra stages have been added to the production process.’

For Kees, this development means that he can professionalize his lab activities. He can buy cheaper and therefore produce more. His labs are better equipped. They are no longer the shabby shacks you see on TV. He does experience more competition from producers in small labs, however, who order their supplies via the Internet in China and sometimes put their products on the market at too low a price. This bothers Kees at times: he scornfully calls them one-man businesses or kamikaze pilots.

2.2 The preparations: chemicals, hardware and locations

Obtaining the chemicals for amphetamine For BMK, the raw material he needs for amphetamine production, Kees is able to get back into business fairly soon, as huge quantities of APAAN are imported from China. This preprecursor is converted into BMK in the Nether- lands, which is extremely profitable. When APAAN became a listed substance in 2013, its successor had already been developed. The substance in question was APAA5, which sufficiently deviates from its predecessor to be a new substance in chemical and legal terms.

So Kees starts the import of APAA from China. His right hand David is in contact with Andrezej, who runs a chemicals route from Poland, where he uses a cleaning business as a front. This is why he can easily order APAA in China, even though the substance has no legal applications. Two friends

5 APAA is an ‘unlisted substance’. This means that it is not registered in legislation and regulations as a substance for drugs production. It is known, however, that the substance is actually used for drugs production, hence the designation ‘unlisted substance’.

Small country, Big Player 17 A synthetic drugs network in action

of Andrezej – Janik and Wiktor – play a logistical role. They transport the APAA from Poland to the Netherlands in a van, as there are no border checks between countries that are party to the Schengen Treaty. Just across the Dutch border, near Groesbeek, Andrezej has an APAA storage location.

‘Of course a part of the chemicals is regulated and is included in the Abuse of Chemical Substances (Prevention) Act (Wvmc). This means that as a criminal you have to call on your network in Belgium, Poland, Bulgaria. APAA is not regulated, and in Bulgaria they order it in bulk from China. Huge quantities of chemicals are bought in Poland. There are plenty of businesses that supply them.’

‘It turned out that a Polish national had set up a chemicals route from Poland. He is a chemicals dealer. He also had a storage location. He ordered the chemicals from a legal company, with the aid of an illegal intermediary; either a company or a person. He simply transported the chemicals in vans from Poland.’

Obtaining chemicals for MDMA To obtain PMK, the precursor for MDMA, Kees is in contact with Jules, a preprecursors dealer from Belgium, who trades in PMK glycidate; the powdered form of PMK. To obtain the substance, Jules frequently flies to Hong Kong, where he has contact with bribed employees of Chinese companies. With the aid of false documents, Jules arranges the transport of PMK glycidate from China to the port of Antwerp. The packaging of the preprecursor then states washing powder, for instance. This is called mislabelling. Jules coordinates the transport of the preprecursors from the port of Antwerp to the Nether- lands. As drivers he hires young guys from his neighbourhood, who can use a little extra pocket money. They receive a Whatsapp message telling them where to pick up a van with false number plates, and where to find the key.

‘Only the driver only knows where to deliver the shipment, but is probably unaware of the organization he works for. It is even doubtful whether he knows what he is transporting.’

In addition to precursors, essential and general chemicals are required, such as methylamine and methanol. These substances often also have legal applications. Wim is one of Kees’ criminal relations, and has a nail wholesale business in Tilburg, which he uses as a cover to transport acetone from a chemical factory in Belgium. Wim deploys André en Stijn, two small-time criminals, to transport the acetone.

Small country, Big Player 18 A synthetic drugs network in action

‘Nothing in this business is black and white. Sometimes a cook purchases the chemicals directly, sometimes via an intermediary. There are various options. Sometimes they are ordered in China.’

Hardware Hardware means production vessels, freezers, jerry cans and other equipment required for the production process. Part of this equipment is easily available on the legal market, such as ovens, hair dryers, freezers, kitchen machines, jerry cans and buckets. Hans, Kees’ main cook, orders Ad and Chiel to buy these items.

‘They have to purchase it all legally. All the legal entrepreneurs earn their share in it. Bins, chemicals, gas cylinders, scales; all these are be bought. All the people supplying them are facilitators; most of them unwittingly.’

Buying equipment that can solely be used for the production of synthetic drugs requires a greater effort. To achieve this, criminals depend on professionals who are capable of manufacturing glassware and production vessels. Kees has been able to find a production vessel manufacturer he can use named Vincent. Vincent is the owner of a boiler fitters company in Best (NL), and did not mind producing one production vessel, at a substantial rate, that would be paid in cash. At least: he thought it was a one-off, but under pressure of Martin, the boxer and member of a criminal motor gang, Vincent unwillingly became part of Kees’ criminal network. By now he has manufactured several production vessels.

‘I think he was put under some pressure. It was a bona fide company. It had a website and looked proper and normal. Technical people indicate that he is a real professional. He does his job well. Firm hand. Why did he consort with such folks and orders?’

‘A production vessel manufacturer worked in a city. Some of his friends were seriously assaulted to pressurize him. Of course the criminals need his craftsmanship. He wanted to quit, because he had been caught.’

Tableting machines are needed to produce ecstasy pills, but these are easily purchased. Hans could order one of these machines himself in China, but it is less risky to order one via a supplier in the Netherlands. He places an order with someone called Noud, whose company imports tableting machines from China. This Noud discovered a while ago that it is legal in the Netherlands to sell tableting machines and that there is a great demand for them among shady characters.

Small country, Big Player 19 A synthetic drugs network in action

‘The tableting machines from China are mainly used in illegal circles. Pharma- ceutical companies do not buy tableting machines in China. It is therefore a separate business for the benefit of synthetic drugs production.’

‘We see tableting machines in all shapes and sizes. We noticed a tendency towards them getting bigger.’

Arranging locations: storage and labs A lab for the production of amphetamine has been furnished in a barn at a farm in Ooij, near Nijmegen (NL). The amphetamine lab is dismantled after every production. Valuable hardware, such as production vessels, are stored in Malden in the shed belonging to Bas, brother of the deceased Johan. The conversion lab where the APAA is converted into BMK is located at a premises on an industrial estate in Wijchen. The premises is registered to Slawomir, Andrezej’s neighbour. Dobry and Marcin, assistant amphetamine cooks, collect the hardware and the chemicals.

‘We sometimes discover stashes for the production, such as glassware, etcetera. They often belong to main cooks, who store their equipment and when there is demand for production, they collect the things from storage, rent a barn, and set up the lab.’

Martin is looking for a suitable location for the production of MDMA. In principle, such a lab can be set up anywhere. Criminals prefer sparsely populated areas, such as industrial estates or farms, because of the strong smell of ani- seed that inevitably develops during the production process. Though not all farmers are equally willing, Martin is always able to convince one farmer or another, applying some pressure where needed. Farmers are facing financial difficulties and are susceptible to the money offered by drugs criminals. For Kees’ lab, Martin arranged an old barn at a farm in Lomm, near Venlo; farmer René has cooperated on earlier occasions.

‘Of course everything is supported by a spiral of violence. This spiral of violence has increased over the past few years. A motor gang passes your house a few times at a very slow pace, and then the farmer definitely won’t protest anymore. Some farmers want to profit from an empty building and make some money. As soon as you protest, they immediately start to threaten you. Farmers think: `maybe they’ll leave in three months’ time and then I’ll keep my mouth shut.’

‘People who think they can make a quick profit without asking too many questions then end up being stuck in a situation they cannot get out of, even if they wanted to.’

Small country, Big Player 20 A synthetic drugs network in action

Ad en Chiel, assistant MDMA cooks, store chemicals and hardware in their homes. Jules, the preprecursors dealer, stores PMK glycidate in a rented lock-up garage and converts it into PMK on site. Hans and his production team set up the MDMA lab in Lomm. As precursors are the most valuable component, they are collected from the conversion lab right before the start of the production process.

‘In the labs or in the stashes we find an abundance of equipment, spare equipment, and general and essential chemicals. Not until they’re ready for use, the precursor is delivered, as this is the most expensive component.’

‘The lab contains everything you need. It is like a chef who is going to prepare a dish. He only puts on the table what he needs, and leaves the rest in the fridge or the larder, or in the freezer. Criminals have a similar working method in the context of risk diversification. The final step is to bring in the raw materials right before the start of the production process. They purchase food for a few days, and their telephones are turned off.’

The production labs are given a front to mislead random passersby. At first sight, the barn appears to be rented to, for instance, a construction company, a car company or a caravan rental. Sometimes criminals build double-walled labs. The labs can be shielded in many different ways. The amphetamine lab in Ooij is equiped with a fake setting of caravans. Farmer René has shielded the MDMA lab by placing divisions.

‘When they rent a warehouse, they themselves put in a roller door, so they can exit the building quickly. This keeps you out of sight. The front is always equipped with a fake setting. The other day in Limburg, there was one where you could see all kinds of curtain fabric samples. The aim is to give the impression of a legal company when an outsider looks in. They always make an effort on the front.’

2.3 The production

Production stages of MDMA For the production of MDMA, Joost is specialized in the reductive amination method.6 The production process consists of a number of stages. The first stage is the synthesis. This involves creating a chemical connection between the precursor PMK and the essential chemical methylamine. The synthesis

6 Amphetamine and MDMA can be produced in various ways. The synthesis criminals use determines the raw materials required.

Small country, Big Player 21 A synthetic drugs network in action

takes place in a single reaction vessel. In this vessel, containing PMK and methylamine, an intermediate product is formed by adding a solvent, such as methanol. Subsequently, a reduction must take place with hydrogen and a catalyst, such as sodium borohydride. The reduction substance reduces the intermediate product to MDMA.

After the synthesis, the MDMA formed must be distilled, as the mixture does not solely consist of MDMA, but also contains the residue of the essential chemical (methylamine) and the solvent methanol. Distillation is a technique to separate substances by means of evaporation. At a specific temperature, the substances methylamine and methanol evaporate from the MDMA. A dark brown oily liquid remains.

This liquid, called MDMA base, needs to be converted into salt. This production stage is called crystallization. During this process, the base is mixed with an acid, hydrochloric acid for instance. First the dark brown oily liquid is diluted with a solvent, such as acetone. Then hydrochloric acid is added to the mixture, resulting in a salt with a low solubility that crystallizes. The crystallization process often takes place in the freezer, because a lower temperature allows for more effective crystallization and a higher yield.

The next stage is filtration. This is a method to separate the pure MDMA crystals from the general chemical (hydrochloric acid). To achieve this, Joost uses a Bűchner funnel, lined with filter paper. Filtration can also be done in other ways, for instance with the aid of tea towels.

What remains are humid crystals. Joost puts these out to dry on a ground sheet. The last stage in the process is pulverization of the dried crystals, reducing the large lumps of MDMA to a fine powder, for which Joost uses kitchen appliances, such as an ice crusher.

‘They do have supplies in store. As there is a risk of being caught, of course they want to ensure that they are not immediately out of business. You won’t find the stash in a lab. The drugs are removed as soon as they are done. Picking them up and taking them somewhere are separate activities. The people doing it don’t even know about each other. You are better off having a stash of basic raw materials than of pills.’

MDMA in powder form is ready for processing. Tableting is the last stage. Kees has a tableting location. At an industrial estate in Etten-Leur (NL), on the first floor of a garage business, are three tableting machines. The space has been insulated, because tableting is a noisy business. Luuk and Frenk are well-known and popular tablet producers. It is a skill they have raised into an

Small country, Big Player 22 A synthetic drugs network in action

art form. During the day they work in the garage; at night they operate the tableting machines.

‘Tableting usually takes place at yet another location, for two reasons. Firstly the diversification of risk, and secondly tableting requires a dry environment and labs are never dry. The more moisture in the pill, the poorer the quality.’

In a concrete mixer, Luuk and Frenk mix the MDMA powder with tableting excipients, such as microcrystalline cellulose, a binding agent also frequently used in legal drugs production. Addition of such agents turns the powder into a solid substance. Frenk also adds red dye to the mixture, because John ordered red ecstasy pills. After mixing, the mixture is ready for tableting. Frenk introduces measured quantities of the mixture into the tableting machines. The machines turn out 40,000 pills an hour. The mixture is sufficient for two million pills. Luuk and Frenk produce the number of ecstasy pills ordered by Kees. If required, they use a punch to add a specific logo. For a long time, the Mitsubishi and the Rolling Stones logos (the one with the tongue) were very popular, but they recently received a request to punch their pills with a Trump portrait. This is fine by them, if a suitable punch is supplied. Finally, they package the ecstasy pills in plastic seal bags, with the aid of a vacuum sealer. Then the pills are ready and can be delivered to the buyer: John.

‘Tableting is a reasonably specialized job. It involves about seven substances that need to mixed in the correct proportions. If you simply throw everything together, you can mix it, but if you throw it into the feeder, it will vibrate, as it is a mechanical process. This will result in separation, like in a spin dryer. The larger particles move to the sides, the smaller ones to the middle. This will result in pills of different proportions, so pills of 80 mg or of 120 mg. Or the result is pills with poor binding, or pills that have become too hard.’

Production stages of amphetamine In the conversion lab in Wijchen, the APAA has been converted into BMK, the precursor of amphetamine. Marcin has transported the BMK to the lab in Ooij. After the hardware is collected from Bas’ shed, and the amphetamine lab in Ooij has been turned fully operational again, the production process is started. Dobry and Marcin are sloppier in their work than Joost. They don’t have a background in chemistry. They carry out the required actions of each production stage with the aid of a YouTube video.

The Leuckart synthesis consists of two cooking steps. The first step is cooking the precursor BMK and the essential chemical formamide, and the addition of formic acid. Dobry and Marcin heat the mixture. This produces the intermediate product N-formylamphetamine. They then wash this intermediate

Small country, Big Player 23 A synthetic drugs network in action

product in a separatory funnel; the washing stage. During the second cooking stage, the intermediate product is converted into amphetamine by heating it in combination with hydrochloric acid.

After the synthesis, the mixture needs to be separated. Dobry and Marcin purify the mixture using caustic soda, followed by distillation, similar to MDMA production. What remains is an oily liquid; the amphetamine oil.

Criminals trade in this amphetamine oil among themselves. As agreed, 200 liter of the substance goes to James. He carries out the last few stages at a location just outside Manchester. James converts the amphetamine oil into a solid substance by mixing it with sulfuric acid; the crystallization stage. He adds too much sulfuric acid, however, resulting in incorrect proportions that cause part of the amphetamine to turn pink. In criminal circles this is called burning. James thinks the burnt part is unusable and throws it out, not knowing that burning can be remedied. After the crystallization stage, he mixes the remaining substance with caffeine. This is called cutting. This increases the volume of the final product, which then contains a smaller quantity of pure amphetamine. As a result, James makes a huge profit.

2.4 The aftermath: cleaning up and distribution

Drugs waste During the production stages of synthetic drugs, residual waste is formed. Especially the conversion from preprecursor into precursor – the conversion stage – produces a lot of waste. The exact quantity of the waste depends on the chemicals used, the cook’s expertise, the quality of the production process, and the production method used (Schoenmakers et al., 2017). Some cooks waste chemicals, thus producing more waste and resulting in a lower drugs yield. This is what, for instance, Dobry and Marcin do. They have little experience and chemical knowledge. Joost is more precise. He is a professional, who tries to reduce waste to a minimum.

‘The yield will not be equally high for everyone, but the proportions of the chemicals are strict. They combine the right quantities, but don’t always boil the mixture for long enough and then the yield is no more than four litre, while a good cook would have a yield of five litre. Meanwhile, the same quantity of chemicals has been used, or there is spillage, simply making part of the chemicals disappear.’

Criminals must get rid of the chemical waste, which they can do in numerous ways. They can put the liquid waste in a container – barrel, jerry can –

Small country, Big Player 24 A synthetic drugs network in action

and leave it somewhere. This is called dumping. Or they discharge the liquid drugs waste into the slurry storage of a farm or in the sewer. Dumping drugs waste is more visible than discharging it. Zygmunt, one of Dobry’s cousins, accepts the job of dumping the waste. He steals a lorry, picks up the jerry cans with drugs waste at the lab in Ooij, drives in the direction of Arnhem, and leaves the lorry at a car park. Joost has a more professional approach. He orders Chiel to rent a van and load it with the drugs waste. He then drives to a car wash and discharges the waste while the car is washed.

‘There are all kinds of developments allowing them to produce without creating a lot of waste. They continuously optimize the process.’

Labs: inactive or undiscovered After the completion of a production process, criminals have several options. Joost is seasoned in setting up and breaking down labs. He has his assistant cooks Ad and Chiel thoroughly clean the lab after the production of MDMA. If the police discover the lab, they won’t be able to detect any traces. Joost stores valuable hardware in a lock-up garage. As soon as Kees puts in another order for MDMA, Joost, Ad en Chiel get back to work.

Dobry and Marcin’s working method is less professional. The drugs waste has been removed, but their amphetamine lab is in total disarray. It is filthy, smelly and damp. Exposure to chemicals can be lethal. Drugs labs may be found by different persons, such as foresters, enforcement officers, police officers, or civilians. Dobry and Marcin’s lab is discovered by chance. On the birthday of the farmer’s daughter, an acquaintance from the village passes the barn. He notices a strange smell, had spotted a few shady characters near the barn on earlier occasions, and understood that the barn contained a drugs lab. He doesn’t mention this to the farmer and his family, but reports his suspicions anonymously to crime Stoppers Anonymous. This report is forwarded to the police. The police dismantle the lab.

‘Sometimes things go wrong. Hazardous substances may be emitted during a fire. Recently, 3,000 litre of chemicals were found in a residential area. If there had been a spark, the whole block would have been wiped out.’

The distribution process: from lab to customer The distribution process offers many options, depending on the customer’s wishes, and the distance to be covered. When the finished products – in this case ecstasy pills and amphetamine oil – are ready, they must reach brokers John and James within the foreseeable future, and without being discovered by the national or international authorities. Criminals are creative when it

Small country, Big Player 25 A synthetic drugs network in action

comes to smuggling methods. Transport is arranged by ship, but often also by plane and lorry, using all types of customary goods as cover cargo.

‘More parties than you think are involved in the smuggling: guys who handle the production, guys who store the final product in warehouses, people who transport the stuff, contacts in intermediate ports, contacts in receiving countries, etc. Very diverse, very many layers and parties. So try and trace who’s earning what. There are so many people involved.’

The smuggling route from Kees to John is a beaten path. Up to now they have never been caught using this method. They have an inventive way of transporting ecstasy pills from the Netherlands to Australia. A friend of Kees’, Barthel, has a company that sells tractors all over the world. At Kees’ request he creates hidden spaces in these tractors and hides the ecstasy pills in them. John’s uncle, Australian farmer Jasper, then orders one of these tractors from Barthel. The order is shipped to Australia by container. After he has secured the pills, Jasper sends the tractor back to the Netherlands, allegedly because it is not satisfactory. He hides the money for Kees and his partners in the tractor.

Kees and James agreed with Martin that he will arrange the smuggling of amphetamine oil to England. Kees likes to use Martin’s services, also because Martin has connections that would allow him to complement potential drugs deficits in the shipment, if needed. This comes in handy right now, as Dobry and Marcin produced insufficient amphetamine oil. Martin can supplement the remaining quantity via his motor gang. Martin’s motor gang has set up a transport company in Tilburg with the specific aim of smuggling drugs. In addition to amphetamine, he transports cocaine, heroin and cannabis in so-called cocktail shipments. Henk en Sjaak, new motor gang members, transport the amphetamine oil by lorry in tomato cans, via the channel tun- nel, to James’ lab near Manchester. As soon as James knows that the shipment of amphetamine oil has arrived, he arranges the payment to Martin and Kees via Morris. Morris can convert cash into bank money using a Hawala system, also called underground banking, which operates via Dubai. Eventually, Martin and Kees will have money in the bank that they have earned with the production of amphetamine. They can use this bank money to do all kinds of things: living the good life – but not too flashy – laundering money, investing it in real estate, investing it abroad, or fund new drugs transactions. Slowly but surely they also enter into the world of cocaine trafficking.

‘A major part of the money flows of one of the leaders of the motorcycle club runs through Dubai. There is a Hawala system in place, where the profits can be entered in cash. The cash is then digitized in Dubai. The money comes back to the Netherlands via a money lender in Dubai.’

Small country, Big Player 26 A synthetic drugs network in action

Persons involved in the synthetic drugs network

Kees: orders the production of synthetic drugs John: criminal buyer of MDMA James: criminal buyer of amphetamine Joost: main MDMA cook David: coordinator for Kees Johan: main cook, deceased Dobry and Marcin: Polish assistant cooks for amphetamine Martin: security guard/boxer/member of a criminal motorcycle gang Ad and Chiel: assistant cooks for MDMA Andrezej: Polish preprecursor dealer Janik and Wiktor: criminal transporters Jules: Belgian precursor and preprecursor dealer Wim: chemicals dealer Andre and Stijn: criminal chemicals transporters Vincent: production vessel manufacturer Noud: tableting machine seller Bas: storage location landlord Slawomir: location straw man René: (deliberate) location facilitator Luuk en Frenk: pill producers Zygmunt: dumps drugs waste Barthel: smuggles ecstasy pills Jasper: provides cover for import of ecstasy pills Henk and Sjaak: transporters/prospective criminal motorcycle gang members Morris: Hawala banker

Small country, Big Player The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs 3

Preamble To the unsuspecting reader, this can be a though chapter. It describes as precisely as possible all the steps we have taken to make a plausible estimate of the total turnover of amphetamine and mdma produced in the Netherlands. Each step in the empirical analysis and each assumption we made in this process has been meticulously described, albeit that the most technical elements have been included in the section ‘Notes’ of Appendix I. The calculations consist of various stages, but once the amphetamine and ecstasy is eventually sold to the user, the turnover worldwide amounts to at least € 18.9 billion.

Introduction The Netherlands is a global player in the production of synthetic drugs.1 This suggests that there are huge amounts of money involved in this drug industry. But what is the yearly production? And how much money is involved in this business? In this chapter, we present an estimate of the production of synthetic drugs in the Netherlands in 2017. It is a broad outline, with more detailed analyses for certain sections. These analyses have been included in Appendix 1 in nine separate notes, to which we refer in this chapter.

We have divided our reasoning and calculations into three parts. First, we present an inventory of all available materials (section 3.1). We also explore the poor information position of investigation authorities. However, after an extensive search and adaptation, hard and uncontaminated information can be found on the scope of the synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands, at least on the part that is intercepted (section 3.2). On the basis of this information, we can determine how many of the raw materials bmk (amphetamine) and pmk (mdma) – after translation – were found in the Netherlands in 2017 (section 3.3).

Next, we made a number of choices and assumptions to determine the total amount of synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands. The first assumption concerns the ‘seizure rate’: how much of the total quantity of synthetic drugs production intended for or produced in the Netherlands, or the raw materials required, is seized by the authorities (section 3.4)? Furthermore, choices need to be made regarding the ‘basic measure’ we use for the calculations, i.e. what is the ‘final

1 In this analysis we limit ourselves to amphetamine and mdma.

Small country, Big Player 28 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

product’, which part of the production is intended for export, and what is the current wholesale and street value of amphetamine and mdma in the Nether- lands and abroad (section. 3.5). For each of these choices we partially fell back on earlier research, but in many cases we also had to rely on the judgements and assessments of experienced professionals.

These two parts together – the inventory of seizures and the assumptions – form the basis for the third step: the calculation of the estimated scope of the synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands in 2017, expressed in euros (section 3.6). Subsequently, we examined how much of this eventually makes its way into the pockets of Dutch criminals (section 3.7).

As we based all choices and assumptions on the most ‘cautious’ scenario (meaning we always chose the alternative that yielded the most ‘pure’ result) we can assume that our calculations result in the absolute minimum amount. They indicate the minimum scope and turnover, but higher figures and quantities are likely.

From a social, scientific and policy-making perspective, figures on the problem of synthetic drugs are indispensable. They serve as the basis for creating awareness of the scope of the issue and help determine the course of action. The opposite is also true: if there are no figures, there appears to be no problem.

‘Of course, the attention is also political. Is it a problem? How big is the problem? Should we put money into it?’

‘Politically speaking, it is currently not really an issue. At the implementing level (Police and Public Prosecution Service), there are signals that there is a problem. However, there are not enough figures to support this.’

We will estimate the scope of the synthetic drugs production for the year 2017. It is important to paint a picture that is as accurate as possible, as the world of synthetic drugs is constantly developing and synthetic drug experts have noticed an increase in recent years. An added benefit is that we have been able to follow the seizures of 2017 in real time. This creates a more substantial and reliable inventory.

3.1 Limited information

We started by creating an inventory of available information, such as annual reports, Crime Pattern Analyses (CBAs) and reports from recent years.

Small country, Big Player 29 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

Analyzing this information proved to be immensely difficult. While we found overviews of seized raw materials, storage locations, production locations, seized drugs, dump sites and rates, this information proved limited, not structurally recorded and fragmented among the various investigation authorities.2 An inquiry among those involved did not result in many new insights; they all held a part of the information and complained without exception of the lack of a complete overview. They indicated they did not have the time to attempt to create such an overview themselves, partially because the quality of the available data and the available timespan for analysis has been greatly reduced (refer also to the Crime Pattern Analysis (CBA) for synthetic drugs and precursors 2016 by the Central Unit).

This lack of information is related to the priority that was given to this criminal phenomenon over the years. At the time of the Synthetic Drugs Unit (USD) (1997-2004), comprehensive reports were created. As analytical and general staff became less available at the investigative and intelligence agencies, insight into the trends and developments decreased. The information position of the investigative agencies is currently insufficient, partially because of a lack of staff. One of the respondents expresses his concern about the figures:

‘In the Netherlands, there are no figures about seizures. We don’t keep track. We’ve sounded the alarm about this so many times already. We have the abilities, but it is just not possible for us anymore. This situation has become very bad and it’s getting worse and worse. We’re fighting a losing battle. Other organizations, such as the EMCDDA, complain bitterly about the situation in the Netherlands. We are the worst country in Europe when it comes to providing figures.’

Concern was also expressed in the Crime Pattern Analysis (Central Unit, 2016). A number of structural, countrywide reports on synthetic drugs have been discontinued since the publication of the previous Crime Pattern Anal- ysis: the semi-annual basic reports on synthetic drugs and precursors by the former Strategic Investigations Team (TSO) of the National Crime Squad (DNR), as well as the annual reports, periodic media scans and weekly publications by the discontinued Centre of Expertise on Synthetic Drugs and Pre- cursors (ESDP). In total, the assessment concludes, there are fewer analytical and monitoring reports available now than there were four years ago.

A positive development is the availability of ERISSP: the European Reporting on Illicit Synthetic Substance Production Sites. This is an information system

2 Public Prosecution Service, Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service, the Netherlands Police and Dutch Customs Service.

Small country, Big Player 30 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

of Europol and the EMCDDA, in which information is brought together at the European level about the number of labs, storage locations and dump sites found. The system is filled by the participating countries. However information about the types and quantities of substances found at these locations is not included in this system.

Eventually we made as precise an inventory as we could, based on the seizures of raw materials and synthetic drugs at storage locations and labs over the period of one year: 2017.

3.2 What is available?

We discovered that data of both the ‘early-stage’ and the ‘later-stage’ of the synthetic drugs production process is available.

‘Early-stage’ refers to the process up to and including the production of synthetic drugs. This concerns seized (pre-)precursors in the Netherlands and abroad, and drugs and drug waste found at storage locations or drugs labs in the Netherlands. (See Note 1 in the Appendix for complexities in the gathering of information about the early stage of the process.)

‘Later-stage’ refers to what is found after the production process is completed and the produced drugs have left the lab. This concerns dumped waste and seized drugs (final product) in the Netherlands and abroad, for example by findingstashes (storage locations for drugs) or by intercepting drugs on smuggling routes. (See Note 2 in the Appendix for complexities in the gathering of information about the later stage of the process.)

In order to reliably estimate the scope of synthetic drugs production, it is crucial to prevent double counting. For that reason, we cannot count with both ‘early-stage’ data and ‘later-stage’ data. If, for instance, empty bags of apaa (pre-precursor of amphetamine) are found in a laboratory, we can use this as a basis to calculate how much amphetamine was produced in the lab. How- ever, the amphetamine is no longer present in the lab. A few weeks later, the police may seize several kilos of amphetamine powder from street dealers. This powder could potentially have been made in the drugs lab for which we have calculated the production scope based on the empty bags of apaa. There is no way to determine this. Therefore, we cannot add up the seized amphetamine powder and the calculated production capacity based on the empty bags of apaa, as this might lead to double counting.

Small country, Big Player 31 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

We chose to focus on the ‘early-stage’ data. Firstly, because the ‘later-stage’ data are much less complete and reliable than the ‘early-stage’ data. Secondly, because we can edit and correct the ‘early-stage’ data in a number of ways (see Note 3 of the Appendix). While calculating the estimate, we worked on the principle of preventing double counts and compensating calculation deviations as much as possible. Since we used a cautious and ‘conservative’ approach, we have reason to assume that our calculations result in minimum figures. They indicate what the minimum scope is, but a higher scope is likely.

3.3 Early-stage seizures

We have decided to use ‘early-stage’ information about the seizures. The investigative agencies involved – Dutch Customs Service, Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service and the Netherlands Police – each have their own responsibilities when it comes to monitoring and detecting precursors and synthetic drugs. This means that the information on seizures of precursors and synthetic drugs is spread out over the different investigation authorities.

Customs Service is tasked with monitoring and inspecting the import and export of drug precursors, which are chemicals that, in addition to their legal purposes, can be used for the production of synthetic drugs. Companies can import these precursors into the European Union when certain conditions are met.

The Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD) is responsible for the detection of criminal offences based on the legislation for drug precursors and the suspicious chemical transactions hotline. When a drugs lab for the production of synthetic drugs is found, the FIOD investigates the origins of the chemicals found. Additionally, the FIOD is responsible for keeping an overview of the quantities of precursors and chemicals seized in the Netherlands by The Customs Service, FIOD and the police.

The Central Criminal Investigations Division (DLR) of the Netherlands Police is responsible for tackling serious organised crime in connection with the production and distribution of synthetic drugs (including precursors). When it comes to synthetic drugs, the DLR collaborates with the Central Intelli- gence Division (DLIO). DLIO focuses international intelligence exchange and national intelligence coordination. When a drugs lab is found, the Central Dismantling Support Unit (LFO), which is part of the Central Operational Cooperation Division (DLOS), is called in. The LFO assists police units in dismantling drugs labs. The police units are responsible for dismantling the labs and carrying out the investigations.

Small country, Big Player 32 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

In our inventory, we established five categories of seizures in 2017: – The Customs Service keeps an overview of seized precursors and pre-precursors at the Dutch border and abroad:3 1. precursors and pre-precursors seized by international investigation authorities, intended for drugs production in the Netherlands; 2. precursors and pre-precursors seized by The Customs Service at the Dutch border, found in parcels, courier deliveries and air and sea freight. – The FIOD carries out investigations into drug-related chemicals4 and seizes these: 3. drug-related chemicals seized by the FIOD domestically. – Police unit LFO records found precursors and preprecursors, drugs and drug waste per storage and production location in the Netherlands for the benefit of criminal investigation: 4. seized drug-related chemicals found at storage and production locations – ‘yet to be produced’; 5. seized drugs, drug waste and empty packaging of drug-related chemicals found production locations in the Netherlands – ‘produced’.

Inventory of ‘early-stage’ seizures of synthetic drugs in 2017 results in five categories, divided between the Customs Service, the FIOD and the police. In particular creating categories 4 and 5 of the police/LFO required a lot of effort. We studied the data on storage locations and drugs labs on a case-by- case basis and recorded the exact quantities of chemicals, drugs waste and/or drugs found. This was a painstaking process. The principles used during this process are described in detail in Appendix I, Note 3.

The next step is to translate all seized substances in these five categories to litres of bmk or pmk: the precursors for amphetamine and mdma. We know, based on ‘recipes’ found in drugs labs, which weighting factors drugs criminals use for the production of amphetamine and mdma (see Note 4 of the Appendix). Based on these weighting factors, we translated the seized precursors and pre-precursors, essential and other chemicals, drugs and drug waste of 2017 to litres of bmk and pmk. This resulted in the quantities listed in table 3.1 (Appendix 2 contains data of individual seizures).

3 In actual fact, this is the border of the European Union in the Netherlands. The focus is on Schiphol Airport and the ports. 4 Chemicals, precursors and preprecursors are recorded in the lists of European regulations, to which the categories of the Abuse of Chemical Substances Prevention Act (Wvmc) refer.

Small country, Big Player 33 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

Table 3.1 Seizures in 2017, translated to litres bmk and pmk

Seizures 2017 BMK PMK Category 1: Customs international 976.58 1,373.23 Category 2: Customs domestic 2,710.44 376.50 Category 3: FIOD 1,447.37 1,500.00 Category 4: LFO (‘yet to be produced’) 50,585.71 16,946.48 Category 5: LFO (‘produced’) 10,372.13 9,415.54 Total 66,092 litres 29,612 litres

It’s a striking fact that, despite under-recording, after translation in total at least 66,092 litres of bmk and 29,612 litres of pmk were seized. As a result of our approach, this constitutes the absolute minimum.

3.4 Seizure rate

However, this is not all. Seizures of synthetic drugs merely form the part of production that the investigation authorities are aware of. An unknown part remains invisible. In order to make further calculations, we have to make a reasoned assumption about the size of the seized portion in relation to the total production. We call this the seizure rate.

Drugs criminals try to operate out of sight of the investigation authorities. They have numerous tactics and techniques to keep their activities hidden. Examples are mislabelling when importing chemicals, and covers for drug locations. Furthermore, drugs criminals take advantage of the slow implementation of legislation, the chances offered by the European commerce and the limited investigation capacity. The actual scope of synthetic drugs production is many times higher than the quantities seized by investigation authorities (see for more details Note 5 in the Appendix).

The key question is: what part of the total is made up by the seizures? This is a difficult question that requires us to use empirical data as our starting point. According to a survey by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010), investigation authorities worldwide seized between 3% and 7% of all ecstasy pills and between 3% and 10% of the amphetamine production. This refers to final products, so ‘later-stage’ seizures.5

5 The seizure rate was calculated for amphetamine-like substances, and therefore includes methamphetamine in addition to amphetamine. Furthermore, this refers to an estimate of the seizure rate of ‘final products’, not of precursors.

Small country, Big Player 34 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

The estimate by the UNODC dates back several years. In order to make a more current assumption, we asked synthetic drug experts of the police the same question. Their estimates are slightly higher and range from 10 to 20 percent. Given our objective to determine the minimum figures, we will use the high ‘seizure rate’ of 20%.

Naturally, the seized quantity needs to be subtracted from the total quantity, as this part of the production can no longer be marketed by criminals. This then yields the result shown in Table 3.2. In these figures, we multiplied the seizures from 2017 by five (20% seizure rate) and then subtracted the seized 20% of production.

Table 3.2 Minimal production of bmk and pmk based on a seizure rate of 20%

BMK (in litres) PMK (in litres) Seized amount x 5 330,460 148,060 Minus 20% seizures* 56,359 20,947 Total (minus 20% seizures) 274,101 127,113

* This is not quite 20%, as part of the scope is based on empty packaging and drug waste found; the drugs produced with the materials originally contained therein have been marketed. This is the case for 9,733 litres of bmk and 8,665 litres of pmk, which have been subtracted from the 20% seizures.

Next, the bmk and pmk need to be converted into the relevant final product, namely amphetamine (speed) and mdma (ecstasy). bmk is first turned into in wet amphetamine paste (with a conversion value of 1.6), which is then dried (conversion value of 0.7). In a multiple step process, the pmk is converted into mdma crystals, which have a conversion value of 1.2. These conversion values were calculated on the basis of recipes that have been found in drugs labs by the police; in these calculations, the police has chosen to use relatively low conversion values.

In total this yields the end result shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Minimum production of amphetamine and mdma in the Netherlands in 2017 274,101 litres of bmk x 1.6 = 438,562 kilos (wet) amphetamine paste 438,562 kilos (wet) amphetamine paste x 0.7 = 306,993 kilos amphetamine powder

127,113 litres of PMK x 1.2 = 152.536 kilos mdma crystals

Small country, Big Player 35 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

Based on the seizures and added assumptions, it can be concluded that in the Netherlands at least 306,993 kilos of amphetamine powder and 152,536 kilos of mdma crystals were produced in 2017.

Amphetamine and mdma come in various forms, i.e. the form in which they are sold to users. For the purposes of our calculations, it is necessary to determine on which form we base ourselves, both type and strength (for further explanation: see Note 6 of the Appendix). For amphetamine, we have taken 1 gram for 50% cut amphetamine powder as our starting point, for mdma, an ecstasy pill containing 157 milligrams of mdma.

Table 3.4 Seized precursors converted into the final products amphetamine and mdma Amphetamine 306,993 kilos = 306,993,000 grams x 2 = 613,986,000 final products (1 gram of cut amphetamine)

mdma 152,536 kilos: 0.000157 kilograms per pill = 971,566,879 final products (ecstasy pills containing 157 milligrams of mdma)

This means that 614 million (cut) grams of amphetamine and 972 million ecstasy pills have been produced in the Netherlands in 2017.

What is the turnover for this?

3.5 The wholesale turnover

The first calculations we made, involved the wholesale price. This is the price paid for the substances directly after they have been produced in the labs. The costs of producing the drugs need to be subtracted from this price (for arranging a production location, purchasing chemicals, hiring laboratory technicians and purchasing hardware).

We know from police intelligence that a drug producer can charge approximately € 0.60 for an ecstasy pill; producing such a pill currently costs the producer approximately € 0.20 apiece. At wholesale, amphetamine is generally sold as wet amphetamine paste, for which the drug producer charges around € 700 per kilo, while his production costs for making this quantity are currently approximately € 163.10, as shown by the same police intelligence (see Note 7 of the Appendix).

Small country, Big Player 36 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

Table 3.5 Wholesale turnover, costs and proceeds Turnover wholesale 438,562 x € 700 = € 306,993,400 amphetamine Turnover wholesale ecstasy: 971,566,879 x € 0.60 = € 582,940,127 Total turnover wholesale: € 889,933,527 Production costs amphetamine: 330,4606 x € 163.10 = € 53,898,026 Production costs ecstasy: 1,131,668,790 x € 0.20 = € 226,333,758 Total production costs: € 280,231,784 Proceeds wholesale € 306,993,400 − € 53,898,026 = € 253,095,374 amphetamine: Proceeds wholesale ecstasy: € 582,940,127.40 − € 226,333,758 = € 356,606,369 Total proceeds wholesale: € 609,701,743

At wholesale, the proceeds for drug producers in the Netherlands in 2017 were at least € 357 million for ecstasy and at least € 253 million for amphetamine. In total, this was at least € 610 million. The total turnover, so including the costs, amounts at wholesale to approximately € 890 million.

However, this is just the beginning.

3.6 Trade Proceeds

Research has shown that the big profits in the criminal drug industry are not found in production, but in the drug trade (Wainwright, 2017). From lab to street the price doubles multiple times and many people somehow share in the criminal proceeds (e.g. transporters, middlemen, street dealers), although little is known about how this industry works exactly and how the proceeds are distributed.

However, we can make a reliable estimate of the final proceeds: what are the proceeds of the amphetamine and ecstasy production when they are eventually sold to users all over the world? To answer that question, we made several assumptions.

a. Export The majority of the amphetamine and mdma produced in the Netherlands is intended for export. Dutch drugs criminals discovered decades ago how

6 Seizures cannot be subtracted from the total quantity, as the criminals probably paid for it in advance. For this reason, we choose the total quantity of litres of bmk: 330,460 and the total quantity of litres of PMK: 148,060 (converted: 1,131,668,790 ecstasy pills).

Small country, Big Player 37 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

profitable the international export of drugs is. But what is the size of the export share? This is important, as the prices for amphetamine and ecstasy vary greatly in the Netherlands and abroad. Calculations of the domestic share of the mdma and amphetamine use amount to 3.9% and 0.28% respectively (see for more information Note 8 of the Appendix). Police experts assume the percentage is higher; their estimates range from 5% to 20%. We used 20% as the basis of our calculations for domestic use, and 80% for export. Once again, a cautious choice.

Table 3.6 Minimum quantity of amphetamine and mdma final product Domestic (20%) International (80%) amphetamine total: 613,986,000 122,797,200 grams 491,188,800 grams grams (50% cut) mdma total: 971,566,879 ecstasy 194,313,376 ecstasy pills 777,253,503 ecstasy pills pills (157 milligrams mdma)

b. Domestic and international street prices Finally, the average price of the final products needs to be determined for products sold in the Netherlands and abroad. This is the final sales price to the consumer, the ‘street price’ (Note 9 of the Appendix explains this in more detail). An ecstasy pill containing 157 milligrams of mdma costs € 3.50 (street price) in the Netherlands and on average € 11.14 (street price) abroad. One gram of 50% cut amphetamine costs € 6 (street price) in the Netherlands and approximately € 18 (street price) abroad.7 The amount of drugs criminals sell per country is unknown. The average price of ecstasy is probably higher because the street price in important markets is higher (LE, 2017).8

c. Estimate of the final proceeds Based on the calculations and assumptions we made in previous sections, we can now estimate the total financial value of synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands, when sold to the end user.

Amphetamine Seizures of amphetamine by the investigative agencies in 2017 amounted to at least 613,986,000 grams of (cut) amphetamine, after translation. The street price in the Netherlands is approximately € 6 per gram of cut amphetamine. Amphetamine is mainly exported to other European countries. We assumed that 80% of the production is intended for sale on the international market,

7 Abroad, cut pills often contain much less amphetamine, sometimes only 10%, but this has almost no impact on the street price. 8 Australia, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina.

Small country, Big Player 38 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

where the street price for one gram of cut amphetamine is € 18. This results in a turnover of € 737 million in the Netherlands and approximately € 8.8 billion abroad. In total, the turnover of amphetamine production in the Netherlands was, in round figures, at least € 9.6 billion in 2017 (street price).

Table 3.7 Calculation of the financial turnover of amphetamine from the Netherlands (globally, street price) Domestic: 122,797,200 x 6 = € 736,783,200 International: 491,188,800 x 18 = € 8,841,398,400 Total: € 9,578,181,600 In round figures: € 9,6 billion

Ecstasy Seizures of mdma by the investigative agencies in 2017 amounted to at least 971,566,879 ecstasy pills, after translation. The majority (80%) of the ecstasy pills was intended for sale on the international market. Exporting ecstasy is lucrative: on average, ecstasy users abroad pay € 11.14 per ecstasy pill. In the Netherlands, users pay an average of € 3.50 a pill. This amounts to a turnover of more than € 680 million in the Netherlands and around € 8.7 billion abroad. In total, the turnover of mdma production in the Netherlands was at least € 9.3 billion in 2017.

Table 3.8 Calculation of the financial turnover of ecstasy pills from the Netherlands (globally, street price) Domestic: 194,313,376 ecstasy pills x € 3.50 = € 680,096,816 International: 777,253,503 ecstasy pills x € 11.14 = € 8,658,604,023 Total: € 9,338,700,839 In round figures: € 9,3 billion

This brings the estimate of the total turnover of amphetamine and mdma produced in the Netherlands in 2017 to at least € 18.9 billion.

This estimate can be considered the absolute minimum, given our assumptions: – The 20% seizure rate is probably too high; – The 20% share intended for domestic use is probably too high; – We only included mdma and amphetamine produced in the Netherlands in our calculations, not any substances produced abroad (Belgium, Poland) by Dutch persons, or the production of which was led by Dutch persons; – When multiple chemicals were found at a storage location, we only included one chemical substance in the calculations;

Small country, Big Player 39 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

– Storage locations where only other chemicals for the production process were stored (no essential chemicals or precursors) were not included in our calculations; – We assumed that dismantled labs only completed a single production cycle; – Production of and trade in NPS, GHB, mephedrone, ephedrine and methamphetamine were not included in the calculations.

3.7 Share of Dutch criminals

This estimate of nearly € 19 billion can be seen as the contribution of the Dutch synthetic drugs production to the (illegal) global economy. Not all of this money makes its way into the pockets of Dutch drugs criminals. In the whole process from production in the Netherlands to reaching the end user somewhere in the world, many national and international drugs criminals can play a part. What part of this huge sum constitutes the proceeds of drugs criminals in the Netherlands? The national and international drugs profits are shared by many: suppliers of chemicals, drug producers, drug importers, international middlemen and street dealers. The profit made varies per drug criminal and depends on numerous factors.9

Little is known about the exact pattern of these trade flows, nor what share of the financial proceeds the various persons involved receive. How much money is made by the drugs criminals in each step of the distribution system (production, export, import, brokering, street trade) can only be guessed. To make an educated guess, we used two different approaches:

1. Several years ago, experts assumed that every ‘level’ of drugs criminals added approximately 100% to the price.10 Assuming that consumers of ecstasy and amphetamine worldwide paid around € 19 billion, we expect that the first level of drug distributors (micro distribution ‘on the streets’) claimed approximately € 9.5 billion. The share of the Dutch drugs criminals in this, is probably fairly limited. Of the remaining € 9.5 billion approximately half will have gone to large-scale distributors in various countries; the share of Dutch drug producers in this, which is doubtlessly present, is unknown. Of the remaining € 4.75 billion, at least a large share will have made its way into the pockets of Dutch drugs producers. This sum then

9 E.g.: expertise, position in the network, agreements, country of export, competitive position. 10 The criminal industry changed drastically after the development of precursors and pre-precursors and the investigative agencies’ insight into the industry has deteriorated, making it unclear whether or not this rule still applies.

Small country, Big Player 40 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

still needs to be divided between the buyer with an international network, the drug producer himself, the transporter and the overall organizer. We know from one overall organizer that he shared the proceeds equally (25% each), with him taking on the role of both producer and overall organizer.

2. Research into the earnings of cocaine and heroin drug traffickers has shown that drugs criminals in the production stage and first levels of international distribution (transport and international buyers) receive approximately 15% of the total turnover value of the final product (Kilmer & Reuter, 2009).11 If we use this as a basis for synthetic drugs – Dutch drugs criminals are mostly active in these first three levels – the turnover for drugs producers in the Netherlands amounts to approximately € 3 billion.

Striking are the differences in turnover that Dutch drugs criminals generate in the various stages of production and distribution; it starts with a wholesale turnover of approximately € 890 million and increases from € 3 to € 5 billion in the first stage of trade to a total turnover on the user market of € 19 billion.

However, when we compare this to cocaine and heroin, these figures are not unlikely. In 2009, Kilmer & Reuter calculated the turnover for cocaine and heroin from production to user. In the intermediate stages, the turnover increased greatly: the price for a kilo of cocaine had doubled 98 times by the time it reached the end user. In the case of heroin, this figure was even higher: namely 117 times. The drug proceeds are shared among dozens of international drugs criminals. Dutch drugs criminals receive a share, but what the exact size of this share is, remains unclear.

3.8 Conclusion

Calculating the scope of the synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands for 2017 asked for perseverance and required us to work with many impossibil- ities and uncertainties. Nevertheless, we succeeded in mapping the number of litres bmk and pmk that drugs criminals used or attempted to use for the production of amphetamine or mdma in 2017. During this inventory, we took a cautious approach. Our calculations concerned the ‘bare minimum’. Inevi- tably, certain assumptions needed to be made, such as the seizure rate of the total production, the average dosage of the drugs and the percentage of production intended for export. Here, we were again conservative in our approach. Despite this, our calculations showed a high total turnover of € 18.9 billion.

11 19% for cocaine and 10% for heroin.

Small country, Big Player 41 The unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

In comparison: Europol and the EMCDDA estimated the total turnover (street price) of drugs in Europe in 2016 to be approximately € 24 billion (EMCDDA, 2016). Considering that just the turnover of synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands (for the global market) already comes close to this sum, this indicates that the estimate of € 24 billion is most likely way too low.

The police experts we spoke to are not surprised by the outcome of our calculations: ‘The calculation of the scope seems plausible. Based on information from the Criminal Intelligence Team, we know that huge quantities enter the country. I’m always taken aback by the recordings of intercepted private communications, how easily large quantities enter the country. What we find is just the tip of the iceberg.’

Small country, Big Player A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in 4 the Netherlands

Introduction Through the years, ecstasy and amphetamine have had multiple applications. Amphetamine has a history of being used as a stimulant by soldiers and cyclists, and as a slimming agent for women. Ecstasy started out as ‘love pill’ in relationship therapy and at dance parties. Since the end of the 1980s, the popularity of ecstasy has kept pace with the emergence of house music on the party scene and the growing number of festivals in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has always had a sizeable production of amphetamine and ecstasy, especially after they became illicit substances in 1972 and 1988, respectively. In this chapter we will provide an outline of their histories in bird’s-eye view, and of the efforts made by the authorities to curb this illegal production.

In 1967, professional cyclist Tommy Simpson died due to a mixture of fatigue, heat, alcohol, and amphetamine use during the ascent of Mont Ventoux in the Tour the France. At the time, amphetamine had been a popular form of doping among cyclists in Brabant and Limburg in the Netherlands for quite a while. Lorry drivers and people in other heavy professions were also keen to use amphetamine. Prior to this, amphetamine already popped up during wars and as a slimming agent. Early 1980s, American therapists used ecstasy, a new ‘love drug’ to stimulate communication and empathy between partners. During this period, the pill, which was legal at the time, found its way into bars and discos, especially in Texas. It provided yuppies who had become rich entertainment when going out, and ultra-Christian youth an alternative for unthinkable alcohol use (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). When the American government wanted to prohibit ecstasy, therapists made an effort to counter such prohibition and prove the beneficial effect of the drug. Mid 1985, while this trial was still ongoing, American Congress, influenced by the DEA, decided to prohibit ecstasy overnight via an emergency Ecstasy Act. In the Netherlands, amphetamine, and later ecstasy, had featured prominently since the end of the 1960s.

4.1 ‘The King of Speed’: the emergence of amphetamine

End 1960s, early 1970s, a group of serious criminals in the province of Zuid-Limburg (NL) specialized in the production and trafficking of amphetamine. Before they were mainly involved in violent bank robberies, being quite

Small country, Big Player 43 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

successful in this field. Gradually, the police managed to curb these bank robberies with the aid of better supra-regional organization, deployment of new resources, such as faster cars, and an improved information provision. In addition, amphetamine trafficking turned out to be easier and equally lucrative for the criminals, especially because, unlike in many other European countries, the substance was legal in the Netherlands until 1972. This turned the Netherlands into a source country for amphetamine (Moors & Spapens, 2017).

A big name in this context is the German Kalle Pauksch. By the end of the 1960s he settled in the south of the Netherlands, where he earned millions with amphetamine trafficking and smuggling, especially to the UK and Swe- den. Pauksch, also known as ‘the king of speed’, legally bought the pills from Dutch wholesalers, or imported the powder from Italy and, together with his right hand Billy P. from Heerlen, arranged the export (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). A smuggling route already existed because of the high price of alcohol in Sweden, which was also used for amphetamine.

In Sweden, amphetamine caused major health risks. The country had over 40,000 young addicted users. A Swedish police chief estimated the annual number of amphetamine use related deaths at about 150 (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). Initially, the Dutch government barely responded to the pressure exerted by the Swedish government to intervene. In 19721, however, the export of amphetamine without a licence became prohibited. In January 1973, Pauksch was extradited to Sweden, where he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. He managed to escape, but was arrested in the Netherlands in 1977, and extradited again.

Of course, the ban on the production and dissemination of amphetamine did not mean the end of the drug. What is more: production and trade flourished with the aid of the knowhow and infrastructure built up in the ‘legal era’. A few former safe-breakers from South Limburg dedicated themselves to the production. Among them the abovementioned Billy P., who cooperated with Peter van D. The raw materials were easily available in nearby Germany and

1 In 1969, stricter regulations were introduced for possession of and trafficking in amphetamine through the so-called Wekamines Decree (wekamine is the former Dutch name for amphetamine), making it punishable with a maximum term of imprisonment of six months or a maximum fine of f500. In 1972, the Amphetamine Import and Export Decision became effective. From then on, the import and export of amphetamines without a licence was punishable by a term of imprisonment of six months pursuant to the Economic Offences Act. Trading in amphetamine had become an offence instead of a misdemeanor (De Kort, 1994, p.175). Amphetamine was subsequently included in list I of the Opium Act in 1976.

Small country, Big Player 44 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

Belgium, and the production process was a piece of cake (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). In the 1980s, the Netherlands developed into the world’s most important amphetamine producer, according to the then National Criminal Intelli- gence Division (Spapens, 2006). In addition, many members of the criminal families Spapens studied in the province of North Brabant became involved (Moors & Spapens, 2017).

In 1987, in the city of Heerlen, an interregional crime squad was set up that focussed on combating organized crime, including drugs criminals, with the aid of its own surveillance team. New and existing investigation methods were used, such as wiretapping, controlled drugs deliveries to gain more insight into the organization, and direct listening in on conversations. In addition, more intensive cooperation with foreign police forces was established. This was later examined by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into Investi- gative Methods; the Van Traa Committee (1994-1996).

The huge sums of money earned by the criminals, initially with bank robberies, later with drugs trafficking, toughened the fight between the authorities and the criminals. Criminals had the means to invest, and did not even hesitate to offer a reward of f 250,000 for the murder of public prosecutor Gonsalves (Gonsalves & Verhoog, 1999). Despite the efforts of the police and the judiciary, the producers in Limburg developed into global players, especially once they started cooperating with criminals from North Brabant and the Amsterdam underworld. We will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 5).

4.2 Can you feel it?!: the emergence of ecstasy

It is likely that ecstasy appeared on the party scene in Amsterdam around 1985. The drug was handed out at the Zorba the Buddha discotheque of the Bhagwan movement to gain more followers. Ecstasy had its real breakthrough in the summer of love in 1988, when house music and ecstasy arrived hand in hand from London. Initially, it was Amsterdam in particular that had a luscious scene. The London comes to Amsterdam party was the big breakthrough. It is described in the book Roxy en de houserevolutie (2008), written by music journalist Job de Wit, which traces back the emergence of house and ecstasy almost exclusively to this single weekend in September 1988.

Amsterdam discotheque ROXY played a prominent role in this joint ascent. Hans Kuipers, manager at the time:

Small country, Big Player 45 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

‘I did not consider it a problem that the visitors of my club used this ecstasy. The atmosphere was great… not as aggressive as with coke. But I didn’t want them to deal in the club, as this wrecks your reputation as a club.’

A former investigator from The Hague, where at the end of the 1980s, after the one in Wormerveer, the second Dutch ecstasy lab was found and dismantled:

‘In the early days, we had to establish what we were dealing with, of course, but in principle we always took action. Everyone in possession of pills was arrested. I mean, even if it was only a single pill, so to speak. This didn’t mean that you would actually remain in prison. And of course this was later adapted bit by bit, because the prisons were overflowing, which didn’t work either.’

In November 1988, ecstasy was included in the Opium Act as a drug with ‘unacceptable risks’, two years after the substance had been banned in the US. By the end of 1989, the municipality of Amsterdam banned a number of parties, and the police cracked down on drugs dealers. Melkweg, Mazzo and iT, Amsterdam party venues, were targeted in particular (Schinkel, 2016). But the raids didn’t last long, and barely had any effect. Drugs researcher Nab- ben: ‘there were illegal parties all over the city in buildings that were hardly ever checked. Young people are hedonistic. The party culture fitted the time frame, also in a political sense. The fall of the Berlin wall, Nelson Mandela being released, and winning the European Football Championship resulted in euphoria’. (Quoted in Schinkel, 2016).

According to Kuipers, the aforementioned manager of Roxy, the fight against ecstasy did not immediately become a priority after its penalization in 1988. By his own account, he contacted the police in 1988. ‘I went to the special legislation department and explained that ecstasy use was becoming rampant, that I did everything in my power, but that I simply couldn’t control it (De Wit, 2008, p. 130).’ The first ‘police operation’ with two ‘undercover cops’ didn’t produce any results. ‘Not to worry; we haven’t spotted anything,’ was what they said, according to Kuipers. The next attempt with the aid of two more streetwise officers showed that drug dealing did indeed take place. Accord- ing to Kuipers, the police took no further action: ‘it was not yet considered a problem. House was a rather small subculture in Roxy’ (De Wit, 2008). An investigator who, together with other undercover officers, visited parties in The Hague confirmed this:

‘Of course you didn’t participate. You weren’t on the dance floor. So you automatically stood out. This is why we didn’t catch many pills at these parties. We usually caught them before or after on the street. It wasn’t our

Small country, Big Player 46 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

priority at the time. Of course we were more focused on hard drug users, especially the heroin addicts, then on users of these types of substances.’

The first publications about the party drug had a positive ring to them: ecstasy was seen as ‘a pill for world peace’; as a drug that did not cause physical addiction, and made users feel euphoric. The number of users increased. But before long, accidents started to happen and house parties gained a bad reputation. Yet, their popularity did not decrease. The fight against ecstasy became more urgent when, around 1993, house became a form of mass consumption and the first ecstasy deaths occured.

Nineteen ninety five was the year of Gabber. Gabber culture was popular among young people, and strongly linked to the house scene. This could be seen in the increasing use of ecstasy. Research by the Ministry of Health in 1996 showed that 3.3% of all secondary school pupils had used ecstasy at some time or other. Shocked, the ministry published the Stadhuis en house (city hall and house) report, advocating better information provision and other pre- ventive measures. Regulations were drawn up for large-scale house parties. These involved a room temperature that is not too high, availability of plenty of water and soft drinks, and security. Investigative services hardly played a role (Schinkel, 2016). ‘Preventing the development of an illegal user and seller circles that the authorities do not have a grip on was the key starting point’, according to Wijenburg (1996, p. 143).

Quality On 1 July 1985, ecstasy was banned in the US, and in 1986, the United Nations listed MDMA as a prohibited substance (Moors & Spapens, 2017). In the Neth- erlands, production was still legal, until November 1988. There was a huge increase in the export of ecstasy from the Netherlands to the US from July 1985 (Huskens & Vuijst, 2002). The first production in the Netherlands took place in the Randstad conurbation in the west of the country, but production soon moved to Limburg in the south, and illegal laboratories started to pop up in the southern province of North Brabant, and in Belgium (Moors & Spapens, 2017). The south of the Netherlands soon became the focal point of the synthetic drugs production. The Netherlands rapidly developed into a source country. After the penalization in 1988, the illegal production of ecstasy in laboratories was off to a quick start.

Soon, Dutch ecstasy was very much in demand because of its quality, in which a self-educated chemist like Robert Holleman, called the nutty profes- sor because of his ability to develop new chemical mixtures time and again, played a key role (Husken & Vuijst, 2002, p.11). As did Danny Leclerc, leader of a Dutch ‘ecstasy multinational’, who was a chemist who obviously knew what

Small country, Big Player 47 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

he was doing (Moors & Spapens, 2017, p.78). In the beginning of the 1990s, the trade in ecstasy and the accompanying profits were huge, leading to a great deal of violence. Danny Leclerc, for instance, was liquidated on 20 May 1993. According Huskens and Vuijst, he was an informant for the Dutch Criminal Intelligence Service (CID), which worked for the Interregional Crime Squad. The case was never solved.

4.3 The Netherlands as a source country

In 1993, the report of the then National Criminal Intelligence Division pointed out that the Netherlands was a source country for amphetamine. The production of ecstasy was mentioned too, its scope being unclear. Ecstasy production and trafficking did not have much priority, however (Spapens, 2006). As a result of the strong focus on users, the profitability of drugs production and trafficking hardly received any attention. Early 1990s, there was a certain degree of satisfaction with police efforts, as they managed to curb the violent robberies by the Kempen gang in Limburg and North Brabant. The visible drug use hotspots in the larger cities, with many addicted heroin users and the accompanying ‘acquisition crime’ slowly but surely disappeared from view. It took a while before anyone noticed that major criminal organizations were developing in the field of synthetic drugs production and, a little later, cannabis cultivation (interview with investigations leader, 2017).

The 1995 Drugsbeleid (drugs policy) report of the first purple coalition cabinet led by Prime Minister Kok actually payed attention to synthetic drugs, but without a sense of investigative urgency. A sum of f 8 million (€3.6 million) was made available for investigations in general. A year later, a few members of parliament called for a motion to confer higher priority on investigations. The reason for this was not so much the role of the Netherlands as production country, but the health risks of ecstasy use at house parties. The motion was adopted, but did not bring about noticeable change.

From the mid 1990s, investigation of synthetic drugs was one of the key objectives of Core Team South (KTZ), a supra-regional collaborative effort between three regional forces in North Brabant and two in Limburg. In 1996, it launched two investigations and responded to a few requests for legal assistance with regard to synthetic drugs, but actual prioritization was not yet a fact (Spapens, 2006). One of the people involved:

‘The Netherlands had six core teams. Each team had a specialization; ours was synthetic drugs. Our main job was to investigate cases that had a link to synthetic drugs, but we also gathered information. The idea was that the

Small country, Big Player 48 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

regions would allocate their best personnel to the core teams. But on this point, the implementation left something to be desired. I think the team consisted of about 40 people, with the possibility of calling up another 40 people, who would be on hold in the region. This caused tension. No one was sitting on the bench waiting to be called on. They simply conducted investigations in their own forces and if I said: ‘I need another ten persons now’, they said: ‘sure, in a year’s time.’ The police commissioners were obstructing the process, as they were not interested in investigations.’

In July 1996, the core team concluded a phenomenon study into synthetic drugs, which showed that the role of the Netherlands as a production country was undeniable. This information was kept under the hat for a while, as the timing was poor: the Netherlands elicited an increasing amount of international criticism. A stakeholder at the time:

‘In an interview, McCaffrey, Director of the US Office of Drug Control Policy, an office directly linked to the White House, called the Netherlands a narco-state. The French agreed with him. In the beginning of 1997, the Netherlands would become chair of the Council of the European Union, and the French had had it with the thousands of kilos of drugs, whether they were hard drugs or soft drugs, which were exported to France: the French market was huge. Halfway 1996 the message was: ‘if the Netherlands does nothing about this tidal wave of synthetic drugs, we will kick up a major row, and maybe the Netherlands should not chair the Council of the European Union.’ This more or less represented France’s point of view, which was supported by other countries, including the US. At the time, figures in the US seemed to be quite accurate, but we didn’t believe them. They indicated that every month, they had to deal with over 20 million pills exported from the Netherlands to the US. The Dutch response was: such nonsense, we couldn’t even produce that much. Until, in a small suburb of Den Bosch, a huge lab was discovered.’

In her memoirs, former Dutch Minister of Justice Sorgdrager indicates that Jacques Chirac was in the habit of lashing out against the Netherlands from time to time (Sorgdrager, 1999). ‘In this respect, war was sometimes waged between Chirac and Kok.’ (p.100). In the JHA Council, the European consultations between Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs, the topic of drugs regularly came to the fore, and it was also on the agenda of the European sum- mit for heads of government and heads of state. ‘And if it wasn’t on the agenda, another opportunity would be found to lecture the Netherlands’ (p.111). It was difficult for Dutch government members to find themselves in an international context where drugs were discussed: ‘I experienced this myself, and it wasn’t always easy for Wim Kok either’ (p.109).

Small country, Big Player 49 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

The criticism from France and the US, and at an earlier stage from Germany – a leaked German document stated that no less than 89.3% of the ecstasy seized in Germany derived from the Netherlands (ANP, 3 March 1996)2 – in combination with the approaching presidency of the European Union, prompted prime minister Kok to request the Public Prosecution Service to draw up an Action Plan for a Synthetic Drugs Unit (SDU) (Bakker et al., 2000, p.99). This SDU, one of the key recommendations of the phenomenon study by the Core Team, had to increase the priority and target-orientedness of investigations. Such action was due as a result of to the international pressure.

Establishment of the SDU was one of the measures that had to improve relations with France (and other countries). In anticipation of this, new life was breathed into the Hazeldonk consultations; consultations between France, Belgium and the Netherlands to improve cross-border police cooperation against drugs tourism. Investment was made in bilateral cooperation, for instance by appointing Rotterdam police commissioner Hessing as attaché at the Dutch embassy in Paris. His assignment was to explain Dutch drugs policy to France. All this quite rapidly improved the relationship with France, which was sealed with the ‘kiss of Toubon’ (Sorgdrager, 1999, p.114): at a press conference after joint consultations in February 1997, French Minister Tou- bon openly kissed Winnie Sorgdrager on both cheeks, according to a journalist present (De Volkskrant, 7 February 1997).

4.4 Intensifying the action

First intensification: establishment of the SDU The SDU was set up at the end of 1996, and became operational in January 1997. Suddenly things were happening in a flash. Someone directly involved:

‘On a Sunday night in October 1996, I was called by the Procurator General in charge. ‘Meeting at the Minister’s tomorrow at 9 a.m.’ Then a chief of investigations and I were given the assignment to draw up a project plan before Wednesday. We sat in the pub for an evening and drew up the SDU on four or five beer mats. And this was how it would be done. A few weeks later, the minister visited us at our headquarters in Veldhoven; a former youth centre. The location had to be furnished in a flash, as the minister would arrive with a complete entourage. It had to look like something, but didn’t even have a computer. We had nothing at all; it was all put down in a hurry. Nothing was connected, but it looked great.’

2 Quoted in Spapens, 2006, p.133

Small country, Big Player 50 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

The SDU’s main task was to gather and coordinate the available information at the national level. In addition, the SDU had to provide support to investigations by the regions, Core Teams and Special Investigative Services, such as the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), to improve their quality. The SDU also acted as national point of contact for foreign authorities and carried out tactical criminal investigations with a national or international character.

The composition of the team was multidisciplinary: FIOD, Economic Inspec- tion Service, Customs Service, regional police forces, the Public Prosecution Service, the Royal Dutch Marechaussee, the National Criminal Intelligence Division and the National Security Service. The SDU was accommodated by Core Team South (CTS). Municipalities were not asked to participate; this would have been impossible at the time. The power struggle that ensued between CTS and ‘little brother’ SDU had functional, but also less functional aspects. The mutual competition strengthened the drive in the team members, but also caused control issues.

The SDU’s working method had several cornerstones. National management, an extra budget of f12 million, integrated multidisciplinary operation, a team of eager young officers and excellent communication to position themselves as well as possible were key. In 1999, the unit had about 50 employees: 46 FTE in investigations, and 6 fte from the Public Prosecution Service. One of the public prosecutors involved:

‘We wanted our team to consist of personnel of all the different stake- holders, and the team shouldn’t be too big. We weren’t aiming to set up an FBI. The regions had to do their own jobs; we were just there to manage everything. At the time, there was no National Crime Squad or a Central Investigations Division. Our main goal was to manage the information and strategic branches. And we always worked with talented people, from both the FIOD and the police. Eager young officers, contrary to the Core Team, which also included washed out staff. Early 1997 we presented ourselves at a conference, and showed our motto for the first time: “early cooperation gives you a head start”.’

The SDU was off to a flying start:

‘One of the things we had was a request for legal assistance from the UK that no one wanted to deal with. It was about a major English drugs dealer, who was suspected not just of large-scale cocaine trafficking, but also of trafficking in pills, especially from the UK to the US and Canada. A week later we hit the jackpot: we found 500 kg of coke and a million ecstasy pills.

Small country, Big Player 51 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

It was front page news. It was great. The media went for it. It was exactly what we needed.’

Two teams were formed to carry out the tactical task: a Precursors Team and a Rapid Intervention Team. With short-term investigations (‘quick hits’), like US did, the SDU distinguished itself from the CTS. Someone directly involved:

‘The SDU was initially a daughter of CTS, but gradually, this daughter grew up. CTS solely conducted long-term investigations, and these ran for three years. Really complicated investigations, for instance into Peter van D. We went for the quick hit. About four weeks and on to the next investigation.’

Scientists, including Fijnaut and Moerland, were closely involved, though initially only indirectly via Core Team South. In those day, it was for the first time that a ‘logistical approach to crime’ was developed in the Netherlands, on which the later barrier models were based (see Chapter 8).

Around the year 2000, the American DEA closely cooperated with the Dutch investigative services, and with the SDU in particular. Earlier, the American investigative methods played a major role in the Interregional Crime Squad (IRT) affair and needed to be applied carefully. The media, which had had a particular focus on police action since the IRT affair, was very suspicious. A lot of attention was paid to the American influence on Dutch investigation practices (Huskens & Vuijst, 2002).

In 1997, the SDU was established for a period of four years. It was evaluated in 2000 (Bakker et al., 2000). The general assessment of the SDU was positive, was the conclusion (p.2). Within a short period of time it managed to gain a position as ‘spider in the web’ in the fight against synthetic drugs. Its public profile was high, as was general appreciation of its actions, especially abroad, where the fact that there finally was a clear contact point was highly appreciated. The attitude of SDU employees was characterized as enthusiastic, prag- matic and aimed at directly noticeable activities and results. In short: ‘the SDU was a pioneering “action club” of enthusiastic people’ (p.101). But it could not be established whether the SDU was already having an actual impact on the nature and scope of the phenomenon (p.100).

Many people involved in the SDU at the time still talk about it in positive terms, as became clear in our conversations. They consider the SDU some sort of integrated cooperation avant la lettre, with a highly operational orientation. People were located in one building, lines were short, and possibilities were abundant, also financially. Another key factor: the SDU itself was mandated to allocate investigations and staff. There was no intermediate layer of steering

Small country, Big Player 52 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

groups and intelligence officers. The management – a police chief and a public prosecutor – contributed ideas and provided cover for the sometimes unorthodox actions. The combination of information specialists, thematic experts and tactical investigation staff was crucial.

The SDU indisputably contributed significantly to the strengthening of the information position and the improvement and the image of the Netherlands abroad. But the question to what degree the SDU also managed to curb the synthetic drugs trade in the Netherlands remained.

Second intensification: ‘Joining forces against ecstasy’ Mid 1990s, it was the first time that the American Customs Service noticed the illegal trade in ecstasy, according to John Varrone, head of investigations for the American Customs Service (quoted in Husken & Vuijst, 2002). Couriers mainly originated in the Netherlands and Belgium. Varrone: ‘we only started to pay serious attention to it in 1997, when we seized 400,000 ecstasy pills.’ Smuggling increased rapidly: from 750,000 pills seized in 1998 to 3.5 million in 1999, and 9.3 million in 2000. It remains unclear to what extent this increase resulted from intensified checks. According to Varrone, the Israeli and Russian mafia were also behind the illegal trade. They were responsible for funding, production and distribution. To protect themselves, the leaders kept their distance from the couriers, who at that time were also sent from other European countries. Ecstasy was smuggled by parcel post too. The Neth- erlands remained the main source country. During public hearings in US Congress, reference was made to 80% to 90% of the pills in the US origi- nating in the Netherlands (Huskens & Vuijst, 2002). In September 2000, Prime Minister Kok visited the White House, where he met with President Clinton. The two were on good terms, also because of the joint involvement in the ‘Third Way’; an attempt to develop a political programme based on the right balance between the liberal market economy and the welfare state. At the end of the meeting, the President of the United States called the Dutch Prime Minister to account on the huge quantities of ecstasy flooding the United States. The US was highly critical. Kok was not amused.

The criticism Kok received at the White House had consequences. Upon his return he called a meeting with senior police chiefs and public prosecutors, and a few months later the Joining forces against ecstasy memorandum appeared, stating that €90 million would be made available for a four-year period (2002-2006). The multidisciplinary SDU was strengthened, and dedicated ecstasy teams were set up within the regional police forces. These operated from Amsterdam, The Hague, Zwolle, Rotterdam and Helmond, and were responsible for the allocation of investigations and staff. The authorities

Small country, Big Player 53 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

and investigative services involved were strengthened with staff and equipment. A lot of attention was paid to improving the cooperation between the various partners. These initiatives did not deviate much from those around the time SDU was established. History repeated itself to a large extent. Appar- ently an extra impulse was needed, despite the SDU’s success rate.

Although the memorandum was aimed at all aspects of the ecstasy chain, the emphasis was on the early stages of the process – the illegal import of precursors and chemicals, the production facilities required, the production in laboratories – and on smuggling of the substances to other countries. All services had to account for their actions to their own ministers. Management was in the hands of a management group chaired by the Ministry of Justice.

In 2002, the increased investigative efforts appeared to bear fruit, based on the work of the SDU. ‘This year, investigations were conducted in top gear’, according to Spapens (2006, p.157). The number of ongoing investigations – 145 – was at an absolute high. More raw materials and final products than ever were seized. A few leaders ended up in prison for a considerable period of time. Cooperation between the Dutch and the American authorities, and a deal with a prime suspect in the US, played a key role. It had a dissuasive effect on criminals in the Netherlands (Huskens & Vuijst, 2002). Dutch suspects were extradited to the US, where more severe punishments could be imposed in a total of thirteen cases (Spapens, 2006, p. 157). It was a controversial measure, but did have an effect on Dutch criminals. The prospect of a longer stay in an American prison, with a significantly stricter regime than in the Neth- erlands, was an unattractive scenario for Dutch criminals.3 A top criminal we interviewed was no longer interested in the American market after a few extraditions. All in all, the effect of all these efforts was that the export of ecstasy pills from the Netherlands to the United States decreased significantly. The more stringent border checks in the US after the attacks on 11 September 2001 also contributed to this decrease, as did the fact that part of the ecstasy export was taken over by Chinese groups in Canada.4

3 The deterrence was mainly caused by the fact that in the US, it could be several years before a case was tried; Dutch pill manufacturers did not feel like spending their pretrial detention in an American prison either. After a potential conviction in the US, Dutch criminals could usually serve their sentence in the Netherlands, where the duration of the sentence was often converted according Dutch norms (Spapens, 2006, p. 157). 4 This development did not continue on a large scale. The DEA’s 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment reported that in 2017, Canadian gangs exported tens of millions of pills to the US (p.14). In comparison, by our own calculations, nearly a billion ecstasy pills were produced in the Netherlands in 2017 (see Chapter 3).

Small country, Big Player 54 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

The international Synthetic Drugs Enforcement Conferences (Syndec), now organized every two years, starting in 2003, played an important role in the strategy of gathering and sharing knowledge, and promoting international cooperation. A person involved:

‘For Syndec we invited the whole world to the Netherlands, and guests were allocated roles in the working groups. If we had 100 persons, we would have hotel Sparrenhorst in Nunspeet fully booked. We booked the whole thing. It is a nice hotel, as it allowed no room for escape. This conference was an important vehicle for building up a network. Really, really important. We jointly considered the problem and came up with possible solutions. China, Russia, US, Canada, Australia; all the relevant countries participated. Everyone dealing with the fight against synthetic drugs from all over the world was represented at the conference. The conferences were legendary.’

The relationship with the US played an important role in the creation of the memorandum (Neve et al., 2007, p.64). It led to an embassy council and two police liaisons in the US. In addition to the operational activities, these diplomatic initiatives probably contributed to the fact that the Netherlands was no longer criticized, but, instead, praised for its approach to ecstasy. In 2006, the White House stated: ‘The government of the Netherlands has achieved considerable success in countering the production and flow of MDMA (Ecstasy) to the United States’ (Neve et al., 2007, p. 53). Thus one of the main objectives of the memorandum was achieved: the export of ecstasy no longer put the relationship with the US under pressure. The Netherlands were taken off the Majors list, the list of the most important source countries for drugs smuggling to the US. Countries on this list risk economic and other sanctions (Neve et al., 2007, p. 52).5 This meant that internal pressure to continue the fight against ecstasy decreased.

The Dutch Centre for Scientific Research and Documentation (WODC), together with the Intraval bureau, analyzed the consequences of the Join- ing forces against ecstasy memorandum. ‘Cahier 2007: final evaluation of the ecstasy memorandum’ is aimed at input, process, output, and outcome. Regarding the input – the deployment of personnel and resources – the evaluation concluded that this initially went as agreed. Later, as a result of reorganizations, it became more difficult to identify the personnel deployed, because they were no longer labeled, or the actual number of staff may have decreased. The process, the cooperation, and the information exchange with partners

5 In fact, the Netherlands was not mentioned in the 2004 Majors List itself, which included countries like Columbia and Afghanistan, but it received criticism in the accompanying text. This did not make it any less unpleasant (Neve et al., 2007, p.52).

Small country, Big Player 55 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

at both the national and the international level was judged as predominantly positive, as was the number of activities engaged in (output). One of the evaluation’s conclusions was:

‘In terms of the number of investigations conducted, the reorganization does not seem to have had any drawbacks.’ Immediately adding: ‘….although these numbers do not provide a comprehensive picture: we did not differen- tiate between major and minor investigations.’

According to the memorandum, it was difficult to measure the outcome – substantial reduction of the production of and trafficking in ecstasy. This not only applied to the reduction as such, if any, but also to the question to what extent it could be ascribed to the memorandum and the measures it described. Other factors may have had an influence too, such as the demand for ecstasy, the availability of precursors, or the efforts of other countries in the fight against ecstasy. There was no simple way of measuring the failure or success of the memorandum. There were several indicators, however, that may have implied reduction of the production in the Netherlands, and reduction of the role of the Netherlands on the international ecstasy market. But there were also indicators pointing towards continued production in the Netherlands. Thus, due to scientific prudence, the answer remained unclear. No visible effects was politically unacceptable. Reality ruled out visible effects. The political benefit was crystal clear: no damning criticism, but praise at the highest US level.

Yet, a certain degree of optimism about the effects of government action gradually emerged, not only prompted by the praise from the US, but also by the results of the ‘source countries strategy’. The idea behind this was that the problem should be approached ‘at the source’ as much as possible, which meant at the source: the precursors, which mainly came from Russia and China. Relevant contacts were established with these countries. Moscow and Beijing were visited regularly.

Fact is that afterwards, by the end of the 2000s, the precursor flow from these countries did seem to dry up. BMK factories in Perm and Wolgograd (Russia) were closed. The Chinese authorities more strictly monitored the production of PMK. The degree to which the Netherlands had any influence on these developments is unknown. The influence of the United States was probably at least equally important. Anyway, synthetic drugs production in the Nether- lands appeared to be hampered by the reduced availability of precursors. From 2007 to 2009, there were indications of a serious dip in ecstasy production in the Netherlands, and also in amphetamine production, but to a lesser extent; see Figures 4.1 and 4.2.

Small country, Big Player 56 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

Figure 4.1 MDMA and amphetamine precursors and preprecursors seized (2001-2005)

MDMA (pre)precursors seized

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 2011 2015 2013 2012 2014 2010 2001 2005 2003 2007 2002 2008 2004 2006 2009

PMK safrol PMK-glycidate sassefrasolie pmk-glycidic acid piperonal

Amphetamine (pre)precursors seized 70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

2012 2013 2014 2015 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

BMK APAAN BMK glycidate phenylacetic acid

Source: Central Unit, 2016.

Small country, Big Player 57 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

FigureFiguur 4.2 4.2 SynthetischeSynthetic drugslabs drugs labs in inNederland the Netherlands (2003-2015) (2003-2015)

Synthetische drugslabs in Nederland 30 25 20

15 10 5 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

amfetaminelabs mdma-labs conversielabs Bron: Central Unit, 2016.

During this period – 2005-2010 – the synthetic drugs problem appeared to be getting under control. The huge growth seemed to level off. Both national and international demand appeared to be falling (Central Unit, 2007). A number of synthetic drugs producers were convicted and sentenced to at least a few years’ imprisonment. Criticism from other countries had been silenced.

A result of these developments was that the synthetic drugs problem gradually disappeared from the political agenda (Spapens, 2006). In 2004, the SDU became embedded in the National Crime Squad (NCS), and became Unit South. The participating partners withdrew their employees and seconded employees went back to their own units. From then on they were only made available for concrete projects. Exclusive orientation on synthetic drugs was no longer an option for NCS staff; they were given a broader set of tasks. In fact, the SDU was discontinued. The number of investigations into synthetic drugs decreased. The SDU’s expertise position was taken over by the Expertise Cen- tre for Synthetic Drugs and Precursors (ESDP), which was part of the NCS. After 2006, its role was systematically reduced as a result of reorganizations and decreased priority for synthetic drugs.

Because of the assumed success of the approach, it was nearly impossible for the people involved to take action against these developments, as new priorities and challenges were waiting. As a result, the inventiveness and perseverance of criminals were underestimated rather severely.

Small country, Big Player 58 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

4.5 Meanwhile in synthetic drugs circles

After the dip between 2007 and 2009, ecstasy production rapidly recovered, much to the surprise of the investigative services. Preprecursors were being developed, which turned out to work as well as the earlier precursors, but at a significantly lower price, sometimes no more than a tenth of the former price. From 2015, the Dutch quality product, the ecstasy pill, made a full recovery. The changing markets resulted in the production of ‘better’ ecstasy, containing a higher dose of MDMA. The focus was still on the provinces of North Brabant, Limburg and South Holland, as shown by Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Drugs locations (storage/lab) by province in 2017

Groningen 0 Friesland 4 Drenthe 3 Overijssel 4 Gelderland 11 Flevoland 0 Utrecht 7 North Holland 9 South Holland 15 Zeeland 5 Noord-Brabant 48 Limburg 16 total 122

Source: data file of the 2017 synthetic drugs study, see appendix 2.

So the results of the efforts to curb synthetic drugs, MDMA in particular, in the Netherlands had been cancelled out after only a few years, and there had even been serious adverse effects. Insiders in the investigative services speak of a synthetic drugs world that had become much more complex because of the emergence of preprecursors: ‘we created a multi-headed monster.’ Pre- viously it sufficed to look for oily substances, but now powdery substances had to be checked too, producing new challenges for the Customs Service. Chinese and Lithuanian intermediary organizations ceased to exist, because criminals could now directly order legal substances in China, which increased profits. The quantity of drugs waste increased significantly, as the use of preprecursors added an extra step to the production process – the conversion stage – which produced a lot of waste. The risks involved in the production of synthetic drugs increased, for instance due to the use of heating mantles, which increased the fire risk. In addition, a number of the traditional pill pro-

Small country, Big Player 59 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

ducers had increasingly become involved in cocaine trafficking in the context of criminal risk spreading.

By then, the police and the judiciary assumed that the production and use of ecstasy and amphetamine had increased again, both in the Netherlands and worldwide, to a higher level than before (see Central Unit, 2016). The production method had changed too. The previous shortage in precursors no longer existed. In a sense, production options were limitless at the time; seizures, even of large quantities of raw materials, were of course a setback, but had much less of an influence on the production or the profitability than before.

The introduction of preprecursors had been more of a game changer than was realized for a long time. Their emergence increased the already considerable profits in the synthetic drugs world. Part of the production now takes place on a larger scale, and has become more professional and specialized; over 1,000 l of PMK/BMK was found in about a fifth of the labs and storages discovered in 2017 (see Table 4.2). The professional set-up of some of these labs by no means resembles the shabby shacks often shown on TV.

Table 4.2 Scope of the laboratories and storage locations in 2017 number percentage large (1001 l or more of PMK/BMK 18 14.8 medium (101-1000) 39 32 small (100 or less) 37 30.3 other 23 18.8 unknown 5 4.1 total 122 100 Source: data file of the 2017 synthetic drugs study, see Appendix 2.

At the same time, these developments have brought synthetic drugs to the attention of new groups. The start-up capital required is smaller than it used to be. The elimination of Chinese intermediaries and the rise of the Internet facilitate easier access to preprecursors. There are strong indications that the number of synthetic drugs producers has increased. As a result, the scale of part of the production has become smaller. Part of the smaller-scale production has moved to residential areas. Table 4.3 shows the connection between the scale of the labs and storages discovered, and the locations where they were found: residential, rural or industrial areas. Smaller labs were mainly found in residential areas, and large ones in both rural and industrial areas.

Small country, Big Player 60 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

Table 4.3 Sizes at the various types of location residential rural industrial other unknown total large 3 9 6 - - 18 medium 9 13 15 1 1 39 small 24 6 6 1 - 37 total 36 28 27 2 1 94 Source: data file of the 2017 synthetic drugs study, see appendix 2.

A result of all this is that there are newcomers on the synthetic drugs market, called kamikaze pilots by one of the old producers. These developments have put the prizes of ecstasy and amphetamine under pressure in the Netherlands. The traditional pill producers complain that ecstasy and amphetamine have become less profitable in the Netherlands. This prompts criminal attempts to strengthen control on the national and international markets. Cooperation with criminal motorcycle gangs can be useful in achieving this objective.

Over the past few years, the criminal motor gangs have become increasingly important in the production and export of synthetic drugs, which probably has three reasons. Firstly, they form a ‘natural’ and protected meeting place for criminals. Secondly they form a protective shield: with the criminal motorcycle gangs acting as organizations that can protect their members against possible violent actions by rival criminals. And thirdly, they have contacts in other countries. The criminal motor gangs have chapters in countries like Spain and Morocco, which facilitates international production and trafficking flows. However, this connection with criminal motor gangs has not solely produced advantages for the initial synthetic drugs criminals. The motor gangs have had a high profile in society and have thus drawn the attention of the authorities, who have put a lot of effort into curbing the criminal motor gangs through both administrative and criminal prosecution.

4.6 The Netherlands Police: further fragmentation

Meanwhile, the SDU as part of the National Crime Squad was discontinued, and from 2006, the remaining SDU members have been distributed among tactical investigation teams. They have to develop from specialization to gener- alization. All staff have to be able to do everything. A person involved:

‘This was an idea they had copied from the British police. The new commissioner said: ‘Let’s use a different approach.’ All teams will have generic responsibilities. So these highly experienced ecstasy teams suddenly had to deal with child pornography. Or terrorism.’

Small country, Big Player 61 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

The same happened to the members of the Expertise Centre for Drugs and Precursors (EDSP). In 2008, the teams were renamed Flexible Intelligence Expertise Teams (FIET), and multiple subjects were added, resulting in fewer people having to do more tasks. At the time, frustration was rife among the investigators involved.

The Netherlands Police was launched in the beginning of 2013. The Central Intelligence Division (DLIO) was formed, in which the FIET was incorporated. The information and expertise arm was separated from the investigations arm. From then on, synthetic drugs experts and information analysists operated under different leadership; they were managed by someone from the intelligence division, no longer by the same chief of investigations. Requests for staff had to pass several desks, and specific knowledge of synthetic drugs was often lacking. In 2006, the EDSP team still included ten analysts and ten Criminal Intelligence experts. They dissipated in 2013, as did the liaison with the International Legal Assistance Centre. As a result, the remaining synthetic drugs experts working for the Central Investigations Division received a deceasing amount of information: ‘We receive less than ten percent of what we used to get,’ It became increasingly difficult to reliably assess what was going on in the field of synthetic drugs in the Netherlands, let alone keep track of developments abroad. ‘This means that little by little we’re going blind in this country, as we don’t get to see anything anymore.’ When gathering the information for Chapter 3 (about the scope of the synthetic drugs world), we encountered one of the consequences, as information about the scope of the synthetic drugs production had to be collected bit by bit throughout the country, and through endless digging in raw operational data. This is symbolic for the ‘lousy information position’ on synthetic drugs that has by now arisen, according to one of the people involved.

In the SDU period, there was ‘a large integrated group’, with partners like the FIOD and the Customs Service, that itself was in charge of and focused on the fight against synthetic drugs. The SDU broke up into all kinds of small subgroups, with different specializations and leaders, which slowed things down and obstructed coordination. According to the calculations of the expertise centre, the actual number of hours available for the fight against synthetic drugs and precursors dropped from 450,000 in 32006 to 80,000 in 2014. In 2013, the last year we have reliable figures for, about 256 FTE were involved in the fight against ecstasy (Neve et al., 2007, p.23), whereas in later years this number was reduced. Estimates produced by the people involved indicate over 200 FTE (Central Criminal Investigations Division, Public Prosecution Service, FIOD, police units, NFI) in 2017, but the wide range of tasks hampered determination of an exact number. This number includes the staff of the 2014 South Netherlands Enhancement Team (see below), some of whom

Small country, Big Player 62 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

also have other tasks. Because of the huge work load, professionals involved in the investigation of synthetic drugs criminals often feel they are fighting a rearguard action.

Recent developments In conclusion it should be mentioned that new players in the fight against synthetic drugs have come to the fore, two of whom we will discuss. Firstly we want to mention Europol, the law enforcement agency of the European Union, which was formally established in 1999 – there had been a European Drugs Unit since 1994. The purpose of Europol was to strengthen the effectiveness and cooperation of the member states’ authorities to better fight serious international crime and terrorism. Europol has no executive power, but is a supporting service mainly aimed at information analysis and exchange. The organization is located in The Hague, and has gained a clearer profile over the past few years. Since 2010, it has been working with a 4-year policy cycle, with two prominent components. The first one is the Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), which contains an analysis of the main criminal developments in Europe, on the basis of which recommendations are made. More than in the past, the SOCTA document draws external attention, in national political discussions and in the media, for instance, and the graphs we presented in the first chapter have been taken from the SOCTA. Based on the SOCTA, the European Justice and Home Affairs Council determined specific priorities, around which the EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platforms Against Criminal Threats) groups were established. One of these EMPACT groups focusses on synthetic drugs and NPS, and has the Neth- erlands as co-driver and Poland as driver. An EMPACT group develops joint activities aimed at sharing information and expertise, also for the benefit of operational actions. A Top X of European synthetic drugs criminals has been drawn up, to mention one of their actions. The individual countries remain responsible for the actual implementation of operational actions; they need to provide the required staff, which is not always easy, as is the case in the Netherlands.

Another important development is the internal pressure that is arising to combat organized crime, especially under the auspices of the mayors of the larger cities in the south of the Netherlands. This has made the local administration an important new player, and gave a strong boost to the development of an ‘integrated approach’, in which organized crime – undermining – is not just dealt with in criminal court, but also via civil law and the tax authorities. The Regional Intelligence and Expertise Centres (the RIECs) are the organizational representation of this development.

Small country, Big Player 63 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

An important moment was the establishment of the B5 Taskforce by the end of 2010. In addition to the five largest cities in the province of North Brabant (B5), the Ministry of Security and Justice, the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the Police, the tax authorities (FIOD), and the Royal Dutch Marechaussee (KMar) were represented in this taskforce. In its first few years, it mainly focused on strengthening the single administration idea, and experiments with cooperation on subjects like the confiscation of criminally obtained profits. From 1 January 2013, the taskforce continued as Taskforce Brabant-Zeeland, with more explicit attention for smaller municipalities, and with an operational focus on nine spearheads, including the fight against synthetic drugs. From 1 January 2017, further improvements have been made, with attention for strengthening social and administrative resilience, and the development of ‘1 smart administration’. Interim evaluation of the taskforce showed that it significantly contributed to raising awareness of the problem, and was a – sometimes unorthodox – driving force behind the cooperation between government organizations (Boutelier & Broekhuizen, 2016). The degree to which they succeeded in curbing undermining crime was not included in the evaluation.

In line with the activities of the taskforce, the Police and the OM autonomously assigned another 140 FTE – 125 from the police force, 15 from the OM – to the ‘South Netherlands Enhancement Team’ in 2015. In fact, no ‘extra’ employees were involved; existing personnel, which had to also continue doing their other tasks, was ‘relabeled’. ‘At their own expense’, was what some people said: these people were going to carry out the work that the police units themselves should have done already. As a result, a number of international investigations were left on the shelf, according to some of the people involved. In any case, a few major hits were realized under the responsibility of the intensification officers, such as the dismantling of an IKEA-like chemicals storage in Den Bommel and the Explorer investigation into a business in Best, disguised as a service centre for pubs and restaurants, which turned out to be a meeting place for synthetic drugs and other criminals. We will get back to this later.

4.7 Conclusion

What stands out in this brief history of the Dutch synthetic drugs world? Firstly that the Dutch producers of synthetic drugs managed to maintain their top position in the world ranking, despite the intensification of the fight against synthetic drugs, initially via the SDU, and later the Joining Forces Against Ecstasy memorandum. There may have been a temporary dip in production, which rather quickly recovered to a level that was higher than before the dip.

Small country, Big Player 64 A brief history of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands

Secondly, that the Netherlands is always a few years behind other countries when it comes to banning substances. This was the case for amphetamine in the 1970s, and for ecstasy in the 1980s. This timeframe created space for Dutch criminals to rapidly turn the Netherlands into a source country for the legal production of these substances, and to subsequently profit once the substances became illegal.

Thirdly, pressure from abroad has often been required to prompt the Neth- erlands into intensification of the fight against synthetic drugs. Only when Sweden (1960-‘70s), France (1990s), and the US (beginning of this century) insisted – sometimes behind the scenes, but sometimes also in the public eye – were the Dutch authorities prepared to take further action.

The loss of foreign pressure as a result of supposed successes, plus a series of reorganizations then systematically reduced the priority given to synthetic drugs. Between 2005 and 2010, this development was fueled by optimism about the results achieved. Significant reduction of the flow of – especially – PMK and BMK from China appeared to decrease the supply of and demand for synthetic drugs. But appearances can be deceptive.

Since around 2010 on, production has been growing to a higher level than before.

In the Netherlands, this has resulted in new reactions. Led by a few mayors, mainly from North Brabant, the issue of the illegal production of cannabis and synthetic drugs was put back on the agenda. In close cooperation with the Ministry of Security and Justice (now Justice and Security), the Public Prosecution Service and other partners, a taskforce was established, which by now covers the entire provinces of North Brabant and Zeeland. ‘Integrated actions’ and ‘one authority’ have become central mantras, which is in fact a return to the ideas behind the SDU, but in a more extensive form, with a more explicit and sometimes leading role for the public administration, particularly the municipalities. This means that for the first time in the history of the Netherlands, severe internal pressure prompted intensification of the fight against synthetic drugs and other crimes. Previously, heavy external pressure was always required to achieve this.

In the next chapter we will focus on the emergence of amphetamine and ecstasy criminality in the Netherlands, and especially on the question why it has become so extensive in the south of the country.

Small country, Big Player The original Brabant-Limburg synthetic drugs criminals 5

Introduction In the 1960s and ’70s, before members of the traveler community and people from working-class neighbourhoods in North Brabant and Limburg started producing synthetic drugs, individuals, families and groups from these circles were already involved in serious offences. They committed violent robberies of both ordinary citizens and other criminals, all sorts of ram raids and safe raids. In the 1970s, they switched to synthetic drugs production (section 5.1), and then developed from small-time criminals into major-league criminals in twenty years’ time (section 5.2).

5.1 From brute force to synthetic drugs

In the 1960s and ’70s, brute force was required to commit crimes. In the crim- inological study conducted for the Van Traa committee (1996), ample attention was paid to this North Brabant and Limburg conglomerate of thieves, poachers, and smugglers. They earned a lot of money with their heinous crimes, but always knew this meant they had the undivided attention of the police and the judiciary (Fijnaut, 1996, p. 47-48).

The disadvantage of this brutal and visible criminal violence was that key figures were regularly sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In 1979, six of them were convicted, including a gang leader who was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The man lived at a trailer park in Eindhoven. When he was released, he and several of his accomplices drove in an extremely expensive Mercedes to Uden, where they robbd a remote farm. They stole over f 4000, shot the farmer’s son, and shot an elderly woman in the back when she reached for the telephone. This time, the traveller from Eindhoven was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.

This type of violence frequently occurred in the 1970s and ’80 in the North Brabant and Limburg border regions, which caused major mental stress among police personnel. Nervousness and fear pervaded the police shop floor on the nights the gangs were active. Chances were that encountering these criminals would lead to risky pursuits or shootings. Travelers and working-class neighbourhood criminals also more systematically caused trouble and were involved in violence on a daily basis. Violence against the police was common. Police officers avoided notorious locations – streets or trailer parks –

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or ensured the deployment of sufficient manpower when conducting an arrest or a raid. At the time, stopping and questioning a person could easily get out of hand. Violence and abusive behaviour, also against the police, and causing trouble appeared to be a matter of course.

In the 1980s, the streetscape at these infamous locations slowly improved. The violence decreased, the trouble was reduced, and police assistance became rarely called for. Matters were dealt with internally at trailer parks and in working-class neighbourhoods. In about ten years’ time, conspicuous violent crime was replaced by three main forms of drugs crime: cannabis production; hash trafficking between on the one hand the travelers and working-class neighbourhood criminals, and on the other criminals who imported the substance into the Netherlands from Pakistan and Morocco; and the production of synthetic drugs, first amphetamine, and from the 1980s ecstasy too.

Police officers remember that drugs crime had a beneficial effect on public order:

‘The Kempen gang was involved in serious crime. I think it would still shock us today. It was heavy stuff. It was really heavy. In that sense, the ensuing period was very calm. In this peace and quiet we lost track, I think, of everything to do with cannabis. Home growing generated huge profits, and the same could be said about ecstasy.’

The violent small-time criminals from Brabant developed into major Dutch drugs criminals, who did business with Amsterdam criminals and set up drugs routes to other countries. Peter van D. and his North Brabant accomplices from the cities of Tilburg, Eindhoven, and ’s-Hertogenbosch became big-time criminals who were good at producing amphetamine. Other criminals organized cannabis cultivation and sold their product to buyers from the Randstad conurbation, and others.

By the end of the 1970s, a notorious ram raider from Oss, for instance, rede- fined his criminal activities from violent crime with a high risk of being caught to drugs trafficking with a significantly lower risk of being caught. By now, his sons and grandsons have taken over the drugs business. The family is involved in the same activities as many other leading criminal families in the North Brabant and Limburg region: they combine soft drugs crime with synthetic drugs. In the 1980s, the profit of synthetic drugs production by far exceeded the profits of cannabis trafficking. They successfully recruited lab technicians and errand boys for all types of services with regard to synthetic drugs production at trailer parks and in working-class areas. The production of synthetic drugs requires chemical knowhow and production

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locations, and is overall more sophisticated than setting up a cannabis nursery. At that time, networks were developed, consisting of top criminals, organizers and people carrying out the various jobs in the field of synthetic drugs.

The paradox is that the switch from simple but serious violent crime to less violent drugs crime had consequences that were appreciated by police officers, mayors and politicians alike: less violence, much needed improved public order at specific locations, and the potential to claim that the Dutch drugs policy was successful because of the decrease in drugs nuisance and the limited damage of drugs use to public health. An implied coalition arose: notorious criminal circles stayed under the radar as much as possible and earned huge sums of money, citizens benefited from cannabis cultivation as extra earnings, and the police were relieved that serious criminal violence was significantly reduced. A shift took place in the public’s idea of the police: crime fighting was relegated to second or third position, and local triumvirates, consisting of the mayor, the chief of police and the public prosecutor, focussed their drugs policies on combating hard drugs nuisance. Professional and criminal respondents all agreed on one thing: the 1980s and ’90 were ideal decades for drugs criminals from North Brabant and Limburg, with major profit margins and a small risk of being caught for synthetic drugs crime or cannabis cultivation.

The emergence of customary leaders and families In 1967, a German amphetamine smuggler settled in Limburg: Kalle Pauksch, who we met in Chapter 4. He simply bought the amphetamine pills or speed pills from Dutch wholesalers or imported powder from Italy (De Kort, 1995), and exported these products to Sweden and probably also to other countries, such as the UK, Germany and Belgium. Swedish investigative services made a major effort to have Pauksch arrested, and to have amphetamine banned in the Netherlands too. The latter came to pass in 1972. Shortly after, Pauksch was arrested and extradited to Sweden, which had to be repeated in 1977, after he had escaped.

The Limburg amphetamine criminals no longer needed Pauksch after his arrests. They simply copied his method of selling amphetamine to foreign buyers with a large profit margin. Producing amphetamine pills was not very complicated, and Limburg criminals were highly motivated to try their hand at this. They already had experience with the production of illegal alcohol, and benzedrine: speed pills that give the users a major energy boost. So the Limburg criminals quickly mastered the not very complicated amphetamine production process.

‘The formulas for producing it could easily be obtained. It is a bit of a cliché, but nine out of ten had past experience with the chemical process of the

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clandestine alcohol distilleries. The same names had switched to synthetic drugs.’

The synthetic drugs market was more or less handed to the Limburg underworld on a silver platter. This came in handy, because the market for clandestine alcohol had collapsed (Van Schoonberghe et al., 2012). The risk of getting caught was much smaller for drugs production than for classic crimes, such as cracking safes.

In under ten years, a network of serious amphetamine producing criminals developed in Limburg. There was an old group of former safe crackers and alcohol distillers, but there were also young guys, who learned the trade on the job, including Rob van L. and Peter van D. They operated laboratories in barns and warehouses, and built up a foreign customer base. They started to look for errand boys for their criminal handiwork, and particularly Peter van D. would develop into a top criminal.

After amphetamine had been made punishable in the Netherlands, laboratories emerged in the crime figures for the first time. Not much later, in the 1980s, the Netherlands gained a worldwide top position in this field. Accord- ing to the Central Investigations Intelligence Service Netherlands, our country was the most important amphetamine producer in the world (Moors & Spapens, 2017). By then, amphetamine production had expanded from Lim- burg to North Brabant. Peter van D. had explained the production process to a few experienced synthetic drugs criminals in Brabant:

‘By the end of the 1970s, in a shed in Limburg, Peter van D. taught the D. and Van W brothers how to produce synthetic drugs. The brothers had driven from Tilburg to Limburg with blinded windows. Peter van D. was the king. He could pull all the strings. It is unclear whether he still is the biggest player. They all know each other anyway.’

‘The D. brothers were blindfolded and transported in a van to Limburg. Afterwards they started producing their own in Tilburg. They started as cooks and ended as main cooks. If you’ve got the knowledge, you can also purchase the materials.’

Halfway through the 1980s, the initial Limburg and North Brabant synthetic drugs criminals had a shot at another easy win. In 1986, the United Nations had listed MDMA (ecstasy) as a banned substance; America had already done so a year earlier. Because ecstasy use hardly caused any problems in the Netherlands, it remained legal until the end of 1988. The criminal infrastructure that had been developed in Limburg and Brabant as part of the amphet-

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amine production catered for this chance. They took on the production and export of ecstasy. Ecstasy labs popped up. In the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s, it was the American market that was particularly interesting. Dutch synthetic drugs criminals soon managed to produce reasonable to good quality pills, and to meet demand in a fast-growing worldwide market. Ecstasy not only became a popular party drug in America, it also gained popularity in the Middle East, Australia and European countries like the UK. Dutch producers could provide good quality synthetic drugs via reasonably reliable transport routes. A combination of ecstasy and amphetamine was also possible, if desired.

Who were the key figures in Brabant and Limburg in the 1970s and ’80s? Most respondents think there was a handful of key figures, surrounded by a network of prominent criminals and criminal families. The shortlist of key figures invariably includes Peter van D., Robbie van L., Janus van W. en de R brothers. Peter van D. is said to have been the ‘ecstasy king’ of the Netherlands in the 1970s and ’80s. He worked from Limburg, where he lived in a ‘large villa on the hill’. In the circle surrounding these key figures, the D. brothers, Piet P., Robert van V. and John H. stand out.

‘There were four to five really big guys, and some ten guys in total who controlled the market. They managed the entire production, had the contacts, had intermediaries, and closely monitored the money flows. Some of them came from trailer parks, some of them from Dutch organized crime. A couple of the key figures – they were underestimated – were the R. brothers from the Oss trailer park. The ones that aren’t in prison or haven’t died yet are still involved in synthetic drugs today, and otherwise their sons. […] There was also this guy in Zuid-Limburg on that hill.’

Their residence ‘in the countryside’ and their past as alcohol distillers or safe crackers contributed to the Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals being underestimated in the 1980s and ’90s. In the Randstad conurbation their activities were considered simple and unthreatening crimes, committed by provincials who did not want to work on a farm or in a factory: ‘no small- holder farmers, but small-time criminals, that was the idea.’ Many people were happy that at least the violence committed by some trailer park criminals, such as the Kempen gang, had been curbed, and that the visible drugs hotspots attended by junkies and heroin and cocaine dealers were gradually disappearing from the scene.

Halfway the 1990s, police and judicial subject-matter experts were shocked by the scope of the synthetic drugs production they were faced with at the time. The genie was out of the bottle for quite a while:

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‘The idea was that the scope was no more than a few million pills a year, mainly produced in a few shabby former alcohol distilleries deep in the heart of Limburg, and near the Belgian border in North Brabant. Then we checked who were really involved, and what the real scope was. In 1995, we caught the first real labs. At the time we dismantled a huge lab in. This lab alone could produce two million ecstasy pills a night, which was really huge at the time.’

5.2 From small-time criminals to top criminals

The criminal leaders in Limburg and North Brabant who spotted and exploited the opportunities on the synthetic drugs market soon became interesting partners for Amsterdam and foreign top criminals. They made a transition from rearguard crime to the worldwide growth market of amphetamine and ecstasy. Until about 2005, the key figures of Brabant-Limburg synthetic drugs crime had the wind in their sails. These small-time criminals were able to grow into renowned top criminals due to five developments: a. Business with leading international criminals; b. Cooperation with Amsterdam criminals; c. Chemical skills; d. Chinese supply routes; e. Crisis in the Dutch investigations division;

Re a. Business with leading international criminals The production capacity formed the basis for the national breakthrough of Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals, and, overnight, made them interesting partners for organized international top criminals. We will give a few examples of cooperation with Turkish, British and Israeli drugs criminals.

In the 1990s, the then SDU gained excellent insight into the large-scale trade and barter trade of North Brabant criminals with Turkish criminals. This was because infiltration programmes were launched, which included cooperation with foreign police services. As a result, a network of Turkish drugs criminals came to the fore, with a key role for a few drugs brokers. The Turkish criminals had a lot of experience with the export of heroin to the Netherlands and other European countries. It would have been a waste not to use the existing transport lines both ways. So the heroin of Turkish brokers was exchanged for cocaine, synthetic cocaine and ecstasy pills. The main Turkish suspects had intensive contacts with leading North Brabant synthetic drugs criminals. The Turkish criminals had settled in North Brabant, where they had legitimate businesses. They owned shawarma (shoarma) restaurants – the longest-running investigation was given the code name ‘Shoarma’ – and other businesses.

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They worked together with Dutch entrepreneurs in the same line of business, who had access to the local administration. According to a respondent, this was exactly what a specific Turkish kingpin did too.

‘But X. had created an image of a simple guy who had worked his way up, had become foreman, had saved and then bought a number of shawarma joints and other businesses. Eventually, all this turned out to be a cover: money laundering, money laundering, money laundering. He was no simple labourer at all. He had gone to university and had been sent to the Nether- lands as a mole. He lorded it over the 4M drugs gang in Arnhem. He was also a level up from the drugs dealer from Tiel, who operated throughout the Netherlands at the time and managed his business from Eindhoven. Everyone thought I. was the man in charge in the South of the Netherlands. But if you listened to the taps, there was only one person who decided what was going to happen, namely X. We got wind of this once one of our informers had befriended him, and they were setting up a new drugs route to the UK together.’

The principal suspect was spotted in the company of a mayor on the golf course, and at other locations. They engaged in business, as the Turkish suspects paid, for instance, for the restoration of a catholic monument. In the motherland, the contacts of the Turkish principal suspects had far-reaching political-administrative influence. In the 1990s, the Turkish criminals used an interesting network: from travelers, via North Brabant entrepreneurs, via the Dutch local administration, to Turkey. They were photographed in the company of smiling Dutch government members.

‘Heroin trafficking became mixed with ecstasy trafficking. Barter trade increased. I myself was involved in the Shoarma investigation at the time; a major infiltration project. Probably the largest we ever conducted in the Netherlands. For two and a half years we cooperated with the Turks and the Americans. We discovered the main broker for large heroin shipments. […] He maintained […] intensive contacts with not only the mayor of X. on the golf course, but also with nearly all major criminals we knew from the ecstasy world. Heroin had never been a popular drug in Turkey, but was a popular export product, and was exchanged for the immensely popular ecstasy. Clubs in Trukey were replete with ecstasy. This guy came to the fore as broker for hundreds of kilos of cocaine. During the infiltration project, we also noticed the development of barter trade. All this happened around 1996. The heroin arrived from Turkey and was transported to the Nether- lands and the UK. But payment often took place in the form of barter trade: synthetic cocaine, which we saw for the first time too, and pills.’

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A request for legal assistance that ‘no one wanted to deal with’ put the SDU on the trail of a British top criminal, who was also very interested in barter trade, a large batch of cocaine in exchange for ecstasy pills, as we mentioned briefly in Chapter 4. The man wanted to strike it rich on the ecstasy market and almost automatically ended up in North Brabant.

‘We obtained information from the UK, which probably had an infiltrator. A huge shipment of cocaine was on its way to the Netherlands and would probably be exchanged for pills. The transaction was to take place somewhere near Roosendaal […] And what happened? Lorries did indeed show up. The whole investigation didn’t take more than a week. A week later we hit the jackpot. We had 500 kg of cocaine and a million ecstasy pills, and who were on top of it? The Englishman and some major drugs lord from South-America. They were having a meeting. They personally attended the exchange. […] We agreed not to arrest anyone in the Netherlands. It would all go to the UK and Germany. The coke eventually went to Germany, where they were all arrested. It wasn’t our case, but the Englishman was arrested driving behind that lorry with a million pills.’

Soon the UK became an important market for synthetic drugs from the Neth- erlands, mainly for amphetamine, but also for ecstasy. As one of the criminals involved formulated it at the time: ‘so much is going there, everyone is addicted there’. At around 2000, he was arrested for supplying ecstasy pills to people in Manchester. There were only 30,700 pills involved. It wasn’t fair, according to the criminal in question: ‘These investigators were hell bent on getting me convicted. But I had nothing to do with those 30,700. I did transport other shipments to the UK, however. Much larger ones.’ Those were the golden days: ‘I could have sold more than I could produce’ (Tops & Tromp, 2017).

In Chapter 4 we read that the Americans estimated that 80% to 90% of the pills in the US originated in the Netherlands. As it turned out (Spapens, 2006 based on DEA reports), smuggling to the US was mainly the work of The Israeli Connection: organized criminal groups consisting of Israelis, and Dutch and American nationals of Israeli descent. As we mentioned in Chapter 4, their couriers included young Hasidic Jews, who did not arouse suspicion because of their looks. The operation was led from Amsterdam (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). In 2000, the SDU, too, noticed the key role of Israeli criminals in the logistical process of international ecstasy trafficking. An SDU member:

‘… At the time (in 2000), a major investigation had just been conducted into a huge export route to the United States. As it turned out, the Americans themselves had taken over. There were a few big players in Florida, who had a number of contacts in the Netherlands, mainly among Israeli dealers. The

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core team had conducted a joint investigation with Israel into the coke route between the Netherlands and Israel. The guys involved turned out to also be contacts of the big players in the United States, who were directly linked to mafia-like structures.’

Husken and Vuijst (2002) give a detailed description of the working method and the investigation of a few of these syndicates around ringleaders like Sean Erez and Jacob ‘Koki’ Orgad. What stands out is that the pills of Orgad, who was convicted in the US, allegedly came from the Dutchman André ‘last name unknown’. André has always remained unknown; the Dutch police have never been able to trace him.

People from the Dominican Republic were also frequently involved in ecstasy and cocaine smuggling. In 2006, about 45 Dutch nationals were detained in Dominican prisons. They were mainly drugs couriers, who tried to import ecstasy from the Netherlands or export cocaine and other substances to the Netherlands. The SDU put a lot of effort into investigating the Dominicans, resulting in the reduction of this flow. The stricter checks in the US after 9/11 2001 also helped, as we saw earlier.

In short, in the 1980s and ‘90s, Dutch synthetic drugs criminals were interesting for top criminals the world over as business partners, buyers or suppliers. The synthetic drugs produced were of good quality, and their shape could be adapted to local requirements. The effective infrastructure offered opportunities for other types of drugs, enabling the one stop shopping concept and barter trade; Dutch synthetic drugs criminals could get you ‘just about anything’.

Re b. Cooperation with Amsterdam criminals In the second half of the 1980s, partnerships were formed between synthetic drugs producers from the south of the Netherlands and Amsterdam criminals. Amsterdam criminals Klaas Bruinsma and ‘De Hakkelaar’, for instance, had contact with North Brabant criminals. The Amsterdam criminals noticed that a lot of money could be made with amphetamine and ecstasy. Criminal funds, mental toughness and foreign contacts were available on both sides, even though these had been built up in other criminal markets.

‘Of old, the R. brothers had ties with guys from Amsterdam, such as De Hakkelaar. Initially, Amsterdam traffickers only earned money in the hash trade, where profits were lower while requiring a much greater effort than the pills. Many of these hash growers switched to synthetic drugs.’

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Some Amsterdam criminals started to produce their own synthetic drugs, or bought them from people in North Holland, such as Syl V., but others exchanged other types of drugs for synthetic drugs, bought them, or funded their production, alone or together with others, which was often carried out by networks in Brabant and Limburg. The interplay between criminals from Bra- bant and Limburg, and criminals from Amsterdam offered a unique opportunity for demand-oriented operation on a global scale. It made little difference what type of drug or what quantity a large foreign customer wanted to buy, as it could almost certainly be delivered. At the time, there were few other criminals in the world who could match this achievement. An almost natural division of tasks developed between the Amsterdam criminals and their partners from the south. Many major customers from all over the world came to Amsterdam, whereas the southern border regions had plenty of space for the production process. For decades, Limburg or Brabant criminals met with Amsterdam criminals in all kinds of hotels and restaurants, such as the bar of the Amsterdam Hilton, and in hotels and restaurants belonging to a hospital- ity industry tycoon and drugs criminal from ’s-Hertogenbosch

It was nearly automatically assumed that Amsterdam criminals predomi- nated in this interplay. What the exact relationship was, is unknown to our respondents, but there are reasons to assume that relations were much more equal than the preconceptions about ‘small-time criminals’ might have sug- gested. In the 1990s, the profit margins of worldwide synthetic drugs trafficking had exceeded those of soft drugs trafficking. Many Amsterdam criminals depended on the countryside labs for their synthetic drugs. This automatically gave the Limburg and Brabant criminal an advantage: a lot of space and a weaker police force than in Amsterdam. A good relationship with a synthetic drugs ringleader from Limburg was extremely valuable to Amsterdam criminals. They therefore were immediately at the beck and call of Peter van D. when this criminal nearly died after a liquidation attempt in 1999:

‘Peter van D. lived in Limburg in a villa with CCTV cameras and a guarded entrance. Peter van D. came from the trailer park in Heerlen. He was always described as lacking in intelligence. He was extremely rich. Never knew exactly where his money was. We searched his home a few times, but contrary to what is normal among travelers, he did not have a lot of cash about. He always carried a weapon, because his life, too, was being threatened. At some stage, the Amsterdam interregional crime squad visited us, looking for information about Peter van D., who had come to the fore in their investigation. Van D. also played a role in the North and South Holland criminal networks, and they wanted investigation details. However, our investigation into Van D. was quite advanced, so we were not immediately willing to hand over our information. At some stage, Van D. drove home in

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his Rolls Royce, was shot with an automatic weapon, and survived. He then made a few phone calls and all of Amsterdam hurried over to see him. This turned around the general idea of the south in Amsterdam. That Van D. was not just a small cog, but that he was a big player in this world. He was in charge. They came because he wanted them to. It caused quite a stir.’

Re c. Chemical skills Criminal cleverness and cooperation were not the only necessities; chemical knowledge and skills were also required. At some time in the 1970s, it had been enough that Peter van D. showed a few people from Brabant how to produce amphetamine in a small shed. In subsequent years, a known criminal from Eindhoven did little else than produce and sell amphetamine. There was a market for this substance in Scandinavia, the UK and southern Europe. But whoever wished to serve a global growth market for ecstasy in the 1980s and ‘90s, had to deal with varying preferences. The customer is king in the demand for drugs products. Sellers worldwide noticed that it was extremely convenient if the production of synthetic drugs could be attuned to a specific demand - dosage, colour, form. Whoever could achieve this, could suddenly be a large-scale supplier for a country or even a continent.

The Amsterdam chemist Robert Hollemans specialized in the production of new, trendy synthetic drugs that were not yet listed as prohibited substances. He was already producing ecstasy when this was still legal in the Netherlands. When MDMA was banned, he produced another party pill: MDEA. When this pill was banned too, he developed other legal varieties (Husken & Vuijst, 2002).

‘Amphetamine was out in the Netherlands, too hard, too unpleasant. But there was demand on the Scandinavian, UK and, particularly, the South American market. But there was no demand on the American and Asian market, so they started to modify. A guru from Amsterdam modified MDMA, and this became MDEA, which suddenly became a huge export product with tulips and wooden shoes. […] We eventually caught him. He was a man who always put himself in a prominent place. Time after time, the guy, like a chemist – he was a lab technician too – added or subtracted a molecule, thus creating new products. He was the intellectual brain. At the time, there was some sort of user magazine for so-called trendy young people who did not want to get involved in real hard drugs like heroin, cocaine and LSD, but wanted party pills, and they had quite a stimulating influence, not just on the use of the substances, but also by pushing the envelope. In the end, all of it was ecstasy anyway […].’

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In the 1980s and ’90s, skilled lab technicians had not (yet) been recruited among chemists. This became clear from the lifestyle of the North Brabant lab technician Puk V. The people around him tolerated his extreme behaviour for a while, because of his unfathomable knack for producing what was in demand on the worldwide synthetic drugs market. The prominent position of this eccentric lab technician shows how mere chance, stupid behavior, and smart business sense could go hand in hand in the world of synthetic drugs.

‘Among those major criminals, such as the R. brothers, were guys who produced the drugs. And it was not just that guru from Amsterdam who was a key wizard. Puk V. from ’s-Hertogenbosch was one too. He really went from lab to lab to teach others how to make the products. He was a very creepy guy, who had killed his father when he was sixteen. After this, he was healed completely by our fantastic youth institution, from where he was released when he was eighteen. A week later he stabbed a hooker, because she wouldn’t do as he told her. So he was locked up again. He did not cooperate with anything, so he wasn’t sentenced to detention under a hospital order, and served a term of imprisonment of a few years. He met the bigger players in prison. It turned out he had a gift for chemistry, even though he could read nor write. What he could do was mix, and, not unimportantly, he had guts. We even found him covered in sores a number of times, when he had been tasting his own candy. He was high as a kite, but at the same time very dangerous. Eventually he made a career for himself. He was sentenced a few times, but at the time you received no more than a year for this type of crime. Over time, his prestige increased. Eventually he no longer produced himself, but had a group of guys to do it for him. Rather deranged guys, all of whom did production work and got better all the time. Puk had also become a hitman, because why not do it again once you had tasted blood. In my opinion, Puk was involved in the quadruple murder in Hilvarenbeek (NL), but a shortly before this came out, he himself was liquidated in ’t Huuske pub in ’s-Hertogenbosch. Dozens of witnesses, and every single one of them had just been visiting the toilet at the time. We measured the toilet and it was 1.20 by 1.20 m.’

Re d. Chinese supply routes The synthetic drugs criminals from Brabant and Limburg needed raw materials for their synthetic drugs production: the precursors PMK (ecstasy) and BMK (amphetamine). Initially, these were mainly imported from Germany and from Ukraine, Russia and former Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe. Prompted by tightened legislation and checks, the international purchase of raw materials shifted to China in the years around the millennium. The R. brothers and Piet P., for instance, set up a route, together with the director of a large Chinese chemical company that produced huge quantities of PMK and BMK:

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‘China had a huge market. Very little PMK and BMK was needed for legal use worldwide; maybe a few thousand liter for eye drops, detergents, etc. In Ukraine a factory was dismantled that could produce 5,000 litre a day, solely for illegal use. In China were factories where 10,000 litre a day could be produced, and these were supervised by, and this is hard to imagine, the People’s Army. We found out about this during the investigation of Mr M. At the end of the 1990s, Mr M. had been caught in Hong Kong, carrying a suitcase with 10 million dollar, and that seemed odd. He turned out to be the director of one of the largest chemical companies in China, and his uncle was a general in the army. He was the boss of all these chemical companies. Mr M. had five passports on him. To our surprise, he also had New Zealand nationality. We checked Mr M.’s travel history, and who did he turn out to have contact with? The R. brothers and Mr P., a major criminal from Eind- hoven. And what information did we get? P. had 2,000 litre of PMK available, retrieved from peanut oil. Mr M. turned out to be involved in large-scale peanut oil trading. We requested M.’s extradition from Hong Kong. This was still possible at the time, and to China’s outrage he was extradited. Mr M. was a very, very big fish and was eventually convicted based on Section 10a of the Dutch Opium Act. He was sentenced to six years.’

A top criminal from Eindhoven benefited from this Chinese route in a simple and opportunistic manner for years. To achieve this, he worked together with a Chinese national from Rotterdam; a relative of the Chinese principal suspect who had been arrested in Hong Kong:

‘China probably allowed it because it generated an incredible amount of money. Normally, 1000 kg peanut oil cost 300 dollar, but we suddenly saw shipments of peanut oil changing hands for 10,000 dollar. We already knew: this was the cover cargo. P. sometimes sold this junk for up to 3,500 euro a litre. This was all he did; he no longer produced any drugs. P was also sentenced pursuant to the new precursor legislation. P had good contacts with a Chinese national in Rotterdam. He was the peanut oil trader and a distant cousin of M.’s.’

In the period from 2004 to 2006, the Parcival investigation conducted by the Zuid-Nederland Unit of the National Crime Squad provided insight into the working methods of a group of Chinese criminals, who smuggled precursors and other substances into the Netherlands (Huisman, 2006). Chinese criminals from Hong Kong and South-China came to the fore. Hong Kong was important for Chinese cross-border crime, as this was where meetings were set up to discuss criminal business. Many chemical factories were situated in the nearby province of Guandong. They not only met with Dutch criminals wanting to buy precursors, but also with criminals from Australia, Canada,

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or Ireland. What stands out is that precursor smuggling to the Netherlands via Ireland was but one of the many criminal activities the principal suspects were involved in. They constantly had various irons in the fire, both individually and in varying international coalitions. An example was the arrangement of PMK transports from China to Canada. The many international options of the Chinese criminals went hand in hand with caution and patience in the separate projects. This clashed several times with the impatience of a Dutch precursors buyer.

Parcival identified Chinese coalitions in which prominent Triad members, in a managing role, cooperated with Chinese criminals who did not belong to a Triad. Of old, Triads were secret societies, but modern Triads in Hong Kong are more like international corporations looking for profitable criminal and other projects.

At the time, which was around 2005, precursor smuggling from China to the Netherlands was partly organized by Chinese nationals resident in the Nether- lands. They worked together with Chinese nationals in Hong Kong, where the meetings took place, and in China. Precursor production took place in China, in an ‘ordinary’ legal factory, as did compiling and packaging the shipments of precursors.

What stands out is that Chinese criminals were aware of their position of power. They called Dutch buyers ‘devils’ and appeared to sense that they held nearly all the cards. They had such a large and exclusive precursor production capacity that their actions resulted in them being able to push up the prices. In a tapped conversation, two Chinese suspects stated that the knowhow of Dutch producers was indispensable. This Chinese assessment gave the Dutch ecstasy producers space for negotiation, and lies at the basis of the precursor smuggling from China to the Netherlands. At the same time, however, it shows that decisions of Chinese criminals partly determined to what extent the world needed the Netherlands as an ecstasy production country.

Re e. Crisis in the investigations

The rise of synthetic drugs criminals from Brabant and Limburg took place in decades during which the Dutch investigations division was in crisis. While excellent criminal opportunities presented themselves, it was a true obsta- cle course for public prosecutors and investigators to get an investigation launched and carried out. The crisis in investigations was described and analyzed by the Committee of Inquiry into investigation methods. The principal message was loud and clear: ‘The crisis in investigations runs deep’ (Van Traa committee, 1996, p. 5).

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The starting point of the investigations crisis lies halfway the 1980s. In political-administrative circles, and among the police and the judiciary, awareness was growing that serious organized crime in the Netherlands was on the rise, and was more extensive and influential than previously assumed. What is more, it became clear that the Dutch permissiveness had attracted international criminals and created a breeding ground for Dutch criminals with national and international activities. By the end of the 1980s, a small investigation team in North Brabant pioneered the investigation of synthetic drugs criminals. In an office in Breda, two investigators of the Municipal Police and two of the National Police gathered information, analyzed tapped conversations, and could sometimes even deploy F16 jet fighters that could measure heat radiation and thus detect labs. The information was used to have Regional Tactical Investigations Teams carry out investigations, for instance into the members of the D. family in Tilburg (Tops, 2018).

At around 1990, the fight against organized drugs crime and other crime – a declaration of war – was initiated. For this purpose, special investigation methods were used, mainly for their effectiveness. The fact that these were on the edge of what is legal, or entirely new methods seemed to be of less impor- tantance in this climate. At the time, the Interregional Investigation Teams (IITs) were established in the frontline of the fight against organized crime. Suddenly, organized crime was taken on, while it had barely received attention from the police in the 1970s and ’80s: ‘[…] for about 20 years, the prominent figures of the Dutch police [had] barely paid attention to the investigations division’ (Rosenthal & Muller, 1998, p. 160). Police management wanted to break out of the police’s social isolation by creating neighbourhood teams within the municipal police forces, with generally trained officers, at the expense of specialized departments, including investigations departments. In the 1980s, the focus subsequently shifted to large-scale enforcement of public order, and the prevention of ‘prevalent’ crime.

In the frontline of the investigations, people who wanted to make a serious effort to fight organized criminals pioneered new methods. The investigations conducted by the IIT included investigations into synthetic drugs criminals and/or their business partners. When Bruinsma was shot to death at the Amsterdam Hilton in 1991, a synthetic drugs criminal from Brabant was sitting at the bar inside, waiting for him (Middelburg, 2006, p.171). Of course, this meeting fell through, but international drugs trafficking by the ‘ North and South Holland networks’ in the Randstad conurbation and the Brabant-Limburg synthetic drugs criminals remained intact and continued to grow. The North Holland/Utrecht IIT decided to deploy unorthodox investigation methods, including the so-called Delta method: deliberately letting drugs pass, under the responsibility of the police and the judiciary, with the aid of

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civilian infiltrators. This led to the dissolution of this IIT, and indirectly to a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry.

In Limburg, the IIT, together with foreign investigation services, took on an investigation into Peter van D. and Robbie van L. They managed to catch these top criminals – ‘the king and the emperor of synthetic drugs’ – in the act. They were arrested three times in the first half of the 1990s. However, the prison sentences imposed were not upheld on appeal because of the many investigative irregularities (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). In its sentence, the court of appeal complained that part of the file had disappeared, that it ‘could not be excluded by any means’ that ‘serious irregularities’ had taken place during the investigation, and that the court had been deceived (www.volkskrant.nl/archief// justitie-moet-xtc-koningen-in-limburgse-irt-zaak-laten- lopen~a591509). Intru- sive surveillance operations in warehouses or barns were carried out without authorization, and telephones were tapped with the aid of PTT telecom. In addition, drugs had been transited with the knowledge of the police, and undercover buyers and a criminal infiltrator were used. To make matters worse, the transcription of phone calls had been tampered with (Husken & Vuijst, 2002).

In 1996, the Committee of Inquiry into Investigation Method’s conclusion was damning. They found a triple crisis: a norms crisis – there were no clear rules for the use of investigative methods – an organizational crisis – the organizations involved did not cooperate effectively, and distrusted each other, which led to the shielding of information and obstruction – and a crisis of authority – the public prosecutors having serious difficulty in exercising authority over the police. In the following years, legislation created norms for the investigation methods.

Remarkably, mid 1990s, investigation was no longer a priority. There was a strong preference for ‘an administrative police’, which led to the emergence of so-called area-based policing, in which community police officers and gen- eralist uniformed police were key. In addition, our respondents stated that invasive investigative methods, such as infiltration and undercover purchase, were abandoned ‘too often’, while many respondents considered them essential for the investigation of serious drugs criminals. In combination, these factors resulted in a favourable climate for synthetic drugs criminals in the Netherlands.

Even today, the preference for an ‘administrative police force’ is still visible in the structure of the Netherlands Police, as the 167 basic teams and 43 districts were ordered to focus their already limited investigative efforts on reported offences (Fijnaut, 2012; Van der Torre & Van Valkenhoef, 2017). It put regional

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and national investigation departments at a disadvantage in the fight against drugs crime, even more so because regional investigation teams have their hands full with investigations into capital offences, such as murders and drugs assassinations.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter we showed how Limburg and Brabant criminals managed to gain control of the synthetic drugs production in the 1980s and ’90s. Of course, historic factors played a role in this. Of old, criminal elements in these provinces were proficient in illegal activities, smuggling for instance, aided by their position near the border and the often sympathetic attitude of the population, which was far from fond of authority, and often shared in the criminal proceeds. But other factors played a role that was at least as important. Criminals from North Brabant and Limburg managed to establish effective cooperation with Amsterdam and international criminals. Apparently they were interesting partners for these criminals, and were accepted on more of less equal terms. Of course, they had something to offer: good products and reliable delivery. They were able to gather the chemical knowledge required in their own way. In addition, they had little to fear from the investigative authorities, as these were in crisis and received relatively limited attention from the public administration and the police organization. The preference for uniformed police officers as part of ‘area-based’ policing, especially after a parliamentary inquiry had shown that organized crime was rife, turned out to be beneficial for the drugs criminals.

Small country, Big Player The national and international arenas 6

Introduction Amphetamine and MDMA are qualified as hard drugs and are included in List I of the Dutch Opium Act. This makes perfectly clear that they are banned or illegal. However, the substances, precursors and chemicals used to produce amphetamine and MDMA do not fall under the Opium Act, as they may be used in the legal economy too. This places these substances in a grey area, as people may have good or bad intentions when they store, supply or order them. Rules for the use of these substances have been drawn up in the Abuse of Chemical Substances (Prevention) Act (Wvmc).

An international system has been developed regulating the production of, trade in, and use of drugs, in principle based on the prohibition of drugs unless they can be used for scientific or medical purposes. The exact interpretation of this basic principle, and the room it offers for specific ‘national interpretation’, has given rise to much discussion, and sometimes causes trouble. The fight against drugs takes place in a complex political arena, in which national interests, normative preferences, and practical options are fighting for priority. Major economic interests are involved, as well as varying opinions about what is ‘healthy’, and sometimes ‘lofty’ legal and ethical principles (human rights), and all this must be weighed against the wish to combat crime and criminality. These considerations often result in complicated decision making, especially in an international arena, where a variety of geopolitical interests also play a role. On paper the systems often check out, but as always, reality is quite a bit more unruly.

International conventions aimed at drugs production, trade, and use have been in place since the beginning of the previous century. Earlier conventions, until about 1930, are mainly limited to regulating the legal trade in drugs that should only be used for scientific and medical purposes (Blom, 2015, p.18). The Dutch Opium Act derives from these conventions. The regulations in these conventions – Shanghai, The Hague, Geneva, League of Nations – may have been effective when monitoring legal production and trade, but fell short when the combat of illegal trade and illegal use was involved. As a result, this increasingly became a task for the police and the judiciary. In addition, an increasing number of substances became prohibited, especially under pressure from the United States. In the Peace Treaties after the First World War, the US managed to have a number of anti-drugs regulations included. Room

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for this was created as a result of a number of factors, including the use of drugs – amphetamine and cocaine – in combat, to suppress pain and fatigue.

After the Second World War, all international drugs conventions were admin- istered by the United Nations. There are three conventions, namely the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Sub- stances, and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The Netherlands ratified all three conventions. The 1971 convention is an addition to the Single Convention, which only related to narcotic substances. In 1971, psychotropic substances were included. The difference between both substances is not always equally clear. The conventions formed the basis for a complicated system of legislation, regulations, and diplomacy. We will analyze the effect of this system by confronting it with the fickle criminal world, and in other ways.

6.1 The United Nations conventions

The name Single Convention derives from the fact that a number of earlier conventions were included in a single convention. It was concluded in New York in 1961, and determined that the member states had to limit the production and use of narcotic substances to medical and scientific purposes, for which they not only had to draw up statutory provisions, but had to develop a system to enforce these too. The convention is organized around the term ‘controlled substances’, which are divided into four lists. List 1 – similar to lists 1 and 2 in the Netherlands combined – is the most important one. Member states are obligated to control drugs in their countries, and develop a permits system for the production of, trade in and distribution of narcotic substances for scientific and medical purposes. Misuse or illegal use will be punished in accordance with the rules and customs of the individual member states.

The convention has two control bodies. The first one is the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations It consists of representatives of 53 member states, elected for four years. The commission meets in Vienna, and decides on topics like amendments to the various drugs lists. It is a political and diplomatic body, where new initiatives, such as convention proposals, can be developed. Decision making about the lists and the substances that should be included in them is an activity with many political aspects, as we will see below.

Within the CND, drugs and drug use is discussed and negotiated about at the global level, with health aspects, and the combat of production and distribution on the agenda. Once a year, a large meeting takes place in Vienna. All

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member states attend this meeting, which means there may be a thousand participants. The actual decisions about the substances that will be included in the lists of prohibited substances or substances subject to licensing obligation are eventually made during the CND meetings. The European contribution is coordinated by the European Commission, or they at least give it their best shot. The Dutch contribution is prepared by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, usually with a representative of the Ministry of Justice and Security present. The permanent representative of the Netherlands in the United Nations in Vienna also plays a role.

Another body that by now falls under the CND is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which was established in 1997 to improve the activities of the United Nations in the field of drugs and drugs crime. The office has its headquarters in Vienna, and employs 1,500 to 2,000 people worldwide. One of its activities is publication of the World Drugs Report.

The second control body derived from the 1961 Single Convention is the Inter- national Narcotics Control Board (INCB), consisting of 15 members, elected for five years by the UN’s Economic and Social Council.1 This Board monitors the effectiveness of the convention, for instance by producing estimates and statistics, and by keeping track of international trafficking. It can ask member states for an explanation, and request governments to take concrete measures. The Board is also authorized to investigate on site, which it did on a number of occasions in the Netherlands, most recently in 1992. This resulted in a critical report about the Dutch coffee shop policy. Imposing actual sanctions based on the Single Convention is impossible; posing critical questions and sounding the alarm are still the only options. An exception is the possibility to recommend terminating the import and export to and from a country, but a medication boycott, which is what it would come down to, seldom occurrs. This instrument was only ever used against Afghanistan.

Much more than the CND, the INCB is an operational body. The PRISM and Cohesion taskforces operate under the auspices of the INCB. These taskforces are international consultation platforms focused on the chemicals for amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), and heroin and cocaine, which have a natural origin, but require chemicals to produce the final product, respectively. They monitor the chemical transactions and inform the member organizations, for instance via Special Alerts that may pertain to new substances or suspect transports. For the Netherlands, the FIOD/ECD participates in this taskforce. The participants meet several times a year.

1 The INCB’s Secretariat has been incorporated in the UNODC.

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The Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub- stances (Vienna, 1988) pertains to international cooperation in the combat of international drugs trafficking. All types of international legal assistance were included in this convention, such as extradition, legal assistance in criminal cases, and police cooperation. The convention does not involve illegal demand and production, which emphatically remain subject to the authority of individual countries. The obligation to make laundering the proceeds of drugs trafficking punishable, as provided for in the convention, was new to the Neth- erlands. Among other things, this resulted in amendment of the provisions for handling stolen goods, and the introduction of ‘squeeze ‘em’ legislation (confiscation of the proceeds of crime).

In addition, the convention obligated the member states to set up a supervision system for the international trade in precursors (Section 12). This was fleshed out at the European level. Control of precursor trade with other countries falls under the authority of the European Union, pursuant to Section 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). EU regulations state rules for the supervision of the international precursor trade. These regulations apply directly to every member state. But to execute these regulation, the national legislation must institute sanctions and appoint competent authorities. In the Netherlands, this is done in the Abuse of Chemical Substances (Prevention) Act.

6.2 The EU precursor regulations

The EU precursor legislation implements the provisions of the UN Conven- tion against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs. By now – there were earlier arrangements – the core of this legislation consists of two regulations. One of them was issued by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, dated February 2004, and stipulates provisions for monitoring the trade in precursors in the European Union. The other is dated December 2004, and was issued by the EU Council. It stipulates provisions for monitoring the trade between the EU and ‘third countries’. Both regulations were reviewed in November 2013, but the amendments made have only been partly included in Dutch legislation, to the frustration of the enforcement agencies involved. Especially the lack of a ‘catch-all clause’ in the Dutch penalization is considered a shortcoming.

The regulations apply to ‘listed substances’, which are divided into four categories: – category 1 comprises the most sensitive substances; – category 2 comprises other important substances;

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– category 3 comprises ‘bulk chemicals’, such as solvents and stain removers; – category 4 comprises specific human and animal medicinal products that contain drugs precursors.

Category 1 comprises the key substances for the production process of illicit drugs. It is the strictest category, and includes the two main classic substances, namely the precursor BMK for amphetamine, and PMK for ecstasy. Possessors of these substances must have an activities permit, and a customer declaration is required for trade within the EU.

Category 2 comprises ‘other important substances for the production of illicit drugs and precursors’. This includes substances like acetic anhydride, which is used to convert morphine into synthetic heroin. Nowadays, this is an interesting substance for drugs criminals in the Netherlands, because it has become scarce in Turley and the Middle East. Users are obligated to keep a register. Users must register all trade in category 2 substances within the EU, and a customer declaration is required. Registration and an export permit suffice for trade outside the EU.

Category 3 comprises ‘chemicals with various applications in the drugs production process’. These include hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, and acetone. The rules are less strict; market participants must report annually in the case of trade within the EU (internal trade), but ‘only at the request of the Customs Service’. Registration is required for external export, as is an export permit for specific countries,

In conclusion, category 4 comprises human and animal medicinal products that contain specific registered substances. An export permit is required for trade in these substances outside the EU.

The requirements ensuing from the regulations are binding for all countries, but according to insiders, the extent of their compliance and enforcement of the sanctions varies widely. Major differences exist between EU member states regarding the licensing chain, information exchange, reporting, monitoring, and sanctioning. Consultations between the member states on the application of EU regulations and on new developments takes place in the Drugs Precursors Expert Group, which meets about once a year. In this group, the Netherlands is represented by the FIOD.

The FIOD plays a central role in the field of precursors and precursor legislation. It is assigned as the National Competent Authority, which means they are the first point of contact for the United Nations and the European Com- mission. In addition, the FIOD houses the national report desk for chemical

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transactions. All companies in the Netherlands are obligated to report suspect transactions of precursors and chemicals listed in the European regulations.

In addition to the FIOD, the Customs Service plays an important role in the monitoring and control system for precursors. The Customs’ Central Import and Export Service is charged with issuing licences for the import and export of listed substances, and registration of the companies that are eligible for such a licence. The POSS team (precursors, strategic goods and sanction legislation) of the Customs Service checks companies that import or export chemicals, for instance by demanding permission to inspect the accounts. The Customs Service is charged with detecting Wvmc violations, but does not play an independent role in the investigation and handling of these violations. It reports irregularities it has identified to the FIOD, which decides whether investigation is required.

In essence, this system has been set up as a form of market regulation; not as crime control. The police, for instance, are not allowed to use the customs data, as they derive from monitoring that the parties involved have usually voluntarily participated in. As mentioned above, if the POSS team detects a possible criminal offence, they report this to the FIOD, which in turn may inform the police. At times, this is a laborious route that ‘includes an area of tension’, according to a person involved.

The FIOD holds a special position in this system, because it is charged with both monitoring and investigation. The Customs Service is solely involved in monitoring, the police in investigating. The FIOD initiates its criminal investigations via the Central Precursors Desk in Eindhoven. These investigations take place under the direction of the National Public Prosecutors’ Office in ’s-Hertogenbosch. Often the investigations are conducted together with the police’s Central Investigations Division, which is responsible for the combat of serious organized crime in the field of synthetic drugs. The police’s Central Intelligence Division (DLIO) conducts specific tasks at the national level, such as international information exchange and central information coordination.

The Central Criminal Investigations Division (LR) in Son (NL) houses a partnership between LR, DLIO, Customs Service and FIOD called Intelligence and Expertise Centre for Synthetic Drugs, which is a rather elaborate name for the few people who work there. The employees in question do all they can, but the expectations raised by the name cannot me met; time and staff are lacking.

Within the FIOD, the precursor domain is monitored by the team for investigative information on precursors, consisting of about fifteen people. However,

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this team will not be able to handle the caseload on its own due to the quantity of relevant indicators in combination with the seriousness of the criminal offences and their consequences for society. There is cooperation with central and regional police units. If necessary, these carry out the investigations, which is what happened with the Explorer (‘Party king’) investigation that ensued from the FIOD’s Dokus case.

All in all, the system is rather complicated, partly due to the history of the legislation and organizations involved in it. Initially, the ECD was responsible for precursor monitoring, but it merged with the FIOD in 1999, now falling under the Ministry of Finance. But the minister with policy-related responsibility for the Wvcm is the Minister of Health, which is why the Health Depart- ment tends to dominate. Health and Finance have entered into a covenant about the implementation of the activities of the Customs Service and the FIOD. The prohibitory provisions and the accompanying sanctions fall under the Economic Offences Act. What stands out is that the Minister of Justice and Security does not play a role at all.

The CAM Committee The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) includes the Coordination point for the Assessment and Monitoring of new drugs (CAM), established by law in 2000.2 The task of the CAM is to subject the new drugs on the Dutch market to a multidisciplinary risk assessment according to fixed procedures and criteria.

There are four criteria, the health of the individual (four potential risks), public health (seven potential risks), public order (three potential risks) and crime (two potential risks). Based on these criteria, the CAM advises the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport about suitable measures. This advice is almost always adopted. In addition, the CAM is responsible for early identification of new drugs. The CAM consists of a coordinator and a secretary, and is supported by a new drugs risk assessment committee, in which various experts in the field of drugs and drug use are represented.

The CAM’s recommendations are supplemental to the international regulations. In police circles people are unhappy about the CAM. According to police and judiciary personnel, the health aspect dominates, sometimes com- plemented by attention for nuisance in a public place. Preventing or curbing organized crime is absent or glossed over. The committee contains three peo-

2 For completeness sake, as it is not an international body nor a body resulting from an international agreement. But it does play a role in the decision making about New Psychoactive Substances.

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ple with a police/legal background, the other eleven members primarily have a different perspective. A police officer:

‘They have a different view. They strictly look at the focus areas of the Opium Act and the lists: Dutch territory, Public Health, and social unrest. So when a substance like Ketamine emerges on the market, they look at the consequences and conclude that hardly any hospitalizations are involved. No deaths. They don’t demolish streets. There are no demonstrations. There is no social unrest about ketamine, so the substance is not included in the list. They often say: it is better to have ketamine than another substance we don’t know the consequences of. And they may have a point in the Nether- lands, but internationally this is not acceptable. There the Netherlands is once again considered the odd one out. In that respect, we in the Nether- lands act as if we don’t need to consider the world. Internationally, ketamine is included in the legislation of countries like Germany, Belgium, and the UK. It is listed everywhere, but not in the Netherlands.’

In and around the CAM, there is ongoing discussion about the question whether it is desirable to draw up a ‘generic list’ for the prohibition of NPS. Most of our neighbouring countries have such a list: substances that meet the criteria of the substances on the list do not need to be individually assessed, but are automatically banned. There are varying opinions about the usefulness of such a list. Some people, especially from legal and chemical circles, doubt its usefulness, as new substances that fall outside the scope of such a generic list will always be developed. In addition, such a list causes legal uncertainty among citizens: does ‘my’ substance fall under the generic list or not? Others, including police and judiciary personnel involved, are in favour of such a list. They feel it will facilitate their work, and notice that the difference with the neighbouring countries makes the Netherlands an attractive location for the production and distribution of NPS. The end of the discussion is not yet in sight.

6.3 Three arenas

So in total there are three arenas in which the approach to drugs is fought out. There is the international UN system, where it is decided whether specific substances will be banned or not. There is the European system, which focuses on what chemical substances should be listed, and if they are, in what list they should be included. And finally, there is the national level of the CAM, where newly emerging drugs are assessed. These three arenas operate from different perspectives: investigative interests, public health interests, economic interests, and diplomatic interests, which are sometimes inextricably intertwined.

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We will discuss this later. In addition, the systems do not function entirely parallel. Substances are categorized differently at the different levels. And there are differences between countries, also within the European Union.

In the world of synthetic drugs, one must operate at a great number of deiffer- ent levels. One respondent complained that it was giving him a ‘substances complex’, because the Dutch authorities and international bodies take such a long time to determine the exact legal classification of a substance or raw material, while synthetic drugs criminal respond swiftly by developing or using new substances, often with the aid of legal companies or fronts, and legal money flows. Nowadays, many FIOD and police respondents feel that the Dutch authorities are constantly overtaken by events, because of the ease with which the chemical innovations of synthetic drugs criminals manage to circumvent the complicated banned and listed substances system.

We will elaborate on this cat-and-mouse game in chapter 8. Here we will use APAAN as an example. APAAN is a precursor for BMK, which was found for the first time in amphetamine samples in 2012, and then really took flight. In 2012, the NFI found the substance in 50% of the amphetamine samples. APAAN is not a listed substance in the sense of the Wvmc and the European regulation. Therefore it is not subject to licensing obligation, according to the ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court in 2012, a judgment that was later confirmed by a prejudicial decision of the European Court of Justice. The Netherlands subsequently made an effort to have APAAN included in the list of registered substances, eventually succeeding in 2013.

Meanwhile, the criminal world did not sit idly by, as by then a new preprecursor had been developed, APAA, with a chemical composition similar to that of APAAN, but deviating sufficiently to formally be a new substance. APAA has no other application than the production of drugs. And the whole circus had to start over again. And after APAA, APA and MAPA were developed. This is an example of the continuing race between drugs criminals and the law.

In the grey area, investigative authorities in the Netherlands can rely on Sec- tion 10a of the Opium Act, which criminalizes ‘preparatory acts’. This means that someone has possession of a substance with the apparent sole objective of producing drugs or facilitating the production of drugs. The section offers a ground to intervene in the case of non-listed preprecursors, but, according to police officers, this is a laborious and time-consuming process. The investigative services cannot simply seize the substances, but must prove that they will be used for synthetic drugs production. This is called ‘double intent’ in legalese. In some cases proving this is very difficult, and in all cases it entails a lot of extra work.

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The legal basis for the combat of preprecursors is complex. The procedure to have the substances included in the EU or UN list of registered substances is laborious. But the discussion also has a ‘national’ dimension. In the legal world, there are some who feel that punishing someone for something that is as yet no more than an intention goes too far, which is, in principle, what Sec- tion10a of the Opium Act does. In addition, they feel that it should be possible to freely transport substances that are not included in any list of prohibited substances within a country, even if they have no legal application. This is part of the reason why there is no consensus in our country about the desira- bility of a list of banned substances for this type of substances – the catch-all provision we talked about earlier – despite the fact that such lists do exist in other countries, and that the investigative services are advocating them. An alternative could be working with a ‘reversed’ burden of proof; someone who has the substance in his possession must be able to prove its legal use, but as yet there is not much support for this idea.

European practices On paper, the international system works, even though it is complicated and often slow in its adaptability. But in practice it is an entirely different ballgame, especially in an international context. The extent to which European countries comply with agreements rather differs. This has major consequences for the Netherlands, also because of the free movement of goods within the European Union. From an economic perspective, this is an excellent situation, but it often causes the investigative services a host of problems.

In the first place, the regulations themselves are a major issue, as we have just seen. Criminals change ‘a bracket’ of a chemical construction and a new unlisted substance is created. Legislation is always a few years behind actual practice. ‘It surprised me how hard it is to have a substance included in the international list, in both the European and the UN context’, said a respondent. In addition, some countries fail to include the agreements in their national guidelines, or fail to act on them, or even obstruct them.

It turned out to be difficult for the Netherlands to indicate the actual Dutch problem in the UN or European context: ‘Then we say: “We’ve got a problem with methyl ester of BMK, and PMK glycidic acid. And then everyone shouts: what are they?”’ They aren’t known or existing products, and have no other application than the production of drugs. Other countries do not feel the need to combat them, as no production takes place on their territory. Another problem is that drugs like heroin and methamphetamine pose a greater risk to public health in an international context. These are highly addictive drugs with health problems that manifest themselves physically in emaciated bodies. Amphetamine and MDMA are drugs that, in comparison and as far as we

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know now, do not result in major public health problems. To put it crudely, according to a respondent: ‘as long as no one dies, other countries will not sound the alarm. Countries will always fight the drugs that cause the most problems’. In addition, the Netherlands does not have an altogether positive image where drugs and drug addiction are concerned. Especially the Dutch lone wolf action in the field of cannabis (coffee shops) has frequently caused annoyance in neighbouring countries. As a result, they are not always at the Netherlands’ beck and call to assist it with its own problems.

There is free movement of goods and persons within the European Union. This has many consequences for economic development, including many positive ones, according to our respondents. But this does not apply to control of the import of chemicals. In the Netherlands, precursors and preprecursors are closely monitored, because we are a major synthetic drugs production country, but other countries do not pay an equal amount of attention to them. The Dutch Customs Service shares the profiles of the new substances with their counterparts in other countries, but the question is whether they can or will actually act on the information.

The rule is that the country where products from countries outside the EU, such as China, enter the EU should check these products and handle the paperwork. Large quantities of Chinese chemicals enter the EU via countries like Poland and Bulgaria, but also via Finland and Spain. These countries then indicate that they cannot act based on the current regulations. Some- times they alert the Netherlands, but they simply let the substances pass.

‘From the boat it is transferred straight into the lorry and this is how complete shipments enter the country. It is impossible to single it out. No customs officer in these countries is alerted by it. It enters the country in bulk. And the risk of being caught is zero.’

According to the persons involved, it is a ‘huge challenge’ to get all European countries involved. Countries do have a choice, however; non-EU member Switzerland, for instance, is much stricter when it comes to chemicals smuggling, and often does seize the chemicals.

Huge quantities of specific preprecursors, such as PMK glycidic acid, are imported into Germany. When German investigative officers discover this substance, they cannot act on it, as the substance is not banned in Germany. They are subject to strict legislation, and production is not as much of an issue as in the Netherlands. This is why they simply let the substance pass into the Netherlands.

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Like the Netherlands, Belgium has a chemicals report desk. However, Belgian legislation is more of a problem. The implementation of the regulation leaves to be desired, because the obligation to report has not (yet) been approved, whereas failure to report is punishable in the Netherlands. Like the Nether- lands, Belgium has insufficient staff to organize monitoring. However, the Belgian authorities are in the process of improving the system, also because the country now has to deal with more drugs laboratories, often located just across the border from the Netherlands. But the larger part of the essential and other chemicals required for the production of synthetic drugs still comes from Belgium, according to the Crime Pattern Analysis on synthetic drugs and precursors (LE, 2016, p. 27).

6.4 The relationship with China

For decades, Chinese companies with a lot of chemical and technical knowledge have acted as mega facilitators for Dutch synthetic drugs criminals. These criminals are very well aware of this, so they invest in their relationships with Chinese companies. They put this task in the hands of their liaisons in Hong Kong, who consult and cooperate with liaisons of Chinese companies. By now, part of these personal contacts has been replaced or supplemented by direct online contact. Dark Web has taken flight in facilitating the ordering of raw materials and hardware in China. Bulk shipments of raw materials from China are regularly intercepted in the Netherlands.

Dutch synthetic drugs criminals need the Chinese knowhow to circumvent national and international policy and regulations. And it works time and again. The slow international consultation and legislative circuits are no match for the expertise and flexibility of Chinese-Dutch coalitions. In an interview, a Dutch top criminal immediately outlined a few important changes in the past decades. In all these changes, raw materials from China, modified by Chinese companies if required, are irreplaceable. In the centre of all criminal lines and movements, it is crucial for a top criminal to work together with Dutch China specialists, either as commissioning party or as preferred buyer:

‘There are groups that are specialized in getting the stuff from China and selling it on the market. You need contacts, and then you place an order and it will come to you. How to get these contacts? That is hard to say. You just sort of tumble into it. And you have to pay attention. [laughs] You just know a few people. If there’s something you don’t have, you check who does. […] In the old days, you simply had BMK and PMK, and now there may be thirty things you can also make it from. These semifinished products.’

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The important facilitating role of Chinese companies turns them into a driving force behind synthetic drugs crime in the Netherlands. This role is not explicitly mentioned in the 2016 Crime Pattern Analysis, but becomes clear from a list of quotes in the report (we added the Italics):

About raw materials and chemicals – ‘In all known cases, PMK glycidate originates in China.’ – These days, nearly all purchases of raw materials take place in China.’ – BMK: continues to enter the country, but now only from China.’ – ‘[…] all of the APAAN found in the Netherlands originates in China.’ – ‘Sodium salt of BMK glycidic acid: has been imported [from China] in large containers since 2015.’ – ‘Dutch individuals imported thousands of litres/kilos of Chinese GBL, and offered it for sale worldwide via the internet.’ – ‘Recently, we have seen an increase in Dutch companies that directly, or via a Hong Kong contact, order legal chemicals in China via the internet.’

About hardware: – ‘The first point is that an increasing quantity of hardware is being bought in China. Seizures in the Netherlands show that it can be delivered to size: tableting machines, stamps and glassware with all the trimmings.’

About designer drugs: – ‘Dutch criminals are also seizing the opportunity to achieve sales in the field of NPS. The NPS they sell […] have […] usually not been produced in the Netherlands. In most cases, the actual production process takes place in countries like China and, to a lesser extent, India. Based on intelligence we assume that various commercial laboratories are constantly working on the development and production of new types of NPS.’

About customer-friendliness when ordering via the internet in China: – ‘The internet purchase options for NPS and other chemicals in China have grown and have been professionalized over the past few years. Anything can be ordered, all payment methods are accepted, and major chemical companies are investing heavily in establishing a bond of trust with buyers […]. The internet contains several catalogues with order options […] There are many order options: from a few milligrams to hundreds of kilos/litres.’

Global legislation is no match for the flexibility of the Dutch-Chinese connection. The Chinese companies limit themselves as much as possible to legal activities, and definitely try to steer clear from activities in the field of drugs production, as these will be punished severely in China, sometimes even with the death penalty. Thus the more severe punishments in China have a positive

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effect for Dutch synthetic drugs criminals. Technically, Chinese companies don’t have any trouble producing MDMA and amphetamine, but, as far as we can oversee, are happy to leave this up to the Dutch synthetic drugs criminals.

Drugs diplomacy with China Section 12 of the UN convention against illicit traffic enables the worldwide exchange of information between the countries that ratified the convention. In this context, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was concluded between the FIOD and the National Narcotics Commission of China (NNCC) in Beijing on 22 October 2004. They ratified agreements on the administrative cooperation and information exchange between China and the Nether- lands to prevent registered substances from falling into criminal hands. This may involve unsolicited information about types and quantities of precursors and preprecursors, countries of origin, seizure data, and information about cover cargo, packaging, routes and means of transport. The MoU does not include information about subjects, because information from the Netherlands could lead to the death penalty in China. It was established that information exchanged under the MoU will not be used as evidence in a court of law.

In 2008, within the same UN framework, a further-reaching bilateral agreement was concluded between the European Commission and the government of the People’s Republic of China that ratifies agreements on cooperation and the provision of mutual administrative support. A Joint EU-China Follow-Up Group (JFUG) was established, which has the power of decision in specific cases. In the Netherlands, the FIOD is the Dutch Competent Authority for precursor issues and frequently attends JFUG meetings, at the request of the European Commission.

In 2014, a JFUG meeting took place in Shenzhen, a former Chinese fisher- man village that, over the past thirty years, has developed into a metropole with almost twenty million inhabitants with a port of great economic importance. It is part of the Guandong province; a province with a major chemical industry.

At the time, APAAN was an important topic. It was included in UN List 1 in March 2014, which also made it a registered substance in China. According to the deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Narcotics Committee, Chinese police officers had visited various types of companies to inform them about the EU’s problems with APAAN. A total of 13.45 tonnes of chemicals was allegedly not exported to the EU, even before the substance had formally been included in the list. The deputy secretary-general also pressed for rapid information exchange and special operational cooperation in the context of APAAN. The Chinese were also interested in joint investigations.

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And in practice So China is sometimes willing to assume some responsibility for Dutch or European problems, but this is not simple. Let us look at the actual practice.

China has several hundreds of thousands of chemical companies. Part of the chemicals they produce are key to the synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands. Almost all preprecursors and precursors come from China, as does part of the NPS and other chemicals (LE, 2016). Effective agreements and good relations with China are therefore crucial for the Netherlands. This turned out to be a complex matter, despite the willingness present at times.

Firstly, China is a world power, for which relations with a country like the Netherlands are not fully irrelevant, but do not exactly have the highest priority either. In addition, China has a huge chemical industry with hundreds of thousands of manufacturers: ‘They simply can’t control all of it’. And the chemical industry is of great importance to the Chinese economy.

Economic interests play an important role in the Chinese considerations, but as they depend on international relations and internal developments, they are also susceptible to foreign pressure or requests. China itself has a strict drugs policy, and the Chinese government is usually willing to comply with international regulations. Raw materials that are listed as banned or subject to licensing obligation by the UN are monitored or no longer exported. Sometimes this requires foreign pressure, as was the case at the end of the first decade of this century, when pressure from countries including the US and the Netherlands resulted in stricter checks for PMK and BMK. At the same time, if a substance is not listed – is not registered – and is therefore legal, the substance is produced and traded: ‘China says: it’s your problem. We will not check for what is not punishable. We will not curb our economy. We will not restrict our trade because you cannot control the drugs production.’

It is very important to the Netherlands to develop a good relationship with China. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. Two factors play a key role: the human rights situation, because China imposes the death penalty, and the degree to which the Netherlands shows itself to be sensitive to Chinese interests.

The moment the Netherlands exchanges judicial information with China, Chinese citizens may get into trouble. China imposes the death penalty, also in the field of drugs: you can be sentenced to death for drugs production or trafficking. For that reason, the Dutch authorities are wary of intensive cooperation in a judicial sense. It is a no go area for the Dutch government. An example:

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‘A murder case in the Netherlands had been shelved for ten years. The suspect was a Chinese citizen resident in China. The Chinese knew what was going on, but decided not to extradite the suspect. They were, however, willing to take over the case and prosecute the suspect in their own country. But murder carries the death penalty in China, and for that reason, the Netherlands did not accept the offer.’

Other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, handle these things differently. They transfer the case subject to certain conditions, if the death penalty will not be imposed or executed. An agreement is that they will visit the convicted person twice a year to check on the state he or she is in. This has enabled them to start a dialogue with China. According to an expert in this field, the Australian and New Zealand authorities argue as follows: the Chi- nese do not benefit from failing to comply with this agreement, because being known internationally as unreliable may have a major influence on trading relationships.

In short, according to our respondents, the Netherlands misses opportunities to enter into further agreements with China to curb the flow of illegal chemicals: ‘China is a problem, but so is the way in which the Netherlands deals with China. The Dutch attitude does not help reduce the precursors flow. As far as I’m concerned, we could be more inventive with regard to the Chinese.’ And there is definitely room for intensification of the cooperation, even when taking the legal and ethical complications into account. Preparatory acts, such as exporting chemicals intended for drugs production, are not punishable in China, and a greater effort could be made to call the Chinese to account for this.

To achieve progress in the diplomatic relations with China, Chinese interests and sensitivities should be kept into account. A person involved told us about a trip to China that had been planned for several years, but had been postponed by China time and again.

‘Every time there was another reason why it could not go ahead. The first time, a top civil servant had embezzled money from the party funds, and subsequently fled China. This person was staying in the Netherlands, and we had to extradite him. But this offence carried the death penalty, so we could not comply with extradition. Eventually we left the case pending, and the Chinese top civil servant fled to Canada. China subsequently put the Netherlands on ice. We were no longer welcome in China, not even for agreements about drugs. This had been decided at a higher level.’

We subsequently tried to slowly improve relations again: ‘But then, in 2014, the ketamine problem kicked in.’ Ketamine is an anesthetic, in principle for ani-

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mals, which is also used as a drug, and that caused a wave of addiction in China. China submitted a proposal to the Commission of Narcotic Drugs to include this substance into the list of controlled substances. They were looking for allies. The Dutch Public Prosecution Service received a written request to support the proposal. But the Ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairs did not agree.

‘Ketamine is a much used anesthetic in Africa. It is easy to use, a midwife is allowed administer it. You don’t need an oxygen mask, no anesthetist, you can simply get going. The Netherlands considered this important, and formulated this rather firmly at the meeting in Vienna. As a result, we were ‘naughty’ again from China’s point of view, and were again not allowed to visit China.’

The incident illustrates how complicated the international game is. Interna- tional interests play a role, but the interests of the various ministries do too. From a health perspective, for instance, ketamine is hardly considered a problem in the Netherlands. According to our respondents, the key question comes from investigative circles:

‘How much is curbing drugs worth to us? On the one hand, we want to ban ketamine to strengthen our alliance with China. On the other I do understand the point of view that the substance is needed for development aid.’

It is a game in which various interests and perspectives meet and are weighed in a certain way.

‘I’ve been in the game for a while now. If, at some stage, America starts spreading the news that we are the Colombia of the world, cogs will be turning and we will have to be on our toes, will be given more money, etcetera. The question is, however, whether fighting the substance is the real objective or whether it is no more than window dressing to prevent ourselves from being blacklisted. International pressure has a major influence on the drugs file.’

6.5 Complexity

International and national arenas are connected. The international arena, where decisions are made about drugs and the combat of drugs, is complex and often works slowly. The Netherlands usually has a relatively limited influence, also because our country does not have a positive image in the field of drugs in many countries. In addition, working the international arena is a

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tough and time-consuming process. To be successful, as many national forces as possible must be mobilized when necessary.

But also the national arena, where decisions are made about the approach to synthetic drugs, is extremely complex. This has been a constant development over the past thirty years. It was, for instance, already expressly identified during the first Drugs Phenomenon Study in 1996. At the time, fifteen departments divided over five ministries were in some way involved in the approach to ecstasy. And this has never changed much. In the first place, many government organizations are involved: the Police in all its diversity, and the Public Prosecution Service, in addition to the FIOD, which merged with the Eco- nomic Investigations Service a while ago, the Customs Service, and various ministries. Not just Justice and Internal Affairs and their various amalgama- tions, but also Health, Finance and External Affairs, the latter because of the always present international component. These days, the municipalities, too, are fully involved, as are the provinces and environmental services due to the drugs waste problem. Fragmentation and competence issues are always lying in wait. Coordination is complicated and time-consuming, and often turns the government into a sluggish organization that has trouble dealing with the flexibility and dexterity of ‘unorganized crime’

In security circles, harmonization problems are usually of an organizational nature, and involve staffing – who decides, and who provides what personnel. In other organizations, problems are often also substantive or ideological: the importance of tackling synthetic drugs must be weighed against other interests, such as public health and the Dutch foreign policy. And these considerations are not always beneficial to the fight against synthetic drugs.

Our outline of the national arena, where decisions are made about the combat of synthetic drugs, once again clearly illustrates the existence of differing and conflicting perspectives and interests. There is a public health interest, where control of drugs use is mainly considered from a Dutch perspective. There is an economic interest, where free movement of goods and persons in Europe will be restricted as little as possible, and where the trading relationship with China must be optimized. There is the diplomatic interest of international consultations, development cooperation and attention for human rights. And there is the investigative interest of curbing the criminal world around the production of and trafficking in synthetic drugs.

Conflicting perspectives are not an unusual phenomenon. It happens for every policy issue of any importance. And there is no reason to assume that the investigative interest would have priority in this balancing of interests. The other interests are equally legitimate. And yet, something feels off. The bal-

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ancing of interests appears to be biased (Schnattschneider, 1961). As a result, investigative interests frequently draw the shortest straw. The interests of the economy, health, and diplomacy appear to outweigh them, and are better represented in the policy arena. This is, in our opinion, one possible explanation of the Netherlands’ long-term top position on the world stage of the synthetic drugs production. When push comes to shove, other interests are given priority over the serious combat of synthetic drugs crime.

6.6 Conclusion: a double battle

Of course the Netherlands is in a position of dependency on the international stage. Our country depends, for instance, on the willingness of China to strictly control the production and export of precursors and preprecursors. It depends on the willingness of other European countries to strictly check the import of illegal chemical substances via their borders. Dutch policy makers cannot control these factors. But also within the Netherlands, the combat of synthetic drugs does not have much priority. The people involved in this fight on a daily basis often feel as if they have to wage a ‘double battle’: one against the synthetic drugs criminals, and the other one against failing legislation and regulations, against barriers and bureaucracy in their own organizations, and against a lack of urgency awareness, especially at the ministries in The Hague. They often consider the latter battle much more complicated and laborious that the first one.

Small country, Big Player The top X and beyond 7

Introduction Nowadays, the Central Criminal Investigations Division (LR) still sees a synthetic drugs market ‘top X’ that mainly consists of criminals from Limburg and North Brabant. We will give a brief outline of the profile of these criminal leaders (section 7.1) and will then address the question why this traditional group is still in the picture (section 7.2). Part of the answer lies in the lack of information, as there are quite a few more criminals and top criminals active than the original criminals from Limburg and Brabant alone (section 7.3).

7.1 A top 35

According to the LR, the national synthetic drugs top consists of 21 individuals. In addition, 14 individuals have been designated ‘candidates’, without having gone through the entire ‘screening process’ for being included in the final list. Of these 35 persons, 27 come from the south of the Netherlands, and 8 from elsewhere in the Netherlands. They are mainly native Dutch criminals, plus a few leaders of foreign descent who focus on the export of ecstasy to Turkey.

To gain a position in this exclusive list, which is based on TCI information, criminals must meet a long list of criteria, used for the first time in 2007. It involves criminals who have access to an organized criminal group of more than two persons, who have been generating a profit on the international synthetic drugs market for a longer period of time, while having structural access to an international network. The leaders are not hierarchically managed and they solely negotiate on an equal footing with other criminals or parties. They have gained a virtually untouchable status. They arrange much of the criminal business, but steer clear from the actual criminal handiwork with the greatest risk of being caught. They are persons who are working on their criminal enterprise nearly every day. They travel inside the Netherlands and sometimes abroad. They establish and use contacts, fund criminal activities, and connect the various parts of the business, such as demand, production and transport of drugs shipments. They allocate tasks and deploy persons or small groups specialized in specific core activities, such as purchasing, production, international transport or money laundering. They discipline their personnel, impose sanctions, and deploy the right people to execute them. They use counter strategies. They shield and protect persons and business processes.

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They hire specialized knowledge, of lawyers for instance, to prevent or solve problems with the authorities.

This top 35 forms the upper layer of the criminal synthetic drugs world that controls and manages the second layer. The second layer consists of brokers or middlemen, who connect the various activities and find the right persons for the jobs, manage and pay – or sometimes cheat – everyone. The bottom layer consists of the workforce, such as lab technicians, couriers and waste dumpers. The top X focuses on synthetic drugs, but also traffics in other drugs, where needed:

‘The criminal entrepreneurs are mainly active in the south of the Nether- lands, and are involved in logistical processes on a daily basis. Every day they are busy maintaining their criminal enterprise, arranging funding, finding the right person for the job, etc. They are on the road all day. Travel through the country and establish connections. They steer well clear of the actual activities, which makes them elusive. They are mainly involved in synthetic drugs. But if for whatever reason these generate less of a profit, they sometimes briefly get involved in cannabis or cocaine. When there was a dip in the ecstasy, a number of them switched to cocaine. They have major financial resources and the right contacts.’

The cooperation with Amsterdam criminals remains important:

‘There are about thirty principal subjects in the picture. They know each other, but not all of them are in direct contact with the others. If an Amsterdam criminal needs synthetic drugs, there will be two subjects who establish mutual contact between the southerners and the Amsterdam underworld.’

The top 35 know each other, but many of them don’t work together. There are differences in working methods and in criminal profiles. One leading criminal, for instance, is mainly characterized as an organizer of international transport routes. These were very profitable for a long time, as they reached from the Netherlands to Australia, with a major profit margin at the final settlement.

‘X has international connections with Australia. There are links between the Italian mafia, a drugs dealer in Belgium and X. Huge shipments were transported in soup cans from the industrial estate in North Brabant to Italian ports, and were subsequently put on the boat to Australia. There are various partnerships.’

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A criminal born and raised in Brabant connects with Amsterdam criminals. Closing this cultural gap is well worth the effort, as of old, the Amsterdam criminals secure the orders placed by criminal abroad. To supply the drugs required, especially when synthetic drugs are involved, they often engage the southern top X criminals.

‘S. is a loner. Every day he drives all over the country as some sort of broker. He does nothing but establish connections. Ensuring that financers meet each other. He is the liaison for business with Amsterdam organizations. He himself is an authentic Brabant citizen. It is unclear why he gets along so well with people from the Randstad conurbation. […] Many big shots and laboratory technicians are in contact with him.’

Over the past few decades, these traditional criminals have frequently been the subjects of investigations, and many of them have been sentenced to prison sentences on a regular basis. These sentences failed to prompt lasting disruption of the criminal system, however. The ecstasy network in a broader sense managed to handle the intensified investigative activities of the authorities in the beginning of this century quite well (Spapens, 2006). If someone is lost due to arrest, there is always someone else to be found who can take over his tasks. If the police seize an important shipment of raw materials, new sources are tapped into somewhere in the network. Criminals have the financial means to compensate for temporary setbacks. And the length of the sentences does not act as a deterrent.

7.2 Why does a Brabant-Limburg top 35 emerge?

In 2017, the national synthetic drugs top X solely consists of criminals who operate from Limburg and North Brabant. The question is why this is the case. What stands out is that various respondents come up with different factors. In part, these confirm that the national top is still formed by the traditional synthetic drugs criminals, and sometimes their children. But there are also factors that point out blind spots and current developments that cause these traditional criminals to lose their national and international top position. These days, the leaders are faced with the full attention of the government, the police, and the judiciary. We will discuss four relevant factors: a. Criminal entanglement: they don’t know any better; b. The Dutch trinity: price-quality ratio, risk of being caught, and severity of the sentences; c. Drugs brokers: they know how to make connections; d. Blind spots.

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Re a. Criminal entanglement: they don’t know any better The first factor is as simple as it is worrying. It involves a small category of criminals, who, as it were, became entangled in this form of organized drugs crime. It is profitable or there is little else they are capable of. The hard core has earned large sums of money. Money is the basis for further investments in the organization of drugs production and transport. They have access to the social and physical infrastructure for international trafficking in synthetic drugs. Therefore they are able to organize the most risky activities in such a way that they watch them from a distance, far away from the risk of being caught. They are criminal merchants who ‘[…] connect logistical networks, find the right people for the job, shield their affairs, and create as many interlayers as possible.’

Money does not appear to be an overriding motive. Drugs crime at the highest level is their way of life. It is more than a means to make money, because it determines their identity, their social network, and their status. This status is ‘[…] based on trust, historical success, shielding techniques, use of violence and/or having useful relationships’.

Sub b. The Dutch trinity: price-quality ratio, risk of being caught, and severity of the sentences The Dutch leaders thank their important global position on the synthetic drugs market to three connected circumstances: the favourable price-quality ratio of the Dutch synthetic drugs, the small or modest risk of the leaders being caught, and the relatively limited severity of the sentences.

The customary leaders and their networks are capable of producing inexpen- sive synthetic drugs. They have years of experience, a physical infrastructure, and a network of hundreds of experienced lab technicians and pill producers. Plus a smaller network of innovators: chemists who know about the latest production methods, and smart pill producers. This combination is important, as it allows them to meet the requirements of the international customers regarding dosage and appearance of the party pill. If the customer wants a pill ‘with Donald Duck on it’ or ‘with three differently coloured layers’, this can be supplied.

‘Of old, the top X consists of native Dutchmen. The market is probably controlled by a couple of dozen. They have the network. Why would you produce the stuff yourself if you can buy it cheap? The quality is good too. Why do it yourself? This is also the reason the Polish stopped producing. In this sense we’re like IKEA. It is so good and so cheap that they won’t organize it themselves [abroad]. In the Z investigation, a chemist came to the fore who boasted about being able to produce an MDMA pill for 15 eurocents. He

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exported mainly to Australia. In Australia, pills will easily cost you 25 to 30 dollar each. The quality of his product is so pure, so clean.’

The result of the low purchase price and high quality is that many national and international top criminals rather purchase the synthetic drugs from the Bra- bant-Limburg criminals than get involved in production themselves. Another deterrent for foreign criminals to get involved in the production is formed by the often more unfavourable conditions in their country with regard to the risk of being caught and/or the severity of the sentences.

‘Why would a criminal in Australia, this country is a major customer for pills from the Netherlands, start smuggling a precursor or a preprecursor, buy chemicals, manufacture hardware, gather knowledge, invest a lot of money while running the risk of severe punishment? As punishments in this context are draconian in Australia. Why would anyone want to do this if a phone call to a Dutch criminal suffices to order as many pills as you like, in the colour you want, with the logo you desire, and with the active substance of your choice, that will be delivered at the location of your choice, at a price no one else can ever produce them for, and on top of that, being of superior quality too. Why would anyone want to?’

The same applies to China. It is a country with many chemical companies and great knowhow. It is easy for the Chinese to produce ecstasy. Our respondents are convinced that Chinese criminals limit themselves to supplying raw materials and hardware, because they risk severe punishments, including the death penalty, for drugs production. This is exactly why the Chinese raw material manufacturers have been working together with Dutch criminals for decades. They do this with a strong profit motive and for tactical reasons only, as Chinese criminals have a strong aversion to the rushed Dutch purchasers, who they call ‘devils’ (Huisman, 2006).

The risk of being caught is small for Dutch top criminals, as the major players can order others to do things for them, can connect orders and deliveries, and can enter into criminal alliances with other established criminals. This is why, in many respects, they are barely affected by the police and the judiciary, in the sense that their identities are known, but that it is all but impossible to organize what is required to put them behind bars for many years: a long- term, labour-intensive international criminal investigation, using the most far-reaching investigative methods.

For criminals that operate internationally, the severity of the Dutch sentences is relatively favourable. An EMCDDA study (2017) showed that this applies to both the nominal sentences imposed and the execution of the sentences, in

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other words ‘the number of years a convicted person spends behind bars’. An examination of files (Reijnen & Van Velthoven, 2005) showed that synthetic drugs smuggling – taking them outside Dutch territory – is punished with sentences of three to four years’ imprisonment, even if a six-year-sentence has been imposed. This is well below the maximum sentence of twelve years. Facilitators are often sentenced to two to three years’ imprisonment. For production, the usual sentence is four and a half to five years. This instills the necessary fear into lab technicians, and leads to precautions during production. But the top layer of Brabant and Limburg criminals physically stays away from the production locations. In addition, they operate at the global level. The sentences in the Netherlands are so much lower than the draconian punishments in important source or destination countries, such as Australia, China, Indonesia, or the United States, that this is an important motive for producing in the Netherlands.

A study among drugs criminals in Belgian prisons shows that they would have preferred to have been convicted in the Netherlands. ‘Sentences there would generally be less severe – often shorter sentences or community service for more minor offences – and if they were severe, this would be justified’, the latter of course in the eyes of the criminals (De Middeleer et al., 2018, p. 223). But, as the researchers noted, this does not play a direct role in the decision to carry out specific activities in Belgium or the Netherlands.

Re c. Drugs brokers: they know how to make connections A third factor has to do with the rather long series of steps that must be taken to be able to supply good-quality synthetic drugs in the required quantities. As we saw in Chapter 2, the main objectives are to obtain raw materials and hardware, bring these two together, find suitable production locations, dispose of the waste, dismantle the production locations, store the raw materials and finished products, and arrange the national and international distribution of the synthetic drugs. The traditional leaders have key positions, which allows them to place orders, bring supply and demand together, and maintain a network of specialized individuals, groups and networks that can carry out these components of the process.

‘The top X is still in the picture. There are many people who make a little bit of money. There is a wide range of people who make good money of it. The average errand boy, the cooks, they are as poor as church mice. They make a lot of money on the production of the drugs, which they then spend in two days’ time. Paying off debts, buying a car or a motorbike, and it’s gone. In the transcripts of the tapped conversations you can read that they are penni- less. They sell amphetamine paste and make a profit of 100 euro, or 50 euro. Or they buy oil and water, and have it crystallized for 25 euro per kilo, and

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then they earn 75 euro per kilo. […] They deal in cocaine on the side. They are co-investors. Or it is an exchange object. The majority is investment. You have to continue to invest in synthetic drugs production. There are so many people who get a piece of the pie. Individuals take care of a part of the process. There is no central management.’

A criminal who comes close to being in the top X as regards status and achievements explained that organizing steps in the ecstasy production chain appears to be very difficult, whereas this is actually quite simple for a highly positioned insider. Large criminal organizations are not required, because coalitions are formed for each project to get the criminal job done:

‘Your friends include the guys who can do anything. Who know people. So hey, I need something, they can sometimes arrange it. It is a sort of networking. Like with everything. It’s not really different from a normal business. If you know someone at the office who knows this or who knows that. People who know each other and try to earn some money together. Joint venture-like. These large syndicates, we don’t have them at all in the Neth- erlands. They’ve got it all wrong, the police and the judiciary. Of one organization and they’re strong, they’re big fish. It’s actually really easy. I need things that I can simply buy here, I don’t have to send anyone to China to get it or anything, I can simply buy it from someone with contacts in China. Hardware too. I buy everything. Simple. Also when it comes to selling. The customers are simply there. One accidently finds you, the other knows where you’re at. People you don’t know, people you know. You’ve known some of these people for a long time.’

Re d. Blind spots A fourth factor is that there are blind spots in the knowledge of the police and the judiciary about the organized synthetic drugs criminals in the Nether- lands. So as a result of a lack of knowledge, the traditional leaders, nearly all of them of Brabant and Limburg origin, get into the picture time and again, with a prominent position for the travellers or former travellers.

In the Netherlands, relatively little investigative staff has been made available for criminal investigations into synthetic drugs criminals since the discon- tinuation of the SDU. As a result, the availability of investigative information about the present state of affairs is limited: information about newcomers on the market, developments outside Limburg and North Brabant, new individuals or groups that make a lot of money from synthetic drugs and other activities, or developments around the traditional top layer. Many respondents have pointed out a persistent phenomenon: labs are found and dismantled, and the errand boys are dealt with, but the organizers too often escape detection. This

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also applies to organizers with a different profile than the traditional Brabant and Limburg criminals.

‘What are the chances of being caught when you’re at the top of the synthetic drugs chain? Suspects responsible for the financial side of the operation are never found in a lab. We only catch the suckers operating the labs. The last lab we found was well-hidden, with lots of cameras. They have counter-surveillance, the telephones are turned off. They run an incredibly smart operation. Of course they know the spy shop in Amsterdam is being monitored by the police. They simply fly to Shanghai and order the stuff there. The order subsequently arrives by mail. Nothing is stopping them from doing their thing.’

In a major investigation named Explorer, the police used cameras and bugging devices to be able to follow what was happening at an important meeting place for synthetic drugs criminals in Brabant, namely The Party King party rental in Best. In Chapter 9 we will further discuss this investigation. For now it is important that more than 700 unique persons were seen at The Party King. A number of them could not be identified because of poor video or sound quality, but there were also individuals who were unknown to the police, the FIOD, or the Justice Department. Yet, nearly all these individuals visited this location to talk about drugs trafficking or drugs production; often synthetic drugs, but also cannabis and cocaine. This led to the conclusion that a large category of criminals of Dutch origin who presently earn their money with synthetic drugs is insufficiently known, according to an investigative officer involved:

‘This is the image that emerged from Explorer, to me anyway. By now it has become so huge and so many people have gotten involved that we have lost sight of things. That we have no idea anymore who exactly does what, and how, or on what scale. These are not just travellers, the antisocial, and I don’t know what, but also ordinary people who have jobs elsewhere, who simply do this on the side. Hundreds of important criminals visited this Party King warehouse, a number of which we did not know. We do know that they weren’t there to rent a standing table. There were no activities that involved any party rental. People constantly visited the location to conduct business or resell chemicals, to borrow each other’s cooks, and to deal in actual drugs. There were so many people we didn’t know at all. So know that ecstasy trafficking in the Netherlands not solely involves these travellers.’

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7.3 Beyond the top X

The top 35 of synthetic drugs criminals is already extensive, yet a few important developments appear to stay under the radar. The following developments are involved: a. Simplification: chances for newcomers from Dutch or foreign origin; b. Criminal motorcycle gangs; c. Turkish drugs criminals; d. Polish criminals.

Re a. Simplification: chances for newcomers of Dutch and foreign origin Until around the millennium change, synthetic drugs production was a complicated, lengthy and difficult process. It took money, patience, raw materials, infrastructure, and chemical knowledge. For several decades, this played into the hands of the traditional top X: they had a strong position on a market that was hard to access for newcomers. This changed in the present century. Initially, synthetic drugs production became more complicated, because national and international policy put up barriers. We will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 8. What is important for now is that it became a lot more difficult for criminals to purchase the raw materials (precursors) for amphetamine (BMK) and ecstasy (PMK). This led to a temporary dip in the production, but also to a search for replacement substances that could be used to produce PMK or BMK without too much effort: the preprecursors. Paradoxical was that specific preprecursors were easy to use, sometimes easy to order, and, on top of that, much cheaper than PMK and BMK.

The consequence of the simplification of the production of drugs or precursors was that new producers entered the synthetic drugs market. An expert compared the production of synthetic drugs with frying an egg:

‘After we managed to get PMK and BMK listed, criminals became more innovative and started to think more about risk spreading. We made them smarter. In the old days, lab technicians with knowledge were required. These days not so much anymore. It seems anyone can make synthetic drugs. Anyone can fry an egg.’

The knowledge of how to produce amphetamine and ecstasy became integrated in the expanded world of lab technicians via mouth-to-mouth information. And via very clear descriptions available on the internet. In addition, it had always been easier to produce amphetamine than ecstasy. And these days, the hardware that comes from China is very easy to work with; less craftsmanship is required than in the past, because of the built in measuring and control technology. Many raw materials, chemicals and hardware can be ordered via

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the internet. The simplification of the production process has led to a certain democratization in the sense that the various newcomers became active in the synthetic drugs world as some sort of collaborating one-man businesses. An experienced North Brabant criminal sees the rise of new producers of semi- finished and finished products as follows:

‘In the old days you simply had BMK and PMK, and now you’ve got maybe thirty different things you can also extract it from. Those semifinished products. They banned it. This is what you always get when you ban things. You saw it in America with this Act. Then you can see what happened. The semi- finished products make everyone try out things.’ Are there more of them now? ‘Yes, all these kamikaze pilots, who will all give it a try. They lock themselves up in an attic or a shed, and do it.’

In the first place, new groups of synthetic drugs criminals of Dutch origin have emerged. They do not need to have an extensive criminal network at their disposal to take up production, fully or in part, and sale. They are one-man businesses, according to an investigative officer involved:

‘It is so easy to order things via the internet. Little knowledge is required to convert APAAN. A heating element and au-bain-marie. APAAN, you add acid and you’ve got BMK. There is a difference in quality depending on how you make it. We can tell this from the labs. Very professional, very clean, and we also see labs where they are still messing about with 22 litre. Then I think: why do they still do this, but they’re hobbyists who try their hand at it. They themselves produce amphetamine, cut it and sell it themselves. You do need a market, of course. In addition to the big leaders, you’ve got the one-man businesses. There are people who explore the market themselves, and see that it is reasonably easy. And they took up APAAN, BMK and amphetamine. […] Large shipments of thousands of litres of APAAN are entering the country, but there are also parcels containing 20 litre arriving at Schiphol. The smaller parcels don’t end up with the larger networks. They are for the one-man businesses. They mess about on a small scale at home.’

In the second place, networks of criminals who do not originate in the Neth- erlands, but live and work there, are involved in the trade in acetic anhydride. They come from Turkey, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. They have the right contacts and the right transport lines to regions with large-scale heroin production worldwide.

For a few years now, the labs dismantled in the Netherlands have included methamphetamine production locations. This production strikingly often lies

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in the hands of Vietnamese nationals. Initially, the Vietnamese produced this drug in small laboratories, the kitchen labs, in the Czech Republic, but they also started producing in the Netherlands, partly because of the relatively lenient sentences. In addition they can use the solid and professional infrastructure for cannabis production and trafficking Vietnamese nationals have built up in the Netherlands (Schoenmakers et al., 2013).

Re b. Criminal motorcycle gangs Over the past ten years, criminal motor gangs have entered the top layer of synthetic drugs criminals. Coalitions have been forged between traditional synthetic drugs criminals and criminal motor gangs. Police respondents emphasize that a criminal motor gang assists in the use of violence, or, by threatening to use violence, helps prevent it. A criminal motor gang provides a supply of errand boys, but also of international criminal contacts and distribution channels. Respondents think that criminal motor gangs themselves have also taken up synthetic drugs production.

‘Certain criminal motor gangs have a special Chapter that is involved in the production of synthetic drugs. It isn’t all that easy to get insight into what exactly they do, as they are of course a closed community. It’s not easy to extract information from it. In the end, all our investigative means are quite limited. Of course they know that you can be tapped or followed. One leader simply stated that he has his own Chapter that produces synthetic drugs.’

‘A picture was created, based on information from the Criminal Intelligence Team and the Dutch Crime Stoppers Anonymous. It’s a Chapter in [North Brabant]. They have labs and produce here in the region and across the Belgian border. We see dumpsites and MDMA reports that can be traced back to this Chapter. The lab in [city in North Brabant] is linked to it.’

Re c. Turkish drugs criminals In Chapter 5, we described the close cooperation between North Brabant synthetic drugs criminals and Turkish drugs criminals. These Turkish criminals were involved in the large-scale export of heroin to the Netherlands. They used the existing drugs route to transport the ecstasy bought in North Brabant to Turkey. Drugs money was at the basis of money laundering and investments in real estate, hotels, pubs, and restaurants, and other types of businesses. It gave the Turkish criminals, like a few of their Brabant partners, a firm position of power in this city and region.

Until the millennium change, Turkish criminals mainly came to the fore as buyers of ecstasy pills, which they subsequently transported to Turkey. According to respondents, this is still happening, increasingly even, but it is

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not limited to Turkish criminals operating in North Brabant. It extends to other locations with well-organized Turkish criminal networks, such as the city of Rotterdam:

‘The export to Turkey appears to be increasing. This probably involves the exchange of ecstasy for heroin. Turkish nationals play a key role in Rotterdam and also where they are from.’

Turkish criminals have drugs routes between the Netherlands and Turkey at their disposal. They use these for the import of acetic anhydride into Turkey. They use the same infrastructure to transport morphine to the Netherlands, and use a lab to convert this into heroin. There is a lively and profitable Turkish drugs trade that no longer shuns chemical processes:

‘In Germany is a factory that produces acetic anhydride at the very low price of 5 euro a litre. Acetic anhydride has legal applications and can be used in many products, but it is also needed to convert morphine into heroin. Dutch criminals buy acetic anhydride in bulk for two reasons. Firstly for the export to Iran, where they are paid about 1,000 euro a litre. Secondly, morphine is transported to the Netherlands. Turkish nationals in the Netherlands buy acetic anhydride and convert the morphine into heroin. They then market the finished product. The people involved in this in the Netherlands are Dutch Turks.’

A shuttle service for synthetic drugs was identified: morphine to the Neth- erlands, and ecstasy to Turkey. A ‘Turkish’ lab, converted the morphine into heroin and produced ecstasy:

‘Recently, a large lab was found on a company premises. They [Turkish criminals] were in the process of converting morphine into heroin, and cutting the heroin. This subsequently goes to the UK, as does the ecstasy of top X criminals, but there are dangerous types among them. In Turkey, you can’t drink, of course, but the dance scene is very important there. So they export a hell of a lot of MDMA to Turkey. In the same vein you see morphine come to the Netherlands. The Turks are also involved in the large-scale tableting of ecstasy at the same location. The pills are taken back to Turkey along the same transport route.’

There is an important difference between the Turkish drugs criminals and the traditional Brabant and Limburg criminals. Turkish criminals or criminal families are much better at making a smooth transition to the legal world. One of the reasons for this is that their names are not automatically associated with synthetic or other types of drugs, whereas, of course, the names of the

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leading criminals from Brabant and Limburg are. Turkish criminals launder money, buy real estate – hotels, pubs, restaurants, etc. – and start companies. They are organized as entrepreneurs, in the legal world they stand up for the interests of their companies and the areas where they all live together and from where they run their businesses.

Re d. Polish criminals

There are different types of relationships between synthetic drugs criminals of Dutch origin and their counterparts of Polish origin. These include Pol- ish nationals who live and work in the Netherlands, but also Polish nationals in Poland. Poland is an important amphetamine producing country. Many amphetamine laboratories in Poland are managed or supervised by Dutch criminals (EMCDDA, 2017; also see LE, 2016). Dutch synthetic drugs criminals buy materials from Polish companies too: hardware and particularly chemicals. There are criminal networks specialized in purchasing chemicals in Poland for drugs production in the Netherlands. Sometimes the chemicals are bought from legal companies, but sometimes Dutch and Polish criminals jointly establish companies to serve as a front for the trade in chemicals.

In the Netherlands, Polish people are being recruited to buy chemicals in Poland. The pay is attractive to poorly paid migrant workers, and Dutch criminals know where to recruit them, namely at the locations where they are housed in poor circumstances, such as holiday parks, hotels, or premises belonging to rack-renters. In addition, the Polish people who supervise the migrant workers, for employment agencies for instance, appear to be involved in drugs trafficking and smuggling. Anyway, respondents have identified -var ious types of cooperation in the field of synthetic drugs between Dutch and Polish nationals. The quantity of chemicals imported into the Netherlands from Poland is such that respondents are at a loss as to where to start tackling the problem:

‘Within the organization I try to join alliances and win people over. In addition I try to create awareness. It’s the small victories that keep me going. The approach is laughable, if you consider the huge quantity of chemicals that enter the country. If the media would get wind of the fact that so many cases are left on the shelf… The Dutch authorities say: Poland, please stop providing information, as we cannot act upon it, […] as can be read in email exchanges.’

Polish synthetic drugs criminals do not yet belong to the top of the synthetic drugs world, but they are slowly working their way up. If there is one category

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that may threaten the position of the traditional synthetic drugs criminals, it is the Polish, according to a well-informed police officer.

7.4 Conclusion

The Central Criminal Investigations Division composed a top 35 of major and well-organized synthetic drugs criminals. They mainly come from North Brabant and Limburg, and nearly all of them are of Dutch origin. It is understandable that the police have drawn up this top X. They see that the leaders and network have already been criminally active for decades, but do not have the means – investigative methods, including infiltration and financial investigation – staff, and international willingness to jointly tackle the problem. A top 35 helps launch such investigations. It is quite an achievement to be included in this list: criminals have to meet a great number of conditions.

There are indications, however, that it would be necessary to look beyond this top 35 to create sufficient insight into the top layer of the synthetic drugs criminals who are active in the Netherlands these days. The top layer has become more extensive and more ethnically diverse. Police officers also stated that the top 35 is no longer entirely up to date. It is based on information from the Criminal Intelligence Team, which has become less comprehensive over the past years due to staff reduction.

The list does show that there is a category of Brabant and Limburg criminals that has been able to maintain their positions at the top of the list for years now. In Chapter 8 we will describe how such criminals have managed to find answers time and again to barriers put up by the authorities.

Small country, Big Player 8 Barriers and criminal innovation

Introduction The awareness among policy-makers that synthetic drugs criminals have to overcome quite a few obstacles, has resulted in a view on criminal activities that has become known as the barrier model. This model portrays criminal business operations as a kind of steeplechase, in the sense that, in the logistical process, substances, production locations, production knowledge, national and international transportation routes, and paying customers have to be connected. The barrier model was seen by policy-makers and police as an attractive guide for disrupting criminal activities.

The core task in this model gradually became to thwart the supply of important raw materials for synthetic drugs production, known as the source country strategy. Initially, this was a successful strategy, for it resulted in a substantial decrease in the supply of PMK and an appreciable dip in the production of XTC by the end of the first decade of this century. However, the euphoria disappeared quickly, as the Dutch synthetic drugs criminals and especially their Chinese partners proved capable of side-stepping the problems created. If raw materials were harder to get, they simply developed alternatives. Experts are clear about the net result of the barrier strategy: it has resulted in professionalization of synthetic drugs crime. In this chapter, we will describe how this came about.

8.1 The barrier model

The barrier model originated in interregional investigations team IRT Southern Netherlands, which was chiefly aimed at synthetic drugs. A few young and prominent investigation supervisors developed a ‘strategic guide- line’ in cooperation with the criminologist Fijnaut. The latter directed their attention to a German study (Logistik der Organisierten Kriminalität by Sieber & Bögel, 1993), which introduced a new approach to fighting organized crime. The point of departure was that criminal groups are often active in a network with other criminal groups, and have built up successful logistics. Therefore, the fight against organized crime did not solely profit from tackling the criminal groups themselves, but also from tackling the logistic network they had built up. This was not simply a task for the police, but for the entire government. This approach seemed suitable for the world of synthetic drugs, on account of its complex logistics. Criminal logistics was analysed, and, in a

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‘grid model’, a distinction was made between facilitators, advisors, companies serving as a front, money and corruption (Paulissen and Venrooij, 1995). The term barrier model was not used at that time, but the basic idea was the same. However, the analysis of the logistical model did not yet influence the government’s strategy in the nineties, as the emphasis remained on the traditional criminal investigations. This changed when the Synthetic Drugs Unit (SDU) was created.

The creation of the SDU provided a combination of three disciplines: information specialists, thematic experts and criminal investigators. Lessons were learned from criminal investigations in the early nineties, such as the one into Peter van D., for these had cost a lot of time and produced few results. In addition to investigating the leaders, SDU analysed the criminal world of synthetic drugs, as though this concerned business processes. The logistical process was charted, partly on the basis of concrete investigation information, but also ‘by-catch’ from criminal investigations, through informers and with thematic insights that had been gained throughout the years by experts, who were now brought together physically. The SDU gained insight into the – then particularly – complex logistic process of producing and selling XTC. The SDU tried to understand and disrupt the logistical process of the trade in synthetic drugs. By doing so, it laid the basis for a Barrier model for synthetic drugs with seven steps, as it is still used today. (See, for instance, the Strategy document ‘Synthetic drugs and Precursors 2012-2016). The seven steps are as follows: 1. obtaining precursors; 2. obtaining essential/other chemicals; 3. obtaining hardware; 4. organizing production and storage site; 5. production; 6. dumping waste; 7. sale.

In the years 2005-2010, investigative authorities and policy-makers developed the idea that the effort should predominantly be focused on the ‘early stage’ of the logistic chain of synthetic drugs production. If the influx of drugs precursors from China and Eastern Europe to the Netherlands could be stemmed, this would be a major blow for Dutch synthetic drugs criminals, with more impact than arrests and convictions within the context of a large-scale criminal investigation. I must be noted that there were few other options at that time. After the SDU had been dismantled, few investigators were available for investigations. So, in addition to a substantive argument, there was a practical necessity to focus on the cheap source country strategy.

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The Netherlands applied itself to synthetic drugs diplomacy (see Chapter 6). Using international bodies, an attempt was made to blockade the import of precursors from China. As early as 1999, the national coordination commission on precursors was set up, partly for this purpose. In this broadly organized commission, the Dutch international synthetic drugs diplomacy was prepared. The aim was clear: to stimulate China to tackle precursor manufacturing by normal chemical companies. About 2005, this message met with increasing response in China, resulting in noticeable effects in 2008:

‘In 2008, China introduced new legislation and increased checks to prevent the illegal production of PMK. Shortage of this raw material resulted globally in a decrease in the availability of ecstasy.’ (Boerman et al., 2012, p. 47)

In 2008, the Criminal Intelligence Team provided information that showed that the price of one litre of PMK had risen from € 800 to € 1,600, or even to as much as € 3,000 (KLPD, 2008). A search for substitute raw materials was initiated.

8.2 PMK: substitute raw materials

The shortage of PMK caused an urgent need for substances that can be converted into PMK.

The first alternative was safrole (oil), which was also available in the past, but was now used on a larger scale. Safrole is a natural substance, produced by the sassafras plant; it figures on list 1 of the United Nations. It is a substance with numerous legal uses. This makes it possible to buy it through a front company, purportedly using safrole legally. It can be bought in other Asian countries apart from China; especially in Cambodia, safrole is widely available. Using chemicals that are easy to obtain, safrole can be turned into PMK by means of the Wacker method.

The Netherlands once more applied its international synthetic drugs diplomacy. It paid for a comprehensive study by the UNODC into the production of, trade in and use of oils containing safrole. This seemed to bear fruit (UNODC, 2006). In an ever growing number of source countries, oils containing safrole were made illegal or were regulated. In 2008, seizures of safrole in source countries peaked, but later they declined. However, in 2016 the conclusion was drawn that seizures made by customs and the police in the Netherlands indicate that safrole remained ‘popular’ (KLPD, 2016).

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In as far as it is possible to trace which source countries are involved, they appear to be varied, and include Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam.

In April 2010, a second alternative to PMK first emerged in the Netherlands: PMK glycidate. This is called a masked precursor, because it is a substance that masks the true nature of the substance (PMK). PMK glycidate is PMK in the form of a solid substance (powder); this is a trick played by criminals, to mislead investigating authorities, who had been looking for oils, not solid substances until then. PMK glycidate is easy to convert into PMK by means of a simple chemical process. It is transported to the Netherlands in a traditional way, i.e. by means of air freight, with false labels and destination companies serving as front.

The interesting thing about PMK glycidate is that it has no legal applications at all. It appears to have been developed solely for the ecstasy production by Chinese companies that aim at this niche market. PMK glycidate, in so far as is known, is exclusively a Chinese export product (KLPD, 2016).

Since 2015, a third PMK alternative has come to the Netherlands. The source country is China, once more. There, sodium salt is made from PMK glycidic acid, which is easy to convert into PMK – ‘add acid and heat it a little’. Ordered on the internet, it comes to the Netherlands through parcel post. Initially, small parcels were intercepted (25 to 30 kilos), but later packages weighing thousands of kilos were found in the port of Rotterdam.

Finally, what is known as MDMA plus has been found in the Netherlands. This is a new Chinese export product with uncertain consequences for Dutch synthetic drugs criminals. It reportedly makes traditional laboratories unnec- essary for the production of ecstasy. A slightly heated drum with acid is enough to convert this substance into MDMA. If the Chinese start producing this and export it abroad, the Netherlands as a staging post will become less logical, less necessary and perhaps superfluous.

8.3 BMK: substitute raw materials

BMK is the precursor for the production of amphetamine. Several Dutch threat assessment reports conclude that Dutch synthetic drugs criminals obtain the BMK from Russia. This is not incorrect, but Russia is not the only source country, and definitely not the favourite one. A few top criminals already ordered the BMK from China, in the pioneering days. They liked it, for the Chinese BMK was of good quality. A leading Dutch criminal specialized almost exclusively in the BMK import from China and earned many millions

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from it. The international pressure on China to take real measures against the trade in precursors did not only reduce Chinese trafficking of PMK, but also of BMK. This explains why a lot of BMK came from Russia by 2008. The quality of the Russian BMK was second-rate. In the words of a police specialist:

‘Russia played a role because the bad BMK came from Russia, according to criminals. China made BMK from phenylacetic acid, nice and pure BMK, and the Russians made it from benzyl cyanide. It was junk, really. BMK is easy to produce from benzyl, one of the most-used chemicals in the chemical and plastic industries. It was also made by certain companies in Russia, because there was a legal demand for it. At some point, two factories were found in Russia, one in Perm and one in Volgograd. Criminals discovered these, possibly through the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, where people speak Russian, and purchased BMK there.’

Dutch anti-precursor diplomacy also focused on Russia:

‘At the time of the SDU (Synthetic Drugs Unit) we thought: if we control BMK and PMK at the start of the chain, then the problem will have been largely solved. The key idea was that if we kept the precursors under control, things would turn out right. We held talks with China, and with the Russians around 2009. The aim was to close down the factories in Russia and China, in order to reduce the BMK and PMK flow towards Europe.’

‘In the past, the synthetics drugs officer went to China and Russia, and lobbied a great deal at the political level to see to it that the factories producing BMK and PMK were closed down. In Russia, this was achieved, eventually. In China, the export of these substances was already a criminal offence, but in Russia, the export was not an offence.’

This diplomacy was successful, for the two major BMK factories were closed down in Russia in 2009 (in Perm and Volgograd). The Russian supply line ‘dried up completely’ (LE, 2016, p. 20). However, as the PMK supply to the Netherlands experienced a temporary dip, the BMK continued to enter the Netherlands, but now almost entirely from China as the source country. The smugglers used circuitous ways, such as a Chinese-German-Polish route.

Criminal entrepreneurs sought and found alternatives for BMK. After BMK bisulphite adduct had been used for several years, a substance was found that was cheaper, more readily available and easier to use: APAAN. It was first detected in the Netherlands in 2010. The police are clear about the source country: China. According to experts, it is a ‘piece of cake’ to convert APAAN into BMK. Between 2011 and 2015, Dutch synthetic drugs criminals bought

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APAAN on a large scale: ‘a tidal wave’. This again led to synthetic drugs diplomacy, due to which the substance was registered eventually. However, in the following years, APAAN was used on a large scale in the Netherlands. It is not clear whether this was a result of hoarding APAAN or of undiminished supply. Soon, other alternatives for BMK (and APAAN) appeared on the market, such as APAA (APAA has no other application than making drugs) and sodium salt from BMK glycidic acid. It is easy to convert it into BMK: add acid and heat it. After APAA, APA and MAPA have been developed by now. And by no means does the criminal innovation stop here.

8.4 The disillusion: criminal innovation

Initially, the barrier strategy produced appealing results. It was seen as a successful way to tackle synthetic drugs crime, and as an example for other criminal markets (Spapens, 2011). As for the fight against synthetic drugs crime, this opinion had completely changed by 2018. The disruption policy regarding the raw materials for amphetamine and ecstasy has chiefly functioned as a stimulus for criminals to innovate. They have been exceedingly successful. The net result is that Dutch synthetic drugs criminals are now operating more professionally and on a larger scale, maintaining their global top position in the production of amphetamine and ecstasy. At the same time, as we concluded in Chapter 7, the strongly simplified production methods have made it easier for newcomers to enter the market of synthetic drugs manufacturers as one-man businesses. The initial euphoria has been substituted by disillusion:

‘A dip in the supply of precursors followed the closure of factories, and after international agreements had been made. However, we did not realize that this was to have major consequences for the production of ecstasy, amphetamine and other substances. The substitutes for BMK and PMK have only exacerbated the problem. Extra steps have been added to the manufacturing process. This teaches us an important thing: the criminal world is innovative.’

We list important trends that make many respondents feel that they have reached an impasse in the fight against synthetic drugs crime, due to criminal inventiveness and market developments: a. substitute substances: (repeated) introduction of new raw materials; b. the emergence of the internet; c. new psychoactive substances (NPS): popular and liberal; d. functional diversification: earning money with different drugs; e. geographical diversification: cross-border logistics; f. professionalization, specialization and a large-scale approach.

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Re a. Substitute substances: (repeated) introduction of new raw materials The arrival of new preprecursors has ended the shortage in the system. Prepre- cursors have become available in large quantities. According to insiders, the ever growing demand can be met. In the past, before the days of the preprecursors, there was also a strong demand, but it was not possible to produce enough. This impediment has now disappeared.

When an important raw material for the production of synthetic drugs is prohibited or registered at the international level, Chinese chemical companies simply develop a substitute, sometimes following directions from Dutch criminals. Subsequently, this substitute is imported by Dutch criminals, due to which the production remains at the same level or is quickly restored. An allocation of duties has developed. The Chinese chemical industry innovates and looks for non-registered raw materials if necessary, so that they will be able to export them without much trouble. Important customers are Dutch criminals who produce synthetic drugs and organize distribution.

Re b. The emergence of the internet The emergence of the internet has changed many things. ‘The internet represents a break with the established system’, according to an investigation expert. Some traditional synthetic drugs criminals also responded quickly, but it has chiefly resulted in new ‘entrants’ to the world of synthetic drugs. Furthermore, the supply has become fragmented, partly because it is relatively easy to obtain raw materials and hardware through the internet, so it is no longer necessary to build up more or less permanent relations with legal or illegal contacts in China (whether or not through intermediaries). As a result, part of the production has become more small-scale.

These small-scale producers are able to offer customers their products through the internet, in particular through the dark web, which is only accessible with special software. Most commonly used is The Onion Router (TOR), which – just like an onion – has so many layers around the original message, that the source can no longer be traced. Initially, this technology was chiefly used by cyberpunks and other internet anarchists, who wanted to remain hidden from the authorities. After some time, TOR was discovered by criminals, who have their own reasons for avoiding being noticed by the authorities.

On the dark web, systems are being developed for the trade in drugs (and all kinds of other illegal products) that are comparable to other cyber market places. This system has many advantages for users. More than in the past, they have now become consumers who have a choice (Wainwright, 2015). On the internet, they can compare the suppliers and read reviews written by other users. They are no longer dependent on the micro dealers they know by

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chance in their neighbourhood. Although few statistics are available about it, experts think that this digital development has enormously stimulated the demand for synthetic drugs on a global scale.

This development presents investigative authorities with new challenges. Interesting successes have been achieved (for instance Hansa market, the illegal dark web market that the Dutch police, cooperating with foreign officers, took over and shut down in 2017), but investigative bodies are faced with a new front in the fight against synthetic drugs.

Re c. New psychoactive substances (NPS): popular and liberal New psychoactive substances are chemical substances with the same types of effects as the known and prohibited synthetic drugs, but they are often neither prohibited nor registered substances. Previously, they were called designer drugs (nowadays NPS), and they are finished products. Since 2009, the NPS have been on the rise, as an alternative for ecstasy. Trade in and use of NPS are increasing all over the world, including the Netherlands. For criminals who trade in NPS, the Netherlands has become an attractive country, because certain NPS have been banned in several European countries, by means of a ‘generic list’, but not in the Netherlands.

There are many websites where NPS can be ordered. The marketeers of these producers have cooked up trendy names such as Explosion, Spice and White Pearls. NPS are not manufactured in the Netherlands, but in China, India and other countries. Dutch criminals are involved in packaging the drugs and determining the sales format. Dutch criminals buy the drug in China or India, and package it subsequently in the desired format.

Users can order NPS through the internet. Apart from such retail trade, NPS are also bought by businessmen active in the Netherlands. These traders may function as distribution companies that supply customers all over the world, but chiefly in Europe, particularly in Germany and France. The substances arrive in the Netherlands in postal parcels or as air freight.

In 2016, it was noted that two types of criminals focus on the NPS market, although the scope of these activities remains unclear. Firstly, there are criminal networks active in the Netherlands. They trade in, for instance, mephedrone, a former NPS, now included in list 1 of the Opium Act. Secondly, foreign nationals come to the Netherlands to buy designer drugs. This involves substances that are not banned in the Netherlands, but are prohibited in their own country. They create businesses in the Netherlands for the purpose of ordering designer drugs, or they travel to the Netherlands in order to buy them. This is a modern variant of drugs tourism.

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Re d. Functional diversification: earning money with different drugs Specialized drugs criminals became aware of their vulnerability as a result of the temporary dip in ecstasy and amphetamine production. This was a stimulus to combine the trade in or production of synthetic drugs (even more) with other drugs. Respondents draw attention to increased diversification. Part of the synthetic drugs producers entered the cocaine market, and in laboratories, various types of drugs, such as heroin, GHB, cocaine and – more often – cannabis, or their raw materials and production resources, are frequently found. The precursors dip of 2007-2008 coincided with an increase in cannabis production.

Re e. Geographical diversification: cross-border logistics Dutch synthetic drugs criminals have cross-border logistics at their disposal for the import of raw materials, the manufacturing and the sales. This has been the case before, of course, but it has received a new boost. Geographic diversification became functional, because certain international movements - raw materials from China to the Netherlands and synthetic drugs from the Netherlands to popular destination countries, such as Australia – had become widely known, giving rise to extra checks.

The flow of raw materials from China to the Netherlands is conspicuous, which is why delivery is not just done directly, but often by means of a detour along other European countries. PMK glycidate (an important precursor for ecstasy production) comes, as far as is known, always from China. The substance is not listed, although highly suspected (there is no known legal application) and is being monitored. When the substance is transported by air freight from China to Europe, it is given a false label, such as camphoric acid. In the cases observed by the Dutch investigative authorities, flights were made to airports in other European countries such as Denmark, Slovakia or Estonia. Subse- quently, the shipment was sent by air or by road to the Netherlands. The orders are virtually always made by companies serving as a front, which work on the instructions of Dutch synthetic drugs criminals, and which were sometimes incorporated (previously or recently) for that purpose (see, for instance, KLPD, 2012).

In addition to precursors and preprecursors, a variety of chemicals is necessary for the production of synthetic drugs. Persons who perform odd jobs for Dutch synthetic drugs criminals buy the required chemicals from chemical companies abroad, in particular in Belgium or Poland. These chemical companies have in turn often made purchases in China. Sometimes, Dutch synthetic drugs criminals incorporate a company serving as front, especially in Eastern Europe, in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Romania. Even then, substances are ordered in China, following which they are trans-

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ported to the Netherlands in trucks. This is easy, as there is free movement of goods and persons within the Schengen area.

Dutch synthetic drugs criminals hire specialists to import precursors, preprecursors and chemicals through European countries to the Netherlands. In this way, the criminals ensure a continuous supply of these substances, without having to dirty their hands; they simply buy these services.

‘One (…) development in the field of synthetic drugs crime is the emergence of new source countries for chemicals, in particular Poland. A criminal business sector seems to be developing, with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) that exclusively focus on providing several drugs manufacturers with chemicals from Poland.’ (KLPD, 2012)

Dutch synthetic drugs criminals also move abroad for the production of synthetic drugs, especially to Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Germany or Poland. Errand boys and front men of Dutch synthetic drugs criminals are often involved in laboratories detected in Belgium. Well-informed respondents estimate it at three quarters or more. Dutch criminals invest in the lab or are responsible for the organization and production.

A study published in 2018 shows that criminal organizations from the southern Netherlands are chiefly responsible for the production of synthetic drugs in Belgium, although the know-how of Belgians involved seems to have improved over the past few years. Moreover, Belgium’s role in the supply of precursors and preprecursors to the Netherlands has become more important. Belgian postal and courier services are also being used to distribute the synthetic drugs products all over the world. The researchers expect that the interconnectedness between the Belgian and Dutch synthetic drugs environment will not disappear soon. In spite of the effort made by the Dutch authorities, in particular the activities of the Brabant and Zeeland Taskforce, the extent of the synthetic drugs phenomenon has not decreased substantially, in their view (De Middeleer et al., 2018).

Re f. Professionalization and a large-scale approach The synthetic drugs criminals were confronted with all kinds of barriers, such as newly scheduled substances, a temporary or permanent decrease in the availability of certain raw materials, and tighter checks on transport movements. This stimulated Dutch synthetic drugs criminals to professionalize the logistical chain.

‘They have become highly professional. I don’t know if you can put it so firmly, but it feels as though the investigations have made them smarter,

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and the world more complex. We repeatedly raise more barriers, so that they have to invent new solutions every time, and they do.’

Professionalization has resulted in geographical (in various countries) and functional (trading in different drugs) diversification, but also in an increase in scale and specialization. All this is interconnected. If the volume of the synthetic drugs production increases, the criminal network becomes more complex, making it impossible to have a clear picture of all running criminal operations, or to control them. Partial processes or clearly defined tasks are contracted out by criminal key figures to persons in a minor network and to legal entities. The purchase of raw materials and chemicals, the production in laboratories, the construction and demolition of a laboratory, and the distribution of finished or semi finished products to the client are different criminal activities, carried out by specialists. It is complex and chaotic, but demand, production and supply are brought together by criminals in central positions.

An example of specialization and large-scale operations is formed by criminal specialists who acquire and store large quantities of chemicals and supply them to other criminals or clients, who subsequently apply themselves to the production of ecstasy and/or amphetamine.

‘A further thing that is noteworthy in the area of chemicals, is the large scale on which criminals collect chemicals. In 2011, two shipments of formamide, totalling almost 30 tonnes, were imported from China within a few months. Not long afterwards, a new shipment totalling almost 18 tonnes came to Belgium, probably meant for

Dutch drugs producers. These three shipments, which ended up in the criminal world, are enough to produce almost 38,000 kilos of amphetamine. In (…) the storage facility in IJzendijke (the Netherlands) almost 25,000 litres and 20,000 kilos of chemicals were found, intended for large-scale conversion of safrole and the production of MDMA. Such incidents possibly indicate the growing volume of the production of synthetic drugs in the Nether- lands.’ (KLPD, 2012)

One insider compares a big chemicals storage site with a warehouse like IKEA, in the sense that the business had a well-ordered and labelled stock, where criminals could pick and choose chemicals from shelves, to subsequently produce the synthetic drugs in their own labs. This huge storage site was found in 2015, during a large-scale police operation in a warehouse in Den Bommel, a small village in the island of Goeree-Overflakkee in the southern Netherlands. The business functioned as a distribution centre for drugs labs

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producing amphetamine and MDMA. It is the largest quantity of drugs chemicals ever found by the Dutch police.

‘Den Bommel was a big hit. It was a kind of IKEA for organized crime. We seized 63,000 litres of chemicals there.’

It is interesting that the dismantling of this huge storage facility had no appreciable consequences for the price of MDMA and amphetamine. Apparently, the illegal market was perfectly able to deal with this setback. This again indicates that drugs markets have their own dynamics, which cannot be automatically compared to the dynamics of legal markets. The lack of transparency for producers and users and the enormous increase in value due to the production process make them a world apart.

Furthermore, the transportation of ecstasy pills to England, for instance, was outsourced to a specialist from the province of Brabant. Due to the routines built up in respect of transport, energy could be dedicated to creating a network for the flows of funds:

‘I think this is really fascinating. He cashes in millions. He has his own criminal organization, and they do nothing but sell ecstasy pills to English buyers. What is also very professional, Pakistanis have been hired for the money transports and underground banking. It was not very easy to tackle this group. Who would think of such a thing? It was based in a antiques shop. You would think these are just a bunch of saps selling old tables. Not so. This was an eye-opener for me.’

One respondent recognized many important trends in a synthetic drugs network that was professionally organized: geographical diversification (active in countries all over the world), functional diversification (ecstasy, amphetamine, methamphetamine and NPS), front companies, sophisticated means of production that remind one of the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), and CCTV surveillance in a large-scale laboratory. The top criminal personally had chemical knowledge. He gave the orders and brought all kinds of criminal activities together. It was a textbook example of highly professional synthetic drugs crime.

‘The main suspect imported chemicals into the Netherlands from Pakistan and India, through Hamburg. He built up a number of labs. He had three or four people who occupied themselves with building up the labs and carrying out laboratory tasks. He himself never visited the labs, but determined what had to be done. The products were shipped to Germany, where they were packaged and then exported to Australia. They made methamphetamine,

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amphetamine, MDMA. They also worked with NPS, substances that are not covered by legislation. He had a company in Pakistan, but had also bought two large warehouses in Hungary, which he had refurbished for 1.7 million euros. Next to his Hungarian warehouse, there was a company that was involved in the import of chemicals. They obtained chemicals from outside of Europe, and put them in jerry cans there. It is no coincidence that these were chemicals that are needed for the production of amphetamine. They arrived in the Netherlands through Hungary. At the other site, he had built a complete research facility, comparable to the Netherlands Forensic Institute. All kinds of analysis devices were found there. He carried out research into NPS, and modified NPS himself. He also made use of the port of Antwerp. The whole set-up was interconnected. He also had financial contacts through the Seychelles, with complex arrangements. If you let this story sink in, you will get a very clear picture of how professionally it was organized.’

The production process was professionalized in order to respond to the demand from customers all over the world, taking into account specific requirements or cultural preferences regarding the chemical composition and the appearance of a pill. This is important for a large customer, as a trendy pill is easier to sell. Anybody who can supply demand-oriented synthetic drugs all over the world, if necessary in large volumes, will become very rich.

‘Dutch ecstasy pills are the best in the world. There is an increase in the amount of MDMA they contain, an improvement in the quality of the pills, and a huge increase in the various logos. They just make to meet the demand. For instance, fluorescent tablets, all kinds of colours and dosages.’

The professionalization as regards the set-up and clearing up of labs is aimed at hindering detection: well hidden, guarded, and no DNA traces after dismantling. Some laboratories are so clean and laid out with an eye for detail, that an insider doubts if they are really set up by the regular top X of criminals from the provinces of Brabant and Limburg:

‘We do not only encounter small and dirty labs, but also the opposite: huge labs. Their size is becoming so much bigger and they also learn from past errors. There are labs where not a single piece of chewing gum or cigarette is found. Nothing at all. No DNA. The lab in Veenendaal was an example of this. It was so absolutely clean. In the past, they were much dirtier. Labs are becoming more professional and built on a larger scale. It is not clear who are behind this. It is a way of working that differs from that of top X criminals. I wonder what is behind this all. They must be smart guys. Manufacturing in itself is not so exciting. In the past, we occasionally confiscated chemistry

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books in prison cells. Nowadays, the persons working in the labs are truly versed in chemistry. Where do they get these people and this knowledge? Where do they get the laboratory technicians? China is possible, but also the Eastern Bloc.’

8.5 Break with the established system

More than has been realized for a long time, the emergence of preprecursors has been a break with the established system. Insiders in the investigative services think the world of synthetics drugs has become a lot more complex due to the emergence of preprecursors: ‘We have created a many-headed monster.’ Dozens of preprecursors have become available, instead of solely PMK and BMK. Formerly, it was sufficient to search for oily substances, but now it is also necessary to search for powdery substances, which has created new problems for the Customs service. Chinese intermediaries have become superfluous, as Dutch criminals themselves are now able to purchase legal substances in China. Drugs waste has increased strongly, due to the extra phase in the production process required by the preprecursors (the ‘conversion step’), which produces a lot of waste. Moreover, a number of the traditional “pill sellers” have become more involved in the world of cocaine, to spread their risks.

By now, the police and the judicial authorities assume (LE, 2016) that the production and use of ecstasy and amphetamine have increased again, in the Netherlands and all over the world, to a higher level than before.

The production methods have also changed. The top producers have professionalized the production, and increased the scale. The production of synthetic drugs has also come within the reach of more people. Less capital is required to enter the market. The elimination of Chinese intermediaries and the emergence of the internet has simplified access to preprecursors. There are convincing indications that the number of synthetic drugs producers has grown. So, in addition to increase in scale, there is also more small-scale production, sometimes carried out in residential areas. Newcomers have entered the market, ‘kamikaze pilots’ according to a traditional producer. The emergence of new producers puts the prices of ecstasy and amphetamine under pressure.

The criminal world of synthetic drugs is characterized by a remarkable apti- tude for innovation. This applies to the product itself (both drugs and preprecursors), which must frequently be renewed, when earlier products are

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banned, without harming the quality; on the contrary, the international reputation of synthetic drugs from the Netherlands remains very positive. The innovation also applies to the organization of logistical flows: international contacts are effectively established and transport flows are changed whenever this is considered necessary. There are also clear signals that the internet is used a good deal more than in the past to order raw materials and hardware and to distribute final products. It would seem that, as a result of this, the scale of the world of synthetic drugs has not just increased, but at the same time decreased, because newcomers (‘start-ups’) enter the synthetic drugs market.

8.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the limitations of barrier thinking are pointed out. The obstacles raised created unintended opportunities for strategically positioned Dutch synthetic drugs criminals and for chemical companies, in particular in China. They contrived to keep a good market position by finding solutions for the barriers raised.

The barriers model is used a great deal in the fight against crime. As such, it is a successful model. It creates order and certainty in the world of synthetic drugs, which often seems so chaotic to the authorities. Thus, it provides clues for investigation strategies and a common language for communication about it on the national and international level.

Moreover, it is logical and obvious to study the criminal synthetic drug process also in respect of its logistics. Precursors and other chemicals come from China to Europe and the Netherlands, are turned into the desired final product here – partly by using hardware obtained abroad – and are subsequently distributed around the world in all kinds of forms (powder, tablet, crystal, paste). An impressive logistical process!

But these advantages must not make us blind for the limitations of the model. Application of the model – for some 26 years now – has not essentially affected or curbed the system of synthetic drugs crime. In a certain sense, the model confirms and reinforces the seemingly eternal rat race between government bodies and criminals. In this race, the criminals have been the strongest and smartest thus far. For some investigators, this has become a kind of ‘fact of life’ (‘it will always be like this’).

Our proposal is to explore what comes beyond the barrier model, not to scrap the model, but to take the investigation of, and fight against the world of synthetic drugs to a higher level. The fact is that the barrier strategy was seized

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upon – in the course of time – due to a shortage of investigative capacity, when top criminals, in their search for innovative methods, hardly needed to fear being caught personally. At most, they lost some kilos or underlings on the way. The shortage of Dutch criminal investigators is not a ‘fact of life’, but a choice made by the police and, more so, politicians.

Small country, Big Player Organized anarchy 9

Introduction The criminal process had better not be viewed exclusively as a straightforward and orderly organized barrier model, but chiefly as a complex and rather chaotic streams model (cf.: Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1984).

In this chapter, the criminal world is outlined as a kind of organized anarchy, comprising permanent flows of providers and buyers, and criminal key figures interconnecting the elements of the logistics process, using numerous specialists and errand boys. This process – more like a ‘garbage can’ than a streamlined production chain – is fairly inscrutable for outsiders and even erratic for criminal insiders.

9.1 ‘Lack of organization’ as strength

The way synthetic drugs criminals operate is often presented as a production chain. This chain starts with the acquisition of raw materials and ends with the dumping of waste and the sale of the drugs produced. Many steps have to be made in this chain, such as obtaining hardware (glassware or production vessels), finding and fitting out a production site or lab, and transporting raw materials and finished products. For criminal operations to be successful, key figures must overcome barriers. Conversely, crime fighting is represented as raising barriers, so that criminals have no, or restricted, access to raw materials and hardware. However, in the erratic criminal world, the processes do not succeed each other in an orderly way, but run side-by-side or through each other, as has become apparent from interviews with insiders. If the criminal process is frustrated by obstacles, then specialists receive the instruction to find a solution for it, preferably quickly and thoroughly, as the large buyers of synthetic drugs must not be disappointed. There is a relationship between the barriers authorities raise and the specialization in the world of synthetic drugs. If sub processes become more difficult and are blocked now and then, it is useful if specialists ensure continuity. The consequence is that the top layer in the synthetic drugs world does not view barriers against the availability of raw materials, chemicals or hardware so much as a spanner in the works, but rather as an early warning that criminal specialists must change their working methods. Or, even better from a criminal point of view, if one criminal approach fails, temporarily or permanently, due to a barrier raised, other parallel methods that are already operational are immediately used. A simple

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example: if a legal business stops supplying production vessels after a visit from the FIOD (Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service), a phone call is made to an errand boy who has a stock of production vessels, or an errand boy goes to a similar business that has not yet been noticed by the authorities, or the production is stopped for a week, until the production vessels ordered in China arrive.

If barriers are raised (at the start of the chain), synthetic drugs criminals will find a solution in their network, sooner or later: from motivated specialists and errand boys, or from legal companies that deliver parts. It does not matter whether it concerns hardware, raw materials or chemicals. Experienced professionals saw this happen time and again throughout the years:

‘Of course, we have been fighting synthetic drugs for a long time, and also very long at the start of the chain. Initially, we found it interesting to know what pills we found, and how many, but at some point we thought: this is not interesting at all, we must focus on the start of the chain, we need to combat drugs there. We have been to China, to Russia, asking them to stop the flow of chemicals. This worked for some time, but they think up something new every time. If they cannot obtain the materials, they think of something new.’

Respondents paint the picture of an organized anarchy, inscrutable for outsiders. Even to successful criminal insiders it is a world that they fail to understand entirely, although they are capable of detecting opportunities and seizing them.

‘In respect of organization and structures, I once said: it is ‘not-organized’ crime. The lack of organization impedes us, the police organization, to get a grip on it. We know that they will be going to do something next Thursday, en then we start preparing. We mobilize two arrest teams and two surveillance teams. A helicopter takes to the air and the Riot Squad is ready for protection, etc. The evening before the action, one of the men goes on a drinking binge, so the next morning, they cannot get him to wake up, and the deal is cancelled. There was a million at stake! The deal fell through because his lordship was drunk in his bed, and we did not know it.’

One early synthetic drug criminal already possessed an entire network of errand boys and specialists. It enabled him to meet the demand abroad for ecstasy and amphetamine. He organized the production in a semi-permanent network and became rich because he was able to supply these drugs to Amsterdam criminals or have them delivered by his own errand boys abroad. A professional respondent paints the same picture:

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‘It is also opportunist crime: earn something here, earn something there. It was not a professional world, and to a certain extent, that was their strength. I don’t know if there was specialization in the production process. It was a group of friends or relatives. They just messed around and were successful. It was more a matter of “who has the biggest mouth”, and who was a mate and in this way they mess around through the criminal world. At some point, we focused on I don’t know how many persons around Van D., but they were mainly self-employed individuals. There was common ground among the leaders, but they just knew each other, at most. For instance, Van D. has never been in Sint Willebrord.’

All things considered, there seems to exist a kind of ‘collective intelligence’ in the world of synthetic drugs. The intelligence is not primarily an aspect of the individuals, but it is rather a collective feature of the criminal network. The ecstasy production in the Netherlands is embedded in a well-functioning network, containing a variety of knowledge and skills. New relationships can easily come into existence in the network and existing associations continue over a long time.

In this network, all kinds of processes are taking place simultaneously, often quite independently, although there are also criminal brokers who interconnect these processes at the right time, or who assign a sub process to groups or individuals. They are pulling the strings, but stay largely under the radar. These criminals are referred to as investors, organizers or coordinating criminals. They have money, talent for organizing, can use violence, and have a criminal reputation that helps to get things done. These criminals are highly respected in the criminal world. People who operate in their environment, have criminal opportunities, as a specialist or organizer of a sub process can also earn good money.

9.2 An eye-opener: the Party King

An official report based on information about the top 35 criminals led the FIOD to the party rental company the Party King in Best. The FIOD observed many people there during a few months that very clearly did not come to hire items for a party. To the extent they could be identified ‘most of them had a criminal record in the area of synthetic drugs’. It was a large-scale meeting place for synthetic drugs criminals. The Central Unit of the Netherlands Police started an investigation (investigation Explorer). Monitoring equipment was installed, so that the conversations in the warehouse could clearly be followed. Hundreds of people were observed and listened in to. The large scale of all criminal activity discussed and carried out, added to the fact that

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a large majority of the suspected visitors were unknown to the police, makes respondents take a gloomy view. In spite of a few ‘satisfactory convictions’, what is underlined is that the investigative services have been overtaken by events and do not know very much, while synthetic drugs criminals seize the opportunity:

‘The Party King was a chance hit. Of course, we carry out information-controlled investigations, and sometimes they are successful. We are working on a few projects at present, and I think they are promising, but there is so much that we do not know. So many drugs criminals are involved in the production of and trade in synthetic drugs, ecstasy and amphetamine, that we are totally unaware of. I can also imagine that they will become less careful at some point. The millions are rolling in, so to speak, and the risk to be arrested is so infinitely small.’

Many respondents describe the Party King as a drugs market place where people liked to come, because it created opportunities for visitors to receive or place orders, and to buy or sell things. One respondent recognized in Best, among the Party King-visitors, the disorganized structure of opportunities that is characteristic of synthetic drugs criminals:

‘I also have the feeling that much of it is not very orderly or planned. It just happens to them. Someone enters and expresses an idea, and others think, this is a good idea, we’ll just do it. They have an opportunistic mindset. Not all of it is so well-planned as we think it is. It depends on whether it suits you. It was a place where opportunities emerged. People wanted to be there, for this was where it happened. At some point, people find out by hearsay and ever more visitors come. It is a market. Maybe it is also see and be seen.’

At the meeting place, many people come together who wish to invest money and who provide criminal products and services. This enables criminals to operate flexibly. They do not plan everything beforehand, but they accept offers or place orders.

‘The old leaders who are involved in synthetic drugs continue to come to the fore. You could identify 700 individuals who met each other at a single location. The periphery is large. These persons, such as transporters etc. can be substituted easily. I have the definite impression that synthetic drugs criminals adapt easily to changes, more quickly than in the world of cannabis, partly because the world of cannabis has become more democratic and less illegal.’

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At the Party King, criminals higher up in the hierarchy were not very shocked when a laboratory was destroyed. It was simply a loss amount and no risk, as the criminal investigations rarely delve deeply and their DNA traces are not found, because they never go there. The errand boys who are arrested in a laboratory probably do not know the investors or tell the police and the judicial authorities nothing, because they will be doubly rewarded then: often a milder sentence, possibly aftercare from the party instructing them (for instance, in the form of a lawyer), and they will be welcome again in he criminal world upon release. Visitors of the Party King reacted unperturbed when a production site was busted, for they would quickly organize setting up one or more other laboratories:

‘The moment we had dismantled a lab – we did break up labs in the course of the investigation – we heard them say, “shit”, they’ve got our lab. They do not use the word ‘lab’, but that’s what they meant. “we must think up something new,” or “I need a new site.” “I need these flasks,” or “ I need a heating jacket.” This is how they talked about it. It’s often other people who start looking for sites. One group looks for a site and fits it out, and somebody else will do the production. It’s a kind of specialization. The processes are often really separate.’

On the drugs market place in Best, persons and production flows met. Leaders functioned as brokers. Police and public prosecutors perceived a clear pecking order, the top consisting of investors and organizers, the bottom of errand boys who transport shipments, fit out labs and clean away things: ‘At the Party King, both leaders and errand boys were present, but the latter did not go there independently. There is a clear pecking order.’ Between the top and the rank and file is the middle management with specialists. These specialists applied themselves to, for instance, the export of drugs abroad or the supply of raw materials and chemicals. People turned up continuously to make deals or sell chemicals, to borrow each others’ cooks and trade in actual drugs. Demand and supply met:

‘It was a brokerage function, we called it a market place. Supply and demand met there. People who actually produced came there; they had labs elsewhere. The stock is often kept elsewhere, but brokerage took also place to obtain chemicals required for the production. Or if APAAN was needed. You could get hold of a finished product there, for they had there own cook and you could obtain chemicals there. That’s how it came together, more or less.’

A respondent who visited the Party King as a kind of criminal odd-job man, also describes the warehouse as a market place. He calls it a ‘hotbed’ where

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opportunities emerge because connections could be established between people and criminal activities.

‘But all right, you need to get hold of these raw materials. You need these channels, but no problem. Take the last time, the Party King in Best. I have been there several times. (…) It was a hotbed, and things were discussed there. Can you get hold of acetone, or methanol? How much does it cost? Have you got somebody who can go and fetch it? Then Pietje was there, and he said: “Yes, I’ve got somebody, I’ve got a good driver, Chrisje, who will be willing to fetch it for me.” “How much does he cost?” “Yes, pay ten grand and he will drive to Germany, he will fetch a van full of it.” And then they came to me eventually, or to somebody else, with a request to do something. That’s how it goes.’

9.3 The situation as described by a criminal

We are talking with a seasoned criminal, who ranks high among the Brabant and ‘therefore’ Dutch and global synthetic drugs criminals. His account, which we took down in three extensive interview sessions, is corroborated by others: another criminal, but also by experts from the police and the Public Prosecution Service. They use different words, but the essence is the same. We include the professional criminal’s story here, not because it can be seen as the absolute truth, but because it is a plausible supplement to available knowledge and interpretations. Without having been asked, he sketched his own version of the streams model.

The man from the criminal world talked about the very high production level of the Dutch synthetic drugs criminals. The products are hardly sold in the Netherlands, but are marketed all over the world. He knows that a multitude of freelancers is active in the province of North Brabant, organized in small groups numbering about three persons, who form temporary coalitions with others and they accept and carry out jobs. They work in semi-permanent arrangements, the total volume of all these synthetic drugs activities being very large.

Another criminal respondent is a cannabis grower, laboratory technician and waste dumper, plus occasionally an honest entrepreneur. He confirms this picture. He knows that at least twenty production sites for synthetic drugs are active in Tilburg in the eight busy months of the year. Tilburg is not unique, for there is an entire region with many labs, where a lot of money is earned, in particular by the buyers:

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‘Everybody along the A58 is involved in synthetic drugs. The major towns are between Bergen op Zoom and Eindhoven. You can do business along this motorway, and people are working at it in every town. Surely, you do not think that the demand for drugs can be met by one lab? I can remember a case in Best. They caught 800 kilos of amphetamine, 200 kilos of ecstasy, and five million pills, all ready to be transported. This only shows how large the customers are. I once wondered: Where does it end up? Where does it end up? In somebody’s stomach probably. Such an awful lot is produced, but there are buyers for it, otherwise not so many people would be involved.’

Our other respondent knows very well where the synthetic drugs end up, for he is a coordinating major criminal. He knows who invest large amounts in projects, who buy big lots, and who dispose of the contacts and transport networks to get the drugs to the major customers abroad. He tells us how the organizers and investors put small groups to work.

‘There are many small groups. Two or three men working together, and they have another small group that works for them and that makes things for them, and they sell it. That is why it is difficult to put one’s finger on it. One small group makes amphetamine, and the other one MDMA. That’s it.’

These small groups work simultaneously, without knowing about each other. Who exactly placed an order, possibly in Amsterdam, is not interesting for a major criminal in North Brabant. During a meeting, he accepts contracts, and carries them out on a large scale, outsourcing the activities in a network that seems anarchistic, but which for him is manageable.

‘You are always busy doing a bit of work. That’s how I see it, and sometimes someone comes along who wants to have something, and then you just arrange it for this man the same week. It is not like you are working on it specifically. The whole thing is not so well-organized. In fact, organized crime does not exist. That is why it is difficult. They think in terms of large organizations, but that’s not what it is. I’m in the know.

Our respondent sketches this ranking order in the organized criminal anarchy on the basis of his own criminal typology. He finds it difficult to give an exact number of criminals active in the world of synthetic drugs, because there are very many operatives and profiteers. He has a clearer view of the criminals who, owing to their managing skills, have real importance in the world of synthetic drugs in North Brabant, because he and his trusted workers actually meet them.

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‘How many people are active in this scene in North Brabant? Hard to tell, very hard to tell, but there are many. Just chemical? (…) Many people are involved, you need a driver, you need a warehouse. If you include all this, it’s even much bigger. But if you restrict yourself to the people that matter, then you would arrive at 300 or 400 in North Brabant. These are the small groups that cooperate. (…)

The people who carry out odd jobs are innumerable. The undermining, let’s call it (laughs). Of course, all people want to earn money. Yes, they are the fools that dump waste for 500 euros. Not more. They are not included in the 300 or 400. They are the followers, there are maybe 10,000 of them, not in North Brabant, but throughout the Netherlands, I think. (…)

These 400 people are like the people that matter, and who cooperate perhaps also with 20 men, there will be about 10,000 of them in the Neth- erlands. They are the people you need to import some raw materials, to get hold of hardware, to sell the finished product. On a scale of 1 to 10 I would say that 300 are seven plus, and all the rest are about five. Above that, there are maybe 100 eight point five or nine. They have the contacts and they are smart. That’s about it.’

He estimates the number of organizing criminals in North Brabant at about 400, 100 of whom are leading coordinating criminals. These hundred score 8.5 or 9 on our respondent’s criminal scale from one to ten. They invest, they outsource many partial contracts, and they make the global demand and the Dutch or North Brabant supply meet. These criminals are respected due to their criminal achievements, but there are also persons with a reputation based on violence; our respondent is not happy about this, because it interferes with the flows of funds. The ‘nine-pointers’ are not just family members of the original synthetic drugs criminals, but also leading members of criminal motorcycle gangs. The highest-ranking criminals even score ‘nine point five’. They are key coordinating criminals who outsource jobs to persons that are allowed to visit them, whether or not invited. They are the kings in Limburg or North Brabant:

‘In fact, you did “nothing”?’ ‘Doing nothing and being able to do everything are equally demanding. Actu- ally, a king doesn’t do an awful lot, but he is the mightiest in the country, isn’t he? Most money, to put it like that. It is just a mirror of society. That’s how you ought to see it.’

Coordinating criminals interconnect criminal sub-processes. They have a clear picture of many activities, they have money and violence at their dis-

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posal, and they have many opportunities to get hold of major criminal contracts. In the criminal pecking order, investors are higher than those who give the orders, although the latter can also be investors, according to a respondent from the investigative services:

‘You will not find the investors in a lab, but they have influence throughout the chain. The huge investments must be made, but there are so many intermediary links. Nevertheless, there are many links between all criminals, but if something happens in Friesland, they very soon find out in Limburg. (…) The commissioning party and the investor are not the same. It is quite possible that there is an investor behind it. He may be someone from a network in Holland, who goes to a number of traveller families and says that he has a hobby warehouse and needs amphetamine. The travellers will start working for him. We have had labs in the south, and we heard through Dutch networks that they were also involved. Holleeder [a notorious criminal] was mentioned once. The well-known big names, everybody is getting nervous, but he himself is not directly involved. There is a difference between paying and organizing. Some invest.’

In total – the North Brabant top also operates outside of Brabant, including foreign countries, such as Belgium – more than 9,500 persons carry out jobs in the North Brabant synthetic drugs world. They are the ‘five-pointers’ in the pecking order. They have insufficient qualities to obtain a satisfactory score.

‘In what category are the laboratory technicians?’ ‘They are the lowest of the low. They score five. They are like drivers, laboratory workers, all more or less the same category. There are dozens of men like that. No, you wouldn’t trust them with something important. They are trained by someone who is familiar with it. This takes three or four weeks, and then they can do it themselves.’ ‘The people who are able to give training, do they fall into the seven plus category?’ ‘No, just a five. The seven plus level are more the organizers.’

Our respondent distinguishes between three networks with which he cooperates: the production network, the transport network and the customer network. Each network is responsible for organizing its own sub-process, including all ‘seven-pointers’ (organizers, trusted ‘professionals) and ‘five-pointers’ (errand boys, laboratory workers) who are involved in it. The activities are coordinated by the top organizers, the ‘intermediaries’; they are eight-pointers or nine-pointers. They interconnect the different networks in the production and distribution processes. Our respondent said that he is both the organizer of the production network and the top organizer of the entire process. As a

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result, he cashes in twice, for in his case the revenue is divided into four equal parts: 25% for each sub-network.

Incidentally, it is noteworthy that this criminal’s classification is not very different from that used by the police concerning the top 35 criminals, although the numbers are larger. The police’s top 35 is in his system a top 100 (eight- point-fivers and nine-pointers), the second layer of brokers is in his system a group of 300 common organizers and professionals (the seven-pointers) and the third layer of persons who carry out jobs is in his system a group of not more than 10,000 followers (the five-pointers).

9.4 Conclusion

The picture painted here seems more than just one criminal respondent’s personal view. It was confirmed in a conversation with another criminal, ‘lower ranking’, but a popular worker. The typology and estimated numbers are also outlined by two police experts who work at the national level. Public prosecutors give no estimate of the exact numbers, but the stream of visitors to the Party King has made them realize that synthetic drugs are a source of income for many thousands (please note: not many hundreds) of people, including many who are unknown to the police and the judicial authorities.

The criminal process is not an orderly chain, for there are many loose networks with many workers, headed by coordinating criminals. They match orders, production and supply. In Chapter 10, we will focus on a few important criminal flows.

Small country, Big Player 10 Criminal flows

Introduction In the preceding chapters, we supplemented the barrier model with the flows model. All kinds of activities in the world of synthetic drugs take place in a disorderly, haphazard fashion. It is a world with many thousands of specialists and errand boys, and in the top layer hundreds of criminals who invest, coordinate, remain at a distance and supply products to large customers. This chapter describes how four important criminal flows are realized: the acquisition of raw materials and chemicals, the production process, transport and logistics, and finance. It should be noted that much has changed in respect of the first three activities over the past decades, and that money, in many respects, is a blind spot for the investigative services.

10.1 Raw materials and chemicals

The easy years Obtaining the most important raw materials for ecstasy and amphetamine (PMK and BMK) did not require much effort for more than two decades. Dutch synthetic drugs criminals simply ordered them from companies in Europe. One criminal explains:

‘Formerly, it just came from Germany, from the chemical factories. You could simply buy it there. It was cheap and it was not a criminal offence. This lasted into the late 1980s. Nowadays, end-user certificates are required, but not so at that time.’

Later, purchases were not only made in German factories, but also in Eastern Europe (chiefly Russia) and in France. This was why Dutch police officers and magistrates could not suppress a smile when Mr Chirac, the president of France from 1995 to 2007, expressed his outrage at Dutch synthetic drugs crime:

‘PMK and BMK had become subject to a licensing obligation, so it became interesting to find out where the stuff came from. Soon it became clear that it could be obtained in Eastern Europe and in a large factory in Le Havre. It sold so much BMK, enough to inundate the Netherlands with it. This, of course, is a striking detail, since a few years afterwards France banged the

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big drum about the Netherlands doing nothing to fight synthetic drugs, but they made a lot of money from it.’

Purchasing specialists In the second half of the nineties, Dutch criminals turned to China for their purchases. Initially, this was largely done through Chinese criminals who lived in the Netherlands and who had many businesses here, such as trading companies and restaurants. They saw to it, often through contacts in Hong Kong, that the precursors (BMK and PMK) came to the Netherlands. At the time, Dutch criminals were already sent to Hong Kong and China to monitor things, to conclude agreements and, if necessary, to exert some pressure (Huisman, 2006).

The purchase of precursors has been substituted by the purchase of preprecursors. The Chinese Dutchmen no longer function as intermediaries. Today, Dutch synthetic drugs criminals work with purchasing specialists: persons and networks that specialize in buying preprecursors and chemicals. This requires customer relations management, language skills, negotiation skills and the ability to organize inconspicuous transports. To this end, routes are used that are not direct connections between China and the Netherlands, but run through ports in other European countries; subsequent transport to the Netherlands takes place by road.

‘If you want to smuggle BMK or a modified form, you order it through a contact in China. Depending on your wishes, they package it. If you pay a little more, the substances are simply delivered from China. (…) If you want to import raw materials into the Netherlands, it is almost impossible through the port of Rotterdam, for the rules are very strict there, and it is also becoming more difficult through Antwerp or Hamburg. It is possible though, but through Eastern European countries such as Romania, Lithu- ania, Bulgaria, and Poland. We have also seen it in Italy and in Spain. It is loaded from the ship into trucks, and that is how complete shipments enter the country. It is impossible to distinguish it from other cargo. No customs officer who detects it. It enters the country in large quantities. The risk of getting caught is zero.’

The criminal buyers see to it that the preprecursors are given false labels, known as mislabelling. This makes it appear transport of innocent substances, such as washing powder or wallpaper paste.

‘We have discovered forty different labels by now. Dutch criminals want to keep it hidden from the Dutch authorities. We are trying to find out if this mislabelling already takes place in the factory. Since we have had contacts

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again with the Chinese, we have been pointing out to them that mislabelling is taking place. The customs documents are falsified. If APAA is transported as washing powder, even through as many as 26 countries, nobody will have a closer look, for all the papers are in order. We have indications that it is done already in the Chinese factory. Corrupt persons are active in the factories. Or it is delivered properly by a factory and then goes to an intermediary working for a Dutch criminal. This person packages the product again and sees to it that it receives a different name on the label. He also provides the falsified documents that are necessary for export.’

Many chemicals are used on a large scale in the legal economy, so a shipment with correct labels is less suspicious. Dutch buyers can simply buy chemicals from stocks held by companies, but they can also place orders through such companies. This is done, for instance, in Poland and Belgium.

Persons and networks that are active in the ‘import flow’ use front companies. Direct shipments from source countries (in particular China) are suspicious, so front companies are incorporated in other countries, such as Belgium, Ger- many, Hungary and Poland. Dutch purchasing specialists do this personally or instruct foreign partners to do it. This has been ascertained in Eastern Europe.

Purchasing anarchy: creating and using commercial contacts The purchasing specialists do not exactly work in an orderly way, through only one or a few contacts. Within their niche, they cooperate with varied parties, working with different connections simultaneously.

An Eastern European connection can start with a simple contact, for instance, when a Dutch criminal meets Polish labour migrants in a bar who like to earn a little extra, because they are paid poorly in the agricultural sector. The Dutch buyer simply hands the Polish migrant worker a list of chemicals and businesses where the chemicals can be bought.

Subsequently, the Pole travels to Poland, purportedly for a visit to his relatives, and comes back with the chemicals ordered. After some time, a network may develop of Poles who say farewell to the strawberries or the mushrooms, although they keep pretending to be migrant workers, but instead are acting as intermediaries.

A smart Dutch buyer has several shuttle services at his disposal, enabling him to make purchases in large areas of Europe without becoming dependent on one or two people who work for him. China always remains an option. A respondent from the police explains how logically and chaotically this functions:

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‘Subsequently, they get in touch with other criminals in a bar, and at one point there is a Pole who says: “At home, the chemicals are four times as cheap.” Then they start up a company in Poland or they order 1,000 litres of hydrochloric acid from companies in Poland. The Pole goes and orders it in Poland, stores it in the boot of his car and drives back to the Neth- erlands. There are no borders, because there is free movement of goods and services. The Pole thinks it is a nice way to make a profit. It is not an offence, unless Section 10a of the Opium Act can be proven. It is a gold- mine. Subsequently, he starts to transport formamide and methanol too. At some point he has an organization that takes care of the import. He has stopped driving personally, he has people doing this for him. They work, for instance, in strawberry growing in the Netherlands and take chemicals with them when they return from visiting their families in Poland. They can also hire a van in Poland and drive it to the Netherlands. Section 10a may then be applicable, but it still needs to be proven. Bulgaria or Romania are also possibilities. I need chemicals and arrange for them through Poland, and maybe one time the delivery is delayed or we fall out with each other, so then I find a Bulgarian and ask him if he can get hold of something for me. Plenty of people can substitute the Pole. If it fails, you can also simply order through China. They need to know through which company, although they know that by now.’

Some buyers have no patience. Then, criminal odd-job men will, for instance, burgle chemical companies in Hungary, Belgium or Germany. The network of Dutch synthetic drugs criminals includes odd-job men who can burgle professionally, wherever it is needed.

10.2 The production process

The criminal target situation: guaranteed production Viewed from a barrier model perspective, the production process seems complicated, with many pitfalls. Actual practice is different, for many things can be arranged if you have a ‘SIM card with the right numbers’. The fact is that a well secured telephone enables a criminal fixer to place orders in a simple way. Business is also conducted at meeting places for synthetic drugs criminals, such as bars, hotels or gyms.

The materials required for the production process are obtained through meetings. Instructions are given to look for sites, to buy production vessels, to do laboratory work and to dump waste. The persons who carry out these task are almost all of them ‘five-pointers’, because they can be substituted. If a lab is broken up somewhere, then it is ‘a pity’, but it has been taken into account and

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can be overcome. This was how the monitored top criminals in the Party King talked about it. The same applies to a production vessel manufacturer who becomes unavailable or a laboratory technician who disappears. The separate activities are organized in a redundant, i.e. double or triple manner.

There is a stock of fixers, sites, means and operatives, who are put under pressure by means of deadlines, production requirements and violence. This is how guaranteed production is pursued. Top criminals have been doing this successfully for decades, although there were also years that were not so fat, at the individual level (arrests, criminal violence) and at the collective level (sometimes a dip in the supply of raw materials, or temporarily a smaller profit margin). Really lean years are rare at this level.

Hardware: a few obstacles, chiefly professionalization Chapter 2 describes what is needed to make a synthetic drugs laboratory function. As for hardware, this includes reaction vessels, heating jackets, glass instruments (for instance, bulb condensers) and tableting machines. All this hardware is useful for the barrier strategy. Businesses were – and still are – sought that supply hardware, either directly or indirectly, to criminals, amidst legal production activities. For instance, in 2007, the Central Criminal Inves- tigations Division focused on the Dutch glassware makers sector. Within the framework of the Athena project, information was provided to them, including the message that prosecution under the Opium Act was a possibility. In the 2008 National Threat Assessment (Boerman, Grapendaal & Mooij), one could read how criminals solved this problem:

‘This hardware is usually bought second-hand through legal companies or through the underworld. It seems to be getting harder to obtain certain hardware, so criminal buyers more often turn to other countries. This situation seems to be the result of the effective checks in the Netherlands and the awareness among suppliers that their products are used for illegal activities. Checks and awareness are at a low level abroad.’ (Boerman et al., 2008, p. 44)

Top criminals (the ‘nine-pointers’) had found out a long time ago – through smugglers, buyers and clients – where else the hardware could be bought, for a clever criminal always has another plan up his sleeve. Subsequently, a telephone call or text message was enough to make this route operational:

‘In the course of years, foreign glassware was found more and more often, chiefly from Germany and Poland; the quality was good. Project Athena tries to anticipate these developments, for instance by cooperating more closely with the German Bundeskriminalamt.’ (KLPD, 2012, p. 31)

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Dutch synthetic drugs criminals were also preparing the next move in the barrier game:

‘In 2008, during investigation Wortel, a container was found containing more than 500 20-litre round-bottom flasks from China. These flasks proved to be of inferior quality and were not fit for the production process.’ (KLPD, 2012, p. 31)

Dutch synthetic drugs criminals have instructed their outposts in China to buy Chinese hardware. After some time, Chinese companies mastered the hardware production to perfection:

‘(…) hardware is increasingly bought straight from China (…). Seizures in the Netherlands show that it can be tailored to the client’s needs: tableting machines, stamps, and glassware with all the trimmings. In 2014, a complete laboratory under construction was found in Almere; it was intended for the conversion of PMK glycidate. All the hardware, including a 50-litre vacuum distillation unit, glass and metal reaction vessels, a separate rotating mixer, Büchner funnel and vacuum pump came directly from a factory in China.’ (LE, 2016, p. 28)

The 2016 crime pattern analysis concluded that tableting machines and stamps had come exclusively from China since 2012. Items can be ordered in China, for instance, through the internet. A respondent joked: faster and better than through alibaba.com. In addition to the China connection, Dutch synthetic drugs criminals still order hardware, such as glassware, in Poland. This is a reliable route, as there are more than enough Polish errand boys who travel to and from Poland carrying chemicals, so it is easy in these circles to order hardware.

Self-employed or clumsy subcontractors operate in amateurish labs, but the better organized sector has replaced old machines (from Poland or Germany) by modern equipment. Measurement and control engineering are used. Man- ual work is decreasing and production capacity is increasing. In amphetamine production, attempts were made to replace glassware by thick plastic vessels. In the conversion into BMK and PMK, large vessels are used more and more often. Hardware is ordered abroad, and subsequently adjustments to increase the production are applied in the Netherlands.

There are companies that specialize in importing Chinese tableting machines into the Netherlands. This concerns (just as with the import of raw materials and chemicals), for instance, small and recently formed companies, which seem to have been created especially

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to supply to synthetic drugs criminals. One such small Dutch company was visited by the FIOD:

‘What we (…) see is that these tableting machines end up at a certain location, and are then picked up by persons that we know belong to the illegal synthetic drugs world. The tableting machines are just sitting at a certain location in a business park. They enter through Customs. There are two suspects. The company is registered in the name of the partner, and that’s where it is dropped off. In addition to tableting machines, there are also buckets of binding agents, which they also deal in. They also have a website where this stuff is offered. It is not a front, for these are the products they sell. They think they are still doing legal business: “surely, we are not doing anything illegal? We sell tableting machines, we sell dyes, and we sell binding agents” (…).’

Obtaining locations There are persons and networks that obtain sites for the storage of production resources and finished products. There are a large number of buildings and persons available for this task.

Important raw materials – the (pre)precursors – and the hardware are usually stored in small quantities. This makes it possible to spread risks and reduce the chance of discovery of valuable production resources. Lock-up garages have often been used, but many alternatives have been found throughout the years, such as a house (or its garage), self storage companies, small warehouses, an outbuilding, a cellar, or a caravan. On the other hand, there are highly professional and large-scale storage sites. The textbook case is the ‘synthetic drugs IKEA’ in Den Bommel, with neatly ordered chemicals and pre-sorted combinations for the production processes.

As far as the production sites are concerned, a similar pattern has been observed for more than a decade. Production is chiefly carried out at business premises, warehouses and sheds, often situated in an industrial park or a rural area. The laboratories are more often large an professionally set up than they used to be. A big lab is often used on a temporary basis, because discovery is expensive.

Sheds or other premises are rented from debt-stricken farms or businesses. Front arrangements are used for renting more marketable buildings, meaning that lease contracts are drawn up in the name of straw men. These businesses function as fronts. At first sight, the lab site seems a legal business, such as a caravan storage company, a firm that sells blinds,

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or an installer company. In the world of travellers, recycling businesses and metal traders often fulfil this role. This pattern has variations, such as, occasionally, mobile laboratories and labs at residential premises, which occur more frequently than mobile labs.

Fixers and errand boys obtain the required materials (raw materials, chemicals and hardware) and see to it that people get to the production locations. This transport is secret, of course, often simply by merging into regular private and business transports. If the laboratory activity takes place in a shed on the premises of an active farm, materials are delivered that are seemingly plausible, such as animal feed. In one caravan storage site, a caravan containing chemicals was used. ‘Five-pointers’ are used for this type of camouflage, although a ‘seven-pointer’ will coordinate the activity in respect of bigger labs. ‘Nine-pointers’ are not to be found there, for they see to it that the deadlines are met. The straw men (‘five-pointers’) are frequently arrested and put into prison for a couple of years:

‘I was at the bottom rung of the ladder. I was a waste dumper and an odd-job man. Building up a lab or moving it. I was actually just finding my place there. At the time, I would have wanted to go on with it. I had wanted to teach myself tableting, but I never got around to that. I was caught, and then I thought to myself that you could get hefty penalties, and I decided to let it go. It’s not worth all the problems. I quit.’

Dutch criminals also turn abroad for synthetic drugs production, as we observed in Chapter 8. Chiefly to Belgium and, to a lesser extent, to Germany and Poland. Errand boys or front men of Dutch synthetic drugs criminals were often involved in labs that have been dismantled in Belgium – insiders estimate in 75% or more of the cases. In the Netherlands, we can also see a limited movement to other parts of the country (Achterhoek, southern part of Gelderland, northern Netherlands).

Laboratory technicians: once important, now not so much anymore In the eighties and nineties, the laboratory technicians or ‘cooks’ were important. They used precursors (BMK or PMK) to make ecstasy or amphetamine. Doing laboratory work was an important part of the process ten or fifteen years ago, as there were not so many laboratory technicians available. People who were able to do it and managed to get the production resources together, had a ticket to a very good criminal income.

When the production of ecstasy had got going and had reached the same criminal value as amphetamine production, the first downgrading of criminals who only did laboratory work occurred about 1990. Due to the large world-

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wide demand for ecstasy and the combination of types of drugs (production of ecstasy, amphetamines and often a lot of cannabis, plus heroin and/ or cocaine) criminals required better organizational skills. Some were able to meet these requirements and continued to thrive, whereas others limited themselves to the production of synthetic drugs. For instance, one criminal from Eindhoven was known as the ‘amphetamine seller’, because he special- ised in selling large quantities of amphetamine. Laboratory technicians with organizational skills built up networks of laboratory workers, and saw to it that they produced for them. A criminal respondent explains that the number of laboratory technicians was growing fast:

‘These big boys, of course, they have built up capital. They themselves again started forming groups, which were all informed of the secret. You are not supposed to tell anybody else, but not everybody complied, so if five persons learn it, and these five each teach it to five others, then there will be twenty-five, and if they teach it to five again, you get 125. Then it’s going fast, isn’t it? If these people bring in two persons, then you get 250 who know the trick.’

Organizers simply pay for laboratory work. They can sell their products at a good price in their network, so if they employ enough laboratory technicians, they can earn a good income. A substantial amount has to be paid for reliable laboratory technicians. We talked to a man who had produced amphetamine during the weekends for years. He did this in an urban business location, which was used for legal activities on weekdays. He earned well, but did not save:

‘Every weekend 10,000 euros, but you live accordingly, you don’t keep it. I had a posh car. You cannot work every weekend, but you can make 300,000 a year. You have an expensive lifestyle. You go to bars seven days a week. You easily spend 2,000 each week. Clothes and things like that. You do not learn to save. Normal people, at the other side of the table, say: “Save during two years, and you’ve made your pile.” It’s not like that, is it? The people you are mingling with make you dress differently, buy a different car. You start throwing your money about.’

Lab technicians became increasingly replaceable in the nineties, as errand boys grew into lab technicians. Respondents noticed that they chiefly caught the ‘dimwits’ when they made arrests in a lab.

‘What is the chance of being caught if you are high in the pecking order of synthetic drugs? Suspects who are responsible for the finances are never found in a lab. We only meet the suckers who do the lab work.’

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‘The lab technician is the sucker or traveller who is coughing his lungs out in order to make a few kilos of amphetamine a week.’

There is a need for a reservoir of laboratory workers. They are frequently arrested and sentenced to several years’ imprisonment. As a result of accidents and poor working conditions, there are many laboratory technicians who stop, permanently or temporarily. Laboratory workers tend to use drugs in order to keep going. One criminal respondent:

‘So, over the past twenty years, the number of laboratory technicians has multiplied, more than anyone would think. There are a lot of people who have done it once or twice, and who will never do it again. There are many who can’t stand it. Of course, the fumes are not harmless. You have to be able to endure working hard. I never noticed anything, when I had worked two days, I used to take a good snort, and slept well. It was a matter of using the one thing as an antidote to the other thing. Yes sir, I’ve used drugs.’

The difference in the criminal pecking order became clear with the transition from precursors (BMK and PMK) to preprecursors. During several years, top criminals were hard-pressed to obtain raw materials, but once the flow of preprecursors had been secured, their main problems were solved. For the organizing middle management and the laboratory technicians, a pioneering phase began at that time, sometimes with precarious moments and processes. Clients supplied the laboratory technicians with APAAN and demanded a certain quantity of BMK. Initially, they did not manage to produce the quantity demanded. As the clients demanded their litres all the same, the laboratory technicians earned little or remained indebted.

‘Yes, APAAN, I have had to deal with it. That was the biggest disaster. It was the last straw for me to say: “Now I quit, for I will die here.” You simply cannot endure this. At first, they did it in a very different way from what they are doing now. If you see photos now, with the production vessels they have; it was not like that, initially, was it? They used to put the drums in a heating jacket, and stir. That stings and itches, it kills you. Weird! Three, four different problems, it did not produce enough. Of course, they said: “It must yield so and so much, and you must give back so and so much,” but it did not work out like that, nevertheless you had to give back the complete end result. So what you were allowed to keep, being your earnings, did not exist at all. So we first did it three or four times and did not get any money. I thought, we’re going to stop with this. I am not going to spend five or six years in prison. This was the third time by then, I’ll never get away with this. If you run the risk of six years in prison, while making a loss, you had better retire.’

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Nowadays, converting APAAN into BMK is considered a simple process. Organ- izers supply better production resources, such as large and custom-made production vessels. Other facilitations were introduced through China: it is easy to make BMK from sodium salt (BMK glycidic acid), and the same applies to the conversion of PMK glycidic acid to PMK (raw material for ecstasy).

‘Only few parties are involved in manufacturing production vessels, but they are competent. Electronics, measurement and control engineering, so that you get a better product and a higher yield. The production vessels are becoming bigger. (…) Today, they get everything in China. Criminals are properly taught how to produce.’

Tableting: professionalism required Tableting requires craftsmanship. It is often carried out at another location than the lab. Spreading locations means spreading risks. Tableting is noisy and might betray a laboratory. It requires a specific type of location, as in a terraced house or a built-up area noise will soon lead to reports and detection. Moreover, inside a laboratory it is damp, whereas you need a dry environment for making good pills.

Tableting is not easy. Two police specialists, for whom the usual synthesis methods have no secrets, once tried to make pills: ‘(…) but it is quite difficult. It’s not just mixing stuff and you’re ready’. About seven substances have to be added in the correct proportions. In addition to the active substance, binding agent, lubricant, and other substances are required. The machine has to be set up properly, in order to prevent that tablets do not bind well or become too hard. Nowadays, professional tableting machines are used that allow many settings, so that the finished product can be tailored to the exact requirements. Such customer focus is important. Producers who can meet specific wishes are able to provide what is popular in a certain country or in a region of the world. Popularity depends on the composition and the appearance of a tablet. For top criminals, it is important that their criminal network produces in a client-oriented way, for this will make it easier to obtain large orders and to receive a good price. This requires skilful pill makers:

‘There are real bunglers; we encounter tableting machines completely covered with powder and badly maintained. And there are the specialists, who clean the machines and keep them in perfect shape; they produce beautiful pills. Nowadays, there are pills with two colours in two layers.’

Cleaning and dumping: cleaners and suckers After the production process, cleaning is required. Typically, these are tasks for the ‘five-pointers’. During dismantling, a lab site is cleared. The hardware

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and the useful remainders are stored. Cleaning labs is increasingly carried out very seriously, especially in the large, professional labs. It is very clear that the idea is not to leave a single forensic trace.

‘There are labs where not a single piece of chewing gum or a cigarette is found. Nothing at all. No DNA. The lab in Veenendaal was an example of this. It was so amazingly clean.’

Producing synthetic drugs results in substantial amounts of drugs waste. The manufacturing of 1 kilo of MDMA produces from 6 to 10 kilos of liquid waste, and the manufacturing of 1 kilo of amphetamine even 20 to 30 kilos of waste (EMCDDA, 2016). Errand boys try to find ways to dump large quantities incon- spicuously and easily. There are all kinds of waste dumpers. The police and the judicial authorities probably catch the bunglers that work like amateurs and dump barrels in rural areas. That is, if the police manage to detect them, since often there are no traces, or very few. ‘Smart guys’ using ingenious methods remain unnoticed. They realize that this too carries the risk of leaving DNA and other traces. Hired or stolen vans with drugs waste are burned entirely. In particular discharges are invisible. There are plenty of possibilities: sewers, slurry pits, carwashes and surface water (Schoenmakers et al., 2016). This does not alter the fact that dumping is really a task for operatives: ‘suckers’, sometimes rather ‘four-pointers’ than ‘five-pointers’, although these are also paid sideline activities for laboratory technicians or other criminal auxiliaries. Figure 2 in the Appendix gives an overview of the locations in the Netherlands where dumped drugs were found in 2017.

A criminal auxiliary explains that dumping barrels in a natural environment is not wise:

‘There are better and easier solutions than dumping waste in natural areas. The easiest way is slurry pits; I’ve filled lots of them. This is the best solution. The slurry pits has its own smell, anyway. Or dump it in manure. We have also had another, very easy solution. We took 1,000 litres to a carwash; if you turn on hot water, and then hose down a trailer, it produces a lot of hot water. At the same time, you empty the barrel into the pit.’

There are harmful effects of dumping and discharging drugs waste for people, the environment and society: exposure to chemicals can result in health problems, and the soil and surface water often get polluted. Moreover, there is the indirect risk that drugs waste ends up in drinking water and the food chain. It is not clear how serious these risks are (Schoenmakers et al., 2016).

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10.3 Transport and smuggling

Bridgehead When the products are ready to sell, transporting them and smuggling them abroad become necessary. The domestic market is small. Orders from abroad are placed with criminals in the absolute top layer of Dutch criminal circles. Many foreign orders for drugs are placed in the Amsterdam region. In the case of synthetic drugs, these orders are put through to networks in the provinces of Limburg and North Brabant. In important destination countries (such as Spain and Turkey), synthetic drugs criminals have bridgeheads for the purpose of obtaining orders and setting up smuggling routes. Quite a few Dutch drugs criminals live, or frequently stay, in Spain, purportedly to run a hotel, restaurant, café or discotheque for their primary income. The Turkish connection is based on the close cooperation of drugs criminals in Turkey and Dutch-Turkish criminals.

Export country: worldwide customer relations In the Crime Pattern Analysis (LE, 2016), Australia is indicated as a major buyer of Dutch ecstasy. For instance, in August 2017 the Dutch police intercepted more than 1,800 kilos of MDMA, 136 kilos of cocaine and 15 kilos of methamphetamine intended for the Australian market. The estimated street value of these drugs amounted to 810 million Australian dollars. In a joint action by the police, 10 persons in Australia, 5 persons in Dubai and 2 in the Netherlands were arrested (Australian associated press, 7 August 2017).

In the same Crime Picture Analysis, Spain is called an important destination country, in particular for ecstasy, but also for amphetamine. Turkey is called a ‘relative newcomer on the list of destination countries for large shipments of ecstasy’. It is estimated that between 2012 and 2016 about thirteen million ecstasy pills, which had been manufactured in the Netherlands, were intercepted during transport to Turkey. The largest finds of ecstasy in the Neth- erlands in 2013 (about 600 kilos of ecstasy) and in 2015 (more than 800,000 ecstasy pills were probably on their way to Turkey. Such huge finds were new and indicated an increase in scale, though insider respondents emphasize that as early as the eighties, Dutch-Turkish criminals exported large quantities of ecstasy to Turkey. This was organized by top criminals with good contacts in Turkey.

Criminals in the United Kingdom buy a lot of drugs from Dutch criminals, not just synthetic drugs, but, in fact, all drugs imaginable, such as ecstasy, amphetamine, heroin, cocaine, cannabis and methamphetamine. On the route to the United Kingdom, frequently ‘cocktail shipments’ are intercepted: large shipments including various types of drugs.

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There are also important destination countries on the European continent. A variety of Dutch synthetic drugs is exported to the neighbouring countries Belgium and Germany. Traditionally, i.e. since the seventies, a lot of amphetamine has been sent to Scandinavia. The smuggling of amphetamine from the Netherlands to Poland has also risen to high levels, partly as a result of coalitions between Dutch synthetic drugs criminals and Poles who live and work in the Netherlands. Part of the amphetamine is manufactured in Poland, often under Dutch leadership.

In addition to the countries that have been mentioned, there is another large category of destination countries, for instance in Asia (including Malaysia and Indonesia), in South America (including Brazil, Argentina and Peru) and in Africa (South Africa). Classic modes of transport (containers) are being replaced/supplemented by transport through postal parcels. Both South America and the United States are important destination regions in this trade.

Over the decades, Dutch synthetic drugs criminals have built up solid customer relationships all over the world. Smuggling synthetic drugs is a difficult and risky business. That is why a class of coordinating criminals limit themselves to giving orders for smuggling, although they do wish to be kept informed about what happens when large shipments are smuggled. Anybody who manages to transport large shipments of synthetic drugs to countries where the market price is high, can hit the jackpot. For top criminals, it is important to receive the final settlement from clients in countries with high prices for drugs. This explains why Australia has always remained an important destination country.

In the first place, leading criminals instruct specialists to export large quantities of drugs. In the second place, errand boys, especially on the European continent, are used to transporting shipments by truck or van. In the third place, drugs are also transported by mail. This seems to involve chiefly internet orders, especially carried out by newcomers who aim at international retail trade.

Export as a critical link Export is a critical link, because interception of a large shipment implies a major loss. Loss of shipments is always made the responsibility of individuals.

Smugglers try to operate smartly. A tested method is to recruit drivers or small logistics companies to transport and deliver drugs, in addition to normal products. For this purpose, they seek errand boys: drivers, self-employed drivers, or small companies that are in financial trouble or that intimate that they are willing to transport suspicious cargo for a substantial sum. For smuggling to

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European countries, persons are also used who simply drive their passenger car or small van to foreign countries such as Belgium, Germany, Poland and the Scandinavian countries.

Recruiting seems difficult, but it isn’t in certain shady cafés or gyms, which is where these types of persons almost automatically meet. What is more, some businesses have gained the reputation that you can get these types of jobs there. People who operate carefully, check who they are dealing with, for they might be police. Our criminal respondents think this is a logical criminal modus operandi. But they point out that many criminals work in an opportunist way and are even financially successful while doing so, as the risk of getting caught is very low for emerging criminals the police are not yet familiar with. A middle course between careful selection from a restricted circle and opportunistic recruitment is to recruit systematically in subgroups whose members are very willing to smuggle drugs as reasonably paid errand boys. For example, in recreation parks where many labour migrants are staying and where often criminals live who are active in the world of synthetic drugs, especially in North Brabant and Limburg. Other typical recruitment locations are gyms, football clubs or shady business parks. It is also easy to recruit among occupational groups who are having a hard time in the legal economy, and among independent workers, who hate the authorities anyway, such as lorry drivers and fishermen.

Cover cargos are used for drugs export, to make it appear that a regular product is transported, instead of drugs. This makes it possible to offer shipments of drugs to legal transporters, who carry the drugs as if nothing were the matter. The cargo may be transported by road or by sea. For transport through seaports, ever changing cover cargos are used, such as removal goods, pizza ovens, tomato sauce, ready-made mixtures or agricultural implements. The drugs have to be brought on board a ship. This can be done in any Schen- gen country, as transport by road in these countries is almost without risks. Ports in Germany, Spain and Italy are used. There are also possibilities nearer home, such as the port of Rotterdam, or various smaller ports. A good deal of attention is paid to intercepting drugs transported under cover of another cargo to the port of Rotterdam, where access to the port area and containers is necessary to get the drugs out. This is only one side of the coin, for in a drugs producing country of global stature – such as the Netherlands – there is a great need for the reverse process: transport of drugs through the Rotterdam port to other countries. Criminals cooperate with varying professionals working in the port of Rotterdam (Smits, 2014).

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Internet trade and postal parcels For about half a decade many international postal parcels with drugs sent from the Netherlands have been intercepted (LE, 2016). The destinations are Australia, the United States and South American countries. The drugs are probably sent by persons who sell drugs through the internet, including synthetic drugs and designer drugs. We spoke with an experienced synthetic drugs criminal. He had held interviews with young and ‘trained’ internet sellers in order to explore this sales channel, but he found the trade too small- scale and risky, as internet traders leave traces. This squares with the picture given by professionals from the police and the judicial authorities. The internet trade is gaining ground. A Rand report from 2016 estimates the contribution of Dutch traders to the global internet trade in synthetic drugs, in terms of finished products, at about 23% (Rand, 2016). Traditional synthetic drugs traders still maintain a distance from the internet trade. It has been adopted by newcomers on the drugs market, who buy or produce drugs, so as to sell them subsequently as a kind of global retail traders. Delivery is often done by means of parcel post. This modus operandi has not gone unnoticed. Australia checks all parcels sent from the Netherlands. The criminal response can easily be guessed. The parcels are transported by road to Belgium or Germany, and sent from there.

10.4 Financial flows

Our calculations in Chapter 3 provide us with insight into the minimum volume of the financial turnover of the Dutch synthetic drugs world. However, there is limited knowledge about where the money goes. What is done with all this money? Police and Public Prosecution circles believe that roughly one third of this money is spent on consumer items, one third is invested (also abroad), and that one third is criminal hand money, necessary to keep the criminal business running. It is unclear how this rough division works out in actual practice.

This is very much connected with the limited insight into the distribution of synthetic drugs. A few things are known about the pre-production phase: which substances are needed, where do they come from, how do they enter the Netherlands, how and where does production take place, and what are the related costs and prices? A few things are also known about the finished product, where it is sold and what the street value is. But we do not know much about the phase between lab exit (the products manufactured by Dutch synthetic drugs criminals) and ‘street’, although the phase following lab exit is the phase involving the largest proportion of the money: about 75% to 85%. Who does what? Who earns the largest share? Who are the ‘coordinating crim-

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inals’? How is the relationship between people in the Netherlands and people abroad? How many links are there exactly between ‘lab exit’ and ‘street’? We are groping in the dark, whereas this area is very interesting for financial investigations. Reinforcement of information on this point is urgently required:

‘I have been involved in financial investigations for dozens of years now. In spite of squeeze ‘em legislation (1990), introduction of a money laundering section (2002) and tightening of legislation in the field of confiscation (2012), crime still pays in the Netherlands. This is not so much due to the lack of possibilities (see, for instance, the extension of legislation in this field), but more to the focus in investigations. In spite of organizational measures in this area - introduction of Financial Support Bureau (BFO), financial criminal investigations, the recruitment of non-police employees with financial and economic knowledge, etc. - investigations still focus on “criminals & kilos” instead of on “euros”. “Financial expertise” in criminal investigations is still too often implemented afterwards (drawing up a confiscation report) or used as “additional personnel” for wiretapping and other investigative processes.’

When the police start a criminal investigation into the import of precursors, surveillance and wiretapping are carried out almost by default. For financial investigations, other questions need to be answered. How can the suspects make such investments? Where do they get the money from? Do they have any assets at all? How do they conceal their assets? In what phase of the process do they earn their money? By now, these questions are being raised more and more often, but they have not sufficiently resulted in investigations into the financial flows in the world of synthetic drugs. The standard investigation methods still focus on the ‘criminals and the kilos’.

A few examples: Dubai within reach There are a few concrete examples that provide insight into separate cases, but from which no ‘general picture’ can be deduced.

Subject 1 is involved in the synthetic drugs trade, together with his brother. In addition, he commits carousel fraud, cheating with the payment and refund of VAT.

Due to both activities, he owns a considerable amount of cash, but owing to various kinds of financial supervision, he cannot use it to pay for real estate with an estate agent or a civil-law notary. He has to find a different route.

Subject 1 and his brother use a financial facilitator, who originates from Paki- stan. The facilitator functions as a sort of broker in the Amsterdam underground banking scene. Previous investigations into underground banking

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have shown that criminals give their cash to various underground bankers. Brokers see to it that the money becomes bank money, in this case in Dubai. This method is called the Dubai route for easy reference, but ‘Dubai’ can be easily replaced by ‘Singapore’ or other places with a suitable financial infrastructure.

Subject 1 wants to buy a house for his son in the Netherlands. The purchase price amounts to € 250,000. He asks his broker to transfer this money by bank to a civil-law notary, and also asks him to draw up a loan agreement for this purpose. Intercepted emails show that Subject 1 clearly concerns himself with the text of the agreement. He directs what should – and what should not – be included. The broker sends this information to his contact with the financial institution in Dubai. The contact ensures the required adjustments are made and provides the loan agreement with the correct stamps, introductory words and formal texts. Finally, Subject 1 instructs the broker to transfer the money to the notary’s clients’ account, following which the purchase price for the house is paid.

Subject 2 has been convicted of drugs trafficking, including synthetic drugs. He wishes to buy real estate and has contacts with the same broker as in the previous case.

Subject 2 asks consultant x to incorporate a Dutch private limited company for the purchase of real estate. This company’s shares are transferred to a trust office incorporated in the form of a foundation. Consultant x negotiates with an estate agent about the purchase of the real estate and agrees a price. He informs the broker about this price, and the latter asks his contacts in Dubai to transfer the amount to a notary’s clients’ account. However, the notary does not trust the transaction and returns the money to the sender in Dubai. Subse- quently, a lot of phone calls and e-mails are exchanged between the consultant and the broker. Eventually, the broker provides an amount of cash, which the consultant includes in his own business records. Subsequently, he transfers this amount to the notary for the purpose of the purchase of real estate.

Further investigation shows that Subject 2 bought real estate in a similar manner in 2012. The flow of money also came from Dubai, and he had bank accounts in Singapore. In the broker’s financial records (a kind of cash book), considerable amounts of money had been added on the revenue side with a reference to Subject 2.

Subject 3 is a member of a criminal motorcycle gang and has been convicted of synthetic drugs trafficking. He buys real estate in Belgium. Once more, our broker plays a role. He has e-mail contact with Subject 3 about the purchase of

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the property in Belgium. In addition, documents have been found concerning an offshore arrangement with a company in Malta with a UBO declaration (Ultimate Beneficial Owner) from Subject 3 and agreements concerning funding and payment.

The investigation also shows that Subject 3 uses the services of a tax consultant who is well-known in the underworld. At the broker’s request, the tax consultant sets up an arrangement in Malta for the benefit of Subject 3. He incorporates a company and instructs to have the name of Subject 3 included in the UBO declaration. Using this offshore company in Malta, they try to open bank accounts, but without success.

Subsequently, correspondence is found about the purchase of real estate in Belgium. Investigation shows that Subject 3 is living in this house in Belgium. Further investigation demonstrates that the purchase price for this house was paid into the Belgian notary’s clients’ account by means of a bank transfer from a financial institution in Dubai. It is the same institution as in the case of subjects 1 and 2. The intention was to pretend that Subject 3 received funding from the offshore company in Malta to buy the house. Relevant contracts have been found. As this company cannot obtain a bank account, eventually the decision was made to pay the civil-law notary straight from the source in Dubai. E-mail concerning this has been found.

In the end, no new loan agreement was concluded, which implies that money has been provided for the purchase of real estate without any form of security or warranty of repayment. This suggests the purchase with private money from Dubai. The investigation has also shown that Subject 3 acquired two real estate properties in Germany in this way. In one case, the purchase price was transferred directly to the selling party, and, once more, the money came from the financial institution in Dubai.

Money laundering and underground banking: criminal routine So, it has been ascertained in several investigations that Dutch synthetic drugs criminals use criminal money to buy real estate through financial institutions in Dubai. There are many indications of money laundering. The deals are based on agreements without the guarantees, repayment schemes, provisions of security, repayment schedules, and so on used in the Netherlands. Offshore companies are used, with criminals as ultimate beneficial owners. The financial practices link up with the cash accounts of underground bankers. Dutch criminals are successful in buying real estate at home and abroad. How often and on what scale, is still unclear, but a whole army of facilitating financials service providers is available to help drugs criminals.

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Dutch criminals use the services of underground bankers on a large scale. It is not possible to indicate the volume of this economic niche, but it is certain that such bankers are often able to process millions of euros a month. A recent investigation showed that € 120,000,000 a year flowed through the business account of a banker in Dubai. In another investigation, a financial administration comprising more than € 60,000,000 was found. Incidentally, this underground banking sector has also come under pressure, according to one of the criminals we interviewed: ‘That is because of the terrorists of course, they also use it and that is why the authorities are focusing so much on it now. Originally, they were always good people who guaranteed their money, but not any more. You cannot do large amounts any more, 50,000 euros a day, 60,000 euros a day at most.’ In addition, it appears to be relatively simple to smuggle money to other countries and to launder it there through banks. Countries with a weak supervision of the financial system (such as Hong Kong) are highly suitable for this.

10.5 Conclusion

Buying raw materials and chemicals, the production process and the logistics are the sum total of a large number of activities carried out by errand boys, the criminal middle management and top criminals. In respect of the financial flow, national and international specialists are active as criminal service providers. The developments and deliberations resemble those in the legal world. This does not apply to the next, influential criminal flow: the use of violence. This is the subject of Chapter 11.

Small country, Big Player 11 Violence

Introduction The world of synthetic drugs has a turnover of billions of euros. The large financial interests have a restraining influence on the use of violence, or, conversely, may cause it. This two-sided nature of criminal violence emerges clearly from interviews with professionals and criminals. Violence is unavoidable, but also risky.

Viewed from a criminal-strategic perspective, violence that the general public and the media become aware of is a criminal business risk, as murder or attempted murder, missing persons or kidnappings result in press coverage and most probably in criminal investigation. In this view, it is preferable for drugs criminals to use violence that remains unnoticed. For instance, anyone who is beaten up because he has stolen chemicals will not report this to the police. If a top criminal fails to punish this type of internal theft with violence, he runs the risk of even more disobedience.

‘You did not start thrashing about in such a case?’ ‘No, it is no use. If violence occurs, the police will come. Making a mistake can happen to anyone. It depends. If somebody steals, that’s a different kettle of fish. If somebody steals from me, I will surely beat them up. If you come upon a burglar in your house, you will hit him, won’t you?’

We will describe violence in the world of synthetic drugs. It should be noted that the emergence of synthetic drugs crime in the provinces of Brabant and Limburg in the eighties and nineties, was accompanied by a decrease in violence and nuisance. Public violence (against citizens and police) and serious criminal violence were replaced by illegal chemical practices. This does not alter the fact that the world of synthetic drugs involves violence and danger. It attracts – also at the top – persons with an aggressive nature, who are doers rather than thinkers, also in respect of violence. We will explain why this has become so visible over the last ten years.

11.1 Why synthetic drugs violence remained limited for a long time

The role of violence changed due to the fact that Brabant and Limburg criminals switched from brutally violent crimes to drugs crime. To organizing drugs criminals, violence is not an inseparable element of the crime, since the

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crime is committed with the consent of all persons directly involved: operatives, organizers and clients. Drugs manufacturing and drugs trade are what are called consensual crimes: all parties profit if the mutual relations remain good and the police are kept out of it. In such a situation, the main role of violence will be to make people in the network toe the line. However, leading Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals do not only use violence to ‘keep things together’. This is done by means of five mechanisms, including violence. Violence in the world of synthetic drugs remained limited for a long time, meaning that, in absolute terms, quite a lot of violence was committed, but it happened chiefly behind the scenes, often in the form of threats, and the scale was limited compared to the large sums of money that were being earned. We list the five criminal regulating mechanisms: a. cooperation in restricted circles; b. large profit margins; c. power distance; d. access to the organized anarchy of the world of synthetic drugs; e. violence.

Re a. Cooperation in restricted circles Cooperation exits between relatives, family members and friends. Al our respondents indicate well-known families and groups of friends. Crimes are committed with partners that are trusted or have shown to be reliable and competent in the past. This reduces the risk of betrayal. It also makes the criminal network less vulnerable to investigation methods, such as infiltration.

‘North Brabant is quite different from Amsterdam. Here it is normal not to begrudge each other things. We are friends. Your social contacts are also in your criminal world. You deal with them every day. They are also your friends. People are quick to say that it is an organization, but they are only friends. Your friends are also the guys who know how to do things, who know people. So, if I need something, they can perhaps get hold of it. It’s just networking, like it is with everything. It isn’t any different from a normal business. Like knowing someone at your office who knows this, and another who knows that. Sometimes, they are friends, and sometimes they are just your contacts. Sometimes, they are acquaintances. They are always acquaintances of acquaintances. Everybody knows somebody who knows somebody. Now and then check if it’s a copper.’

Family ties and close-knit friendships give stability in a working environment that requires individuals to collect all raw materials, chemicals, hardware and production capacity without alarming the investigative services. If social relationships are closely knit, the people involved know that they need each other.

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It is important for them, as a network, to stay out of reach of the investigative services, as an arrest can easily become a risk for the small collective. If a person belonging to the network is detained, reticence towards the police and the judicial authorities is rewarded, for instance by means of a good lawyer, security for the next-of-kin and – in the Netherlands often after only one year or a few years – a relaunch in the underworld following release. The world is harsh, though, for anybody who fails to keep his mouth shut, runs great risks. During detention, next-of-kin may become the target of violence, after detention, the talking criminal himself may be beaten up (or worse), and not much will be left of his goodwill in the trusted criminal circles.

Re b. Large profit margins Synthetic drugs criminals used to have the advantage of large profit margins with the production of and trade in amphetamine and ecstasy. Money is a social lubricant in a criminal network. Although relationships in the networks were characterized by strong inequality, with ‘nine-pointers’ as opposed to ‘five-pointers’, earnings were good across the board. Laboratory technicians can earn a few thousand euros (guilders, in the past) if they produce sufficiently in a long weekend or a short working week. People who transport chemicals in a truck or van, receive a generous salary for a driver. A criminal respondent talked about the generous earnings he received by doing laboratory work during long weekends (see Chapter 10). But there is also information indicating that the arrival of preprecursors has resulted in lower criminal earnings due to the influx of new players.

Re c. Power distance Errand boys and operatives have long-lasting social and criminal opportunities at their disposal if they provide the top layer with reliable work. As a consequence of the power distance between top criminals (the ‘nine-pointers’) and operatives, the mutual income differences are accepted. These differences are based on achievements that are expressed by the ability to invest in drugs projects and to supply customers with large drugs shipments, intended for foreign markets. Anybody who is able to do that, creates a solid profit margin and has the possibility to pay the operatives handsomely. This creates opportunities that not many operatives would have if they stopped working in this sector. One criminal respondent clearly understood this social mechanism. He spoke of organized groups of a few top criminals who cooperated across the networks (the ‘nine-pointers’) with organizers in the ‘middle management’ (the ‘seven-pointers’) and especially the errand boys (the ‘five-pointers’). Incomes that satisfy the operatives, stimulate the acceptance of the power distance and income inequality. This reduces the risk of internal conflicts.

The pecking order in criminal circles is also maintained by the top criminals’ lead in knowledge and contacts. Top criminals have a network with purchas-

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ing specialists for raw materials and chemicals at their disposal, contacts with persons who receive international orders, export specialists, and persons with chemical knowledge or production skills. Criminals in the middle management layer, or operatives lack these contacts and the ability to interconnect the sub activities. Such criminals conform to their specialism, to their assignments or additionally, focus on other drugs activities, such as cannabis growing or trafficking. In many respects, the top layer in the synthetic drugs world is left in peace by criminals lower in the pecking order. Cannabis growers are confronted with ripoffs much more often than synthetic drugs producers, simply because many criminals hardly understand what they encounter in a lab or storage site. A criminal respondent explains:

‘Is it more violent than the cannabis world?’ ‘Well, the sums of money are much larger. The stakes are so much higher. You can become a multimillionaire in a short period. The cannabis world is a lot more dangerous in terms of violence. Quite a lot of violence is used there. Assaults, blackmail, threats, murders, ripoffs. You hardly hear about a lab being ripped off, there is no sense in it, for I may be able to rip off a lab, but I do have to have knowledge of these things. You need to have been a laboratory technician or something, because I can show you labs…when we enter, we think: what’s all this here? Is this a junk’s den? People have no idea, they don’t know: what a filthy stench! Somebody who has no know-how, he may break into a shed, but he is confronted with a lot of junk, and he thinks: “What am I to do with it? I don’t touch it, the whole thing may explode.” A person who has knowledge of these things, he will see whether it is waste oil or not, or that it’s powdery stuff. Somebody who is knowledgeable, he will not start burgling. He will make his own stuff. If I knew about these things, I would do that, I could earn millions, then there is no need for me to break into a shed to see what’s in it. So, few ripoffs in the scene.’

Re d. Access to the organized anarchy of the synthetic drugs world Reliability gives criminals access to the opportunities in the organized anarchy of the synthetic drugs world. This disciplinary mechanism should not be underestimated. Within the networks in the synthetic drugs world, criminal opportunities arise due to the permanent demand for reliable personnel. Meeting places, such as the Party King, are for the ‘five-pointers’ and ‘seven-pointers’ a job market where they can sell their activities. In the criminal garbage can, there are permanently cooperating networks, but there are also errand boys and specialists who provide services to different criminals or organized gangs. To obtain access to this criminal allocation network, a reputation of reliability is required. People who were not trusted, did not visit the Party King. In the world of synthetic drugs, there is a need for reliable specialists to produce, dump waste, drive or use violence.

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Re e. Violence Violence is used to make criminal personnel toe the line. Violence is used in case of theft or if people inform the police. The leaders need to do this to keep their status and to prevent future betrayal. In our interviews, we also came across two other, more or less frequent forms of instrumental violence: putting persons under pressure so as to make them provide, or continue to provide, services and violence as a way of conflict settlement.

Considerable pressure can be exerted on persons to continue production or export activities, or to make up for setbacks (a police raid, a failed production process). For instance, if farmers or entrepreneurs have rented their shed or business premises to synthetic drugs criminals and want to stop this, they may be threatened so production can continue, or to stamp out the idea of reporting to the police. If laboratory technicians make errors or wish to stop, they can be put under pressure to earn back the loss of income or to continue the laboratory activities. We have interviewed a laboratory technician who had experienced all this. He almost collapsed physically, because he had to do laboratory work for many days without a break, and he did not see a way out. He was on the brink of shooting a person who threatened him if they continued to pressure him to do laboratory work.

Conflicts arise frequently in the world of synthetic drugs, for instance about the delivery of drugs, and payment. The production process of synthetic drugs involves many deliveries and payments, not just of the finished product, but also of raw materials, chemicals, hardware and semi-finished products, while subcontractors such as buyers and exporters must also be paid. The series of transactions in one large project implies a considerable risk of conflicts. Add to this that the production process may fail, and that when the yield of the laboratory is disappointing, the suspicion arises whether laboratory technicians are stealing products (raw materials or finished products), or whether there were problems with the chemical composition of the substances used.

Payment problems are a major cause of criminal violence. A banal payment problem arises when a large shipment of drugs is intercepted by investigative officers. Logically speaking, the final customer will not pay. According to our respondents, in the synthetic drugs world, it is normal that the top layer – the investors or organizers – will hold persons accountable: ‘Somebody will always be held liable, always.’ A public prosecutor:

‘This Mr X seemed a rather small fish, but if this really was so, we never know (…). He was a garage owner, who had made a room in his garage available for the construction of a lab, since he was in financial difficulty. I think that he was liquidated because others were afraid that he would talk, but it

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is also possible that he was not as innocent as we thought, initially. In addition to a lab, firearms were found at his place. Sometimes people are held accountable because a lab has been dismantled or something in that vein. It’s all possible. You don’t know why people are liquidated. Usually because they have lost a shipment of drugs.’

According to the public prosecutor, criminals are more afraid of internal violence than of arrests:

‘I do not think they are afraid of the police catching them, but they do fear that their shipments will be seized, because they will be held accountable. If there is a case of infiltration, they are afraid that they were the one to have introduced someone. This really means trouble for them. Risks are internal, I think.’

We spoke with a criminal respondent when the police had just seized seven thousand litres of raw materials. He called this dangerous, because such a seizure will lead to serious tensions in the underworld:

‘That was a major blow. And it’s dangerous, for someone may get killed, considering what has been seized. It was a tip-off, somebody had been talking. The person who ordered it, must also deliver; he ordered x litres of raw materials and had to supply them to Mr B, for Mr B had to start producing in order to supply to Mr C, who also had to supply. There are so many links in the chain, and if one of the links goes missing and somebody is unable to deliver, then somebody will be held accountable. In the ecstasy world, this often ends with a bullet in somebody’s head, because they know that no payment will be made.’

For the top layer, it is important that in the event of costly setbacks, the persons responsible are identified, as this increases the probability of obedience. Ideally, threats of violence will suffice. In actual practice, this often consists of a unilaterally imposed offer to earn back the losses in a following project. One top criminal thought this was a reasonable arrangement: typical Brabant conflict settlement, without immediately using fists or firearms, ‘as they do in Amsterdam’. One respondent laboratory technician got severe physical and mental problems due to the punitive production task imposed on him. He took a lot of hard drugs to endure the hard working conditions and almost resorted to firearms to get rid of his tormentors, because he understood that they would beat him up severely if he failed to deliver. So this kind of perverse criminal pressure is also typical of North Brabant.

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If necessary, violence is used to punish or to set an example and to reduce the risk of future disobedience. Calculating synthetic drugs criminals need a reputation of violence. They invest in large projects, due to which they run a considerable risk of internal theft, of interception by investigative agencies, and of all kinds of internal conflicts. A robust reputation of violence is indispensable in these cases. This is why many a leader is reported to be ‘dangerous’.

‘The X family are subject to criminal investigations. They belong to traveller communities in Oss and Den Bosch. They have been involved in cannabis, synthetic drugs and cocaine for generations. They probably launder their money in tanning salons. But if you realize how much they probably earn, this cannot possibly be the only way. I myself conducted an investigation in Den Bosch; over there they even throw hand grenades into a competitor’s establishment. There are underlying interests. We are not sure whether they actually did it, but the scenario was obvious.’

Violence is not always instrumental. Aggressive bosses or leaders also use violence on impulse. Persons in their immediate environment fear such violence. Semi-conflicts or misunderstandings can lead to hefty violence. The ease with which heavy artillery can be deployed leads to counterstrategies: criminals seek refuge, go into hiding, or resort to violence themselves. One aggressive leader in the synthetic drugs world, for example, was apparently pre-emptively fired at when he was seeking redress from an operative. Potential victims think that a reasonable settlement is impossible with this type of criminal. Kruisbergen et al. (2012) give a poignant example. A criminal errand boy who had probably stolen money, threw himself in front of a moving car because he saw no way out. They also give the following example about a criminal leader:

‘This man, who himself became the victim of a liquidation, held one of the co-perpetrators responsible for an ecstasy transaction that miscarried. By means of an escalating series of actions (intimidation, physical abuse, threatening with a firearm) he tried to force the person involved into paying damages. That his intentions were serious, was evident from the fact that he promised somebody € 50,000 if this person managed to recover the money. In the end, this also failed, but the supposed debtor was seriously maltreated by three men.’ (Kruisbergen et al., 2012, p. 72)

It is interesting to note that the criminal leader from the above example was killed. This is in keeping with the stories told by our respondents: not only does unreasonable criminal violence scare off people, it also provokes violence against impulsive criminals. So, anybody wishing to earn money with synthetic drugs, had better use properly dosed disciplinary violence.

Small country, Big Player 168 Violence

11.2 Violence as a public problem

From about 1980, violence among Brabant and Limburg criminals subsided, because they switched from violent property crime to drugs crime, including synthetic drugs. Our respondents indicate that violence in the world of synthetic drugs has risen in the past decade. Violence and danger have become visible in the public domain in its following aspects: a. drug-related killings; b. brutal violence: criminal motorcycle gangs; c. less generous earnings; d. undermining: on the authorities’ agenda

Re a. Drug-related killings Liquidations of criminals in the context of drugs, known as drug-related killings, are conspicuous. In 2017, 160 murders were committed in the Neth- erlands, including 36 drug-related killings. It is not always about synthetic drugs, although some cases certainly are. On 6 January 2017, a 60-year-old man was killed in Breda on leaving a bar. He was a member of the traveller community who was reportedly active in the ecstasy trade. On 1 February 2017, the body of a 44-year-old man from Moergestel was found in a burned minibus. A drugs lab had been found in his business and he was a suspect in the investigation into the Party King. There are no statistics available about the exact number of murder in relation to synthetic drugs.

Leistra (2018) makes a comparison between the drug-related killings in 1992 (42 of a total of 260 murders) and in 2017 (36 of a total of 160 murders). In absolute numbers, drug-related killings have decreased, chiefly due to the decrease in murders in the open drugs scenes, but they increased in a relative sense. In addition to successful drug-related killings, there are also failed liquidations and persons who fear a liquidation. In other words, drug-related killings are the visible tip of the iceberg of violence in the drugs environment.

Re b. Brutal violence: criminal motorcycle gangs The brutal violence committed by drug criminals, including those involved in synthetic drugs, has become more visible and has increased due to the activities of criminal motorcycle gangs. According to a source, one motorcycle gang is involved at the level of the national board, and the chapters in trade in various kinds of drugs, such as ecstasy, cocaine, cannabis and hash. The same source has it that one outlaw motorcycle club founded chapters in Germany, Spain, Suriname, Indonesia and other countries for the purpose of international drugs trade. The networks and organizational structures of a criminal motorcycle gang offer excellent opportunities for the production and international distribution of synthetic drugs. However, the emergence of criminal

Small country, Big Player 169 Violence

motorcycle gangs went hand in hand with seriously undermining behaviour, such as brutal violence and extreme examples of power display in public life. On the basis of information from the Criminal Intelligence Team, one public prosecutor connects members and board members of a criminal motorcycle gang with murders or contract killing in gangland. This same criminal motorcycle gang extorts hotels, restaurants or pubs and has an organizational structure for hiding and using weapons, as well as internal training in violence, such as shooting practice.

Criminal motorcycle gangs exert far-reaching pressure on members, for instance by imposing penalties, by maltreatment and by depriving people of their property. Members are punished when drugs transactions miscarry or when drug shipments go lost. On the other hand, there is internal discipline, plus a stock of specialists and errand boys that can be used for many criminal activities. This is why it is attractive for synthetic drugs criminals to cooperate with criminal motorcycle gangs. It is questionable how voluntary this is, as apart from clear advantages of a partnership, there are also obvious disadvantages involved in a relationship with a criminal motorcycle gang. To start with, there are, or there seem to be, many leaders of criminal motorcycle gangs who are aggressive personalities, who automatically claim a leading role for themselves and who are used to thinking and acting in hierarchical terms. This clearly puts the traditional synthetic drugs criminals in a different environment from the networks with tightly knit social structures, with a fairly obvious financial allocation formula and with criminal room for manoeuvre for small networks. One criminal respondent, who consciously declined mem- bership of a criminal motorcycle gang, points at the almost frantic fear among North Brabant criminals when the leader of a criminal motorcycle gang does no more than ring the bell:

‘These travellers form a closed world, as it were. Not every citizen dares to enter a caravan site, so they have a certain status and live more easily. These motorcycle gangs are super dangerous, and this is only getting worse, and some five years ago I thought it was growing less. If these leaders, such as X, appear on your doorstep, your life is finished. They have approached me, but I am not going to walk about in such a vest, piss off. Nor of No Surrender. I don’t fall for it.’

Many Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals preferred to operate with a low profile, without being conspicuous in public life. Conversely, criminal motorcycle gangs like to attract the attention. They appear in areas with restaurants and bars, in the media, on the public road, in residential areas and have real or de facto clubhouses. They exude power and show in various ways that they will not budge an inch. Respondents think that the criminal motor-

Small country, Big Player 170 Violence

cycle gangs have ‘challenged’ the entire public administration. They also think that they have overplayed their hands, as is demonstrated by the actions taken by mayors, the police and the judicial authorities nowadays: from shutting down clubhouses and conducting criminal trials, to attempts to impose a ban, which were successful in two cases in the first instance in mid-June 2018; an appeal has been lodged.

However powerful the criminal motorcycle gangs are (or imagine they are), it is not a favourable context for staying under the radar with organized drugs crime. It is doubtful how instrumental the violence and the public display of power still are. When we pointed out to a criminal respondent the disadvantages of ties with a criminal motorcycle gang, he heaved a sigh and said that his lawyer also found it a bad idea.

Re c. Less generous earnings Due to various causes it has become more difficult to ‘make money’ with or to ‘cash in on’ the production of and trade in synthetic drugs. The profit margins are smaller or less generous than five or ten years ago, and competition has become fiercer, leading to more mutual conflicts. The Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals partly owe this to themselves. They have trained and employed many laboratory technicians, pill makers and buyers. The production processes are not simple, but they are no business secrets any more. Moreover, top criminals have found solutions for the shortage of raw materials (precursors), so that nowadays preprecursors are used, which makes it relatively easy to make precursors. Consequently, in the world of synthetic drugs, there are not only thousands of errand boys who work for organizers or investors, but also self-employed people who market their services and their final and intermediate products.

There are still far fewer laboratory technicians than cannabis growers, but the world of synthetic drugs has become less exclusive and can no longer be controlled by the leaders by means of ‘mild’ and instrumental violence. Such a leader complained about the dumping of products by newcomers:

‘Due to these semi-finished products, everybody is going to try it. Most of them make a mess of it, as they start producing something but have no know-how, and no buyers, and then they dump it on the market, a lot cheaper. They offer this to people.’

In addition to the influx from below, there has been an influx from above in the Dutch synthetic drugs world, for instance through criminal motorcycle gangs and Turkish criminals (see Chapter 7). This created alternatives for large national and international clients. A simple law seems to apply: competi-

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tion results in smaller or less generous profit margins. One criminal respondent was aware of this and drew the conclusion that it is useful to trade not just in synthetic drugs, but also in cocaine:

‘If you produce a pill at 25 eurocents and sell it at 50 eurocents, you have a 100% profit, but you have earned only 25 cents. It is not all profit. If you send them a shipment, for instance of 100 kilos, it costs you 30,000, and you receive 40,000 for it; your profit margin is only 25%. But this entire amount has to come back to the Netherlands, and you also have to pay commission on it. The additional expenses are quite high. It is not all as profitable as it seems. The turnover is very high and the margins are small. In the distribu- tive trade there is only very little profit left, it’s hard. (…) With cocaine you can earn most, you need less turnover. Look, a kilo of cocaine costs 30,000, if you make a 25% profit, you earn a nice wad, get it? Your profit is higher and cocaine is easier to sell than pills.’

With international contracts, it has become more difficult to cash the final amount. During decades, it was safe to do this using what is known as tokens. Large sums of money could be put on these tokens abroad, and could subsequently – less ‘banking costs’ – be withdrawn in the Netherlands. Pakistanis were often involved in this underground banking business. However, this illegal financial channel is also used by terrorists, due to which international investigative services make a major effort to suppress it. It resulted in settlement problems for Dutch synthetic drugs criminals:

‘Five dollars is the market price I know, more or less. Yes, including transport and so on this amounts to a million pills. Then you have five million Australian dollars. An Australian dollar equals about 60 eurocents. So that makes 2.4 million euros. You don’t get them in your hand, no you just get a token and you can collect the money here. There are deductions, of course. Banking costs. Illegal banking. But with the token you also get a lot of problems with the Pakistanis, it’s a rotten lot. It’s not like it used to be. No longer useful. It used to be a solid thing, but it isn’t any longer.’

As a consequence of the stronger competition and the reduced profit margin, the top layer resorts more readily to violence than a decade ago. The youngest generation of a well-known North Brabant criminal family –since the seventies active in the world of drugs, including amphetamine and later ecstasy – is clearly more violent than their father’s generation. This father switched from aggressive violent crimes to drug trafficking, with violence ‘where necessary’. In a certain sense, the youngest generation is as aggressive again as their grandfather, not with crude property crime, but with drugs crime.

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Re d. Undermining: on the authorities’ agenda In 2018, the danger of synthetic drugs is not viewed like the risk of a fire, a murder or any other incident. It is considered a phenomenon with major harmful effects: undermining. Mayors are fed up with the fact that drug labs are built in residential areas, that farmers and entrepreneurs with business premises are approached, sometimes aggressively, for the use of their buildings as production or storage sites, that criminals buy real estate or land, that they extort hotel, restaurant or bar owners, or that they corrupt police or customs officers. At a deeper level, many a mayor has discovered that criminals obtain status, prestige or support in social or economic circles, such as residential areas, caravan sites, business parks, professional groups (such as financial consultants, lawyers or contractors) and the sports sector. What applies to mayors, applies equally to police officers and magistrates. Under- mining is considered a serious social problem.

One criminal respondent, almost having the status of a top-x criminal, under- stands that this poses a threat to him. He smiles, when he talks about ‘let’s call it undermining’, but he has noticed that the authorities are getting organized to achieve tangible successes in the fight against well-known criminal leaders. In his intuitively intelligent way he feels that he, his network and his colleagues are in danger of ending up in a sticky situation because they are known to the police, the judicial authorities and the administrative authorities.

11.3 Conclusion

Violence is a double-edged sword for synthetic drugs criminals. In the eighties and nineties, the switch Brabant and Limburg criminals made from violent crime to quiet, secret laboratory work, put the authorities in a lenient mood. Keeping a low profile, a category of synthetic drugs criminals evolved into international top criminals. With all the criminal interests and risks involved, violence was necessary to keep or put things in order internally. During the last ten years or so, violence has become more visible to the public, because it was not limited to criminal environments. Drug-related killings are perpetrated and criminal motorcycle gangs show their power, defying the authorities. This puts motorcycle gangs and synthetic drugs criminals on the administrative agenda, in the sense that ever more mayors realise how large, dangerous and influential organized drugs crime has become. Doing laboratory work while keeping a low profile is over. This is an unfavourable development for criminals, albeit that the risk of being caught is still at a low level for top criminals.

Small country, Big Player Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: 12 effects, risks and use

Lex Lemmers and Raymond Niesink (Trimbos institute)

Introduction In the present chapter we will discuss the effects, health risks and use of ecstasy and a number of other psychostimulants. In addition to ecstasy, we will focus on a number of new psychoactive substances (NPS), which form a group of ‘designer’ drugs that are also referred to as ‘legal highs’, ‘research chemicals’ or ‘smart drugs’. It concerns substances that imitate the effects of well-known drugs. They are usually synthetic, but sometimes they are vegetable. Since the structure of these substances differs from banned drugs, these NPS are not, or not yet, subject to the Opium Act. Producers of NPS and the authorities are involved in a cat-and-mouse game in respect of these drugs. The Opium Act is adapted frequently, but producers are continually trying to circumvent the law by introducing new substances on the market that are not yet banned. Before we will deal with amphetamine and NPS, we will discuss ecstasy in detail.

12.1 Ecstasy and the dance culture

The use of ecstasy in the Netherlands is strongly linked to the dance culture and Electronic Dance Music (EDM). In the early 1980s, new musical styles evolved in the United States from disco, synthesizer and other music, including ‘house’ (named after the club The Warehouse in Chicago) and ‘techno’. Soon afterwards, house and techno reached the Netherlands through England, and the first house parties were organized in our country in the late eighties. Every musical or youth culture has its preferences for certain drugs (Ter Bogt, 2012). The ‘ecstatic’ effect of ecstasy perfectly matched the needs of ravers in the house and techno scene. In particular due to its combination of stimulating and slightly hallucinogenic and entactogenic effects, which arouse a ‘feeling of love’ (love drug) in users and enhance the musical experience, ecstasy became an inextricable part of the dance culture.

Ecstasy was introduced into the Netherlands by the house scene in the late eighties, but the history of the substance dates back to the early twentieth century. The active ingredient of ecstasy is MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine). MDMA belongs to a family of synthetic drugs, the

Small country, Big Player 174 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

phenylethylamines, to which amphetamine also belongs. Phenylethylamine itself is a substance that occurs naturally in the body. Chemists are able to restructure the molecules of the phenylethyl group infinitely. Depending on the ordering of the molecules, the effects vary, from stimulating to strongly hallucinogenic. Early in the twentieth century, pharmacologists were involved in all kinds of research into new medicines. The German pharmaceutical company Merck was the first to succeed in creating MDMA synthetically; it was patented in 1912. As a matter of fact, MDMA had been discovered inadvertently as an intermediate product in research into a new blood coagulation drug. Interest in the further development of MDMA declined after the Great War.

In about 1939, scientists got interested again in further research into MDMA. For instance, its usefulness as an appetite depressant was researched, and also whether it could be used as a synthetic version of adrenaline (Connolly, 2000). The Second World War ended these experiments again. The definitive breakthrough of MDMA happened in the late sixties, when the Californian chemist Alexander Shulgin started to spread knowledge about the mental effects of MDA, MDMA and other hallucinogens. MDMA or ecstasy was a legal substance for a long time, and was used as an alternative for LSD in therapeutic settings. It was propagated by therapists as a means of making patients less inhibited, which made it effective as a therapeutic tool.

However, in the seventies ecstasy became illegal again in many countries due to its alleged toxicity, and it went underground, to be picked up by the ravers from the house and techno scene. The chemical knowledge about the production of MDMA and other synthetic drugs had also found its way to new, illegal manufacturers. On account of its health risks, MDMA has been included in List 1 of the Dutch Opium Act since 1988, which means that the authorities consider it a hard drug.

12.2 Monitoring the drugs market in the Netherlands

As ecstasy is included in List 1 of the Dutch Opium Act, trading in and possessing ecstasy is a criminal offence. Due to this, the production of and trade in ecstasy are kept hidden from the authorities. Inspection, as is carried out in respect of food by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, is not possible. In order to gain an insight into what is happening on the drugs market, the Drugs Information and Monitoring System (DIMS) was formed at the initiative of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. The DIMS office is housed in the Trimbos Institute and cooperates with a national network of test sites, usually housed in regional institutions for addiction

Small country, Big Player 175 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

care. Drugs samples of chiefly ecstasy, cocaine and speed are sent through the network to the Trimbos Institute, to be tested for contents and strength.1 In this way, the DIMS is able to monitor closely what is sold on the market of recreational drugs, including the ecstasy market. Owing to this, we know the dosages of active ingredients in substances, or whether the substances are contaminated with cutting agents. If samples are found that contain dosages or substances that form an immediate danger to public health, a Red Alert is issued to warn drugs users against these sometimes life-threatening drugs. Throughout the years, the DIMS has also collected a good deal of information about the quantity of MDMA in an average ecstasy pill. Analysis of samples has shown that the dosage of MDMA in ecstasy pills has risen sharply over the past few years. In 2006, only 3% of the pills contained more than 150 mg of MDMA, whereas in 2017 this was the case with more than 65% of the pills (Figure 12.1). The average concentration of MDMA in ecstasy tablets rose again in 2017. In 2016, it was 156 milligrammes, and in 2017 an average concentration of 167 milligrammes was measured (Van der Gouwe & Rigter, 2018).

The concentration of MDMA can be very different in each pill, and is also subject to major variations over time. Users take from one half to several pills per evening or occasion (Wouters et al., 2014; Goossens et al., 2014; Van der Poel et al., 2010). If this is used as a basic assumption, the recreational dose amounts to 0.5 to 4 mg/kg, spread over many hours (sometimes several days), but there are significant peaks (up to 10 mg/kg).

1 In 2002, the possibility to have synthetic or other drugs tested during large-scale parties or festivals was abolished. Officially, a ‘zero tolerance’ policy was introduced, which meant that it was prohibited to take these drugs to festivals, so that it was no longer necessary to have them tested. At present, they can only be tested through DIMS at a number of locations, prior to a festival. Incidentally, the zero tolerance policy appears to be just a formality in actual practice. It is a public secret that drugs are used on a massive scale at festivals: an analyses of sewage at the Decibel Outdoors festival in Hilvarenbeek in 2017 demonstrated, in spite of the zero tolerance policy, the presence of four kilos of drugs: two kilos of MDMA, one kilo of cocaine, and one kilo of amphetamine (Brabants Dagblad newspaper, 11 April 2018).

Small country, Big Player 176 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Figure 12.1 Concentration of MDMA in ecstasy tablets provided to DIMS in the period 2009-2017 (Van der Gouwe & Rigter, 2018) MDMA in ecstasy tablets

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

< 101 mg MDMA 100-150 mg MDMA > 150 mg MDMA

12.3 Effects and risks of psychostimulants

Research into the effects of ecstasy Although MDMA is illegal in many countries, small scale scientific research into it is still ongoing. Ecstasy is the street name for 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). Most knowledge about the effects of MDMA derives from experimental research on rats and monkeys, supplemented by scientific research carried out on humans. Even today, research is being conducted into medical applications of MDMA (chiefly in psychiatry). The results of this research cannot be applied directly to the effects of ecstasy during dance events. The circumstances during medical research differ strongly from the circumstances under which ecstasy is used in a non-medical setting. Medical research uses healthy experimental subjects who are given a controlled quantity of MDMA, and the research is conducted under controlled circumstances: a steady room temperature, quiet environment and no physical exertion. The use of ecstasy during festivals is quite the opposite: usually there is major physical exertion (dancing) taking place at a high environmental temperature, and often the dose is unknown.

Effects on the brain: the psychoactive effects of MDMA Our brains consist of hundreds of thousands of nerve cells, the neurons. These neurons interconnect by means of a chemical process. The substances

Small country, Big Player 177 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

playing a role in this are called neurotransmitters. Just as many other drugs, including medication, ecstasy influences neurotransmission in the brain. These neurotransmitter processes cause the psychoactive effects of drugs. A distinction is made between sedative, stimulating and hallucinogenic effects. Animal experiments have shown that MDMA stimulates the serotonergic nerve cells2 in the brain. In addition, MDMA influences the neurotransmitters dopamine and noradrenaline (See Figure 12.2) and other neurotransmitters to a limited extent, such as GABA and opiates produced naturally by the body. Through its effect on the neurotransmitters, MDMA also influences the emis- sion of hormones, such as the antidiuretic hormone (ADH) and the hormone oxytocin. The entactogenic3 effect of MDMA is in particular attributed to the effects of serotonin (Tancer & Johanson, 2001), but there are indications that the hormone oxytocin also plays a role (Dumont et al., 2009). Box 12.1 gives an overview of the mental and physical effects of ecstasy.

Figure 12.2 The neurotransmitters serotonin, dopamine and noradrenalin are involved in various aspects of behaviour

noradrenaline serotonin

alertness fear obsessions concentration impulsiveness compulsiveness energy irritation memory

mood cognition appetite attention sex agression

pleasure reward motivation/drive dopamine

Toxicity of MDMA A full toxicological evaluation, as is required for new medication, has never been carried out for MDMA. In actual practice, and on the basis of epidemiological studies, serious side effects have come to the fore. By now, we know that MDMA can be acutely toxic, but it is hard to predict when and with

2 Nerve cells that secrete the neurotransmitter serotonin. 3 Users experience euphoria, togetherness and openness, facilitating contacts with other people.

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whom it will occur. Many substances have a dose-response relationship, which means that a gradually increasing intensity of the effects will occur as the dose is increased. This is also the case with MDMA, but seems less applicable to certain effects. Sensitive persons already show signs of undesired effects with low doses, whereas less sensitive persons feel no effect at all with these same doses. The cases of serious and sometimes fatal acute reactions in humans do not always seem to be dose-related, and are therefore unpredictable.

Serious acute side effects of MDMA Most knowledge about serious acute side effects of MDMA is based on practice and to a lesser extent on scientific research. Health professionals who were active at dance festivals and physicians at emergency departments of hospitals were the first to be confronted with serious side effects of MDMA, and they began reporting on it (Henry, 1992). Since 2009, the Trimbos Institute has systematically collected the nature and number of drug-related health incidents in the Netherlands with the aid of the Drugs Incident Monitor (MDI). Below follows a description of the most important and serious acute effects of ecstasy use.

Several cases of death due to ecstasy use have been reported. In October 2014, three people died as a result of drug overdose during the Amsterdam Dance Event. The precise cause of death is often difficult to establish (Vreeker et al., 2017). Combinations of drugs or pills with too high a dose may play a role. Unpredictability remains a problem. There are known incidents with fatal consequences where only one ‘pure’ ecstasy pill had been used, whereas there are also cases in which allegedly there were only mild symptoms after inges- tion of more than 40 tablets (Henry et al., 1992). This difference in reaction between different users is probably based on genetic factors (Rietjens et al., 2012).

Box 12.1 Mental and physical effects of ecstasy

Effects of MDMA Mental effects of MDMA: – experiencing feelings of connectedness, openness, euphoria, making it easier to have contact with other people (entactogenic effect); – stimulating, comparable to the effect of amphetamine, giving users more energy and the ability to carry on longer; – intense musical experience; – slightly hallucinogenic effect. Contrary to LSD, for instance, ecstasy produces no strongly visual hallucinations. To a limited extent, it results, as all other hallucinogens do, in anxiety, paranoia, concentration problems, forgetfulness, and confusion.

Small country, Big Player 179 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Physical effects of MDMA: – increased heart rate; – increased blood pressure; – muscular tension; – gnashing one’s teeth; – increased body temperature; – sweating; – dry mouth; – thirst; – nausea; – headache; – dizziness; – insomnia; – reduced appetite; – dilated pupils; – nystagmus (involuntary, rapid and repetitive movement of the eyes); – tremor (shaking).

Ecstasy deaths in Great Britain Contrary to the Netherlands, Great Britain does have central registration of drug-related deaths. In 2015, 76 ecstasy-related deaths were registered, which means that every four days someone died due to ecstasy in Great Britain. Below is an overview of the number of deaths in Great Britain in the period from 1999 to 2015 (http:// volteface.me/features/fired-ecstasy-related-deaths-rising-uk).

Annual number of ecstasy-related deaths in UK, 1999 to 2015 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Small country, Big Player 180 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Possible acute serious side-effects of ecstasy are: – hyperthermia or overheating. This occurs when the body temperature rises above 40°C, and is the cause of most deaths due to ecstasy use (Strobbe et al., 2007); – hyponatremia. This occurs when there is a low concentration of sodium ions in the blood. If it is not treated in time, it may be lethal. Hyperthermia can be prevented by drinking cold water, but drinking too much water under the influence of MDMA can result in an excess of water in the body and, consequently, to hyponatremia (Traub et al., 2002; Gowing et al., 2002). MDMA stimulates the secretion of antidiuretic hormone. This hormone blocks the release of water into the kidneys, resulting in an excess of water in the body. Symptoms of hyponatremia are headache, nausea, vomiting, feelings of weakness and fatigue. Hyponatremia may lead to cerebral oedema, brain herniation and seizures (Kiyatkin & Sharma, 2011). Incidentally, cerebral oedema after the use of ecstasy can also occur without hyponatremia (Strobbe et al., 2007); – cerebral and cardiovascular diseases. The use of ecstasy leads to increased blood pressure, increased heart rate and a heightened cardiac output. Increased blood pressure increases the risk of haemorrhages or infarc- tions. The use of ecstasy may also result in tachycardia (acceleration of the heart rate) with a risk of heart arrhythmia, heart failure and pulmo- nary oedema. People who already have cardiovascular problems, run the greatest risk (Gowing et al., 2002); – liver and kidney damage. Ecstasy use may also cause serious damage to the kidneys and liver; – lockjaw. The effect ecstasy has on the facial muscles may lead to lockjaw; – depression. MDMA influences the concentration of serotonin in the brain, and there is a clear relationship between a reduced serotonin concentration and the onset of depression. Research has shown that ecstasy users obtain much higher scores on tests for depressive moods and anxiety, but the question remains whether this is caused by the use of ecstasy or whether people with a predisposition for such psychiatric disorders are more readily inclined to use ecstasy. It is clear, though, that the symptoms of depression and anxiety persist long after the user has stopped using ecstasy.

Long-term effects of ecstasy use More information about the long-term effects on health of ecstasy use is also becoming available. A recent study by Croes et al. (2018) shows that the use of ecstasy may lead to a range of long-lasting health problems. This concerns damage to nerve cells, and memory, concentration and mood problems. An unknown but probably small percentage of users also suffer from persistent perceptual disturbances, including ‘floating shapes’ and ‘dots’ in the field of vision (visual snow) and from feelings of depersonalisation and derealisation

Small country, Big Player 181 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

(dissociation from one’s self and the world). It is not clear what factors exactly play a role in the occurrence of these symptoms.

Amphetamine and NPS Amphetamine is a synthetic drug, just like ecstasy. The molecular structure of amphetamine very much resembles that of ephedrine, and it also resembles the hormone adrenaline and the neurotransmitters noradrenaline and dopamine. Amphetamine is usually referred to as speed or pep by users. It is available in powdery form, capsules or tablets. Amphetamine gives the user energy and it reduces fatigue. The user feels energetic, cheerful, active and confident. The Romanian chemist Lazăr Edeleanu first developed amphetamine in 1887. It was used as a means to reduce symptoms of asthma and bronchitis. Soon after it had been discovered, it became clear that amphetamine produced increased bodily activity. Partly due to this effect, amphetamine was used during the Second World War to keep soldiers alert. After the war, amphetamine became a prescription medicine and in the Netherlands it is included in List 1 of the Opium Act. As the demand for amphetamine continued, the drug was produced increasingly in illegal labs. Amphetamine has been a permanent feature of the Dutch drugs market since the sixties.

Amphetamine is a ‘traditional’ synthetic drug. Newer variants are called new psychoactive substances (NPS). NPS form a minor part of the market in the Netherlands. These drugs are sold under obscure names such as 6-APB and Mephedrone. The best-known is 4-fluoramphetamine or 4-FA. This drug appeared on the Dutch drugs market in 2007 (Linsen et al., 2015). Initially, it was used as a cutting agent for amphetamine. Users had specifically started looking for this substance, because it allegedly had fewer side-effects than ecstasy. It was known as ‘ecstasy light’ among users. The effects of 4-FA are somewhere between those of amphetamine and MDMA, and are both stimulating and entactogenic, though less stimulating than amphetamine and less entactogenic than MDMA. The user feels euphoric, talks and moves a lot and does not get tired (Linsen et al., 2015). 4-FA is produced as a powder, a capsule or a pill. In Box 12.2, some of the health risks of amphetamine and 4-FA are described.

Small country, Big Player 182 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Box 12.2 Health risks of amphetamine and 4-FA

Health risks of amphetamine (not exhaustive, www.drugsinfo.nl): – tachycardia; – increased blood pressure; – cardiac arrhythmia and other heart conditions; – hyperthermia; – lock jaw; – liver and kidney failure; – aggressive behaviour; – paranoia.

Health risks of 4-FA (not exhaustive, Wijers et al., 2017): – exhaustion; – very severe headache; – nausea; – excessive perspiration; – hyperthermia; – increased heartrate; – teeth grinding; – anxiety; – brain haemorrhage is a rare but serious complication of 4-FA use.

12.4 Use and developments of psychostimulants in the Netherlands

The use of ecstasy, amphetamine and NPS in the Netherlands Apart from cannabis, ecstasy is the most widely used illegal drug in the Netherlands (Van Laar et al., 2017). It is estimated that in 2016, one in thirteen Dutch citizens aged 18 years or older had at some time used ecstasy (7.6%). Among the school population, ecstasy use is low. It is predominantly used in pubs and clubs by youths and young adults in the age category 18-35 years. Several studies have shown that ecstasy is by far the most important drug in the party circuit, especially in the dance scene.

How do we measure drug consumption? Epidemiological research into drug consumption uses a number of standard measures to chart consumption: Ever use, past-year use, past-month use. They are opera- tionalized as follows in research:

Have you ever in your life used [substance x]? Have you used [substance x] in the past year? Have you used [substance x] in the past month?

Small country, Big Player 183 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Most people in the Netherlands do not use illegal substances and they have no need for them. The ever use indicates how many people have ever experimented with a substance. Most people stop using a drug after having experimented with it once or twice. For others, it is the start of a user career. The question about use in the past year gives an indication of recent use and the question about use in the past month gives an indication of current use. The percentages of ever use are always higher than the percentages of recent or current users. By no means all people who experiment with drugs will become problematic drug users or develop an addiction. For most people, the period during which they use drugs is limited, and in the course of time they abstain from using illicit drugs.

The Lifestyle Monitor published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM) and the Trimbos Institute (Van Laar et al., 2017) shows that of the adult Dutch population approximately 2.9% used ecstasy and 1.4% used amphetamine (see Table 12.1). This comes down to about 390,000 users of ecstasy and 180,000 users of amphetamine (National Drugs Monitor, 2017). Amphetamine consumption is comparable to NPS consumption; it is estimated that 140,000 adults used NPS last year. It is striking that chiefly 4-FA (fluoramphetamine) was used in 2016, and that other NPS had a very low prevalence. This might be explained by the fact that sufficient ‘good quality’ substances are available on the market, and that people do not need to resort to other new substances to experience a special intoxication.

Table 12.1 Lifetime (ever-use), past-year (recent) and past-month (current) use of psychostimulants by adult Dutch citizens (18 years and older) in 2016

Substance Ever-use Past year Past month Ecstasy 7.6% 2.9% 1% (ca. 1 million p.) (ca. 390,000 p.) (ca. 130,000 p.) Aphetamine 4,4% 1,4% 0,6% (ca. 590,000 p.) (ca. 180,000 p.) (ca. 70,000 p.) Cocaine 4.9% 1.7% 0.8% (ca. 650,000 p.) (ca. 230,000 p.) (ca. 110,000 p.) NPS total - 1.1% - NPS 4-FA (fluoraphetamine) - 0.9% - NPS other (e.g. 6-APB, - 0.2% - Methoxetamine, Synthetic cannabis, Mephedrone)

Source: National Drug Monitor: Annual report 2017 (Van Laar et al., 2017).

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The Large-Scale Nightlife Survey In the Large-Scale Nightlife Survey (HGU), the Trimbos Institute systematically charted the use of substances by partygoers. The survey was conducted in 2014 and 2016. The 2016 survey included 4,905 adolescents and young adults between 15 and 35 years who visited a party, festival, club or discotheque in the past year (Monshouwer et al., 2016). Almost half of them lived with their parents and 44% were between 20 and 24 years old, 88% were native Dutch people. The educational level was high: 54% studied at a university or university of applied sciences, or had completed such studies. Fifty-seven percent visited a club or discotheque at least once a month, and 18% once a week. One third (34%) visited a party or festival at least once a month. Due to lack of statistics about the population, the researchers do not claim that their prevalence statistics are representative, but owing to the large sample they do provide a good and innovative picture of the partygoers.

Table 12.2 shows the prevalence statistics of the various drugs that were found in the Large-Scale Nightlife Survey 2016. If we focus on the group of partygoers, we get an entirely different picture of drugs usage from what is found in the national prevalence surveys. The chief outcome of the Large-Scale Nightlife Survey is that a large proportion of the partygoers studied consider it normal to use drugs. Thus, slightly more than half of the partygoers (55%) indicate they have used ecstasy at some time. Consumption of ecstasy during the past years was at 46.2%, and during the past month at 21.6%. Of the participants who had used ecstasy in the past year, 18% used it once, 53% used it a couple of times a year, and 19% took it once a month. Nine percent used ecstasy a few times a month, 1.1% once a week and 0.3% several times a week. Daily or near-daily use of ecstasy did not occur (Monshouwer et al., 2016).

In addition to ecstasy, several other substances are used. About 33% of the respondents from the Large-Scale Nightlife Survey 2016 indicated they had used amphetamine at least once. Use of amphetamine in the past year was at 25% and current use (past month) at about 12%. Of the NPS, 4-FA was most popular. Ever-use of 4-FA was at 29%, past-year use at 24.5% and current use at about 10%.

Small country, Big Player 185 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Table 12.2 Lifetime (ever use), past year (recent) and past month (current) use of drugs by partygoers (N: 4,905) Substance Ever-use Last-year use Past-month use Cannabis 75.5 52.8 32.1 Ecstasy 55.1 46.2 21.6 Laughing gas 53.5 37.3 10.6 Amphetamine 33.4 25.1 12.2 Cocaine 32.5 24.5 12.4 4-fluoramphetamine 29.2 24.5 9.9 (4-FA/4-FMP) Magic truffles 20.8 10.3 1.7 Ketamine 17.3 12.3 5.3 Ritalin 16.8 9.0 4.1 GHB/GBL2 13.8 7.5 3.0 2-CB1 14.8 9.5 2.7 Psilocybin mushroom1 9.7 2.1 0.4 LSD1 5.6 3.0 0.7 Benzo-Fury (6-APB)1 3.2 2.0 0.5 Methoxetamine (MXE)1 2.2 1.4 0.3 Mephedrone1 2.1 1.0 0.2 Methylone1 1.5 0.9 0.2 Spice1 1.4 0.7 0.2 4-MEC1 0.7 0.4 0.2 Other drugs1 4.8 3.2 1.7 1 N: 4,703 (202 participants did not complete this part of the questionnaire). 2 The majority of the GHB/GBL users chiefly use GHB. Source: The Large-Scale Nightlife Survey 2016 (Monshouwer et al., 2016).

Other studies, such as the Amsterdam Antenna study confirm the picture that it is normal for partygoers to use drugs. Ecstasy is also in Amsterdam by far the most favourite illegal drug for partygoers. (Nabben et al., 2017). According to the Amsterdam researchers, ecstasy remains pre-eminently the substance used during festivals in Amsterdam nightlife. The nightlife survey conducted by the Municipal Health Service GGD Haaglanden provides insight into the use of drugs in The Hague (Van Dijk & Reinerie, 2015). In this survey, the ever-use of ecstasy was at 48%, and the past-month use at 16% (males 20%, females 12%). The average age at which ecstasy was first used was 19 years.

Small country, Big Player 186 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Effects on the health of partygoers The Large-Scale Nightlife Survey provides a picture of the effects of drugs on the health of partygoers, of whom 59% reported to have experienced a blackout (loss of memory) following the use of alcohol and/or drugs. Twelve percent said they had passed out at some point, mainly due to alcohol (84%). Respondents reported fairly often that they used GHB (16%) and/or laughing gas (11%) on the night they passed out. Anxiety and panic attacks were relatively frequent: they occurred in 20% of the partygoers in the survey during the past year. Ecstasy is the most frequently used drug on such nights (47%).

In most cases, partygoers that ended up in the emergency department of a hospital had only used alcohol (49%) or only one drug (35%), often GHB (13%). When partygoers visit the first-aid station at an event, ecstasy (48%) and 4-FA (14%) are by far the most widely used drugs that night. Fewer than half of the respondents failed to attend school or work (46%) due to use of alcohol and/or drugs during the past year, or failed to function properly there due to a hangover (52%). In most cases, it remained limited to once or twice, in 3% to 5% it occurred more often.

The use of drugs, including ecstasy, was recently associated with ‘hallucino- gen persisting perception disorder’: even long after the drug is no longer taken. Seeing floaters (floating particles) was reported most frequently by the respondents (this is based on self-reporting, not on clinical assessment); 69% of the respondents mentioned it. Also reported: seeing flashes of light (27%) and afterimages4 (23%). Visual snow (dots in the field of vision) happens to 17% of the respondents, as does seeing geometrical shapes. Halos (a circle of light around an object or a person) are reported by 15% of the respondents.

Seventeen percent of the partygoers is sometimes bothered by returning visual disturbances. Only 1% indicate that they are seriously or less seriously hampered by visual disturbances in daily life.

Developments in the use of psychostimulants There are indications that the use of ecstasy has increased over the past few years. Use has been strongly connected with the dance scene from the very beginning. Among partygoers in the Netherlands, dance has evolved from an underground style into a mainstream style. The lifestyle monitor of the Trimbos institute, Statistics Netherlands and the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM) shows a clear increase in experimenting with and using typical recreational drugs such as cocaine,

4 The person continues to see the same image after the head has been moved in another direction.

Small country, Big Player 187 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

amphetamine and ecstasy. In 1997, 2.3% of the adult population had used ecstasy at least once, whereas the percentage was about 7.6% in 2016, see Table 12.3. Researchers of the Trimbos institute perceive a normalization of the use of recreational drugs (Goossens & Van Hasselt, 2015) and it is expected that due to this normalization the use of recreational drugs will grow in the future.

Table 12.3 Percentage of ever-use among adult Dutch (18 years and older) of ecstasy, cocaine and amphetamine in the years 1997 and 2016 Ever-use among 18 years and older 1997 2016 Ecstasy 2.3 7.6 Cocaine 2.6 4.9 Amphetamine 2.2 4.4 Source: National Drug Monitor: Annual report 2017 (Van Laar et al., 2017).

Use in an international perspective Although the use of traditional drugs such as opiates is low in the Netherlands compared to that in other countries, this certainly does not apply to MDMA and amphetamine consumption, which is higher in the Netherlands than in the other European countries (EMCDDA, 2017). Figure 12.3 shows the past- year use of MDMA by young adults (15–34 years) in Europe and Figure 12.4 the past-year use of amphetamine by young adults. The Netherlands clearly stands out in respect of both substances. The use of NPS also seems to be relatively frequent in the Netherlands. Comparatively much 4-fluoramphetamine is used, but the use of, for instance, synthetic cannabinoids is very low.

Figure 12.3 Past-year MDMA use by young adults (15-34 years) in Europe, in 2016 (The Netherlands: 7.4 percent)

MDMA Past year prevalence among young adults(15-34) 7.4

NL IE CZ BG UK FI EE FR HU NODK HR DE ES SK AT LT SE IT PL BE LV SI GR CY PT RO TR LU MT

Source: Country Drug Report, EMCDDA 2017.

Small country, Big Player 188 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Figure 12.4 Past-year amphetamine use by young adults (15-34 years) in Europe, in 2016 (The Netherlands: 3.6 percent)

Amphetamines Past year prevalence among young adults(15-34) 3.6

NL EE FI HR DE BG CZ DK HU SE ES AT SK SI FR LV UK IE BE LT NO PL IT CY RO TR GR LU MT PT

Source: Country Drug Report, EMCDDA 2017.

Table 12.4 NPS use in various countries Country Year Age (Year) Ever-year Past-year (%) use (%) Australia 2016 18 and older Synthetic cannabinoids 2.9 0.3 18 and older NPS 1.1 0.3 Finland 2014 15-34 Synthetic cathinones 0.8 0.1 France 2014 18-34 Synthetic cannabinoids 4.0 - Latvia 2015 15-34 Synthetic cannabinoids 5.4 1.5 Netherlands 2016 15-64 NPS: 4-FA, mefedron, - 1.4 15-34 synthetische - 3.5 cannabinoïden, methoxetamine and/or 6-APB 15-34 Synthetic cannabinoids - 0.1 Slovakia 2015 15-34 Synthetic cannabinoids 0.8 0.4 United Kingdom 2015 16-59 NPS 2.9 0.9 Source: National Drug Monitor: Annual report 2017 (Van Laar et al., 2017).

12.5 Acute incidents with psychostimulants

Since 2009, the Trimbos institute has been using the Drugs Incidents Monitor (MDI) to record data about the nature and extent of acute drug-related

Small country, Big Player 189 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

health incidents. This concerns patients who are treated at hospitals’ emergency departments, by ambulance personnel, by police surgeons or by first-aid stations at large events. The information is supplemented by data from the Dutch Injury Surveillance System (LIS) of VeiligheidNL (data from 14 emergency stations of hospitals throughout the Netherlands). Although the monitor does not give a complete picture of the number of drug incidents in the Neth- erlands, it provides a good indication of which drugs cause problems (Wijers et al., 2017). On the basis of the data from the MDI, trends in relation to drug incidents can be made clear.

In the period 2009-2016, a total of 33,072 drug incidents were reported: 28,421 to the MDI and 4,651 to the LIS. The largest part was connected with ecstasy (28%), cannabis (19%), GHB (15%) or a combination of substances (20%).

Figure 12.5 Percentages of drug-related incidents in the period 2009-2016

15% 20% 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 19% 3% 1% 6%

28%

GHB base coke ketamine

cannabis heroin other substances

amphetamine mushrooms combination

ecstasy 4-FA

cocaine LSD

Source: Drug Incidents Monitor Trimbos institute (consulted in November 2017).

Small country, Big Player 190 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Incidents with ecstasy Incidents with ecstasy are reported most often to the MDI. In the period 2009-2016 ecstasy was reported 7,964 times as the only drug used, see Table 12.5. Furthermore, there was combined use of ecstasy and another drug in 2,756 incidents in this period. A total of 10,720 incidents in which ecstasy was involved were recorded by the MDI in the period 2009-2016. The majority (about 85%) of the ecstasy incidents came from first-aid stations at large-scale events.

Table 12.5 Incidents with ecstasy as the only drug (N: 7,964) recorded by the Drug Incidents Monitor (MDI) and the Dutch Injury Surveillance System (LIS), 2009-2016 Ambulances emergency- emergency- Police First MDI-hospitals LIS-hospitals surgeons aid Number of incidents 382 321 359 145 6.757 (% of the total within (5) (7) (8) (7) (51) the service) Male (%) 63 69 64 89 59 Age: < 25 year (%) 56 61 61 52 66 Degree of intoxication Light (%) 23 29 - 52 78 Moderate (%) 53 46 - 41 19 Serious (%) 24 25 - 6 3 Source: National Drug Monitor: Annual report 2017 (Van Laar et al., 2017).

Incidents with amphetamine and NPS A relatively small part of the acute incidents is linked with amphetamine. In the period 2009-2016 there were 752 incidents with amphetamine, see Table 12.6. Of the new psychoactive substances, 4-fluoramphetamine (4-FA) was the substance that was used most and about which most incidents were recorded. In the period 2009-2016, 439 incidents were recorded with 4-FA as the only drug, and 333 in combination with another substance, see Table 12.7. At first-aid stations, the proportion of incidents with 4-FA increased substantially in the period described. Whereas in 2009 there were hardly any reports about 4-FA related incidents, in 2012 the proportion was 2.2% and in 2016 it had even risen to 15.3% of all incidents reported by the first-aid stations.

Small country, Big Player 191 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

Table 12.6 Incidents with amphetamine as the only drug recorded by the Drug Incidents Monitor (MDI) and the Dutch Injury Surveillance System (LIS), 2009-2016 Ambulances emergency- emergency- Police First MDI-hospitals LIS-hospitals surgeons aid Number of incidents 161 105 135 97 274 (% of the total within (2) (3) (3) (5) (3) the service) Male (%) 74 74 76 87 67 Age: < 25 year (%) 37 39 41 21 71 Degree of intoxication Light (%) 28 40 - 49 85 Moderate (%) 56 39 - 39 13 Serious (%) 15 21 - 12 2 Source: National Drug Monitor: Annual report 2017 (Van Laar et al., 2017).

Table 12.7 Incidents with 4-fluoramphetamine recorded by the Drug Incidents Monitor (MDI) and the Dutch Injury Surveillance System (LIS), 2009-2016 Incidents at First-aid stations of 4-FA as only drug 4-FA in combination large-scale events with other drugs Number of incidents 439 333 Male (%) 47% 65% Age: < 25 year (%) 79% 81% Degree of intoxication Light (%) 85% 63% Moderate (%) 13% 30% Serious (%) 2% 8% Source: National Drug Monitor: Annual report 2017 (Van Laar et al., 2017).

Deaths caused by psychostimulants With some frequency, deaths are reported that involve psychostimulants. Their precise number is unknown and the reported cases probably represent an underestimate. According to the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), in at least eight deaths in 2015, MDMA was found in the blood; in 2015 this was the case with five persons who died. In the period 2006-2015, the NFI identified MDMA as the primary cause of death (whether or not in combination with other substances) in a total of 47 cases.

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(Vreeker et al., 2017). In the statistics of causes of death published by Statistics Netherlands, the number of registrations in which psychostimulants (ecstasy, amphetamine and other psychostimulants) supposedly played a role doubled from 14 in 2015 to 28 in 2016. It is not known whether these increased numbers represent a real increase or changes in registration methods.

Increase of serious ecstasy incidents The MDI researchers (Wijers et al., 2017) have observed a striking increase in the seriousness of ecstasy intoxications at First-aid stations over the past few years. The proportion of moderate and serious intoxications rose from 7% in 2009 to 28% in 2014. Since then, the proportion remained high at 28% in 2015 and 26% in 2016. The patients with a serious ecstasy intoxication, compared to patients with a light intoxication, are more often male, tourist, used more ecstasy, and had also more often used alcohol or other drugs (Wijers et al., 2016). In patients with a serious ecstasy intoxication, often a range of symptoms was observed: problems with the blood circulation (heart rate too high or too low, high blood pressure, cardiac arrhythmia), overheating (hyperthermia), reduced levels of consciousness (from slight loss of consciousness to deep coma), psychiatric symptoms (anxiety, panic, psychosis, hallucinations and excitation), neurological disorders (such as epileptic seizures), hyponatremia, blood sugar content too high (hyperglycaemia) or not enough oxygen in the blood (reduced oxygen saturation).

12.6 Conclusion

Producers and the market are continuously innovating. Every day, new substances, which are not yet subject to the Opium Act, appear on the market, and part of the drugs trade has shifted to the Internet. Through the Drugs Information and Monitoring System (DIMS), the Trimbos institute keeps monitoring the developments in order to issue a warning, if necessary, as soon as extra dangerous substances appear on the market. However, monitoring the drugs market is – and will remain – harm reduction, it is chiefly intended to limit the most serious damage caused by the use of drugs. If we really want to discourage the availability of, demand for and supply of psychostimulants, more is needed. Developing a policy of discouragement that tackles the availability of and the demand for drugs, forms a new challenge for prevention. But we must not lose sight of the achievements of our current policy of tolerance and should not start criminalizing users. The strong elements of the Dutch drugs policy, such as decriminalisation, respect for users’ human rights, cooperation with users and embeddedness in a care structure must be included as prominent features. At the same time, we must face the fact that

Small country, Big Player 193 Ecstasy and other psychostimulants: effects, risks and use

individual users are also responsible for collective problems caused by the use of drugs. To find a new modus vivendi here will be a task in the years to come.

Information about drugs and developments on the drugs market can be found at www.drugsinfo.nl and www.trimbos.nl (www.trimbos.nl/themas/monitoring-markten-incidenten-drugs/monitoring-drugsmarkt-in-nederland-dims).

Small country, Big Player Concluding observations: a painful balance 13

Introduction The following questions have been at the centre of our activities:

1. What is a plausible and credible estimate of the minimum scope of the world of production of and trade in synthetic drugs in the Netherlands, in terms of both persons involved and financial turnover? 2. Description and analysis of the operational functioning of the system: who does what, what raw materials are needed, where do they come from, how are the relationships among the criminals, and what developments have taken place? Also: what is the international dimension of the system? 3. What do we know about the effectiveness of the way the phenomenon is tackled? What seems to work, and what doesn’t?

The question why the Netherlands has played such a prominent role in the production of synthetic drugs since the 1980s gradually began to gain in importance.

In the concluding observations, we answer these four questions. The recommendations following from these answers are shown with light blue shading.

13.1 The scope

Turnover It is a known fact that the Netherlands has played a leading part in the global world of drugs since the 1980s. Dutch criminals play an important role in the production of amphetamine (together with criminals from a few other countries, in particular Poland), and are Europe’s largest manufacturers of ecstasy. The Netherlands is probably also the largest manufacturer in the world, but ‘hard’ global data are lacking. The undisputed top quality of their ecstasy makes the Dutch criminals the ‘world champions of ecstasy production’, so to speak. But what is the exact scope of the Dutch synthetic drugs production, in 2017?

It turned out to be difficult to obtain accurate statistics. Since the days of the Synthetic Drugs Unit (1997-2004) the attention paid to proper data gathering has dwindled more and more. This is a source of irritation for the investigating officers involved. Eventually, we ourselves gathered data from the absolute

Small country, Big Player 195 Concluding observations: a painful balance

source, i.e. forms detailing all relevant substances seized in 2017. On the basis of a few assumptions – in particular 20% as the percentage of substances seized and 80% as the percentage of substances exported, as well as a calculation of the probable street prices at home and abroad – we were able to arrive at an estimate of the minimum production (more than 600 million grammes of cut amphetamine and almost a billion ecstasy pills) and of the financial turnover, on a global scale in terms of street prices. For amphetamine this amounts to at least € 9.6 billion and for ecstasy to at least € 9.3 billion. In view of our methods and the assumptions used, the € 18.9 billion is most probably a minimum amount. In reality, the amount is probably much higher, the more so because we have included neither the income of production abroad (Poland, Belgium) under Dutch direction in the calculation nor the NPS.

€ 18,9 billion is a large amount. It can be regarded as a contribution of the Dutch world of synthetic drugs to the illicit world economy. Ultimately, traders in all parts of the world make money out of it. It is the middlemen and the street dealers who probably pocket the largest proportion of this money. The turnover of the Dutch manufacturers and traders is smaller and probably amounts to at least € 3 to 5 billion. In wholesale terms, i.e. immediately after the production in laboratories, it amounts to 890 million euros. The costs of manufacturing synthetic drugs amount to about 280 million euros.

A few figures for the sake of comparison. According to Europol, the total turnover of drugs in Europe amounted to € 24 billion in Europe in 2016. The worldwide turnover of synthetic drugs manufactured in the Netherlands alone comes close to this amount. Another comparison: the added value of the Port of Rotterdam to the Dutch economy amounted to approximately € 23 billion in 2017, according to the port’s annual report. So the minimum contribution of the Dutch synthetic drugs world, in this case to the world’s shadow economy, approaches this amount.

Getting the financial figures in order is not merely important because it provides facts, but also for tactical reasons. Without statistics about the scope of synthetic drugs crime, arguments for reinforcement of investigation will be taken less seriously. This is not wise, but it is the reality. Therefore, better and more reliable information must be gathered, targeted at drugs and damage, not as part of a Research and Documentation Centre monitor or a National Threat Assessment. Statistics Netherlands estimates the value of the illegal Dutch drugs economy (synthetic or otherwise) far too low.1

1 For 2001, the value of the domestic sales of ecstasy and of exported ecstasy was estimated at € 360 million. See: www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2004/39/de illegale economie in Nederland. In 2015 the proceeds of ‘production of, trade in and sales of ecstasy’ was estimated at € 160

Small country, Big Player 196 Concluding observations: a painful balance

Reliable information requires substantial deployment of personnel. Setting up a Drugs Expertise Centre within the Dutch Police is highly recommended. A National Rapporteur on Drugs, to be appointed by the Lower House – whether or not linked to the chairmanship of the Strategic Consultations on Under- mining – may play an organizing and stimulating role.

Another dimension is of interest here. Although we now have insight into the minimum volume of the financial turnover in the synthetic drugs world, there is only a limited picture of where all this money goes. What happens to all this money? The general assumption is that one third goes to consumer spending, one third is invested (also abroad) and that one third is criminal hand money, necessary to keep the criminal business running. But how this broad division works in actual practice is still very unclear. Little is known about it.

This is also connected with the limited insight into the distribution flows in respect of synthetic drugs. Yes, there is some knowledge about the pre-production phase: which substances are needed, where do they come from, how do they enter the Netherlands, how and where does manufacturing take place, and what are the related costs and prices (wholesale)? There are also a few things that we do know about the finished product, where it is sold, and what the street price is. The ‘wholesale’ prices and ultimate street revenue that we have been able to calculate here can – given the assumptions – be considered relatively firm.

But we do not know a great deal about the phase between ‘lab exit’ and ‘street’, and this is exactly the phase in which the largest part of the money circulates: about 75% to 85%. Who are doing this? Who are earning most of the money? Who are the ‘coordinating criminals’? How is the relationship between people in the Netherlands and people abroad? How many links are there exactly between ‘lab exit’ and ‘street’? We are groping in the dark, whereas this area is very interesting for financial investigations. Enhancing the availability of information on this point is urgently required.

The criminals Criminals from the provinces of Limburg and Brabant succeeded in obtaining a dominant position in synthetic drugs production in the 1980s and 1990s. Historical factors undoubtedly played a role. Traditionally, criminal elements in these provinces were adept at criminal activities such as smuggling,

million; see https://nos.nl/artikel/2233362-hoe-schat-je-de-waarde- van-illegale-economie. html. Incidentally, as a consequence of new assumptions, Statistic Netherlands recently increased the estimate for cannabis by € 2.3 billion (CBS, 2018); it seems advisable to apply such an update to synthetic drugs as well.

Small country, Big Player 197 Concluding observations: a painful balance

facilitated by the nearby border and the population’s often sympathetic attitude. Many citizens did not like the authorities very much and not a few got a piece of the pie of criminal revenues. Other factors played a equally important part. Brabant and Limburg criminals built up effective partnerships with Amsterdam and international criminals. Apparently, they were interesting partners for them, and were more or less accepted on an equal footing. They had much to offer, i.e. good products and reliable delivery. They managed to gather the chemical knowledge required for this in their own way. More- over, they had little to fear from the investigating authorities. Initially, the police were fragmented into the National Police and small municipal forces. After this, the police, which had been merged into regional police forces, was in crisis, especially following the IRT affair, and investigation of organized crime had low priority for public administration and police. Regionally, the emphasis was laid on area-based policing and public order. At the level of the 43 police districts and 167 basic teams, little changed in this respect when the new Dutch National Police was formed (Van der Torre & Van Valkenhoef, 2017).

The top layer of the Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals achieved an ‘apparently untouchable status’. They form the traditional top 35 of synthetic drugs criminals, who have been committing international drug crimes on a large scale for years, while they – like the persons in their immediate environment – often come off unscathed. However understandable and justified the wish may be to conduct criminal investigations into the traditional top criminals, it is striking how our interviews show the many threats that the native Dutch criminals are exposed to, including criminal competition, quite apart from the efforts made by the police and the judicial authorities:

– According to criminal respondents and professionals who take the time to let all their experiences sink in properly, the number of top criminals has grown considerably. A well-informed criminal estimates that there are some 400 organizing criminals in Limburg and North Brabant, of whom about 100 can be considered to belong to the hard core of ‘coordinating criminals’. On his crime scale ranging from 1 to 10, they score ‘8.5’ or ‘9’. They invest, outsource assignments and connect the global demand to the Dutch supply. A number of them belong to new groups, in particular Turks and Moroccans.

– During a large criminal investigation (Explorer, aimed at a criminal meeting place, the Party King) professionals became aware that they failed to recognize hundreds of visitors, and that seemingly small players achieved a major turnover, for instance as criminal specialists, such as organizers of drugs export.

Small country, Big Player 198 Concluding observations: a painful balance

– The increase and ethnic diversification in the top layer is connected with changes in the production of synthetic drugs. Since about 2011 it has become easier to manufacture amphetamine and ecstasy or semi-finished products with which to make these, due to the emergence of the preprecursors. With APAAN, APAA or BMK glycidate it is fairly easy to produce a precursor (BMK), and with PMK glycidate it is not difficult either to make PMK (precursor for ecstasy). It has also become easier to make ecstasy pills, for instance due to the availability of better hardware. As a consequence, quite a few newcomers enter the market, leading to lower prices and lower profits. This is inconvenient for the better organized top criminals.

– The simplification of the production process encouraged new Turkish and Moroccan criminals and motorcycle gangs to start producing synthetic drugs. The turning point occurred in about 2011 with APAAN, according to our respondents. These new criminals see how easy it is to make BMK with it – after doing some pioneering in labs – and enter the business.

– The dark web is an increasingly important place for purchasing chemicals, hardware and finished products and for the sale of finished products. The traditional top x is not involved in such internet sales, in so far as we know. They still consider it something for highly educated upstarts, who want to make “a quick buck”. This does not alter the fact that the importance of internet trade is growing fast. According to a Rand report from 2016, the Dutch share in the worldwide online earnings from synthetic drugs amounted to about 23% at that time (Rand, 2016); this percentage reflects only the sale of finished products.

– The world of synthetic drugs production is also in full swing and innovative in other respects. For instance, the investigative services are aware of a new Chinese export product that will possibly render the traditional laboratories redundant for obtaining ecstasy. If there are Chinese who dare to produce it and export it abroad, the Netherlands will become less logical and less necessary, and even superfluous as an intermediary stage

From the point of view of the (central) police it is perfectly understandable that they draw up a list that is partly intended as a target list for investigation. Admittedly, it requires a considerable effort to investigate the notorious criminals properly, i.e. with special investigative means, with sound financial investigations and in cooperation with foreign investigative services. A top 35 can help to start up such investigations. However, it fails to provide sufficient insight into the top of synthetic drugs criminals who are active in the Neth- erlands today. This is why it is necessary to look farther than this top 35; the world of synthetic drugs has become larger and more complex.

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The users Since the emergence of the dance culture in the Netherlands in the late 1980s, there has been a clear increase in the use of psychostimulants, in particular ecstasy. The ravers saw ecstasy, amphetamine and new psychoactive substances (NPS) as means to enhance their nightlife experience and to give them energy to continue partying endlessly. That is why these substances have become inextricably linked with the dance scene, electronic dance music and a hedonistic lifestyle. As the dance scene has developed into a mainstream style of music, large groups of partygoers have got into contact with psychostimulants. Researchers observe a normalization of drug use among partygoers. For many of them it has become normal to use drugs, ‘a pill is simply part of it’. Although this normalization applies to many Western countries, the Neth- erlands stands out negatively in respect of the use of psychostimulants. This is possibly the case because the dance culture has developed more strongly in the Netherlands than in other European countries. Dance itself has even become an important export product.

Simultaneous with the increase in drugs use and the normalization of it, there has been an increase in the quantity of MDMA in an ecstasy pill. Ecstasy pills are stronger and purer than ever before. A possible connection between the increase in dosage and the growing number of serious ecstasy incidents cannot be excluded.

Producers and the market are innovating continuously. Every day, new substances, which are not yet subject to the Opium Act, appear on the market, and part of the drugs trade has shifted to the Internet. However, monitoring the drugs market is – and will remain – harm reduction, it is chiefly intended to limit the most serious damage caused by the use of drugs. If we really want to discourage the availability of, demand for, and supply of psychostimulants, more is needed, according to the Trimbos-institute experts in Chapter 12 of this report. Developing a policy of discouragement that tackles the availability of and the demand for drugs, forms a new challenge for prevention. But we must not lose sight of the achievements of our current policy of tolerance, according to these Trimbos experts. At the same time, we must face the fact that individual users are also responsible for collective problems caused by drugs use. To find a new modus vivendi here, will be a task in the years to come.

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13.2 The system

System change The emergence of preprecursors was, more than was realized for a long time, a kind of game changer. Insiders in the investigative services speak of a synthetic drugs world that has become far more complex with the arrival of the preprecursors: a many-headed serpent was created inadvertently. Dozens of preprecursors have become available now, instead of just PMK and BMK. This means that the scarcity of precursors has all but disappeared. Whereas in the past it was sufficient to look for oily substances, now also powdery substances must be looked for. This has created new problems for the Customs Service. Chinese intermediary organizations have disappeared, as Dutch criminals can now order non-banned substances straight from China. The quantity of drugs waste has grown strongly due to the fact that the use of preprecursors has added an extra step to the production process (the ‘conversion step’), which produces a lot of waste. Moreover, a part of the traditional ‘pill sellers’ has got more involved in the world of cocaine within the context of ‘spreading risks’. Turkish, Moroccan and Polish criminals, as well as motorcycle gangs, have discovered the world of pills or stepped up their efforts in this field.

The production method has changed. At the top, production has become specialized and professionalized, including an increase in scale. At the same time, the production of synthetic drugs has come within reach of more people. The capital that is required to enter the market has become less. The elimination of Chinese middlemen and the emergence of the Internet have facilitated access to preprecursors. There are clear indications that the number of synthetic drugs manufacturers has grown. Top criminals more often choose large-scale storage or production sites, and their organization and technology create the impression of thriving legal businesses. On the other hand, we observe more small-scale production, which has been partially moved to residential areas. Newcomers have appeared on the market: ‘kamikaze pilots’ according to a traditional criminal producer. The emergence of new producers puts the prices of ecstasy, amphetamine, and semi-finished products for their production under pressure. These developments have consequences for investigation and enforcement; thinking in terms of a barrier model must be supplemented with a ‘flows model’ (see below).

Interconnectedness The world of synthetic drugs has become intertwined with other drugs markets. It is not only about synthetic drugs, but about all kinds of drugs; criminal networks are very flexible.

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First and foremost, there is overlap and alternation between the production of amphetamine and ecstasy. Although specialization exists, synthetic drugs criminals can easily switch from producing MDMA to amphetamine. This ability to switch applies in particular to the top layer, i.e. the organizers or coordinating criminals. Specialization applies to some parts of the production process (importing raw materials, producing / doing laboratory work, international distribution). Connections with the trade in NPS are also possible.

There has always been a connection between the cannabis growing world and the synthetic drugs world. Cannabis growing was often used to gather the money required to scramble for a position in the synthetic drugs world. Can- nabis growing was for many a kind of entry level crime in which one could learn the trade and make contacts, before switching to the more complex and profitable synthetic drugs trade. During the PMK dip, some returned to the cannabis world.

Certainly during the temporary shortage of BMK and especially PMK, relationships developed between synthetic drugs producers and the international trade in cocaine, which in Europe, to a large extent, is taking place through the Netherlands and Belgium. For the synthetic drugs producers it was an attractive market to invest in at that time: it kept you busy and you earned money.

The interconnectedness of the worlds of drugs offers an interesting competitive edge to the Dutch drugs criminals. The international image and promise are: the Dutch can supply any type of drug, it does not matter which type or what quantity, for it will be successful. It is called poly drugs trade. The National Threat Assessment (NDB) uses the phrase ‘criminal versatility’ in this context (NDB, 2017, 298-299) and the Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) uses poly-criminality (2017, p. 15). Both concepts have a broader meaning, but also refer to combining various drugs activities.

This interconnectedness is important to be able to understand how serious the situation is. Probably, more people are involved than just a top X of native Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals and some traditional Turkish partners. Other networks too (Vietnamese, Moroccan and Polish) were already active in the criminal drugs world. Moroccans that had become big in hash, Turks in heroine and cocaine, Vietnamese in cannabis. They have the relevant social and physical infrastructure at their disposal, with synthetic drugs trade now coming within their field of activity, as it has become relatively easy to organize, and the profits are potentially large. It is about a large drugs conglomerate that does not just aim at synthetic drugs, but at drugs in general.

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The judicial authorities and the police trying to combat drugs crime, ought to focus on all kinds of drugs, as in the criminal world cannabis, synthetic drugs, cocaine and other drugs are closely connected to each other. Like Sia- mese twins. From the level of the basic teams to the national and international level, the police should consider this one domain or ‘portfolio’, i.e.: investigation into organized crime, with drugs as a top priority. So they should not only focus on synthetic drugs or any other kind of drug, or on undermining or investigation only.

13.3 The approach

History A few striking conclusions can be drawn from our short description of the history of the Dutch synthetic drugs world.

Firstly, it is interesting that the Netherlands, when it comes to banning drugs, is always lagging several years behind other countries. This applied to amphetamine in the seventies and to ecstasy in the eighties. This period of time created room for Dutch criminals to quickly turn the Netherlands into a source country for the production of these drugs. A working structure was built up legally, and subsequently continued in the criminal period. At present, this same pattern seems to apply to NPS.

Secondly, foreign pressure has often been necessary to step up the fight against synthetic drugs in the Netherlands. Not until Sweden (sixties/seventies), France (nineties) and the United States (early this century) insisted on it, behind the scenes, but sometimes openly – was the Dutch government prepared to take action.

After pressure from France in 1996, the Synthetic Drugs Unit (SDU) came very speedily off the ground. The police had insisted on it before. The SDU was an early example of integrated collaboration, without involvement from the local authorities, but with a strong operational orientation. Staff were all in one building, the lines were short and many things were possible, also financially. Returning to the SDU is undesirable, but much can be learnt from its working methods: flexible, operational, short lines, administrative and official backing, with a great deal of attention for access to information and analysis, scientific or otherwise. The SDU also had a strong international orientation, something which was related to the foreign criticism of the Netherlands, but also to the international organization of the synthetic drugs world. The SDU has undeniably contributed strongly to the enhanced access to information and the improvement of the public image of the Netherlands abroad.

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The efforts were stepped up a few years later under the influence of criticism from the United States. The memorandum Conspiring against ecstasy from 2002 resulted in reinforcement of the activities. In this period (2002-2006) a total of 250 staff within the police, Public Prosecution Service, FIOD and Customs Service were involved daily in the fight against ecstasy production. It resulted in an increase in investigative activities and a decrease in criticism from the US. To this extent, the activities were successful. Whether they resulted in a lasting decrease in the production of ecstasy in the Netherlands could not be ascertained at that time (see Neve at al., 2007).

It is striking that the Netherlands has often been more successful in synthetic drugs diplomacy than in combating synthetic drugs. Criticism from abroad, in particular from France or the United States, is invariably followed by a diplomatic offensive, by which an attempt is made to create more understanding abroad for the Dutch drugs policy. This often results relatively quickly in an improvement of the mutual relationships.

Between 2005 and 2010, there was initially considerable enthusiasm about the results, in particular due to the Netherlands’ improved international image. Synthetic drugs disappeared as a priority from the political agenda. The SDU had been incorporated into the Criminal Investigations Division, which was created in 2004, and the extra resources available were drying up. More or less out of necessity, an increased effort was made to implement the ‘source countries strategy’, which was chiefly aimed at reducing the flow of precursors from Russia and, even more so, from China. This strategy seemed quite successful, initially. Between 2007 and 2009, there was a serious dip in the production of ecstasy in particular. But appearances are deceptive. From about 2010 the production has grown to a level that is most probably higher than before the dip. Dutch synthetic drugs criminals have managed to keep their top position in the world ranking list.

This indicates that the criminal world is innovative and overcomes setbacks. It shows that a long-lasting effort on a broad front (not just police and judicial authorities, but also administrative and financial authorities, not just on a local and national scale, but also internationally) is necessary to make the results permanent.

Conflicting perspectives In this study, we were repeatedly confronted by disparate and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the issue of synthetic drugs.

Our respondents from the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), the police and the judicial authorities have an enforcement and investigation

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perspective. They see that criminals all over the world – with China as the main producer of raw materials and the Netherlands as the focal point of the synthetic drugs production – order, supply and produce raw materials. This involves speedy innovation and making use of the legal or non-registered status of certain raw materials or finished products. The settled criminal groups professionalize the logistic process and do not limit themselves to one type of drug. They earn money with various drugs, not just synthetic, but also with cocaine, heroine and cannabis. At the same time, it has become easier to enter the criminal synthetic drugs world. Raw materials and designer drugs can be ordered on the Internet. It has become very easy to use certain preprecursors to produce synthetic drugs or semi-finished products. Investigative officers regard synthetic drugs as a major global crime problem, with the Netherlands performing a pivotal role in their production. They think that it ought to be an absolute top priority in Dutch security policy.

On the other hand, there is the public health perspective. From this point of view, synthetic or designer drugs use have only limited harmful effects on the Dutch population; the harm reduction approach proves effective. The quality of the drugs consumed in the Netherlands is good and the consequences of their use remain limited, as far as we know now. Seen in this perspective, the synthetic drugs policy in the Netherlands is successful and this is why synthetic drugs form no issue for the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. If there are no problematic addicts or if no deaths occur, not much is wrong, is the reasoning. What needs to be prevented is the emergence of circles of illegal users that the authorities cannot control. In this public health world people think that investigative services claim that synthetic drugs are an enormous problem, but that police and the judicial authorities fail to provide statistics that underpin their claims.

From an economic perspective, it is important that legal business processes are not confronted with heavy bureaucratic burdens due to regulations and inspections concerning chemicals with legal applications. An attempt is made to strike a balance between, on the one hand, rules and restrictions that prevent that substances are used improperly by criminals, and on the other hand the economic interest of the legal trade in chemical substances. According to some parties involved, legislation lays a heavy burden on the shoulders of chemical companies. The tragedy is that it fails to work on both sides: the cor- porate sector becomes bureaucratic and it does not help fight crime.

Finally, there is also a diplomatic (or international) perspective. Sometimes, this concerns placating friendly nations that put pressure on the Netherlands to limit the export of drugs. In the past, this applied to Sweden, France and the United States, and especially undisguised threats of sanctions had an effect on

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the Dutch government. Many more countries put pressure on the Netherlands behind the scenes.

The existence of capital punishment has always played a role in the relationship with China. This impeded the exchange of criminal-law information. The Netherlands does not want to run the risk that Dutch information is used in China to condemn people to death, is the official position, although it seems that other countries find solutions for this: they share information on the condition that no death penalty will be imposed. The relationship of the Nether- lands with developing countries in Africa sometimes play a role as well, for instance in the international decision-making about ketamine. China wanted a ban because it had a serious domestic problem with ketamine addicts. The Netherlands opposed this rather emphatically, because ketamine is used as an anaesthetic in developing countries. As a consequence there was a deadlock in the Chinese-Dutch talks about synthetic drugs.

Of course, all these perspectives are legitimate. In any meaningful policy process, interests and perspectives must be balanced against each other, so also in the case of synthetic drugs. At the same time, one needs to realize that in this balancing, the interest of investigation is represented rather weakly. When push comes to shove, the other interests often carry more weight. This is certainly the case in the Netherlands, where public health interests dominate. The interests of investigation only carry more weight temporarily under strong international pressure. It is very important to examine this critically and to change it. It needs to be recognized that reinforcement of repressive measures against drugs criminals is important in view of the social harm they inflict.

Barrier model Our analysis points out limitations of barrier thinking, which has become the dominant model in the approach to synthetic drugs and other crime in the past 20 years. Barriers turned out to be an unintended stimulus for strategically positioned Dutch synthetic drugs criminals and for chemical companies, in particular in China, to professionalize their activities. They have managed to keep a good market position and have evaded all barriers. International consultations about substances to be banned require a great deal of energy and time. It seems an important discussion when you are in the midst of it, but if you consider the whole, it is less relevant. It has a tragic dimension. The chief success in this field was the influence exercised on Russian and Chinese authorities to reinforce the monitoring of the production and export of the precursors PMK and BMK. Viewed retrospectively, this provided the impetus for important innovations in the field of synthetic drugs production, and it has

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confronted the national and international authorities with new questions that thus far they have not been able to answer.

In the synthetic drugs world there are thousands of subjects involved in a jumble of relationships, with controlling Dutch coordinating criminals and high-tech parties in China. Creating barriers or raising thresholds has only resulted in temporary effects. A registration duty or ban on substances and the decision to conduct short-term criminal investigations were a welcome innovation in the days of the SDU, but have less impact on the criminal process now. The barrier model may still be useful for the authorities today (it divides the criminal production process into ‘manageable’ parts), but the criminals themselves know how to evade it where necessary.

These experiences teach us that the criminal process had better not be regarded as a straightforward barrier model, but as a complex and rather chaotic streams model; as a reality with permanent activities by suppliers and clients and with criminal entrepreneurs who manage to interlink criminal streams and for this purpose use a variety of legal companies, criminal specialists and criminal errand boys. This approach needs to be developed and examined for its operational consequences in the coming period. Not in order to scrap the barrier model, but to investigate what approaches there are that can permanently undermine the criminal world instead of stimulating it to innovate.

13.4 Conclusion: why the Netherlands?

It is a hard fact that there is very extensive and harmful synthetic drugs crime in the Netherlands. The Dutch synthetic drugs world owes its important global position on the synthetic drugs market to three interconnected circumstances: the good price-quality ratio of the Dutch synthetic drugs, the leaders’ small risk of being caught, and the relatively mild punishments in the Nether- lands compared to the draconic punishments in countries that are relevant in this context, such as Australia, China, Indonesia and the United States.

The leaders and their networks are capable of producing cheap synthetic drugs. They have many years’ experience, have access to a physical infrastructure and a network of hundreds of experienced laboratory technicians and pill makers. They also have a smaller network of innovators: chemists who know the latest production methods and persons who are experts at tableting. This combination is important as in this way the wishes of international clients in respect of the dosage and appearance of pills can be met. The result is that many national and international top criminals prefer to buy the synthetic drugs from Dutch

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criminals instead of producing them themselves. For foreign criminals, the production in their own country has obvious disadvantages such as the higher risk of being caught and the severity of the punishment, compared to placing a synthetic drugs order in the Netherlands.

The same applies to China. It is a country with many chemical businesses and much knowhow. It is a piece of cake for Chinese to produce ecstasy. Our respondents are convinced that Chinese criminals limit themselves to supplying raw materials and hardware because they risk the death penalty with ecstasy production. That is why they have been cooperating on a large scale with Dutch criminals in the raw materials trade for years.

The low risk of being caught and the mildness of punishment are connected with the general social climate in the Netherlands. When the interests of investigation, public health, economy and international relations are weighed against each other, the interest of investigation often gets the worst of the bar- gain, we observed. The emphasis on harm reduction in the public health policy in the Netherlands has resulted in a tolerant climate in respect of drugs use and drugs production. The economic features of the Netherlands – an open economy, favourable trading conditions, excellent infrastructure, free movement of goods and persons within the Schengen countries – have brought our country a great deal of prosperity and are important, but they also make our country attractive for drugs trade and production.

Another aspect of the permissive social climate is the relatively low priority given to the interest of investigation in the Netherlands. In 2018, it is striking how limited the consequences were that were attached to the work of the Par- liamentary committee of inquiry into Investigation Methods (Van Traa committee). At the time, two major problems were identified: the unlawfulness of the investigation and the extent of crime in combination with the insufficient clout wielded by investigative authorities (which thwarted each other). The first problem received a great deal of attention. The latter problem was not dealt with, partly because there was a lot of reluctance to use human intelligence (for instance, infiltration, persons making a voluntary disclosure, and star witnesses) in criminal investigations. Within the police, the regional police forces strongly emphasized area-based policing and public order. Even today, this is noticeable in the way the Netherlands Police is organized (Fijnaut, 2012; Van der Torre & Van Valkenhoef, 2017). It puts regional and central investigations departments at a disadvantage in the fight against drugs crime, the more so as regional criminal investigation units have their hands full with investigations into capital crimes, such as (drugs related) murders. This is ideal for drugs criminals. Even within the police, the investigation into drugs-related crime has not been given priority for years, although this seems to be changing in

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recent years. The emphasis on the ‘quick strike’ has reduced awareness of the necessity to tackle major international criminal partnerships in an international context.

We cannot avoid doing something about the penalties, which are relatively low for drug-related crimes in the Netherlands, as was shown by a study by the EMCDDA (2017). Long prison sentences do not work, is the official doctrine. But criminals think they do work. For instance, they were and are scared to death to be extradited to the United States. We do not wish to make a plea for American-style punishments, but we are proponents of a better balance in the Netherlands. A balance between creating opportunities in society and organizing a risk of getting caught and a severity of punishment that does justice to the social harm caused by organized drugs crime. What is essentially needed: understanding that tackling drugs criminals is key to maintaining the democratic rule of law and upholding a decent society. This requires major and long-lasting efforts, in a criminal-law sense, but also otherwise: fiscal and comprehensive, public and private, by the authorities and the citizens, repressive and social.

Organized drugs crime in the Netherlands, which belongs to the global top and leads to a great deal of violence and injustice in our country, ought to be an inconvenient reality and top priority for the Dutch government. This is by no means the case. The consequence is that mayors and dozens of professionals are forced to fight a rearguard action.

In the past few years, we have observed growing domestic pressure to push back, among other things, the production of synthetic drugs in the Neth- erlands. Mayors – initially chiefly from the southern Netherlands, put the problem on the agenda, showed the realities of undermining and developed strategies for pushing it back. The Regional Information and Expertise Cen- tres played a supportive role in various locations, and in the south the Bra- bant-Zeeland taskforce and the South Netherlands Enhancement Team were important energizers.

Results have definitely been achieved. Many municipalities have shed their naivety (‘these things do not happen in our town’) and have started to take measures to make their organizations more resilient. Businesses, civic organizations, and citizens are increasingly involved in the approach. A few major meeting locations where synthetic drugs activities had been discovered have been dismantled, such as the storage facility near Den Bommel and the criminal meeting place in Best (the Party King).

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Synthetic drugs criminals have been hindered by these activities, as is also confirmed by the criminals we interviewed. But the synthetic drugs system as such has not been affected by them. The flexibility and the innovative power of this system, its huge financial proceeds and its advantageous international competitiveness enable it time and again to innovate itself and to recover.

In addition to continuation and intensification of the local and regional approaches (aimed at all kinds of drugs), at any rate reinforcement is required of the criminal investigations at the national level, by means of, for instance, enhancement of the international cooperation – China – and reinforcement of the interests of investigation in the interdepartmental weighing up of interests. Furthermore, a strengthening of the judicial chain is required through reinforcement of the investigation, prosecution and hearing capacity of the police, Public Prosecution Service and courts, and increased severity of punishment for the organization of drugs production. Finally, the tolerant social attitude towards drugs and drugs use needs to be influenced, and the harm reduction approach in public health needs to be supplemented – quite in keeping with the continually stronger discouragement of smoking and drinking – by a stronger emphasis on use reduction, so that, for instance, drugs use at music festivals and in nightlife is no longer taken for granted.

Small country, Big Player The twelve most important findings

1. Synthetic drugs are not just a problem for the southern Netherlands, but a national problem with international consequences for the position and image of the Netherlands. It can only be combated with sufficient, persistent and dedicated staff capacity and a constant, broad international effort. This has been lacking over the past few years.

2. In 2017, criminals in the Netherlands produced at least 18.9 billion euros’ worth of ecstasy and amphetamine. This is an estimate based on fieldwork from the source. We have used conservative assumptions. The amount of € 18.9 billion concerns street prices, at home and abroad. It can be considered the absolute minimum. The actual turnover is most probably much higher.

3. The amount of € 18.9 billion can be regarded as the contribution by Dutch synthetic drugs criminals to the illicit world economy. A part of this global turnover flows straight into the pockets of Dutch synthetic drugs producers and traders. In wholesale terms, i.e. immediately after production in laboratories, it amounts to 610 million euros. We estimate the share of Dutch criminals in the subsequent phases of the sales at 3 to 5 billion euros, at the least. Relatively little information is available about the phase between ‘lab exit’ and ‘street sale’, which is crucial for criminals, as top criminals earn most in this phase.

4. The Netherlands’ access to information in regard of synthetic drugs is poor. Insufficient investment has been made in persons who can interpret international developments and trends, and insufficient analysis capacity is available. Sharing of information among public-sector and other organizations is a problem. This is distressing for a country that has such a dominant position in the global synthetic drugs world.

5. As regards the production of synthetic drugs, Dutch criminals belong to the world top. International criminals place tall drugs orders in the Netherlands. Dutch synthetic drugs have a good price-quality ratio. Drugs ordered in the Netherlands, are – by criminal standards – delivered reliably, all over the world. Processes of buying and selling through the Internet have quickly assumed a considerable volume.

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6. The Netherlands has an ideal business climate for criminals who are involved in synthetic drugs. Its geographical location and infrastructure have advantages for international entrepreneurs in legal and illicit lines of business. The Netherlands is a vulnerable country on this point, but has insufficiently realized this. There are far too few investigative officers who carry out criminal investigations into synthetic drugs criminals, as a result of which the risk of being caught is low, in particular for top criminals who keep a distance from the criminal handiwork. The relatively low severity of punishment in the Netherlands (both the sentence and the actual duration of the detention) makes it extra attractive to produce synthetic drugs in the Netherlands. Although a few remarkable investigative successes have been achieved over the past few years (such as the Explorer investigation), the general impression continues to be that investigative services are increasingly up against an insurmountable problem.

7. The interest of investigation often suffers defeat when it is weighed against interests of public health (limiting the harm caused by drugs: harm reduction), diplomacy (good relationships with foreign countries) and economy (protecting the chemical industry). Investigation chiefly got priority when friendly foreign heads of state (the US, France) raised the alarm about the Dutch drugs industry. When diplomatic rest returned, priority for the criminal investigation into synthetic drugs disappeared.

8. Due to the simplification of the production process, the world of synthetic drugs has developed two layers. On the one hand, there is an increase in scale and professionalization in large, ‘clean’ labs. On the other hand, production is extended to small laboratories of sole traders, even in residential areas.

9. Many raw materials and chemicals come from China, just as hardware for laboratories (such as production vessels with control options). The Chinese chemical industry has companies that, with their chemical and techno- logical knowledge, are huge facilitators of Dutch synthetic drugs crime. Slow international consultation and legislation circles are defeated by the expertise and flexibility of Chinese-Dutch coalitions.

10. The criminal process around synthetic drugs can be compared to a complex and rather chaotic river valley. There are thousands of subjects in a jumble of relationships. There are permanent flows of suppliers and buyers, while clever criminal entrepreneurs (coordinating criminals) manage to interconnect these flows. To this end, the make use of many legal businesses, criminal specialists and criminal errand boys. In order to understand and tackle this world, the barrier model needs to be supplemented by the flows model.

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11. Public violence committed by synthetic drugs criminals remained within bounds for a long time, the more so if one considers the billions earned. The traditional Brabant and Limburg synthetic drugs criminals worked with trusted persons, large profit margins and violence behind the scenes to keep their criminal world under control. However, the synthetic drugs world has changed; it has more uncertainties and competition between the criminals, and more violence.

12. Mayors, magistrates and police have come to realize that drugs-related crime has serious undermining consequences for society. At street level, this literally involves brute violence, the danger posed by illegal labs for residential areas, and environmental pollution caused by illegal waste dumping. At a deeper level, there is a truth that is even more worrying: for many the production of synthetic drugs is a fairly easy opportunity to acquire money, status and power. Organized crime has resulted in a lot of violence and unjust situations in our country. To fight it with a broad- based approach ought to be a top priority for the Dutch government. This is insufficiently the case, which is an inconvenient truth.

Small country, Big Player Appendix 1 Notes on the search for the unprecedented scope of the world of synthetic drugs

This appendix consists of a number of ‘notes’ that elaborate on parts of Chapter 3. These are necessary, but detailed and sometimes technical frag- ments, which might have made it difficult to focus on the central topic of this chapter. This is why they are discussed separately. Chapter 3 mentions the part a specific note refers to.

Note 1: Early-stage seizures (before and during production), incomplete information Officers of the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), the Customs Service, and the Netherlands Police were very helpful by providing information about early-stage seizures. They too are frustrated about the fragmentation of the relevant information and the deficient information position regarding the seized chemicals and synthetic drugs. ‘How can it be that we are the world’s leading production country and can’t even keep track of the seizures? I feel deeply ashamed.’ A number of issues complicate calculation of the scope of early-stage synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands:

– The Customs Service depends on enforcement agencies abroad for information about seizures of precursors and preprecursors. The information exchange between the international investigation services is not very effective, as a result of which the Customs Service is not always aware of precursors and pre-precursors intended for Dutch production seized abroad.

– The FIOD is the authority responsible in the field of precursors and has a comprehensive overview of the seizures of drug-related chemicals in the Netherlands, with the obligation to report this to national and international bodies.1 The FIOD’s comprehensive overview is based on sources from various investigative agencies: seizures after Customs checks of sea and air freight, and parcel post at the Dutch external borders, seizures by the FIOD, and seizures by the Netherlands Police’s Central Dismantling Facility. Unfortunately we cannot use the FIOD’s comprehensive overview

1 INCB, EU, EMCDDA, NDM and Trimbos Institute.

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to calculate the production of synthetic drugs in 2017, for the following reasons: • The FIOD’s overview indicates for each drug-related chemical how much of it was seized in 2017. But we cannot calculate the production capacity for each chemical and simply add up these figures, as the chemicals included in this list may be intended for the same final product. For instance: a combination of apaa and formamide is used to produce amphetamine. If we simply add up the quantities of the raw materials, overlap is unavoidable. • For its overview, the FIOD depends on the information provided by the investigative partners. And as this information provision is deficient, the overview is incomplete. • The FIOD, like the Customs Service and the Netherlands Police, is short staffed. Only a single FIOD officer is charged with recording seizures of drug-related chemicals in the Netherlands for the benefit of the comprehensive overview. And this is just one of the tasks assigned to the person in question, which is why structural and high-quality recording of quantities suffers.1

– The Police’s Central Dismantling Facility (LFO) records the quantities of chemicals found at each storage location or drugs lab. They take samples of part of the drug-related chemicals to find out whether the location is a synthetic drugs lab. This information can be used as evidence in criminal trials. So inventory of storage or production locations by the LFO does not primarily serve to determine the total quantities of drugs, chemicals or drug-related waste found; identification of the location as a synthetic drugs lab suffices. This hampers calculation of the total quantity: • Structural recording of the total quantity of the chemicals is lacking. Only in very few cases has the production capacity been calculated. • The quantities of the chemicals are not always meticulously recorded. For instance: recording the discovery of five bags of apaa, without indicating the exact quantity of apaa (number of kilos) in each bag. • Police units can only submit a limited number of samples to the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) during a certain period. As a result, a substantial part of the chemicals found at storage locations and labs is not officially identified.2

1 The Netherlands Police have the same problem regarding ‘later-stage’ seizures: lack of staff and deficient information provision and position lead to very limited awareness of seizures of Dutch-produced synthetic drugs seized in the Netherlands and abroad. 2 Almost without exception, identification by LFO experts matches the results presented by the NFI. This is why testing by LFO experts provides a good indication of the substances for which no sample could be submitted.

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Note 2: ‘Later-stage’ calculation of production is impossible It is impossible to calculate the production of synthetic drugs based on ‘later- stage’ seizures. Figures regarding the seizures are incomplete and unreliable. Below a description of the deficiencies regarding drugs waste and synthetic drugs seizures in the Netherlands and abroad:

– Drugs waste: drugs criminals have various options to get rid of their waste. They can burn, discharge or dump it. Knowledge of how often these methods are used is limited. Solely dumping, i.e. ‘the blue drums in the ditches’, can be spotted by citizens and investigative and other agencies. In addition, the recorded data about dumping is unreliable; not all dump sites are reported to the police, and usually no samples are taken at drugs waste dump sites.3 This means it is not certain whether the waste is indeed synthetic drugs waste. Neither is the quantity of the drugs waste found established.

– Synthetic drugs seized in the Netherlands: the police frequently seize synthetic drugs. These seizures are not systematically recorded, however. For their overview of seized synthetic drugs, information gatherers depend on the provision of information by police units. A respondent described the situation as follows:

‘We have two people in Zoetermeer who are charged with recording drugs seizures in the Netherlands. They send emails to the units saying: it is the first of November and we would like to receive an overview of the drugs you have seized by the first of January, and then they receive responses from three units, and nothing from the other units. This then constitutes the final figure for the Netherlands.’

Another respondent:

‘The Customs Service finds synthetic drugs in outgoing shipments, in other words in air and sea freight, parcel post, and courier shipments, and on air passengers. Registration of these finds is incomplete and inaccurate.’

– Synthetic drugs seized abroad: the Netherlands is a production country, where the greater part of the drugs is produced for export. This is why international investigation services from various countries regularly seize drugs produced in the Netherlands. The police has little information about international seizures, and do not have sufficient staff to actively pursue

3 The reason for this is that usually there is no investigative indication.

Small country, Big Player 216 Appendix 1

the figures of synthetic drugs seizures abroad, so they depend on information provided by investigation services in other countries, including destination countries.

‘In the past I kept track of all seizures outside of the Netherlands, but this has become impossible. It involves a countless number of emails every day, and half of these emails we don’t even receive anymore. We receive requests from other countries left, right and centre, when they have seized 100 kg of ecstasy with a Dutch phone number. All this comes in and we should record it. We should keep track of it all. At present, the story is that something has been found in Spain, and in the media you can read lots of things that never end up in the systems.’

Note 3: Principles of the early-stage inventory to prevent double counting – We distinguish two categories of drugs labs: labs where drugs are yet to be produced and labs where drugs have been produced. The first category (category 4) indicates what could have been produced based on the quantities of precursors or pre-precursors, or essential chemicals found at a storage or production location. The second category (category 5) indicates the quantity of actually produced synthetic drugs found at a storage or production location. We make our calculations on the basis of empty packaging, or drugs waste4, or drugs found.

– The calculation of the expected production at each storage location or lab is based on the chemical substance – precursor or pre-precursor, or essential chemicals – of which the largest quantity has been found. Of course we cannot add up the precursors and pre-precursors and essential chemical substances, as they are all needed for the final product. If, for instance, 40 litres of bmk are found in a lab, and 14,000 litres of formamide, we use the formamide as the basis for our calculations.

– The intended production of each storage location or lab is calculated on the basis of the (pre-)precursors or essential chemicals found. These chemicals are rarer and more expensive than the other chemicals required. Experts state that if these precursors, pre-precursors or essential chemicals are present at a location, drugs criminals intend to make full use of them for the production of synthetic drugs.

4 If both the conversion from pre-precursor to precursor (conversion stage) and the synthesis have taken place in a lab, only the waste of the synthesis is counted to prevent double counting.

Small country, Big Player 217 Appendix 1

‘All other chemicals for the process are cheaper and easier to obtain. The criminals can buy them in bulk. No problem. But methylamine, the essential chemical for mdma, for instance, is expensive and purchasing it requires an effort, so criminals won’t want to waste any of it or have any left over.

– Calculation of the produced quantity of synthetic drugs for each storage location or lab can be based on the number of empty packages found or the quantity of drugs waste or drugs found. We base our calculation on the largest quantity found. Of course we cannot simply add up empty packaging of apaa and amphetamine waste at a location, as the waste partly consists of the content of the empty apaa packaging.

– When no precursors, pre-precursors or essential chemicals were found at a storage location5, but merely ‘other chemicals’, We did not include these locations in our calculations, because the chemicals in question are widely available. This notwithstanding the fact that these chemicals are probably intended for the production of synthetic drugs. This was the case at ten locations, for example a storage location where several litres of sulfuric acid were found.

– In 2017, a few major storage locations were dismantled, containing hundreds of litres of various chemicals. These locations were probably distribution points that served several labs. We are not sure about this, however. To prevent double counting, we solely used the precursor, pre-precursor or essential chemical of which the largest quantity was found as basis for our calculations. If a storage contained 44,000 litres of formamide, 10,000 litres of bmk and 23,000 kg of apaa, for instance, we solely used the formamide in our calculations, whereas it is highly likely that not all of these substances were intended for the same production process in a single lab.6

5 This is different in the case of drugs labs, where the ‘other chemicals’ found were ready to be used in production. 6 On the other hand, raw materials found at two different storage locations may be intended for the same lab. At storage facility one, 10,000 litres of apaa were found, and 1,000 litres of formamide. At storage facility two, 1,000 litres of APAA and 10,000 litres of formamide were found. We then make our calculations based on the largest quantity found in the storage, while chances are that the substances from both storages will end up in a single lab. Then the total would only be 11,000 litre; not 20,000 litres. It is impossible to trace how often this may have happened. The same holds true for the conversion labs. The quantity of precursors calculated on the basis of empty packaging or drugs waste found in a conversion lab may have been used in a production lab that has also been discovered.

Small country, Big Player 218 Appendix 1

– Part of the chemicals is lost during each production process, because mistakes are made or production is not fully effective. This may vary per batch and much depends on the quality of the cooks involved. This means that less is produced then we presume based on our calculations. On the other hand, the conversion values used to calculate how much precursors, pre-precursors and essential chemicals are needed to produce mdma and amphetamine are too low (See Table 1 in this appendix). In actual fact, a litre of precursor produces more final product than indicated. According to experts we consulted, either factor compensates for the other.

Note 4: weighting factors for translating quantities of chemicals, final products or drugs waste into bmk and pmk

Table 1 Calculation factors for 1 litre of bmk and 1 litre of pmk Calculation factors for precursors of amphetamine and MDMA 1 litre of bmk: 1 litre of pmk: Preprecursors 2 kg bmk glycidate 2 kg pmk glycidic acid 2 kg bmk glycidate acid 2 kg pmk glycidate 1,6 kg apaan 2 l safrole 1,9 kg apaa Essential chemicals 1,5 l formamide 0,8 l methylamine Other chemicals 0,2 l sulfuric acid 100 g sodium borohydride 0,7 l formic acid 5 l acetone Final products 0,8 l amphetamine oil 1,2 kg MDMA crystals 1,6 kg amphetamine paste Waste 8 l amphetamine waste 6 l MDMA waste 6 l conversion waste 6 l conversion waste

Note 5: why the seizure rate is much lower than the actual production Drugs criminals try to operate out of sight of investigative agencies. They use a number of tactics and techniques to prevent discovery. Think, for instance, of mislabelling when importing chemicals, and covers used for drug production locations. These criminals also make effective use of the slow implementation of legislation, the opportunities offered by European commerce, and the limited investigation capacity. The actual scope of the synthetic drugs production is probably much greater than the seizures by investigative agencies indicate:

– Drugs criminals import precursors, pre-precursors, and chemicals in a sophisticated manner. Relevant chemicals are brought into the country

Small country, Big Player 219 Appendix 1

under false names or literally covered by other substances. There are countless possibilities to cover the illegal cargo. If investigative agencies discover a form of mislabelling, drugs criminals always find ways to work around this by using new methods. As a result, investigative agencies miss an unknown number of shipments:

‘I’ve received information that they let eight shipments pass already and have sampled the ninth shipment just to be sure, and it turns out to be apaa. The eight previous shipments probably too, but we’re not sure. This is the problem: they were all destined for the same recipient and all had the same cover cargo or mislabelling, but we’ll never really find out.’

– Drugs criminals effectively use the open borders within the EU. In the Netherlands, investigative agencies strictly check the import of drug-related chemicals. This contrary to most European countries, where no synthetic drugs are produced. The criminals use this fact by importing the chemicals in other European countries. As soon as the chemicals have entered the EU, these substances can be freely transported to the Netherlands as a result of the open borders. Checks only take place at the outside EU border.

‘We don’t know what percentage of the total quantity we discover. Most European countries have other priorities. They will have less attention for chemicals, as most of these countries don’t have a synthetic drugs production problem. They don’t have any labs, and if they discover any chemicals, they do not have the authority to seize them, and have to let them pass anyway. We can make Schiphol Airport and the Port of Rotterdam water- tight, but even then it will be imported via Finland, Spain or Portugal.’

– At present, the legislation in the Netherlands and other European countries is insufficiently attuned to the development of new precursors and pre-precursors. Initially, pre-precursors are legal substances, unless it can be proven that they are solely intended for synthetic drugs production.

‘Our legislation is constantly outdated. You can easily see that the legislation is no longer effective. Take for instance the pre-precursors pmk glycidate and apaa. Germany cannot seize them, while synthetic drugs production is their sole purpose. We cannot intervene. We cannot report it. Part of the problem lies in the Netherlands but the surrounding countries also play a role. You can always hope they will report a shipment coming up, but you’ll lose it when they decide to turn right at the border.’

Small country, Big Player 220 Appendix 1

– As a result of the limited investigation capacity, criminals often have free play. Synthetic drugs have little priority with the police, the FIOD and the Customs Service. Investigative agencies discover the majority of the labs and storage locations by accident through tip-offs of citizens via the line for anonymous tips, or as a result of cannabis checks; not because of investigations into synthetic drugs. Despite the lack of staff, the number of storage and production locations found has increased over the past few years. The number of reported suspect transactions involving chemicals, which companies are obligated to report if they suspect foul play, is also on the rise.

‘It is near impossible to keep track of suspect transaction reports. Take this report about a shipment of pallets of caustic soda, for instance. We have to let it go through, as we do not have the staff to deal with it. We may find it empty at a lab next month. Reports are an indication of the scope, but you cannot assume that a product is destined for a lab without evidence. If we see 1,000 litres of sulfuric acid at a farm, for instance, it may go to a lab, but it may also be used in pigsties.’

These indications may suffice to conclude that the seizures comprise no more than a part of the total scope of synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands. Given our working method, based on the most conservative estimates, we may conclude that the seizures in 2017 are an indication of the absolute minimum.

Note 6: forms and dosage Amphetamine and mdma exist in various forms. This is why we need to determine the form and dosage we use as the starting point for our calculations. Amphetamine users take pills, snort, or sometimes inject the drugs (EMCDDA, 2017). Snorting amphetamine and taking amphetamine pills is popular in Europe. In the Middle East, amphetamine users often take captagon pills (UNODC, 2017). Leading national and international organiza- tions7 researching drugs markets and drugs use usually consider the powder the final product, mostly with 1 gram as the standard measure.

Users never consume pure amphetamine (100%). The substance is cut, usually with caffeine, but sometimes with paracetamol, baking powder, flour or other substances. One gram of cut amphetamine contains a maximum of 73% of amphetamine, but around 50% purity8 was the average in the Netherlands

7 EMCDDA, UNODC, and Trimbos Institute 8 The purity percentage was provided by the Central Criminal Investigations Division’s Specialist Support Department, and was determined by experts in the fields of synthetic drugs and precursors. The prices are based on more than one information source (DIMS/

Small country, Big Player 221 Appendix 1

in 2017. In Europe, purity percentages are much more varied, and may range from 7% to 50% – average purity 13-35% (EMCDDA, 2017). Purity depends on several factors, including the number of middlemen. They add cutting agents to increase their profit margins. For our calculations we use a conservative 50% of amphetamine per gram of cut product. mdma may be processed into pills, commonly called ecstasy pills, but can also be used in crystal or powder form. In Europe, the US, Australia and South-East Asia, the ecstasy pill is the most popular form (UNODC, 2017). The Global Drugs Survey (2015) showed that worldwide, 48.9% of ecstasy users use the drug in pill form. Therefore it is not surprising that national and international studies into drug use take the ecstasy pill as their starting point (EMCDDA, 2017; Trimbos Institute, 2017; UNODC, 2017). We too calculate the scope of the mdma production based on the ecstasy pill as final product.

The mdma dosage in ecstasy pills varies. The dosage has increased significantly over the past few years (see chapter 12 about use). In 2016, 65% of the ecstasy pills contained over 150 mg of mdma, as opposed to 3% in 2006. The average concentration of mdma in ecstasy pills in the Netherlands in 2016 was 157 mg (Trimbos Institute, 2017). In Europe average purity varied between 35 and 128 mg (EMCDDA, 2017). We base our calculations of mdma production on the conservative starting point of 157 mg of mdma in each ecstasy pill.

Note 7: Amphetamine and mdma production costs The costs of amphetamine and mdma production vary. Police experts have calculated and listed the average costs of amphetamine and mdma production based on studies and accounts kept by criminals to be able to successfully confiscate criminal gain.9 The exact calculations are confidential. A litre of bmk costs a drugs criminal an average of €163.10. These costs can be divided into chemicals and hardware. The purchase of pre-precursors, and essential and other chemicals costs, on average, €147.60 per litre of bmk. These costs are based on the average legal purchase price of essential chemicals and other chemicals. In criminal circles, these chemicals are resold for higher prices. In addition, the hardware, such as reaction vessels, heating mantles, etc., costs an average of €15.50 per litre of bmk. The average cost price of a litre of bmk is €163.10.

Internet/Police/FIOD/Europol), and derive from investigations, tapped/covertly recorded conversations, documents found, and information obtained in the line of duty. 9 The official reports of findings regarding the costs of amphetamine and mdma production were drawn up in 2015. The prices have been updated for 2017. We take €90 for a litre of apaa and €350 for a kg of pmk glycidate as our starting point.

Small country, Big Player 222 Appendix 1

The production of mdma costs €928.30 a litre: an average of €919.50 for chemicals – pre-precursors, other and essential chemicals – and €8.80 for hardware, such as pressure vessels and distillation equipment. This results in a cost price of €0.12 per ecstasy pill. On average tableting, for which a tableting machine and tableting powder are required, costs €0.05 to €0.10. We assume that the production of an ecstasy pill costs €0.20 on average.

The costs of the production of amphetamine and mdma solely relate to the purchase of chemicals and hardware. The costs of location rental, the transport of chemicals, and payment of the cooks and their assistants has not been included in the calculations.

Note 8: how much is used in the Netherlands and how much is intended for export? The majority of the amphetamine and mdma production in the Netherlands is intended for export. Dozens of years ago, Dutch criminals discovered the profitable nature of the export of drugs. But what part of production is actually exported? This question is important because the prices of amphetamine and ecstasy in the Netherlands and abroad differ considerably.

The Trimbos Institute carries out an annual survey among adults, asking them whether they used drugs in the past year. This shows that 180,000 Dutch people over 18 used amphetamine in 2016. If we assume that these users use amphetamine 10 times a year, the domestic share of amphetamine use is 0.29% of the total quantity of amphetamine produced in the Nether- lands. The number of mdma users is higher: in 2016, 390,000 Dutch adults took ecstasy pills (Trimbos, 2017). Unfortunately, the Trimbos institute does not monitor the quantity of drugs used by these people; do they use once or several times a year, how much do they use each time? It makes quite a difference whether 390,000 ecstasy users use one pill a year, or use a pill every week (52 pills a year). Experts estimate that in 2017, festival visitors took 18.5 million ecstasy pills. Outside the festivals (at home or in the pub), mdma users in the Netherlands use an estimated 18.5 million ecstasy pills a year.

Based on these 37 million ecstasy pills, the domestic share of the total MDMA production in the Netherlands is 3.8%. The absence of figures regarding the quantity of drugs the users take complicates assessment of the Dutch production of amphetamine and mdma for the internal market.

This forces us to examine the international users and production market in more detail. We will first discuss amphetamine, followed by MDMA.

Small country, Big Player 223 Appendix 1

Amphetamine It is difficult to assess the worldwide user market for amphetamine. This is because studies into drug use do not distinguish between amphetamine and methamphetamine, while for our calculations we are solely interested in amphetamine use. In 2013, the UNODC (2015) estimated the number of users of amphetamine-like substances at 34 million worldwide. If we follow the reasoning of the Dutch Crime Pattern Analysis (CBA, Central Unit, 2016), which is that the ratio of the seizures of methamphetamine and amphetamine is indicative of the ratio of methamphetamine and amphetamine users, we can conclude that there are 10 million amphetamine users worldwide.10 Amphetamine is popular in Europe (UNODC, 2015; EMCDDA, 2017). Dutch amphetamine is mostly used in countries like Sweden and the UK. This drug, in the form of captagon pills, is also very popular in the Middle East, and the number of amphetamine users in the US has been on the increase over the past few years (UNODC, 2017).

Dutch drugs criminals control a significant part of the international amphetamine market. They produce the drug in the Netherlands or manage its production in Belgium. In addition, amphetamine is produced in Poland, the Baltic States, and Bulgaria, and on occasion in Germany and Turkey (Central Unit, 2016). A small part of the amphetamine is manufactured for the export outside Europe, mainly to the Middle East and Oceania (UNODC, 2017).

MDMA Worldwide, the Netherlands is a key player in the production of mdma. Dutch mdma criminals sell their products all over the world. The continents with the largest number of ecstasy users are Europe, North America and Oce- ania, but Southeast Asia and South America are emerging markets (UNODC, 2017). Ecstasy use in Australia, the UK and the US is relatively high (Trimbos Institute, 2017). In 22 countries the number of ecstasy users exceeds 1% of the total population11 (UNODC, 2015). In 2013, 18.8 million people between 15 and 64 had used mdma at some time in their lives, 13 million of whom lived in Europe. In Europe, 2.5 million people recently used mdma (EMCDDA, 2016). The number of mdma users is probably much higher, as no figures are available for Asia and Africa (UNODC, 2015). In the EU, the Netherlands and the UK are frontrunners in lifetime prevalence (having used at one time or other) of ecstasy use, and in ecstasy use over the past year (yearly prevalence).

10 Ratio 1 : 2.5 (CBA p.63). 11 Australia, New-Zealand, Czech Republic, Northern Ireland, Georgia, Scotland, Estonia, Slovakia,Latvia, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, England and Wales, Spain, US, Bulgaria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Albania, Belgium, Israel, Lebanon, Lithuania.

Small country, Big Player 224 Appendix 1

Mdma production appears to be concentrated in the Netherlands, although Dutch drugs criminals regularly divert their activities to Belgium. They subsequently export the drugs all over the world. The leading position in the export of mdma from the Netherlands has little competition (Central Unit, 2016). Small-scale production also takes place in Asia, North America, South America and Australia (EMCDDA, 2017). In 2012, investigation in Austria, Hungary and Sweden showed that 100% of the seized ecstasy pills came from the Netherlands. Nearly all mdma seized in Australia, a country with a sizable market, also appears to come from the Netherlands.

Export share It is difficult to determine the share of the Dutch mdma and amphetamine production for the export on the basis of the national and international user markets. The available information has methodological limitations, white spots, and lacks information about quantities. In short we can say that Dutch drugs producers have a sizeable share in the worldwide production of amphetamine, and a top position in mdma production.

Calculations of the domestic share in mdma and amphetamine use result in percentages of about 3.8 and 0.29, respectively. These low percentages appear to be unlikely. Experts think the percentages are higher; their opinion varies from 5% to 20%. In this study we will assume that 20% is intended for domestic use and 80% for the export. We know this means that our internal drug use estimate is too high at 20 percent of the MDMA and ecstasy produced in the Netherlands. However, we are not trying establish exact drug use figures for the Netherlands; we aim to determine the absolute minimum of the worldwide turnover generated by drugs criminals active in the Netherlands.

Note 9: prices in the Netherlands and abroad This section discusses the national and international prices of final products, or in other words the prices the consumer has to pay; the ‘street price’.

Prices in the Netherlands In 2017, the price of an ecstasy pill ranged from €0.50 to €15 in the Nether- lands. On average, an ecstasy pill cost users €3.50.12 In 2017, users paid €6 for one gram of cut amphetamine (50%). Prices on the domestic market varied

12 The average prices were provided by the Central Criminal Investigations Division’s Specialist Support Department, and were determined by experts in the fields of synthetic drugs and precursors. The prices are based on more than one information source (DIMS/ Internet/Police/FIOD/Europol), and derive from investigations, tapped/covertly recorded conversations, documents found, and information obtained in the line of duty.

Small country, Big Player 225 Appendix 1

between €1 and €50 per gram of cut amphetamine, depending on the cutting percentage and other factors (Trimbos Institute, 2017).

We use the following starting points for the prices of amphetamine and ecstasy in the Netherlands:

In the Netherlands, an ecstasy pill containing 157 mg of mdma costs €3.50 (street price). One gram of cut amphetamine (50%) costs €6 (street price).

Prices abroad The export of synthetic drugs yields major profits for criminals. Abroad, prices are significantly higher than in the Netherlands. Most European users pay between €6 and €10 for an ecstasy pill, although prices may vary from €3 to €16 (EMCDDA, 2017). However, the market for ecstasy pills is stretched out over several continents. Dutch mdma is well-liked worldwide. A Global Drugs Survey (2015) shows that worldwide, the average price of an ecstasy pill is 13.04 Australian dollar. Using the exchange rate on 1 January 2017, this comes down to €8.99 for each ecstasy pill. The website www.havoscope.com contains average prices of ecstasy pills in 57 countries;13 on average, a pill costs €16.44.14 We will use the average of the three abovementioned sources: €11.14 per ecstasy pill.

Table 2 Ecstasy prices (in Australian dollars) in various countries country price country price Australia 26.63 New Zealand 41.79 Germany 10.29 Ireland 11.55 France 14.4 Belgium 7.64 United Kingdom 14.88 Austria 15.53 United States 17.01 Canada 9.64 Switzerland 19.3 Portugal 10.14 Netherlands 6.27 Spain 11.24 Brazil 17.98 Scotland 16.69 Hongary 7.46 Denmark 12.16 Average: 13.04 Australian dollars. Source: Global Drugs Survey, 2015.

13 It is unknown whether these prices are recent. 14 17.30 US dollar.

Small country, Big Player 226 Appendix 1

Table 3 Ecstasy prices (in US dollar) in various countries (Havoscope) country price country price country price Myanmar 68.1 Finland 19.9 Bulgaria 8.8 South Korea 56 Switzerland 19.1 Germany 8.7 Norway 44.1 Romania 18.9 France 7.9 Montenegro 41.7 Sweden 16.2 Latvia 7.5 Egypt 40.2 Malaysia 16 Guatemala 6.6 United States 35.5 Jamaica 14.5 Ireland 6.6 Japan 33.65 Spain 13.6 Estonia 6.6 Vietnam 32.5 Greece 13.2 Iran 6.2 Australia 32.1 Cyprus 13.2 South-Africa 5.8 Thailand 29.65 Honduras 13 Belgium 5.7 New Zealand 28.7 Brazil 12 Cambodia 5 Philippines 27.5 Israel 12 Portugal 5 Chili 25 Czech Republic 10.5 Hungary 4.8 Costa Rica 25 Zimbabwe 10 United Kingdom 4.8 Ecuador 25 Austria 9.7 Lithuania 4.6 Colombia 22.6 Venezuela 9.4 China 4.5 Italy 22 Turkey 9.3 Netherlands 3.9 Dominican Republic 21 Indonesia 9 Serbia 2.65 Singapore 20.25 Denmark 8.9 Poland 1.7 Source: www.havocscope.com/black-market-prices/ecstasy-prices.

No sources are available that provide information about the price of amphetamine worldwide. A large part of the Dutch amphetamine production is probably intended for the European market. In Europe,15 prices of one gram of amphetamine vary from €7 to €43, but on average, the price is between €10 and €26. We used an average of €18 for one gram of cut (50%) amphetamine (EMCDDA, 2017).

15 Including the Netherlands and Turkey

Small country, Big Player Appendix 2 Overview of synthetic drugs seized in the Netherlands in 2017 Cannabis nursery Two tabletingTwo machines (50,000 hour) pills an Small-scale drugs production experiments Tableting hardwareTableting Cannabis-related equipment Hardware storage Storage of other chemicals Hardware storage Other or several drugs found

37 175 370 750 250 237.5 1166.67 PMK (l)

62.5 62.5 1000 74.38 50.26 973.68 2,777.46 BMK (l) 1,048.55 Scale small large medium small medium large small small medium medium small large medium large Location residential residential rural rural rural rural industrial residential residential residential industrial residential residential residential residential rural rural rural industrial industrial NB NB Li Ge NB NB NH Dr NB ZH Ge NB NB NB Ge Li Ze NH Ze ZH Province Helmond Veghel Grashoek Nijkerk A27/Breda Baarle-Nassau Wormer Emmen Eindhoven Voorburg Tiel Bergen op Zoom Eindhoven Oss Putten Leveroy Rilland A12 Ritthem Leimuiden Town Storage locations or drug labs in 2017 (amphetamine and mdma) and (amphetamine 2017 locations in or drugStorage labs lab storage lab lab storage lab lab lab lab lab storage lab lab storage storage storage storage storage storage storage Type Date 2-1-17 5-1-17 14-1-17 12-1-17 18-1-17 19-1-17 19-1-17 22-1-17 25-1-17 26-1-17 26-1-17 30-1-17 31-1-17 2-2-17 2-2-17 3-2-17 9-2-17 9-2-17 12-2-17 13-2-17 Table 1 Table

Small country, Big Player 228 Appendix 2 Other or several drugs found Methamphetamine production Cannabis nursery Cannabis storage GHB Micro quantities of BMK and PMK, and 40 litres of methamphetamine Cocaine Chemicals storage: no information available about scale GHB production Heroin production, cocaine cutting activities, and cannabis storage Canabis storage

70 70 20 0.5 130 725 7.68 23.33 25.07 0.402 3187.5 399.98 PMK (l) 15 5.26 1060 46.11 21.87 163.75 358.75 973.33 156.25 300.71 2,677.08 BMK (l) Scale medium small large large large medium medium large small medium medium small small small small medium medium small Location industrial industrial industrial residential rural residential residential residential residential residential industrial industrial industrial residential rural residential rural rural industrial residential NB NB NB ZH NB NB NH Ov NB NH NB Ut Ut NB Ge ZH Li ZH Ut Li Province Town Beek en Donk Beek en Donk Eindhoven Den Haag Leende Tilburg Amsterdam Enschede Eindhoven Nieuw Nieuw Loosdrecht Den Bosch Nieuwegein Nieuwegein Eindhoven Ermelo Wassenaar Oirle Driebruggen Veenendaal Brunssum Type lab storage lab lab lab lab lab lab lab lab lab storage storage lab storage storage storage lab lab lab Date 15-2-17 15-2-17 19-2-17 21-2-17 23-2-17 23-2-17 28-2-17 2-3-17 3-3-17 7-3-17 15-3-17 16-3-17 16-3-17 23-3-17 25-3-17 25-3-17 31-3-17 2-4-17 4-4-17 5-4-17

Small country, Big Player 229 Appendix 2 - Other or several drugs found Hardware storage Methamphetamine and cocaine production equipment Storage of other chemicals Other chemicals and tableting equipment No information available about the scale tion available about the scale Chemicals storage: no informa

75 714 179.17 4295.7 469.05 396.25 PMK (l)

30 3125 5100 207.5 35.53 10.63 315.79 193.33 276.05 208.57 609.38 1,177.43 BMK (l) Scale medium large medium large small medium medium large large medium medium small large small Location industrial industrial industrial rural industrial residential industrial residential industrial industrial industrial industrial residential anders rural rural rural residential residential industrial NB Ge Dr ZH Ge ZH NB NB ZH NB ZH Li ZH NB NB Li NB NH Ze Ze Province Town Roosendaal Terborg Assen Nieuwland Arnhem Rotterdam Best Eindhoven Lisse Uden Schiedam Roggel Dordrecht Eindhoven Tilburg Haler Zegge Castricum Goes Grijpskerke Type lab lab lab lab storage storage storage storage lab storage storage lab storage storage lab lab storage lab storage lab Date 6-4-17 11-4-17 19-4-17 25-4-17 27-4-17 2-5-17 3-5-17 5-5-17 10-5-17 11-5-17 15-5-17 16-5-17 19-5-17 24-5-17 31-5-17 10-6-17 10-6-17 16-6-17 23-6-17 23-6-17

Small country, Big Player 230 Appendix 2 - Other or several drugs found Hardware storage Storage of other chemicals Production and storage of methamphetamine and MDMA Hardware storage Cannabis storage Cannabis-related equipment mation available about the scale Preprecursors storage: no infor Acetic anhydride storage

17 53 1.3 514 550 100 37.9 21.33 23.61 512.5 166.66 PMK (l) 15 60 320 12.5 0.22 1200 187.5 16.08 476.67 BMK (l) Scale small medium medium small small medium small medium medium small small medium small small medium small large Location industrial residential rural industrial industrial residential residential rural residential residential residential industrial industrial residential industrial residential residential industrial industrial residential rural NB Ov Fr NH NH NB Li Li Ut Li NB NB Li Ut ZH NB NB NB NB NB NB Province Town Tilburg Oldenzaal Berlikum Uithoorn Beverwijk Tilburg Urmond Heerlen Amersfoort Heerlen Eindhoven Waalwijk Landgraaf De Meern Bleiswijk Geldrop Geldrop Waalwijk Veen Tilburg Molenschot Type storage storage lab storage storage storage lab lab lab storage lab storage lab lab storage storage lab storage storage storage storage Date 26-6-17 29-6-17 30-6-17 30-6-17 30-6-17 3-7-17 4-7-17 4-7-17 5-7-17 6-7-17 7-7-17 11-7-17 14-7-17 15-7-17 19-7-17 19-7-17 19-7-17 24-4-17 25-7-17 28-7-17 1-8-17

Small country, Big Player 231 Appendix 2 Other or several drugs found Cocain found Cannabis storage Production equipment storage Tableting locationTableting Other chemicals Other chemicals No information available about the scale Hardware storage Methamphetamine production

325 0.03 1141 94.74 293.2 228.5 0.006 561.21 268.33 1492.5 PMK (l)

3.13 31.6 0.63 0.24 6.25 25.13 11.84 347.33 28400 189.05 558.33 208.33 382.89 BMK (l) Scale small small medium small medium medium medium large medium small medium small medium small medium large Location residential anders rural residential industrial residential industrial onbekend rural onbekend rural rural rural rural industrial residential industrial residential rural residential rural industrial Ze NB Ge Li NB Ge NB ZH Ov ZH NB NB NB Li Ov Ut Fr Li Dr NB Li NB Province Town Vlissingen Hank Neede Neer Heijningen Nijmegen Rupchen Den Haag Steenwijker-land Leidschendam De Moer Dongen Wijk en Aalburg Weert Enschede Maarssen Joure Klimmen Zuidwolde Kaatsheuvel Weert Waspik Type lab storage lab lab lab storage storage storage lab lab storage storage storage storage lab lab storage storage lab lab storage storage Date 4-8-17 11-8-17 12-8-17 14-8-17 16-8-17 23-8-17 12-9-17 26-9-17 4-10-17 5-10-17 13-10-17 13-10-17 18-10-17 11-10-17 12-10-17 23-10-17 25-10-17 27-10-17 30-10-17 3-11-17 7-11-17 7-11-17

Small country, Big Player 232 Appendix 2 Cannabis storage and GHB production Other or several drugs found Cannabis nursery GHB production Cannabis storage Hardware storage Tableting locationTableting Crystallization of amphetamine: No information available about the scale Hardware storage 810 100 8.74 1250 4000 16.66 PMK (l) 2 42 600 6.88 1600 161.5 21.25 71.88 641.75 783.75 266.67 1190.79 BMK (l) Scale large medium medium small large small small medium medium medium small small large large small Location residential residential residential rural rural residential residential industrial rural rural residential rural rural residential rural industrial residential industrial residential NB NB NB Ut NB NH NB ZH Li Ge ZH Fr Li Ge Fr NB NB NH Ge Province Town Tilburg Tilburg Eindhoven Utrecht Zeeland Koog de aan Zaan Oisterwijk Schiedam Velden Lunteren Schoonhoven Haulerwijk Roermond Arnhem Arnhem Suwald Cuijk Eindhoven Amsterdam Zaltbommel Type lab lab lab lab lab storage lab lab lab lab lab lab storage lab lab lab lab storage storage Date 8-11-17 7-11-17 9-11-17 10-11-17 11-11-17 16-11-17 17-11-17 21-11-17 23-11-17 27-11-17 28-11-17 30-11-17 11-12-17 11-12-17 12-12-17 11-12-17 13-12-17 19-12-17 19-12-17

Small country, Big Player 233 Appendix 2

Comment 1: five of the 122 locations were not included in the calculation of the scale, because of the lack of relevant information.

Comment 2: there is a minor difference in the data we present and those in the 2017 ERISSP overview. This is because the ERISSP figures include heroin, methamphetamine and NPS, and our overview does not. In addition, ERISSP qualifies a few locations as drugs labs and storage locations, while our overview merely qualifies them as drugs labs. This has no influence on the calculation of the scope.

Comment 3: Map 1 in Appendix 1 indicates where in the Netherlands the storage locations and drugs labs were found.

Small country, Big Player 234 Appendix 2

Table 2 The five seizure categories

1. Customs seizures 2017: abroad destined for the Netherlands (category 1)

Date Type Quantity (kg) BMK (l) PMK (l) 23-1-2017 APAA 130 68.42 31-3-2017 APAA 25 13.16 27-4-2017 PMK glycidate 1180 590 3-5-2017 PMK glycidate 25.46 12.73 X-5-2017 PMK glycidate 20 10 27-6-2017 PMK glycidate 771 385.5 3-7-2017 PMK glycidate 230 115 7-8-2017 PMK glycidate 20 10 14-9-2017 PMK glycidate 500 250 27-9-2017 APAA 513 270 1-12-2017 APAAN 1000 625 Total 976.58 1373.23

2. Customs seizures 2017: in the Netherlands (category 2)

Date Type Quantity (kg) BMK (l) PMK (l) 3-1-2017 APAA 26.50 13.95 3-1-2017 APAA 26.30 13.84 3-1-2017 APAA 26.50 13.95 3-1-2017 APAA 26.40 13.89 3-1-2017 APAA 26.40 13.89 3-1-2017 APAA 26.40 13.89 3-1-2017 APAA 26.40 13.89 9-1-2017 APAA 26.30 13.84 9-1-2017 APAA 26.80 14.11 9-1-2017 APAA 26.40 13.89 11-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.00 5 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 11.40 5.7 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.40 5.2 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.40 5.2 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.40 5.2 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.50 5.25 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.50 5.25 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.60 5.3 12-1-2017 APAA 23.30 12.26

Small country, Big Player 235 Appendix 2

Date Type Quantity (kg) BMK (l) PMK (l) 12-1-2017 APAA 23.30 12.26 12-1-2017 APAA 23.30 12.26 12-1-2017 APAA 23.30 12.26 12-1-2017 APAA 26.40 13.89 12-1-2017 APAA 24.00 12.63 12-1-2017 APAA 23.40 12.32 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 23.90 11.95 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 26.10 13.05 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 26.20 13.1 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 12-1-2017 PMK glycidate 26.00 13 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.60 5.3 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.40 5.2 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.60 5.3 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.70 5.35 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.70 5.35 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.50 5.25 13-1-2017 PMK glycidate 10.60 5.3 16-1-2017 APAA 26.00 13.68 26-1-2017 PMK glycidate 23.00 13 26-1-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 31-1-2017 APAA 21.00 11.05 31-1-2017 APAA 500.00 263.16 15-2-2017 PMK glycidate 29.00 14.5 15-2-2017 PMK glycidate 29.00 14.5 15-2-2017 PMK glycidate 29.00 14.5 15-2-2017 PMK glycidate 29.00 14.5 15-2-2017 APAA 26.10 13.74 15-2-2017 APAA 26.60 14.32 15-2-2017 APAA 26.10 13.74 15-2-2017 APAA 27.20 14.32 30-3-2017 APAA 200.00 105.26 6-4-2017 PMK glycidate 20.00 10 1-5-2017 APAA 800.00 421.05 4-5-2017 APAA 26.50 13.95 4-5-2017 APAA 175.00 92.11 4-5-2017 APAA 200.00 105.26

Small country, Big Player 236 Appendix 2

Date Type Quantity (kg) BMK (l) PMK (l) 28-4-2017 PMK glycidate 1.00 0.5 28-4-2017 APAA 1.00 0.53 9-5-2017 APAA 1.00 0.53 12-5-2017 APAA 0.50 0.26 12-5-2017 PMK glycidate 0.50 0.25 23-5-2017 APAA 27.00 14.21 28-5-2017 APAA 2.00 1.05 29-5-2017 APAA 15.00 7.89 1-6-2017 APAA 27.00 14.21 8-6-2017 APAA 1.00 0.53 8-6-2017 APAA 27.00 14.21 30-6-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 4-7-2017 APAA 27.00 14.21 5-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 5-7-2017 APAA 27.00 14.21 5-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 6-7-2017 APAA 27.00 14.21 7-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 12-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 12-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 12-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 12-7-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 19-7-2017 APAA 54.00 28.42 19-7-2017 PMK glycidate 54.00 27 25-7-2017 PMK glycidate 20.00 10 25-7-2017 PMK glycidate 20.00 10 25-7-2017 PMK glycidate 20.00 10 28-7-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 28-7-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 28-7-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 28-7-2017 PMK glycidate 25.00 12.5 31-7-2017 PMK glycidate 20.00 10 31-7-2017 PMK glycidate 20.00 10 1-8-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 3-8-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 4-8-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 4-8-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 17-8-2017 APAA 10.00 5.26

Small country, Big Player 237 Appendix 2

Date Type Quantity (kg) BMK (l) PMK (l) 17-8-2017 APAA 10.00 5.26 17-8-2017 APAA 10.00 5.26 18-8-2017 APAA 260.00 136.84 18-8-2017 APAA 675.00 355.26 19-8-2017 APAA 450.00 236.84 23-8-2017 APAA 10.00 5.26 23-8-2017 APAA 21.00 11.05 23-8-2017 APAA 21.00 11.05 3-9-2017 APAA 100.00 52.63 14-9-2017 APAA 200.00 105.26 21-9-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 21-9-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16 21-9-2017 APAA 25.00 13.16

3. FIOD seizures 20171 (category 3)

Date Type Quantity (kg) BMK (l) PMK (l) 2017 PMK glycidate 3,000 1,500 2017 APAA 2,750 1,447.37

4. LFO seizures at storage locations or drugs labs 2017: quantities yet to be produced (category 4)

Date Location yet to be produced BMK (l) PMK (l) 2-1-2017 lab 10 kg APAA 5.26 5-1-2017 storage 1,900 kg APAA and 350 kg PMK 1,000 175 glycidic acid 12-1-2017 lab 74 l safrole 37 18-1-2017 storage 475 kg PMK glycidate 237.5 19-1-2017 lab 102.18 kg APAA 53.78 31-1-2017 lab 160 l PMK 160 3-2-2017 storage 160 l formamide 106.67 9-2-207 storage 600 l methylamine 750 15-2-2017 lab 525 l formamide 350 19-2-2017 lab 1500 kg APAAN 937.5

1 In 2017, the FIOD seized more than these two batches. The LFO was also involved in these seizures, which is why the seizures of FIOD investigations are included in the LFO overview.

Small country, Big Player 238 Appendix 2

21-2-2017 lab 5 kg APAAN and 0.8 l safrole 3.13 0,4 23-2-2017 lab 3200 l formamide 2,133.33 23-2-2017 lab 20 l BMK 20 28-2-2017 lab 25 l sulfuric acid 125 16-3-2017 lab 200 l formic acid 285.71 16-3-2017 lab 70 l PMK 70 23-3-2017 lab 10 l PMK 10 25-3-2017 storage 70 l PMK 70 2-4-2017 lab 260 l formamide 173.33 4-4-2017 lab 100 kg tableting powder 83.32 6-4-2017 lab 180 l formamide 120 11-4-2017 lab 8,2 kg BMK glycidate 4.1 19-4-2017 lab 4 l PMK 4 25-4-2017 lab 1,020 l sulfuric acid and 77 l 5,100 96.25 methylamine 3-5-2017 storage 975 kg APAAN 609.38 5-5-2017 storage 275 l formamide and 375 l 183.33 468.75 methylamine 10-5-2017 lab 625 l sulfuric acid 3,125 15-5-2017 storage 4,295.7 l PMK 4,295.7 16-5-2017 lab 775 l acetone 155 24-5-2017 storage 600 kg APAA 315.79 31-5-2017 lab 6 l sulfuric acid 30 10-6-2017 lab 400 l formamide 266.67 23-6-2017 lab 25 l BMK and 20 kg APAA 35.53 30-6-2017 storage 400 l methylamine 500 4-7-2017 lab 30 l PMK 30 4-7-2017 lab 320 l N-Formylamphetamine 320 5-7-2017 lab 20 l formamide 13.33 7-7-2017 lab 85 l PMK 85 11-7-2017 storage 715 l formamide 476.67 14-7-2017 lab 90 l formamide and 10 l PMK 60 10 15-7-2017 lab 10 kg sodium borohydride 100 19-7-2017 storage 400 kg vivapur microcrystalline 166.66 cellulose 19-7-2017 storage 40 kg tableting mixture 33.32 25-7-2017 storage 1,100 kg PMK glycidic acid 550 1-8-2017 storage 1,200 l BMK 1,200 4-8-2017 lab 26.6 l BMK 26.6

Small country, Big Player 239 Appendix 2

11-8-2017 storage 0.05 l safrole 0.03 12-8-2017 lab 550 l BMK glycidic acid. 452.5 162.5 177.5 l BMK and 325 kg PMK glycidate 16-8-2017 lab 40 l sulfuric acid 200 23-8-2017 storage 280 l formamide 186.67 12-9-2017 storage 448 l methylamine and 0.6 l PMK 560.6 4-10-2017 lab 22.5 kg APAA and 210 l 11.84 262.5 methylamine 5-10-2017 lab 180 l methylamine 225 11-10-2017 storage 727.5 kg APAA 382.89 18-10-2017 storage 0.12 kg APAA and 0.36 kg BMK 0.24 glycidic acid 30-10-2017 lab 440 l formamide. 54 l BMK 218 l 347.33 228.5 PMK and 21 l safrole 3-11-2017 lab 24 l formamide 16 7-11-2017 storage 244 l PMK and 98.4 l PMK 293.2 glycidic acid 7-11-2017 storage 42,600 l formamide en 2,875 kg 28,400 1,437.5 safrole 7-11-2017 lab 32.3 l sulfuric acid 161.5 8-11-2017 storage 3200 l methylamine 4,000 9-11-2017 lab 640 l methylamine 800 11-11-2017 lab 10 kg APAA and 12.2 l BMK 17.46 17-11-2017 storage 10 kg BMK glycidic acid 5 21-11-2017 lab 780 kg BMK glycidic acid 390 23-11-2017 lab 600 l BMK 600 27-11-2017 lab 310 l BMK 310 28-11-2017 lab 2.5 l BMK 2.5 11-12-2017 lab 1,600 l N-Formylamphetamine 1,600 12-12-2017 lab 400 l formamide en 266.67 1,000 800 l methylamine 19-12-2017 lab 35 l methylamine 43.75 Total 50,585.71 16,946.48

Small country, Big Player 240 Appendix 2

5. LFO seizures at storage locations or drugs labs in 2017: produced quantities (category 5)

Date Location Produced BMK (l) PMK (l) 2-1-2017 lab 12 kg amphetamine paste and 45 30 l amphetamine oil 14-1-2017 lab 1850 kg APAA 973.68 19-1-2017 lab 5175 kg APAA 2,723.68 25-1-2017 lab 50 l amphetamine oil 62.5 26-1-2017 lab 595 l amphetamine waste 74.38 30-1-2017 lab 250 l MDMA oil 250 31-1-2017 lab 420 kg PMK glycidate 210 2-2-2017 storage 50 l amphetamine oil 62.5 3-2-2017 storage 7535 l amphetamine waste 941.88 13-2-2017 storage 7000 l MDMA waste 1,166.67 15-2-2017 lab 7 l amphetamine oil 8.75 15-2-2017 storage 140 l MDMA waste 23.33 19-2-2017 lab 980 l amphetamine waste 122.5 21-2-2017 lab 3,4 kg amphetamine paste and 2.13 0.002 22 ecstasy pills 23-2-2017 lab 8700 waste (amphetamine and 543.75 725 mdma) 23-2-2017 lab 48 l amphetamine oil, 45 l 136.25 amphetamine oil and 22,48 kg amphetamine powder 28-2-2017 lab 31 l amphetamine oil and 0,5 l 38.75 0.5 MDMA oil 3-3-2017 lab 3100 kg PMK glycidate and 3.187.5 3275 kg pmk-glycidezuur 7-3-2017 lab 21 kg mdma-poeder and 25.07 18,17 kg ecstasy tablets 15-3-2017 lab 130 l pmk 130 16-3-2017 storage 12 l amphetamine oil 15 23-3-2017 lab 10 l pmk 10 25-3-2017 storage 12 l amphetamine oil 15 31-3-2017 storage 175 l amphetamine waste 21.87 2-4-2017 lab 1200 l formamide 800 4-4-2017 lab 380 kg tableting powder 316.66 5-4-2017 lab 50 kg amphetamine powder, 46.11 7.68 3,3 kg Captagon tablets, 8,97 kg MDMA powder and 1596 ecstasy tablets

Small country, Big Player 241 Appendix 2

Date Location Produced BMK (l) PMK (l) 6-4-2017 lab 700 l amphetamine waste 87.5 11-4-2017 lab 1760 l formamide 1173.33 19-4-2017 lab 710 l PMK 710 25-4-2017 lab 1800 l MDMA waste 300 27-4-2017 storage 85 l amphetamine waste 10.63 5-5-2017 storage 8 l amphetamine oil and 10 0.3 0,35 kg MDMA powder 10-5-2017 lab 1075 l MDMA waste 179.17 16-5-2017 lab 60 kg amphetamine powder 53.57 75 and 450 l MDMA waste 10-6-2017 storage 7,5 l amphetamine oil 9.38 29-6-2017 storage 34 l safrole 17 30-6-2017 lab 1500 l amphetamine waste 187.5 30-6-2017 storage 28 l safrole 14 3-7-2017 storage 10 l amphetamine oil 12.5 4-7-2017 lab 138 l MDMA waste 23 5-7-2017 lab 22 l amphetamine waste 2.75 7-7-2017 lab 0,350 kg amphetamine paste 0.22 427.5 and 2565 l MDMA waste 14-7-2017 lab 60 l MDMA waste 11.33 19-7-2017 lab 24 kg MDMA and 23.61 28893 ecstasy tablets 19-7-2017 storage 11 kg ecstasy tablets 4.58 28-7-2017 storage 12 l amphetamine oil and 15 1.3 3,2 kg ecstasy tablets 4-8-2017 lab 40 l amphetamine waste 5 11-8-2017 storage 1 kg amphetamine paste 0.63 12-8-2017 lab 635 l amphetamine waste and 105.83 105.83 635 l MDMA waste 14-8-2017 lab 95,85 kg MDMA powder and 94.74 35.680 ecstasy tablets 16-8-2017 lab 50 l conversion waste from 8.33 amphetamine 23-8-2017 storage 3,8 kg amphetamine paste 2.38 12-9-2017 storage 5 l amphetamine oil and 6.25 0.61 0,735 kg MDMA powder 4-10-2017 lab 5271 kg MDMA waste 878.5 5-10-2017 lab 80 l monomethylamine 100 18-10-2017 storage 50 ecstasy tablets 0.006 27-10-2017 storage 25 l amphetamine waste 3.13

Small country, Big Player 242 Appendix 2

Date Location Produced BMK (l) PMK (l) 3-11-2017 lab 73 l amphetamine waste 9.13 7-11-2017 storage 330 l MDMA waste 55 8-11-2017 storage 5,5 l amphetamine oil 6.88 9-11-2017 lab 60 l MDMA waste 10 10-11-2017 lab 25 kg amphetamine paste and 71.88 45 l amphetamine oil 11-11-2017 lab 1760 l formamide 1173.33 17-11-2017 storage 13 l amphetamine oil 16.25 16-11-2017 lab 10,49 kg MDMA powder 8.74 27-11-2017 lab 2654 l amphetamine waste 331.75 21-11-2017 lab 3150 l amphetamine waste 393.75 28-11-2017 lab 39,5 l BMK 39.5 12-12-2017 lab 1500 l MDMA waste 250 19-12-2017 lab 45 l monomethylamine 56.25 Total 10,372.13 9,415.54

Small country, Big Player 243 Appendix 2

Figure 1 Drugs locations (storages and labs) and dump sites in the Netherlands in 2017

Dump sites Storage location Drugs lab

Sources: synthetic drugs investigation data file 2017 and ERISSP 2017.

Small country, Big Player List of abbreviations

ADH = Antidiuretic hormone APAA = 2-phenylacetoacetamide APAAN = Alfa-phenylacetoacetonitrile AT = Arrest team ATS = Amphetamine-type stimulants BFO = Bureau for Financial Support BMK = Benzyl Methyl Ketone CAM = Coordination desk for the Assessment and Monitoring of new drugs CBA = Crime Pattern Analysis CID = Criminal Intelligence Service CSV = Organized Criminal Group DEA = Drugs Enforcement Agency DIMS = Drugs Information and Monitoring System DLIO = Central Intelligence Division DLOS = Central Operational Cooperation Division DLR = Central Investigations Division DNA = Desoxyribo Nucleic Acid DNR = National Crime Squad ECD = Economic Investigation Service EDM = Electronic Dance Music EMCDDA = European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction ESDP = Expertise Center for Synthetic Drugs and Precursors ERISSP = European Reporting on Illicit Synthetic Substance Production EZ = Economic Affairs FIOD = Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service GABA = Gamma aminobutyric acid GBL = Gamma butyrolactone GHB = Gamma hydroxybutyric acid IDEC = International Drugs Enforcement Conference INCB = International Narcotics Control Board IRT = Interregional investigation teams JFUG = EU-China Joint Follow-Up KLPD = Netherlands Police Agency LE = Central Unit of the Netherlands Police LFO = Central Dismantling Facility LSD = Lysergic acid diethylamide ME = Riot Squad MDI = Monitor of Drugs Incidents MDMA = 3,4-methylenedioxymetamphetamine

Small country, Big Player MMA = Anonymous tip line MoU = Memorandum of Understanding NFI = Netherlands Forensic Institute NNCC = National Narcotics Commission of China NPS = New Psychoactive Substances OM = Public Prosecution Service OT = Surveillance Team PMK = 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-propan-2-one RIVM = National Institute for Public Health and the Environment SOCTA = Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment STAK = Trust Office Foundation TCI = Criminal Intelligence Team TOR = The Onion Router TSO = Strategic Investigations Team UBO = Ultimate Beneficial Owner UNODC = United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime USD = Synthetic Drugs Unit UN = United Nations VWS = Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport WODC = Research and Documentation Centre Wvmc = Abuse of Chemical Substances (Prevention) Act XTC = Ecstasy ZZP = self-employed worker without personnel 4-MEC = 4-methylethcathinone 6-APB = 6-(2-aminopropyl)benzofuran

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Small country, Big Player Conversations overview

1. Public Prosecution Service, 7 March 2017, 135 minutes 2. Police, 19 April 2017, 80 minutes 3. Police (x2), 21 April 2017, 90 minutes 4. Police, 28 April 2017, 90 minutes 5. Police (x3), 1 May 2017, 165 minutes 6. Police, 1 May 2017, 75 minutes 7. Police, 2 May 2017, 90 minutes 8. Public Prosecution Service, 2 May 2017, 90 minutes 9. Environment Agency, 2 May 2017, 60 minutes 10. FIOD (x6), 4 May 2017, 90 minutes 11. Police (x2), 5 May 2017, 150 minutes 12. Regional Information and Expertise Centre (RIEC) (x2), 5 May 2017, 90 minutes 13. Taskforce (x2), 10 May 2017, 120 minutes 14. Police, 16 May 2017, 60 minutes 15. Police (x4),16 May 2017, 90 minutes 16. Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), 15 June 2017, 90 minutes 17. FIOD, 15 June 2017, 90 minutes 18. FIOD, 15 June 2017, 90 minutes 19. FIOD, 16 June 2017, 90 minutes 20. Public Prosecution Service (x2), 16 June 2017, 90 minutes 21. Public Prosecution Service, 22 June 2017, 105 minutes 22. Public Prosecution Service (x2), 22 June 2017, 120 minutes 23. Police, 4 July 2017, 90 minutes 24. FIOD, 11 July 2017, 105 minutes 25. Public Prosecution Service, 11 July 2017, 90 minutes 26. Public Prosecution Service, 13 July 2017, 120 minutes 27. Police, 13 July 2017, 105 minutes 28. Police, 13 July 2017, 100 minutes 29. Police, 2 August 2017, 60 minutes 30. Police, 3 August 2017, 90 minutes 31. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 16 August 2017, 90 minutes 32. Ministry of Justice and Security (x3), 17 August 2017, 60 minutes 33. Criminal circles, 23 August 2017, 120 minutes 34. Police (x3), 28 August 2017, 90 minutes 35. Police, 14 September 2017, 60 minutes 36. Criminal circles, 3 October 2017, 120 minutes 37. Criminal circles, 24 October 2017, 90 minutes

Small country, Big Player 252 Literature and documents

38. Criminal circles, 24 October 2017, 100 minutes 39. Criminal circles, 22 November 2017, 90 minutes 40. Customs Service (x2), 4 December 2017, 90 minutes 41. Police, 13 December 2017, 90 minutes 42. Police, 13 December 2017, 120 minutes 43. Criminal circles, 22 December 2017, 45 minutes 44. Police, 3 April 2018, 180 minutes 45. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 16 April 2018, 60 minutes 46. Customs Service, 16 April 2018, 105 minutes 47. FIOD, 24 April 2018, 90 minutes 48. Police, 24 April 2018, 60 minutes

Small country, Big Player Supervisory committee

Josien van Aken (Public Prosecution Service, team leader for synthetic drugs)

Karijn van Doorne (Taskforce Brabant-Zeeland, policy advisor)

Neeltje Geldermans (Public Prosecution Service, national public prosecutor for synthetic drugs, until 1-9-2017)

Caspar Hermans (Taskforce Brabant-Zeeland, programme director)

Neeltje Keeris (Public Prosecution Service, national public prosecutor for synthetic drugs)

Ingrid van Lankeren (FIOD, Account and Investigative Information team leader for Collegial Team Southeast)

Liesbeth Maas (Police, programme manager for the Central Criminal Inves- tigations Division)

Jack Mikkers (mayor of ’s-Hertogenbosch)

Franca van Montfoort (RIEC Zeeland-Brabant, head)

Margot van de Mortel (FIOD, project leader for intelligence on precursors)

Wilbert Paulissen (Police, head of the Central Criminal Investigations Divi- sion)

Freek Pecht (Police, unit coordinator for synthetic drugs, Zeeland-West-Bra- bant Unit)

Marion Veltkamp (Public Prosecution Service, senior policy officer for synthetic drugs)

Small country, Big Player About the authors

Prof. dr. Pieter Tops (1956) is a scholar in public administration and holds a chair in organized crime at the police academy of the Netherlands

Judith van Valkenhoef, MSc (1989) is researcher at the Police Academy.

Dr. Edward van der Torre (1969) is lecturer of Area-based Policing at the Police Academy

Drs. Luuk van Spijk (1975) is researcher at the Police Academy.

Dr. Lex Lemmers is senior local policy advisor at Trimbos Institute.

Dr. Raymond Niesink is senior scientific member of staff at Trimbos institute.

Small country, Big Player The Police Academy is the training, knowledge and research centre of the Netherlands Police. The academy’s activities are aimed at continued quality improvement in the police profession, with knowledge and research providing important contributions. Activities focus on improving police practices and adapting the training. To achieve this, the research function keeps track of current affairs and developments, but also keeps an appropriate distance from everyday hustle and bustle. www.politieacademie.nl

This report was published at the same time as an abbreviated analysis. This analysis, The Netherlands and synthetic drugs: an inconvenient truth, is based on the underlying report, but can be read independently, and includes an interpretation of the facts. Both publications can be found here: www.politieacademie.nl/syntheticdrugs.