Issue 92 – Autumn 2013

50987®Flight Safety iss 92 2/10/13 13:42 Page 1 ISSUE 92 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY 13 AUTUMN The official publication of the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee ISSN 1355-1523 50987®Flight Safety iss 92 2/10/13 13:42 Page 2 Contents The Official Publication of THE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE ISSN: 1355-1523 AUTUMN 2013 FOCUS is a quarterly subscription journal devoted Editorial 1 to the promotion of best practises in aviation safety. It includes articles, either original or reprinted from other sources, related to safety issues throughout all areas of air transport operations. Besides providing information on safety Chairman’s Column 2 related matters, FOCUS aims to promote debate and improve networking within the industry. It must be emphasised that FOCUS is not intended as a substitute for regulatory information or company publications and procedures. New Flight Crew Reminder Function 3 Editorial Office: by Brad Cornell & Gordon Sandell The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey. GU24 8HU Tel: 01276 855193 Fax: 01276 855195 e-mail: [email protected] Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday Anti-Collision Warning Beacons – A view from the ground 6 by CAA Ground Handling Operations Safety Team Advertisement Sales Office: UKFSC The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey GU24 8HU Tel: 01276 855193 Fax: 01276 855195 email: [email protected] Navtech Charts and ADQ2-IR 9 Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk by Jonathan Kirk Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday Printed by: Woking Print & Publicity Ltd The Print Works, St. Johns Lye, St. Johns, Your Slip Is Showing 12 Woking, Surrey GU21 1RS Tel: 01483 884884 Fax: 01483 884880 by Joe Vizzoni e-mail: [email protected] Web: www.wokingprint.com FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose of improving flight safety and, unless copyright is Maker’s Way 16 indicated, articles may be reproduced providing that the source of material is acknowledged. by Robert W. Moorman Opinions expressed by individual authors or in advertisements appearing in FOCUS are those of the author or advertiser and do not necessarily reflect the views and endorsements of this journal, Members List 20 the editor or the UK Flight Safety Committee. While every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained herein, FOCUS accepts no responsibility for any errors or omissions in the information, or its consequences. Specialist advice should always be sought in Front Cover Picture: Investing in Next Generation Technology at CTC Aviation. relation to any particular circumstances. Credit: CTC Aviation and SIM Industries. focus autumn 13 50987®Flight Safety iss 92 2/10/13 13:42 Page 3 EDITORIAL Is Change Good for You? by Dai Whittingham, Chief Executive UKFSC ome years ago, I was surprised to find secure the engine at 8000ft in the descent that rejecting a touch and go is unwise simply Smyself feeling incredibly tired and subsequently made a safe landing. But because you will have no idea what following one of my monthly simulator what would they have done if the good performance figures you are dealing with or sessions (yes, we had to do one per engine had failed on them? Would a cold how much energy you will have to dissipate in month…). The session had only been an start on an uncontrollable engine have stopping - you will certainly not be able to hour from start to finish and had worked? And how would you fly the approach calculate a V1 with any reasonable accuracy. comprised a normal start-up and on one engine with a fixed EPR? (Now that You might think you will be able to stop, but departure, an electronic warfare exercise would be an interesting simulator exercise…) you can’t be certain. In effect, you are in that involved intercepting jamming Again, the simulator experience would have much the same situation as having landed targets, followed by a normal recovery via guided this crew into the scenario that engine long and hot, and your chances of a runway an instrument approach. problem = shut down. excursion (the No 1 cause of hull losses) are raised very significantly. All manual flying on instruments, but it was The same issue of simulator content becomes bread and butter, routine stuff. So why was I stark when we look at the Go Around. Of all My argument for ignoring the warning here so tired? I had asked myself the same the GAs that are flown, not many occur when is that the probability of the configuration question while sat with the obligatory coffee you are minus an engine and at Decision warning sounding during a touch and go afterwards, and eventually it dawned on me: I Altitude, but that is what you routinely is very high – you can expect flaps and trim had been working very much harder than practice in the simulator. In the air, you are to be in the wrong place when you push up normal. And the reason was simple – nothing much more likely to have a GA initiated by the power, so brief it accordingly. I would had gone wrong! I had not been presented ATC when you are still approaching the still want to take a quick look to see that with a single system failure or fault from start descent point, or at altitudes well above DA the flap selector is in the right detent to finish. But this was the simulator, where I because you recognise that you are unstable, and that speedbrake/spoilers are stowed, always ended up on one engine, or on fire, or or closer to the ground for the same reason. but everything else can wait until you with no electrics or hydraulics, or with a And then you have a light aircraft with lots of are airborne. complex scenario that eventually prompted excess power and we wonder why FDM shows an ejection decision and so I had spent the level busts, speed and pitch events. I think it fair to say that the simulator regime previous hour frantically scanning the cockpit – which has developed over many years - is trying to spot what I had obviously missed As another example of where simulator producing some expectation bias when it and with my mind working overtime on training may have influenced the outcome in comes to the GA and engine faults. Reliability possible ‘hidden’ problems. the wrong direction (NB: this is my personal has improved to the point where it is the ‘high assessment), there is an incident currently technical merit’ faults that more likely to be “And what has this got to do with us?” I hear under investigation in which a crew opted to encountered, so should we be practicing for you ask. Well, there have been a number of RTO because the configuration warning horn them? At the least, there are questions to be recent incidents where crews have shut down had sounded. There was some minor damage answered about what we use the simulators an engine when they didn’t really need to, to the aircraft, though it stopped within the to train for. Feel free to disagree with me; I with one captain observing that his available runway distance. The configuration will be happy to publish your letters because I experience in the simulator had been that warning system had operated as expected think it is a debate worth having. engine faults inevitably led to a shut down, and the crew will have responded accordingly hence he was pre-disposed to that as a course – indeed, the warning is used as a trigger for of action. I was always taught that, unless an RTO by many simulator instructors. So on the QRH directed otherwise, you only shut an this occasion, the crew responded per their engine down as the last resort; if possible, training. What is the problem with that? leave it at flight idle until you are certain you won’t need it again (ie you are on the ground). The problem is that this incident occurred during a touch and go. I accept that it is not In the last few months, a 757 crew was faced a normal manoeuvre, but it is often a part of with an engine stuck at 1.5 EPR; there was no initial base training or conversion to a new concrete advice in the QRH although time type; moreover, pilots are unlikely to be was available for discussion. They opted to exposed to touch and go without an instructor in the other seat. My own view is focus autumn 13 1 50987®Flight Safety iss 92 2/10/13 13:42 Page 4 CHAIRMAN’S COLUMN Manual Flying Skills by Capt Chris Brady, easyJet y predecessor wrote in the last Unfortunately, there are times when pilots the TCAS RA manoeuvre thereby reducing the Medition of FOCUS asking if don’t have a choice but to fly manually and number of inappropriate responses to an RA. technology had improved flight safety. I these may include high-workload situations think most of us would agree that the such as responses to TCAS, GPWS or Airports and Regulatory Authorities: Should be many technological advances over the windshear events; autopilot, hydraulics, probe encouraged to provide an RNAV approach for years have improved flight safety; the or IRS malfunctions; circling approaches, every runway not served by an ILS and accident statistics certainly bear this strong crosswinds, any landing in which arguably for ILS runways for when the ILS is out. However, the downside is that there autoland is not available and every take-off.

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