INFORMATION to USERS I Ts

Home , Abolition of monarchy, Chen Lifu, Feng Guozhang, Free China Journal, Vilfredo Pareto

INFORMATION TO USERS I tS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter free, while others may be from any type o f computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONSTRAINT AND CHOICE:

CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO DEMOCRACY

Shaohua Hu

submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service o f the American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Chair: eng^nao

nedman

Dr. Hyung^Kook Kim

Dr. Nicholas Onuf h v J o i d Dean of the School

Oa/vl&'L 1%T~ Date 1997 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 A ‘>c - A -ICAfJ LNiVERSiTY LIBRARY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9810889

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. © COPYRIGHT

Shaohua Hu

1997

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For my father, the late Jijian Hu and for my mother, Boying Ge

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONSTRAINT AND CHOICE:

CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO DEMOCRACY

Shaohua Hu

ABSTRACT

China established Asia’s first republic in 19 U, but still fell short of democracy at

the end of the twentieth century. This study attempts to explain why China lacks

democracy. The central theme is that the Chinese have wanted and needed a strong state

to pursue power and wealth since the 1840 Opium War. At first, democracy was thought

to facilitate a strong state, but what happened after the 1911 Revolution made the Chinese

realize that democracy did not necessarily strengthen, but might weaken the state. To treat

democracy not as an end, but as a means characterizes the Chinese attitude toward

democracy, and this utilitarian mentality determines that democratization has always been

put on the back burner.

To support this theme, this study takes a genetic approach. It examines the

impacts of historical legacies, local forces, the world system, socialist values, and

economic development on the democratization process in pre-1911 era, the Republican

one (1912-1927), the Nationalist one (1927-1949), the Maoist one (1949-1976), and the

Dengist one (1978-1997), respectively. While the first three factors set constraint on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. democratization process, the last two factors represent choices which do not emphasize

democracy. All these five factors contribute to China’s lack of democracy.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

This study endeavors to explain why China has failed to achieve democracy in the

20th century. Amid the extensive research on Chinese politics, this study hopes to make

its contribution in three ways. It will make a systematic analysis of the whole process,

characterize different phases of China’s democratization, and provide a framework of

analysis to study democratization.

My original interest was in studying economic modernization, as testified by my

previous dissertation title Literati and Samurai: The Impact of Chinese and Japanese

Elites on Modernization. My limited knowledge of Japan led me nowhere. Anxiety and

boredom drove me to make a two-week trip to Taiwan in July 1993, which was sponsored

by the China Reunification Alliance. The long separation and mutual hostility across the

Taiwan Strait had made Taiwan shrouded in mystery. What impressed me in Taiwan was

not prosperity, but democracy. Imperfect as it was, Taiwan’s political system struck me as

the first genuine and feasible democracy in Chinese history. During and after the trip, the

striking contrast between a democratic Taiwan and an authoritarian mainland raised the

question: Why had Taiwan achieved democracy and how long would it take for mainland

China to democratize itself? After all, peoples on both sides of the Strait are Chinese, hi

many ways, the Taiwanese preserve Chinese traditions better than do mainlanders. This

trip shifted my attention from economic modernization to political democratization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The new topic appeals to me because it was closely related to my life experiences,

hi retrospect, two watersheds separate three phases of my life: Mao’s death in 1976 and

my arrival in the United States after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Bom and raised in a

small town in Jiangsu province, I was no stranger to fear, poverty, and ignorance during

the Cultural Revolution. It was stability and egalitarianism which made life bearable.

Mao’s death opened the opportunity for reform, hi 19791 was fortunate enough to enter

the Department of International Politics at Peking University, a hotbed of intellectual and

democratic movements in 20th-century China, hi the eye of a political whirlwind, I was

surrounded by democratic ideas and movements. If my study at Beijing represents a

transition from traditional to modem society, my arrival at the other side of the Pacific

symbolized a contact between Eastern and Western civilizations. By living in a foreign

country, I am more willing and able to reflect on China: willing because people here

expect me to know China well; able because a different environment provides me with a

new perspective. The diametrical differences between China and America in politics,

economy, culture, society, geography, demography, and history led me to ponder the

merits and demerits of the democratic system and its feasibility in China.

However, my formal education is tangential to the subject of Chinese

democratization. A student of international politics, I did not receive enough training in

political theory or Chinese politics. Like the Soviet Union, Communist China dismissed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political science as a bourgeois pseudo-science and abolished political science

departments in universities. The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s contributed to the

establishment of two Departments of International Politics at Peking University and

Fudan University, but political science itself, especially western political theories, got

short shrift The program’s focus on international politics diverted attention from Chinese

politics. For purely academic and institutional reasons, political theory and Chinese

politics fell beyond my education at the School of International Service at the American

University.

hi writing this dissertation, I faced three difficulties. First, the broad subject of my

dissertation taxed my intelligence and knowledge. Not infrequently did I doubt the

wisdom of choosing this topic, but I did not give up. Social scientists have to make a

choice between broad and narrow subjects: the former tends to err on the side of

simplification, but may be compensated by insights; the latter tends to risk being

uninspiring, but may enjoy the advantage of being accurate. My academic environment

and personal temperament tipped the balance in favor of a broad subject. The dismal

future awaiting doctoral students in political science portended that my intellectual life

might not start with, but rather culminated in my dissertation, and this led me to take my

dissertation perhaps too seriously. My temperament also predisposes me to read and

reflect, rather than ferreting out new materials.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r

Self-reflection is often a painful process. On the cognitive level, my Chineseness

tends to block a new perspective and my familiarity with China may well discourage bold

generalizations. On the emotional level, my love for China may affect an objective

analysis in two different ways. One tendency is to serve as an apologist, refuting any

criticism leveled against China. The other tendency is to adopt a nihilist attitude toward it,

because love may make people cruel and despair.

The third difficulty in writing this dissertation is how to deal with the relations

between theory and history. Theory is a simplification of history. It does not and cannot

reflect the richness of history. I even argue that it should not do so, otherwise it would be

too similar to history to be useful. History could be compared to a picture; theory should

be regarded as a cartoon, which highlights some parts of history, but slights other parts.

To study the Chinese democratization process necessitates both theory and history, and

this double jeopardy requires a balance between being useful and being true.

To conduct research in an ivory tower would be pleasant, but to write a

dissertation in real life is no fun. By forgoing other parts of life and facing a gloomy

future, I cannot help comparing the enterprise to a fool’s errand. The difficulties of

writing this dissertation made me fully appreciate all the help I received from my

professors, colleagues and friends. I would like to express my indebtedness to those

individuals who criticized part or whole of the manuscript at various stages. They are

Yuguo Chen, Jack Gray, Lei Guang, Harry Harding, Charlotte Ku, Andrew Nathan,

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Lucian W. Pye, John Richardson, Martin Z. Rivlin, Richard H. Solomon, and Anne

Thurston. My thanks also go to those who have helped me in different ways: Ju-hsiu

Chang, Jian Chen, Jerome Hanus, Thomas J. Johnson, Lou Klarevas, Chu-cheng Ming,

Abdul Aziz Said, Yunshi Wang, and Menghua Zeng.

No words can express my gratitude to my dissertation advisers: Edward Friedman,

Hyung-Kook Kim, Serif Mardin, Nick Onuf, and Quansheng Zhao. Without their

patience, instruction and encouragement, this dissertation would be less satisfactory at

best, and nonexistent at worst.

In writing Chapter 2, “Historical Legacies and Democracy,” I have drawn upon my

published article: “Confucianism and Western Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary

China 6 no. 15 (July 1997), pp. 347-63.1 am thankful to Carfax Publishing Limited for its

permission to reproduce parts of this article.

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... ii

PREFACE ...... iv

Chapter

1. THE CHINESE PUZZLE...... 1

The Major Problem ...... 1 Democracy and Democratization...... 6 Existing Answers...... 16 An Alternative Explanation...... 22

2. HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND DEMOCRACY...... 29

General Conditions ...... 30 Confucian D octrine...... 35 Alternatives to Confucianism ...... 44 Authoritarian Traditions...... 53 Concluding Rem arks...... 64

3. LOCAL FORCES AND DEMOCRACY...... 65

Asia’s First Republic ...... 65 Temptation of Dictatorship ...... 78 Warlordism ...... 89 The Left Turn...... 96 Concluding Remarks...... Ill

4. THE WORLD SYSTEM AND DEMOCRACY ...... 113

China in the World System...... 114 The Nationalist Rule ...... 122 The Japanese Invasion...... 135 War and Revolution...... 147 Concluding Rem arks...... 156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5. SOCIALIST VALUES AND DEMOCRACY...... 158

Socialist Democracy ...... 159 Transformation to Socialism...... 165 Two Types of E rro r...... 174 Totalitarian Rule ...... 185 Concluding Remarks...... 195

6. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY ...... 197

Farewell to Totalitarianism ...... 198 Economic Development...... 205 Political Reform...... 214 The Legitimacy Crisis ...... 221 Concluding Remarks...... 231

7. EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION ...... 233

The Importance of Sequence...... 233 The Role of Pow er...... 241 The Limitations of Democracy ...... 249 Prospects for Democracy...... 254

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 266

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

THE CHINESE PUZZLE

All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.

Tolstoy, Anna Karenina

The Maior Problem

Why has China fallen short of a democratic system? This is the question this study

attempts to answer. Despite extensive studies on all kinds of Chinese political events,

thoughts, institutions, and personalities, not many studies focus on democratization

itself,1 and very few can be called systematic.

There are several reasons for the lack of attention. First, Chinese attempts at

1 The Tiananmen Incident aroused strong academic interests in Chinese democratization. For example, C. L. Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (New York: Norton, 1995); Andrew J. Nathan, “Is China Ready for Democracy?” Journal of Democracy 1 (Spring 1990): 50-61; Nathan and Tianjian Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey,” Daedalus (Spring 1993): 95-123; Elizabeth J. Perry and Ellen V. Fuller, “China’s Long March to Democracy,” World Policy Journal 8 (Fall 1991): 663-85; Dorothy J. Solinger, “Democracy with Chinese Characteristics,” World Policy Journal 6 (Fall 1989): 621-32; Brantly Womack, “hi Search of Democracy: Public Authority and Popular Power in China,” in Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective, ed. Brantly Womack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 53-89.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2

democracy are more frustrating than encouraging. For Andrew J. Nathan, “the democratic

experiments were few in number, short in duration, and limited in their democratic

characteristics. The democratic experiments were not robust on the electoral dimension

after 1918, and on the liberalism dimension after 1937.”2 The fact that Chinese

democratization process is not a success story but failed attempts is largely to blame.

Second, limitations of researchers also are in play. Nathan points out that Chinese

democracy is too broad a subject for a non-Chinese, but Chinese in the mainland do not

have the freedom of studying it.3 He may exaggerate the difficulties both Chinese and

non-Chinese scholars face, but there is some truth to his argument.

Such omissions can finally be attributed to prevalent methodologies. There is,

says Fernand Braudel, a constant tendency for social scientists to evade historical

explanation. They focus on doing two different things. Either they concentrate on specific

event; or they provide a mathematic formulation of structure.4 In China studies, most

studies fall into the first category. But careful study of trees does not necessarily allow us

to see the forest of democratization. Survey research comes closer to positive study, but

has major problems.5 Not only is the data hardly accessible, but such a method tends to

2 Andrew J. Nathan, “Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure,” The Journal of Contemporary China 4 (Fall 1993): 5.

3 Nathan, “Acknowledgment” in Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985).

4 Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: LongueThe Duree,” chap. in On History trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 35.

5 See, for example, Yongnian Zheng, “Development and Democracy: Are They Compatible in China?” Political Science Quarterly 109 (1994): 235-59; Jianhua Zhu,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

ignore the huge gap between attitudes and behavior, and to simplify the spectrum of

political behavior ranging from support, through indifference and tolerance, to opposition.

In reality, what distinguishes one society from another is not what it supports, but what it

does and what it tolerates. The Sermons on the Mount and the golden rule of the mean

exist in all societies one way or another. Comparative studies provide us with insights,6

but the study of democratization in socialist countries was often missing before the

collapse of socialism in East Europe.7 Besides, the fact that China is in a class of its own

diminishes the usefulness of comparative studies.

The question of why China has not democratized itself deserves more attention

than it has received. Nobody would doubt the practical importance of Chinese

democratization. China has accounted for between one-fifth and one-fourth of the world’s

population. And millions of unnatural death and political persecution in the 20th century

Xinshu Zhao, and Hairong Li, “Public Political Consciousness in China: A Empirical Profile,” Asian Survey 30 (October 1990): 992-1006; and Stanley Rosen, “Students and the State in China: The Crisis in Ideology and Organization,” in State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform, ed. Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1992), 167-91.

6 See, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France. Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

7 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Boulder, C.O.: Rienner, 1989); Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorship and Double Standards (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. resulted, directly or indirectly, from China’s lack of democracy.8

Scholars’ academic interests are not merely determined by the practical

importance of a subject. In many cases, scholars are motivated by a desire to solve a

puzzle. The twists and turns of Chinese democratization in the 20th century pose such an

intellectual challenge. China has almost exhausted all forms of political system, but none

of its regimes can qualify as a democracy. The 1911 Revolution ended a long-standing

dynastic system, and created Asia’s first republic, which was designed to be democratic.9

In no time, the new republic deteriorated into a dictatorship under Yuan Shih-kai’s role.

His political ambition culminated in his ill-fated dynasty called the “Grand Constitution

Chong-xian).” The power vacuum left by Yuan’s death in 1916 was soon filled by

numerous warlords. Anarchical warlordism prevailed in China. When Chiang Kai-shek

unified China in 1927, he delayed the establishment of a democratic system, and flirted

with fascism. After the Communists took over the mainland in 1949, a socialist state was

established and later turned into a totalitarian regime. During Deng Xiaoping’s reign,

China moved from totalitarianism to authoritarianism. All this is puzzling, because all

Chinese constitutions after the 1911 Revolution have recognized the people as sovereign,

8 R. J. Rummel, China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991).

9 Most theorists had employed the phrase “democratic republic,” or used the two terms interchangeably. In modem China, republic is treated as democratic republic, but in reality, it equals dictatorship without monarchy. But James Madison divides popular government into two types. Democracy refers to direct participation in a small society, and republic adopts representation in a big society. See James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 126.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

and no Chinese leaders have opposed democracy in principle.

One may argue that democratization takes time. But it is one thing that China has

not finished the long march to democracy; it is another that it has made little progress.

John H. Fincher reminds us that elected assemblies appeared at the local, provincial and

national levels in 1907, 1909, and 1910, respectively. Nearly two million non-official

elite, which accounted for about one percent of the adult male population, were qualified

for the 1909 election.10 hi the parliamentary elections of late 1912 and early 1913, over 40

million people, representing from 20 to 25 percent of the adult male population and 10

percent of the total population, enjoyed franchises.11 These records were even better than

those of Deng’s China, which allowed elections only at the village level.12

China’s failure to achieve democracy was more puzzling when it is put in

comparative perspective. By the end of the second millennium, democracy has swept

throughout the world. One may feel tempted to say that China is different. It has long

been influenced by Confucianism; it is poor and populous; and it is a vast socialist

10 John H. Fincher, Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local. Provincial and National Politics. 1905-1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 16.

11 John H. Fincher, “Political Provincialism and the National Revolution,” in China in Revolution: The First Phase. 1900-1913. ed. Mary Clabaugh Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 210.

12 For local participation, see, for example, J. Bruce Jacobs, “Elections in China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 25 (January 1991): 171-99; Susan V. Lawrence, “Democracy, Chinese Style,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32 (July 1994): 61-68; and M. Kent Jennings, “Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside.” American Political Science Review 91 (June 1997): 361-72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. country. By merely looking at China's neighbors, however, one will find that these claims

have become less justifiable. To the east, Japan and South Korea were heavily influenced

by Confucianism, but they have been democratized. Taiwan, a Chinese society imbued

with Confucianism, went democratic in the 1990s. To the south, India is also haunted by

poverty and overpopulation, but democracy has taken root there since its independence in

1947. To the north, the Soviet Union, a much larger and more socialist state, collapsed

and joined the democratic world in the early 1990s.

hi sum, it is understandable why China’s democratization process has been short

changed in China studies, but it deserves more attention than it has received, not only

because of its practical importance, but because of its intellectual challenges. The

extensive studies on 20th-century China made it both possible and necessary to conduct

research on the history of the“longue duree, ” as opposed to the “history of events.”13

Democracy and Democratization

hi order to explain China’s lack of democracy, it is necessary to understand what

democracy means and why China should become democratic, hi the 20th century,

democracy has gained such popularity that most world rulers have described their rule as

democratic, but most countries have not been democratic most of the time, and many

have witnessed unprecedented autocratic rule. Generally speaking, the term democracy is

misused, consciously or unconsciously, in two ways. First is to add an adjective to the

13 Braudel, On History, p. 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7

term. Since Western bourgeois democracy is the prototype of modem democracy,

modifications are made along two lines. Either people suggest theirs are not bourgeois

democracies, but are “people’s democracies,” “proletarian democracies,” or “socialist

democracies;” or they emphasize local characteristics of their systems, such as “Burmese

type of democracy” and “African type of democracy.” The second type of misuse is to

expand democracy into a laundry list, which contains almost all kinds of good things.

Earlier this century, westerners tended to think that democracy was too good for non-

western peoples; at present, they maintain that democracy is so good that it can be applied

to any society with little modification.

Then what is democracy? Modem democracy originated from Athens more than

2,500 years ago, when Cleisthenes allowed all citizens of Attica to preside over the affairs

of the city. Etymologically, the termdemocracy means rule by the people. One of the best

analysis of democracy was made by Aristotle, who, like virtually all famous Greek

scholars, was no fan of democracy.14 For him, democracy embodies the spirit of liberty.

While “the interchange of ruling and being ruled” forms political liberty, “living as you

like” constitutes civil liberty.1S Democracy comprises two conceptions: popular

sovereignty and individual liberty.16 Based on Aristotle’s definition of democracy, this

study will define democracy in terms of freedom, which involves both positive and

14 A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), 41-72.

15 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle trans. and intro. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 258.

16 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle. 234.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8

negative aspects.17 Freedom in the positive sense means a situation in which people have

the ability to interfere in government; freedom in the negative sense means a situation in

which people have a right to live without arbitrary interference from government.

Athenian democracy differed from modem democracy in several ways. First,

along with tyranny and oligarchy, democracy was regarded by the Greeks as a corrupt

form of government Second, Athenian democracy took the form of direct democracy,

where citizens directly participated in making laws, although women, slaves and resident

aliens were excluded. Finally, regardless of their properties and talents, rulers were

selected not by ballot, but by lots.

Whatever the differences between Athenian and modem democracy, modem

democracy is still based on these two principles—popular sovereignty and individual

liberty. Ideal as the principle of popular sovereignty may be, it is technically impossible to

let people in a nation-state decide everything.18 In fact, modem democracies are not

participatory, but representative. The principle of popular sovereignty in modem times

hinges on two major mechanisms: the separation of powers advocated by Montesquieu

17 Isaiah Berlin makes a remarkable distinction between “positive freedom” and “negative freedom.” See his ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,” chap. in Four Essavs on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 121-34.

18 Theorists of different stripes deemed direct rule by the people to be impossible. See, for example, Robert Michels, an elitist theorist, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy trans. E. Paul and C. Paul, intro. S. M. Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1962), 366; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a staunch advocate of popular sovereignty, The Social Contract in The Essential Rousseau trans. Lowell Bair, intro. Matthew Josephson (New York: New American Library, 1975), 57.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9

and the competitive election highlighted by Schumpeter.19 While the ruled choose their

rulers during an election, rulers are mutually checked and balanced before and after the

election. On balance, the competitive election is more important than the separation of

powers in determining the nature of a particular political system, because divisions of

labor is employed in any government, especially a modem one. Robert A. Dahl goes

further to identify two dimensions of elections—public contestation and inclusiveness—

and privileges the former over the latter.20 This is without reason. What constitutes people

has undergone great changes in terms of class, gender, race, and age. Universal elections

are a relatively new phenomenon.

Individual liberty is another principle of democracy. Two modem British thinkers

figure prominently in advocating individual liberty. John Locke emphasizes that

individuals are the best judge of their self-interests, and that even a democratic

government has no right to damage people’s life, liberty and property. John Stuart Mill

cautions that the tyranny of the majority poses threats to individual liberty, and stresses

that society should be on its guard against the tyranny of both government and the

19 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 157-66; Joseph A. Schumpeter reduces democracy to opportunities for the people to choose those who are to rule them. See his Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), 269.

20 Robert A. Dahl, Polvarchv: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10

majority.21

Liberalism characterizes modem democracy. For a long time, human beings

embraced an organicist conception of society, privileging society over individuals. Even

ancient democrats lacked the doctrine of natural rights and the notion of minimal state.22

Starting from Thomas Hobbes,23 modem contract theory has adopted an individualistic

conception, imagining that individuals precede the establishment of society. Despite the

importance of liberalism to modem democracy, it is important to point out that popular

sovereignty takes precedence over individual liberty, because while the former refers to

the source and purpose of government, the latter deals with the scope of government.

Besides, individual liberty may be historically and culturally specific. Suffice it to

mention the good old days in New England, whose ordinances required church-going,

prohibited drunkenness, and outlawed adultery. Today’s Yankee would regard all these as

violations of individual liberty.

In the 20th century, democracy and totalitarianism are regarded as two ends of the

political spectrum.24 To put it in terms of ideal types, a government respecting both

21 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government ed. Richard Cox (Arlington Heights, LL.: Davidson, 1982), 82-87; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1986), 10-11.

22 For relations between liberalism and democracy, see Norberto Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy trans. Martin Ryle and Kate Soper (London; Verso, 1990).

23 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan ed. and intro. C. B. MacPherson (New York; Penguin Books, 1981).

24 Gabriel Almond classifies the universe of political systems into four categories; Anglo-American systems, preindustrial systems, continental European systems, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

principles of popular sovereignty and individual liberty is democratic; a government

violating them is totalitarian. A hybrid system, which is neither democratic nor

totalitarian in the strictest sense of the term, contains two sub-types: one may respect

popular sovereignty but violate individual liberty; the other may violate popular

sovereignty but respect individual liberty. For Francis Fukuyama, today’s Islamic

Republic of Iran and 18th century Britain represent these two types, respectively.25

Throughout human history, few regimes have ever been totalitarian and most have been

authoritarian. Compared with totalitarian regimes, authoritarian regimes are less willing

and less able to damage people’s rights and interests.26

The question of why China lacks democracy implies an assumption that China

should become democratic. To introduce democracy, a more recent Western political

system, to China, an oriental country with a long and rich political history, requires

justification. Emile Durkheim regarded Kantian deontology and Benthamite utilitarianism

as two major moral theories.27 The former treats individuals as an end rather than a

totalitarian systems. See his “Comparative Political System,” Journal of Politics 18 (August, 1956): 391-409.

25 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), 43-44.

26 Juan J. Linz defines authoritarian systems in terms of their mode of interest representation, “mentality,” degree of mobilization, and position of the leader. See his “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, ed. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, with a foreword by Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1970): 251-83.

27 See Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx. Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. means, and the latter advocates the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.

Democracy tends to be justified along these two lines. To be specific, what justifies

democracy is as follows. First, it accords with human nature. No one expresses the basis

of democracy better than Reinhold Niebuhr, who holds that “men’s capacity for justice

makes democracy possible; but men’s inclination to injustice makes democracy

necessary.”28 Democracy is based on the assumption that human beings are self-

interested. Without external constraints, rulers tend to expand their power. This

assumption would fail the test of falsificationa la Popper,29 for not all human behavior is

motivated by self-interest.30 Despite its over-generalization and oversimplification, the

assumption is more valid than its null assumption, which holds that human nature is not

self-interested. After all, most human behavior is self-interested, but not necessarily

selfish. Besides, Machiavelli’s pessimistic view of human nature31 was not a voice in the

Press, 1971), 68. In the same vain, Max Weber draws a distinction between the “ethic of ultimate ends” and the “ethic of responsibility.” Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essavs in Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 120.

28 Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, “Young Democracies Face Big Challenges,” The Free China Journal (September 8, 1995): 7.

29 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge & Paul, 1969).

30 Max Weber identifies several basic types of social action: “rational” action, “value rational” action, “affective” action, and “traditional” action. See Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory. 152-53.

31 Machiavelli says, “One can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well, they are yours.” He adds, “It can be observed that men use various

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. wilderness, but was echoed in the mainstream of the modem world. According to the

“Thomas Theorem,” “if men define situations as real, they are real in their

consequences.” Not the least of all, common sense suggests that it is wiser to base policy

on a pessimistic assumption than an optimistic one. Most sound policies are based on

worst-case scenarios, although the prisoners’ dilemma suggests that rational and self-

interested acts may produce sub-optimal results. Since human beings, rulers and ruled

alike, are neither omniscient nor selfless, democracy is commendable.

Second, democracy better reflects the nature of society, and its flexibility and

open-endedness allow it to accommodates all kinds of situations. Human society never

lacks conflicting values and interests. Even in a society full of resources and collectivism,

people would still disagree over what constitutes the common good and how to achieve

it.32 For Aristotle, people generally agree that happiness is the final good in human

society, but there are different views as to what happiness is.33 Immanuel Kant even

praises antagonism within society as the means used by nature to further the development

methods in pursuing their own objectives, that is glory and riches.” See his The Prince (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), 96,131.

32 Joseph V. Femia, Marxism and Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 173. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 95.

33 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics trans. & intro. David Ross, revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), especially Book I ‘The Good for Man,” 1-27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14

of innate human capacities.34 Simply suppressing conflict does not solve, but may even

create problems. By respecting majority rule and minority rights, democracy provides a

fair and efficient mechanism to facilitate decision making.35 Democracy might even allow

people to forgo their democratic system under two conditions. Either they lack enough

information to make a good judgment, hence entrusting power to those who do not

deserve their trust. The fate of the Weimar Republic is a case in point Or situations

become so bad that they voluntarily relinquish basic democratic principles. It is an old

custom that Eskimos over a certain age voluntarily committed suicide to avoid being a

burden to their communities.

Third, democracy respects individual decisions and encourages individual

development. Although individuals cannot live outside societies, it is individual existence

that makes life meaningful. So individual decisions should be respected. John Stuart Mill

says, “If a person possess any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own

mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because

it is his own mode.” Kant went so far as to regard paternalistic government as the greatest

conceivable despotism.36 We all know that doing more exercises and eating less meat is

good for one’s health, but the final decision should rest with individuals. To force them to

do what is right but unpleasant would make their lives miserable and deny meanings to

34 Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, ed. & intro. & notes by Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet. 2d, enl. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 44.

35 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. 33.

36 Mill, On Liberty. 77. Kant, Kant: Political Writings. 74.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. their lives. What makes democracy more precious is the fact that while obedience and

passivity entailed by despotism stifled individual development, democracies encouraged

individuals to realize their intellectual and moral potentials, which in turn contributed to

human development as a whole.

Last but not least, democracy is more valuable in modem times, in which the

leviathan of the state needs to be tamed and controlled. The increasing role of the state in

society is a characteristic of modem society. As Dankwart A. Rustow points out that:

The last two centuries provide significant landmarks of this increase, such as the spread of conscription on the European continent after Carnot’slevee en masse of 1793; the adoption of universal public education in the early nineteenth century; the shift in public revenue from customs and excises to income taxes, first level and then steeply graduated; the development of governmental welfare services and of central economic planning in this century; and the enormously expanded use of the means of public information and propaganda.37

China serves as an example. As the main source of state finance in the late Qing dynasty,

The land tax merely accounted for 5-6 percent of the harvest, which was very low by

world standards. In the Qing dynasty, the ratio of state functionaries to people was 1 to

600; the comparable figure in Communist China was 1 to 35.38 Expansion of state applies

to both totalitarian regimes and democratic countries. For example, from 1953 to 1973,

government spending as the average percentage of the gross national product increased

37 Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 19.

38 Joseph Esherick, ‘Ten Theses on the Communist Revolution,” Modem China 21 (January 1995): 57,69.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16

from 34 percent to 49 percent in OECD countries.39 All these justifies the introduction of

democracy in modem world.

Existing Answers

Adam Przeworski divides the study of democratization into two types: macro-

oriented and micro-oriented. The former focuses on objective conditions and partakes of

determinism. The micro-oriented studies emphasize political actors’ strategic behavior in

particular situations. For a long time, scholars have tried to find out the conditions for

establishment and maintenance of democracy. Samuel P. Huntington identifies twenty

seven possible independent variables used to explain democracy and democratization.

Most scholars prefer to narrow the variables down to a few. Robert A. Dahl, for example,

elaborates seven conditions: historical sequences, the degree of concentration in the

socioeconomic order, level of socioeconomic development, inequality, subcultural

cleavages, foreign control, and the beliefs of political activists.40

China studies reflect the overall situation. Focusing on the Republican era (1912-

1928), Franklin W. Houn attributed the failure of democracy to many factors. The 1911

39 John Burton, Whv no Cuts?: An Inquiry into the Fiscal Anarchy of Uncontrolled Government Expenditure (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1985), 26.

40 Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, foreword by Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 47; Huntington, The Third Wave. 37- 38; and Dahl, Polvarchv. 32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17

revolution was incomplete and unsatisfactory. People lacked political and educational

capabilities, public spirit, a sense of citizenship, a desire for self-government, strong

public opinion, and a respect for law. China also lacked a sound government structure, a

middle class and loyal opposition parties. There existed military and foreign

intervention.41

With an eye to the early 1990s, Martin King Whyte identified several groups of

barriers to Chinese democratization. The first concerns China’s history and traditions.

The second concerns the absence of sociological factors, such as a legal tradition with an

emphasis on the rule of law, a commercialized society and money economy, independent

sources of power and opinion, a powerful middle class, and a conception of universal

citizenship. An extreme version of the Leninist organization constitutes the third barrier.

The fourth barrier consists of China’s poverty, low level of education, large territory,

preponderance of peasants, and huge population. The fifth barrier is called the “no

Gorbachev” argument. Unlike its counterparts in East Europe, Chinese socialism was

indigenous. The last barrier is that the economy was good so that democratization had a

difficult sell42

Looking at the Chinese democratization process as a whole, Andrew J. Nathan

lists nine possible causes. Democracy has never been a dominant ideology. Internal and

41 Franklin W. Houn, Central Government of China. 1912-1928: An Institutional Study (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1959), 161-75.

42 Martin King Whyte, “Prospects for Democratization in China,” Problems of Communism (May-June, 1992): 59-62,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18

external wars led the Chinese to give priority to national security. Militarism undercut

civilian authority. Chinese political culture may be inhospital to democracy. China was

too underdeveloped. Peasants delayed the democratization process. Faulty constitutions

and institutions created problem for democracy. The political activists were

undemocratic. Military-based elites find little benefits in the process.43

Indeed, multiple factors determine the democratization process, and most scholars

concur with Huntington that no single factor is a necessary or sufficient precondition for

democracy.44 But a mere listing provides few insights and constitutes no analysis. So

many scholars seek economic and cultural explanations. The economic perspective

highlights the significance of economic factors. For many, the level of economic

development correlates positively with democracy 45 It is said that economic development

creates a middle class, who will spearhead the democratization movement. For Barrington

Moore, Jr., “no bourgeois, no democracy.” Economic development also facilitates liberal

views, because education fosters tolerance and reduces extremism. Lipset concludes that

43 Nathan, “Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure,” 3-13.

44 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer, 1984): 214.

45 Seymour Martin Lipset claims that “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” See his “Economic Development and Democracy,” chap. in Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 27-63; Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” Journal of Economic Perspective 7 (Summer, 1993): 71-85.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19

a high level of education is a necessary condition for democracy.46

Economic explanation has its limitations. First, the role of economic factors is

exaggerated. Andrew Nathan says that “social scientists have identified no absolute

threshold of development required to qualify a people for democracy, but China is now

clearly above the minimum level in simple economic terms and far above it with regard to

social development and communication facilities.”47 Second, a middle class does not

necessarily constitute a challenge to authoritarian regimes, hi Chinese history, merchants

and officials are less rivals than allies. In Taiwan’s democratization, rich businessmen

and the middle class have long been the most loyal followers of authoritarian rule.48

Finally, the economic argument may have negative implications. Rulers often used the

backward economy as an excuse to delay democratization. On the eve of the 1989

Tiananmen Incident, neo-authoritarianism called for an enlightened authoritarianism to

facilitate economic modernization 49

The cultural perspective emphasizes the importance of cultural factors.50

46 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 418; Lipset, “Economic Development and Democracy,” 40.

47 Nathan, “Is China Ready for Democracy?” 51.

48 Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism. 155.

49 For the debate on the neo-authoritarianism, Liu Ling and Liu Jun, ed., Neo- Authoritarianism: Debate on Theories of Reform (Beijing: Economic Institution Press, 1989).

50 For the discussion of political culture, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 3-76; and Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, ed., Political

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20

Huntington regards culture as a central independent variable in explaining different

patterns of political and economic development. Through cross-national historical

studies, Lipset and his collaborators find that cultural factors appear more important than

economic ones. Francis Fukuyama argues that democratization occurs at the levels of

ideology, institutions, civil society, and culture. For him, what matters most are

developments at the third and especially fourth levels.51 Generally speaking, Western

culture is said to be conducive to democracy, because it believes in the individual’s value,

human freedom, and the rule of law. By contrast, many scholars highlighted the negative

impact of Chinese culture on democratization.52

There are several problems with the cultural perspective. First, any culture is not

Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 3-26, 512-60. Larry Jay Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, C.O.: Rienner, 1993).

51 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Goals of Development,” in Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1987), 22; Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requites of Democracy.” International Social Science Journal 45 (May 1993): 155-75; and Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture.” Journal of Democracy 6 no. 1 (January 1995): 7- 14.

52 For analyses of China’s political culture, see Lloyd E. Eastman, “Social Traits and Political Behavior in Kuomintang China,” chap. in The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule. 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 283- 313; Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985); Arthur H. Smith, Chinese Characteristics (Shanghai: North-China Herald Office, 1890); Richard H. Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); He Baogang, “Democratization: Antidemocratic and Democratic Elements in the Political Culture of China,” Australian Journal of Political Science 27 (1992): 120- 36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21

as coherent and unambiguous as we assume. Its complexity and even self-contradictions

make a cultural perspective oversimplified and overgeneralized. Second, many cultural

preconditions of democracy have been regarded more and more as results of democracy.

More often than not, democratic values follows, rather than precede democratic systems.

For Barrington Moore, Jr., ‘To explain behavior in terms of cultural values is to engage

in circular reasoning.” Last, a cultural perspective partakes of determinism. Lucian W.

Pye once identifies two different views. Either, government policies tend to reflect

cultural characteristics, or they use their culture for the purpose of modernization. He

dismisses the first view as deterministic, and endorses the second view which allows for

the role of choice and even accidents.53

To sail between the Scylla of numerous explanans and the Charybdis of one

explanan, some scholars focus on process and interaction.54 Terry Karl and Philippe

Schmitter hold that the search for democratic prerequisites is misguided.55 fit studying

53 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 486; Pye, Asian Power and Politics. 29.

54 The following writings are representative. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and The Class Struggle in France in The Marx-Eneels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 594-652. Leonard Binder and others, Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Juan Linz, Crisis. Breakdown, and Equilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-21; and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

55 Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schimitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America: Southern and Eastern Europe,” International Social Science Journal 43 (May 1991): 269-84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22

democratization in Latin America, Karl argues that instead of searching for new

preconditions, one should examine the mode of regime transition and strategic

interactions. In studying democratization in East Asia, Edward Friedman highlights the

importance of the political process. For him, cultural and socioeconomic factors are

relatively stable, but political factors did suddenly change.56

An Alternative Explanation

This study does not single out one factor to explain China’s lack of democracy,

simply because what determines the outcome of democratization is not a single magic

factor, but rather a set of interacting factors. Nor does this study intend to add more

factors, both because the existing lists are already exhaustive, and because a laundry list

does not represent a theoretical explanation. As an alternative, this study focuses on the

role of the state itself throughout modem Chinese history.57

The central theme is that the Chinese wanted and needed a strong state, but not

necessarily a democratic one. Since the 1840 Opium War, China’s most important

56 Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” 19. Edward Friedman, ed., The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1994), 10.

57 For the importance of the state, see, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, ed., Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Clive Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23

objective has been to pursue power and wealth.58 To achieve this objective, a strong state

has been deemed as imperative. At first, democracy was thought to facilitate a strong

state, but what happened after the 1911 Revolution made the Chinese realize that

democracy did not necessarily strengthen, but might weaken the state. To treat democracy

not as an end, but as a means characterizes the Chinese attitude toward democracy, and

this utilitarian mentality determines that democratization has always been put on the back

burner.

To support this theme, I use a genetic explanation. Ernest Nagel, the former

president of the American Philosophical Association, once identified four major types of

explanation: deductive, probabalistic, functional or teleological, and genetic.59 Alan C.

Isaak regards genetic explanation as unique. While all other explanations take the form of

“if A (representing laws and initial conditions), then B (the explanandum),” a genetic

explanation, in its simplest two-stage form, looks like “If A (factors at time 1), then B

58 This view was popularized by Benjamin Isadore Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964). This dual objectives was nothing new, as described by the first article of World Politics. Jacob Viner, ‘Tower versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” World Politics 1 (October, 1948): 1-29.

59 For genetic explanations, see Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, ed., Crisis. Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973); W. B. Gallie, “Explanation in History and the Genetic Sciences,” in Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner (New York: Free Press, 1959), 386-402; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcour, Brace & World, 1961), 20-26. Sidney Verba, “Sequences and Development,” in Binder and others, Crises and Sequences in Political Development. 283-316. Alan C. Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science: An Introduction to the Methodology of Political Inquiry 4th ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1985), 145-61.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24

(consequent factors); and if C (B plus other factors at time 2), then D (explanandum).”60

In other words, genetic explanation uses several explanantia to explain an explanandum

over time. Rather than highlighting any single link, it emphasizes the entire chain of

events and identifies continuity between explanantia and explanandum. It deserves

mentioning that although both genetic explanation and a sequential model of political

development61 emphasize the importance of historical sequence, the former is more

modest than the latter. A sequential model seeks to be universally applicable, but a

genetic explanation tends to be historically specific.

A genetic explanation requires a coverage of whole historical process. My study

contains five stages. The first stage covers Chinese history before the 1911 Revolution.

Traditional China was not monolithic or static, but it displayed basic characteristics. The

second stage is the Republic era from the 1911 Revolution to the unification of China in

1928. The unification heralded the Nationalist era, which lasted until the Communists

took over China in 1949. The fourth stage is the Maoist era from 1949 to 1976 when Mao

died. Following the Maoist era is the Dengist era from 1978 to 1997. These five stages

represent all cases in modem Chinese history.

Isaiah Berlin says, “The purpose of history is to paint a portrait of a situation or a

process, which like all portraits, seeks to capture the unique pattern and peculiar

60 Isaak, Scone and Methods of Political Science. 156.

61 See, for example, G. A. Almond and G. B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1966); A. F. K. Organski, Stages of Political Growth (New York: Knopf, 1965); Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25

characteristics of its particular subject.”62 With a view to exploring negative impacts on

the democratization process, this study provides an analytical framework which consists

of five factors — historical legacies, local forces, the world system, socialist values, and

economic development.63 My study finds that these five factors characterize the afore

mentioned five eras, respectively. No doubt, such an association is an ideal type, a

heuristic reconstruction of reality,64 because all these factors are at work in all eras. But it

not only captures distinctive features of China’s democratization process in the 20th

century, but also makes the study technically manageable and theoretically insightful.

Although the selection of these five factors is based on Chinese history, they may

contribute to the understanding of democratization processes in other countries. Edward

Hallett Carr once distinguished between rational and accidental causes. While rational

causes might be applicable to other cases and lead to fruitful generalizations, accidental

62 Isaiah Berlin, “History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History,” in Generalizations in Historical Writing, ed. Alexander V. Riasanovsky and Barnes Riznik (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 91.

63 In his presidential address at the American Political Science Association, Lucian W. Pye suggested to combine Robert A. Dahl’s seven sets of conditions, the elements of Dankwart A. Rustow’s dynamic model, and basic political cultures and historical conditions. My study seems to answer his call, because it contains five explanatory factors and emphasizes the dynamic process. See his “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” American Political Science Review 84 (March 1990): 14- 15.

64 Anthony Giddens says that “An ideal type is constructed by the abstraction and combination of an indefinite number of elements which, although found in reality, are rarely or never discovered in this specific form.” Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory. 141.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26

causes are unique, hence defying generalization and teaching no lessons.65 The five

factors in my study fall into the former category, because they are at work in other

countries, albeit in different scope, intensity, and sequence.

Specifically speaking, no democratization has occurred in a political vacuum, and

all are constrained by their historical legacies. The remaining four factors correspond to

Talcott Parsons’ functional prerequisites. For him, any system must satisfy four needs or

requirements. It must adapt to its environment{adaptation), have a means of mobilizing

its resources to achieve its objective {goal attainment), coordinate its components

{integration), and maintain equilibrium as much as possiblepattern ( maintenance).66

Likewise, any state system in modem world have to meet these four requirements. In my

analytical framework, the world system, socialist values, local forces, and economic

development are related toadaptation, goal attainment, integration andpattern

maintenance, respectively, hi a modem world, no country can be immune to outside

influence. Although most countries have not adopted socialist system, all countries

adopted some values and measures which typify socialism. The modem state has to strike

a balance between central authorities and local forces. Economic development probably

represents the single most important human aspiration and creates tension between

change and order. It goes without saying that all these functions interact with the

65 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 140- 41.

66 For a brief introduction to Parsons’ idea, see Ian Craib, Modem Social Theory: From Parsons to Habermas 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27

democratization process.

The structure of this study will follow a chronological order. Following this

chapter, Chapter 2, “Historical Legacy and Democracy,” examines the impact of China’s

general conditions, traditional political thoughts, and political tradition on

democratization. As the oldest uninterrupted civilization on earth, modem China not only

inherited a huge empire, but retains its distinctive political thoughts and traditions. The

force of inertia was too powerful for any political transformation.

Chapter 3, “Local Forces and Democracy,” explores how local forces affected

China’s political development in the Republican Era. Western incursions forced the

Chinese to make political changes to meet foreign challenges. The 1911 Revolution

eliminated the monarchial systems, but post-revolutionary China disintegrated and local

forces continued to assert themselves. It follows that unification took precedence over

democracy in this period.

Chapter 4, “The World System and Democracy,” analyzes the ways in which the

world system shaped China’s democratization process in the Nationalist Era. Chiang Kai-

shek’s unification of China in 1927 was symbolic, and he had to complete the process of

nation-building. His efforts aimed to increase China’s international status, but they were

interrupted by the Japanese invasion and the civil war in the context of the Cold War. In

the face of foreign invasion and internal disturbance, democracy did not top the political

agenda.

Chapter 5, “Socialist Values and Democracy,” looks at how the pursuit of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28

socialism affected China’s democratization process. The Communists’ rise to power

changed China’s political development to new directions. Liberal democracy was no

longer cherished. Mao thought that socialist democracy was superior to bourgeois

democracy, but his rule turned out to be totalitarian.

Chapter 6, “Economic Development and Democracy,” seeks to examine the

impact of economic development on democracy in the Dengist era. After Mao, Deng

endeavored to foster economic development while keeping one party rule. Deng parted

company with Mao’s totalitarianism, and put economic development before everything

else. Economic development unleashed all kinds of forces, and to control them required a

strong state and diverted attention from democratization.

Having focused on dynamic analysis, the final chapter, “Explanation and

Prediction,” offers a static explanation, predicts the future of Chinese democratization,

and draws some historical lessons. The explanation for China’s lack of democracy

emphasizes the importance of historical sequence, the role of power relations and the

limited utility of democracy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ' f

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND DEMOCRACY

Let the prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father, the son a son.

Confucius

Marx says that “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they

please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under

circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.”1 This certainly applies

to the study of the Chinese democratization. Few people doubt that historical legacies

represent a logical starting-point in such a study, but most of them rind it difficult to

assess how and to what extent historical legacies affect the democratization process.

hi fact, what should be included and excluded would generate controversy in the

first place. Vilfredo Pareto maintains that what determines the forms of society are

environment, external elements, such as foreign influences in spatial terms and historical

conditions in temporal terms, and internal elements. Alexis de Tocqueville attributed

American democracy to three kinds of conditions; its government structure, geographical

and historical accidents, and American culture.2 Despite their different explanantia and

1 The Marx -Engels Readers, ed. Tucker, 595.

2 Vilfredo Pareto, Sociological Writings selected and intro. S. E. Finer, trans. Derick Mirfin (New York: Praeger, 1966), 251. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1

explan anda, a moment’s reflection would reveal their similarities. Pareto’s first two

categories correspond to Tocqueville’s second condition; Tocqueville’s first and third

conditions can be subsumed under Pareto’s last category.

This study breaks down historical legacies into general conditions, political

thoughts, and political traditions. Such a division makes it possible to assess the impact of

historical legacies on the Chinese democratic process. I will first look at the impact of

general conditions, which set constraints on the Chinese historical development. I will

then compare and contrast Confucian doctrine with modem democracy in a systematic

way. While people have rightly focused on Confucianism, they have wrongly ignored

three other important doctrines —Legalism, Mohism, and Taoism. This does not mean

that no solid research has been done, but mean that few have compared them with

democratic thoughts. The third section attempts to provide a preliminary analysis in this

respect. What shapes political traditions of a particular country is less its political

thoughts than its political practices. So the final section will examine how democratic or

undemocratic Chinese political traditions were.

General Conditions

Today’s political map demonstrates that democracies can exist in all kinds of

countries, irrespective of their wealth, culture, and size. While it is futile to point out

certain unsurmountable obstacles to democracy, it is safe to say that some features are

America (New York: Vintage Books, 1990).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. more conducive to democracy than others. China’s vast territories, huge population, harsh

environment, long history, and geographical isolation are not favorable to democracy.

Lying in the eastern part of the Eurasian continent, China possesses a territory as

large as that of Europe and ranks third, only next to Russia and Canada. Although China

was not always as large as it is today, other empires and nations were much smaller.

Within that huge territory, regional diversity surpasses that of Europe and the Indian

subcontinent. The contrast between North and South China, which is divided by the Huai

River in the east and the Qinling Mountains in the west, is striking. The Yangtze River

has long blocked overland communications between the south and the north. While the

north is strategically important, the south is economically prosperous. In modem times,

the difference between the coastal region and interior area assumes increasing

importance. The former is more open and developed than the latter.3

A large and diverse territory poses challenge to any state, especially in traditional

times. Before modem times all democracies existed in small political entities. As the

cradle of democracy, Athens was small enough to walk across in two days. For Aristotle,

the polis is a community with a view to some good purpose. It is a natural development

from the household and the village. It represents the last stage in a historical evolution

and is sufficient in meeting human needs. Once a community has grown too large, it

3 For a brief introduction to Chinese geography, see Norton Ginsburg, “The Geography of China,” in Understanding Modem China ed. and intro. Joseph M. Kitagawa (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

cannot be well governed or provide for sufficient political participation.4 Montesquieu

even thought that large, medium and small state correspond to despotism, monarchy and

republic, respectively.5 That pre-modem democracy was participatory rather than

representative excluded the possibility that the Chinese could enjoy it.

As early as the Neolithic ages, China had a greater population density than did

Mesopotamia and Greece.6 Ever since its unification in 221 B.C., China has remained the

most populous nation on earth. A population explosion occurred in the Qing dynasty

(1644-1911). From 1711 to 1812, the population in China increased fifteen times to 360

million.7 This presented a striking contrast to Athens, whose population was about

350,000 when the Peloponnesian War broke out. Among them, half were Athenians,

about a tenth resident aliens, and the rest slaves. Even among such a small population,

only adult males participated in democracy. A huge population does not facilitate a

participatory democracy, because it renders it difficult to organize political life and

4 R. G. Mulgan, “The Polis,” chap. in Aristotle's Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977), 13-37.

5 For the relations between size and democracy, see Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws. 112-28; and Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

6 David N. Keightley “Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How it Became Chinese,” in Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization, ed. Paul S. Ropp (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 48.

7 Modem China: From Mandarin to Commissar trans. and intro. Dun J. Li (New York: Scribner, 1978), 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

decreases people’s interest in public policy.8 In addition, high population density militates

against an individualistic-oriented social ethic.

The balance between population and resources in China was not enviable. Most of

China’s territory is not suitable for production or inhabitation. About 10 per cent of the

area, which is mostly in the eastern part of China, is intensely cultivated, hi 1793, five

years before the publication of Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population.

Chinese scholar Hong Liangji warned that population increase would far surpass food

supply.9 Now China accounts for 21 percent of the world’s total population, but possesses

only 7 percent of the world’s water resources and arable lands.10 Moreover, natural

disasters frequented China. For example, the period from 108 B.C. to 1911 A.D.

witnessed 1828 famines in at least one province. From 620 to 1619, at least one province

experienced insufficient rain in 610 years and severe drought in 203 years. Sometimes a

drought lasted six years.11 In a 3,000-year period, the Yellow River caused more than

1,500 floods. As the cradle of the Chinese civilization, it has ironically been named

“China’s Sorrow.” The harsh natural environment was too much for individuals to

8 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

9 Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China. 1368-1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 271.

10 For China’s ecological situations, see Vaclav Srail, China’s Environmental Crisis: An Inquiry to the Limits of National Development (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993).

11 Roger Howard, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese People (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34

handle, so collectivism and a strong state were necessary. According to Karl Wittfogel,

oriental despotism was based on the hydraulic role of the state.12

China boasts the oldest uninterrupted civilization in history. China’s recorded

history started with the Shang dynasty in the 14th century B.C. The unification of China

in 221 B.C. laid a solid foundation for China. Most scholars would concur with Emanuel

C. Y. Hsu that “China’s political system, social structure, economic institutions, and

intellectual atmosphere remained substantially what they had been during the previous

2,000 years.”13 Such a long history carries a powerful inertia with it, and even if people

wanted to make changes by themselves, any great changes would encounter resistance

from tradition.

Surrounded by the Pacific Ocean in the east, tropical jungles in the south, high

mountains in the west, and desert or grassland in the north, China has been relatively

isolated from the West. China’s size, population, wealth and culture gave it such an

advantage over its neighbors that it was regarded as both Greece and Rome in East Asia,

and was called the Central Kingdomzhong C guo). This superiority was not always

translated into military prowess. Nomad groups in Inner Asia had posed constant threats.

12 For the impact of the environment on politics, see Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations trans. Jack Cohen, ed. and intro. E. J. Hobsbawm (New York: International Publishers, 1965); Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957); Manus I. Midlarsky, “Environmental Influences on Democracy: Aridity, Warfare, and a Reversal of the Causal Arrow,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (June 1995): 224-62.

13 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modem China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35

In fact, some conquered part or ail of China and established ruling dynasties. According

to John K. Fairbank, most of the time in the past one thousand years, the Chinese have

been subject to alien rule. But an eternal historical law, says Marx, determines that alien

rulers “conquered themselves by the superior civilizations of their subjects.” This cultural

superiority and isolation created an unhealthy sense of self-centeredness and insensitivity

to new things. Perry Anderson echoed Max Weber by pointing out that Graco-Roman

civilization was “quintessentially Mediterranean.” Such a geographical foundation

facilitates positive interactions with neighbors. Facing southeast, ancient Greece had easy

access to earlier and richer civilizations in Asia and Egypt.14 An open boundary and open

mind facilitated democratization. For all these, it is safe to say that China’s general

conditions were not in favor of democracy.

Confucian Doctrine

On the impact of dominant individuals on different civilizations, Bertrand Russell

says that “Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not the whole.

Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant individuals who happen to

emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, Mahomet, and Confucius.”13 Confucius

14 John K. Fairbank, “China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 47 (April 1969): 451; Karl Marx, “The Future Results of British Rule in India,” in The Marx-Encels Reader, ed. Tucker, 659; Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: Verson, 1974), 20; and H. D. F. Kitto, The Greeks (New York: Penguin Books, 1951), 31.

15 Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 187.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36

(551-479 B.C.) lived in an era replete with disunity and war. He was of noble ancestry,

but grew up in humble circumstances, hi his youth, he preferred to launch a political

career, but the hereditary nature of feudalism left Confucius with little chance of

achieving the goal. He channeled his time and energy into teaching, out of which came

the most influential doctrine in Chinese history.

It is controversial whether Confucianism is compatible with democracy. Some

regard Confucianism as the ideological underpinning of “oriental despotism,” hence

dismissing it as anti-democratic.16 Others hold that Confucianism is full of humanism and

was far from undemocratic.17 The debate suffers a major problem, that is, three meanings

of Confucianism-a doctrine, a state ideology, and a mistaken but understandable

synonym of Chinese tradition—are often used indiscriminately. Confucianism as a

doctrine was mainly represented by The Analects, which was compiled long after the

death of Confucius.15 hi the course of history, Confucian doctrine has developed two

16 Samuel P. Huntington, for example, asserts that “‘Confucian democracy’ is clearly a contradiction in terms.” The Third Wave. 307.

17 For example, Franklin W. Houn, Chinese Political Traditions (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965); Roger V. Des Forges, “Democracy in Chinese History,” in Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections, ed. Roger V. Des Forges, Luo Ning and Wu Yen-bo (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 21-52; Kim Dae Jung, “Is Culture Destiny?: The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs 73 (November/December 1994): 189-94; Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 20-33.

18 According to Arthur Waley, between 100 B.C. and 100 A.D., two versions of The Analects were used, but not until the second century A.D. did it resemble what we read today. The Analects of Confucius, trans., annotated and intro. Arthur Waley (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37

major branches. One branch is associated with Mencius (372-289 B.C.), who thought that

human nature is good and that people are more important than rulers. The other branch is

associated with Hsun Tzu (298-238 B.C.), whose doctrine rests upon the assumption that

human nature is evil and that goodness results from conscious activity.19 Later, Mencian

doctrine enjoyed such a high status that Confucianism denoted both Confucian and

Mencian doctrines. The ascendence of Confucianism was not completed overnight, or

even intended in the first place. Not until the 14-year-old Emperor Wu in the Han dynasty

ascended throne in 140 B.C. did Confucianism become the state ideology. Given the

influence of Confucianism, non-Chinese and even contemporary Chinese use

Confucianism to designate the Chinese tradition.

What are similarities and differences between Confucianism in the first sense and

modem democracy?20 Let us look at their similarities. In the first place, both find

common ground in opposing despotism, a worse version of authoritarianism. Regarding

what should be done for the people, Confucius’ answer was to enrich and then to instruct

them (Confucius, 13:9). Confucianism believes the interests of rulers and people to be

closely related and mutually beneficial (Confucius, 12:9), so it is important for rulers to

win the people’s support. Among three prerequisites of the government— sufficient food,

sufficient weapons, and people’s confidence in the rulers, Confucius gave priority to the

19 Hsun Tsu. Basic Writings trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

20 The following quotes are from Confucius’s Analects and Mencius’s The Book of Mencius.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38

last one (Confucius, 12:7). Confucius even specified four things rulers should avoid:

cruelty, oppression, injury and meanness (Confucius, 20:2).

In the second place, Confucianism goes further in defending people’s interests and

rights. The Confucian teachings mentioned above may strike people as utilitarian and

common-sensesical, because few political thoughts in human history have regarded the

relationship between the ruler and the ruled as antagonistic, and have encouraged rulers to

milk the ruled. Mencius defended people’s interests and rights in no uncertain words. He

maintains that people are more important than the state, which in turn is more important

than kings (Mencius, 7b: 14). Moreover, he defended the people’s rights to rebellion. For

him, killing a despot did not constitute regicide (Mencius, lb:8). Mencius was not the

first to justify the right to rebellion. As early as the 12th century B.C., the new rulers of

the Zhou dynasty used the “mandate of heaven” to justify their conquest as an act of

liberating the people of the Shang dynasty from their oppressive rulers. For them, to rule

presupposes the “mandate of heaven,” which partakes of a tautology: whoever ascended

the throne had the mandate; whoever had the mandate ascended the throne. Despite this,

Mencius’ official status legitimated the right of rebellion, which was regarded by Elbert

Duncan Thomas as the basis of Chinese democracy.21

hi the third place, like democracy, Confucianism advocates an active participation

in politics. Unlike Christianity, which at least makes a distinction between the emperor’s

21 Elbert Duncan Thomas, Chinese Political Thought: A Study Based upon the Theories of the Principal Thinkers of the Chou Period (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1927), 216.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39

affairs and those of God,22 Confucianism deems it gentlemen’s duties to serve emperors.

Mencius identified three types of participation and withdrawal. The first type is

represented by Boyi, who participated in government when the situation was good and

withdrew from it when it turned bad. The second type is represented by Yiyin, who

served the government in both good and bad times, because he thought his participation

would not worsen, but improve the situation. The third type was represented by Hui, who

dealt with all kinds of people, virtuous or vicious, intelligent or ignorant, without

compromising his principles. Mencius did not make an invidious distinction among these

types. Citing Confucius as an example, he thought that the decision should depend on

particular situations (Mencius, 5b: 1). Despite this flexibility, Confucianism encourages

participation in government to make rulers benign and wise. This, however, should not be

understood as a hunger for power. Confucianism often stresses the distinction between

gentlemen, whose principle is righteousness, and mean-spirited people, whose principle is

self-interest.

In the fourth place, both Confucianism and democracy place a premium on civic

virtue. What distinguishes democracy from despotism is no less their purposes than their

methods. All rulers, democrats and despots alike, claim to serve people’s interests, but

they employ different methods. While despots are willful and unpredictable, democrats

are careful and predictable. Confucianism sets store by two virtues: benevolenceren ()

22 Matthew, 22:21; Mark, 12:17; and Luke, 20:25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40

and propriety (/i).23 Benevolence was ill-defined, but Confucius did identify it with loving

people (Confucius, 12:22) and most Chinese use the word this way. Propriety denoted the

rituals in sacrifice and ancestral worship, but later came to mean accepted standards. In

social life, it represented self-discipline and mutual respect. If these virtues were hard to

practice, Confucius advised people to follow the golden rule of means, that is, “do not do

unto others what you do not like them to do unto you” (Confucius, 12:2). Democracy

embodies the spirit of “live, and let live,” calling for civility, tolerance and compromise,

hi this respect, Confucianism resembles democracy.

Finally, Confucianism has strong egalitarian tendencies, especially in socio

economic terms. Confucian says:

I have been taught to believe that those who have kingdoms and possessions should not be concerned that they have not enough people or territories, but should be concerned that wealth is not equally distributed; they should not be concerned that they are poor, but should be concerned that the people are not contented. For with equal distribution, there will be no poverty; with mutual goodwill, there will be no want; and with contentment among the people, there can be no downfall and dissolution (Confucius, 16:1).

No doubt, democracy places an emphasis on political and civil equality, but

enhancing economic and social equality has received more and more attention. This

emphasis on socio-economic equality constitutes another similarity of Confucianism and

democracy.

The similarities between Confucianism and democracy do not conceal their

23 For the relationship between these two virtues, see Tu Wei-ming, “The Creative Tension betweenJen andLi," Philosophy East and West 18 (1968): 29-39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41

differences. First, they differ in their views of human nature. Confucianism concurs with

democracy that human beings are rational and educatable, but disagrees on whether

human nature is good or bad. Generally speaking, democracy is predicated on the

assumption that human beings are neither omniscient nor omnipotent, and that their

selfishness makes conflict unavoidable. By contrast, Confucianism plays down the

negative side of human nature. Confucius said that human beings were bom upright

(Confucius, 6:17). Mencius states bluntly that human nature is good (Mencius, 2a: 6).

The different assumptions carry practical implications. A pessimistic assumption is more

conducive to the emergence of democracy than an optimistic one, because while the

former necessitates external constraints on rulers’ power, the latter misleads people into

pinning their hopes on enlightened rulers.

The second difference is that while modem democracy is associated with

individualism, Confucianism places a premium on familism. Two cases illustrates the

Confucian emphasis on family value. In one case, Confucius thought that if a father had

stolen a sheep, his child should conceal the misconduct instead of bearing witness against

him (Confucius, 13:8). Mencius said that if Emperor Shun’s father committed a murder,

the emperor might abandon his empire and run away with his father (Mencius, 7a:35). To

emphasize family values does not necessarily conflict with democracy, since the family

has always been the basic social unit in human society. But Confucianism regards filial

piety as the uttermost virtue in society and this has stunted the development of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42

individualism and patriotism in modem times.24

The third difference between Confucianism and democracy lies in their attitudes

toward the dichotomy of hierarchy and equality. Neither Confucianism nor democracy

denies the different endowments of human beings, but while democracy preaches equality

as a goal worth pursuing, Confucianism accepts and beautifies hierarchy, as epitomized

by the motto that “let the prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father,

and the son a son” (Confucius, 12:11). Mencius claims that in society, <

with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by

others.” (Mencius, 3a:4). Moreover, Confucianism distinguished between the old and the

young, and between men and women. In each case, the latter is supposed to obey the

former. In fairness to Confucianism, such attitudes permeate all traditional societies and

still exist in modem democracies. Yet without tensions between social realities and

human ideals, society would hardly make any progress.

The fourth difference between Confucianism and democracy is that while

democracy is characterized by the rule of law, Confucianism advocated the rule of men.

Confucius prefers ethics to law to such an extent that it obviates the need of law in

society. Confucius argues, ‘TJnder a virtuous rule the orders of the government will be

effective even though they are not followed by law and punishment; and that under a

corrupt rule the people will not obey the orders of the government even though they are

24 For the importance of individualism and the public spirit to democracy, see, for example, J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 257,245-246, 258-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

liable to severe punishment” (Confucius, 13:6). For Confucius, law was not only useless,

but even harmful.

If in government you depend upon laws, and maintain order by enforcing those laws by punishment, the people will try to avoid punishment and will gradually lose the sense of shame for wrong-doing. If, on the other hand, in government you depend upon the rule of virtue, and maintain order by encouraging the practiceli, of the people will have a sense of shame for wrong-doing and moreover, will emulate what is good (Confucius, 2:3).

Highlighting the importance of morality in society is beyond reproach; without morality

no society can survive. But Confucius mistook a necessary condition for government as a

sufficient one. His argument begs the question: How can one be sure that rulers and ruled

are as moral as he wished? Given the immorality pervading his times, Confucianism is

unrealistic in solely relying on morality.

The most important difference between Confucianism and democracy manifests

itself in their attitudes toward rulers. The essence of democracy is to select and control

rulers. Without elections and the separation of powers, there is no democracy. Confucius

did say that a commoner might become a prime minister overnight (Confucius, 12:22)

and that one of his disciples might properly ascend a throne. But how to select rulers is

not the concern of Confucianism. No doubt, Confucianism advise rulers to be wise and

benevolent, but it fails to ask what should be done if morality fails. Unlike democracy,

Confucianism provided few realistic mechanisms to prevent rulers from abusing power.

What conclusions can be drawn from the comparison between Confucianism and

democracy? In its opposition to despotism, defense of the people’s interests and rights,

support of participation, emphasis on civic virtue, and egalitarian tendency, Confucianism

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44

resembles democracy. But their similarities do not provide legitimate reasons to believe

that Confucianism is democratic. Confucianism may advocate a government for the

people, it does not call for a government of the people and by the people. The fact that

Confucianism does not advocate popular sovereignty and individual liberty excludes the

possibility that Confucianism is democratic. Likewise, in its view of human nature, its

emphasis on the family, deference to authority, the rule of men, and a lack of mechanism

against despotism, Confucianism differs from democracy. But these differences evince

little evidence that Confucianism is anti-democratic. To advocate democracy is one thing;

to oppose it is another. On the political spectrum, there exist numerous possibilities.

Confucianism is neither democratic nor anti-democratic; it is appropriate to call it a-

democratic.

Alternatives to Confucianism

Confucianism is not the only doctrine which has influenced China. Facing the

same realities of chaos, immorality and war, four major doctrines competed with one

another in the later part of the Zhou dynasty. Confucianism turned to morality for

solutions; Legalism emphasized the importance of law; Taoism advocated that the

populace distance themselves from society; Mohism preached universal love as a

panacea.25 Having concluded that Confucianism is a-democratic, we should wonder if the

25 For a review of these schools, see Yu-lan Feng, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Benjamin Isadore Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45

three rivals of Confucianism contain democratic elements.

Legalism became China’s first state ideology when Shang Yang served as prime

minister of state Qin before it unified China. Without a recognized founder, it found its

great synthesizer in Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C.), who combined Shen Tao’s conception of

power (shf), Shen Pu-hai’s conception of stratagem(shu), and Shang Yang’s conception

of law (fa). Along with Li Si, the first prime minister of the Qin dynasty, Han Fei Tzu

studied under the guidance of Hsun Tzu, the great Confucian scholar with a pessimistic

view of human nature.

Legalism resembles modem democratic theories in its pessimistic view of human

nature and its reliance on the rule of law. Legalism believes that human beings act out of

self-interest. What concerns the people most is to avoid danger and poverty and to seek

security and profit.26 What motivates the officials to serve rulers are less their love of

their ruler than their hope of substantial gain.27 Human nature may take different forms in

different situations. Han Fei Tzu points out:

Hence, when men of ancient times made light of material goods, it was not because they were benevolent, but because there was a surplus of goods; and when men quarrel and snatch today, it is not because they are vicious, but because goods have grown scarce. When men lightly relinquish the position of Son of Heaven, it is not because they are high-minded, but because the advantages of the post are slight; when men strive for sinecures in the government, it is not because they are base, but

1985).

26 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 115.

27 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46

because the power they will acquire is great.28

Human weakness justified the rule of law. Rulers have no time or energy to

supervise all government activities.29 There lacks enough worthy people to fill official

posts. If these posts are left unfilled, disorder may increase. Therefore enlightened rulers

have to rely on the rule of law rather than longing for qualified people.30 Moreover, most

people bow to authority, but few can be moved by morality.31 Attempts to make people

benevolent and righteous is the same as efforts to make them wise and long-lived.

Therefore rulers should focus on law rather than morality.32 An enlightened ruler does not

expect people to do good, but tries to prevent them from doing harm.

Law should be effective and predictable. As he puts it,

The best rewards are those which are generous and predictable, so that the people may profit by them. The best penalties are those which are severe and inescapable, so that the people will fear them. The best laws are those which are uniform and inflexible, so that the people can understand them.33

Moreover, unlike traditional Chinese practice, Legalists insisted that law should be

applied to both officials and people. The highest minister should be penalized if he is

guilty; the lowest peasant should be rewarded if he is commendable. Otherwise rulers

28 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 98-99.

29 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 26.

30 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 109.

31 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 102.

32 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 125-27

33 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 103-04.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47

could not win the confidence of the people.34

But the similarities between Legalism and democracy pale before their

differences. First, law in the Legalist mind is not the mechanism at the command of the

people to control the ruler, but rather the instrument at the discretion of the ruler to

consolidate his power. Law was deemed to be “inimical to the private interests of the

officials and common people.”35 Vitaly A. Rubin claims that Legalist view of the

antagonistic relations between ruler and ruled find no parallel in all human political

thoughts.36 Second, unlike democracy, Legalist laws give priority to duty and punishment,

rather than rights and rewards. The goal of a state is to be rich in times of peace and to be

powerful in times of trouble.37 For this objective, such basic human rights as freedom of

speech must be sacrificed. Freedom and diversity in words and deeds would create

chaos.38 Third, while modem democracy believes that people know their interests better

than do others, Legalism looks down upon people and distrusts their judgement. People

are regarded as stupid and slovenly; they complain about a small loss but forget great

long-term profits.39 Last, legalism opposed social welfare. For Han Fei Tzu,

34 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 90.

35 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 81.

36 Vitaly A. Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers, trans. Steven L Levine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 62.

37 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 111.

38 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 120.

39 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 95.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48

The lazy and extravagant grow poor; the diligent and frugal get rich. Now if the ruler levies money from the rich in order to give alms to the poor, he is robbing the diligent and frugal and indulging the lazy and extravagant. If he expects by such means to induce the people to work industriously and spend with caution, he will be disappointed.40

Han Fei Tzu was correct in pointing out that different behaviors of people affect their

social status. But to assume away inequality of opportunity is naive, if not

unconscientious.

Mohism, whose namesake is Mo Tzu (fl. 479-438 B.C), represents another

alternative to Confucianism. Mohism resembles modem democracy in several ways. First

is its view of the origin and function of the state. Mo Tzu preceded Hobbes in using the

concept of “the state of nature.” He thought that prior to the formation of any laws or

government, the world was as chaotic as if it had been inhabited by birds and beasts

alone. This is because people had different views, believed theirs to be correct, and

quarreled with one another. To find a solution for chaos, the most worthy man was

selected as king. Given his own limitations, other worthy men were selected to help

him.41

Second, the Mohist principle of organizing government sounds like modem

bureaucracy. He points out:

Upon hearing of good or evil, one shall report it to his superior. What the superior considers right all shall consider right; what the superior considers wrong all shall consider wrong. If the superior commits any fault, his subordinates shall remonstrate

40 Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings. 121.

41 Mo Tzu, Basic Writings trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 34-35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49

with him; if his subordinates do good, the superior shall recommend them. To identify oneself with one’s superior and not form cliques on the lower level—such conducts as this shall be rewarded by those above and praised by those below.42

Third is the Mohist conception of universal love(jian ai). Although it is far

fetched to associate modem democracy with fraternity, modem democracy does have a

universalist cast in treating each individual as being equal. For Mo Tzu, the Confucian

emphasis on family values had a perverse impact on society. He avers that partiality in

human relations produces all the great harms in the world 43 With hindsight, we certainly

appreciate the relevancy of his criticism of familism. The notion of universal love goes

hand in hand with non-aggression(fei-gong ). Aside from preaching his doctrine, Mo Tzu

led a group of talented people to discourage rulers from launching wars.

Lastly, the Mohist way of thinking strikes a resemblance to modem democracy.

Totalitarianism and democracy are based on two different ways of thinking. While

totalitarianism is utopian, holistic, and metaphysical, democracy is realistic, atomistic,

and empirical. In this respect, Mohism is much closer to democracy. Mo Tzu provided

three tests of a theory. First is to judge its origin by comparing it with the deeds of ancient

sage kings. Second is to judge its validity by comparing it with the evidence provided by

people’s eyes and ears. Third is to judge its applicability by observing its effect on the

state and the people.44 All this is similar to democratic scepticism.

42 Mo Tzu, Basic Writings. 35-36.

43 Mo Tzu, Basic Writings. 39.

44 Mo Tzu, Basic Writings. 118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50

Differences between Mohism and modem democracy are evident. First, although

Mohism meant well, its pragmatic and rational attitude may turn out to be undemocratic.

Mo Tzu despised human feelings, lambasted such customs as expensive funerals and long

mourning, and even argued against music and dance. Chuang Tzu, one of the two Taoist

masters, discovered the contradiction between Mohists’ advocate of universal love and

their contempt for human feelings. He said that teaching people to suppress their joys and

sorrows meant not to love them.45

Second, Mo Tzu ignores possible conflicts between the interests of the state and

those of the people. H. G. Creel thinks that Mo Tzu “seems to believe five goods to be

especially desirable, to wit: enriching the country, increasing the population, bring about

good order, preventing aggressive war, and obtaining blessing from the spirits.”46 All of

these functions are acceptable to all people, but Mohism does not reveal his stand if such

conflicts occur. Given the fact that the state usually has upper hand over ordinary people,

a Mohist stance stands rulers in good stead.

Taoism’s two masters are Lao Tzu, who was said to be near half a century older

than Confucius, and Chuang Tzu, who lived in the third and the fourth centuries B.C.47

The central concepttoo literarily means road or way of action, but implies that natural

45 Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China. 38.

46 H. G. Creel, Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 57.

47 The following quotations from Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu are based on Taoteching and Chuang Tzu. respectively.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51

law governs the whole world, hi this sense, it is similar to the Greek word “logos.”

Taoism reveals three main similarities to modem democratic ideas. First is its

principle of non-interference. Unlike Confucius, who idealized the ancient sage kings,

Lao Tzu praised the original state of nature as being better, and advocated non

interference, as embodied by his conception of non-activity(wu wei)f* He says that “Of

great rulers, the subjects do not notice the existence. To lesser ones, people are attached;

they praise them. Still lesser ones, people fear, and mean ones, people despise” (Lao Tzu,

ch. 17). For him,

The more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the people will be. The more sharp weapons the people have, the more troubled will be the country. The more cunning craftsmen there are, the more pernicious contrivances will appear. The more laws are promulgated, the more thieves and bandits there will be (Lao Tzu, ch. 57).

He compared ruling a big country to cooking a small fish, cautioning against attempting

too many changes (Lao Tzu, ch. 60). For Max Weber, Taoism demanded the greatest non

intervention possible and argued that human happiness would be promoted through the

natural laws of the harmonic cosmos.49

Second, Taoism is skeptical of politics. Chuang Tzu was cynical in saying that “A

petty thief is put in jail. A great brigand becomes a feudal lord. And among the retainers

of the latter, men of virtue will be found” (Chuang Tzu, bk. 29). When King Wei of Chu

48 Taoism’s notion of non-activity will be reinforced later by imported but influential Buddhism, which regards the world as full of sorrow and sufferings, and believes in transmigration of souls in an afterlife.

49 Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth, intro. C. K. Yang (New York: Free Press, 1964), 185.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. asked him to become his prime minister, he turned down the offer (Chuang Tzu, bk. 17).

If the Confucian elite were less interested in politics, power struggle would have been less

fierce.

Last, Taoism is characteristic of relativism. Even in adopting the notion ofyin,

which corresponded to shadow, cold, contraction, and the female sex, yang,and which

correspond to sunshine, heat, expansion, and the male sex, Taoism emphasized their unity

and interaction. Such relativism provides theoretical justification for individualism and

compromise, hence facilitating the democratic ideas.

In many senses, Taoism is closer to anarchy than to democracy. It anticipated

Rousseau in regarding society as evil and calling on people to distance themselves from

it. Ironically enough, a-democratic Taoism can be manipulated to serve despotism. Lao

Tzu takes it for granted that “Heaven and Earth are not benevolent; they treat the ten

thousand creatures ruthlessly. The sage is not benevolent; he treats the people ruthlessly”

(Lao Tzu, ch. 5).

Legalism, Mohism and Taoism enriched Chinese political thoughts in different

ways, but none of them qualifies as being democratic. With the passage of time, only

Confucianism and Legalism played important role in Chinese politics. Although Legalism

was more influential than rulers wanted to accept, it was Confucianism which mainly

characterized the Chinese political culture. If Confucianism is closer to modem

democracy in spirit, Legalism is closer to modem democracy in its mechanisms. To a

certain degree, Legalism can be more easily adapted to modem democracy than

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53

Confucianism. The long and the short of Confucianism was paternalism, which is harder

to reconcile with modem democracy. But the rule of law advocated by Legalism served as

a solid basis of modem democracy.

Authoritarian Traditions

It is misleading to judge a country’s historical legacies by merely examining its

major political doctrines. After all, most doctrines in human histories preach goodness,

and there is always a gap between theory and practice. Lucian W. Pye argues that such a

gap in Chinese political culture “is wider than in almost any other culture.”50 hi many

senses, Chinese traditions are no less Confucian than Machiavellian.51

The debate over the nature of the Chinese political system has a long history.

While Aristotle, Montesquieu, Hegel and Marx dismissed oriental countries, including

China, as despotic, Leibnitz, Voltaire and Quesnay regarded the Chinese political system

as enlightened.52 Different views reflect the complex and changing nature of the Chinese

political system53 and observers’ positions. Many European thinkers, according to

50 Pye, Asian Power and Politics. 204-05.

51 For the Machiavellian side of Chinese society, see Dennis Bloodworth and Ching Ping Bloodworth, The Chinese Machiavelli: 3.000 Years of Chinese Statecraft (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976).

52 For western views of traditional China, See Andrew L. March, The Idea of China: Mvth and Theory in Geographic Thought (New York: Praeger, 1974).

53 For the variations of the Chinese political system, see, for example, Ch’ien Mu, Traditional Government in Imperial China: A Critical Analysis trans. Chiin-tu Hstieh and George O. Totten (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54

William Theodore de Bary, had a rosy view of the Chinese system in the 17th and 18th

centuries. H. G. Creel even found that Confucianism influenced the thinkers of the

Enlightenment, who, in turn, promoted western democracy.5* But gradually, the Chinese

political system was stigmatized as an “oriental despotism.” The reason why Europeans

saw China in different lights was not that China’s political system underwent great

change during these centuries, but that Europe undergoing change itself provided a

different framework of reference. We have to remember that discontent with existing

system motivates people to idealize alternative system; that pride in our own system

makes us demonize other choices; and that our intellectual limitations may never allow us

to do justice to other systems.

The complexity and evolution of China’s political traditions do not conceal their

distinctive features. Let us examine the following aspects: sovereignty, elite selection, the

central-local link, state-society relations, and the rights of individuals. Sovereignty in

China unmistakably rested with the emperors, and emperorship was hereditary. As a

Chinese saying goes, “all lands under the sky belong to the emperor; all people in the

world are his subjects.” But this does not necessarily make a Chinese emperor despotic.

First, unlike European kings, who claimed the divine right to rule, Chinese emperors had

to rely on the “mandate of heaven.” Anybody who lost it deserved to be overthrown. The

1982); and Jack L. Dull, “The Evolution of Government in China,” in Heritage of China. ed. Ropp, 55-85.

54 William Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press and New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 93. H. G. Creel, “Confucianism and Western Democracy,” chap. in Confucius, 276-301.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55

“dynastic cycle”55 served as a warning to all incumbent rulers. Second, more often than

not, emperors reigned, but did not role.56 Prime ministers ruled China until the Sung

dynasty. Even after the position was abolished, emperors could not do whatever they

wanted.57 Even if emperors were hard worker, they could not make or implement all

nation’s policies. Not least of all, traditions constrained Chinese emperors no less than

laws controlled American presidents. Indeed, Chinese emperors were not constrained by

civil society a la Europe, but their power were regulated by Chinese traditions and

realties.58 For Franklin W. Houn, Chinese rulers not only faced competition from many

social forces, but encountered numerous restrictions even within their own regimes.

Among them were local officials, imperial relatives and eunuchs, imperial officials, the

decision-making process, remonstrances, ancestral precepts, precedents, public opinion,

55 Each dynasty, which was established by force and justified by the mandate of haven, followed a pattern of growth and decay. Finally a new dynasty replaced an older one. The rise and fall of dynasties went on. See John T. Meskiil ed., The Pattern of Chinese History: Cycles. Development, or Stagnation? (Boston: Heath, 1965).

56 Ch’ien, Traditional Government in Imperial China.

57 The changing attitude of T’ai Tsu toward Mencius serves as a good example. T’ai Tsu, one of China’s most notorious despots, decided to rid Confucius’ temples of Mencius’ image for his disrespect of rulers and declared any remonstration to be guilty of “contempt of majesty.” The President of the Ministry of justice Ch’ ien Tang, however, risked his life to remonstrate against the order and did change the emperor’s mind.

58 To put Chinese political system in historical and comparative perspective, see, respectively, K. C. Chang, Art. Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and Alexander Woodside, “Emperors and the Chinese Political System,” in Perspectives on Modem China: Four Anniversaries, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and others (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1991), 5-30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56

and divine visitations and prodigies.59 Joseph R. Levenson even attributed the longevity

of the Chinese state to a vital tension between emperor and his scholar-officials.

The ruling class was usually selected on the basis of birth, wealth, or military

power, but China practiced a meritocratic system.60 Initiated in the first century during the

Han dynasty, the civil service examinations were revived and improved during the Tang

dynasty (618-906). No official positions but emperorship was hereditary; most required

the candidates to pass examinations; and almost all people were entitled to participate in

examinations. All these presented a striking contrast to feudal Europe, Japan and India.

Vilfredo Pareto highlighted the importance of the so-called “circulation of elites,” saying

that “Society is harmed not only by the accumulation of inferior elements in upper strata

but also by the accumulation in lower strata of superior elements which are prevented

from rising.”61 By coopting talented people, the civil service system provided a safety

valve, defusing people’s possible discontents with the existing order.

Yet, the civil service system was not as impressive as it seemed. In reality,

children of poor families could not afford lengthy and costly preparations for the

examinations. Even if one passed the examinations, there were much more successful

59 Houn, Chinese Political Traditions. 45-98. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “A Note on the Development of the Theme of Bureaucratic-Monarchic Tension in Joseph R. Levenson’s Work,” in The Mozartian Historian: Essays on the Works of Joseph R. Levenson. ed. Maurice Meisner and Rhoads Murphey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 123-33.

60 For the civil service system, see Johanna M. Menzel, ed., The Chinese Civil Service: Career Open to Talent? (Lexington, M.A.: Heath, 1963).

61 Pareto, Sociological Writings. 159.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57

candidates than positions. Moreover, the Chinese bureaucracy as a whole did not

constitute an opposition force, but rather represented a ruling tool. Max Weber points out

that the civil service system might contribute to the demise of feudalism, but did not

exercise a serious constraint on autocracy.62 Unlike modem bureaucracies, it lacked

functional specificity,63 and was notorious for its corruption. Etienne Balazs’ remarkable

analysis of corruption deserves full quotation:

According to the usual pattern, a Chinese official entered upon his duties only after spending long years in study and passing many examinations; he then established relations with protectors, incurred debt to get him appointed, and then proceeded to extract the amount he had spent on preparing himself for his career from the people he administered—and extracted both principal and interest. The degree of his rapacity would be dictated not only by the length of time he had had to wait for his appointment and the number of relations he had to support and of kin to satisfy or repay, but also by the precariousness of his position.64

No less important is the fact that the content of such examinations had negative impacts

on Chinese mentalities. The focus on ancient classics fostered dogmatism and narrow

mindedness.65

China enjoyed a great deal of local autonomy, as attested by the Chinese saying

62 Weber, From Max Weber. 416-20.

63 J. R. Levenson regards anti-professionalism as “one of the outstanding all- pervasive values of Confucian culture.” See his “The Suggestiveness of Vestiges: Confucianism and Monarchy at the Last,” in Confucianism in Action, ed. David S. Nivinson and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 262.

64 Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme trans. H. M. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 10.

65 For the negative impact, see, for example, Donald J. Munro, The Imperial Style of Inquiry in Twentieth-Centurv China: The Emergence of New Approaches (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1996).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [

“The mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.” The vast territory, regional

diversity, backward technology, and small bureaucracy merely allowed the central

authorities to reach the county level, and this provided opportunities for the local gentry

comprising formally those who had passed at least the first level of examinations and

informally wealthy families. But the loose central-local link did not necessarily benefit

local people. The “principle of avoidance” required bureaucrats to serve outside their

home provinces to reduce nepotism. Local governments were designed in such a way that

they had little power and no revenue of their own. Since there was little distinction

between public and private expenses, local officials used their own income to defray

official and personal expenses.66 But without identifying themselves with local people,

bureaucrats tended to serve their own interests rather than local or even imperial interests.

Yoshihara Kunio finds that unlike Japanese daimyo, who identified with the people in

their domain and had a sensenoblesse of oblige, Chinese mandarins were merely

interested in enriching themselves.67 In fact, the debate on the relative merits and demerits

of the feudal (feng-jian) and bureaucratic(jun-xian ) system had never ceased since China

was united in 221 B.C.68 Despite administrative inefficiency, Chinese emperors realized

66 T’ung -tsu Ch’u, Local Government in China under the Ch’ing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), xiii.

67 Yoshihara Kunio, Japanese Economic Development 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 107.

68 Min Tu-ki, “The Theory of Political Feudalism in the Ch’ing Period,” chap. in National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial China ed. Philip A. Kuhn and Timothy Brook (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University and Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1989), 89-136. In the West, Gaetano Mosca is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59

that bureaucratic unity was a lesser evil than feudalistic decentralization.

China lacked a civil society. Although democracy does not necessarily presuppose

a strong civil society,69 it has facilitated the introduction of democracy in modem times.

Charles Tilly identifies three common conditions for European societies in 1500: cultural

homogeneity, prevalence of peasantry, and decentralized political structure.70 What

distinguished Europe from China was the third condition. In Europe, numerous states

constantly competed with one another. In 1500, there were some five hundred political

entities. The church, which gradually lost out to states, still commanded loyalty and

authority. Hereditary noble families set constraints on the central authorities. Towns

enjoyed autonomy from the state, and became the cradle of bourgeois capitalism. Given

the relative autonomy of civil society, Lord Acton even regarded the 13 th century as the

highest point in human freedom.71 For German historian Otto Hintze, Western

representative institutions resulted from feudal privileges, the tension between the church

probably the first seminar theorist to contrast “bureaucratic system” with feudal system. See his The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 70-102.

69 For Anderson, “Athenian democracy signified, precisely, the refusal of any such division between ‘state’ and ‘society’.’’Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. 43.

70 Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 17-25.

71 Gertrude Himmelfarb, Lord Acton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 82-84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

and the state, and international rivalries within Europe.72

By contrast, China was a united empire. No religious order challenged the secular

authority. The four-tier class structure, which consists of officials, peasants, craftsmen,

and merchants, paled before the distinction between ruler and the ruled.73 Towns were

citadels of rulers. To Joseph Needham, the Chinese town was “not a spontaneous

accumulation of population, nor of capital or facilities of production, nor was it only or

essentially a market-centre; it was above all a political nucleus, a node in the

administrative network, and the seat of the bureaucrat [or]...the ancient feudal lord.”74

Thus, few intermediary social entities existed between individuals and the state.

hi traditional China, the only powerful unit which competed with the state for

loyalty was the family. The Chinese family played an important role in society. It owned

property, paid taxes, and even held the power of life and death over its children. The

Chinese might be respectful to the emperors, but their final loyalty belonged to their

family. But Chinese familism did not facilitate democracy at all. Filial piety and loyalty

did not necessarily contradict, but often reinforced each other. The former was in fact a

good preparation for the latter. Chinese rulers even invented collective responsibility to

72 Otto Hintze, “The Preconditions of Representative Government in the Context of World history,” in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. ed. Felix Gilbert (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 302-53.

73 Karl A. Wittfogel holds that a division into a ruling class and a ruled class is one of the distinctive characteristics of the hydraulic society. See his Oriental Despotism. 321.

74 Joseph Needham and others, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), vol. 4, 71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61

preserve social order. Moreover, familism sacrificed individualism and nationalism, and

militated against public-spiritedness. Lin Yutang says that “Graft or ‘squeeze’ may be a

public vice, but is always a family value.” John Leighton Stuart, American ambassador to

China, selected mutual jealousies and suspicions as a more characteristically Chinese

weakness and attributed this weakness to “the highly personalized element in their social

structure.”75 Comparing China with Japan, Yoshihara Kunio points out that “hi China,

when family interests came into contact with those of the community or other non-kinship

organizations, family interests usually took precedence over non-family interest, hi Japan,

however, family interests were often sacrificed in the interests of a ‘higher’

organization.”76 Hence, the task facing Chinese democrats was not to adjust the relations

between the state and society, but rather to create a civil society.

There is no denying that traditional China downplayed the rights of individuals.

The lack of a term for rights in the Chinese language had not bothered the Chinese until

they started translating the Western concept in the late 19th century. But ordinary Chinese

did enjoy a large measure of socio-economic freedom and equality. Bertrand Russell

argues that no country resembled China in that personal liberty came so close to

anarchy.77 Unlike Europe and India, China did not have a rigid class system. Ho Ping-ti

75 Lin Yutang, Mv Country and People (New York: Day, 1935), 180. John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart. Missionary and Ambassador (New York: Random House, 1954), 290.

76 Yoshihara. Japanese Economic Development. 100-01.

77 Russell, The Problem of China. 76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

finds that in the Ming-Qing period, the status system was fluid and flexible and that no

effective legal and social barriers prevented status change.78 China’s lack of

primogeniture certainly boosted Chinese socio-economic equality. Given the fact that the

Chinese preferred large families and that the rich could afford to raise more children, the

equal division of inheritance among all male descendants would make sons poorer than

their fathers, hence narrowing the gap between rich and poor in the long run. A Chinese

saying has it right: “wealth cannot last more than three generations.” Not the least of all,

Chinese history witnessed myriad rebellions, which sometime forced rulers to be more

benign, and sometimes even succeeded in replacing one dynasty with another.

Based on what has been discussed, it is safe to reach three conclusions. First,

Chinese political traditions contains no less democratic elements than other societies.

Throughout human history, the vast majority of political traditions have been

authoritarian rather than democratic, and almost all political thinkers are undemocratic.

Chinese history did not lack democratic ideas or movements, and many of its political

systems, such as the civil service system, were commendable.

Second, it would be far-fetched to claim that the Chinese political system was

democratic. In terms of popular sovereignty, Chinese rulers might respect the people’s

interests, but sovereignty rested with the emperors. Election of rulers by the people and

the separation of powers in the modem sense never took place. Institutional constraints on

78 Ho Ping-ti, Ladder of Success in Imperial China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 257.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63

rulers, as entailed by democracy, were neither numerous nor compulsory. Occasional

rebellions might represent the people’s will, but what makes a political system democratic

is not that it contains some democratic ideas or witnesses some democratic movements.

After all, democratic ideas and movements can be found in any society. In terms of

individual liberty, the fact that the Chinese enjoyed much freedom does not hide another

fact that their freedom was not political in nature and depended on one key condition that

the rulers’ power should not be threatened. Such freedom resulted from the rulers’

indifference, but did not represent a sphere of immunities.79 Local autonomy merely

indicated the limited power of the central authorities, but did not make the Chinese

system democratic.

Finally, the Chinese system was authoritarian, but not totalitarian. No doubt,

Chinese emperors faced little competition, and some emperors did try to exercise strict

control over society. But exercising totalitarian rule in traditional China was neither

necessary nor possible. It was unnecessary because traditional rulers faced less

contestation than their modem counterparts do, and had little incentive to damage a

society which essentially belonged to them. It was almost impossible because modem

technology and international competition are essendal to totalitarian rule. Chinese

authoritarianism ranged from paternalistic to despotic rule. Chinese history witnessed no

fewer wise and benign emperors than stupid and malignant rulers.

79 Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), xxiv.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r* 1

Concluding Remarks

Historical legacies may defy easy analysis, but this difficulty does not blind us to

their importance in influencing the Chinese democratic process. To fulfill this difficult

and important task, I divide the historical legacies into three categories: general

conditions, political thoughts and political traditions.

My analysis of these three categories suggests that China’s historical legacies pose

a challenge to the democratization process. As a vast, populous, and the oldest

uninterrupted country, China will encounter huge inertia in adopting new systems and

habits. Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism, and Taoism contain some democratic elements,

but none qualifies as being democratic. Chinese political traditions did not lack political

wisdom, and fared no worse than other world traditions. But the presence of democratic

ideas and movements could not hide the fact that in terms of popular sovereignty and

individual liberty, China failed to meet the requirement of modem democracy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

LOCAL FORCES AND DEMOCRACY

China is a sheet of sand.

Sun Yat-sen

If China’s historical legacies are not in favor of democracy, one has to explain

why China established Asia’s Erst republic in 1911. This chapter attempts to demonstrate

two things. First, the Republic of China resulted less from the Chinese elite’s belief in

democracy than from the impossibility of establishing another dynasty after the

revolution. Second, chaos and disunity in the republican era convinced the Chinese that

dictatorship was a lesser evil than anarchy.

It is local forces which determined the Chinese democratization process in the

Republican era. They played the decisive role in overthrowing the Qing dynasty,

constituted a challenge to Yuan Shih-kai’s attempt at stopping national disintegration,

evolved into anarchical warlordism after Yuan’s death, and motivated the Chinese elites

to seek an alternative to liberal democracy.

Asia’s First Republic

The 1911 Revolution was triggered by a local movement. In the spring of 1911,

the Qing court planned to buy up the Sichuan-Hankow and Canton-Hankow trunk

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i

railways. Having recovered the railway rights and interests from foreigners, the gentry

were outraged at the nationalization plan by means of a foreign loan, and instigated riots.

When riots broke out in Sichuan province, some troops from Hubei province were sent to

suppress them. An uprising broke out in Wuchang, an area in the capital of Hubei

province on October 10,1911. Like a spark in a dry prairie, the Wuchang Uprising set off

a chain reaction around the country. In a few months, most of the provinces declared their

independence from the Qing court, and established the Republic of China on January 1,

1912.

The reason why the Qing dynasty collapsed like a house of cards has to be found

in a shifting balance of power between the central government and local forces. Indeed,

there were four major social forces in early 20th century China: the Qing court, local

elites, foreign powers and ordinary people, but foreign powers and ordinary people were

not directly involved in the 1911 Revolution. Foreign powers constituted the most

powerful social force in China. They performed two functions in facilitating the

revolution. On the one hand, their incursions since the 1840 Opium War deteriorated

socio-economic situations, and motivated the Chinese to seek change. On the other hand,

they offered China new alternatives and ideologies. After the failed self-strengthening

movement, whose slogan was “Chinese learning as the basis; Western learning for

practical use,” Chinese elites realized that modem weaponry and technology were the tip

of the iceberg of Western civilization, and that China should adopt Western social and

political systems. Democracy came to be regarded as the best political system to achieve

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67

national objectives.1

After the revolution broke out, foreign powers kept their neutrality. This did not

mean that they did not have their own preferences for a political system. While Britain,

Germany, Japan and Russia preferred a constitutional monarchy, the U.S. and France

liked a democratic republic. But what determined their policies toward the revolution was

their economic interests in China. Mary Wright writes that such neutrality resulted from

their indifference to the outcome because they were sure that neither side would dare to

harm their interests.2 They adopted a ‘wait and see’ policy. Only when the parliament

elected its speaker, did the U.S. accord formal recognition to the Republic. Other powers

were more cautious, and extended recognition after Yuan Shih-kai was elected formal

president in October 1913.

The vast majority of Chinese population were spectators of, but not participants in

the revolution. The Chinese did not lack rebellion tradition, and the 19th century

witnessed numerous rebellions which had undermined the Manchu rule.3 But the 1911

Revolution was not a peasant uprising, and affected a small proportion of the population.

The American diplomat W. G. Calhoun found no evidence “that there is any large

measure of popular support for the new government. The most that can be said is that, so

1 Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey. 1839-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

2 Wright ed., China in Revolution. 54.

3 C. K. Yang, “Some Preliminary Statistical Patterns of Mass Actions in Nineteenth-Century China,” in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Frederic Wakeman and Carolyn Grant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 174-210.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. !

far, there has no openly expressed opposition to it. The people accept it in stolid, perhaps

unsympathetic, silence.”4

The Qing dynasty, which was established by alien Manchu in 1644, gradually lost

the “mandate of heaven.” Indeed, this dynasty expanded China’s territories to an

unprecedented level and was assimilated into Chinese civilization. But its incompetence

in resisting foreign invasion undermined its legitimacy. More important, its selfishness in

putting its interests before national interests finally alienated the Chinese people.

The Manchu, who totaled 5 million and accounted for slightly more than 1 percent

of China’s total population, took a disproportionate share in aspects of life.5 Politically,

they occupied all the key positions in the government. For a long time, practically all the

governors and govemors-general were Manchu. Half of the top posts in the central

government were set aside for them. In the six ministries, they headed almost all

departments and bureaus, and outnumbered the Chinese three to one. Suffice it to

mention an anecdote. Only eighteen days before the Qing court surrendered its power, did

it grant Prime Minister Yuan the title of Marquess, the highest rank the Chinese could

4 Robert A. Scalapino and George T. Yu, Modem China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order. 1850-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 339.

5 For the status of the Manchu in China, see Ch’ien, Traditional Government in Imperial China. 121-42. Edward J. M. Rhoads, “The Assassination of Governor Enming and Its Effect on Manchu-Han Relations in Late Qing China,” in China’s Republican Revolution, ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 3-24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

ever get.6 Socio-economically, the Manchu and the Chinese were separate and unequal.

About half of the Manchu lived in Beijing; the other half in provincial garrisons all over

China. They were only employed in military service and public administration, prohibited

from intermarrying, lived in segregated areas, and enjoyed many special privileges.

Geographically, the Qing court designated Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang as

forbidden areas for its future use. Regardless of the population pressure, it prohibited the

Chinese from emigrating to these large and sparsely populated areas almost until the end

of the dynasty. All these suggest that the Manchu put their own interests above those of

the Chinese.

The local forces gradually asserted themselves. Chinese elites, consisting of

officials and gentry, became more powerful during the Taiping Rebellion in the middle of

the 19th century. To suppress this rebellion, regional armies, such as Zeng Guofan’s

Hunan Army, Zuo Zongtang’s Chu Army, and Li Hongzhang’s Anhui Army, developed

into powerful forces. They were largely recruited from their own areas and showed their

final loyalty to their Chinese commanders.7 Li Hongzhang complained that only Chihli

province fought Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.8 During the Boxer Rebellion

in 1900, the provincial authorities did not fight the foreign troops; many observed a secret

6 B. L. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1917), 37.

7 Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure. 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

8 James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70

agreement of neutrality with the foreigners.9 After their defeat, the Qing court decided to

build the New Army, and it was the Chinese generals who commanded the strongest army

in China.

The Chinese Revolution was mainly led by the gentry.10 Unlike their English

counterparts, who were hereditary landed class, the Chinese gentry were those who

passed civil examination, but failed to hold official positions. The officials and gentry,

who accounted for about 2 percent of population, earned 24 percent of the gross national

product in the late 19th century. In terms of source of income after tax, 52 percent came

from compensation for services, 29 percent from rent, and 19 percent entrepreneurial and

interest income.11 Gentry assumed local leadership and enjoyed privileges in legal and

economic terms. In the 19th century, they paid only 70 or 80 percent of required taxes,

while the ordinary people paid two or three times as much as required taxes.12

The gentry became more willing and able to challenge the central government.

When the Chinese civilization was in doubt, the gentry’s status was anything but secure.

The 1905 abolition of the civil service examinations symbolized the decline of their

9 Li Jiannong, The Political History of China. 1840-1928 trans. and ed. Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956), 178.

10 For the gentry’s status, see Chung-li Chang, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in Nineteenth-Centurv Chinese Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955).

11 Chung-li Chang, The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 326-32.

12 Chuzo Ichiko, “The Role of the Gentry: A Hypothesis,” in China in Revolution. ed. Wright, 298.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71

social status. But elites worked hard to keep their status. Two factors allowed them to

expand their power. One was the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion. During the period,

they increased by about 34 percent, and many bought their degrees.13 The other factor

which increased their status and power was constitutional reforms. After the foreign

suppression of the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, Empress Dowager Cixi,

who had disrupted Emperor Guangxu-led “Hundred Days’ Reform” following Japan’s

defeat of China, instituted reform herself. Intended to strengthen the central power, the

reform unintentionally tipped the balance in favor of local forces. The provincial

assemblies were a case in point. Its official status was even below that of the governor’s

chief assistant (ssu-tao), and its duties were largely confined to local matters. But the

1909 elections enabled the gentry and rich merchants to dominate the assemblies and to

exercise more influence than expected.14

The rise of local force should not be treated unequivocally as democratic

movement. Frederic Wakeman, Jr. credits Philip A. Kuhn with dividing local autonomy

into three categories.15 The first was similar to civil society. Local self-government

13 Fincher, “Political Provincialism and the National Revolution,” 212.

14 For the reform movement, see, for example, Merebeth E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China. 1898-1912 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931); and Fincher, Chinese Democracy.

15 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Models of Historical Change: The Chinese State and Society, 1839-1989,” in Perspectives on Modem China, ed. Lieberthal and others, 73-74. Philip A. Kuhn, “Local Self-Government under the Republic: Problems of Control, Autonomy, and Mobilization,” in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Wakeman and Grant, 257-98.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72

controlled their legitimate public sphere. The second category reminded people of local

autocracy, in which local elites not only encroached on central power, but damaged

interests of local people. In the third category, the local elites were characterized as

revolutionaries, who attempted to overthrow the central authorities.16

The local forces continued to shape political development after the revolution.

The independent provinces sent their delegates to Nanjing to make political

arrangements. Either selected by the provincial military governments, or elected by

former provincial assemblies, these delegates elected Sun Yat-sen the provisional

president of the Republic. Sun’s success resulted from his two competitors’ weakness and

his revolutionary reputation. Li Yuanhong was the military leader of the Wuchang

Uprising, but he was forced to assume leadership at the gunpoint of his soldiers. Huang

Hsing was a veteran revolutionary who was said to be a good military leader, but he did

not participate in the Wuchang Uprising or win any victory after he took command. What

distinguished Sun was three factors. First, he was familiar with outside world. Bom into a

peasant family in Guangdong province in 1866, he was educated at a Hawaiian

missionary school as a teenager. Later he studied medicine and converted to Christianity

in Hong Kong. Second, he was the most respectable revolutionary in China. He created

16 The following writings represented three categories, respectively. Mark Elvin, “The Gentry Democracy in Chinese Shanghai, 1905-1914,” in Modem China’s Search for a Political Form, ed. Jack Grey (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 41-65; James Polachek, “Gentry Hegemony: Soochow in the T’ung-chih Restoration,” in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Wakeman and Grant, 211-56; and Arthur L. Rosenbaum, “Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910,” Journal of Asian Studies 34 (May 1975): 689-716.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73

the “Society to Revive China” (xing-zhong-hui) in 1894 and expanded it into the

Revolutionary Alliance tong-meng-hui( ) in 1905, the predecessor of the Nationalist party.

He also orchestrated ten failed uprising in China before 1911. Third, he lacked

administrative experience in China. In the 16 years before the revolution, he only made an

overnight stay in the mainland.17 The revolution was initiated by the new army, which

was not closely related to Sun’s camp.18 He learned of the 1911 uprising by reading a

newspaper in Denver, Colorado, and returned to China only several days before his

inauguration. For all these, Sun was chosen as provisional president, hi his oath of office,

he promised to resign when the Manchu government was overthrown, the republic was

internationally recognized, and order returned to China.

The power of old elites was also reflected both in national and local politics. In his

cabinet, Sun appointed six imperial bureaucrats, but only three revolutionaries. At least

five of them held lukewarm attitudes towards the new republic. Some stayed in Nanjing

for a short time and then left for Shanghai.19 Others never took up their posts. Among the

fifteen provinces which had declared independence before the end of 1911, nine

provincial assemblies kept their power since independence. In most of the remaining six

cases, political power shifted from revolutionary armies to the gentry and rich merchants.

17 Chun-tu Hstieh, Huang Hsine and the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 31.

18 For the characteristics of the new army, see Yoshihiro Hatano, “The New Armies,” in China in Revolution, ed. Wright, 365-82.

19 K. S. Liew, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-ian and the 1911 Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1971), 140.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74

In nine provinces, old Qing officials were nominated as governors, and five of them did

take the jobs. In seven provinces, the military officials of the New Army became

governors, hi seven provinces, the governors were native sons, and four more provinces

would soon follow suit.20

The fate of the revolution was hung in balance, and the person who was capable

of tipping the balance was Yuan Shih-kai. Bom into a peasant family in Henan province

in 1859, he was adopted into an influential military family. Having failed the civil service

examinations twice, he used his family connections to become a military officer. Before

Yuan became China’s paramount leader, he acquired rich administrative experiences

which only Deng Xiaoping could match. Yuan was Chinese commissioner for trade in

Korea, commander of the New Army, governor of Shandong, and governor-general of

Chihli, the most prestigious regional post in China. He took charge of foreign affairs in

the Grand Council, the highest policy-making body. After Empress Dowager Cixi and

Emperor Guangxu mysteriously died within several days, the new regent sent Yuan

packing in late 1908, because the regent thought that Yuan had betrayed his brother

Emperor Guangxu during the “Hundred Days’ Reform.” After the Wuchang Uprising,

Yuan was not only reinstated, but granted almost omnipotentary power.

Yuan understood that the Manchu had lost their “mandate of heaven.” Although

his background and temperament made him more a monarchist than a republican, he

realized that the republic was afa it accompli. He decided to establish a government

20 Ichiko, ‘The Role of the Gentry,” 305-06.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75

himself, be it republican or monarchic. He attacked the revolutionaries to show the

strength of the imperial army, but left negotiating option open. When the revolutionaries

promised him the presidency, he pressured the Qing court to relinquish its power on

condition that it would receive preferential treatment. On February 12,1912, the court

authorized Yuan to organize a provisional republican government. Three days later, Sun

urged the Nanjing Assembly to elect Yuan the provisional president in his place.

Yuan was offered the presidency not because of his beliefs and character, but

because of his ability of holding China together. No doubt, his conversion into

republicanism had a streak of opportunism, but what mattered more was that his

conversion served national interests. At least, bloodshed was avoided and China was

united. Seen in this light, the compromise made among the revolutionaries, the gentry,

Yuan and the Qing court should be regarded less as a regrettable fact than as a

commendable feat. A spirit of compromise came close to the essence of democracy.

Compared with the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, the

1911 Revolution was bloodless. In retrospect, this seemingly unprincipled compromise

benefited China more than the uncompromising struggle between the Nationalists and the

Communists later on.

In order to protect the revolutionary fruits, the revolutionaries took two major

precautions to curb Yuan’s power. First was the plan of relocating the national capital

from Beijing to Nanjing. This partisan decision was not in the national interest, because it

would risk losing control of the territory north of the Great Wall. Fortunately, not only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76

Yuan and his associates were reluctant to leave their power base, but the foreign legations

found it inconvenient and expensive to move southward. When the Nanjing government

sent delegate to escorts Yuan southwardly, the riots of Yuan’s army in the north scuttled

the plan.

The second precaution against Yuan was to promulgate a Provisional Constitution

when he assumed the presidency on March 10. This constitution differed from the

existing Organic Law of the Republic in two aspects. First, it included articles on human

rights. It guaranteed freedom of property, speech, press, movement and religion;

prohibited illegal search, arrest, trial and punishment; and accepted the right to petition

authorities. But these rights were not regarded as absolute, and could be limited and

modified for the sake of common welfare, public order or urgent necessities. Second, the

Constitution changed the presidential system into a parliamentary system. K. S. Liew

bemoaned the fact that the personnel factor shaped republican politics. At the beginning,

the parliamentary system was dismissed because the parliament did not like to see Song

Jiaoren as the premier; but now it was adopted because they wanted to limit President

Yuan’s power.21

The establishment of Asia’s first republic does not necessarily indicate that the

Chinese were willing and able to establish and maintain a democratic system. Before the

1911 revolution, the vast majority of the Chinese had never heard about democracy.

Revolutionaries who demanded a democratic republic and reformer who advocated a

21 Liew, Struggle for Democracy. 148.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77

constitutional monarchy mainly took refuge in Japan. According to Hu Han-Min, a

revolutionary leader, the reformers led by scholars Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao

outnumbered the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen.22 The minority who espoused

democracy took a utilitarian attitude. Yan Fu and Liang Qichao, for example, praised

democracy, because it would energize the Chinese to enhance state power. So unlike

western democracy, which was designed to limit state power, Chinese democracy was

supposed to strengthen state power.

Liang Qichao reflected and reinforced the Chinese elites’ suspicion of democracy.

At the beginning, he advocated constitutional republicanism in China. During his trip to

the U.S. in 1903, he was disappointed by the defects of republicanism and Chinese’s

uncooperative behavior in San Francisco. As a result, he advocated constitutional

monarchy rather than constitutional republicanism. Two years later, he went further to

tout “enlightened despotism” as a solution to China’s political problem.23

The 1911 Revolution left China no choice but to adopt republicanism, because

replacing one dynasty by another was virtually out of the question. To overthrow an alien

monarchy is a democratic action, but the abolition of monarchy is neither a necessary or a

sufficient condition for a democratic system. In fact, most of stable democracies in the

22 Hsiieh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. 38.

23 For Liang’s view, see, for example, Hao Chang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China. 1890-1907 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Philip C. Huang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Modem Chinese Liberalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); and Nathan, “Liang Qichao and the Chinese Democratic Tradition,” chap. in Chinese Democracy, 45-66.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78

early stage of democratization took form of constitutional monarchy. The Chinese soon

realized that to overthrow a monarchy is one thing, to maintain a democratic system is

another.

Temptation of Dictatorship

Local forces, which had doomed the Qing dynasty, continued to threaten the new

republic. The mandate of Yuan Shih-kai was to stem the tide of national disintegration.

The most threatening form of disintegration was the separatist movements of Outer

Mongolia and Tibet. The Chinese empire comprised “China proper” and the outlying

territories. In China proper, which has about 1.5 out of 3.7 million square miles, the Han

Chinese accounted for more than 94 percent of the total population. China proper is

surrounded by the outlying territories populated by ethnic minorities. To the west is Tibet,

to the northwest is Xinjiang, to the north is Mongolia. The 1911 Revolution shook the

foundations of the Chinese empire. Outer Mongolia had never been in the firm control of

China and had long been regarded by Russia as a region of economic and strategic

interest. Within one month after the breakout of the revolution, the Russia-supported

Buddhist leaders informed the Qing court of their intention to exercise self-rule. On New

Year’s Day, they launched an independence movement. Meanwhile, a separatist

movement was under way in Tibet. The revolution triggered a mutiny of Chinese soldiers

in Tibet, who had been dissatisfied with their living conditions and demanded to be sent

home. Under this circumstance, the Dalai Lama pushed for independence. Britain wanted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79

Tibet to serve as a buffer zone between India and China, and compelled China to divide

Tibet into inner and outer parts. The outbreak of World War I, however, diverted

England’s attention from the Tibetan issue. Yuan was procrastinating and conciliatory in

dealing with the issues of Outer Mongolia and Tibet because of their foreign connections.

But under Yuan’s reign, China did not even lose Outer Mongolia.

Self-rule was the other form of disintegration. After the 1911 Revolution, the

central government lost control of its financial and administrative power. In 1913 the

provinces remitted only 5 million, instead of the expected more than 32 millionyuan, to

the central government.24 Most provinces had their own public banks and issued

provincial bank notes. Internal customslijin ( ), which came into being during the Taiping

Rebellion, prevented free trade from one province to another. In administrative terms, the

principle of avoidance was ignored. Local elites began to control their own provinces.

The military, who had had a low status in traditional China, exercised an overwhelming

influence in local politics. Following Hubei’s example, most revolutionary provinces

established miliary governments headed by military governors. The post of civil governor

existed only in a few provinces. Provinces even started dealing directly with foreign

financiers, such as the relations of Henan and Zhejiang with Great Britain, of Guangxi

with France, of Fentien with Japan, and of Guangdong with both Great Britain and Japan.

Rampant banditry was symptomatic of national disintegration. The most famous band

24 Jerome Ch’en, “Historical Background,” in Modem China’s Search for a Political Form, ed. Gray, 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80

was led by the White Wolf, who claimed to command 3,000 to 10,000 soldiers in North

China between 1913 and 1914.

To combat national disintegration requires a strong central government. The new

republican government was anything but strong. The weakness of the central government

had something to do with the defects of the Provisional Constitution. Under the

parliamentary system, the president was not really responsible to parliament, and the

cabinet was not fully responsible to either president or the parliament. It created the

possibility of dispute between the legislature and the executive on the one hand, and

between the President and the Cabinet, on the other. Furthermore, the Constitution failed

to deal with the provincial system, and lack means of solving disputes among all sides.25

What further weakened the central government was party politics. Human history

never lacked partisan conflict, but party politics was barely institutionalized and mainly

stigmatized, because it was deemed disruptive of unity. Even George Washington

cautioned against the “mischiefs of the spirit of party” in his 1796 Farewell Address.

After he took position, President Yuan asked Tang Shaoyi, his old follower and a member

of the Revolutionary Alliance, to serve as the first premier. The coalition nature of the

cabinet created partisan conflict, and Premier Tang and the revolutionary members who

had been given less important positions resigned. Likewise, the provisional parliament,

whose members were chosen by the military governors and the provincial assemblies, had

its share of party politics. Among the several parties, none had majority. Yuan once

25 Houn, Central Government of China. 174.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. t

confided to the British minister that “a republic meant a great deal of useless talking and

very little work.”26

Partisan conflict in the cabinet soon gave way to the power struggle between Yuan

and the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries differed in their political approaches. Sun

Yat-sen and Huang Hsing decided to support Yuan. They visited President Yuan and Vice

President Li Yuanhong in the fall of 1912, promising to focus on economic issues and to

allow Yuan a ten-year presidency. For Edward Friedman, “This signified that Yuan’s

north, Li’s area in the heart of the Yangtze valley, Huang’s fortress at the mouth of the

Yangtze, and Sun’s Canton—China’s central power areas—were joining in a common

effort.”27 But at the same time, the revolutionaries led by Song Jiaoren contemplated a

cabinet government under a premier elected by the future parliament. The Revolutionary

Alliance united with four parties to form Kuomintang (KMT) or the Nationalist Party,

and worked hard to win the parliamentary elections of late 1912 and early 1913. By

contemporary standards, the election was far from satisfactory. Only males over twenty-

one years old with either elementary education or a certain amount of property were

entitled to vote.28 According to one estimate, the turnout was one-third to four-fifths of

26 Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), 81.

27 Edward Friedman, Backward Toward Revolution: The Chinese Revolutionary Party (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 35.

28 Fincher, “Political Provincialism and the National Revolution,” 210.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82

those registered.29 Local elites heavily influenced the election. Despite these problems,

this represented the first genuine nationwide democratic election after the revolution. The

new parliament consisted of two chambers. While the upper house was determined by the

provincial assemblies, the lower house was elected directly by popular vote. The KMT

won 269 seats out of 596 in the lower house, and 123 out of 274 in the upper house.30

The majority of the KMT in the new parliament did not mean that much for serval

reasons. First, the assassination of Song Jiaoren left the KMT without an effective leader.

Since a formal constitution was to be drafted by the parliament, and the KMT became

more critical of Yuan’s policy, Yuan feared threatened and had Song assassinated in

March 1913. Second, Yuan bribed the KMT members to leave the party or to form new

parties. While Tsou Lu claimed to reject an offer o f400,000 yuan to create a new party,

other KMT members formed half a dozen parties soon. Last, Yuan provided financial

assistance to the KMT opponents. They received a monthly allowance of 200 yuan.31

Soon the Progressive Party(Jin-bu dang), which resulted from the merging of the three

minor parties in the parliament in May 1913, competed with the KMT.

Despite the decline of the KMT power, Yuan intended to eliminate it. To prepare

for a showdown, he obtained foreign loans without formal parliamentary approval in

April, and then dismissed three Nationalist military governors. Sun and other Nationalists

29 Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-le’ai. 14.

30 Huang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Modem Chinese Liberalism. 116.

31 George T. Yu, Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang. 1912-1924 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83

launched the “Second Revolution” to overthrow Yuan, but failed. After the Second

Revolution was put down, Yuan proceeded to destroy representative institutions and

provincial self-government. Before abolishing parliament, he resorted to threats and

bribery to have himself elected formal president in October 1913. The next month, he

ordered a nationwide ban on the Nationalist Party and disqualified the Nationalist

members of parliament, although most of them dissociated themselves from the Second

Revolution. Yuan convened the Political Conference to perform advisory functions in

December. At the request of some provincial leaders, parliament was finally dissolved in

January 1914. On May 1, the Constitutional Compact, a revised constitution, nullified the

1912 Provisional Constitution and many other laws, and prescribed the Consultative

Yuan to perform the functions of the legislative Yuan. To ensure Yuan’s dictatorship, the

Presidential Election Law was passed. According to it, the term of the Presidency was set

at ten years, and there was no term limit. Incumbent president was entitled to nominate

three candidates and to make known his nomination on election day. The Consultative

Yuan might offer the incumbent president another term if two-thirds of its members

agreed.

Yuan also took harsh measure against self-rule. He disbanded all provincial

assemblies, suspended self-government at all levels, appointed civil governors to each

province, put down banditry, and established a new national examination system for

magistrates. The civil governor not only had higher official rank, but acquired a degree of

military power. Yuan restored all taxes enacted before the 1911 Revolution, cut back

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84

provincial expenses, and imposed a wide range of new taxes. As a result, Beijing’s

revenue from the provinces rose to 20 millionyuan in 1916.32

Yuan’s suppression of the Nationalists precluded the possibility of loyal

opposition, and made the Nationalists his enemy. Such tragedy would repeat itself in

1927 when the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek suppressed the Communists. Despite

the Nationalist opposition, Yuan’s dictatorship had won support among non-Nationalist

elites, not only because his leadership provided the nation with order and unity, but

because the Chinese were suspicious of opposition forces no less than of established

authorities. Liang Qichao and Cai E, who were not Yuan’s followers and later instigated

uprising against his monarchical scheme, regarded his dictatorship as necessary for

China’s reform. Popular confidence in Yuan was reflected in the over-subscription to two

domestic loans of 1914 and 1915, which was unprecedented in the history of Chinese

domestic loans.33 But when Yuan launched his monarchial scheme, all political groups—

Confucian, nationalist, or Communist— rightfully stamped him as a selfish and

untrustworthy opportunist,34 but wrongly downplayed his success in arresting the trend of

national disintegration.

32 Ch’en, “Historical Background,” 28.

33 Kinn Wei Shaw, Democracy and Finance in China: A Study in the Development of Fiscal Systems and Ideals (New York: Ams Press, 1970), 154.

34 Jerome Ch’en. Yuan Shih-k’ai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 197. Even the Qing court realized that Yuan had betrayed them. See Pu Yi Aisin-Gioro, From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi trans. W. J. F. Jenner (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964) vol. 1, 36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

No sooner did the Presidential Election Law guarantee Yuan an actual life-long

presidency than he opted for a monarchy. The leading advocate of monarchy was the first

president of the American Political Science Association.35 hi August 1915, Yuan’s

constitutional adviser Frank J. Goodnow wrote an article, suggesting that China should

restore its monarchy. In his view, the state system of a particular country is less

determined by its elites’ choice, than by its history, customs, and socio-economic

situation. Historically, most European and Asian countries adopted the monarchical

system. Republicanism, which enjoyed popularity in modem times, did not apply to all

countries, especially those with low levels of education. The success of republicanism in

the U.S. and France and its failure in Latin America supported this argument. Given a

long tradition of despotism and ill-educated people, China had better adopt monarchy.

Actually, if the Manchu were not alien, China would have established constitutional

monarchy. For Goodnow, smooth transition from republicanism to a monarchy depended

on several factors. The reforms should not jeopardize stability or raise objections among

citizens and foreigners. The issue of secession should be resolved; constitutionalism

should be promoted. He mentioned that what concerns Western countries was not China’s

political form, but its political stability and their own economic interests.

In the same month, the “Society for the Preparation of Peace”chouan-hui ( ) was

established to advocate monarchy. Yuan’s old friend Yang Du maintained that unlike a

35 The debate over the change of political system is well-documented in Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China. For the articles of Frank J. Goodnow, Yang Du and Liang Qichao, see 175-85, 150-71, and 192-215, respectively.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86

monarchy, a republic did not make China strong or rich, because citizens prefer freedom

and equality to discipline and hierarchy, and instability of a republic creates little chance

for prosperity. For him, monarchy has contributed to the power of Germany and Japan;

republicanism has enriched, but not empowered the U.S. and France. Since China is the

neighbor of monarchical Russia and Japan, republicanism bodes ill for China.

Furthermore, China’s long monarchical history leads the Chinese to misunderstand

republic, laws, freedom and equality. Since no single person qualifies as the candidate for

next presidency, the presidential competition would lead to internal instability and foreign

intervention. In his view, constitutionalism has not failed in China, but rather has never

been really tried. Without the Manchu’s insincerity, the revolutionary party would never

have been influential.

History does not lack irony. While a leading political scientist from the world’s

most democratic country gave his imprimatur to a monarchical scheme, Liang Qichao, a

principal supporter of constitutional monarchy before the 1911 Revolution, spearheaded a

crusade against monarchy. His seeming flip-flop sprang from his conservatism. He

preferred to maintain the existing political system, be it monarchial or republican. For

him, no political system is perfect, and all contain the seeds of instability. Since a change

of political systems creates instability, careful choice should be made. Having undergone

too frequent changes after the revolution, China is not stable enough to bear more

changes. Liang did not believe that the establishment of a monarchy would guarantee the

success of constitutionalism. He attributed China’s lack of constitutionalism to local

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87

interests, authority’s attitudes, and people’s habits and capabilities. Since none of them

resulted from republicanism, the abolition of republicanism would not eliminate sources

of failed constitutionalism. Liang did not deny that certain political systems suit some

countries better than others. But a monarchy does not necessarily serve China better than

a republic. It is true that a republic faces the problem of secession, but the new election

law has basically solved the problem. The dignity of the monarchy, once insulted, would

be difficult to regain. For Liang, Yuan’s allegiance to the republic disqualified him from

being a new emperor. All these do not rule out the possibility of a monarchy in the future.

However, he imagined two possible scenarios. Either the incumbent president would

make greater achievements, or someone would save China from chaos.

Behind this academic debate lay interests and power. “The Society for the

Preservation of Peace” kept in daily touch with the President’s Palace. The Procurator

General of Beijing were urged to proceed against the Society, but threats to his life forced

him to flee the capital.36 Supported by the president’s men, the monarchical campaign

was in full swing. Petitions for a monarchy poured. In August 1915, Yuan referred these

petitions to the Consultative Yuan, which lost no time in recommending the convocation

of the “National Convention of People’s Representatives” to discuss them. Elected and

summoned post haste, 1,993 delegates voted unanimously for the establishment of a

constitutional monarchy in November. Yuan pretended to decline their request to ascend

the throne for his modest contributions and his allegiance to the old dynasty and the new

36 Weale. The Fight for the Republic in China. 149.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88

republic. But Yuan accepted the second petition in the following month.

But the balance of power was not in Yuan’s favor. Yuan’s civil-bureaucrats was

the backbone of his monarchical scheme. They were good at manipulating public opinion,

but had limited power. The Nationalists vehemendy opposed Yuan’s ambidon out of their

self-interest and republican ideals, but they were too weak to challenge him. Yuan’s

military subordinates, such as Feng Guozhang and Duan Qirui, did not openly challenge

or support him. Other subordinates’ support was at most lukewarm. Even conservatives

withdrew their approval. A story had it that in the fall of 1915, the “pigtail general”

Zhang Xun, who kept his soldiers’ queues to show allegiance to the Qing court and who

would later restore it, responded to the monarchists by saying that “I very much agree

with the imperial system, but who is to be emperor?”37

What sealed Yuan’s fate were the foreign powers led by Japan and local forces. In

late October 1915, Britain, Japan, and Russia formally took exception to Yuan’s attempt.

In December, France and Italy joined the group to present their second protest on the

grounds that the monarchial movement would cause instability. The news of foreign

opposition gave impetus to the anti-Yuan’s forces. Cai E declared the independence of

Yunnan province ten days later, which led several other southwestern provinces to follow

suit. Yuan’s monarchical scheme plunged China into another civil war. Having failed to

suppress the uprising, Yuan terminated his emperorship, but resumed his presidency. The

anti-Yuan forces insisted on his resignation and China’s strong man succumbed to

37 Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai. 227.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. disease, humiliation and frustration in June 1916.

Warlordism

Yuan’s death left a political vacuum which the warlords soon filled. James E.

Sheridan defines warlords as those who used their own army to exercise control over a

territory. Warlordism, the situation in which warlords ruled the country, was not foreign

to the Chinese. For Richard H. Solomon, Chinese tradition preaches peace and harmony,

but warring states have been an enduring characteristic of Chinese political life. Without

traditional legitimacy, power is the sole base of legitimacy. Naked force played so

important a role that Mao Zedong stated that “Power comes of the barrel of the gun.” For

Lucien Pye, in a disrupted society the military is so well-organized as to seek political

power and influence public policy.38

The immediate power transition after Yuan’s death was smooth and

constitutional. Vice President Li Yuanhong assumed the presidency, and Feng Guozhang

was elected to the vice presidency. The new government faced two powerful military

groups: Yuan’s Beiyang faction, and the southern groups. Li did its best to maintain a

balance between them. He appointed Duan Qirui as premier to curry favor with the

Beiyang faction. To win supports in the southern provinces, he resurrected the 1912

38 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 16; Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. 3; Lucian W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

Provincial Constitution and recalled the parliament dissolved by Yuan.

The hope of a revival of republicanism, however, was shortly dashed. Before long,

the quarrels among president, premier, and parliament paralyzed the central government.

Premier Duan treated Li as a figurehead, and advocated war against Germany, a proposal

rejected by the president, vice-president and parliament. Relying on military governors,

who had formed a loose but influential organization during the Anti-Yuan campaign,

Duan wanted the president to dissolve parliament. Instead Li fired Duan, who refused to

accept the legality of the decision and encouraged eight provinces to declare

independence. Seeking military protection from Duan’s threat, Li summoned the “pigtail

general” Zhang Xun to Beijing. On his way to Beijing, Zhang forced Li to dissolve

parliament, and then restored the Manchu monarchy in July 1917. The restoration was so

unpopular that all sides united to preserve the Republic. Duan’s expedition defeated

Zhang Xun within two weeks. President Li was forced to resign, and Duan resumed his

premiership. He declared war against Germany, organized a provisional senate to replace

parliament, and produced a new constitutional document. With Duan as premier and Feng

as president, the Beiyang faction dominated the central government. Although the

republic was restored in name, it was military generals who dominated both national and

local politics. Excluding the rival government led by Sun Yat-sen in Canton, Andrew J.

Nathan kept count of ten heads of state, forty-five cabinets, five legislatures, and seven

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91

constitutions or basic laws from 1912 to 1927.39

By the first half of 1920, warlordism had taken definite shape. There were several

major factions. The Beiyang faction was succeeded by two factions. One was the Anfu

faction led by Duan Qirui. This faction was the most influential one at the beginning, and

controlled the central government and eight provinces. The other was the Chihli faction

led by Feng Guozhang first and then by Wu Peifu and Cao Kun. It dominated five

provinces. The Fentien faction headed by Zhang Zuoling dominated Manchuria. Beside

these three major factions, there were numerous local warlords. Guangdong, Guangxi,

Yunnan and Guizhou were under the jurisdiction of a group of southwest warlords.

Shanxi, Hunan and Sichuan were under control of their own provincial warlords. In many

provinces, there were small warlords.

All warlords expressed commitment to a united China, but none wished to

sacrifice their own interests. The Anfu faction, which controlled the central government,

advocated military unification, but did not succeed. The Chihli faction, which faced

southern warlords, advocated peaceful unification. The southern warlords, who were the

weakest, advocated federalism, hi fact, people of all stripes, such as Sun Yat-sen, Liang

Qichao, Hu Shih and Mao Zedong, embraced federalism from 1920-1923. The 1924

Constitution even partook of federalism.40 In the September 1922 issue of Pacific Ocean

39 Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 25.

40 For an analysis of the federalist movement, see Jean Chesneaux, “The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-3,” in Modem China’s Search for a Political Form, ed. Gray, 96-137; and Arthur Waldron, “Warlordism versus Federalism: The Revival of a Debate?”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92

[Taiping Yang], a journal devoted to federalism, Tang Tehchang regarded federalism as

the way of saving China. In his view, it would facilitate economic development, provide

better political education, respect provincial characteristics, and guarantee democracy

against monarchical restoration. At that particular time, it would also limit military

power, help avoid civil wars, and secure a peace.41 Yang Duanliu challenged the

conventional wisdom that federalism ran counter to the Chinese tradition of unification,

and claimed that a unified China accounted for less than a third of its 3,000-year history42

With hindsight, there were rational elements in federalism, because China’s vast size and

regional diversity requires a federalist solution. But during the warlord period, federalism

had little chance to succeed. Hsi-sheng Ch’i correctly points out, “The people’s greatest

desire was for nationalism through power and unity, not regionalism through continued

division. Regionalism was acceptable only as a temporary device to escape the oppression

of civil wars.”43 As a result, the baby of federalism was thrown away with the bath water

of warlordism.

Before 1920, most warlords focused on consolidating their power in their own

areas, and therefore no major conflicts occurred among them. But their expansion of

The China Quarterly (March 1990): 116-28.

41 Chesneaux, “The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-3,” 125.

42 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modem China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 186.

43 Hsi-Sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China. 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 193.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93

power soon led to a series of civil wars. The war first broke out between Anfu and Chihli

along the Beijing-Hankow railway, one of China’s two arteries running from the north to

the south, in July 1920. With the help of Fentien, Chihli defeated Anfu, which lost control

of the Beijing government, and all provinces but Zhejiang and Fujian. For almost two

years after the Anfu-Chihli war, the Beijing government was manipulated by the Chihli

and Fentien cliques.

With the defeat of their common enemy, the conflict between Chihli and Fentien

came to the surface. The more powerful Chihli wanted to have a greater say in the Beijing

government. As a result, the First Chihli-Fentien War broke out in April 1922. After its

victory, Chihli reinstated Li Yuanhong as president in June, but soon Chihli warlords,

especially Cao Kun, desired to rule themselves. He forced Li to flee to Tianjin, bribed

almost all five-hundred-odd parliamentarians at about 5,000 yuan per person to elect him

to the presidency in October 1923. To win the warlords’ support, he formally let

provinces collect the land-tax, the single most important source of revenue in the imperial

times.44 Fentien, the KMT and Anfu all denounced the illegal election. Tension escalated

to the Second Chihli-Fentien War in the fall of 1924. Despite the support of Fentien and

Sun Yat-sen, the Anfu faction was eliminated. But the war took an unexpected turn when

Chihli general Feng Yuxiang defected to Fentien by occupying Beijing in October 1924.

Chihli had to retreat from north China to the Yangtze valley. Fentien took the areas along

the Beijing-Tianjin-Pukow railway, and Feng’s army acquired the areas along the Beijing-

44 Ch’en, “Historical Background,” 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94

Hankow and Beijing-Suiyuan railways. To maintain the balance of power system, the

Anfu leader Duan Qirui was chosen as chief executive in November 1924. This war had

so disrupted and weakened the North that it paved the way for Chiang Kai-shek’s future

unification.

The warlord period from 1916-1928 might not be as dismal as we assume. Arthur

Waldron found a great deal of economic growth, political freedom, and cultural

development.45 But the negative side of warlordism could not go unnoticed. First, war

was prevalent in China. Between 1916 and 1924, war, on the average, hit more than seven

provinces annually. After 1924, it damaged about fourteen provinces annually.46 In

traditional China, the military had a low status, as encapsulated by the saying that “Good

iron does not make nails, good men do not make soldiers.” But after the 1911 Revolution,

the legitimacy of the Chinese rulers were often challenged. Warlordism reflected and

reinforced this unwholesome situation. According to a conservative estimate, the Chinese

troops quadrupled between 1911 and 1928 47 Soldiers did not maintain law and order, but

rather caused instability and havoc.

Second, national integration was disrupted. The central government lost its control

of national finance. Such a loss can be dated back to the last years of the Qing dynasty,

45 Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point. 1924-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 264,

46 Hsi-hseng Ch’i, The Chinese Warlord System: 1916 to 1928 (Washington. D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University 1969), 74.

47 Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers. 1911-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95

but the situation went from bad to worse during the warlord period. Among the fifteen

provinces with records, the numbers of the provinces which transmitted taxes to the

central government were eleven in 1918, three in 1919 and zero after the 1920 Anhui-

Chihli war.48 To consolidate their power base, warlords tried to minimize external

influence and to push for self-sufficiency in their turf. Internal customs, which had

represented a 0.1 percent tax on certain commodities, increased to 10 percent in some

areas, and levying stations were established in many places. Given the fact that the

comparative figures of internal and external trade for China in 1925 were 981 million and

2,716 million Chinese dollar, respectively, the negative impact of warlordism on

economic integration was obvious 49

Not the least of all, ordinary people suffered a lot. Since warlords realized that

their rule was not permanent, they fleeced the local people as much and soon as possible.

Mancur Olson points out that “when an autocrat has no reason to consider the future

output of the society at all, his incentive are those of a roving bandit and that is what he

becomes.”50 Evidence in China shows that the more insecure a warlord’s position was,

the greedier they were. While an insecure Zhang Chingyao established a brutal regime in

Hunan, a secure Yan Xishan exercised enlightened rule in Shanxi.51 During this period,

48 Ch’i, The Chinese Warlord System. 68.

49 Ch’i, The Chinese Warlord System. 75.

50 Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 97 (September 1993): 571.

51 Nathan, Peking Politics. 1918-1923, 100.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96

exorbitant taxes were levied on ordinary people, especially peasants.

According to one estimate, there were at one time 673 different kinds of taxes levied on land property, hi Kiangsu, alone, there were 147 kinds. It was also not unusual for land taxes to levied not merely for the current year but for future years. In the early twentieth, advance payment of land taxes were extorted up to 1936 in Anhwei; to 1956, 1965, 1972, respectively, in different parts of Szechwan; and even to the next century in some other places. The result was that the land taxes constituted at least 30 percent, and frequently as much as 80 percent, of the total income for the warlords.52

The small business suffered as much as peasants. The local chambers of commerce were

often extorted.

For all this, warlordism deserves to be regarded as anathema. In fact, China’s fear

of chaos in modem times resulted partly from painful memories of warlordism. For the

Chinese, dictatorship is a lesser evil than anarchy, and this justifies the Chinese tolerance

of dictatorship.

The Left Turn

After the 1911 Revolution, the new bottle of republicanism still contained the old

wine of despotism. What followed the demise of the monarchy was not democracy, but

Yuan’s dictatorship and anarchical warlordism. The disappointing realities forced

Chinese elites to seek solution. There were three options: Confucian tradition, liberal

democracy, and Russian Bolshevism. It was natural for the Chinese to revert to Confucian

traditions, both because they were familiar, if not comfortable, with the traditions which

did not lack political wisdom. The devastating effects of World War I and the alleged

52 Ch’i, The Chinese Warlord System. 73.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97

decline of Western civilization justified the trend. Liang Qichao, for example, opposed

Western individualism and hedonism, and advocated the familism, whose values are

“reciprocity,” “respect for rank,” and “concern for posterity.” The British philosopher

Bertrand Russell, who lectured in China in 1920 and 1921, lent credibility to the

argument. For him, the Chinese should learn from the Westerners scientific method, and

that the Westerns should learn from the Chinese “a just conception of the ends of life.”53

But mainstream intellectual elites deemed it inevitable to break with Chinese

traditions, and many of them kept embracing liberal democracy. Such mentalities were

reflected in the New Cultural Movement in the mid-1910s.54 Beginning with Chen

Duxiu’s publication of New Youth magazine in 1915, this movement dismissed Chinese

traditions as useless and harmful. Enlightenment thinkers chanted the slogan of “Down

with Confucius and sons,” and preached democracy and science as the method of saving

China. But as Tse-tsung Chou points out, the Chinese intellectuals did not understood the

catchword of democracy well, but John Dewey, who lectured in China in 1919 and 1920,

impressed the Chinese by dividing democracy into four elements: political democracy

(constitutionalism and representation), civil rights, social democracy (the abolition of

social inequality), and economic democracy (the equalization of the distribution of

53 Russell, The Problem of China. 154.

54 Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98

wealth).55

The Russian Revolution of 1917 presented Marxism as an alternative to liberal

democracy. Although socialism did not replace liberal democracy, it is an undisputed fact

that socialism gradually increased its influence at the cost of liberal democracy. On May

1, 1919, Li Dazhao, a Japanese-trained political scientist and the head librarian at Peking

University, edited a “special issue” on Marxism for New Youth. In December, a society

for the Study of Socialism was founded at Peking University. In early 1920, the

Comintern sent representatives to promote communist movement in China. In July 1921,

Chen Duxiu, a new convert, and Li Dazhao, an old evangelist, founded the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP).

What caused the relative rise and fall of socialism and liberal democracy was the

May Fourth Movement. On May 4, 1919, students in Beijing took to the streets against

the warlord government, because the Paris Conference had decided to allow Japan to take

China’s Shandong province which had occupied by Germany. The Chinese who had

fought against Germany felt betrayed by the imperialist powers. The students movement

soon spread to many cities, and urban residents, including merchants and workers,

actively participated. A Western observer was quoted as saying that:

Literally millions of farmers, dealers, and artisans are talking for the first time of national and international affaires which it never entered their minds that they could express an opinion on, not even when stirred up by the recent revolutions. On can go to any food shop among group of laborers on the job and hear it about him. The signs

55 Tse-tsung Chou, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modem China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 228.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99

in the tea shops: ‘Don’t talk politics’ are out of date. It is a remarkable thing which these young crusaders [students] are doing—perhaps the real awakening of China at last.56

As a result, the government fired three pro-Japan officials, refused to sign the Versailles

treaty, and left students unpunished.

Chinese appreciation of a foreign ideology is based on both message and

messenger. The successive popularity of liberal democracy, fascism, socialism and neo

authoritarianism mainly reflected the glory of messengers. The May Fourth Movement

further alienated the Chinese intellectuals from liberal democracy. The Chinese, who

were poor and conservative, never liked capitalism on which liberal democracy was

based, and hated imperialist polices of democracies. Since the May Fourth Movement,

most of Chinese intellectuals, as Maurice Meisner points out, “find it increasingly

difficult to accept the West in its dual role of teacher and oppressor.”57 Chen Duxiu, who

had propagated democracy, dismissed democracy as a “tool that bourgeoisie formerly

used to overthrow the feudal system and which they presently use as a devise to swindle

mankind in order to maintain political power.”58

While liberal democracy failed to fill the civilizational vacuum, more Chinese

found in socialism a holistic and all-embracing solution to China’s problem. Like

Buddhism, another foreign export in China, Marxism appeals to both the intelligent and

56 Chow, The May Fourth Movement. 227-28.

57 Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 99.

58 Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, 113.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100

the ignorant. For the intelligent, it is a coherent and comprehensive world view.59 For the

ignorant, it is dogma that emphasized the importance of economy and class struggle in

social life. Its devastating criticism of capitalism and imperialism and its alleged equal

attention to efficiency and equality endeared it to the disadvantaged and desperate people.

Dissatisfied with imperialism, warlordism and themselves, the Chinese wanted an

overall solution and immediate actions. In the summer of 1919, the debate over

“problems and isms” was mainly conducted between Hu Shih and Li Dazhao. Hu, whose

belief in liberalism and pragmatism revealed his American educational background, urged

students to study more problems and to talk less about isms. For him, isms advocating

overall solutions were irrelevant and even harmful. The real solution to social problems

ought to be gradual. Li Dazhao contended that despite the importance of studying real

problems, it was necessary to spread an ideal ism, because it gave people purpose and

direction. Without it, there could be no solution of individual problems. Although neither

side could claim victory, more Chinese came to discard liberals’ advocacy of moderate

reform.

Sun Yat-sen’s intellectual and political journey represented trends in China rather

well. His political ideas took shape before the 1911 Revolution,60 but culminated in his

59 Thomas S. Kuhn found that scientific development takes the form of paradigm change. But it is my belief that social sciences differ from natural sciences. The relative status of major paradigms may change, but they will always remain. For Kuhn’s view, see his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2d, enl. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

60 Leng Shao-chuan and Norman D. Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism (New York: Praeger, 1960), 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101

Three Principles of People.61 These principles are nationalism, democracy, and

livelihood, corresponding to “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” respectively. He defined

the dual goals of nationalism as overthrowing the alien Manchu rule and acquiring equal

status with other nations. His principle of livelihood is similar to socialism. He

maintained that the discrepancy between rich and poor should be reduced. To promote

people’s welfare, he suggested two methods. One was the equalization of land ownership.

He did not plan to communize land, but rather adopted Henry George’s method to ensure

the equalization of land rights.62 The other method was the regulation of capital. He

deemed it necessary to limit large private capital, but the small size of Chinese industry

provided little reason for imminent nationalization.63

To understand Sun’s view of democracy presupposes an appreciation of his

conception of equality. Sun does not believe that all people are created equal, and made

distinctions between natural and artificial inequality on the one hand, and between false

61 For Sun’s ideas, see Paul M.A. Linebarger, The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat- sen: An Exposition of theSan Min Chu (Baltimore: I Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937); Chu-yuan Cheng ed., Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modem World (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1989).

62 According to this method, it is up to land owners to determine their land value. Based on their estimation, government can either collect taxes or purchase land. Those who overestimate the value risk paying high taxes. Those who underestimate the value risk underselling their lands.

63 When Song Jiaoren advised the provisional president not to mention the principle of livelihood, Sun categorically refused by saying that “The revolution aims at the welfare of the people and the solution of the problem of livelihood. If we discarded the Principle of Livelihood, we may as well give up the whole revolution.” Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism. 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102

and true equality on the other. Natural inequality means that human beings are endowed

with different capabilities. He divides people into three categories: discoverers who know

and perceive beforehand, promoters who know and perceive afterward, and practical

persons who do not know and perceive.64 Artificial inequality refers to social inequality

exacerbated by autocracy.65 False equality refers to the situation in which different people

are forced to be equal. Enlarging inequality is wrong, so is imposing a false equality on

natural inequality. False equality runs counter to natural inequality, lets down talents, and

damages society in the long run. Sun compares false equality to a race, in which runners

are not allowed to run as fast as they can, but are required to reach the finish line at the

same time. True equality only means equal opportunity for all people to fully realize their

potential. To use the same analogy, when the race starts, all runners should be at the same

starting line.

Since inequality is natural, Sun thinks, democracy is limited to political equality.

Even this is difficult to achieve. Sun cites Greek democracy, in which slaves accounting

for a large proportion of the population were excluded, and the American democracy, in

which whites and non-whites were treated unequally. Although inequality is a reality, Sun

praised the human desire of equality as “the highest of moral ideals.” He keenly

64 Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Taipei: China Cultural Service, n.d.), 152-53.

65 Sun, San Min Chu I. 134.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103

understood the possible conflict between equality and efficiency.66 To ensure political

equality and social progress, Sun divides state power into “political power”zheng-quan) (

and “administrative power”zhi-quan ( ). While the former power rests with the people, the

latter lies with government. What people are to their president in a republic is, for him,

what shareholders are to their president in a company.67

Sun regards democracy as a world trend and justified it in three ways. First,

people represent the foundation of the nation, and in a nation where everyone is supposed

to be equal, the ruler has no place. Second, 260 years of Manchu rule had embittered the

Chinese and excluded the possibility of constitutional monarchy in China. Third,

democratic system can avoid the problem suffered by China. In the past, Chinese

revolutions ended in chaos and wars, because everyone wanted to be an emperor. By

introducing a democratic system, all such conflicts would disappear.68

Sun wanted to improve existing western democratic practices and made them

suitable to Chinese realties. For Sun, social sentiments, customs, and habits in China have

differed from those in the west for thousands of years, methods of social control should

66 For a classical study of the relations, see Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975). Robert A. Dahl provided three criteria for authority: personal choice, competence, and economy. See his After Revolution? Authority in a Good Society rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 1-44.

67 Sun, San Min Chu 1.214-15.

68 Sun, “A History of the Chinese Revolution,” in Prescription for Saving China: Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994), 252-53.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104

vary from society to society.69 He made three adjustments. First, given the fact that

Western democracy merely amounted to suffrage, he borrowed from the idea of the

Progressive Movement in America that people should be entitled to four rights: suffrage,

recall, initiative, and referendum.70 Second, he created a so-called “five power

constitution.” In the west, there are three branches of government: legislative, executive

and judiciary. Inspired by Chinese tradition, Sun added two more branches. The

examination branch takes charge of selecting civil officials; the control branch monitors

their behavior.

Last, but not the least, he devised a three-stage revolutionary strategy. For Sun,

people under tyrannical rule were not only incapable of liberating themselves, but were so

ignorant as to ridicule and disregard revolutionaries promoting their interests. Thus,

revolutionaries faced two tasks: destroying their enemy and enlightening people, hi his

view, revolution should pass through three stages of military administration(jun-zheng ),

political tutelage (xun-zheng), and constitutional rale(xian-zheng). In the first stage, the

revolutionary party would seize power and establish a military dictatorship. In the second

69 Sun, San Min Chu L p. 190. Many thinkers would agree with Sun. See, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland.” in Rousseau: Political Writings. Selections trans. and ed. Frederick Watkins (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), I. Based on Harry Eckstein’s “congruence theory,” stable democracy requires that the pattern of authority relationships in a political system must be more or less congruent with the corresponding authority patterns in the society. See his “Authority Relations and Government Performance: A Theoretic Framework,” Comparative Political Studies 2 (October 1969): 269-326.

70 Delos F. Wilcox, Government bv all the People: or. the Initiative, the Referendum, and the Recall as Instruments of Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1912).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105

stage, it would educate people, introduce local autonomy, and promote popular rights.

After six years, autonomous counties would elect a national assembly to create a

constitution guaranteeing constitutional rule. In the third stage, people would have the

rights of suffrage, initiative, referendum, and recall at the county level; the national

assembly would have all rights but suffrage at the national level.71 The problem with

Sun’s strategy is that it is naive to suppose that his vanguard party would act in the

national interests and press for a constitutional rule in due course. In other words, Sun

failed to address the question of who guards the guardian. No wonder that such a strategy

would justify Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian rule rather than promoting a pluralistic

democracy.

Although Sun never gave up his democratic ideals, he gradually moved toward

authoritarianism. The failure of the “Second Revolution” sent him into exile in Japan. He

reorganized the KMT into the Chinese Revolutionary Party(zhong-hua ge-ming) indang

July 1914. Robert Michels’ theory of political party was invoked to justify the

authoritarian party. For the sake of unity and discipline, he insisted that all initiates

should take an oath of allegiance to him personally, rather than the party’s elected leader.

This policy kept many of his long-time comrades, such as Huang Hsing, from joining the

party. Sun reiterated a three-stage strategy, and emphasized the idea of one-party

government. Besides, he created a hierarchy in the party system, and divided party

members into founding, associate, and general ones according to the date of entry into the

71 Sun, “A History of the Chinese Revolution,” 255-56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106

party. The earlier they joined the party, the more privileges they enjoyed during the

second stage of the revolution. Non-party members would not have political rights until

the promulgation of a constitution.72 His 1919 reorganization of the party continued the

authoritarian trend and granted him supreme power as the party’s Director-Generalzong (-

cai).

After his return to China, Sun was not a cure for national disintegration, but an

important cause of it. He allied with southern warlords to organize rival government three

times in Canton. Although his regime was never powerful, it challenged the legitimacy of

the Beijing government. Edward A. Mccord correctly points out that “Warlordism did not

originate simply in rejection of legitimate political authority by military commanders, but

rather in the difficulty of defining which authority was legitimate.”73 When Duan Qirui

discontinued parliament, Sun established a rival government in July 1917. Far from

meeting a required quorum, the rump parliament instituted a provisional military

government with Sun as Generalissimo to uphold the 1912 Provisional Constitution.

While Sun aimed at unification, the warlords wanted to keep their turf intact. Dissatisfied

with his status as figurehead, Sun returned to Shanghai in May 1918. In late 1920 when

Chen Jiongming captured Canton, Sun returned to be elected “Extraordinary President of

the Chinese Republic,” which only exercised control in Guangdong province. Several

months later, when Li Yuanhong was restored to the presidency and convened the 1913

72 Yu, Party Politics in Republican China. 127-28.

73 Edward A. Mccord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modem Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 310.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107

parliament, Sun was urged to unite with the Beijing government. His rejection of the

proposal and insistence upon a northern expedition led Chen Jiongming to revolt in June

1922. With the help of Chiang Kai-shek, whose loyalty won Sun’s heart, Sun narrowly

escaped death. One month after warlords from Yunnan and Guangxi defeated Chen

Jiongming, Sun was reinvited in February 1923 to head a new government. What

distinguished this government is that he took a left turn by allying with Soviet Russia.

Sun’s alliance with Soviet Russia resulted from three factors. First, he admired the

Russian Revolution. During his stay in London in 1896, he was impressed by the long

term plan and down-to-earth efforts of Russian revolutionaries.74 The success of the

Russian revolution impressed him even more, because it had defeated a more powerful

enemy than had the Chinese Revolution. Unlike the alien Manchu, who had ruled a

weakest state and received no outside help during the revolution, the Tsars, who were

Russian themselves and the patriarchy of the orthodox church, ruled one of the world’s

strongest states and enjoyed support from the great powers.75

Second, without any other foreign assistance, Sun could not afford to turn down

Soviet offer of friendship. Sun was always desperate for foreign help. When he was in

Japan in the mid-l910s, he had even secretly offered Japan some special privileges,

74 Sun Yat-sen, sun zhong-shan xuan-ii [Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 583.

75 Sun, sun zhone-shan xuan-ii. 916.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

108

which invited accusation that he put personal ambition before national interests.76 Foreign

aid had never materialized until the Soviet Russia came in. Just as the French Revolution

invited outside intervention by abolishing the monarchy, so the Russian Revolution

caused foreign invasion by establishing the first socialist country in a capitalist world.

Facing a hostile world, Soviet Russia decided to utilize nationalist movement in colonial

and semi-colonial countries. Since Western capitalism relied on these countries for raw

materials, markets and investment outlets, nationalist revolutions constituted a “flank

attack”on the capitalist world. As a result, the Soviet announced its willingness to

relinquish all Czarist privileges and interests in China and to abrogate all unequal treaties.

The Soviet diplomats worked very hard to win support from all factions in China. Having

received little foreign help, Sun decided to side with Soviet Russia.

Finally, Leninist strategy and ideas attracted Sun. Indeed, he never endorsed

Marxism, which maintained that material economic environment mainly determined

human behavior and that class struggles promoted social progress. For Sun, modem

economic development and social progress resulted from cooperation rather than

conflict.77 More important, Marxism could not be applied to China, and might even affect

the Chinese ability to appreciate the beauty of Chinese civilization, especially ethics. But

Leninism struck a chord in him. Like Leninism, Sun attached importance to a vanguard

party. He adopted a doctrine of party tutelage as the only way to create national unity and

76 For detail, see Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

77 Sun, San Min Chu I. 276.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109

democratic institutions. For Sun, his disciples had dismissed his political ideas as

idealistic and unattainable, because they did not understand his doctrine, whose theme is

that ‘To understand is difficult, but to achieve is easy.” Sun was also similar to Leninism

in downplaying the importance of individual liberties. For Sun, the Chinese revolution

was different from the European ones. The Europeans fought for liberty, which they

lacked. By contrast, the Chinese did not lack liberty, but needed unity. So the Chinese

revolution should break down individual liberty and turn China from a sheet of sand into

a piece of rock.78 Without putting national liberty before individual liberty, the Chinese

would not be able to establish a stable and working democracy.

In January 1923, Sun and the Soviet diplomat Adolph A. Joffe issued a joint

statement, and laid the groundwork for future cooperation. Very soon, Sun returned to

Canton to reestablish his government. With the assistance of the Comintern, Sun

proceeded to reorganize the KMT for the third time. One important policy was to form a

united front between the Nationalists and the Communists. The Soviets pressured the

Communists into joining the KMT by portraying it as a party for all classes instead of

only the bourgeoisie. The Communist leaders opposed the proposal, because such an

alliance might dilute their class purity and affect party independence. But the warlords’

suppression of the Communists in North China changed the latter’s mind. Most KMT

leaders did not like the united front either, because the KMT had some 150,000 members,

78 Sun, San Min Chu I. 127-28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110

but the CCP less than three hundred.79 Sun finally convinced his comrades to join the

united front.80

The new KMT in 1924 was very much a Leninist party. The Bolshevik principle

of democratic centralism replaced the rule of personal loyalty to Sun. The Communists,

who pledged their allegiance to the KMT, joined it as individual members. The KMT,

which had consisted largely of self-seeking elites, broadened its power base by assisting

workers and peasants. The Whampoa Military Academy was established to train military

officers. Supported by the Soviet assistance and mass movement, the Nationalists

renounced collaboration with the southern warlords, called for national unification, and

took a position of anti-imperialism. They declared their intention to abrogate the unequal

treaties, to abolish foreign concessions and extraterritoriality, and resume tariff autonomy.

Although the reorganization achieved its objective in a short period, Sun did not

live to see its results. After the Second Chihli-Fentien war, he was invited to Beijing with

a view to reconciliation between the north and the south. He died of cancer in Beijing in

March 192S. Only three months after his death, the Nationalists established a national

government based on his concept of a five-power constitution in Canton. Two years later,

they succeeded in unifying China.

79 Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism. 58.

80 For Sun’s reasons for the united front, see Modem China, ed. Li, 206-07.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1

111

Concluding Remarks

From the world’s oldest civilization to Asia’s first republic, China seemed to have

made a quantum leap. Asia’s first republic does not necessarily indicate that the Chinese

were willing and able to maintain democracy. Before the 1911 Revolution, the vast

majority of Chinese people and elites had no preference for democratic republicanism,

and those who advocated democracy treated it less as an end than as an means to national

power and wealth. But the 1911 Revolution ruled out the possibility of establishing a new

monarchy in China, and ushered in the era of republicanism.

The revolution and later political development were mainly shaped by the shifting

balance of power between the central government and local forces. Since the Western

incursion in China, the Manchu regime had been buffeted by foreign powers and local

forces. During the 1911 Revolution, the independence of provinces sealed the fate of the

ancient regime. The local forces which had doomed the Qing dynasty continued to

threaten the new republic. The danger of disintegration called for a strong man to rule

China. Yuan Shih-kai’s fight against disintegration served the national interest, and won

the widespread support. But his monarchical scheme discredited him, and his death left

political vacuum for the warlords to fill. During the warlord period, the central

government not only lost control of local forces, but became a puppet of powerful

warlords. Partisan conflict, domestic instability and civil wars in the Republican era made

the Chinese disillusioned with republicanism. One may rightly argue that democracy was

not really tried in China, but the painful experiences made the Chinese conclude that a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

112

strong government was necessary and desirable, and that democracy was not a unifying,

but a divisive force. It is against this background that the Nationalists turned to Leninism

for help. After all, chaos is worse than dictatorship.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4

THE WORLD SYSTEM AND DEMOCRACY

Internal pacification must take precedence over external war.

Chiang Kai-shek

The world system in the post-CoId War era facilitates democratization. The fact

that all rich and powerful countries are democratic has a “demonstration effect.”

According to Samuel P. Huntington, all non-oil producing high income or upper middle

income countries except Singapore are democratic. All western and western-influenced

countries have become democratic, with very few exceptions such as Cuba. The

undemocratic countries tend to be either poor or with little western influence.1 Democracy

is not only desirable but possible. A peaceful and interdependent world deprives an

important cause of and excuse for dictatorship. The existence of a hostile world has

always provided legitimate reasons for dictatorship. Not least of all, democratic countries

used all kinds of leverage to promote democracy in the world, and undemocratic countries

face great pressures from the democratic world.2

1 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Challenge,” World Link (March/April, 1994), 20.

2 Giuseppe Di Palma identified four major ways international factors affect democratization: demonstration effects, promotion, the removal of a veto against democracy by a regional hegemon, and hegemonic self-reform. See his To Craft

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114

But more often than not, the world system militated against democratization

processes in disadvantaged countries. No era in modem China provides a better case than

the Nationalist one. Since China was dragged into the modem world system, its national

goals were to survive at least, and to pursue power and wealth at most. In a world

characterized by power politics, it is imperative to strengthen state power. What made

democratization process more difficult was foreign intervention, which may take the form

of foreign conquest or proxy war. This chapter will look at China’s status in the world

and its impact on Chinese national goals; examine the Nationalists’ efforts to build a

modem nation state; explore how the Japanese invasion affected China’s political

development, and finally analyze the Chinese Civil War against the background of the

Cold War.

China in the World System

Modem Chinese history is one of Chinese response to foreign challengesa la

Toynbee.3 China’s relations with the modem world system passed through several stages.

At the beginning, China had no interest in interacting with it, because China was self-

sufficient and self-contented, as represented by Emperor Qianlong’s oft-quoted letter to

King George El. But merchant’s greed, missionary’s zeal, and the military’s prowess in

Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1990), 183-99.

3 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History abridged by D. C. Somervell (New York: Dell, 1969).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115

the West dragged China into the system. The Chinese did try to improve their status in the

system, but in vain. The Communists finally managed to retreat from the capitalist world

system, but this turned out to be a dead-end. Then Deng Xiaoping voluntarily led China

back to the world system.4

The world system is undemocratic. Justice in the world may take three possible

forms: justice as the interests of the stronger; geometrical justice based on relative

contributions, and arithmetic justice based on democratic principle.5 The UN Security

Council, the World Bank, and the UN General Assembly correspond to these three forms,

respectively, hi a semi-anarchic world, might often makes right. Power politics was not a

modem invention. The Melian dialogue, in which the Athenians attempted to persuade

the Melians to surrender during the Peloponnesian War, put it this way:

Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.6

The modem world system has two distinctive features. The first is the balance of

4 For a historical description, see Arthur Cotterell, East Asia: From Chinese Predominance to the Rise of the Pacific Rim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

5 Plato, The Republic of Plato trans. and intro, and notes by Francis MacDonald Comford (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), pt. I, “Some Current View of Justice,” 1-40; and Aristotle, The Politics, bk. 3, ch. 9-12, 193-209.

6 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War trans. by Rex Warner with an introduction and notes by M. I. Finley (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 404-05.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

116

power system, which emerged out of the Westphalia Conference of 1648 and has

dominated the world ever since. Its central feature was its recognition of sovereignty of

the European states, big and small. But Poland’s fate of being divided up three times

revealed the chasm between words and deeds.7 Moreover, the system did not respect the

sovereignty of non-European countries and treated them merely as bargaining chips in the

European balance of power. The second characteristic is capitalism. Immanuel

Wallerstein traced the modem world system back to early 16th-century Western Europe,

and characterized it as capitalist world-economies, whose purpose is to maximize profit

in the market, hi the world-economy, states are divided into core-states, semi-periphery,

and periphery states.8 However true its characterization, Wallerstein rightly highlighted

the two distinctive features of the modem world: it has become more integrated and

contains closer economic relations.9

The Chinese reluctance to join the world system arose both from their long

historical tradition and from unfair treatment they had received. The Chinese tribute

system, which had preceded the modem world system by about 18 centuries, had long

7 For the balance of power system, see Martin White, Power Politics ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1957).

8 For Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system perspective, see his The Modem World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic, 1976); The Capitalist World-Economv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); The Politics of the Capitalist World- Economv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

9 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1977).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. !

117

regulated China’s relations with the outside world.10 It differed from the modem world

system in that it was hierarchical. As the “central kingdom," China refused to treat

outsiders as equals.11 But unlike the modem world system in the early stage, the tribute

system was not exploitative. China “gave more than took” and exchanged material

benefits for political prestige. Besides, interactions between China and the outside world

were infrequent. Until mid-19th century, China adopted an isolationist policy on the

ground that it had little to gain from abroad.

The 1840 Opium War forced China to open its door to the outside world, and

made China a semi-colony in the modem world system. Indeed, China had suffered from

foreign invasion and domination before.12 But the Chinese agrarian civilization had

always triumphed over the nomadic civilizations. For the first time, China felt a sense of

inferiority in front of a higher mercantile and industrial civilization.

While Western scholars tend to describe the effects of the foreign presence as

modest or even favorable,13 their Chinese counterparts tend to highlight its devastating

10 For the Chinese system, see John King Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

11 John K. Fairbank, “China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 47 (April 1969): 459.

12 Alien rulers ruled part or all of China, as the “Five Dynasties and Ten States” in the 4th and 5th centuries, the Liao Dynasty of Khitan Mongols (907-1125), the Jin dynasty of the Jurchen (1125-1222), the Yuan dynasty of the Mongols (1279-1368) and the Qing dynasty of Manchus (1644-1911).

13 Robert F. Demberger, “The Role of the Foreigner in China’s Economic Development, 1840-1949,” in China’s Modem Economy in Historical Perspective, ed. Dwight H. Perkins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 19-47. Chi-ming Hou,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118

impact.14 With hindsight, external influence as a whole was a blessing for China in the

long run. On the eve of foreign incursions, the imbalance between the population and

resources in China had reached a level at which survival and further development became

very difficult.,s It was questionable whether capitalism and industrial revolution might

have occurred in China without any foreign influence, because this counter-factual

argument ignores the fact that human history had witnessed myriad rises and falls of

civilizations, but had experienced only one industrial revolution. Marx’s analysis of

British rule in India is applicable to China. For Marx, England fulfilled a double mission

in that it destroyed traditional society and laid the material foundations for modem

society.16

Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China. 1840-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Ramon Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Honei and Shantung. 1890-1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Rhoads Murphe, The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

14 See, for example, Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory with notes and commentary by Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy, 1947). Feng-hwa Mah, “External Influence and Chinese Economic Development: A Re-examination,” in Modem Chinese Economic History, ed. Hou Chi-ming and Tzong-shian Yu (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1979), 273-302; Tim Wright ed., The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century: Recent Chinese Studies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); James Peck, “The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America’s China Watchers,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 2 (October 1969): 59- 69; Frances Moulder, Japan. China, and the Modem World Economy, ca. 1600 to ca. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

15 See Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); Ho, Studies on the Population of China.

16 Marx, “The Future of British Rule in India,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Tucker, 659.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. However, China’s grievance against the modem world system was not groundless.

Psychologically, modernization tore down the social fabric of traditional society, and

disturbed the human mentality evolved over millennium. What made Chinese lives more

melancholy was the fact that the process was exogenous, imposed, and telescoped into a

relatively short period. Moreover, human beings think of gain or loss in both absolute and

relative terms. Even if the Chinese gained in absolute terms, foreigners benefited far more

than did the Chinese. For example, foreign investment made a huge profit between 1914

and 1930. The annual investment averaged 73.60 million Chinese dollars, but the average

remittance of profits abroad reached 138.80 million Chinese dollars.17 Such relative

deprivation aroused Chinese resentment and anger.

Although it is unfair to dismiss the positive impact of foreign trade and

investment in China, the Chinese economy suffered in many ways. First, foreign wars, in

terms of both defense expenditure and war indemnity, were too costly. Keeping in mind

that the Qing court’s revenue from China proper totaled slightly more than 100 million

taels at the turn of the century,18 nobody doubts that the two largest indemnity— 230

million taels paid to Japan after 1895 and 450 million taels Boxer indemnity in 1901—

were unbearable burdens to China. To pay the indemnities, China had to borrow money at

high interest rates. China’s foreign debt stood at 900 million taels in 1911. Second, China

17 Wang Yuru, “Economic Development in China between the Two World Wars (1920-1936),” in The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century, ed. Wright, 73.

18 Horsea Ballou Morse, The Trade and Administration of China (New York: Russell & Russell, 1908), 129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120

lacked tariff autonomy. Unequal treaties allowed foreigners to administer China’s

customs and set the Chinese custom tax rate at 5%. In fact, less than 4% was collected.

As a result, the influx of foreign machine-made commodities damaged China’s handicraft

industries. Third, foreign trade is good if countries exchange their surplus or desirable

goods. But the unfavorable terms of trade and the import of such goods as opium drained

China’s limited wealth. Last, foreign investment stunted the development of local

industry. Up to the 1920s foreign capital had mainly controlled Chinese trade and finance,

but before the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, it had dominated Chinese industry. By 1936

foreign capital controlled 95 per cent of pig iron output, 83 per cent of steel output, 66 per

cent of mechanized coal-mining, and 55 per cent of electrical energy resources, and

possessed 46 per cent of the spindles and 56 per cent of the looms in the textile industry.19

If we shift from the economic to the political field, the negative foreign impact is

more obvious.20 Although China did not become a colony, its fate was no better than a

colony. Some even argued that China suffered more than a colony, because no power

took responsibility for China, but all tried to take advantage of it. The infringement of

China’s sovereignty was epitomized in numerous unequal treaties. They were unequal

because they were secured by force, and were not reciprocal, and limited China’s

19 Ci Hongfei, “On the Consequences of the 1935 Currency Reform,” in The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century, ed. Wright, 201-02.

20 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press. 1984), 142.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121

freedom.21 By these treaties, China ceded a large territory to Russia, Taiwan to Japan,

Hong Kong and Jiulong to Britain, and lost suzerainty of Vietnam to France.

Extraterritoriality, or the right of consular jurisdiction, exempted foreigners from the

observation of Chinese law. With this privilege, foreign consuls had jurisdiction over all

cases where any of their countrymen was charged as defendant, and provided legal

assistance in cases where their countrymen were plaintiffs.

Existence of concessions, settlements, and leases also violated Chinese

sovereignty. Foreigners, who had been prohibited from residing in trading ports, forced

China to establish settlements, in which they might acquire property from native owners,

and concessions, which represented foreign countries’ perpetual lease of lands. In the late

1920s, settlements existed in 19 of 50 treaty ports. Concessions were acquired at the end

of the 19th century when imperialism was at its height.22 Believing in China’s imminent

disintegration, the great powers proceeded to lease gratis Chinese territories of strategic

and economic value. As a result, Germany leased Jiaozhou Wan, Russia Port Lushun and

Dalian Wan, Britain Weihaiwei and the New Territories near Hong Kong, and France

21 For the Chinese resentment against the world system, see Paul Monroe, China: A Nation in Evolution (New York: Macmillan, 1928). Especially chap. 8 “The Chinese Puzzle-From Inside Looking Out,” 357-91.

22 V.I. Lenin defines imperialism as the highest stage of the capitalism, see his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publisher, 1939); Joseph A. Schumpeter regards imperialism as “the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion.” See his “The Sociology of Imperialism,” in Imperialism and Social Classes trans. Heinz Norden, ed. and intro. Paul M. Sweezy (New York: Kelley, 1951), 7. Johan Gultung regards imperialism as structural violence which comprises the relationship between a central and a peripheral nation. See his “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971): 83, 91.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122

Guangzhou Wan. Enjoying complete jurisdiction over these areas, the great powers used

them as springboard to claim preferential treatment in nearby regions. While “spheres of

interests” involved the exploitation of commercial and natural resources, “spheres of

influence” referred to areas where the great powers had more political interests. As a

result, Germany dominated Shandong province; Russia Manchuria and most of North

China; England the Yangtze valley; France the southwest China; and Japan Fujian

province.

Even if the modem world system did not impoverish or weaken China, it certainly

made Chinese feel that China was poor and powerless. This motivated the Chinese to

strive for equality in the world and to regain their old glories no matter what they were.

To pursue wealth and power became a national goal, and to create a strong state took

precedence over democratization.

The Nationalist Rule

Danwkart Rustow argues that national unity is the only necessary precondition for

democracy.23 If that is the case, democracy had little chance to succeed in the early years

of the Nationalist era. Before the Northern Expedition began in July 1926, the Northern

warlords had wakened themselves by righting one another. The Fentien and Chihli

cliques fought to control the Yangtze area. Both of them also engaged Feng Yuxiang,

23 Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970): 337-63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123

forcing him to retreat to the Northwest. The Northern Expedition targeted Wu Peifu in

Central China, Sun Chuanfang in the Southeast, and Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria and

most of North China. Wu ignored the Nationalist attack and continued to fight Feng’s

army in the north. When he returned to the south, it was too late to turn the tide. Another

Chihli warlord Sun Chuanfang chose to stand on the sideline. When Wu’s downfall was

imminent, he put up a fight but in vain. Only after Sun had suffered great losses did

Fentien take steps against the Nationalists. The Nationalists co-opted southern warlords,

and allied with Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. They established a new government in

Nanjing in September 1927, and captured Beijing in June 1928. During his retreat from

Beijing to Manchuria, Zhang Zuoling was assassinated by Japanese officers near Mukden.

In December 1928, his son Zhang Xueliang joined the Nationalist government.

But national unity was symbolic. Chiang ruled China from 1927 to 1949,24 but his

position was not secure for a long time. Bom into a well-to-do merchant and peasant

family in Zhejiang province in 1887, Chiang received military training in China and

Japan. Although he participated in the revolutionary movement, his role was not

important. Having won Sun Yat-sen’s favor during Chen Jiongming’s revolt, he was

appointed commandant of Whampoa Military Academy. After Sun’s death, Chiang

ranked no. 4. But Liao Zhongkai was allegedly assassinated by Hu Hanmin’s brother, and

24 Chiang was forced to resign for three short periods: in 1927 after the split between the Nanjing and Hankow governments; in mid-December 1931 after the establishment of a rival government at Canton and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; and at the beginning of 1949 on the eve of the Communist triumph in China.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124

Wang Jingwei was alleged to have colluded with the Communists. These two events

catapulted Chiang to the highest place. By leading the Northern Expedition, Chiang

further consolidated his power. But seniority and capability allowed Hu and Wang to

remain influential. In the spring of 1927, after Chiang suppressed the Communists in

Shanghai, the Hankow government led by Wang even dismissed Chiang from the party

and forced him to resign. In early 1931, Chiang arrested Hu, then head of the Legislative

Yuan, over differing political opinions, which led Hu’s followers to establish a rival

regime in Canton from May 1931 to September 1936. Not until 1938 did Chiang assume

the title of the Director-General (zong-cai) of the Party. Wang finally defected from the

Nationalist party to organize a Japanese puppet regime in 1940.

Chiang also faced challenges from the militarists, who differed from warlords in

their acceptance of national government. After unification, the Nanjing government

decided to streamline the standing army and to institute a system of conscription, because

the military was a heavy burden to China and most troops were still controlled by new

militarists. Among China’s two million strong troops, Chiang controlled only 240,000,

and his army alone cost about 60 million Chinese dollars more than Nanjing’s annual

revenue in 1928.25 Fearing the loss of influence, the militarists blocked the disbandment

program. A series of war between Chiang and the militarists ensued. In March 1929, the

Guangxi group led by Li Zongren and Bei Chongxi revolted against Nanjing. Soon Feng

25 John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, ed., The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 13, pt. 2, 125.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125

also rebelled because Chiang reneged on his territorial promises to him. With Feng’s

defeat, Yan Xishan and Feng formed an anti-Chiang coalition in early 1930. They

established a rival government in Beijing, and even promulgated a constitution that

contained a human rights bill to distinguish it from the Organic Law of 1928, which

merely provided for government structure and administrative jurisdiction. In late 1933,

the Nineteenth Route Army, which had bravely fought against Japanese troops in

Shanghai in early 1932, staged a rebellion in Fujian province in late 1933. In late 1936,

Zhang Xueliang even kidnaped Chiang for his appeasement of the Japanese invasion.

Although Chiang emerged victorious from all these conflicts, he never completely

eliminated opposition forces.

During the interwar era, the Nationalists faced three major models in the world

system: liberalism, fascism and communism. Liberalism, as represented by the U.S. and

Britain, did not lack glamor and prestige, but had its limitations. Traditionally, liberalism

went hand in hand withlaissezfaire capitalism. But the Great Depression sounded the

death knell oflaissezfaire policy, and ushered in Keynesianism advocating state

intervention. More importantly, the standard of liberalism at that time was lower than it is

today. Even after World War H, the Speaker of the House of Commons in Britain told

Chen Lifu, staunch supporter of Chiang’s dictatorship, that democratic politics did not

mean control by the people, but meant that people should be informed of the two different

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126

policies of ruling and opposition party.26 In fact, only after the civil rights movement in

1960s did the U.S. acquire moral authority to promote its human rights policy.

Just as liberalism was not as attractive as it is today, so communism and fascism

were not as stigmatized as they are now. The rapid economic development in the Soviet

Union presented a striking contrast to the depression in the capitalist world. Many people

regarded the Soviet model as a short-cut to industrialization and hailed socialism as a

“new civilization.” Fascism in Germany, Italy and Japan was no less anti-communist than

liberalism, but did not endorse liberalism andlaissezfaire , and resented these states’ low

status in the international arena. Its success in handling political instability and economic

dislocation qualified it as another alternative model. To liberalism, Communism was

pagan, and fascism a heresy. Despite their differences, market failure and international

rivalry in the inter-war period gradually but irreversibly increased the role of state in

society.

Chiang hated communism, liked fascism, and paid lip service to liberalism. Ever

since Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang on a fact-finding trip to the Soviet Union in 1923, Chiang

had become suspicious of communism, hi the united front, the Communists became too

influential, and accounted for more than a third of the delegates at the second KMT

Congress in early 1926. Chiang then staged a coup against the left wing of the party.

During the expedition, he employed Shanghai underground societies to suppress the

26 See Ch’en Li-fu, The Storm Clouds Clear over China: The Memoir of Ch’en Li- fu. 1900-1993 (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1994), 208.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127

Communists and their sympathizers on April 12, 1927, sowing the seeds of the future

civil war. In the early 1930s, Chiang launched five campaigns against the Communists

who conducted guerrilla war in remote areas. The remnant of the Communists were

forced to flee, and settled in Shannxi, a remote northwest province after the Long

March.27

Chiang hated radical communism, but took to conservative fascism.28 William C.

Kirby demonstrates that fascism was the leading ism in the 1930s, and that Chiang’s

government had the closest relations with Germany.29 Lloyd Eastman identifies five

ideological traits of fascism: exaltation of the state and its totalitarian control; one-party-

mle and glorification of the leader; nationalism which called for traditional culture; a new

fascist man who subordinated the individual to the collective will; and the glorification of

violence and terror. By this standard, he finds Chiang’s regime to be fascist.30

There lacked no evidence. In June 1927, the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu,

who were Chiang’s loyal followers and nephews of his late mentor Chen Chi-mei, created

27 For Chiang’s anti-communism, see Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing -UP at Seventy bv Chiang Kai-shek (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1957); and Hu Shih, “China in Stalin’s Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 29 (October, 1950), 11-40.

28 Fascism resembles an “ideology;” Communism “utopia.” See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1936).

29 William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 2-3.

30 Eastman, Abortive Revolution. 31-84. His definition of fascism appears in 80- 81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128

the secret organization the Blue-white society, advocating “one ideology (three principles

of people), one organization (Kuomintang), and one leader (Chiang Kai-shek).” During

the period of 1932-38, Chiang’s military followers formed the Blue Shirts Society.

Modeled after their fascist counterparts in Europe, this organization was the most

important tool of Chiang’s autocratic rule.

Chiang had little tolerance for opposition parties and political dissidents. The

Human Rights Alliances in the late 1920s demanded the protection of human rights, but

withered away because of Chiang’s suppression and the Japanese invasion. The

Democratic League, established in 1944, called for liberty, peace and democracy. Chiang

outlawed it after it sided with the Communists.31 Dissidents, such as leading Shanghai

newspaper editor Shi Liang-cai and Professor Wen Yiduo of Southwest United

University, often faced assassination, which did little to intimidate his opponents but

made the regime despicable. It is interesting that Mao’s systematic persecution of class

enemies did not anger people as much as Chiang’s sporadical persecution. This may

support Stalin’s observation that a single death is a tragedy, but a million deaths is a

statistic.

Like fascists, Chiang sung praise of tradition. All the books he recommended to

his officials in 1936 were Chinese classics, except for his own and Sun’s works. He

31 For arguments for constitutionalism in Chiang’s times, see, for example, Hu Shih, “The Rights of Man” and “Why shall We Have a Constitution?” in Hu Shih and Lin Yu-tang, China’s Own Critics: A Selection of Essays (New York: Paragon Books Reprint Corp., 1969), 22-37; Carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129

blamed both the liberals and the Communists for the Chinese lack of self-respect and self-

confidence. He also attempted to militarize civilian life. The 1934 New Life Movement

intended to inculcate traditional virtues and to improve personal conducts.

Although Chiang and his followers admired and imitated fascism, Chinese

fascism differed from its counterparts in Europe.32 First, what finally stigmatized

European fascism was its foreign aggression and racism, especially genocide. But

Chinese fascism was an attempt to defend the country against internal and external crisis,

and had no element of racism. Second, even if Chiang wanted to build a fascist state, he

could not realize his dream. Japanese invasion, local militarists, and foreign concessions

prevented Chiang from effectively controlling society. Third, Chiang’s embrace of

fascism was indirect and short. Chiang could not totally forsake Sun’s three principles of

people, and when Japan became fully allied with European fascism, it would be

unjustifiable to openly embrace Fascism.

The call for dictatorship did not merely result from politicians’ self-interest, but

also from many intellectuals’ ideological commitment.33 In early 1930s, many influential

liberal intellectuals preferred dictatorship to democracy, because nationalism required

dictatorship to stave off internal and external crisis. As Japan stepped up its effort to

32 The Chinese characteristics of fascism allows Maria Hsia Chang to question if Chiang’s regime was fascist. See her The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985).

33 For the intellectual trends, see Eastman, “Democracy and Dictatorship: Competing Models of Government,” chap. in The Abortive Revolution. 140-80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130

conquer China and the new militarists still blocked China’s nation-building process, this

trend was understandable and justifiable. This testifies to Li Zehou’s view that in

contemporary Chinese history, national survival often took precedence over

enlightenment ideas, such as liberty and rights.34 Amid the praise of dictatorship, Hu Shih

provided an unusual justification for democracy. For him, dictatorship required a high

level of intelligence and expertise, which was lacking in China. So it would be better to

adopt democracy, a “government of kindergarten.” His seemingly unflattering defense did

suggest that democracy can start at any place and at any time and involves a learning

process.35

Since Chiang inherited Sun’s mantle, he paid lip service to liberal democracy.

After the unification, the Nanjing government proceeded to the second stage of the

national revolution, and to exercise “party rule” on behalf of the people. Theoretically, the

National Party Congress represented its supreme body, but while it was supposed to

convene biennially, it met only six times in twenty years. Even in session, it would be too

much to expect several hundred hand-picked members to be influential. The real power

rested with the Central Executive Committee (CEC), especially its Standing Committee.

It exercised authority over the Central Political Council (CPC), which governed the State

34 Li Zehou, “qi-meng yu jiu-wang” [Enlightenment and National Survival], chap. in zhong-guo xian-dai si-xiang-shi lun [On Contemporary History of Chinese Thoughts] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 7-50.

35 For Hu Shih’s view of politics, see Min-chih Chou, “Chinese Politics,” chap. in Hu Shih and Intellectual Choice in Modem China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 107-46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i

131

Council of the Central government. Under the State Council, there were five Yuans, with

the Executive Yuan resembling a cabinet. It was the CEC which chose the Chairman of

the State Council and the heads of the five Yuans.

But party rule was only in name. In Sun’s design, the party was more important

than government, which, in turn, was more important than the army. But Chiang stood

Sun’s relative ranking on its head for good reason. The party increased its membership

from 150,000 in 1926 to 630,000 in 1929,36 and became less a vanguard party than a

bandwagon on which all kinds of people jumped. It is not surprising that factionalism was

endemic. There were four major factions in Chiang’s government: the Reorganization

faction, the Political Study Faction, the CC faction and the Whampoa faction.37 The

reorganization faction advocated the revolutionary principles the KMT had adopted in its

1924 reorganization. The leftist tendency of the faction did not endear it to Chiang. The

Political Study faction represented business interests and local interests, and constituted a

loose faction without influential leaders. The CC faction centered around the Chen

brothers, who became influential in the party by directing its organizational work after

1926. The Whampoa faction, comprised former faculty and students of the Whampoa

Military Academy, played an important role in Chiang’s dictatorship. Like a skillful

politician, Chiang played one faction against another to his own advantage, and

36 Fairbank and Feuerwerker, ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, pt. 2, 118.

37 For detail, see Hung-mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China. 1927-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 45-72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132

factionalism, for Joseph Fewsmith, did not undermine but rather perpetuated nationalist

rule.38

The ruling party’s lip service to democracy is better than no commitment at all,

because it allowed oppositional forces to push for democracy and prompted the ruling

party to move in the right direction, hi late November 1946, the National Assembly

passed a constitution39 and proclaimed the inauguration of constitutional government in

December 1947. According to the 1947 Constitution, the National Assembly, which were

to be elected by all adults over twenty years old, took charge of electing and impeaching

the president and of amending the constitution. The five government branches were

retained, with the Legislative Yuan in charge of passing laws. The president was both the

head of the state and the Chairman of the State Council. The new constitution also

contained a comprehensive bill of rights guaranteeing liberty and equality for all citizens,

laid down liberal policies in the economic, social, and educational realms, and defined the

respective authorities of the central and provincial government. Before, local autonomy

had been a sham. The provincial governments had been appointed by the central

government, and no provincial assemblies were established between 1928 and 1948. Now

provincial governors and legislatures were to be elected by the local people. Amid the

Civil War (1946-1949), the new constitution meant little, because “war needs a

38 Joseph Fewsmith, Party. State, and Local Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890—1930 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 187.

39 The Nationalists had three constitutional documents in 1928, 1931 and 1936.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133

centralistic intensification of the group form, and this is guaranteed best by despotism.”40

Even without the war, it would be naive to believe that Chiang would have gone

democratic. As late as 1951 Chiang interpreted the “spirit of democracy” as “discipline,”

and “the meaning of science” as “organization.” For him, democracy and science should

be complemented by nationalism and ethics.41 In reality, Chiang never relinquished his

power and handed it over to his son after his death in 1975.

To judge Chiang’s achievements by examining how democratic he was misses the

point, because what drove him was not democracy, but nationalism. Given China’s

situations, most people would probably share his preference. As Hsi-sheng Ch’i points

out,

The notions of constitutional democracy, political rights, redistributive justice, or social reform were almost never addressed by Chiang in the Nanking period. Chiang had its vision fixed on the creation of a modem state predicated upon a rigid and stable social structure, a disciplined and trained citizenry, and a thriving productive process under a unified central government. Once such a state was built, China would be able to wage an effective nationalistic revolution against her foreign humiliators.42

By this standard, one will And that Chiang’s government made progress in nation-

building during the first decade. When Chiang took power in 1927, he only had firm

control of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and part of Anhui, but by late 1936 he managed to extend

his control to 11 out of 18 provinces in China proper. Aside from political unification, his

40 Georg Simmel, Conflict & the Web of Group-Affiliations trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (New York: Free Press, 1955), 188

41 Chow, The May Fourth Movement. 344-45.

42 Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse. 1937-45 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982), 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134

government laid the foundation for China’s further development. Two important railways

were built. The Canton-Wuchang railway linked south and central China; the Haichow-

Shannxi railway connected the costal areas to interior region. 50,000 miles of highways

were built and a nationwide network of telecommunications was constructed. The major

cities were linked by airlines. The expansion of modem communication and

transportation helped foster nationalism in China.43 Furthermore, China recovered its

tariff autonomy and abolished internal customs, and completed monetary unification in

November 1935.

Capitalism flourished from 1927 to 1937 so that the period was regarded as the

golden age of Chinese capitalism. State-owned heavy industries begun, and private

industry developed. Ironically, the golden age of capitalism witnessed the low political

status of the bourgeoisie, the so-called backbone of modem democracy. As Marie-Claire

Bergere points out, the political power of the Chinese bourgeoisie rose with the 1911

Revolution, but ended with the 1927 military coup. Economically, Chiang resorted to

intensive taxation on merchants and entrepreneurs, but worked with the bankers. For

Parks M. Coble, Jr., what concerned the Nanjing government was revenue, not the

capitalists’ interests or economic development.44

43 For the importance of social communication to nationalism, see Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication 2d ed. (Cambridge: MTT Press, 1966).

44 Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie. 1911-1937 trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pt. 3 “The Bourgeoisie and the Quest for Power and Modernity;” Parks M. Coble, Jr., The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nanking Government. 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1986), 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Japanese Invasion

The Nationalist revolution was to overthrow two enemies—warlordism and

imperialism. In fact, they were related, as represented by the relations of Zhang Zuolin

and Duan Qirui to Japan, of Wu Peifu and Chen Jiongming to Britain, and of Feng

Yuxiang and the KMT itself to the Soviet Union. With the downfall of the warlords, the

main task of the revolution was to overthrow imperialism. Chiang’s effort to recover

China’s sovereignty faced unsurmountable obstacles.45 Not only were the great powers

reluctant to make concessions, but Japan stepped up its efforts to conquer China.

No power did more damage to China than Japan in the half century from 1895-

1945. This was especially humiliating for the Chinese, because few in the mid-19th

century had expected that Japan would be more successful than China. The different fates

of China and Japan resulted from several factors. First, foreign powers were more

interested in China than in Japan, because China was big, populous and rich in resources.

Second, China had been no stranger to foreign invasion and conquest, but it was

culturally superior to outsiders. Japan was probably the only country in the world which

had never been invaded by foreigners, but it had no problem borrowing from the outside

world including China. It was safe to say that the Japanese were more willing and able to

learn from foreigners than the Chinese. Third, while Japanese daimyo and samurai were

45 Edmund S. K. Fung, “The Chinese Nationalists and the Unequal Treaties, 1924- 1931Modem Asian Studies 21 (October 1987), 793-819.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136

rather capable and honest, Chinese mandarins and gentry were inefficient and corrupt.

Fourth, Japan’s imperialism paid off. Chinese indemnity of 1895, which amounted to

about one-third of Japan’s gross national product, facilitated Japan’s modernization

process.46 Last, but not the least, ordinary Japanese were better-educated, more loyal and

more law-abiding than ordinary Chinese.47

After Japan modernized itself, its imperialist policy further empowered and

enriched Japan at the sacrifice of China. After its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of

1895, China lost Korea, Taiwan and Penghu; paid an indemnity, which was four times as

large as all combined indemnities the great powers had demanded since the Opium War.

China granted Japan most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and allowed it to build factories

in four new trading ports, a practice which endangered China’s nascent industry, because

the Western powers already enjoyed MFN status. Fishing in the troubled waters of World

War L Japan presented ‘Twenty-One Demands” to China on New Year’s Day of 1915.

According to them, China would cede Shandong to Japan; allow Japanese investments

and troops in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; relinquish partial control of several

Chinese-owned iron and steel industries; deny other powers additional coastal territories;

and allow Japanese advisers to supervise the Chinese government. All this amounted to

46 Peter Duss, The Rise of Modem Japan (Boston; Mifflin, 1976), 142.

47 For a comparison between China and Japan, see, for example, Marion J. Levy, Jr. “Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 2( 1953-54): 161-97; William W. Lockwood, “Japan’s Response to the West: The Contrast with China.” World Politics 9 (October 1956): 37- 54; and Yoshihara, Japanese Economic Development. 96-110.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137

reducing China to a Japanese colony. Without the help of Western powers which were

busy fighting, Yuan accepted a limited version of the demands.

After World War I, the “Versailles system” settled the old disputes and regulated

future relations in Europe. The Paris Peace Conference allowed Japan to take over

Germany’s rights in Shandong province, but the Chinese refused to sign the treaty. Not

until the Washington Conference of 1921-22 did the great powers adjust their power

relations in the Asia-Pacific region and endorse the U.S. “open door policy,” which

upheld China’s territorial and administrative integrity and allowed the great powers an

equal opportunity in China.

Driven by economic factors, such as its lack of resources and over-population, and

national glory, Japan proceeded to conquer China. Nothing indicted Japan’s intention and

policy better than “The Tanaka Memorial,” presented by Premier Tanaka to the Emperor

on July 25, 1927. It stated:

Final success belongs to the country having food supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having raw materials; the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territories. If we pursue a positive policy to enlarge our rights in Manchuria and China, all these prerequisites of a powerful nation will constitute no problem.48

When the Nationalist troops approached Shandong during the Northern Expedition,

Japan fought them in Jinan, the capital of Shandong. Japan set about conquering

Manchuria in the fall of 1931, and established the puppet state “Manchukuo” headed by

48 Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, ed., Republican China: Nationalism. War, and the Rise of Communism. 1911-1949 (New York: Random House, 1967), 184-85.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. e

138

the last Manchu emperor Puyi. Having occupied Manchuria, Japan attacked North China.

The Tanggu Agreement of May 1933 required the Nationalists to withdraw their forces

from North China. When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out near Beijing on July

7, 1937, an all-out Sino-Japanese war ensued.

The Sino-Japanese War highlighted China’s insufficiency of nationalist feelings.

From 1931 to 1937, Chiang’s response to Japan’s challenge was characterized by

passivism and appeasement. His position was based on two assumptions. First, China

would need more time to prepare for a military show-down with Japan. Second, it was

not the Japanese but his domestic rivals who constituted a greater threat to his power. He

compared the Japanese aggression to a disease of the skin, but regarded the Communists

as a disease of the heart. Hence he advocated that “internal pacification must take

precedence over external war.” The subsequent political development substantiated his

survival instinct, but his position was untenable at that time. Chinese patriotism ran high.

Student demonstration, boycott movement, and national salvation organizations

demanded actions. Chiang’s rivals, especially the Communists, did not impede, but rather

advocated an anti-Japanese war. Moreover, his appeasement policy only whetted the

Japanese appetite. Chiang’s different attitudes toward the Japanese and the Communists

provoked widespread condemnation. This dissatisfaction culminated in the Xian Incident

in late 1936. Zhang Xueliang kidnaped Chiang, asking him to fight the Japanese instead

of the Communists. With the mediation of the Communists under Soviet instruction,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139

Chiang was set free.49

The woeful lack of nationalism did not go unnoticed, hi early January 1936,

Matsumuro Koryo, Chief of Japanese Intelligence in Beijing, wrote that

Rarely does a Chinese leader care whether his country can or cannot survive, and he is the least concerned about his countrymen’s sufferings, for which he does not feel responsible. On the other hand, his desire for political power, as well as creature comfort, is practically unlimited.. A Chinese leader devotes all of his effort to the suppression of those who might be in a position to challenge his authority; he, consequently, has little energy left to do anything else, let alone resisting Japan.50

Japanese invasion put nationalism before democratization and rallied Chinese

behind Chiang’s leadership.51 Chiang became an undisputed leader in the party and the

whole country. In front of foreign invasion, the Second United Front between the KMT

and the CCP was formed. The CCP promised to stop its armed revolution and radical

social programs, and to put its army under central government command. The KMT

agreed to suspend its anti-Communist campaign and to legitimate the CCP, and convened

the People’s Political Councils (PPC) as a forum of public opinion four times between

1938 and 1947. But after the initial brave fight against the Japanese aggressors did not

succeed and stalemate ensued, the Nationalists became more interested in containing the

49 For Chinese responses to Japanese aggression, see Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism. 1931-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

50 Matsumuro Koryo, “Our Mission in China,” Modem China, ed. Li, 263.

51 Rupert Emerson identified nationalism as the most important force in Asian and African political movement. “Nationalism and Political Development,” The Journal of Politics 22 (February I960): 3-28. Waldron says that nationalism was portrayed as an animating and directing power in Chinese history after 1911. Waldron, From War to Nationalism. 267.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Communists than in fighting the Japanese. The most notorious case was “the Wannan

Incident,” in which the Nationalist army ambushed and annihilated the Communist-led

New Fourth Army in January 1941. The Communists also exerted themselves to expand

their power bases in North China. Except for the battle of Pingxing Pass in late

September 1937 and the Hundred Regiments campaign in late 1940, the Communists

were also charged with putting self-preservation and expansion above fighting the

Japanese. One anecdote indicated how nationalism was lacking in China. In 1964,

responding to Japanese socialists’ apology for Japanese invasion, Mao half jokingly

thanked Japan for creating an opportunity for the Communists’ rise to power.

Chinese collaboration with Japan was far from rare, hi Japanese-occupied areas,

puppet regimes were established. The last emperor Puyi headed Manchuguo in

Manchuria. The so-called Provisional Government of the Republic of China came into

existence in North China as early as December 1937. On March 28, the so-called

Restoration Government of the Republic of China was installed in Nanjing. An overall

puppet regime was created in 1940. The figurehead was no other than Wang Jingwei, the

veteran Nationalist leader who had regarded military resistance as a dead-end and

defected from the Nationalist government in Chongqing.52

Patriotism is a natural feeling among human beings, but it was the 1789 French

52 John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War. 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Gerald E. Bunker, The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War. 1937-1941 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r

141

Revolution which inaugurated the era of modem nationalism. Before that, rulers had

often put their own interests before national interests. In many senses, rulers of different

countries identified with one another more than with their subjects. Suffice it to mention

royal marriages between different monarchies. No wonder that a high-ranking Qing

official was quoted as saying that “it was better to hand over to friendly nations rather

than domestic servants.” It was also understandable that ordinary people sometimes were

indifferent to foreign conquest, because it often meant little more than a change of one

despot by another.

China’s lack of nationalism had its own historical origins. First, Confucianism

emphasized benevolence, propriety, and harmony. The aversion to conflict and war had a

large impact on the Chinese mentality. The contrast between the Chinese literati and

Japanese samurai served as a good example. Indeed, China did not lack war or cruelty,

but it is safe to say that the Chinese culture was not aggressive.53 Second, China had been

a unified empire for a long time. The nation-state in the modem sense did not exist. For

Joseph R. Levenson, at the turn of the century, nationalism, which is based on the modem

nation-state, began to replace China’s traditional culturalism, which was based on a

common cultural heritage. Lucian Pye characterizes China as “a civilization pretending to

53 See, for example, Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo revised from Marsden’s translation and edited with an introduction by Manuel Komroff (New York: Modem Library, 1931); Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984); Russell, The Problem of China: Haizong Lei, zhong-guo wen-hua vu zhong-guo de bing [Chinese Culture and the Chinese Military] (Changsha, 1940).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142

be a state.” John Fitzgerald calls China a “nationless state.”54 Third, familism competed

with the nation-state for loyalty. China was so large and diverse that it was difficult to

create a sense of community, especially in ancient times. So Chinese loyalty was to their

families and clans, not to the emperor who collected taxes and imposed the corvee.

Whoever controlled a remote capital mattered little to the ordinary Chinese. As a result,

the Chinese demonstrated more bravery in inter-clan fighting than in their fight with

foreigners. Last but not the least, nationalism is not mere sentiment, but involves cost-

benefit analysis. In Chinese history, Chinese elites were so sure of the superiority of their

civilization that foreign conquest did not really hurt their pride that much. In fact,

collaboration with alien enemies “has actually enriched China’s culture and enlarged her

territory and influence.”55 When a country was weak, it was useless to put up a fight. The

boxers, who relied on their kung-fu to fight with foreigners armed with modem weapon,

might be patriotic but did not help. While Chinese should blame themselves for lack of

nationalism, Chinese aggressors might regard their aggression not as a heroic feat, but as

shameful deeds.

The Japanese invasion made the world sympathize with China, but foreign

54 Joseph R. Levinson, Confucianism China and Its Modem Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), vol. 1,98-104; Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics new ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 235. John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modem Chinese Nationalism,” in Chinese Nationalism, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1996), 56-85.

55 Lin Han-sheng, “A Cases Study of Chinese Collaboration: The Nanking Government, 1940-1945.” Unpublished manuscript, I.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1

143

sympathy did not change the power relations between China and Japan. The League of

Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations (UN), provided the ideal place for the

Chinese to make its case. But two factors doomed the League to failure. First, its

principle of unanimity, which required all resolutions to be unanimously endorsed by its

members, emasculated this organization. All it could do was economic sanctions and

moral condemnation. In the case of China, the League did little more than condemn

Japan. Second, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two great powers which had both

interests and capabilities in changing the balance of power in East Asia, happened to be

outside of this organization. The U.S. Congress refused to join President Wilson’s

brainchild, and retreated from Wilsonian internationalism into Washingtonian

isolationism after World War I. The Soviet Union, which had been treated as an

international pariah, was not allowed to join until 1934 when the organization had already

lost its credibility.

Historically, American policy toward China represented a case of “benign

imperialism.” Its purpose was mainly to served its self-interest, but it was more benign

than other powers’ policies. At the height of imperialism, the American proposed an

“Open Door” policy, which helped preventing China from being divided up. The

American used the Boxer indemnity to educate Chinese students. Washington led the

great powers to accept the “Open Door” policy, and persuaded Japan to return Shandong

to China in the 1921-22 Washington Conference. In 1933 Secretary of State Stimson put

forth his “non-recognition doctrine,” refusing to recognize Manchuguo. The U.S. took the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144

lead in abrogating the unequal treaties with China in 1943; provided extensive aids to

China during and after World War II; and supported China as a permanent member of the

UN Security Council. All these endeared the American to the Chinese.

But in the 1930s, Washington did Iitde to stop Japan’s invasion of China, because

it was busy recovering from the depression, and did not think that its vital interests in

Asia had been seriously threatened. Americans regarded the war in Asia as “a relatively

unimportant war being fought by relatively unimportant people over relatively

unimportant issues.”56 As President Roosevelt, who sympathized with China, put it, “it

was not up to us to alter our policy merely because the Chinese were unable to protect

themselves.”57 The Silver Purchase Act in 1934, which authorized the government to buy

silver at a higher price, even unintentionally derailed Nanjing’s efforts at economic

rehabilitation. From April 1934 to November 1935, China’s silver reserves dropped from

some 602 million yuan to 288 million yuan.58 As a result, China was forced to abandon

the silver-based currency system.

The only country which was seriously concerned with the Manchurian situation

was the Soviet Union. For a long time, Russia treated Manchuria as its sphere of

influence. Amid China’s domestic disturbances and foreign invasion, the Qing court

56 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations 2d ed. (New York: Wiley, 1980), 150.

57 Cohen, America’s Response to China. 140.

58 Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987), 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

145

ceded Russia 640,000 square kilometers of its territories in Manchuria. After the Sino-

Japanese war of 1895, Russia signed a treaty with China, further extending its influence

into the area. Russian refusal to withdraw its troops from Manchuria after the suppression

of the Boxer rebellion finally triggered the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. A defeated

Russia even managed to collude with Japan in setting up spheres of influence in

Manchuria and North China.

After the Japanese attack on Mukden in 1931, Moscow was anxious to prevent the

Japanese advance in the north. In late 1932, Moscow resumed diplomatic relations with

Nanjing, which were severed after Nanjing sought to take over the Soviet-operated

Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. Later Moscow sold the railway to Japan in 1935. After

Germany and Japan concluded the anti-Comintern pact in November 1936, Moscow

wanted to use China to balance Japan. But Chiang was not very enthusiastic about such

an alliance. After the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident” in July 1937, Nanjing and Moscow

reversed their positions. Nanjing offered to align with Moscow, but Moscow only agreed

to sign the treaty of mutual nonaggression in August 1937. In the early period of the war,

only Moscow rendered substantial assistance to China.59 After the Soviet victory in

border clashes with Japan in 1939 and the signing of Soviet-German Non-aggression

pact, Japan reevaluated its policy. As a result, Tokyo and Moscow signed the neutrality

59 Between 1937-1939, Soviet loans amounted to about $300 million; Soviet military advisors numbered 500; and the Soviet Union delivered 60,000 tons of military hardware. Ch’i, Nationalist China at War. 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146

agreement, which dashed China’s hope of obtaining more assistance.60

Despite the fact that China inflicted Japanese heavy casualties and tied up large

Japanese forces,61 Japan’s attempt to conquer China were mainly thwarted by the anti

fascist alliance. But such an alliance took time to form, and it was self-interest rather

than moral principle that determined great powers’ policies. A democratic England

sacrificed Czech interests by signing the Munich Agreement with Germany in September

1938. Disgusted by Western appeasement and anti-communism, Soviet Russia gave up its

effort to organize an anti-fascist popular front and signed a non-aggression Pact with

Germany immediately before the outbreak of World War U. Fascist Japan, which was in

conflict with the Soviet Union, felt betrayed by fascist Germany, but did take advantage

of Germany’s swift victories in Europe to expand its influence to Indo-China. Fascism

reached its peak when Germany, Japan and Italy entered into the axis alliance in

September 1940. To prevent a two-front war, Soviet Russia signed a neutrality pact with

Japan in April 1941. Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 and Japan

launched a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941. When Soviet Russia and

the U.S. were dragged into the war, an anti-Fascist alliance emerged. The success of the

60 For details of Sino-Soviet relations, see John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations. 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

61 According to inflated Chinese sources, the Japanese suffered 2,419,000 casualties including 483,000 deaths in China during 1937-45. Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution. 1937-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 136. Around one million Japanese troops were bogged down in China. Ibid., 130-31.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147

anti-Japanese war was just a matter of time. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima

and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945 and Moscow’s declaration of war against Japan on

August 8 forced Japan to accept unconditional surrender, ending its 14-year invasion of

China.

The Japanese invasion represented the worst impact of the world system on

China’s internal development, and put democratization on the back burner. But the anti-

Japanese war facilitated the cooperation of Chinese parties, and fostered the development

of Chinese nationalism, increased China’s intematioanl status, and contributed to the

demise of old colonialism and imperialism.

War and Revolution

The Chinese desired peace after eight years of war and suffering. It is estimated

that more than 20 million Chinese had died. The amount of economic losses was difficult

to calculate, but was no doubt enormous. James C. Hsiung quoted one source as saying

that ‘Total wartime property loses were estimated to run in excess of U.S. $100 billion.”62

But an all-out civil war broke out in June 1946, less than one year after the end of the

anti-Japanese war. While its impetus was internal, external forces did play an important

part in the outbreak and the outcome of the Civil War.

The single most important factor for the Civil War was that the Japanese invasion

62 James C. Hsiung, “The War and After: World Politics in Historical Context,” in China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan. 1937-1945. ed. James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (New York: Sharpe, 1992), 296.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148

changed the balance of power so that the Communists could compete with the

Nationalists on a roughly equal footing. No doubt, the Nationalists did not lose their

numerical and material superiority until the early fall of 1948. hi mid-1946 Chiang

controlled a three million strong army and possessed China’s air force and navy. Besides,

the Nationalists received large amount of American aid. By recovering China’s lost

territories in Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, and becoming a permanent member of the

UN Security Council, the Nationalist government achieved a status it had never dreamed

of.

But the Communists developed very fast, hi 1937 the Communists ruled about 1.5

million people in a small area, controlled a 80,000 strong army, and had 40,000 party

members. Scholars tend to agree that by 1936, another all-out suppression campaign

might have eliminated the Communist forces in northern Shannxi.63 In 1945, they ruled

over 90 million peoples in north China, controlled a 900,000 strong army and over 2

million militia troops, and had over 1.2 million party members. Aside from quantity, the

quality of the Communist party had also improved. The rectification Movement of 1942-

1944 consolidated Mao’s power in the party, and the Communists were more united than

ever before. The party also accumulated rich experiences in mass mobilization and public

administration.

The outbreak of the Civil War was closely related to the shift from the “Yalta

63 Joseph Esherick, ‘Ten Theses on the Communist Revolution,” Modem China 21 (January 1995): 53.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149

system” to the Cold War system. On the eve of the anti-fascist victory in early 1945,

Washington, London and Moscow held the Yalta Conference to discuss post-war

arrangements. To oppose Japan, Roosevelt and Stalin reached a secret agreement.

According to its terms, Moscow promised to declare war against Japan. In return,

Washington would allow the Soviet Union to reclaim its old privileges in China.

But the “Yalta system” did not last long. The wartime coalition soon gave way to

mutual suspicion and rivalry. In a February 9, 1946 speech, Stalin reiterated the

inevitability of war and the importance of war preparations. Less than one month later,

Winston Churchill delivered his “Iron Curtain” speech, with President Truman by his

side. The tension was not accidental. First, the defeat of fascism and decimation of

colonialism replaced a multipolar system with a bipolar one. The interests of the two

superpowers gradually came into conflict. Second, with the disappearance of their

common enemies, their old ideological conflict resurfaced. Wartime cooperation was

only a happy episode in their long hostile relations. As the leader of the capitalist world,

the U.S. was rabidly anti-Communist.64 Suffice it to mention that it did not recognize the

Soviet Russia until 1933 or Communist China until 1979. After World War Two, the

victorious Russian had more confidence in the superiority of socialism. Third, Soviet

expansion in East Europe was intolerable for an all powerful U.S. At its peak, the U.S.

64 Anti-communism was symbolized by the irony of George F. Kennan, who chastised the American “legalistic-moralistic approach” to international problems on the one hand, and advocated the containment policy, on the other. See his “Diplomacy in the Modem World,” and “The Source of Soviet Conduct” in American Diplomacy. 1900- 1950 A Mentor Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 79-106.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150

accounted for 40 percent of the world’s GDP and monopolized atomic bomb. All these

made it willing and able to adopt an new strategy to contain actual and potential Soviet

expansion.

Despite their differences in their China policies, Washington and Moscow had

three things in common. Firstly, both wanted to see peace rather than war in China, since

weariness of war prevailed after World War H. Washington did go out of its way to

mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists. Even during the war, General

Patrick J. Hurley assisted the peace negotiation. He even escorted Mao to Chongqing to

enter into negotiations. After the war, General George C. Marshall was in China for more

than one year to make peace. Since neither side intended to make any major concessions,

Marshall failed in his mission and returned to serve as Secretary of State in January 1947.

In the spirit of the Yalta agreement, Moscow even signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty

of Friendship and Alliance with the Nationalists on August 14, 1945. Chiang accepted the

independence of Outer Mongolia and allowed the Russian to regain some privileges in

Manchuria. In return, Stalin respected Chiang’s position as China’s legitimate leader and

recognized Nationalist rights to take over China’s lost territories, including Manchuria.

That Chiang extended an invitation to Mao for negotiations on the same day indicated

that the treaty had boosted Chiang’s status and power in dealing with the Communists.

Although Chiang later accused Moscow of bad faith, Moscow at first did try to abide by

the treaty. For example, it ordered the Communists out of Manchurian cities and handed

them over to the Nationalists in late 1945. In the spring of 1949, none but the Soviet

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151

ambassador moved with the Nationalist government to Canton when it was driven out of

Nanjing. The Communists regarded Moscow’s agreement with the Nationalist

government as a betrayal of the Chinese revolution.65 Mao later recalled that “Stalin

wanted to prevent China from making revolution, saying that we should not have a civil

war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek.”66 Stalin later apologized for doing more

harm than good to the CCP.67

Second, both sides wanted to maximize their own influence and minimize the

other’s presence in China. Washington still stuck to its traditional “open door” policy and

wanted to build China as a counterbalance to Japan. During the Sino-Soviet negotiations

in July 1945, Washington attempted to keep Moscow within the limits of the Yalta

Agreement. Later Washington protested Moscow’s failure to withdraw from Manchuria

before the deadline. According to Steven I. Levine, Moscow preferred a weak China; if

impossible, it would like to see a strong but dependent China.68 Evidence seems to

support his argument. Moscow plundered Manchuria as much as possible, and tried to

65 hi the Spring of 1945, Mao told American diplomat John Service that with Soviet help, the Communists would control Manchuria. See US Department of State, FRUS 1945,7:282-283.

66 Mao Tse-tung, Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters: 1956- 1971 ed. and intro. Stuart Schram, trans. John Chinnery and Tieyun (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 191.

67 Jian Chen, “Leaning to one Side,” chap. in China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

68 Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria. 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152

minimize the American military presence in North China. Moscow even suggested to

Washington that both countries should simultaneously withdraw their troops from China

by January 15, 1946. Ten days after Marshall started his mission, Stalin invited Chiang’s

son Ching-kuo to the Soviet Union, urging China to adopt an “independent policy” and

extending an invitation to meet Chiang himself.69 When the Communist victory was at

hand, Stalin suggested that the Nationalists and the Communists rule south and north

China, respectively.

Third, both Washington and Moscow were hardly impartial in making peace.

When the Nationalists and the Communists competed to accept Japan’s surrender, the

U.S. sided with the Nationalist government. It ordered the Japanese troops and their

puppet regime to surrender only to the Nationalists, flew Nationalist troops from the

Southwest to East and North China, and even sent marines to accept the Japanese

surrender on Chiang’s behalf.70 Marshall’s mediation was not expected to be even-

handed. President Truman instructed that even if Chiang blocked a political settlement,

the U.S. would continue to support him.71 All American aid went to the Nationalist

government. Between 1945 and 1949, Washington supplied it with $2 billion worth of

military and economic assistance, which was more than half of Chiang’s monetary

69 Chiang, Soviet Russia in China. 156.

70 For the Chinese Communist view of international relations during 1945-49, see Okebe Tatsumi, “The Cold War and China,” in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press; Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), 224-51.

71 FRUS. 1945, 7:770.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153

expenditures and larger than American assistance to any Western European country.72

Levine summarized Moscow’s China policy in this way, “the Soviets engaged in

that duality of tactics that was as old as their China policy itself. Support for the

Revolutionary side was balanced by support for the status quo. Like a rich patron at the

racetrack, Stalin bet on all the horses to be sure of a winner.”73 Moscow, however, did

gradually lent support to the Communists. It obstructed and opposed the dispatch of the

Nationalist troops into Manchuria and allowed the Communists to capture large quantity

of Japanese arms. When the Americans revealed their intention of monopolizing control

over Japan, Moscow decided to be more supportive of the “margarine Communists” in

China. The Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria without prior notice and allowed the

Communists to strengthen their position. For Odd Arne Westad, the emergence of the

Cold War international system excluded the possibility of a negotiated settlement

between the Nationalists and the Communists.74

Chiang’s debacle in the Civil War caught people by surprise. While the

Communists tended to ignore the role of luck and opponent’s error in their victories, the

72 Dean Acheson, “Letter of Transmittal, July 30, 1949,” in The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? ed. and intro. Pichon P. Y. Loh (Boston: Health, 1965), 72.

73 Levine, Anvil of Victory. 33.

74 Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War. 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 166.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

154

Nationalist tended to blame uncontrollable forces and their rival’s cruelty and cunning.75

Then what are the major reasons for Chiang’s debacle?76 The answer has to be found in a

combination of factors. The Civil War was both a war and a revolution. As Samuel P.

Huntington correctly points out, successful great revolutions do not occur in

democracies.77

Specifically speaking, first, the realities Chiang faced were too harsh for him.

Economic depression, Japanese invasion, and domestic conflict had diverted his attention

from social, economic and political problems. His focus on perpetuating his power left

him little energy to institute reform, even if he had such a vision.

Second, Chiang mismanaged the economy and alienated the urban population

after the Anti-Japanese War. When the Nationalists returned to former Japanese occupied

areas, the use of their overvalued legal tenderfapi resembled a covert robbery, and

initiated an inflationary spiral. To balance the budget, Chiang ran his own money printing

machine. Between January 1946 and August 1948 prices rose 67 times. The official effort

to replace the fapi with the gold yuan note failed. For the eight months from August 1948

to April 1949, the Shanghai price index rose from 100 to 13,574,000. The urban

population, including government officials and the military, bore the brunt of the mnaway

75 Many, the Nationalists and Americans alike, even blamed the U.S. partly for Chiang’s debacle. See, for example, Chonghal Petey Shaw, The Role of the United States in Chinese Civil Conflicts. 1944-1949 (Salt Lake City, U.T.: Schlacks, 1991).

76 For a survey on the debacle, see The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949. ed. Loh.

77 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 275.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r

155

inflation.78

Third, abject poverty and gross injustice prevailed in rural China. Peasants

accounted for the bulk of China’s population. Land shortages and slow agricultural

development made peasants live in an abyss of misery. The problem of poverty was

aggravated by the unequal distribution of land. “Rents, 50-70 per cent of the main crop,

continued to be exacted, and approximately half the Chinese farmers continued to rent all

or part of their land.”79 The Communists instituted land reform, and won peasants’

support. This was the key to the their success and distinguished the Chinese revolution

from its Russian counterpart, which captured the cities first and then the countryside. This

lesson did not go unnoticed even by Chiang, who instituted land reform after he settled in

Taiwan.

Fourth, corruption was prevalent in the Nationalist government. Bureaucratic

factions acquired control over huge economic resources. Chiang Kai-shek, his brother-in-

law T. V. Soong, his wife’s brother-in-law H. H. Kung, and his protegee the Chen

brothers were regarded as the “four big families.”80 Soong made a fortune by heading the

Bank of China following the nationalization of the banks in 1935. When Chen Guofu was

governor of Jiangsu, the CC faction controlled the Farmers’ Bank of Jiangsu. Kung

started his business in Shanxi province and later controlled the Bank of Communications.

78 The figures are from Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution. 1915- 1949 trans. Muriel Bell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 194-95.

79 The Cambridge History of China. 151-52.

80 Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156

For Fewsmith, bureaucratic capitalism “was not corruption narrowly defined but a

structure of political action.”81

Last, Chiang’s military leadership was at fault, hi fairness to Chiang, he suffered

from two main disadvantages as a national leader. While fighting the Communists, he had

to take care of other business. He had to overstretch his troops to defend the whole

country from Communist attack. By contrast, the Communists could afford to concentrate

on destroying their enemies in a selective way. Chiang’s personalism had lots to do with

his defeat. His selection of military commanders was based more on their loyalty than on

their competence. While his trusted generals were unable to fight the Communists,

capable generals were unwilling to fight for Chiang. So he had to rely on himself. Chiang

lost two decisive battles — the Manchurian campaign in the fall of 1948 and the Huaihai

campaign in early 1949, partly because his orders were issued hundreds of miles away

from the battlefields.

Concluding Remarks

The modem world system is not characterized by democracy, but by power

politics. China’s low status in the system made it understandable that the pursuit of

wealth and power was put before democratization. Chiang’s symbolic unification of

China was the first step in the nation-building process. Amid internal disturbance and

foreign threat, the Nationalist government and Chinese intellectuals found dictatorship

81 Fewsmith, Party. State, and Local Elites in Republican China, 192.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157

attractive. Among the three influential ideologies during the interwar period, Chiang

fought communism, flirted with fascism, and paid lip service to liberalism.

The Japanese invasion represented the worst impact of the world system on

Chinese political development. Although the Anti-Japanese War sidetracked the

democratization process, it facilitated partisan cooperation, stimulated Chinese

nationalism, and helped democratizing the world system. The Civil War originated from

domestic factors, but was related to the changing world system. The Sino-Japanese War

changed the balance of power between the Nationalists and Communists, hi the “Yalta

system,” the two superpowers worked together to promote peace in China, but before

long the Cold War set in. Their ideological and power struggles set the stage for China’s

Civil War. The Nationalist defeat in the war was not merely military; its dictatorial nature

provoked a revolution.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

CHAPTERS

SOCIALIST VALUES AND DEMOCRACY

Poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has no blotches, and so the newest and most beautiful words can be written on it, the newest and most beautiful pictures can be painted on it.

Mao Zedong

When Mao led the Communists to victory in 1949, unity and independence

provided the Chinese people with a sense of security, hope and pride, and laid solid

foundations for future development. Many constraints on democracy seemed to have been

surmounted. Traditional culture was in retreat; national unity reached an unprecedented

height; the successive hostilities of the two superpowers were not translated into real

threats to China’s independence.

However, Communist preferences sidetracked the democratization process. Like

his predecessors, Mao wanted to build a rich and powerful China, but unlike his

predecessors, who endorsed capitalism and democracy, Mao chose socialism to realize

this major objective. This chapter examines how the pursuit of socialism affected China’s

democratization process. I review the socialist conception of democracy, look at the

establishment of a socialist state, analyze its development strategy, and examine

158

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159

totalitarian rule during the Cultural Revolution.

Socialist Democracy

Socialist society is supposed to be built according to a blueprint. But its vision in

terms of politics is not unproblematic. Ralph Miliband finds that the discussion of

Marxist theory of politics runs into two difficulties.1 The first difficulty lies in the

definition of Marxism. Marx died in 1883, and his own ideas were then expanded by

others. Some figures such as Engels were trusted by Marx; others such as “revisionists”

were not. Even in his late life, Marx said that all he knew was that he was not a Marxist, a

statement which supports a quip that “to be great is to be misunderstood.” Later, Lenin

enlarged Marxism, and established the first socialist society in a relatively backward

Russia. It is anybody’s guess if Lenin’s achievement would flatter or annoy Marx, who

envisioned that socialism should be built in advanced capitalist countries. Before the

Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky predicted that “the leonine head of Marx would be the

first to fall under the guillotine.”2 When Marx’s early writings were published long after

his death, people found a young Marx more humanistic and romantic. All this forced us

to think what Marxism is. The second difficulty is that “none of the the greatest figures of

classical Marxism, with the partial exception of Gramsci, ever attempted or for that

‘Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1- 2 .

2William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present 4th ed. (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), 704.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160

matter felt the need to attempt the writing of a ‘political treatise.’”3 This lack of attention

may result partly from their intention of distinguishing themselves from Utopians, and

partly from their economic determinism.

Despite the complexity and uncertainty surrounding Marx’s political theory, it is

safe to outline three basic characteristics of the socialist view of democracy.4 First, the

state belongs to the superstructure, and is determined by economic base. So western

democracy is handicapped by its economic base of capitalism. For Lenin, “democracy

means onlyformal equality.”5 To apply formal equality to those who are unequal is

unjust.6 He argues,

Freedom in capitalist society always remains about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republic: freedom for slave-owners. Owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, the modem wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty that ‘they cannot be bothered with democracy’, ‘cannot be bothered with politics’; in the ordinary, peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life.7

Moreover, democracy means little, both because the real business was done in the

bureaucracy rather than in parliament, and because electoral conditions are distorted by

3Miliband, Marxism and Politics. 2.

4For the socialist view of politics, see, for example, Neil Harding, Leninism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996); Michael Levin, Marx. Engels and Liberal Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1989); John M. Maguire, Marx’s Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); and Miliband, Marxism and Politics.

5 V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, in Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960-70), vol. 25,477.

6 Lenin, State and Revolution. 470.

7Lenin, State and Revolution. 465.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161

bourgeois economic power and political influence. So bourgeois democracy is formal but

not substantial, political but not economic, and means little.

Second, the state is a coercive apparatus that exercises the dictatorship of a single

class. Western democracy is a bourgeois one. For Marx and Engels, the executive of the

modem state is but “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole

bourgeoisie.”8 For Lenin, “the state is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one

class by another.”9 No matter what forms bourgeois states take, all of them are

dictatorships of the bourgeoisie.10 Bourgeois parliamentarism is no exception: it does not

change the nature of the capitalist state, but only allows the ruling class to choose who is

to repress the people.11

Last, the state is a historical phenomenon. After class antagonism caused

irreconcilable conflicts, states came into being. With the disappearance of classes, the

state will wither away.12 Compared with feudalism, bourgeoisie democracy represents a

great historical progress, but it will be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariate in

the transition period from capitalism to communism. For Lenin, “The scientific term

8Marx and Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in TheMarx-Engels Reader, ed. Tucker, 475.

^ n in , The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautskv. in Collected Works, vol. 28, 259.

I0Lenin, State and Revolution. 418.

11 Lenin, State and Revolution. 427-28.

I2Engels, “The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Tucker, 751-55.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162

‘dictatorship’ means nothing more or less than authority untrammeled by any laws,

absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force.”13

By substituting public ownership for private ownership, socialism will eliminate

economic exploitation, and lay a solid foundation for a genuine democracy. Marx and

Engels never spelled out what socialist democracy would look like. After the Paris

Commune in 1871, they did propose several measures to limit state power. Elections

would be complemented by recall at any time; state functionaries would not receive pay

higher than that of workmen; control and supervision by all would be introduced

immediately.14 But all these are quite impractical in a nation-state.

Mao’s view of democracy15 represented a Chinese understanding of Marxist

theory. It can be summarized in the following way. First, any political system is defined

in terms of its state system(guo ) ti and the system of government(zhen ti). State system

refers to nature of the state, indicating “the status of the various social classes within the

state.” The system of government refers to the ruling form, “a matter of how political

power is organized, the form in which one social class or another chooses to arrange its

I3Lenin, “A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship,” in Collected Works, vol. 31,353.

14Lenin, State and Revolution. 486.

15For Mao’s thought, see Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For a critique of Mao’s thought, see Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-Tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); F. V. Konstantinov, ed., A Critique of Mao Tse-tung’s Theoretical Conceptions trans. Yuri Sdovnikov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163

apparatus of political power to oppose its enemies and protect itself.”16

Second, the Chinese revolution would go through democratic and socialist stages.

After the Russian Revolution, Mao argues, there exists three major types of state systems:

republics under bourgeois dictatorship, proletarian dictatorship, and joint dictatorship.

The democratic revolution in China belongs to the third type, hi the period of “new

democracy,” the state system is a joint dictatorship of four revolutionary classes: the

working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. The

system of government is democratic centralism, according to which, the People’s

Congress at all levels would determine major policies and elect government officials.

Third, democracy is not an end but a means. Mao says that “Democracy

sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means....both democracy and

freedom are relative, not absolute, and they come into being and develop under specific

historical circumstances.”17 Before taking power, Mao occasionally mentioned the

necessity to introduce a system of universal suffrage.18 After his rise to power, Mao

16Mao Tse-tung, “On New Democracy,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), vol. 2,351-52.

I7Mao, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971).

l8Mao, “On New Democracy,” 352, and “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works, vol. 3, 230. In response to a Reuters correspondent’s question about the meaning of ‘Tree and democratic” China in 1945, Mao replied that “It means that central and local governments must be chosen by universal vote and secret ballot. It means Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People and Lincoln’s principle of government by and for the people and the principles enumerated in Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter.” See Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire trans. and ed. Nancy Liu, Peter Rand, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164

implied that democratic methods equaled letting the people speak out.19

Fourth, democracy is often confused with unbridled freedom. Mao emphasized

that the Communist party needs less democracy than centralism, which means that “the

minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, the part to the

whole, and the entire membership to the Central Committee.”20 He calls on to combat

ultra-democracy and “liberalism.” For him, ultra-democracy stems from a handicraft and

small peasant economy and bourgeoisie’ individualistic aversion to discipline;21 China’s

lack of democracy is due to small-scale production and the patriarchal system.22 In other

words, although both ultra-democracy and lack of democracy have roots in the traditional

Chinese economy, bourgeois influence and feudal tradition are responsible for ultra

democracy and lack of democracy, respectively.

Finally, Mao had a mixed feeling about the relations between people and leaders.

On the one hand, he realized the importance of people, comparing them to the driving

force of world history. So he advocated the “mass line.” That is, the party make policies

Lawrence R. Sullivan; with a foreword by Andrew J. Nathan (Boulder, C.O.: Westveiw Press, 1994), 15-16.

19Mao, Chairman Mao Talks to the People. 160.

20Mao, “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work,” Selected Works, vol. 3,44.

21For Mao’s view of liberalism, see his “Combat Liberalism,” Selected Works. vol. 2, 31-33. For Mao’s view of ultra-democracy, see his “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” Selected Works, vol. 1, 105-16.

“ Mao, “Role of the Chinese Communist Party,” Selected Works, vol. 2, 204.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165

based on people’s ideas, and then sends them back for feedback and support.23

Commendable as it is, the “mass line” is not democracy in the strictest sense of the term.

It addresses the questions of how to lead, but not who to lead. On the other hand, Mao

cherished Leninist conception of the vanguard party. People are said to focus on their

personal interests rather than societal ones. The party is supposed to understand the laws

of historical development and to know best about long-term societal interest. Thus, Mao

never doubted the importance of Communist leadership.

Socialist criticism of capitalist democracy makes sense in the early stage of

capitalism. Even today, it is an exaggeration to say that capitalist democracy equally

represents all people’s interests. But what is special about capitalist democracy is its

never-ending rationalization process. More important, socialist democracy never provide

a real alternative. It claims to represents the interest of vast majority of people, but make

no bones about suppressing the “exploiting class.” In reality, it does not establish

necessary mechanism to limit rulers’ power and to protect people’s interests, while its

unapologetic acceptance of oppressive nature of the state often justifies and even

beautifies its abuse of power.

Transformation to Socialism

It took the Communists 22 years to defeat Chiang Kai-shek who had suppressed

BMao, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” Selected Works. vol. 3, 119.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166

them in 1927. The price of the Chinese revolution was exorbitant. Compared with the

1911 revolution and Chiang’s unification of China, it incurred huge human and financial

losses. The transition from the Qing dynasty to Republican China was relatively smooth

and bloodless. The overthrown rulers even enjoyed some preferential treatments.

Chiang’s unification of China involved some fierce battles, but old social forces mainly

jumped on the bandwagon. The Communist victory was less tainted by compromise, but

involved huge costs. For Engels, revolution is the most authoritarian thing, without which

victory could not be achieved or maintained.24 This is especially true of socialist

revolution, because its effort to abolish private property would invite the strongest

opposition from all propertied class, especially the upper class.

Socialist revolution did not end, but rather start with, the seizure of power. The

establishment of the PRC initiated the stage of the “new democracy.” Communist polices

during this period were similar to Sun Yat-sen’s principles of livelihood. In the urban

area, state capitalism was introduced. The state expropriated the property of the three

major enemies — imperialists, feudal landlords, and the bureaucratic and compradore

bourgeoisie, hi late 1952, the state owned 70 to 80 percent of heavy industry and 40

percent of light industry. State and collective trading agencies handled more than 50

percent of total business turnover.25 hi rural areas, the land reform confiscated the land of

24Friedrich Engels, “On Authority,” in The Marx -Engels Readers, ed. Tucker, 733.

“ Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949-57, in The Politics of China. 1949-1989. ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167

landlords who made up 3 to 5 percent of the rural population, and redistributed, without

redemption, some 43 percent of China’s cultivated land to around 60 percent of the rural

population.26

The Communists had promised to stay in the stage of “new democracy” for a long

time until it was ripe for socialist transformation. But when they exercised effective

control of the whole country and restored the war-worn economy to its prewar peak in

1952, Mao pushed for quick socialist transformation. From 1953 to 1956, China

completed the change from private to state and collective ownership in agriculture,

handicraft, and capitalist industry and commerce. Many argue that “new democracy” was

merely a tactic to minimize resistance. No doubt, the Communists were adept in

establishing the united fronts against their enemies. For example, in Yanan, the

Communists shared power with non-Communists. One third of posts were reserved for

Communists, left progressive, and intermediate forces, respectively. But this explanation

is simplistic. The Communists did believe that socialism should be built on an advanced

economy, and realized that Chinese industry never employed more than 3 million

industrial worker, who constituted only about 0.5 per cent of the total population. In fact,

Mao’s push for agricultural collectivization encountered reservation from many leaders,

including his designated successor Liu Shaoqi, because they were worried about the loss

of peasant support. Even Mao expected that the transformation would take more than 10

years, but it was completed in little more than one year.

26Teiwes, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime,” 36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168

Socialist economy is characterized by three main factors: the public ownership, a

planned economy and withdrawal from the world capitalist economy. Let us discuss it in

reverse order, because it tallies with the Chinese situation. The withdrawal from the

capitalist world system is an important, but often ignored characteristic of socialism.

Even before the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Communists adopted a policy of

“leaning to one side,” allying with the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. After

the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. led the capitalist camp in imposing an embargo

on China. China had to reorient its foreign economic relations to the socialist countries in

the 1950s. After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, Mao made a virtue out of

necessity by emphasizing the principle of “self-reliance,” which interested the

proponents of dependency theory.”27

A planned economy constituted the second characteristic of a socialist economy.

For socialists, free market leads to waste and injustice; planned economy brings about

efficiency and fairness. As a result, nationwide economic planning began in 1953. China

preferred the Soviet model of the “big push” to the Western model of “balanced growth,”

because the former model, with its emphasis on heavy industry, would secure national

27For dependency theory, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 263-305; Alvin Y. So. Social Change and Development: Modernization. Dependency, and World-Svstem Theories (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 91-165; and Charles K. Wilber, ed., The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1973).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169

economic independence and bring about an economic revolution through spread effects.28

The First Five-Year Plan reflected this line of thinking. The 156 large projects built with

Soviet assistance accounted for nearly half of all industrial investment and spread

industrialization from the coastal cities to the interior areas. A comparison with the

“golden age” of the Chinese capitalism is helpful. In the early 1930s China’s gross

investment represented 7.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); machinery and

equipment just 5 to 7 percent of total imports. But the comparable figures in the mid-

1950s were 24 percent, and 20 to 40 percent, respectively.29

The most important characteristic of socialist economy is public ownership. Marx

and Engels summed up Communist theory in one sentence: “the abolition of private

property.”30 For them, the basic contradiction of capitalist society was the one between

the social character of production and the private character of ownership. While

individual companies may be efficient, society as a whole is not. Public ownership is

supposed to eliminate exploitation and to stimulate the productive forces. Having enjoyed

rising incomes after land reform, the peasants were not enthusiastic about collective

farming. But the state made them believe that the collectivization would increase

“ Jack Grey, “The Two Roads: Alternative Strategies of Social Change and Economic Growth in China,” in Authority Participation and Cultural Change in China. ed. Stuart R. Schram (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 110-11.

29Mark Selden, The Political Economy of Chinese Development (Armonk. N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993), 11-12.

30Marx and Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Marx-Eneels Reader, ed. Tucker, 484.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170

productivity, raise their incomes, decrease rural polarization, and accelerate

industrialization by providing more food, raw materials and capital. The transformation

involved a three-step strategy. The first was to create the mutual aid teams, where

peasants worked together, but retained their means of production including land

ownership. The second was to establish the lower-level cooperative, where the means of

production were collectivized, but peasants’ dividends were based on their relative

contribution to these means. The final step was to create the higher-level cooperatives,

where peasants’ private property was transformed into collective property, and payment

was solely determined by labor.

In urban areas, the Communists proceeded to nationalize industry and commerce.

After 19S2, the state and capitalists established joint enterprises, and capitalists received

25 percent of the profits of the enterprises, hi 1955, the state deprived them of their

means of production, but kept them as highly salaried employees, and provided them with

an interest of 5 percent annum on their capital in seven years. By the end of 1956,

cooperativization was accomplished far more quickly than expected. With the means of

production now largely in the hands of the state or collective units, the victory of

socialism over capitalism had been secured.

If liberal democracy goes hand in hand with capitalism, the dictatorship of

proletariate is supposed to accompany socialist economy. Although the Chinese economy

had entered into socialist stage by the end of 1956, the Communists did not officially

claim to exercise the dictatorship of the proletariate until the 1975 Constitution. The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171

Chinese political system seemed to have separation of powers. The government was

divided into three branches. The People’s Congress was established as the legislative

branch. Supreme power was theoretically vested with the National People’s Congress

(NPC). The executive branch was led by the republic’s chairman, a post abolished in

1975. A State Council, with a premier as its head, took charge of routine government

jobs. A Supreme People’s Court and Procuracy represented the judicial branch. In terms

of the central-local relations, the constitutions proclaimed China to be a unitary and

multinational state. Local government did not enjoy residue powers of sovereignty. Ethnic

minorities, who occupy 60 percent of the national territory, enjoyed autonomous power,

but not the right to secession.

Under the semblance of the separation of powers lied the one-party rule. Unlike

the Nationalists who had made no bones about their party rule but did not really

materialize it, the Communists kept a low profile in the 1954 Constitution. This

constitution, which spanned almost all of Mao’s era, mentioned the party only twice. But

the party rule was an indisputable reality. Theoretically, People’s Congress appointed

government officials at its level, but since almost all its members were hand-picked by

the Communist party, the congress merely served as the rubber stamp. The NPC, which

was supposed to convene annually, failed to do so for almost a decade during the Cultural

Revolution. In 1960 a high ranking Chinese leader told Edgar Snow that about 800 first

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172

generation Communists ran and would run the country for a while.31

Compared with the Nationalist party, the Communist party was much more

unified and effective. It is organized according to the principle of democratic centralism.

At the apex of party power stood the National Party Congress and its Central Committee.

The Congress is elected by next lower level congresses. The Central Committee carries

out the decisions of the Congress, and directs party work when the latter is in recess. But

the real power rested with the Politburo. The post of party chairman, the most powerful

one in China, was held by Mao from 1935 until his death in 1976.

The CCP claims to be “the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the faithful

representative of the interests of the people of all nationalities in China, and the force at

the core of China’s cause of socialism.” But power struggle and policy divergence

brought about “line struggle.” Making allowance for aging process, one finds the

following statistic on the reelection of the Central Committee member reflecting the

intensity of line struggle. Almost all members of the Seventh Central Committee in 1945

made it to the Eighth in 1956; only one third of the Eighth appeared at the Ninth in 1969;

about 72 percent of the Ninth made it to the Tenth in 1973; 62 percent of the Tenth won

reelection to the Eleventh in 1977.32 Western democracies would be satisfied with such

turnover. When the Communist party punctured the myth that it was a “great, glorious,

3lEdgar Snow, The Other Side of the River (New York: Random House, 1961), 331.

32Thomas P. Bernstein, “Chinese Communism in the Era of Mao Zedong, 1949- 1976,” in Perspectives on Modem China, ed. Lieberthal and others, 280.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173

and correct party,” it prided itself in its self-corrective mechanism. This suggests an

interesting phenomenon that even all powerful ruler cannot resist change for long.

James R. Townsend attributed the Communist power to four pre-1949 conditions.

China had not really experienced a competitive political system. The total military victory

made the Communists unchallenged. The Communists accumulated rich experiences of

political control before their rise to power. Mao’s leadership unified the party and

appealed to the people.33 After 1949, the civil society was crashed. Townsend deserves a

quotation in full-length:

The social strata that wielded real or potential political power in pre-Communist China were uniformly weakened in the early years of the People’s Republic. Land reform destroyed the political power of the landlords, while the Five Anti-Movement and the socialization of the economy undercut the strength of industrial and commercial groups. Non-party intellectuals suffered heavy blows through early thought reform campaigns and changes in the educational structure; their surviving political ambitions were smashed in the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957.34

Having consolidated their power and completed socialist transformation, the Communists

convened the Eighth Congress to chart their future course in September 1956. The

congress featured dual themes. First, the Congress declared that the contradictions in

socialist society was between the “advanced social system” and the “backward social

productive forces.” Since the exploitation of man by man had been in the main

eliminated, economic construction would replace class straggle as the party’s major task.

33James R. Townsend, “Intraparty Conflict in China: Disintegration in an Established One-Party System,” in Authoritarian Politics in Modem Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Partv Systems, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 288-93.

^Townsend, “Intraparty Conflict in China,” 285.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174

Second, in the wake of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, the Congress put emphasis

on the principle of collective leadership, and opposed a personality cult. The new party

constitution dropped Mao’s thought as part of its ideology. Deng Xiaoping took up the

newly created post of General Secretary of the Central Committee to take charge of the

party’s routine work. By any standard, this congress pointed in a right direction for China

to go.

In assessing the human cost of revolution, Peter Berger makes distinction between

terror against armed opponents and terror against disarmed ones.35 The former is more

justifiable than the latter. Both the KMT and the CCP committed wanton acts of terror

against their opponents, but it is hard to justify the reign of terror after the establishment

of the PRC. In 1957, Mao estimated that the Communist state had executed 800,000,

which was a conservative estimation. Here it is important to add one more distinction

between manifest and latent sacrifice. The former involves those who were persecuted on

purpose, such as landlords, and the latter involves those who suffered from policy

mistakes, such as peasants in the great famine of 1959-1962. As will be shown soon, the

costs of the Chinese revolution were much higher if latent sacrifice is also considered.

Two Types of Error

No matter how political systems are organized, human nature will surface one

way or another. Human beings tend to suffer two major problems: stupidity and

35Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 77.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ;

175

selfishness. All governments commit two types of error: one out of rulers’ stupidity and

the other out of their selfishness. In their quixotical combat with human weakness, the

Communists succumb more to both stupidity and selfishness than many other systems,

not because they were evil and corrupt, but because their power was less constrained. In

fact, the Communist leaders tended to be idealistic and committed at the beginning. The

problem was not that they did not want to serve their nation, but that they were too eager

and too self-confident.

The Communist success had largely resulted from their self-constraint and good

understanding of Chinese reality. Despite Mao’s warning that the Communist should not

be carried away with victories, power corrupted them. The Communist suppression of the

intellectuals reflected and reinforced this trend. In its early days, the Communist China

incorporate non-party members into the government. Before the promulgation of the 1954

Constitution, supreme state power rested with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference (CPPCC), which consisted of the CCP, the democratic parties and

nonpartisan democratic personages. Non-communists occupied numerous positions at the

beginning. Two were deputy chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, one was a

vice premier, and one the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. One-third of the ministers

and vice ministers were also non-Communists. However, these parties had little decision

power, and could only recruit members from the bourgeoisie, a declining, if not extinct,

species. The 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign cost most of them their jobs, and revealed the

real relations between the CCP and the so-called democratic parties.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176

In early 1957, Mao repeatedly urged non-Communists, especially the intellectuals,

to criticize the government. Most of solicited criticism were leveled against

administrative mistakes and deficiencies, but a few demanded the abolition of one-party

rule and called for free elections. Realizing the pernicious impact of these criticisms on

the party’s reputation, Mao reversed his position and spearheaded the campaign against

the “rightists.” Some 550,000 people were labeled “rightists.” Most of them received

reform through labor, but a small proportion were driven to suicide.36 During the Cultural

Revolution, these parties were disbanded, and were not restored until 1979. They are

supposed to coexist with the CCP, conducting political consultations on major issues and

supervising the Communist government.37 But they merely performed function of

window dressing.

With little opposition in society, the Communist state brought China to the verge

of collapse. Such a situation resulted less from Communist selfishness than from their

stupidity. To accelerate China’s modernization process, Mao advocated a “Great Leap

Forward”and commune system.38 Adopted in May 1958, the Great Leap Forward

encouraged the whole country to boost iron and steel output. Although the objective was

36For Communist policy toward the intellectuals, see Theodore H. E. Chen, Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960).

37 For a review, see Li Chiu-I, “‘Multiparty Cooperation’ Under the CCP’s Leadership.” Issues & Studies (November 1990): 75-85.

38For details, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960 (London: Oxford University Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177

achieved, its price was too high. Much steel made from backyard furnaces was useless.

Given the input of huge financial, material and human resources, the whole project was

inefficient. Losses in this respect was estimated to surpass 4,000 million Yuan.39

Moreover, the focus on iron making ignored light industry and agriculture, which in turn

affected heavy industry. As a result, output in agriculture, light industry and heavy

industry decreased for several consecutive years. By the end of the year, Mao and other

leaders realized the huge problems and stopped the program.

At the height of the Great Leap Forward, people’s communes were established

throughout the country. The commune differed from high-level cooperatives in both size

and nature. Each commune comprised many co-operatives and controlled a population

ranging from 25,000 to 100,000. For the Communists, larger organization would mean

more efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, the commune contained “buds of

communism,” since much of the peasants’ property and daily lives were cotnmunalized.

Nothing better represented communal life than the mess-hall, where members ate together

without paying. Many peasants did not like the idea, and minimized their loss by

concealing grain, killing livestock, and ignoring their crops. The commune put the state

interests before those of peasants. In 1958, the accumulation of the state and commune

accounted for 30 percent of net agricultural output, an increase of roughly 100 percent

over the average for 1953-1957. hi 1959 China’s net grain exports reached 4 million tons,

and it began to import grain in significant amount in 1961 after the worst of the famine

39Konstantinov, ed. A Critique of Mao Tse-tung’s Theoretical Conceptions. 228.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178

passed.40 Mao confessed that the most serious fault was excessive requisitioning.41

Peasants’ sacrifice was justified by the possible happiness of future generation, but the

subsistence level of the Chinese economy and inefficiency of the commune system made

peasants’ sacrifice unjustifiable. What was worse, the period of 1959-61 witnessed one of

the worst famines in Chinese history. More than 20 million died in this mostly man-made

disaster. Amartya Sen had a point in arguing that famines only occurred in non-

democratic countries 42

The folly of the Chinese Communists can be attributed less to Marxism than to

the Chinese situation. A loyal Marxist may even argue that the Chinese violated Marxism.

Marx makes it perfectly clear that every country “can neither clear by bold leaps, nor

remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal

development.”43 The irony of Marxism is that socialism is supposed to be built in

advanced countries, but rather took root in backward countries. Socialist countries have to

rely on political means to promote the economy. Lenin had demonstrated a tendency to

emphasize the primacy of politics. But Lenin never doubted that the more backward the

economy, the more difficult the transition from capitalism to socialism would be. By the

40 Selden, The Political Economy of Chinese Development. 20.

41Mao, Chairman Mao Talks to People. 190.

42Amartya Sen, Resources, Values, and Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

43Marx, “Preface to the First German Edition” of Capital, vol. I, in The Marx- Engels Reader, ed. Tucker, 297.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179

end of the 1950s, Mao criticized the Soviets for their overemphasis on the relations of

production and their underestimation of the superstructure and the people. He went

further by arguing that the more primitive the economic conditions, the poorer the

population, “the more they would want revolution.”44 Here Mao obviously confused the

intention and capability on the one hand, and revolution and construction on the other.

His emphasis on politics, for Stuart R. Schram, came much closer to traditional Chinese

thought than to Marx or Lenin.4S Maurice Meisner deems Maoism to be more akin to

utopian socialism in that “economic backwardness was not seen as an obstacle to the

achievement of socialist goals but rather was converted into a social advantage.”46

The reasons for the Great Leap Forward and the commune system have to be

found in China’s situation. First, Mao was carried away with the Soviet success. In the

summer of 1957, the Soviet Union had tested an ICBM and orbited an earth satellite in

October. After Moscow announced its intention to surpass the United States

economically, Beijing expressed its desire to surpass England in fifteen years. Second,

several factors motivated Mao to devise a distinctive “Chinese road to socialism.” The

First Five Year Plan suggested that the Soviet economic model did not fit the Chinese

situation. The Soviet Union had decreased its economic aid to China. After Stalin’s death,

44Mao Zedong, A Critique of Soviet Economics (New York: Monthly Review, 1977), 50.

45Stuart R. Schram, “The Marxist,” in Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History, ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 37.

46Maurice Meisner, Marxism. Maoism and Utopianism: Eight Essays (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180

Mao coveted world communist leadership. Third, Mao had succeeded in setting political

agenda in all important issues, such as participation in the Korean War and the socialist

transformation. He was so eager to make China rich and powerful that he emphasized that

“These fifteen years depend on the first five. The first depend on the first three, the fist

three on the first one, and the first year depends on the first month.”47 Last, but not the

least, the Communist rise to power decreased the quality of elite. For Gaetano Mosca,

One might say that penetration into the upper classes by elements coming from the lower is helpful when it takes place in due proportion and under such considerations that the newcomers at once assimilate the best qualities of old members. It is harmful when the old members are, so to say, absorbed and assimilated by the newcomers. In that event an aristocracy is not replenished. It turns plebs.48

The Communist party selected their cadres not because of their competence but because

of their loyalty. These cadres were loyal executor of party policy. The Anti-Rightist

Campaign served further to suppress free, critical and independent thinking.

From the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s idealism

deteriorated into Machiavellianism. Chinese politics resembled a trilogy: Mao’s face

saving at the sacrifice of “intra-party democracy,” his loss of power and influence, and his

attempt to stage a comeback. In July 1959, the Communist leaders gathered at Mount

Lushan to review economic policies. Many people including Defense Minister Peng

Dehuai criticized the Great Leap Forward during small group discussions, which

47Mao, Chairman Mao Talks to the People. 92.

48Mosca, The Ruling Class, 425.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181

displeased and embarrassed Mao.49 Later Peng summarized his view in a private letter to

Mao, who made the letter public and treated Peng’s criticism as “a right opportunist

attack.” By threatening to conduct guerrilla war, Mao succeeded in purging Peng and

several other high-ranking officials and in making Lin Biao Defense Minister.

The Lushan meeting had a pernicious impact on China and the Communist party.

The following campaign against Peng’s right opportunism did not reverse Mao’s radical

policy, hence losing a chance to halt incoming disaster. Before 1958, one major reason

for Communist success was their adherence to the principle of democratic centralism,

which permitted free discussion among the party leadership. V. O. Key, Jr. finds

factionalism to be inversely related to competitiveness of the party system.50 The CCP

seems to find a way of avoiding factionism in a one-party system. Franz Schurmann once

made a distinction between “opinion groups” and “factions” within the CCP. While the

former refers to those who share similar opinion but have no organization base, the latter

is organized opinion group.51 The Communists tended to tolerate “opinion groups,” which

are policy-oriented, but not “factions,” which are power-driven. The Gao-Rao group in

the early 1950s was a faction, but the purge of Peng obviously violated intra-party

49See Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician trans. Tai Hung-chao; with the editorial assistance of Anne F. Thurston (New York: Random House, 1994), 306-23.

50V. O. Key, Jr., Politics. Parties, and Pressure Groups 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964).

5IFranz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 55-56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ft

182

democracy and set an negative precedent.52 When selfishness and cowardliness prevented

other leaders from siding with their honest and courageous colleagues, they left China and

themselves vulnerable to autocratic decisions in the future, a lesson they would learn the

hard way during the Cultural Revolution.

Mao’s purge of Peng saved his face, but could not save the party’ confidence in

his leadership. In fact, he became pessimistic about the Chinese future.53 Mao retired to

the second front in 1959. While yielding the position of the republic’s chairman to Liu, he

remained the party chairman. Liu and Deng reversed his radical policies. In agricultural

affairs, communes were downsized and decentralized; the workload was lessened. To

restore peasants’ initiative, Liu and Deng allowed more private plots,54 more free markets,

more small enterprises, and fixed output quota on a household basis. In industrial affairs,

Liu and Deng respected management and experts, stressed rules and discipline, and

increased material incentives for workers. In educational affairs, they emphasized

academic qualification and faculty authority, hi international affairs, they adopted a more

conciliatory attitude toward imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces and

52Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics and Puree in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950-65 (White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1979).

S3In a 1962 speech Mao said that given China’s large population, meager resources and backward economy, China could not catch up with, or overtake the most advanced capitalist countries in over a hundred years. Mao Zedong, mao zedong si-xiang wan-sui! [Long Live Mao Zedong Thought!] (Beijing: 1969), 413.

^Reserved for peasant families after collectivization, private plots had provided 27 percent of their incomes in 1957. Konstantinov, ed. A Critique of Mao Tse-tung’s Theoretical Conceptions. 225.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183

advocated less aid to world revolution. For Mao, all these stood for revisionism.

To make a comeback, Mao advocated class struggle on the one hand, and

promoted the personality cult, on the other. Even after the Eighth Party Congress, Mao

still believed that class struggle ‘‘will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will

even become very acute.”55 In 1962, he claimed that class struggle would exist throughout

the transition from capitalism to communism. In 1964, he warned that Khrushchev

revisionism might well exist at all levels in China.

Mao’s obsession with class struggle resulted from many factors: his temperament,

his world-view, his experience, and Chinese realities. Mao was a bom rebel. At a tender

age, he defied his father’s authority. His rebellious spirit is encapsulated in his motto that

“I feel boundless joy in struggling with heaven, with earth, and with men.” His career

reflected his personality in that he was often at odd with the party.56 Since 1920 Mao

embraced the notion of conflict of interests advocated by Darwin and Marx. In his view,

human history is one of class struggle, and class struggles are its driving force. He treated

contradictions as natural, ubiquitous, beneficial and permanent, and later regarded the law

of contradictions as the only basic law in the world.57 Mao’s personal experience did not

help him believe in the harmony of interests. For the revolutionary cause, eight of his

55Mao, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” 463.

56Leo Goodstadt, China’s Search for Plenty: The Economics of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Weatherhill, 1073), 24.

^For Mao’s early view, see his “On Contradiction,” Selected Works, vol. 1,311- 47. For his later view, see Mao, Chairman Mao Talks to the People. 241.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r

184

family members had sacrificed their lives. Among them, his first wife was executed; his

two brothers was killed in battle; and his son died in the Korean War. No the least of all,

when the Communists showed a tendency of de-radicalization, Mao felt betrayed.

But power struggle played an extremely important role in Mao’s advocacy of class

struggle. Although none wanted to usurp his power, he was marginalized. Liu’s open

criticism of Mao’s policy at an January 1962 party “work conference” did not please

Mao. On August I, Liu published a revised version of his essay “How to Be a Good

Communist,” an obvious and unusual act to boost his reputation. When Mao launched a

“Socialist Education Campaign” in 1962, Liu preferred to tackle the problem from the

top down, rather than following Mao’s method of mobilizing the masses to address the

party problem. Mao told Edgar Snow in 1970 that before the Cultural Revolution, a great

deal of power had been out of his control. He complained that Deng had never consulted

him since 1959, and that he had been “treated as a dead ancestor.”58

To defeat his opponents, Mao fostered the personality cult to enlist the people’s

support. Not long after Lin Biao became Defense Minister, he began indoctrinating the

military with Mao’s thoughts. Mao was so impressed that he exhorted the whole country

to learn from the military in 1964. Very soon, the “Red Little Book” — Quotations from

Chairman Mao Zedong—came out. To promote Mao’s cult is not difficult. Mao is both

Lenin and Stalin to the Communist China. Bom into a rich peasant family in Hunan

province, Mao received some traditional and modem education. He was a founding

58Mao, Chairman Mao Talk to the People. 266-67.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185

member of the Communist party. During the united front between the Nationalists and

Communists, Mao played an important role in propaganda and peasant issues. Since

1927, Mao established a guerrilla base on the Hunan-Jiangxi border in 1927, which later

became the Communist central base. For a while, the Soviet-educated leaders kept Mao

on the sidelines. Not until January 1935, when the Communists were on their Long

March, did Mao rise to power. Since then, he led the Chinese revolution to victory. His

success in defeating the Nationalists, his leadership in completing the socialist

transformation, his romanticism, heroism, and intellectual proclivity paved the way for

the personality cult. Mao identified a perpetual human desire to worship and to be

worshiped, and divided his cult member into three groups: sincere people, those drifting

with the tide, and insincere people.59 Mao gradually substituted his charismatic leadership

for Communist party rule itself.60

Totalitarian Rule

The period of 1966-76 witnessed acceptance of the International Human Rights

Covenants in the world and a totalitarian society in China. The origins of the Cultural

Revolution can be interpreted at three levels. The first level is that Mao tried to finish the

socialist revolution in the cultural realm. A cultural revolution had long been regarded as

59Edgar Snow. The Lone Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 169-70.

“ For an analysis of charismatic leadership, see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), 358-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186

an integral part of the Chinese revolution.61 During their first 16-year rule, the

Communists focused on consolidating their power, completing socialist transformation

and promoting economic development. Although they never relinquished their control

over cultural affaires, they did not have chance to eliminate the feudal, capitalist, and

revisionist culture that had long dominated China.

The second level is an institutional one. Bureaucracy before the Cultural

Revolution became too large and too conservative. State functionaries in the 19th century

Qing dynasty, in the late Nationalist era, and in 1958 were 40,000, two million and eight

million, respectively.62 As early as 1956, Mao suggested cutting the bureaucracy by two-

thirds.63 Aside from its size, the bureaucracy struck Mao as conservative. His perception

was not wrong. For Max Weber, bureaucracy was characterized by the following factors:

a division of labor, hierarchy, routinization, officials’ formalistic impersonality, and the

goals of efficiency.64 Leon Trotsky and Milovan Djilas warned that the ruling Communist

party would become a new class, whose interests were antagonistic to societal interests.65

6‘Mao, “On New Democracy,” 369-82.

“ Barrington Moore, Jr., Authority and Inequality under Capitalism and Socialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 78-79.

“ Mao, Chairman Mao Talk to the People. 75.

“ See Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modem Society (New York: Random House, 1956), 28ff. For an analysis of Chinese bureaucracy and its problems, see Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy. 1949-1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981).

“ Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1937), 278; Milovan Diilas. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187

The third level at which the origins of the Cultural Revolution can be explained is

power struggle between Mao and his opponents. Before the Cultural Revolution, Mao

started to lose control. Despite his party chairmanship, Mao criticized many party

branches as “independent kingdom.” As the Republic Chairman, Liu exercised great

influence in the government. Mao even found that his words were not heeded in the

capital city of Beijing. Mao relied on Lin Biao in effectively controlling the military. But

Mao finally allied with urban people, especially young students, to eliminate his

opponents.

If Mao acted on impulse in his economic policy, he dealt with his political

opponents with great deliberation. In late 1965, under Mao’s auspices, Shanghai’s

newspaper Wen-hui Bao criticized a play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office. The play’s

author Wu Han, a deputy Mayor of Beijing, was accused of attempting to rehabilitate the

former Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. Mao instigated a debate on the nature of the play

in China. Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing and the leader of the Cultural Revolution Group,

reported to Mao the Group’s conclusion that the Wu Han question was not political, but

academic. Mao purged Peng and several other senior leaders as a counter-revolutionary

cell. On May 16, 1966, Chen Boda and Mao’s wife Jiang Qing became leaders of the

Central Committee’s Cultural Revolution Group, and the Cultural Revolution was

officially launched.

Encouraged by the Cultural Revolution Group, the first poster appeared on the

Praeger, 1976).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. t *

188

campus of Peking University, criticizing university leaders for their opposition to the

Cultural Revolution. Mao ordered the poster to be broadcast to the whole country. As a

result, the party committee at other schools were soon under attack. Liu and Deng went to

Hangzhou for Mao’s instruction. With Mao’s agreement, the party decided to send “work

groups” to control the student movement. But Mao reversed his position, withdrawing the

work groups and causing confusion in the party. As Liu told students that “You ask us

how we should bring about this revolution, and I tell you honestly that I don’t know. Our

comrades in the Central Committee of our party and the members of the work groups

don’t know either.”66

Although Liu and Deng were humiliated in the process, they still held power. On

August 5, 1966, Mao posted a poster at government headquarters. Entitled “Bombarding

the Headquarters,” it accused many Chinese leaders of exercising bourgeoisie dictatorship

and blocking the Cultural Revolution. The message finally got across. The students

targeted Liu and Deng. Before long, they were purged as the two leading capitalist

roaders. Many old cadres also lost their position. The restructuring of the government also

spread to the local level. Between January 1967 and September 1968, “Revolutionary

Committees,” consisted of military men, mass representatives, and former cadres,

replaced the previous local governments.67

“ Yen Chia-chi and Kao Kao, The Ten-Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), 36.

67Harding Harry thinks that participation was achieved at the cost of institutionalization. Harry Harding, “Political Development in Post-Mao China,” in Modernizing China: Post Mao Reform and Development ed. A. Doak Barnett and Ralph

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189

Mao’s triumph was symbolized by the Ninth Party Congress convened in April

1969. Only 54 of the 167 previous Central Committee members attended this congress.

The ousted leaders faced persecution, but not physical elimination, which sowed the

seeds of the future gerontocracy in the Dengist era. The new party constitution reversed

the themes of the Eighth Party Congress, stressing the role of Mao’s thought and the

importance of class struggle. Lin Biao’s role in promoting Mao’s personality cult won

him the status of Mao’s official successor.

Power struggles within the party were more fierce after Mao’s totalitarian rule,

because Mao’s victory over his opponents created a power vacuum. Lacking skills,

stamina and charisma, Lin Biao coveted more positions to consolidate his power.68 His

jockeying for position displeased Mao. The official interpretation had it that after his

failed attempt on Mao’s life, Lin died in a plane crash in Mongolia while fleeing to the

Soviet Union in September 1971. The Lin Biao Incident put Mao in a no-win situation.

Either he was regarded as a willful and unpredictable dictator who mistreated his loyal

follower;69 or he lacked good judgement by trusting someone who had attempted to

N. Clough (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1986), 15.

68For a more sympathetic view of Lin, see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution. 1966-1971 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996).

69This accusation was not without reason. In late July, 1968, Mao turned his back on the Red Guards, who had ousted Mao’s rivals from political stage. Afterwards, millions of urban youth were sent to the countryside to receive reeducation, and were disillusioned. Mao also eliminated ambitious radicals led by some members of the Cultural Revolution Group, who had tried to topple the majority of cadres and to extend the Cultural Revolution into the army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190

assassinate him. After the fall of Lin Biao, Mao exercised divide and rule by pitting three

groups against one another: the radical “Gang of four” led by his wife, the old guard

represented by Premier Zhou Enlai, and new stars later represented by Hua Guofeng.

After Mao’s death, the “Gang of Four” challenged both Hua’s status as Mao’s successor

and the old guards’ power, only to end up in jail.

The Ninth Congress heralded a new era of totalitarianism in China. Unlike

traditional dictatorship, Mao’s totalitarianism has many distinctive characteristics.70 First,

traditional dictators tended to limit their power to the political sphere, but Mao’s regime

tried to control all aspects of society. Public ownership laid the solid foundation for total

control. Communes organized rural people; working unit(tan-wei) controlled the urban

people, since they dispensed salaries and provided houses. Residents’ committees had

been established on a street basis since 1954, keeping watchful eyes on urban people’s

daily lives. Mao’s totalitarian rule was such that people’s dresses, attitudes and behaviors

were forced into a strait-jacket.

Second, while traditional dictators preferred an apathetic population, Mao

demanded both acquiescence and active support. He practiced so-called “great

democracy,” encouraging the people to air their views, to put up posters, to conduct

debates, to criticize the authorities. During a mass campaign, the whole society was

70For a classic explanation of totalitarianism, see, for example, Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1965); Carl J. Friedrich ed., Totalitarianism (New York: Cresset & Dunlap, 1964); and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 2d enl. ed. (New York: Meridian Books, 1958)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

191

mobilized to carry out the party’s new policy.71 All these, however, cannot be regarded as

democratic participation. Myron Weiner defines political participation as voluntary action

to influence the choice of political leaders and public policies.72 hi Mao’s China, the

people had little choice but to participate. As Joseph V. Femia points out, “What was

required, however, was not participation in theformulation of public policy but in its

execution andcelebration."73 And participation was acceptable only when it supported the

socialist system and the party’s leadership.74

Third, unlike traditional dictatorship, which focused mainly on keeping its power,

Mao’s totalitarianism intended to restructure people and society. Socialists dismiss self-

interest as selfishness, and believe that societal change will bright about human change.7S

“New socialist people” are supposed to show little interest in material gains, demonstrate

a devotion to common welfare, and set store by cooperation. To create such kind of

people, Mao called on the people to criticize traditional and foreign cultures. The results

were disastrous. Obscurantism prevailed in China. For example, during the Cultural

7IFor a study of these campaigns, see Gordon A. Bennett, Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1976).

n Myron Weiner, “Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process,” 164

?3Femia, Marxism and Democracy. 133.

74John Bryan Starr, Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 220.

75Marxism believes that “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Tucker, 145.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192

Revolution, the Zhonghua Press only published 500 of 13,000 book titles in its 50-year

list, but 3 billion copies of Mao’s works were printed.76 Jose Ortega Y Gasset’s criticism

of modem time fits the Cultural Revolution well. He says that “not that the vulgar

believes itself super-excellent and not vulgar, but that the vulgar proclaims and imposes

the rights of vulgarity, or vulgarity as a right.”77 Mao preached selflessness, self-reliance,

friendship and cooperation, but hostility, dishonesty, suspicion and treachery were

prevalent. Even Mao disproved of lying and mistreatment of captives during the Cultural

Revolution.78

Not least of all, while traditional dictatorship tended to preach a harmony of

interests, Mao’s totalitarianism called for class struggle. For Mao, everyone belongs to a

particular class in class society, and every kind of thinking carries the brand of a class.79

In Mao’s era, a class label was determined not by individuals’ current socio-economic

status, but by their families’ economic positions before the Communist victory.80 Class

analysis was a powerful analytic tool, but the emphasis on class character ignored

humanity and individuality, and the call for class struggle damaged the social fabric. By

76Konstantinov ed., A Critique of Mao Tse-tung’s Theoretical Conceptions. 275.

^Jose Ortega Y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: Norton, 1932), 70.

78Snow, The Long Revolution, 174.

79Mao, “On Practice,” Selected Works, vol. 1, 296.

80Jonathan Unger, “The Class System in Rural China: A Case Study,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolutionary China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 121.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193

dehumanizing class enemies, the Communists made it easy to abuse human rights.

By our definition, Mao’s regime was anything but democratic. In terms of positive

freedom, the Chinese people were subject to one party rale, which was based on the

Communist power and their claim that they represented the best interests of the nation.

Thomas Aquinas distinguished two forms of subjection. Either the master makes use of

his servant for his own convenience, or the master rales for the benefit of ruled.81 These

two forms correspond to dictatorship and paternalism, respectively. Communists’ claims

at best fall into the second category, hi terms of negative freedom, human rights are not

respected. The notion of Class struggle minimized the protection of minority rights.

It may be unfair to emphasize formal democracy in evaluating the Communists,

because they claim to focus on substantive democracy. But they failed to deliver the

goods. The Communist state in Mao’s era lacked efficiency. China stayed out of the

world economic boom in the third quarter of this century. Living standards in China were

low and barely increased. Socialist states tend to pride themselves in achieving equality.

In this respect, Mao’s China had mixed record. Based on the statistics of Chinese urban

residents, William L. Parish concludes that China was slightly more equal than the

average socialist state.82 In the past, landlords and capitalists sat on top while peasants

and workers sat on the bottom. Mao stood the traditional pyramid of social status on its

8lThomas Aquinas, Aquinas Selected Political Writing (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 103.

82William L. Parish, “Destratification in China,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolutionary China, ed. Watson, 84-120.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194

head. The disadvantaged peoples, such as manual workers and women, did increased their

social status, but previously privileged groups, such as intellectuals, lost the chance to

play their proper role in society. The worse record in terms of equality was that the gap

between town and country, which was regarded by Marx as “the greatest division of

material and mental labor,” was entrenched and enlarged.83 The household registration

system, which was installed in 1955, prevented rural residents from living and working in

urban areas, and even made it difficult to visit cities.

The question is whether socialism inevitably conflicts with democracy. Advocates

of socialism think that there is no contradiction. Ralph Miliband, for example, says that

Socialist democracy would embody many of the features of liberal democracy, including the rule of law, the separation of powers, civil liberties, political pluralism, and a vibrant civil society, but it would give them much more effective meaning. It would seek the democratization of the state and of society at all levels.84

This theoretic possibility has never been translated into reality. Peter Berger finds that

although countries with market economies were not necessarily democratic, all

democracies coexisted with market economies.85 C. B. MacPherson argues that although

political freedom is not guaranteed in existing socialist countries, this does not mean that

“ Marx, “The German Ideology,” in The Marx-Eneels Reader, ed. Tucker, 176.

MRalph Miliband, “The Socialist Alternative,” in Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy Revisited, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 117.

85 Peter L. Berger, “The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism,” in Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy Revisited, ed. Diamond and Plattner, 3. For the interaction between capitalism and democracy, see Gabriel A. Almond, “Capitalism and Democracy,” in PS: Political Science and Politics (September 1991): 467-74.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they cannot do so. He attributed the socialist failure in this respect to three specific

factors. Socialist countries were established in underdeveloped countries; they faced the

hostility of the Western powers; and their birth in revolution or civil war entailed the

restriction of freedom.86

Other theorists saw inevitable conflict between socialism and democracy. As early

as 1848, Tocqueville was quoted as saying:

Democracy extends the sphere of individual freedom; socialism restricts it. Democracy attaches all possible value to each man; socialism makes each man a mere agent, a mere number. Democracy and socialism have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude.87

For many, socialist preference of collective rights over individual rights is at the root of

totalitarianism.88 It is safe to conclude that it would be wrong to regard the heretofore

existing socialism as the only possible form, but socialist economy and the dictatorship of

proletariat are more conducive to despotism than to democracy.

Concluding Remarks

While Communists are sarcastic about the capitalist state, they are confident about

86C. B. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 151-52.

^Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 25.

88Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York: Harper, 1949), 504. Femia, Marxism and Democracy; Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1960).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196

their own sincerity and capacity. They think that western democracy is bourgeois in

nature and is more formal than substantive. They want to establish a superior socialist

democracy. Socialist economy has been characterized by public ownership, planned

economies, and isolation from the outside world. Such an economic base certainly

endows the state with too much power. Within this state, the Communists monopolize

power. What was worse, all power finally rested with Mao in China. Such power made

the Communists susceptible to both folly and selfishness. While the “Great Leap

Forward” testified to Mao’s folly, the Cultural Revolution to his selfishness.

Socialist China in Mao’s era neither met the common standard of democracy, nor

delivered on its own promise in increasing people’s living standards. It turned out to be

inefficient, and had a mixed record on equality. The socialist experience proved that the

path to hell is paved with good intentions. The Chinese pursuit of socialism created an

unprecedentedly totalitarian state in China and sidetracked the Chinese democratization

process.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 6

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it can catch mice, it is a good one.

Deng Xiaoping

For more than two years after Mao’s death in September 1976, his designated

successor Hua Guofeng called the tune. He pledged to uphold whatever policies

Chairman Mao made and to follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao had given. But

Mao’s policies could not last long, and Deng’s reform policy won out. The Third Plenary

Session of the Eleventh Party Congress in late 1978 symbolized Deng’s rise to power.

Deng never assumed formal leadership in the party or state. Having resigned the

chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission in late 1989, he had no official

title. He was last seen in public in February 1994, and died at the age of ninety three in

February 1997. His lack of titles did not diminish, but highlighted his status as China’s

paramount leader.1

What occupied Deng’s mind was less political democratization than economic

development. However, this fact did not prevent him from playing a very important role

1 For an overall assessment of Deng, see Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Claredon, 1995).

197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

198

in the Chinese democratization process. After all, economic development and political

democratization interact with each other. Deng parted company with Mao’s

totalitarianism and initialized the process of liberalization. His economic reforms

unleashed forces which were conducive to democratization. His political reforms

rationalized Chinese bureaucracy. His crackdown on the 1989 democratization movement

excluded the possibility that China would have democratized itself like the socialist

countries in East Europe, but set China on an authoritarian path which had been taken by

“four little dragons” in East Asia. To study the impact of economic development on

political democratization in the Dengist era is the task of this chapter.

Farewell to Totalitarianism

Mao built up a totalitarian system, and Deng tore it apart. In doing so, Deng had to

balance between doing too little and doing too much, ft he did too litde, he could not

initialize his reform policy, but if he did too much, he would undermine the legitimacy of

Communist rule. He focused on doing several things. The first was to abolish Mao’s

personality cult. In his later life, Mao was truth incarnate. What the Chinese should do

was to follow his instructions. For Deng, Mao’s patriarchal style had inflicted many

disasters on China. To demolish the personality cult, Deng and other reformers proposed

practice as the sole judge of truth, and called on people to emancipate their minds. An

overall assessment of party history was made on the eve of the sixtieth birthday of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199

Communist party in June 1981.2 Mao’s thought was construed as the crystallization of the

party’s collective wisdom. He was rated as having been right 70 percent of the time and

wrong 30 percent of the time. He was praised for his emphasis on independence and self-

reliance, the “mass line,” and his notion of seeking truth from facts. He was criticized for

overestimating people’s subjective will, promoting the personality cult, advocating class

struggle, and indulging voluntarism.

Second, Deng gave priority to economic development. Mao showed too much

enthusiasm for politics. During the Cultural Revolution, Maoists even went so far as to

argue that it would be better to be poor under socialism than to be rich under capitalism.

Deng did not deny Mao’s wish to develop the productive forces, but thought that he used

many wrong methods. How to assess Mao’s economic record is controversial,3 but Deng

estimated that from 1958 to 1978, living standards of peasants and workers remained low

and rose only a little, and that China’s GNP per capita was less than $250 in 1978.4

Deng’s policies were summarized as “one center” and “two basic points.” The center

refers to the objective of accelerating economic development. The two basic points are

2 See Resolution on CPC History (1949-81) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981).

3 Dwight H. Perkins argues that economic growth, especially industry, was quite impressive during the Maoist period. See his “The Prospects for China’s Economic Reforms,” in Modernizing China, ed. Barnett and Clough, 39-40. Shigeru Jshikawa holds an opposite view. See his “China’s Economic Growth since 1949—An Assessment,” The China Quarterly no. 94 (June 1983), 242ff.

4 Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), 105-06.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. !

200

concerned with the means to achieve this goal: adhering to the “four cardinal principles”5

and adopting the policy of reform and opening up. For Deng, economic development

would not only satisfy the people’s needs, but accord with Marxist’s fundamental

principle of developing the productive forces.6

Third, Deng threw class struggle into the historical dust-bin and renounced class

struggle and mass campaigns as the way of socialist revolution and construction. In late

1978 and 1979, most of China’s so-called “five bad elements” (landlords, rich peasants,

counter-revolutionaries, rotten elements, and rightist) were said to have remolded

themselves into self-supporting laborers. Although class labels still exited in dossiers,

they meant little in reality. The short novel ‘Trauma,” in which the heroine regretted her

failure to visit her dying mother with a bad class background, reflected and reinforced the

people’s dislike of class labels and class struggle during Mao’s times. No doubt, Deng did

launch campaigns against “spiritual pollution” in late 1983 and against “bourgeois

liberalism” in early 1987, but they were short in duration, narrow in scope and low in

intensity. For example, Deng called on the people to eradicate “spiritual pollution”

resulting from foreign contacts. But “spiritual pollution” was defined as containing two

major categories. One is deviation from Marxism-Leninism and the propagation of

bourgeois ideas such as humanism and socialist alienation; the other is propagation of

5 Put forth in March 1979, the four principles refer to the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariate, party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

6 Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 106.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201

indecent, horrific and absurd things as well as a decadent bourgeois lifestyle. The whole

campaign lasted only 27 days.

Fourth, Deng and reformers rehabilitated those who fell victims to Mao’s

wrongful persecution and to eliminate those who had benefitted from the Cultural

Revolution. Deng and his colleagues cleared the name of many Communist leaders, such

as Peng Dehuai, the former Defense Minister, Qu Qiubai, the former party leader who

was executed by the KMT but was regarded as a renegade by the CCP during the Cultural

Revolution, and Liu Shaoqi, the former republic’s chairman. Since Mao had not adopted

a policy of liquidating his political opponents, most of them had survived. Deng and his

protegee Hu Yaobang rehabilitated them, and heralded an era of gerontocracy. Such

rehabilitation was not limited to a high level. By the end of 1982 some three million

cadres, administrative and technical personnel had been rehabilitated.7 Deng also decided

to purify the party. About 40 percent of 41 million party members were admitted during

the Cultural Revolution; 35.7 percent between 1950 and 1965; 4.3 percent during Hua’s

times; 13.5 percent since Deng came to power.8 hi 1983, Deng proceeded to eliminate

“three types of persons,” namely, those who had followed the “Gang of Four,” those who

had formed faction, and those who had used violence during the Cultural Revolution. As

a result, several millions were purged.

7 Barry Naughton, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform. 1978-93 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

8 Milton D. Yeh, “The Ideology and Politics of Teng’s Leadership in Post-Mao Mainland China,” Issues and Studies (May 1988): 78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202

Last, Deng made the Communists less ideological and more pragmatic. Deng is

famous for his pragmatism and prudence, as encapsulated by his two famous mottoes.

One is that “It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it can catch

mice, it is a good one.” The other is “crossing a river by feeling for stones on the bottom.”

His approach is immune from “fatal conceit,” which think that economic and social

advance stem from deliberate design.9 Deng’s reform agenda was not guided by any

blueprint; he relied on piecemeal engineering to solve problems. He regarded the

emergence of village and township enterprises (TVE) as the party’s greatest success, but

acknowledged that it had not even anticipated that spontaneous development.10

hi explaining Deng’s farewell to totalitarianism, some scholars tried to pinpoint

specific events or periods. Lowell Dittmer identified three origins of Deng’s reform: the

golden fifties, the post-leap revisionist period, and the Cultural Revolution. Brantly

Womack emphasized the importance of the Cultural Revolution in shaping Deng’s

reforms. Dali Young traced Deng’s reform to the 1959-61 Famine.11 Admirable as these

efforts may be, Deng’s break with Maoism, especially in political realm, have to be

explained by a combination of factors.

9 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (London: Routledge, 1988).

10 Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 189.

11 Lowell Dittmer, “The Origins of China’s Post-Mao Reforms,” in Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng, ed. Victor C. Falkenheim (New York: Paragon House), 59. Womack, “In Search of Democracy,” 79. Dali Young, Calamity and Reform in China: State. Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203

First, the Chinese people were disillusioned by Mao’s legacies. David S. G.

Goodman points out that, with the possible exception of the army, all social forces were

dissatisfied with the status quo. The living standards of urban workers had not improved

for the previous 20 years. Since the Great Leap Forward, the peasants had been alienated

from the party. The constant policy changes and possible mistreatment made cadres

skeptical of the party. Intellectuals had suffered from attack since the 1957 Anti-Rightist

Campaign, especially during the Cultural Revolution.12 One book on human rights in

China identifies the following groups as victims: counter-revolutionaries, farmers,

businesspeople, workers, intellectuals and “democratic elements,” Red Guards and

political dissidents, factions, women, ethnic minorities and religious groups.13 Although

this study ignores the fact that women and workers did increase their status in Mao’s

China, and forgets the reality that all social groups have complaints in all societies, it does

make it clear that the Communist state did affect most of the Chinese.

Second, revolutionary passion ran out of steam. Deng says that “revolution takes

place on the basis of the need for material benefits. It would be idealism to emphasize the

spirit of sacrifice to the neglect of material benefit.”14 Deng’s observations are consistent

12 David S. G. Goodman, “Democracy, Interest, and Virtue: The Search for Legitimacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in Foundations and Limits of State Power in China, ed. Stuart. R. Schram (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1987), 296-97.

13 Yuan-li Wu and others, Human Rights in People’s Republic of China (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1988).

14 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. 1975-1982 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 157.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204

with what has happened in other revolutionary regimes. Crane Brinton suggests the

“universality of the Thermidorian reaction.” For him, the revolutionary process

experiences the decline of utopianism and a return to normalcy. Focusing on Marxist

movements, Robert Tucker finds a tendency of “deradicalization,” which means their

inevitable willingness to come to terms with existing realities. Adam Przeworski observes

that by the 1970s, the Communist leadership had become bourgeoisified. The emergence

of goulash communism, Kadarism and Brezhnevism suggested that socialism was no

longer a model for the future, and that elites had promised material welfare to silence

people.15

Third, Deng’s personal experiences might have contributed to his move away

from totalitarianism. Bom in 1904 in Sichuan province, Deng went to France for further

study in early 1920. He worked instead of studying there. On his way home, he received

short-term training in Moscow in 1926. Three times in his life he fell from grace. When

he was in Mao’s central base, Mao’s rivals dismissed him from his position, and his wife

divorced him. After the Communists took power, Deng rose to top leadership. During the

Cultural Revolution, Mao sent him packing but reinstated him later. Suspecting that Deng

was attempting a policy reverse, Mao used the public protest on Tiananmen Square in

April 1976 as an excuse to purge Deng. Not until 1977 did Deng return to the political

15 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 205-36. Robert C. Tucker, “The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements,” chap. in The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton, 1969), 172-214. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205

stage. Deng’s international experiences, his familiarity with routine jobs, and his

sufferings from power struggles fostered his pragmatism and dislike of despotism.

Not the least of all, even if Deng was willing to inherit Mao’s dictatorial mantle,

he would be unable to do so. As the first among equals, he had to share power with other

senior statesmen. Deng was no Mao in the Communist party. Mao participated in

founding the party and building the army, led the Communists to victory, and served as

the party’s chief ideologue. Deng was not a top leader before 1949. His meteoric rise after

1949 never made him as awed and respected as Mao had been before.16 In a word, despite

his power, Deng could never achieve Mao’s status.

The measures taken by Deng were common-sensical. It took those who had lived

under Mao’s totalitarianism to appreciate the profound changes. Even before the impact

of economic reform was felt, ordinary people already enjoyed a great deal of freedom.

The days of totalitarianism were gone.

Economic Development

Both political democratization and economic development provide people with

more freedom of choice. While democratization allows people to choose their rulers,

development enables them to choose richer and more diverse lives.17 But good things do

16 For power struggles between Deng and his rivals, see, for example, Ruan, Deng Xiaoping: and David Bachman, “The Limits on Leadership in China,” Asian Survey 32 (November 1992): 1046-62.

17 David Apter defines the termdevelopment as “expanding choice.Choice refers to the range of articulated alternatives available to individuals and collectivities.” See his

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. j

206

not necessarily go together. Sometimes a choice has to be made between democratization

and development. Jack Donnelly identifies three trade-offs between development and

human rights. The “needs trade-off’ notion sacrifices people’s consumption for

development. The “equality trade-off’ notion sees inequality as an inevitable consequence

of, if not a contributor to, development. The “liberty trade-off’ notion caution that human

rights might disrupt development.18

Deng gave priority to economic development instead of political democracy. This

might disappoint democrats, but Deng’s choice was justifiable. If there were a choice, the

Chinese people would have preferred economic development to political

democratization.19 It does not take Marx or Maslow to understand why a piece of bread

serves a hungry person better than a piece of ballot-paper. People in poverty or with

memory of poverty are concerned with survival more than with anything else. Even if

living standards are well above subsistence level, it often take a new generation to change

preferences. Equally important, Deng’s farewell to totalitarianism further decreased the

Rethinking Development: Modernization. Dependancv. and Postmodern Politics (Newbury Park, C.A.: Sage, 1987), 16.

18 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 164-65.

19 On the relations between economic development and democracy, see, for example, E. William Dick, “Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development.” Journal of Political Economy (Julv-August 1974): 817-28. Erich Weede, “The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth,” Kvlos 36 (1983): 21- 39; Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); and Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207

Chinese desire for democracy. People tend to tolerate the repressive regime until it

became excessive.

Michel Oksenberg and Bruce J. Dickson highlight the importance of the sequence

of reform, which is based on “the strategic decisions about pace, levels, sectors, regions,

and the strength of the opposition.”20 A honorary chairman of the Chinese Bridge

Association, Deng knew the importance of sequence. Deng’s reform originated in the

rural area, where the commune system could not feed the people, especially peasants, hi

1979, Deng made a bold decision by dissolving the commune. In its place Deng

introduced the “responsibility system.” The land of communes was distributed to

individual peasant households, and individual household replaced the production team as

the basic unit of agricultural production. In 1978,66 percent of rural income derived from

collective sources; by 1989 the comparable figure was less than 10 percent, while 81

percent of income was from the family.21 The new system stipulated that as long as

peasants fulfilled output quotas, it was up to them to decide what, how and how much

they would produce. Since income is linked to output, peasants showed enthusiasm for

production. Along with boosting agricultural production, the new system allowed

peasants to branch into sideline, industrial, and commercial activities. Given the fact that

20 Michel Oksenberg and Bruce J. Dickson, “The Origins, Processes, and Outcomes of Great Political Reform: A Framework of Analysis,” in Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 249-50.

21 Mark Selden, The Political Economy of Chinese Development (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993), 216.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208

from 1957 to 1988, China’s arable land dropped by 15 percent, and its population rose by

more than 80 percent,22 it was no small achievement that China realized food self-

sufficiency.

At the time of the rural reforms, Deng also abandoned Mao’s principle of self-

reliance, and opened China to the outside world.23 If Deng occasionally showed hesitation

in his domestic reforms, he never had second thoughts in strengthening China’s ties with

the world. Unlike Mao, who had never traveled abroad before 1949 and had only visited

one foreign country — the Soviet Union— twice in his life, Deng realized that economic

development could not be materialized without foreign capital, technology, and markets.

In the early 1980s, China established four Special Economic Zones as “windows on the

world,” hoping they would have ripple effects first on the coastal regions and then on

interior areas. Before long, China was integrated into the world economy. From 1979 to

1991, China absorbed $80 billion worth of foreign loans and investment and imported

$24.6 billion worth of foreign technology and equipment. From 1980 to 1992, the total

volume of foreign trade increased from $38.1 billion to $165.6 billion, which moved

China from the world’s 34th largest trading nation to the 11th. From 1978 to 1992, the

percentage of exports in GNP increased from 4.65 percent to 19.5 percent, which

22 Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social. Political, and Economic Ferment in China (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1990), 30.

23 For Chinese foreign economic relations, see Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209

surpassed the average 12 percent for very large countries.24 Since 1992, China has been

further integrated into the world economy.

Having succeeded in rural reform, Deng shifted his attention to urban reform,

which contained both easy and difficult parts. The easy part was to permit individual

economic activities in urban areas. According to Marxism, if the individual economy is

allowed to develop freely, it will generate capitalism. So during Mao’s era, the individual

economy was discouraged, if not prohibited. Deng’s decision to restore the individual

economy provided opportunities for unemployed and underemployed in urban areas, an

act which not only released the government’s burden of employment, but enhanced

production and commodity circulation.25 Equally important, Deng relaxed restrictions on

population movement. In the years 1960-80 the urban population accounted for 13-15

percent of the total population. Between 1984 and 1987, those living and working in

urban areas soared from 19 to 46 percent of the total population.26 This policy did create

social problems in the cities, but brought more freedom and equality to the vast majority

of the Chinese people.

24 Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 63.

25 Thomas B. Gold identified seven positive function of urban private business: alleviating unemployment, preserving state resources, increasing state revenue, Oiling gaps in the economy, especially in service sector, putting pressure on the public sector, increasing political stability, and facilitating the notion of “one country, two systems.” “Urban Private Business and China’s Reform,” in Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China: The Road to Tiananmen, ed. Richard Baum (New York: Routledge, 1991), 87-89.

26 Selden, The Political Economy of Chinese Development. 219.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210

But the difficult part was to reform the state-owned sector, since this undermined

the planned economy and affected the privileged urban residents. In October 1984, the

party called for an overall reform of the planned economy and the development of a

commodity economy. The measures included granting more autonomy to enterprises,

emphasizing material incentives, utilizing the market mechanisms, separating government

administration from enterprise management, and reforming the price system. The 1987

Thirteenth Party Congress put forth the “initial stage of socialism” thesis, acknowledging

that China was in a low stage of socialism. The practical implication was that China

should focus on developing its forces of production and de-emphasize public ownership

and the planned economy. In September 1988 Deng crossed the Rubicon by calling for

price and wage reform. Price reform would allow markets, not the state, to determine

prices. People’s fear of the unpredictable market led to hoarding, inflation and bank run,

thus scuttling the plan. Until his death, Deng failed to transform the state sector,

especially industry.

Deng’s economic reforms enriched the largest proportion of human beings in

history. The whole world, especially the Chinese people, credits him with this

achievement.27 But the economic reforms had many limitations. First, ownership is still

an issue to be solved. Deng’s policies amounted to the acceptance of the failure of public

ownership. Private ownership is superior to public ownership, not because it is morally

27 Deng, who had been twice named the man of the year by the Time Magazine in 1978 and 1985, was awarded the same title by London* Financial Times in 1992.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211

superior, but because it is technically feasible. As R. H. Tawney cogently puts it, “Private

property is a necessary institution, at least in a fallen world; men work more and dispute

less when goods are private than when they are common. But it is to be tolerated as a

concession to human frailty, not applauded as desirable in itself.”28 The rural reforms

changed the form of agricultural organization, but the state still owns lands, hi the urban

area, the state-run enterprises are still obstacles to further economic reform.

Second, although public ownership turns out to be less conducive to efficiency,

the positive impacts of private ownership should not be exaggerated. Mark Selden

pointed out that the increasing living standards in the countryside could not be solely

attributed to the “responsibility system.” At work were other policy changes, such as huge

increases in crops price in the years 1979-1981, and rural commercialization and

industrialization.29 Sometimes, private ownership may also have a negative impact on

society. Tawney warns that the conversion of efficiency from an instrument into a

primary object would destroy efficiency itself, because cooperation is the condition of

efficiency in a complex civilization.30 Deng’s reforms did not pay enough attention to

public goods, economies of scale, technical advances and the division of labor in many

ways. The mentality of getting rich shifts people’s attention from industry to commerce,

but it is industry, not commerce, which created wealth. In the countryside, the state’s

28 R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926), 32.

29 Selden, The Political Economy of Chinese Development, 216.

30 Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. 283.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212

investment in agriculture dropped from 10.6 percent of overall investment in i978 to 3.3

percent in 1986. Security, health, education and welfare were largely left in the peasants’

hands. Janos Komai found that historic movements resembled a pendulum rather than a

straight line. In the beginning of the transformation process, people wanted to move from

a maximal state to a minimal one. But later generations will possibly strike a balance

between state intervention andlaissezfaire .3I

Last, in transition from a planned economy to a market economy, equality and

equity are possibly at stake. Most of those who get rich are those within the Communist

nomenklatura and those taking advantage of loopholes in the current system. Status and

power brought economic benefits. The reform process was supposed to be in the interests

of the people, but may create conflict between short-term and long-term interests, on the

one hand, and partial and holistic interests, on the other.

Economic reform has its own logic. It was designed to legitimate Communist rule,

but actually undermined the state power and facilitated democratization. First of all, the

economic reform has weakened the state power over Chinese society. Unlike many East

European countries, China did not privatize large state enterprises, but non-state sectors

have grown very fast vis-a-vis state sector. According to Jim Rohwer, state-owned firms

accounted for only 25 percent of China’s total output including agriculture and services;

31 Janos Komai, The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of Hungary (New York: Norton, 1990), 22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213

and their share of industrial output dropped from 78 percent in 1978 to about 50 percent.32

As a result, people’s economic fate is decided more by their local enterprises than by the

central government.

Second, economic reform diverted elites attention from political power alone.

Indeed, power is a permanent scarce resource, but wealth has come to replace power as

the symbol of status in China. The separation of power and wealth stands democracy in

good stead. Now that elites may have choices between making money and seeking power,

the frequency and extent and intensity of power struggles have been greatly reduced.

Third, economic reform led to decentralization. Since the early 1980s, the central

government has gradually lost much of its fiscal authority to local governments.33 China’s

total financial revenues as a proportion of its GNP dropped from 30 percent in 1978 to

less than 12 percent of the country’s GNP in 1994. To put it in perspective, the Chinese

central government’s revenues in 1994 amounted to only about 6.5 percent of GDP, but

the comparable figures in the United States and India were more than 20 percent and 15

percent, respectively.34 Although decentralization is not necessarily desirable, it does limit

32 Jim Rohwer, “China” (a survey article), The Economist (November 28, 1992), 8.

33 One leading figure in pointing out the danger is Shaoguang Wang. See his “The Rise of the Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State Capacity in China,” in The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary, ed. Andrew G. Walder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 87- 113.

34 James A. R. Miles, The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 140, 308.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214

the state power.

Not the least of all, once economic development satisfy people’s basic needs, they

demand freedom and democracy. The early stage of the transition from agrarianism to

industrialism witnessed few cases in which democratic politics and economic liberalism

occurred simultaneously. Based on the mid-1970s situation, Samuel P. Huntington

identified a “zone of transition,” in which a country whose GNP per capita was between

$ 1000 and $3000 would have a chance to undergo democratic transformation.35 It was

against the background of the economic reform that more people called for democracy.

Political Reform

Deng showed an interest in political reform twice. Shortly after he came to power,

he advocated political reform. In December 1978, he said that China should particularly

emphasize democracy, because it had had too little democracy for too long.36 Deng did

plan to fight bureaucraticism, the over-concentration of power, patriarchism, cadres’

lifelong tenure and various prerogatives. His interests stemmed partly from dislike of

Mao’s totalitarianism and partly from his power struggle with Chairman Hua. But Deng

soon shifted his attention to economic reform. Ruan Ming attributed this change to his

success in consolidating power, opposition from conservative leaders, dissident’s

35 Huntington, The Third Wave. 63.

36 Deng, Selected Works. 155.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215

criticism of Deng, and the Solidarity movement in Poland.37

In the summer of 1986, there was renewed interest in political reform. The

progress of the economic reforms made Deng realize the importance of political reform to

economic development. For him, all other reforms depend on the success of the political

reform, because it is human beings who are agents of reform.38 Besides, China’s political

structure did not meet the needs of the economic reforms. Without political change,

economic reform would be impossible to maintain and advance.39

A hybrid of Marxist and Chinese thought, Deng’s view of democracy can be

better understood by examining what he thought democracy should not be. First,

democracy should not jeopardize stability and unity. For Deng, disorder and anarchy had

prevented China from prospering, and left China vulnerable to imperialism.40 During the

Cultural Revolution, mass participation led to a virtual civil war, rather than mass

democracy 41 To distinguish democracy from anarchy, Deng often emphasized democracy

towards the people and dictatorship towards the enemy at the same time.

Second, democracy is not an end, but a means. Deng’s objectives of political

37 Ruan, Deng Xiaoping. 91-103.

38 Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 147.

39 Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 149.

40 Deng. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 165.

41 hi 1980, the National People’s Congress revised the constitution, deleting from Article 45 of the Constitution the provision that citizens “have the right to speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character poster,” because Deng thought that these four rights were abused during the “Cultural Revolution.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 216

reform are three-fold: consolidating the socialist system, developing the socialist

productive forces, and expanding socialist democracy. For Deng, the purpose of

encouraging democracy is “to stimulate the initiative of the people and of the grass-roots

units,”42 which is, in turn, to “develop the productive forces and raise living standards,

thus increasing the strength of our socialist country and consolidating and improving the

socialist system.”43 So democracy was a means to make a strong socialist state. For this

reason, democracy should not stand in the way of economic development.

Last, China will not adopt the Western political system for several reasons. Deng

looked at democracy through the prism of class analysis. A socialist China cannot

embrace bourgeoisie democracy, but should adopt the system of the people’s congress,

democratic centralism, and people’s democracy under the Communist leadership. For

Deng, Western democracy serves bourgeois, especially monopoly capitalists, and

represents no more than multi-party elections and a balance of the three powers.44 Deng

acknowledges that capitalist countries are more efficient in administration and economic

management, but he thinks that the socialist system as a whole is efficient, because a

decision made by the higher level will be put into practice by the lower levels. Deng

argues that China’s vast territories, huge population, numerous nationalities, varied

conditions, and educational backwardness renders it very difficult to hold general

42 Deng. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 151.

43 Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 156.

44 Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 192.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 217

elections.45

From all these, it is not difficult to conclude two things. First, Deng’s political

reforms do not result from respect for human rights, but from pragmatic considerations.

For He Baogang, these considerations include: resolving the authority crisis;

strengthening and enriching the nation; meeting the needs of modernization, especially

economic reform.46 Second, Deng’s political reforms were conducive to democracy, but

were not democratic in the strictest sense of the term. They were meant to be more

liberalization than democratization. What Deng wanted was not a change of the system,

but a change in the system.

Deng’s political reforms raised hopes of democratization, but its failure frustrated

those who advocated democracy. College students organized public demonstrations in

several cities at the end of 1986, demanding more rights, liberties, and welfare. Such

demands did not appeal to ordinary people, and the demonstrations were soon under

control. In the following anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign, Hu Yaobang, the reform-

minded party secretary, was forced to resign. Several leading liberal spokesman,

including Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan, were also dismissed from the party. But the new

party secretary Zhao Ziyang promised more political reform, which would separate the

party and government, separate the government and enterprises, promote decentralization,

institutionalize consultation and dialogue, improve socialist democracy, strengthen the

45 Deng. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 195.

46 He Baogang, “A Critique of the Chinese Paternalistic Model of Democracy,” Issues & Studies (October 1990), 26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218

legal system, and further democratic development in all organizations.

While Deng’s economic reforms attracted the whole world’s attention, his

political reforms deserved more credit than they have received. Let us look at the

following aspects: elections, the legal system, administrative reform, and human rights.

Since the early 1980s, elections to the People’s Congress have been held at the county

level and below. Most of them were quite free. Elections of village leaders took place

after the end of the commune system. By the end of 1991, half of China’s one million

villages had selected the members of the local self-governing committees through some

kind of election.47 Competitive elections were also introduced into the Communist party.

At the 1987 Thirteenth Party Congress, there were more candidates than positions for the

Central Committee. As a result, several conservatives were driven out of office. The party

primaries were instructed to eliminate 5 percent of the candidates as delegates to the

Congress. The elimination rate at the primaries of the 1992 Fourteenth Party Congress

was set at 10 percent, but the final election for the Central Committee members was non

competitive. So election took place in the peripheral areas where party rule was not

threatened. Since then, local elections have become freer throughout the country.

Legal reform was another part of political reform.48 Deng resuscitated police

organs, procuratorates and courts, which had been damaged during the Cultural

47 Chong-Pin Lin with Man-jung Mignon Chan, ‘Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on Democratization,” World Affairs 155 (Winter 1993): 120.

48 For Deng’s legal reform, see, for example, Carlos W. H. Lo, “Deng Xiaoping’s Ideas on Law: China on the Threshold of a Legal Order,” Asian Survey 32 (July 1992): 649-65.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 219

Revolution. A comprehensive criminal code and code of criminal procedure were adopted

in 1979. These codes specified that people could not be prosecuted simply for their

“reactionary ideas.” They paid more attention to “due process of law,” prohibiting

indefinite detention of suspects, promising a speedy and public trial, and dismissing

confession as the sole basis of convictions. The 1982 Constitution reinstated the principle

that “all citizens are equal before the law,” which was included in the 1954 constitution

but was deleted later. Citizens were entitled to freedom of the press, assembly,

association, conscience, and personal correspondence. They were promised inviolability

of home and person and the right to criticize any authority. The 1989 Administrative

Procedure Law enabled citizens to sue the government for the first time, fa 1996,

“counter-revolution” was dismissed as a crime. No doubt, enactment of laws was

different from their enforcement, but the legal reforms have set a high standard and

improved the whole system.

Deng intended to institute political reform along three lines: separating the party

and the government; eliminating bureaucratic inefficiency; devolving some powers to

local authorities.49 All these can be defined as administrative reform. The major obstacle

of political reform was gerontocracy. To facilitate the retirement of older cadres, Deng

first established institutions, such as the CCP Central Advisory Commission (CAC),

allowing them to influence policy making and implementation. He then asked 131 old

guards to retire from the party’s three top apparatuses in September 1985, and finally

49 Deng. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 152-53, 158-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. !

220

abolished the CAC in 1992. As a result, old cadres came to be replaced by younger

professionals. The following statistics are worth quoting:

The average age of CC members in 1977 was 66 years, but a decade later it had dropped to 55. In the 1982-87 period alone, this decrease in the Secretariat was 64 to 56; in the Politburo, 72 to 64; and in the Standing Committee, 74 to 64 years. The portion of college-educated CC members rose, from 1977 to 1987, from 26 percent to 73 percent. In this same decade, the ratio of college-educated Politburo members rose from 23 percent to 67 percent.50

Technocrats and professionals played more important roles. Deng installed a civil

service system and created the Ministry of Personnel in 1988. Hong Yung Lee identified

six characteristics of technocrats. They are experts in their field; are less ideological; tend

to support economic and political reform; are more cosmopolitan, forward- and outward

looking; behave more like a coordinator rather than a politician; and stress technical and

administrative feasibility in policy making. While the quality of cadres changed for the

better, Deng failed to downsize the bureaucracy, which increased from 20 million in 1982

to 29 million by 1988.51

Although the human rights record in Deng’s China was far from satisfactory, it

was far better than that in Mao’s time.52 The Chinese Communist view of human rights

50 Lynn T. White HI, “The End of the Chinese Revolution: A Leadership Diversifies,” in Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng, ed. Victor C. Falkenheim (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 79-80.

51 Hong Yung Lee, “China’s New Bureaucracy?” in State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform, ed. Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (Boulder. C.O.: Westview Press, 1992), 58-60.

52 For an analysis of China’s human rights records, see, for example, R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin and Andrew J. Nathan, Human Rights in Contemporary China. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Ann Kent, Between Freedom and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221

are based on three assumptions. Human rights lie within the sovereignty of each country;

the standard of human rights vary from country to country; the right to subsistence is the

most important one in China.S3 As a socialist country, China tended to emphasize social

and economic rights rather than political and civil ones. As a developing country, Deng’s

China regards the right to survival as the basic right. Nobody doubted Deng’s

achievement in this aspect. By western standards, the record of political and civil rights

were dismal, but the Chinese enjoy more rights and freedom in their everyday life than

ever. Indeed, the state has never relinquished its will and power to suppress dissidents,

but it has mainly kept its hands off ordinary people. Even power struggles among elites

have lost their cruelty. Suffice it to compare the fates of Mao and Deng’s successors. Mao

and Deng had got rid of their two successors. Liu Shaoqi died of persecution, and Lin

Biao died in a plane crash on his flee to the Soviet Union. By contrast, Hu Yaobang and

Zhao Zhiyang did lose their position, but neither suffered physical persecution.

The Legitimacy Crisis

Deng’s reform was designed to resolve the legitimacy crisis of Communist rule.

But reform was a two-edged sword. While economic development and political

liberalization did enhance Communist legitimacy, the reform opened a “pandora’s box”

Subsistence: China and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Andrew J. Nathan, “China: Getting Human Rights Right,” The Washington Quarterly 20 (1997): 135-51.

53 For the Chinese government’s view of human rights, see ‘White Paper on Human Rights in China.” Beijing Review 34 (November 4-10. 1991): 8-45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222

and challenged the Communist rule.54 hi fact, the Communists found a no-win situation in

reform. If reform fails, popular discontent will threaten their legitimacy. If reform

succeeds, civil society will challenge their rule. In the transitional period from a planned

economy to a market economy, people hoped to benefit from both systems, but they

found that they tended to suffer from problems of both systems. As early as 1944,

Fredrich A. Hayek averred:

Both competition and central direction become poor and inefficient tools if they are incomplete; they are alternative principles used to solve the same problem, and a mixture of the two means that neither will really work and that the result will be worse if either system had been consistently relied upon.55

Nothing symbolized the legitimacy crisis of the Communists better than the

Tiananmen Incident of 1989. Modem telecommunications have etched the incident

indelibly on the memory of the world. This tragic incident resulted from a combination of

factors. First, economic reforms caused anxiety and uncertainty. Inflation and

unemployment were almost non-existent in Mao’s time, but overinvestment, price

reform, decreasing revenue, and trade deficits56 had contributed to rampant inflation since

the mid-1980s. Even according to official statistics, the retail price index rose 12.5

54 Mancur Olson, Jr. “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,” Journal of Economic History 23 (December 1963): 529-52. Samuel P. Huntington highlighted the necessity of stability to growth. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). But in the long run, growth leads to stability. Based on statistics of South America between 1946 and 1988, Przeworski find a high correlation between growth and stability. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. 32.

55 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. 42.

56 Between 1984 and 1988, China’s trade deficit totaled $39.57 billion. See Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre. 31.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223

percent in 1985,7 percent in 1986,7.2 percent in 1987, and 18.5 percent in 1988. But the

impact on everyday life was more severe. Amid the overall rise of 7.2 percent in 1987, the

price of all food and that of meat, poultry, and eggs rose 10.1 and 16.5 percent,

respectively. In the first quarter of 1988, prices for nonstaple foods rose 24.2 percent, and

prices of fresh vegetables increased 48.7 percent, hi the first half of 1989 the inflation rate

soared 25.5 percent over the preceding period. The rate in major cities exceeded 40

percent.57 In 1988, surveys showed that at least 14 to 25 percent of the total work force

was “latently unemployed” in many major industrial cities.58 The urban Chinese, who had

enjoyed economic security, found it difficult to face change. The result of a national

survey is revealing. The respondents was asked whether they would switch to a different

job which requires more work, carries a higher chance of unemployment, but has more

chance to increase pay and status. 53.5 percent of respondents said yes, and 39.3 say no.59

It would not be wrong to say that people’s fear of further economic reform set the stage of

political turmoil.

Relative deprivation had struck the vast majority of people. Drawing from the

French Revolution, Tocqueville concludes that a political system may break down amid

improving conditions as a result of rising expectations and eroding traditions. Chinese

57 Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre. 29-30.

58 Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre. 32.

59 Quoted in Martin King Whyte, “Popular Opposition to the Reforms in China,” in Marxism and Capitalism in the People’s Republic of China, ed. Peter P. Cheng (Lanham, M.D.: University Press of America, 1989), 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224

people, whose traditional culture and socialist experience promoted egalitarianism, are

more susceptible to “relative deprivation.” Even if everybody is better off, relative losses

will generate resentment. When a small group of people are better off at the cost of the

vast majority, the resentment ran high. Deng had anticipated that widening gap between

the rich and the poor would create revolution.60 But the Communist party gradually

accepted inequality as an inevitable price of economic development. The relative decline

of status in the public sector vis-a-vis private sector was a major reason for the 1989

protests. Many intellectuals and workers resented the high income of those in the private

sector. According to a 1988 survey conducted in Beijing, individual businessmen earned

about seven times as much as high school teachers; private restaurant owners earned ten

times as much as high school teachers did; many owners of private enterprises earned

more than ten times as much as did college professors.61

If there is any single factor which united the whole movement, that was the

Chinese people’s resentment of corruption. Corruption was nothing new in China, but the

late 1980s witnessed an unprecedented level of it in the history of the Communist

China.62 Owing to their direct and indirect control of scarce resources, many officials

60 Dene. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 184.

61 Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre. 24.

62 See, for example, Alan Liu, “The Politics of Corruption in the People’s Republic of China,” American Political Science Review 77 (September 1983): 602-23; Yan Sun, “The Chinese Protests of 1989,” Asian Survey 31 (August 1991): 762-78; Gong Ting, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, C.T.: Praeger, 1994); and Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism. 1978-1994 (New York: Hill & Wang,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225

feathered their nests at the public’s expense. Since 1985, the so-called “crown prince

party”(tai-zi-dang) have invited resentment. The group consists of a large number of

children and relatives of influential families who were promoted to all kinds of positions

in the government and party apparatus. They not only took a disproportionate share of

political power, but did their best to enrich themselves. Ordinary people found

Communist leaders’ selfishness in this period more intolerable and unforgivable than

their stupidity in Mao’s era.

Political upheavals have often been influenced by people’s mentalities. The year

1989 contained memorable anniversaries: the 40th anniversary of the founding of

Communist China, the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and the 200th

anniversary of the French Revolution. As a result, some Chinese dissidents and reformers

pressed for an amnesty of all political prisoners and further democratic reform. But the

Communist leaders were in no mood to do so. The Chinese people, who usually suppress

their feelings, tend to find the mourning of a dead person a legitimate opportunity to vent

their feelings. Just as the death of Premier Zhou Enlai led to a mass protest against Mao’s

dictatorship in Tiananmen Square five months before Mao’s death, the death of former

party secretary Hu Yaobang on April 15 precipitated the democratic movement in 1989.

With hindsight, we realize that the balance of power was not in favor of those who

participated in the movement. Indeed, Communist China had never witnessed the mass

1996), especially chap. I, “Bureaucratic Capitalism,” 300-45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226

protest in such a dramatic way. The movement swept through all major cities.63 Almost

all urban people sympathized with, if not actively supported, the movement. But the

movement had its limitations, which eluded overseas television audiences.

Students were the mainstay of the 1989 movement. They represented some

interests of ordinary people, and many of them demonstrated admirable heroism and

idealism. But it is unrealistic to expect people who are socialized into an authoritarian

society to pine for democracy or to behave in a democratic way. History provides ample

evidence that those who fought dictators were not necessarily democrats. The student

demonstrators called for negative freedom rather than positive freedom.64 They urged the

government to allow more freedom, to accelerate political reform, and to redress some

socio-economic problems, but they barely demanded general elections and a multiparty

system, let alone the overthrow of the Communist rule. The modest and reasonable

demands might be regarded as their tactics, but did reflect their political consciousness.

Student leaders were more interested in winning political rights and powers for

intellectual elites. Having experienced a relative decline of their status and faced

uncertain future, they hoped to participate more in politics. While they should get credit

63 See Jonathan Unger, ed., The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces (Armonk. N.Y.: Sharpe, 1991).

64 For balanced views of the student movement, see Craig J. Calhoun, Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Daniel Kelliher, “Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses: Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement,” Comparative Politics (July 1993): pp. 379-96; and Lei Guang, “Elusive Democracy: Conceptual Change and the Chinese Democracy Movement, 1978-79 to 1989,” Modem China 22 no. 4 (October 1996): pp. 417-47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227

for challenging the authoritarian regime, they fought among themselves over power,

resources, and strategies. Feng Congde, a leading student leader, confessed that it was a

Chinese tragedy that young and immature students led the democratic movement.

Urban people sympathized with the students, and some of them even joined the

demonstrations. But no single strike was reported throughout the country. At the

beginning, the students hoped to exclude the ordinary people from the movement to

demonstrate the purity of the student movement, but later they did try to coopt workers

into the movement. But worker’s attitudes and behavior were mainly determined by their

socio-economic status. Shortly after the Communists took power, workers earned about

50 percent more than did peasants. In the late 1970s, they earned four to six times as

much as did peasants. Unlike peasants, workers enjoyed life-long health and welfare

benefits. Deng’s reforms decreased the relative income and status of urban residents

including workers. In 1986 the government initiated a program to replace lifetime

employment. Despite the “paradise lost,” the urban residents still received subsidies for

food, housing, and health. Their reliance on the state prevented them from actively

participating in the movement. By contrast, the private sector pitched in. In Beijing, the

Flying Tiger Motor Brigade, which comprised self-employed businessmen, used their

motorcycles to provide communications and logistical support. Wan Runnan, a well-

known private businessman, donated $25,000 and electronic broadcasting equipment to

the demonstrators.

As in the 1911 Revolution, rural people did not participate in the movement.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

228

While students leaders were eager to solicit international support, they never attempted to

mobilize rural people. This was a grave mistake. Rural people had been shortchanged in

Communist China. Compared with urban residents, they contributed more to the

Communist victory, but reaped far fewer benefits. When there were crises in cities, the

government transferred the burden to the countryside. Twenty million urban residents

were sent to the countryside in the aftermath of the 1959-61 famine, and seventeen

million urban youth faced the same fate after 1964. Peasants’ large numbers and lack of

organization, which fits Marx’s description of the French peasantry as a “sack of

potatoes,”65 doomed them to be often ignored and exploited. At the initial stage of the

reforms, rural people did raise their living standards, but soon they lost their advantages

and fared worse than urban residents again.66

Most important of all, Chinese leaders had no intention to step down. Vilfredo

Pareto provides two indications of the decline of elites. They are softer in defending their

power, but become more greedy and corrupt.67 But the decreasing strength of the

dominant class goes hand in hand with an increase in violence.68 This is certainly true of

the Chinese situation in 1989. Indeed, the Communists showed unusual disunity in

65 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 608.

66 For the problems facing rural people, see Jean C. Oi, “Partial Market Reform and Disintegrative Corruption in Urban China,” in Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China, ed. Baum, 143-61.

67 Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites intro. Hans L. Zetterberg (Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1986), 59.

68 Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites. 71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

229

dealing with the students. Both reformers and conservatives tried to take advantage of the

occasion to strengthen their own positions. But neither groups were willing to hand over

their power.

The democratic movement was drowned in blood. Although the repression might

temporarily stabilize the situation, legitimacy crisis became far more severe. Before long,

Deng regained a great deal of legitimacy. Such legitimacy resulted from Deng’s sound

policy, Chinese self-reflection, and the international situation. Economic performance has

been the single most important basis on which authoritarianism seeks legitimation.69

Deng knew this very well, and deepened and broadened economic reform against the will

of conservative forces. In the early 1992, Deng made his famous southern tour, calling for

more reform and emphasizing a combination of the market with socialism. He denied that

any planned economy was socialist and any market economy was capitalist. For him, both

planning and the market were means of controlling economic activity, and the latter could

also serve socialism.70 At this point, Deng completed his ideological retreat from the 1979

“four cardinal principle,” through the 1982 notion of “socialism with Chinese

characteristic,” and the 1987 concept of the “initial stage of socialism,” to open rejection

of the dichotomy between capitalism and socialism. Deng’s economic reforms made

some remarkable successes. In 1995, five years earlier than planned, China fulfilled the

target of quadrupling the country’s 1980 GNP. China eliminated poverty in the main and

69 Stephen White, “Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy,” World Politics 38 (April 1986): 463.

70 Miles, The Legacy of Tiananmen. 78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230

achieved relatively high standard in terms of health, nutrition, life expectancy, and

literacy rate.

The ordinary people found no realistic alternative to the Communist rule. The

Tiananmen Incident made the Chinese people realize that Communist rulers would not

hesitate to shed blood to defend their power. Since they still monopolized the legitimate

use of power, and co-opted most elites, it was unrealistic to overthrow them. The only

alternative to Communist rule seemed to be chaos, the worst nightmare for everybody. At

the later stage of the democratic movement, most Chinese observers and participants

concluded that the crisis was so destructive that any solution would be better than none at

all. Drastic changes undermine the social fabric and require excessive force to redress. As

Edmund Burke points out, “Rage and phrensy will pull down more in half an hour, than

prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years.”71 As a result,

conservatism has dominated China ever since. No indication is better than the fact that

the dissidents were marginalized by mainstream society. They were no longer treated as

intelligent and courageous heros, but as annoying and egoistic trouble-makers.

The international environment after 1989 also reinforced the Chinese belief that

economic development should be put before democratization. Since 1989, Communist

rulers have adopted neo-authoritarianism.72 This ideology draws on the experiences of the

71 Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine, Two Classics of the French Revolution: Reflections on the Revolution in France and The Rights of Man Anchor Books (New York: Doubleday, 1973), 183.

72 For neo-authoritarianism, see, for example, Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong, ‘The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231

“four little dragons”—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.73 According to it,

economic development requires enlightened dictatorship, and development should

precede democracy. Equally important, the Russian experience convinced the Chinese

that gradual reform was better than shock therapy. By embracing both democracy and

capitalism in a short period, the Russians have produced political instability and

economic decline. The Chinese perception may well be wrong,74 but has dominated the

Chinese thinking ever since.

Concluding Remarks

Economic development and political democratization are both desirable. But good

things do not always come in tandem, and sometimes may even compete with each other.

Deng preferred economic development to political democratization. This decision no

Critique,” Asian Survey 30 (November 1990): 1099-1117; and Ting Gong and Feng Chen, “Neo-authoritarian Theory in Mainland China.” Issues & Studies (January 1991): 84-98.

73 For the East Asian Model, see Charmers Johnson, M1TI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), and “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Govemment-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” in The Political Economy of East Asian Industrialization, ed. Frederic C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 136-64. Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

74 See, for example, Edward Friedman, “Is China a Model of Reform Success?” chap. in National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1995), 188-207.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232

doubt appealed to the Chinese people. China’s economic backwardness, undemocratic

traditions, and Deng’s political liberalization alleviated people’s desire for democracy.

But the economic reforms could not be deepened without political reform. Deng

did institute political reform twice. They were more administrative than democratic, and

represented a change in system rather than a change of system. But Deng unmistakably

parted company with Mao’s totalitarianism, and brought about a great deal of political

liberalization. Moreover, economic development has paved the way for democratization.

It has reduced the state power over the society, created an autonomous economic realm,

and motivated better-fed and better-educated people to demand more freedom and rights.

Deng’s reform was intended to legitimate Communist rule, but when it suffered a

setback, it actually created a legitimacy crisis, as reflected in the 1989 Tiananmen

Incident. After Deng’s repression, Communist China focused more on economic

development to regain legitimacy, and succeeded in doing so. Since then, the Chinese

leaders and people seem to have reached a consensus that it is better to follow the East

Asian model than to repeat the Russian mistake. As a result, economic development has

continued to take precedence over political democratization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 7

EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION

The most obvious facts are the most easily forgotten.

Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism

China’s failure to achieve democracy in the 20th century is not accidental. The

concluding chapter provides an overall analysis of why China lacks democracy and makes

predictions of what will happen to China’s democratic process. The previous chapters

concentrate on demonstrating the importance of historical sequence, but a better

understanding requires more than an examination of process, and demands an analysis of

the Chinese, the subject, and democracy, the object.

The Importance of Sequence

China’s political development in the 20th century resembled a long march. The

Long March originated from the Communist defeat, comprised various experiences, and

ended in a remote but safe place. China’s political development stemmed from the

decline of Chinese civilization, experienced twists and turns, and ended in an

undemocratic, but promising stage. This long march is a set of variations upon a theme.

The theme consisted of two linked motifs. The first motif is in the major key, which

233

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i

234

demand a strong state to unify, defend and develop China. The second motif is in the

minor, which calls for a democratic state to ensure people’s right and liberty.1 While

historical legacies, local forces, and the world system set constraint on the

democratization process, socialist value and economic development represent choices

which do not emphasize democracy. But all these five factors highlight the first motif and

downplay the second one.

Unlike the West, whose democratization process was indigenous, the Chinese

process had foreign origins. It is China’s failure to meet the foreign challenge which

made the Chinese conclude that democracy was the best political system to pursue

national wealth and power. But no foreign countries imposed democracy on China, as

they did with former fascist Germany and Japan after Worldn, War or bestowed

democracy on China, as Britain did to its former colonies. So the Chinese

democratization process represents efforts to graft a foreign ideology onto Chinese

reality.

China’s historical legacies do not lend itself to democratization. With the possible

exception of Legalism, China’s traditional political doctrines did not advocate tyranny,

but preached benevolence towards people. However, democratic ideas were rare. Few

doctrines advocated elections of rulers or defended human rights unequivocally. The

Chinese traditional political system did not lack political wisdom, as testified by the civil

1 This musical metaphor is borrowed from J. H. Shennan, Liberty and Order in Early Modem Europe: The Subject and the State. 1650-1800 (London: Longman, 1986), ix.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235

service system. Hereditary rulers had little intention to be despotic, and the traditional

technology of communication and transportation, and vast territory excluded the

possibility of a totalitarian system in China. But as a whole, the traditional political

systems was authoritarian—paternalistic at best, and despotic at worst. China witnessed its

own tyrannies, but when tyrannies passed certain limits, people rose to rebellion. Chinese

history was characterized by the “dynastic cycle,” in which one dynasty replaced another

one, but none of them was democratic.

After the 1911 Revolution, the oldest uninterrupted civilization on earth embraced

democratic republicanism. Although republicanism replaced monarchism, the revolution

was very much part of the “dynastic cycle.” The decline of the Qing dynasty was reflected

and reinforced by the rise of local forces. The major task of the new republic was to

reestablish central authority. Partly out of personal ambition and partly out of national

necessity, Yuan Shih-kai proceeded to consolidate state power, and made remarkable

success. But his unsuccessful monarchical scheme tarnished his reputation, and after his

death China lapsed into warlordism. The anarchy under warlordism made a strong and

unified state a necessity and a virtue. Yuan’s dictatorship and subsequent warlordism

made the Chinese disillusioned with democratic republicanism. Sun Yat-sen serves as a

good example. He never gave up democratic ideals, but gradually deflated the importance

of democratic system and deemed it premature for the Chinese to adopt democracy. He

finally relied on the Soviet Russia to achieve China’s unification.

To turn ancient Chinese civilization into a modem state was the task facing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236

Chiang Kai-shek after his symbolic unification of China. However, the modem world

system characterized by capitalism and political power militated against the Chinese

democratization process. To survive in such a world required a strong state, but not

necessarily a democratic one. Japanese aggression in 1931 represented the worst impact

of the world system on China. It had a mixed impact on Chinese democratization.

National survival undermined the call for democracy and human rights, but facilitated

cooperation between the Nationalists and the Communists. The task of nation building

against domestic and foreign forces overwhelmed Chiang’s regime so that it was left with

little energy to solve China’s socio-economic problems. The Anti-Japanese War allowed

the Communists to grow into a formidable challenger to the Nationalists. The Cold War

finally set the stage for the Chinese Civil War, which ended with a Communist victory.

The negative impact of the world system led China to seek isolation from the

capitalist world. The Communist objective was to build a prosperous and powerful

country. Shortly after the Communist rise to power, Benjamin Schwartz correctly

regarded Chinese communism as an expression of Chinese nationalism.2 Unlike the

Republican and the Nationalist eras, in which Chinese leaders at least paid lip service to

the ideal of liberal democracy, Mao’s era witnessed China’s pursuit of socialist

democracy, which emphasized socio-economic equality. Mao’s failure in his economic

policy shifted his attention to politics. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao encouraged

2 Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communist and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237

the mass democracy, which meant a mass participation in state affairs, but people did not

have real power to select rulers or to influence policy. Mao’s rule became totalitarian in

the true sense of the term.

Mao’s failure to enrich the country and his abuse of human rights determined that

China should pay more attention to economic development and political liberalization.

This was precisely Deng’s policy. As a Communist, Deng never embraced liberal

democracy. He did break with Mao’s totalitarianism, but his attempts to institute political

reform were short-lived, and focused on rationalizing the bureaucracy. What interested

Deng was economic development, and he did succeed in enriching the largest number of

people in human history. But economic development unleashed forces against the central

state, and even created a legitimacy crisis. Deng cracked down on the 1989 democratic

movement, but he further pushed for economic reform in 1992. Since then, Chinese

leaders and people seem to have reached a consensus that they would imitate the East

Asian model, but not follow in Russia’s footsteps.

Despite distinctive features of each era, there are several common characteristics

in all these eras. First of all, all eras witnessed the rule of men rather than the rule of law.

Twentieth-century China attests to Carlyle’s dictum that “History is the biography of

great men.” Paramount leaders—Yuan, Chiang, Mao, and Deng-dominated China’s

political stage. The warlord period is an exception which proves the rule. Without a

paramount leader, China suffered from chaos. The emergence of a particular paramount

leader depended on his ability to tackle the major problem of his time. But in many

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238

senses, they have outlived their usefulness. Yuan died in office even though he was

condemned for his monarchial schemes. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to resign three

times, but he held power until his death in 1975 and even handed it over to his son in

Taiwan. Mao’s wisdom in leading China’s economic development was doubted in the

late 1950s, and his totalitarian rule lost credibility after Lin Biao incident in 1971, but he

stayed in power until he died in 1976. Deng was unique in maintaining his leadership

without an official title for a long time. Lying on a deathbed for his last three years, Deng

still occupied the paramount leadership. So what matters in Chinese politics was not the

passing of solar years, but rather generational time.3

Second, modem Chinese rulers could not exercise paternalistic rule. Human

histories do not lack paternalistic rule. Even John Stuart Mill and John Rawls permit

paternalism, or despotic democracy, to occur under certain conditions.4 But Chinese

paramount leaders were neither well-educated nor secure enough to exercise paternalistic

rale. Except Deng who was bom in 1903, other leaders were bom in the 19th century.

None of them had good modem education. Without it, they were more of prisoners of the

Chinese tradition, hence denied advantage in leading the drive for modernization. More

important, unlike traditional rulers, whose births secured their legitimacy, modem rulers

3 Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. 21.

4 John Stuart Mill argues for the possibility of a legitimate “benevolent despotism.” See Gerald F. Gaus, The Modem Liberal Theory of Man (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 221. John Rawls argues for two stipulations necessary for paternalistic rule. See his A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 250.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239

had to rely on their followers to maintain their positions. So even though they know what

is best for the nation, their vested interests might prevent them from taking the best

course. For example, Sun’s doctrine no doubt made Chiang realize the importance of the

people’s livelihood, but the reliance of Chiang’s regime on landlords made it difficult to

institute land reform on the mainland. The fact that Chiang started land reform shortly

after he settled in Taiwan testified that vested interests sometimes made willing rulers

unable to serve national interests.

Third, the Chinese elites always tinkered with political systems for their own

benefits. Since the breakdown of the Qing dynasty, the Chinese have been searching for a

suitable political form. Lucian Pye finds that China has a mentality of “wanting the best”

in their commercial negotiations.5 This is no less true of Chinese political system. The

establishment of Asia’s first republic, Chiang’s flirtation with Fascism, Mao’s adoption

of socialism, and Deng’s tacit acceptance of neo-authoritarianism are all relevant

examples. But in seeking a new political form, the Chinese elites demonstrated a

tendency of utilizing the system to their own interest, rather than national interests. Recall

that the parliamentary system was dropped because the constitutional framers did not

want Song Jiaoren to become prime minister; and when Yuan Shih-kai became president,

the framers installed a parliamentary system. When the Nationalists established a national

government at Canton in 1925, it was designed to be a cabinet system, but when Chiang

5 Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles (New York: Quorum Books, 1982), 38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240

unified China in 1928, a presidential system was installed, hi 1931 the cabinet system was

restored until it was replaced by the presidential system.6 Communist China promulgated

four constitutions (1954, 1975, 1978, and 1983), and treated them more as political

programs than basic law.7 China seems to support Durkheim’s observation that those

societies in which political revolutions are most frequent did not possess the greatest

capacities for change, but retained their basic traditions.8

Not the least of all, China’s political thinking remained very much the same.

Womack found the following common themes in modem China. The moral obligation is

to serve the people, whose welfare constitutes the test of regime legitimacy; China should

be unitary and centralized, and disunity means chaos and disorder; intellectuals have a

governing mission; self-discipline and moral education, rather than institutions of

external control, are counted on to control government; community take precedence over

individuals.9 If a political system can be compared to a computer, Chinese political

system after 1911 contains democratic hardware, but undemocratic software. It has been

6 For the changes in the Nationalist political system, see Suisheng Zhao, Power by Design: Constitution-Making in Nationalist China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).

7 The choice between presidential and parliamentary system on the one hand and the choice between unitary and federal system on the other have been the two major institutional controversies troubling Chinese politicians since the early Republican era. Paul M.A. Linebarger, Djang Chu, and Ardath W. Burks, Far Eastern Government and Politics: China and Japan (Princeton. N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956), 141.

8 Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory. 203.

9 Womack, “In Search of Democracy,” 59-60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241

democratic in form, but dictatorial in content. While the people could not select their

rulers or to influence policy, the governments often arbitrarily violated people’s liberty

and rights.

The Role of Power

Historical sequences were not in favor of Chinese democratization, but did not

make it impossible. The success and failure of democratization finally hinges on Chinese

preferences and power relations among different social forces. Regardless of their social

status or ideological persuasion, modem Chinese share the same undemocratic traditions

and cherish the same goal of achieving national wealth and power. This formed a typical

Chinese attitude toward democracy. Hao Chang’s analysis of Liang Qichao may well be

applied to most Chinese in this century:

But since he viewed democracy basically from a collectivistic and utilitarian point of view, his democratic convictions did not exert as much check on his inclination to statism as might be anticipated in the context of Western liberal tradition. Thus without the governance of traditional moral values and without the control of Western liberal values, concern only with the state and its rationalization always carried the possibility of political authoritarianism.10

When the Chinese say that they like democracy, they are not telling a lie. Human

preferences are diverse, but not equally intensive. More often than not, what determines

the intensity of preference is the utility of desideratum. A. H. Maslow identifies five basic

human needs: physiological, safety, love, esteem and self-actualization in a descending

10 Chang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China. 298.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242

order of prepotency. For him, the more basic the need is, the more powerful it is.11 As

individuals, the Chinese are more concerned about satisfying their basic human needs,

and as citizens they craze national prosperity and power. So democracy seems a luxury to

China.

Specifically, Chinese lukewarm attitude towards democracy was determined by a

trinity of poverty, weakness, and populousness. Since the Chinese have been groaning

under the yoke of poverty, they cherish economic prosperity more than anything else. Sun

Yat-sen thought that the Europeans’ longing for liberty is similar to the Chinese desire for

fortune. The Chinese government claimed that the right to livelihood and the right to

development are the most important things, and the Chinese people certainly buy this

argument. Poverty motivates people to scramble for scare resources, a process which may

cause waste, undermine the social fabric, and create foul play. James Scott characterizes

an important aspect of Malaysian politics as the “competition for a constant pie.” Edward

C. Banfield characterizes the dominant ethic of a Southern Italian community as “amoral

familism,” whose precept is “Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear

family; assume that all others will do likewise.” Lucian W. Pye describes the dominant

tone of Chinese public institutions as envy and jealousy instead of selflessness as

11 A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” in Twentieth Century Psychology, ed. Philip Lawrence Harriman (New York: Philosophy Library, 1946), 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243

preached.12 So poverty not only diverts people’s attention from democracy, but makes it

hard to organize society.

China’s low status in the world system led China to demand a strong state. Since

the Opium War, China has faced the danger of being colonized or divided up. The

Japanese invasion confirmed that long-standing fear. Even when China was united in the

Mao’s era, two hostile superpowers successively made the Chinese circle their wagon. In

adversity, people want and need a strong state. It is not accidental that socialism came to

Russia after World War I, to East Europe after World Warn, and to China after the Civil

War. Fascism came to Italy, Germany and Japan during the terrible interwar period. Even

in the U.S., the New Deal followed the “Great Depression.” Amid foreign challenges,

domestic disturbance, and modernization process, the Chinese leaders and people

demanded a strong government which often sacrifices individual freedom and human

rights.

John Maynard Keynes once said that “The great events of history are often due to

secular changes in the growth of population and other fundamental economic causes,

which, escaping by their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are

attributed to the follies of statesmen or the fanaticism of atheists.”13 If there is any

12 Sun, San Min Zhu 1.117. James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 94. Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, LL.: Free Press, 1958), 85. Lucian W. Pye, ‘Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge,” Asian Survey 30 (April 1990): 335.

13 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Howe, 1920), 14-15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. t

244

invisible hand which controls the Chinese political development, it is the growth of

population. In this century, China has tripled its already huge population to almost 1.3

billion. A large population has negative impacts on political development. It not only

contributes to poverty, but also provides little incentive for a democratization process.

The larger the number of individuals who are required to provide a public good, the less

likely they are to do so. This results either from rational calculation, as testified by the

prisoner’s dilemma, or from mere negligence, as represented by the saying that

“everybody’s business is nobody’s business.”

Separately and together, all these factors compromised the Chinese preference for

democracy. But it is power relations among different social forces which “most

importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize, and then maintain itself

even in the face of adverse conditions.”14 By social forces we mean interest groups in

society. Two factors determine the formation of social forces: socio-economic interests

and political beliefs. Usually, socio-economic interests are determined by the place of a

particular group in society. Political beliefs, which are heavily affected by socio

economic interests, has its distinctive features. According to Robert A. Dahl, three factors

chiefly affect political beliefs. They are the amount to which people are exposed to the

political idea, the relative prestige of a particular political idea, and the extent to which

the political idea is consistent with previous ideas and experience.15 The Chinese, rulers

14 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 5.

15 Dahl. Polvarchv. 185.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245

and ruled alike, had similar utilitarian views of democracy, so what mainly determines

their attitudes towards democracy are their socio-economic interests.

The democratization process depends on the interaction among the following

three groups: ruling elites, opposition elites, and ordinary people. Like any ruler, Chinese

rulers would not give up their power voluntarily. Power is an absolute scarce resource in

any society, and is an effective and legitimate instrument to redistribute resources. Amid

economic backwardness, a political career is very attractive. The high payoffs, in terms of

both rewards and punishments, makes politics a zero-sum game, and militates against the

spirit of “live, and let live.” Such an atmosphere is a hotbed for despots, but not

democrats. Seymour Martin Lipset notes,

Comparative politics suggest that the more the sources of power, status and wealth are concentrated in the state, the harder it is to institutionalize democracy. Under such conditions the political struggle tends to approach a zero-sum game in which the defeated lose all.16

Opposition elites might be credited with fighting tyranny and advocating

democracy, but all those fighting tyranny are not democrats, and most of them are tyrants

in the making. Amid ruthless power struggles, end often justifies means. When the

opposition elites Finally take power, the sunken cost has been so high that they will deem

it justifiable not to share power.

The middle class and intellectuals figure prominently as possible opposition elites.

The middle class desired democracy not because of its high-mindedness, but because of

16 Seymour Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review 59 (February 1994): 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246

its high stake in modem society. Its willingness and its power to challenge authorities

made it the backbone of modem democracy. This group, however, has been weak in

China. They tended to curry favor with rulers, but did not form an opposition, hi the

Republican era, the middle class became active in defending its self-interest and in

participating in politics, hi Nationalist China, the state either exploited or allied with

them. In Mao’s China, the middle class was eliminated. During the Dengist era, it

resurfaced. At the beginning, most of them werede classes, such as unemployed people

or even former criminals. But with the private sector booming, many young, talented, and

well-educated people joined the middle class. They are no longer stigmatized, but rather

glorified. But they are still too weak to wrest substantial concessions from the authorities.

Intellectuals constitute a special force in China. They include, as X. L. Ding points

out, both ruling and opposition elites. Unlike intelligentsia in Russia, Chinese

intellectuals inherited many traits of traditional literati. They are fond of politics, believe

in meritocracy, take a moralistic rather than a technical view of politics, and tend to be

dogmatic. Timothy Cheek says that most Chinese intellectuals have yet to make the

transition from “priests” serving the interest of the state to independent professionals. But

they are not saints.17 Their discontent with the existing government results less from

17 X. L. Ding defines counter-elites as “the well-educated social strata who were deeply involved in politics and dated to voice criticism and dissent against the Communist regime.” See his The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis. 1977-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 44; Timothy Cheek, “From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State under the CCP,” in Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modem China: Learning from 1989. ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1992), 124-45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247

democratic ideals than from their self-interest. Lee Feigon’s socio-economic explanation

of the students in the late 1910s applies to the later period:

Proud of their position as intellectuals and yet unable to take advantage of the new commercial opportunities in Chinese society, they felt particularly resentful of their lowly situation and of those around them who were advancing because of material or mercenary interests.18

It is no exaggeration to say that Chinese intellectuals are mainly dependent on the state,

and that they have not been as democratic as they claim to be.

While ruling elites lacks the intention of being democratic, the mass lacks both

intentions and capabilities. The mass may need democracy, but do not necessarily want or

demand democracy. For elitist theorists, the mass’s apathy and elites’ greed for power are

embedded in human nature.19 The mass has no burning passion for voting, and tend to

tolerate injustice unless it is excessive. Well-organized rulers have lots to lose in a power

struggle; ill-organized people gain very little even if they win, and may risk their lives if

they lose. Russell Hardin mentions that cooperation to oppose a loss may be easier than

cooperation to support a gain.20 According to a survey conducted in 1987, 26 percent of

peasants, 21 percent of or workers and 11 percent of intellectuals thought that “China

18 Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 114.

19 For classical elitist theories, see Robert Michels, Political Parties: C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); Mosca, The Ruling Class: Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1935): and Sociological Writings.

20 Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 62-63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248

does not need democracy right now.” 33 percent of peasants, 27 percent of workers and

13 percent of intellectuals would “listen to leaders,” in case there were different views.21

The result proves Seymour Lipset’s argument that lower class demonstrate more tendency

of authoritarianism than upper class.22

More often than not, the mass represents heterogenous groups, which compete

with one another for official favors, rather than ganging up against rulers. For example,

urban residents in Communist China enjoy prerogatives, and stand to lose at the initial

stage of democratization. Peasants are the least advantaged group in China, but it is a sad

reality that those who suffer most from tyranny might be the basis of this oppression. Jean

Chesneaux’s comments on the peasant’s role in Chinese history applies to Chinese

democratization:

It would be wrong to overemphasize the positive contribution of the peasant movements to the history of China. They may have added to the difficulties of the imperial regime, they may have obstructed the designs of the West and hastened the fall of the dynasty; but they were never capable of putting China on a new historical path, more favorably to their own interests. They did not, nor were they able to, produce a revolutionary programme or a revolutionary solution.23

For all these, it is safe to conclude that the Chinese preference for a strong state trump

their desire for democracy, and that power relations among China itself are not conducive

to democracy.

21 Min Qi, zhong-guo zheng-zhi wen-hua [Chinese Political Culture] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshi, 1989), 179, 190.

22 Lipset, “Working-class Authoritarianism,” chap. in Political Man. 87-126.

23 Jean Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China. 1840-1949 trans. C. A. Curwen (London: Norton, 1973), 75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

249

The Limitations of Democracy

The Westerners are eager to export democracy, but reluctant to export high-tech.

By contrast, the Chinese are eager to import high-tech, but reluctant to import democracy.

This interesting phenomenon prompts us to look at the limitations of democracy itself.

Specifically speaking, democracy as a human ideal has not realized its potential;

democracy as a means is not necessarily effective; and democracy as an alternative to

traditional systems faces obstacles.

Democracy embodies two different human values: liberty and equality, but they

do not necessarily see eye to eye with each other. Robert A. Nisbet describes their

incompatibility as the basic principle of the conservative philosophy. While liberty aims

at the protection of individuals and family property, equality points to redistribution of

material and immaterial values of a community.24 Generally speaking, while liberty

highlights the right to be different, equality sets store by similarity. The privileged

demand liberty, and the disadvantaged crave equality. Historically, while the Anglo-

American conception stresses liberty, their French and Russian counterparts emphasize

equality.

Democracy in this world is political in nature. Adam Przeworski points out,

“Democracy restricted to the political realm has historically coexisted with exploitation

24 Robert A. Nisbet, Conservatism: Dream and Reality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250

and oppression at the workplace, within the schools, within bureaucracies, and within

families.”25 Even in the political field, democracy is not substantive, but formal. For

Weber, people never govern, but are governed. Democratization changes the method of

leader selection and of popular influence, but does not necessarily allow people a more

active role in government.26 In studying four seminal works of rational choice theories,27

Emily Hauptmann finds two conflicting positions:

On the one hand, rational choice theorists identify democracy with honoring individual choice, a norm they believe has been overshadowed by pursuing what to their minds are the dubious goals of securing the common good or increasing popular participation. On the other hand, they also conclude that the choices citizens are given are not worth making because they are either too insignificant individually to make any difference or are offered and counted in ways that end up distorting the very things that were supposed to be honored.28

What eclipses popular rule are two factors.29 One is that interest groups play a

25 Adam Przeworski, “Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” chap. in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. 63.

26 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 985.

27 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); and Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action.

28 Emily Hauptmann, Putting Choice before Democracy: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 4-5.

29 The two factors are highlighted by Marx and Weber, respectively. For a comparison of their views of democracy, see Ira J. Cohen, “The Underemphasis on Democracy in Marx and Weber,” in A Weber-Marx Dialogue, ed. Robert J. Antonio and Ronald M. Glassman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 274-95.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 251

very important role in democracy. Nobody denies that the rich have been more willing

and able to exercise political influence than the poor. Modem evidences confirms that the

disadvantaged think it unworthy to pay the costs of participation.30 The other is the rise of

modem bureaucracy. Weber points out that modem democracy and bureaucracy go hand

in hand with each other.31 But democracy advocates equality, participation, and

individuality; bureaucracy promotes hierarchy, specialization and impersonality.

Democracy as an instrument is not necessarily effective in pursuing national

power and wealth. For Andrew Nathan, democracy can perform the following four

functions: regulating conflict, legitimizing government, improving the quality of

government, and encouraging stability. But an enlightened despotism can do the same

things. Based on his cross-national study, Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. rinds that democratic and

undemocratic nations experience about the same violent mass conflict. Many scholars,

such as Leonard Binder and Robert A. Dahl, are worried about the conflict between

democracy and state capacity. For James Coleman, egalitarianism tends to create

excessive demands, aggravate the integrative task of the state, and heightens disaffected

groups’ revolutionary potential.32 Moreover, democracy does not necessarily bring about

30 Almond and Verba, ed., The Civic Culture Revisited. 83.

31 Weber, Economy and Society. 983.

32 Nathan, Chinese Democracy. 224-25; Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (New York: Wiley. 1973), 130; Leonard Binder, “The Crises of Political development,”in Binder and others, Crises and Sequences in Political Development. 57; Robert A. Dahl, “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation.’’ Political Science Quarterly 109 (1994): 23- 34; and James S. Coleman, “The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 252

economic development, the most important objective all over the world.33 In fact,

participation and equality can conflict and compete with political stability and

socioeconomic development. Weiner says that a democratic system had to divert more

scarce resources from developmental activities to welfare and distribution programs.34

What further impedes the introduction of democracy is traditional mentalities. The

established order, says Michael Levin, usually has an upper hand over calls for change,

because it is rational to follow customs which have accumulated wisdom of many

generations.35 Jane Mansbridge distinguishes between “unitary” and “adversary”

democracy. While unitary democracy was practiced in hunter-gatherer societies spanning

more than 99 percent of our existence, adversary democracy appeared only after the

emergence of the nation state and the market economy. Unitary democracies emphasizes

common interests, consensus, face-to-face assembly, and mutual respect. Adversary

democracies assume conflicting interests, and emphasizes majority rule, the secret ballot,

Capacity,” in Binder and others, Crises and Sequences in Political Development. 95.

33 Two lead articles addressing the relationship between development and democracy in a book find no correlation between them. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” 3-24; John E. Roemer, “On the Relationship between Economic Development and Political Democracy,” 28-55, in Democracy and Development ed. Amiya Kumar Bagchi (New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with the International Economic Association, 1995).

34 Weiner, “Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process,” in Binder and others, Crises and Sequences in Political Development. 185.

35 Michael Levin, The Specter of Democracy: The Rise of Modem Democracy as Seen bv its Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 43.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

253

and the equal protection of members’ interests.36 The differences between agrarian and

industrial society are reflected in topologies of status vs. contract (Maine),Gemeinschaft

vs. Gesellschaft (Toennies), mechanical vs. organic (Durkheim), traditional vs. rational

(Weber), and town vs. metropolis (Simmel). For Erich Fromm, our brain lives in the 20th

century, but our heart remains in the Stone age. So “modem man still is anxious and

tempted to surrender his freedom to dictators of all kinds, or to lose it by transforming

himself into a small cog in the machine, well fed, and well clothed, yet not a free man but

an automaton.”37 As a result, democratization, like modernization, poses a challenge to

human mentality.

The acceleration of the democratization process does not help. In Western Europe,

democratization is a slow and gradual process. The franchise has been expanded from the

aristocracy to the gentry and bourgeoisie, to all male adults, and finally to women. It is

easy for democracy to emerge when the expansion of political competition precedes the

expansion of political participation. Nowadays it is difficult to deny any group of adult

population franchise. Besides, state functions have greatly expanded in modem time.

Adam Smith identified three functions of the state: national defense, administration of

justice, and some public works. But today’s states are no longer minimal.38

36 Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980), x.

37 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1969), xii.

38 For the modem state, see Bertrand Badie and Pierre Bimbaum, The Sociology of the State trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature. Development and Prospects (Stanford: Stanford

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254

In sum, democracy as a human ideal has not fully lived up to our expectations. As

a means, it is not famous for its effectiveness. Since modem democratic systems are alien

to traditional society, and the democratization process has been telescoped into a short

period, democratization may encounter huge mental resistance.

Prospects for Democracy

Making predictions in social sciences is risky, because future developments are

determined by numerous, complicated, changing, and interacting factors. Besides, self-

fulfilling prophesy may alter the future in some ways.39 Yet to identify possible

developments is both possible and necessary: possible because historical events do not

come out of the blue, and necessary because the purpose of understanding the world is to

remold it. There are two tendencies for scholars to make predictions. One is to mistake

the past for the future; the other is to mistake the present for the future.40

There lack no optimistic41 or pessimistic42 predictions about the Chinese

University Press, 1990).

39 According to Robert K. Merton, “The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true.” See his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, IX.: Free Press, 1949), 182ff.

40 These two tendencies are represented by Huntington and Fukuyama, respectively. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affaires 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49; and Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.

41 Yasheng Huang, “Why China will not Collapse?” Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995): 54-68; Merle Goldman, “Is Democracy Possible?” Current History (September

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255

democratization process. But most of these predictions are mainly based on arbitrary

selections of factors. Based on the five factors in my analytic framework, my analysis

provides reason for cautious optimism.43 Indeed, historical legacies die hard. A linear

view of the world does not replace a cyclical view once and for all. Post-Mao China is

witnessing the resurrection of Chinese traditions. But Chinese modernization has reached

such a level that traditions can only play second fiddle. Taiwan’s democratic experiences

suggest that Chinese traditional culture cannot hold back modernization and

democratization, but merely gives the Chinese political system certain characteristics.

Indeed, China has not struck a balance between central and local power. It is the

only big country which still practices a unitary rather than a federal system. But the return

of both Hong Kong and Macao, the existence of a prosperous and democratic Taiwan, the

1995): 259-263; Minxin Pei, “Creeping Democratization in China.” Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 65-79; Henry S. Rowen, “The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy,” The National Interests (Fall 1996): 61-70.

42 William Theodores de Bary thought that both liberalization and repression will continue to exist in the long run. The Liberal Tradition in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 105. William Hinton even raised concern that China is headed for a neocolonial future. “Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea.” Monthly Review 45 (July/August 1993): 87-104; Jack A. Goldstone expects a terminal crisis in China within the next 10 to 15 years. “The Coming Chinese Collapse,” Foreign Policy 99 (Summer, 1995): 35-52.

43 If China and the outside world stay pretty much the same, I predict that China will become democratic by 2011. This year celebrates 100 years of the 1911 Revolution. By then, China’s economy will be in Huntington’s “zone of transition.” Not the least of all, more than two generations have passed since the founding of the Communist China in 1949. The Communists will have no legitimacy whatsoever to monopolize power.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 256

ethnic minorities with separatist tendencies,44 and more importantly, assertive provinces45

will force China in that direction. To stimulate economic development, the central

government has encouraged decentralization, but came to fear national disintegration. So

far such a possibility seems to be slim, because modem technology and nationalism have

unified China more than ever. So China is experiencing a healthy tension between the

central government and local forces right now, which stands democracy in good stead.

The world system is now facilitating Chinese democracy. At the end of the second

millennium, China faced the most favorable international environment in modem time.

National unity, possession of nuclear weapons, and permanent membership in the UN

Security Council give China an unprecedented sense of security. Western countries have

not only abandoned colonialism and imperialism, but have pressured China to

democratize itself. Even if Chinese leaders do not like the idea, China’s close relations

with the outside world determines that China cannot hold back the democratization

process long. The success of democratization in parts of East Asia will make the Chinese

more willing and able to follow their path. In a word, a pro-democratic and

interdependent world renders it difficult to be undemocratic.

Socialist dream has turned into a totalitarian nightmare, hi terms of living

44 Given ethnic differences in China, consociationalism, which permitted politicians representing minorities’ interests to govern with other leaders at a national level, might be needed. For consociationalism, see Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), I.

45 Yumei Zhang, “China: Democratization or Decentralization,” The Pacific Review 8 (1995): 249-65; Arthur Waldron, “China’s Coming Constitutional Challenges,” Orbis (Winter 1995): 27-28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257

standards and human rights, socialist countries paled before advanced capitalist ones.

Comparisons of mainland China and Taiwan and Hong Kong, of North Korea and South

Korea, of East Germany and West Germany are most devastating to extant socialist

beliefs. China’s reform not only reflected the Chinese suspicion of socialism, but has

greatly reduced the socialist presence. With the declinelaissez-faire of and the rise of the

welfare state, capitalism puts on human face.46 All these contributed to the popularity of

capitalism and liberalism.

Most important of all, China’s economic development lays the foundations for

democracy. Chinese experiments with democracy suggest that democracy could not be

built on the quick: sand of foreign ideology, but should be based on the solid rock of

economic development. China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and

no indication shows that its economic development will stop in the near future. With its

rising living standards, higher level of education, and more complicated socio-economic

realities, people will demand mote freedom and democracy. A civil society is emerging in

China.47

46 For Theories of Convergence, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington. Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964); Alfred Meyer, “Theories of Convergence,” in Change in Communist System, ed. Chalmers A. Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 313-41; Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fiftieth (Glencoe, I.L.: Free Press, I960).

47 David Strand, “Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China,” Problems of Communism 39 (May-June 1990): 1-18; Thomas B. Gold, “The Resurgence of Civil Society in China,” Journal of Democracy I (Winter 1990): 18-31; Martine King Whyte, ‘Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?” in State and Society in China, ed. Rosenbaum, 77-102; A group of articles in Modem China 19 (April 1993); and Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 258

No matter how these factors may be favorable to Chinese democracy, its success

or failure finally depends on human efforts. To facilitate the democratization process,

several lessons need learning. First, democracy should not be idealized or underestimated.

Democracy never changes the nature of state and politics. Weber defines a state as an

political organization which monopolizes the legitimate use of force within a given

territory.48 Politics deals with the allocation of resources.49 No matter how rational and

benevolent, power is always coercive. Democracy still has to perform certain coercive

functions such as levying taxes, enforcing conscription, exercising control, and

administering justice. Adam Przeworski’s comment deserves full quotation:

The every day life of democratic politics is not a spectacle that inspires awe: an endless squabble among petty ambitions, rhetoric designed to hide and mislead, shady connections between power and money, laws that make no pretense of justice, policies that reinforce privilege. The experience is particularly painful for people who had to idealize democracy in the struggle against authoritarian oppression, people for whom democracy was the paradise forbidden. When paradise turns into everyday life, disenchantment sets in.50

A realistic assessment of democracy was made by Winton Churchill, who quipped that

“democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been

tried from time to time.” Democracy is no panacea, but a medicine, which may take time

Social Change in Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996);

48 Weber, Economy and Society. 56.

49 David Easton defines the “political system” as the “authoritative allocation of values.” See his The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953), 129-34. Harold Lasswell holds similar views. See his Politics: Who Gets What. When. How (New York: Smith, 1950).

50 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. 93-94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to work, cost a lot and have side-effects. Democracy cannot work magic, but can prevent

many disasters from happening. Democracy may appear to be inefficient and cosdy, but

dictatorship is more destructive.

Second, not revolution but reform should be encouraged. Ellen Kay Trimberger

suggests that revolutions from above will be more prevalent than revolution from below,

and bemoans this trend because the former tends to be ineffective.511 tend to agree that

the age of great revolution is gone, but welcome this trend. If the revolution from above is

ineffective, the revolution from below is costly. The distinction between victims and aids

of dictatorship is far from clear. Not ail ruling elites are villains, and not all rebels are

decent people. It is tolerance and compromise, not hatred and revenge, which give

democracy more chance to succeed. Under relaxed circumstances, individual rulers may

promote democracy either out of genuine beliefs, or as a way of winning support, or even

out of personal vanity. Under tense situations, desperate rulers would put up fights and

make havoc of society. Moreover, revolution usually leads to more absolute power, as

indicated by the replacement of Charles I, Louis XVI, Nicholas II by Cromwell, Napoleon

and Stalin, respectively.52 For all these, many scholars emphasize the importance of

modalities of transition to the features of the new regime.53 Right now, the Chinese

51 Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan. Turkey. Egypt and Peru (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

52 Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power (New York: Viking Press, 1949), 216.

53 Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”; and Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260

leaders are on the right track, although their pace can and should be quickened. So it is

unwise to push for a revolution.

Third, reform from the top-down should be accompanied by pressure from the

bottom-up. Without pressure, rulers would tend to maintain the status quo. As a first step,

an emphasis should be placed on improving the existing political system. The gap

between what is and what is proclaimed should be narrowed. The clause on civil rights in

the State Constitution should be honored; different government branches should function

as stipulated by the constitution; laws should be enacted and enforced; local elections

should be expanded. Democracy will not fall to ground like a ripe fruit; it requires

persistent efforts. It is up to the ordinary people to exert pressure on rulers to democratize

the state.

Fourth, neo-authoritarianism should not be dismissed out of hand. The post-Deng

leadership practiced neo-authoritarianism. Among his six scenarios regarding China’s

future, Richard Baum predicted a Neo-authoritarian future.54 Such an ideology might be

used as a pretext to delay democracy, but if the East Asian model can serve as a guide, we

may as well accept it.55 Neo-authoritarianism sacrifices political democracy at the altar of

Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

54 The six scenarios are: a sudden democratic victory; muddling though; factional conflict and political paralysis; regional disintegration; a military coup; and neo authoritarianism. Richard Baum, “Political Stability in Post-Deng China: Problems and Prospects,” Asian Survey 32 (June 1992): 502-03.

55 We have to realize that the “four little dragons” differed from China in several aspects. First, they were committed to private property and the market economy. Second,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261

economic development in the short run, but it provides an effective way of obtaining both

development and democracy in the long ran. Economic development would allow elites

more career choices and give people more opportunity of education and empowerment.

By putting development before democracy, the East Asian model proves that the horse of

development did and can pull the cart of democracy.

Not the least of all, democracy necessitates not only a democratic system, but

democratic culture. Nobody puts it better than Alex Inkeles:

hi those terms, the democratic character emerges at the opposite pole from the authoritarian personality syndrome. The citizen of a democracy should be accepting of others rather than alienated and harshly rejecting; open to new experience, to ideas and impulses rather than excessively timid, fearful, or extremely conventional with regard to new ideas and ways of acting; able to be responsible with constituted authority even though always watchful, rather than blindly submissive to or hostilely rejecting of all authority; tolerant of differences and of ambiguity, rather than rigid and inflexible; able to recognize, control, and channel his emotions, rather than immaturely projecting hostility and other impulses on to others.56

The primary characteristic of Chinese culture is familism, which is not in favor of

democracy in several ways. First, familism fosters paternalism. No family praises an

abusive and autocratic father, but all idealize a caring, wise, and authoritarian one. Such

mentality increases sense of dependence, and impairs the growth of individualism. Since

most human beings tend to be as dependent as possible, paternalism will always compete

they could afford to focus on economic development without considering equality and welfare too much. Third, their technocrats were both sophisticated and influential in formulating and implementing policy. Last, owing to their small size and anti communism, a rich Uncle Sam was willing and able to give them free ride.

56 Alex Inkeles, “National Character and Modem Political System,” chap. in National Character: A Psvcho-Social Perspective (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 242.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262

with democracy. Second, familism undermines institutionalization. All families have

their roles, but they tend to be implicit and flexible. This is no shortcoming in itself, but is

unrealistic in modem society which has to be governed by explicit and rigid law.

Familism emphasizes reasonableness, but institutionalization stresses lawfulness. The

reasonable thing is not necessarily lawful; vise versa. The May Fourth Movement, which

was more reasonable than lawful, led John Dewey to doubt “whether China will ever

make the complete surrender to legalism and formalism that Western nations have

done.”57 Finally, familism affects Chinese public spirit. Like all peoples, the Chinese are

influenced by interests more than anything else. The Chinese may sacrifice their own

interests for their family members, but tend to be free riders in society. The lack of public

spirit tend to spawn a severe criticism of self-interests and a unrealistic advocacy of

common good. Democracy presupposes a mixture of public-spiritedness and self-

interests. But in China, both public-spiritedness and acceptance of self-interests are

lacking.

To change a culture is no easy task. Culture resembles the rule of the game in

regulating human behavior. Whoever does not go by the rule tends to suffer. As a result,

culture becomes self-sustaining. But it can be changed in three major ways. The first is to

change its material bases. Human behavior is greatly affected by resources in society.

Abundance of resources tends to create a more civil and tolerant society. The second is to

interact with other cultures. People are all prisoners of their cultures, and tend to take

57 Chow, The May Fourth Movement. 168.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263

their culture for granted. By interacting with different cultures, people will appreciate

strengths and weaknesses of their own culture and other cultures. Last, the state has to

play an important role in educating people. This sounds politically incorrect in a

democratic society, but it does not. The state tends to be and should be more enlightened

and transcendent than the whole society. Without the intervention of U.S. federal

government, the civil rights movement would have made little progress in the south. The

government should not merely follow the society, but should lead it.

Sooner or later, China will adopt a democratic system, because democracy is the

best possible system for a modem society. But it is too much to expect China to resemble

a Western country.58 China will display several distinctive features. First, authoritarianism

will occasionally raise its head even after China is democratized. The sheer size of China

makes its problems more complex and intractable than those of other countries. No

matter if we like it or not, the adverse situation creates need for authoritarian government.

But even if China relapses into autocracy, it will be regarded as a temporary solution,

rather than as a praiseworthy system. Whenever circumstances get better, autocracy will

disappear. Second, the Chinese are likely to treasure order and duty more than liberty and

right. Although these two sets of values exist in all society and do not necessarily conflict

with each other, different societies have different emphases. Peoples in East Asia tend to

believe that without order, there is no liberty. Order is necessary condition for any

58 For a thoughtful analysis of cultural differences, see Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The West: Unique, Not Universal,” Foreign Affairs 75 (November/December 1996): 28- 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 264

society; liberty is a more ideal human situation.59 Third, the Chinese will set store by

meritocracy. For the Chinese, officials are not intelligent or selfless, neither are the

masses. Leaders are supposed to be smarter than the masses, otherwise they should not be

elected in the first place. Fourth, the family will play a more important role in China than

in the West. In current Western democracies, the state has assumed lots of roles which

were played by family. A welfare state resembles a surrogate parent now. China will

become more like Western democracies in this respect, but Chinese family will compete

with the state for more influence. Finally, Chinese culture will assert itself. William

James identifies three stages of a theory. At the beginning, a new theory is dismissed as

absurd and then regarded as true but obvious and insignificant. When its opponents

realize its importance, they claim that they discovered it.60 We will not be surprised that

the Chinese traditional culture will be reinterpreted as democratic,61 and that the Chinese

will pride themselves in their splendid culture, in which they have lacked confidence

since 1840.

59 For the “Asian value,” See for example, Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994): 109-26; Daniel A. Bell and others, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); and Bilahari Kausikan, “Governance that Works,” and Joseph Chan, “An Alternative View,” Journal of Democracy 8 (April 1997): 24-34, 35-48, respectively.

60 William James, Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Wavs of Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907), 198.

61 Democrats with Asian background have already reinterpreted Asian cultures. See, for example, Kim, “Is Culture Destiny?”; and Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Li Peng don’t Understand about Asia,” The New Republic (July 14 & 21): 33-40.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265

Different traditions and realities make it both necessary and possible to form new

political variations. Jack Donnelly identified three kind of cultural relativism. Radical,

strong, and weak cultural relativism hold that culture is the sole, principal, and important

source of the validity of a moral right or rule, respectively.62 My belief in the universality

of morality prevents me from identifying with cultural relativism, but people’s values and

choices, which are subjective in nature, should be respected and encouraged. A

democratic world should be heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous. That a country

with a fifth of the world’s population merely copy other political systems should be

deplored rather than praised.

62 Donnelly. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 109-10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aisin-Gioro, Pu Yi. From Emperor to Citizen—The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi. Translated by W. J. F. Jenner. 2 vols. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964.

Almond, Gabriel A. “Comparative Political System.” Journal of Politics 18 (August, 1956): 391-409.

______. “Capitalism and Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics (September 1991): 467-74.

Almond, Gabriel A., Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, ed. Crisis. Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1973.

Almond, Gabriel A., and G. B. Powell. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1966.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, ed. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

______. The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1980.

Amsden, Alice H. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Anderson, Perry. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: NLB, 1974.

Antonio, Robert J., and Ronald M. Glassman, ed. A Weber-Marx Dialogue. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985.

Apter, David Ernest. Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

______. Rethinking Development: Modernization. Dependancv. and Postmodern Politics. Newbury Park, C.A.: Sage, 1987.

266

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267

Aquinas, Thomas. Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. Edited with an introduction by A. P. Dentreves; translated by J. G. Dawson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.

Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 2d enl. ed. New York: Meridian Books, 1958.

Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and introduced by David Ross; revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

______. The Politics of Aristotle. Translated and introduced by Ernest Barker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2d ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

Bachman, David. “The Limits on Leadership in China.” Asian Survey 32 (November 1992): 1046-62.

Badie, Bertrand, and Pierre Bimbaum. The Sociology of the State. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Bagchi, Amiya Kumar, ed. Democracy and Development: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Barcelona. Spain. New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with the International Economic Association, 1995.

Balazs, Etienne. Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme. Translated by H. M. Wright. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

Banfield, Edward C. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, IX.: Free Press, 1958.

Barnett, A. Doak, and Ralph N. Clough, ed. Modernizing China: Post Mao Reform and Development Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1986.

Baum, Richard. “Political Stability in Post-Deng China: Problems and Prospects.” Asian Survey 32 (June 1992): 491-505.

Baum, Richard, ed. Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China: The Road to Tiananmen. New York: Routledge, 1991.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ;

268

Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fiftieth. Glencoe, LL.: Free Press, 1960.

Bell, Daniel A., David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones. Towards Dliberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

Bennett, Gordon A. Yundone: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1976.

Berger, Peter L. Pyramids of Sacrifice. New York: Basic Books, 1974.

______. “The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism.” In Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy Revisited, ed. Diamond and Plattner, 1-10.

Bergere, Marie-Claire. The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie. 1911-1937. Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Berlin, Isaiah. “History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History.” In Alexander V. Generalizations in Historical Writing, ed. Riasanovsky and Barnes Riznik, 60- 113. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.

______. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Bermeo, Nancy. “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship.” Comparative Politics 24 (April 1992): 273-91.

Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution. 1915-1949. Translated by Muriel Bell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Binder, Leonard, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, ed. Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Black, Cyril E. The Dynamics of Modernization. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Blau, Peter. Bureaucracy in Modem Society. New York: Random House, 1956.

Bloodworth, Dennis, and Ching Ping Blood worth. The Chinese Machiavelli: 3.000 Years of Chinese Statecraft. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976.

Bobbio, Norberto. Liberalism and Democracy. Translated by Martin Ryle and Kate Soper. London: Verso, 1990.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f

269

Boyle, John Hunter. China and Japan at War. 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

Braudel, Fernand. On History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Breslin, Shaun G. “China: Developmental State or Dysfunctional Development?” Third World Quarterly 17 (1996): 689-706.

Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. Rev. ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Samuel P. Huntington. Political Power: USA/USSR. New York: Viking Press, 1964.

Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.

Bunker, Gerald E. The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War. 1937- 1941. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.

Burke, Edmund, and Thomas Paine. Two Classics of the French Revolution: Reflections on the Revolution in France and The Rights of Man. Anchor Books. New York: Doubleday, 1973.

Burton, John. Why no Cuts?: An Inquiry into the Fiscal Anarchy of Uncontrolled Government Expenditure. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1985.

Calhoun, Craig J. Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Cameron, Merebeth E. The Reform Movement in China. 1898-1912. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931.

Carr, Edward Hallett. What is History? New York: Vintage Books, 1961.

Chan, Joseph. “An Alternative View.” Journal of Democracy 8 (April 1997): 35-48.

Chang, Carsun. The Third Force in China. New York: Bookman Associates, 1952.

Chang, Chung-li. The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Centurv Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

270

______. The Income of the Chinese Gentry. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.

Chang, Hao. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China. 1890-1907. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Chang, Maria Hsia. The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.

Ch’en, Chieh-ju. Chiang Kai-shek’s Secret Past: The Memoir of his Second Wife. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1993.

Ch’en, Jerome. Yuan Shih-k’ai. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

______. “Historical Background.” In Modem China’s Search for a Political Form, ed. Gray, 1-40.

Chen, Jian. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Ch’en, Li-fu. The Storm Clouds Clear over China: The Memoir of Ch’en Li-fu. 1900- 1993. Stanford, C.A.: Hoover Press, 1994.

Chen, Theodore H. E. Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960.

Cheng, Chu-yuan. Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social. Political, and Economic Ferment in China. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1990.

Cheng, Chu-yuan, ed. Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modem World. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1989.

Chesneaux, Jean. Peasant Revolts in China. 1840-1949. Translated by C. A. Curwen. London: Norton, 1973.

Ch’i, Hsi-sheng. The Chinese Warlord System: 1916 to 1928. Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, 1969.

______. Warlord Politics in China. 1916-1928. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 271

______. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse. 1937-45. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982.

Chi, Wen-shun. Ideological Conflicts in Modem China: Democracy andAuthoritarianism. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986.

Chiang, Kai-shek. China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory. With notes and commentary by Philip Jaffe. New York: Roy, 1947.

______. Soviet Russia in China: A Summing -UP at Seventy bv Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1957.

Ch’ien, Mu. Traditional Government in Imperial China: A Critical Analysis. Translated by Chun-tu Hstieh and George O. Totten. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982.

Ch’ien, Tuan-sheng. The Government and Politics of China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.

Chiou, C. L. Democratizing Oriental Despotism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

Chou, Min-chih. Hu Shih and Intellectual Choice in Modem China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984.

Chow, Tse-tsung. The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modem China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Ch’u, T’ung -tsu. Local Government in China under the Ch’ing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Coble, Parks M. Jr. The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nanking Government. 1927-1937. Cambridge: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1986.

______. Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism. 1931-1937. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Cohen, Arthur A. The Communism of Mao Tse-Tung. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Cohen, Ira J. “The Underemphasis on Democracy in Marx and Weber.” In A Weber- Marx Dialogue, ed. Robert J. Antonio and Ronald M. Glassman, 274-95. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272

Cohen, Paul A. Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.

Cohen, Warren I. America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino- American Relations. 2d ed. New York: Wiley, 1980.

Coleman, James S., and Thomas J. Fararo, ed. Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique. Newbury Park, C.A.: Sage, 1992.

Confucius. The Analects of Confucius. Translated, annotated and introduced by Arthur Waley. New York: Vintage Books, 1938.

Coser, Lewis. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press, 1956.

Cotterell, Arthur. East Asia: From Chinese Predominance to the Rise of the Pacific Rim. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Craib, Ian. Modem Social Theory: From Parsons to Habermas. 2d ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.

Creel, H. G. Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

______. Polvarchv: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

______. A Preface to Economic Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

______. After Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

______. “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation.” Political Science Quarterly 109 (Spring 1994): 23-34.

Dahl, Robert A., and Edward R. Tufte. Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273

de Bary, William Theodore. The Liberal Tradition in China. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press and New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

______. The Trouble with Confucianism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

de Jouvenel, Bertrand. On Power. New York: Viking Press, 1949.

de Schweinitz, Karl. Industrialization and Democracy: Economic Necessities and Political Possibilities. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Deng, Xiaoping. Selected Works of Dene Xiaoping. 1975-1982. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984.

______. Speeches and Writings. New York: Pergamon Press, 1987.

______. Fundamental Issues in Present-dav China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987.

Demberger, Robert F. China’s Development Experience in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Des Forges. Roger V. “Democracy in Chinese History.” In Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections, ed. Roger V. Des Forges, Luo Ning and Wu Yen-bo, 21-52. Albany,: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Deutsch, Karl. Nationalism and Social Communication. 2d ed. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.

Diamond, Larry Jay, ed. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, C.O.: Rienner, 1993.

Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, ed. Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia. Boulder, C.O.: Rienner, 1989.

Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, ed. Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy Revisited. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Ding, X. L. The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis. 1977-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I

274

Di Palma, Giuseppe. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Djilas, Milovan. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. New York: Praeger, 1976.

Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.

Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modem China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Dull, Jack L. “The Evolution of Government in China.” In Heritage of China, ed. Ropp, 55-85.

Duss, Peter. The Rise of Modem Japan. Boston: Mifflin, 1976.

Eastman, Lloyd E. The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule. 1927-1937. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

______. Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution. 1937-1949. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.

Easton, David. The Political System. New York: Knopf, 1953.

Ebenstein, William. Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present. 4th ed. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969.

Eckstein, Harry. “Authority Relations and Government Performance: A Theoretic Framework.” Comparative Political Studies 2 (October 1969): 269-326.

Edwards, R. Randle, Louis Henkin, and Andrew J. Nathan. Human Rights in Contemporary China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Eisenstadt, S. N. ‘Volitical Struggle in Bureaucratic Societies.” World Politics 9 (October, 1956): 15-36.

______. The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275

Emerson, Rupert. ‘‘Nationalism and Political Development.” The Journal of Politics 22 (February I960): 3-28.

Esherick, Joseph. ‘Ten Theses on the Communist Revolution.” Modem China 21 (January 1995): 45-76.

Eto, Shinkichi, and Harold Z. Schiffrin, ed. China’s Republican Revolution. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994.

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, ed. Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Fairbank, John K. Chinese Thought and Institutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

______. “China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective.” Foreign Affairs 47 (April 1969): 449-63.

Fairbank, John K., and Ta-tuan Chen, ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Fairbank, John K., and Albert Feuerwerker, ed. The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Vol. 13.

Falkenheim, Victor C., ed. Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng. New York: Paragon House, 1989.

Feigon, Lee. Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Femia, Joseph V. Marxism and Democracy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Feng, Yu-lan. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

Fewsmith, Joseph. Party. State, and Local Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai. 1890—1930. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

Fincher, John H. Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local. Provincial and National Politics. 1905-1914. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 6

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents. Translated and edited by James Strachey. New York: Norton, 1962.

Friedman, Edward. Backward Toward Revolution: The Chinese Revolutionary Party. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

______. National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1995.

Friedman, Edward, ed. The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1994.

Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 2d ed. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Friedrich, Carl J. ed. Totalitarianism. New York: Crosset & Dunlap, 1964.

Fromm, Erich. Escape from Freedom. New York: Avon Books, 1969.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3- 18.

______. The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

______. “The Primacy of Culture.” Journal of Democracy 6 (January 1995): 7-14.

______. “Confucianism and Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 20- 33.

Gardiner, Patrick, ed. Theories of History. New York: Free Press, 1959.

Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations. 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Gasset, Jose Ortega Y. The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton, 1932.

Gaus, Gerald F. The Modem Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.

Giddens, Anthony. Capitalism and Modem Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx. Durkheim and Max Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277

Gilbert, Felix, ed. The Historical Essavs of Otto Hintze. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Gold, Thomas B. “The Resurgence of Civil Society in China.” Journal of Democracy I (Winter 1990): 18-31.

Goldman, Merle. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

______. “Is Democracy Possible?” Current History (September 1995): 259-63.

Goldstone, Jack A. “The Coming Chinese Collapse.” Foreign Policy 99 (Summer, 1995): 35-52.

Gong, Ting. The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes. Westport, C.T.: Praeger, 1994.

Gong, Ting, and Feng Chen. “Neo-authoritarian Theory in Mainland China.” Issues & Studies (January 1991): 84-98.

Goodstadt, Leo. China’s Search for Plenty: The Economics of Mao Tse-tung. New York: Weatherhill, 1973.

Gray, Jack. “The Two Roads: Alternative Strategies of Social Change and Economic Growth in China.” In Authority. Participation and Cultural Change in China, ed. Stuart R. Schram, 109-57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Gray, Jack, ed. Modem China’s Search for a Political Form. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Gultung, Johan. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971): 81-117.

Hadenius, Axel. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278

Han, Fei Tzu. Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Hardin, Russell. Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Harding, Harry. Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy. 1949-1976. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.

______. China’s Second Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987.

Harding, Neil. Leninism. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996.

Hauptmann, Emily. Putting Choice before Democracy: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.

Hayek, Friedrich A. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

______. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. London: Routledge, 1988.

He, Baogang. “A Critique of the Chinese Paternalistic Model of Democracy.” Issues& Studies (October 1990): 24-42.

______. “Democratization: Antidemocratic and Democratic Elements in the Political Culture of China.” Australian Journal of Political Science 27 (1992): 120-36.

Heath, Anthony. Rational Choice and Social Exchange: A Critique of Exchange Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis. New York: Wiley, 1973.

Himmelfarb, Gertrude. Lord Acton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Hinton, William. “Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?” Monthly Review 45 (July/August 1993): 87-104.

Ho, Ping-ti. Studies on the Population of China. 1368-1953. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

______. Ladder of Success in Imperial China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited and introduced by C. B. MacPherson. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

Hogarth, Robin M., and Melvin W. Reder, ed. Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economic and Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Holt, Robert T., and John E. Turner. The Political Basis of Economic Development. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1966.

Hook, Sidney. Reason. Social Myth, and Democracy. New York: Humanities Press, 1950.

Hou, Chi-ming. Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China. 1840-1937. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Houn, Franklin W. Central Government of China. 1912-1928: An Institutional Study. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959.

______. Chinese Political Traditions. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965.

Howard, Roger. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese People. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

Hsiung, James C., and Steven I. Levine, ed. China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan. 1937-1945. New York: Sharpe, 1992.

Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modem China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Hsiieh, Chiin-tu. Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Hsun Tsu, Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Hu, Shaohua. “Confucianism and Western Democracy.” Journal of Contemporary China 6 (July 1997): 347-63.

Hu, Shi. The Chinese Renaissance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

______. “China in Stalin’s Grand Strategy.” Foreign Affairs 29 (October, 1950): 11- 40.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 280

Hu, Shih, and Lin Yu-tang. China's Own Critics: A Selection of Essays. New York: Paragon Books Reprint Corp., 1969.

Huang, Yasheng. “Why China will not Collapse?” Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995): 54- 68.

Huang, Philip C. Liang Oichao and Modem Chinese Liberalism. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972.

Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy.” Journal of Economic Perspective 7 (Summer, 1993): 71-86.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

______. “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly99 (Summer, 1984): 193-218.

______. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

______. “Democracy’s Challenge.” World Link (March/April. 1994): 20-23.

______. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affaires 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

______. “The West: Unique, Not Universal.” Foreign Affairs 75 (November/December 1996): 28-46.

Huntington, Samuel P., and Joan M. Nelson. No Easy Choice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Inkeles, Alex. National Character: A Psvcho-Social Perspective. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997.

Iriye, Akira. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. London: Longman, 1987.

Ishikawa, Shigeru. “China’s Economic Growth since 1949-An Assessment.” The China Quarterly no. 94 (June 1983): 242-81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. )

281

Isaak, Alan C. Scone and Methods of Political Science: An Introduction to the Methodology of Political Inquiry. 4th ed. Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1985.

Jacobs, J. Bruce. “Elections in China.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 25 (January 1991): 171-99.

James, William. Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Wavs of Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907.

Jansen, Marius B. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Jennings, M. Kent. “Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside.” American Political Science Review 91 (June 1997): 361-72.

Johnson, Charmers.M 1T1 and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.

______. “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Govemment-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.” hi The Political Economy of East Asian Industrialization, ed. Frederic C. Deyo, 136-64. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Johnson, John J. ed. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Jones, A. H. M. Athenian Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957.

Kant, Immanuel. Kant: Political Writings. Edited with an introduction and notes by Hans Reiss, and translated by H. B. Nisbet. 2d, enl. ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Karl, Terry Lynn. “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-21.

Karl, Terry Lynn, and Philippe C. Schimitter. “Modes of Transition in Latin America: Southern and Eastern Europe.” International Social Science Journal 43 (May 1991): 269-84.

Kausikan, Bilahari. “Governance that Works.” Journal of Democracy 8 (April 1997): 24- 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 282

Kelliher, Daniel. “Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses: Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement.” Comparative Politics (July 1993): 379-96.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1977.

Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy. 1900-1950 A Mentor Book. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Kent, Ann. Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Key, V. O., Jr. Politics. Parties, and Pressure Groups. 5th ed. New York: Crowell, 1964.

Kim, Dae Jung. “Is Culture Destiny?: The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values.” Foreign Affairs 73 (November/December 1994): 189-94.

Kirby, William C. Germany and Republican China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. Dictatorship and Double Standards. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982.

Kitagawa, Joseph M., ed. Understanding Modem China. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969.

Kitto, H.D.F. The Greeks. New York: Penguin Books, 1951.

Konstantinov, F. V. ed. A Critique of Mao Tse-tung’s Theoretical Conceptions. Translated by Yuri Sdobnikov. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972.

Komai, Janos. The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of Hungary. New York: Norton, 1990.

Kuhn, Philip A. Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure. 1796-1864. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

______. “Local Self-Government under the Republic: Problems of Control, Autonomy, and Mobilization.” In Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Wakeman and Grant, 257-98.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 283

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2d ed., enl. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Lardy, Nicholas R. China in the World Economy. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994.

Lary, Diana. Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers. 1911-1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Lasswell, Harold D. Politics: Who Gets What. When. How. New York: Smith, 1950.

Lawrence, Susan V. “Democracy, Chinese Style.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32 (July 1994): 61-68.

Lee, Hong Yung. “China’s New Bureaucracy?” In State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform, ed. Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, 167-91. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1992.

Lei, Haizong. zhong-guo wen-hua vu zhone-guo de bine [Chinese Culture and the Chinese Military]. Changsha, 1940.

Leng, Shao-chuan, and Norman D. Palmer. Sun Yat-sen and Communism. New York: Praeger, 1960.

Lenin, V. I. Colleted Works. 45 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960-70.

______. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: International Publisher, 1939.

Lemer, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: Free Press, 1958.

Levin, Michael. Marx. Engels and Liberal Democracy. London: Macmillan, 1989.

______. The Specter of Democracy: The Rise of Modem Democracy as Seen bv its Critics. New York: New York University Press, 1992.

Levine, Steven I. Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria. 1945- 1948. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Levinson, Joseph R. Confucianism China and Its Modem Fate: A Trilogy. Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 284

Levy, Marion J. Jr. “Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 2 (1953-54): 161-97.

______. “Some Aspects of ‘Individualism’ and the Problem of Modernization in China and Japan.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (April, 1962): 225-40.

______. Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors. New York: Basic Books, 1972.

Li Chiu-I. ‘“Multiparty Cooperation’ Under the CCP’s Leadership.” Issues & Studies (November 1990): 75-85.

Li, Dun J., ed. Modem China: From Mandarin to Commissar. Translated and introduced by Dun J. Li. New York: Scribner, 1978.

Li, Jiannong. The Political History of China. 1840-1928. Translated and edited by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956.

Li, Zehou. zhong-guo xian-dai si-xiang-shi lun [On Contemporary History of Chinese Thoughts]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987.

Li, Zhisui. The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician. Translated by Tai Hung-chao; with the editorial assistance of Anne F. Thurston. New York: Random House, 1994.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China: From Revolution through Reform. New York: Norton, 1995.

Lieberthal, Kenneth, Joyce Kallgren, Roderick MacFarquhar, and Frederick Wakeman, Jr., ed. Perspectives on Modem China: Four Anniversaries. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1991.

Liew, K. S. Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-ren and the 1911 Chinese Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Lin, Chong-Pin with Man-jung Mignon Chan. ‘Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on Democratization.” World Affairs 155 (Winter 1993): 117-29.

Lin, Han-sheng. “A Cases Study of Chinese Collaboration: The Nanking Government, 1940-1945.” Unpublished manuscript.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 285

Lin, Yu-sheng. The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

Lin, Yutang. Mv Country and People. New York: Day, 1935.

Lindblom, Charles E. Politics and Market: The World’s Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1977.

Linebarger, Paul M. A. The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of theSan M in C hu /. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937.

Linebarger, Paul M. A., Djang Chu, and Ardath W. Burks. Far Eastern Government and Politics: China and Japan. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956.

Linz, Juan. “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain.” In Mass politics: Studies in Political Sociology, ed. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, with a foreword by Seymour Martin Lipset, 251-83. New York: Free Press, 1970.

______. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis. Breakdown, and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978.

______. Crisis. Breakdown, and Equilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Setpan, ed. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

______. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.” American Sociological Review 59 (February 1994): 1-22.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John Charles Torres. “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requites of Democracy.” International Social Science Journal 45 (May 1993): 155-75.

Liu, Alan P. L. “The Politics of Corruption in the People’s Republic of China.” American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 602-23.

Liu, Ling, and Liu Jun, ed. Neo-Authoritarianism: Debate on Theories of Reform. Beijing: Economic Institution Press, 1989.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 286

Lo, Carlos W. H. “Deng Xiaoping’s Ideas on Law: China on the Threshold of a Legal Order.” Asian Survey 32 (July 1992): 649-65.

Lock, John. Second Treatise of Government. Edited by Richard Cox. Arlington Heights, I.L.: Harlan Davidson, 1982.

Lockwood, William W. “Japan’s Response to the West: The Contrast with China.” World Politics. 9 (October 1956): 37-54.

Loh, Pichon P. Y., ed. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? Boston: Health, 1965.

Lukes, Steven. Power: A Critical View. London: Macmillan, 1974.

______. Marxism and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960. London: Oxford University Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

MacFarquhar, Roderick, ed. The Politics of China. 1949-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

McCord, Edward A. The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modem Chinese Warlordism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

MacKinnon, Stephen R. Power and Politics in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Macpherson, C. B. The Real World of Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

______. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.

Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. New York: Penguin Books, 1987.

Maguire, John M. Marx’s Theory of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287

Mah, Feng-hwa. ‘‘External Influence and Chinese Economic Development: A Re examination.” In Modem Chinese Economic History, ed. Hou Chi-ming and Tzong-shian Yu, 273-302. Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1979.

Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1936.

Mansbridge, Jane J. Beyond Adversary Democracy. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Mao, Zedong. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. 4 vols. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967.

______. mao zedong si-xiang wan-sui! [Long Live Mao Zedong Thought!]. Beijing: 1969.

______. Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971.

______. Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters. 1956-1971. Edited and introduced by Stuart Schram and translated by John Chinnery and Tieyun. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.

______. A Critique of Soviet Economics. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

March, Andrew L. The Idea of China: Myth and Theory in Geographic Thought. New York: Praeger, 1974.

Marks, Gary, and Larry Diamond, ed. Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset. London: Sage, 1992.

Marsh, Robert M. The Mandarins: The Circulation of Elites in China. 1600-1900. New York: Free Press, 1961.

Marx, Karl. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. Translated by Jack Cohen; edited and introduced by E. J. Hobsbawm. New York: International Publishers, 1965.

Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” hi Twentieth Century Psychology, ed. Philip Lawrence Harriman, 22-48. New York: Philosophy Library, 1946.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 288

Meisner, Maurice. Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

______. Marxism. Maoism and Utopianism: Eight Essavs. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.

______. The Dene Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism. 1978- 1994. New York: Hill & Wang, 1996.

Menzel, Johanna M. ed. The Chinese Civil Service: Career Open to Talent? Lexington, M.A.: Heath, 1963.

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, I.L.: Free Press, 1949.

Meskill, John T., ed. The Pattern of Chinese History: Cycles. Development, or Stagnation? Boston: Heath, 1965.

Meyer, Alfred. “Theories of Convergence.” In Change in Communist System, ed. Chalmers A. Johnson, 313-41. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy. Translated by E. Paul and C. Paul; introduced by S. M. Lipset. New York: Free Press, 1962.

Midlarsky, Manus I. “Environmental Influences on Democracy: Aridity, Warfare, and a Reversal of the Causal Arrow.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (June 1995): 224-62.

Miles, James A. R. The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Miliband, Ralph. Marxism and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

______. “The Socialist Alternative.” In Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy Revisited, ed. Diamond and Plattner, 112-18.

Mill, John S. Utilitarianism. Liberty, and Representative Government. New York: Dutton, 1951.

______. On Liberty. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1986.

Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 289

Min, Tu-ki. National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial China. Edited by Philip A. Kuhn and Timothy Brook. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University and Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1989.

Mo Tzu. Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Monroe, Paul. China: A Nation in Evolution. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

______. Authority and Inequality under Capitalism and Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Moore, Charles A., ed. The Status of the Individual in East and West. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968.

Morse, Horsea Ballou. The Trade and Administration of China. New York: Russell & Russell, 1908.

Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. Translated by Hannah D. Kahn; edited and introduced by Arthur Civingston. New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1939.

Moulder, Frances. Japan. China, and the Modem World Economy, ca. 1600 to ca. 1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Mulgan, R. G. Aristotle’s Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Munro, Donald J. The Imperial Style of Inquiry in Twentieth-Centurv China: The Emergence of New Approaches. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1996.

Murphe, Rhoads. The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.

Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcour, Brace & World, 1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 290

Nathan, Andrew J. Peking Politics. 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

______. Chinese Democracy. New York: Knopf, 1985.

______. “Is China Ready for Democracy?” Journal of Democracy I (Spring 1990): 50- 61.

______. “Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure.” The Journal of Contemporary China 4 (Fall 1993): 3-13.

______. “China: Getting Human Rights Right.” The Washington Quarterly 20 (1997): 131-51.

Nathan, Andrew J., and Tianjian Shi. “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey.” Daedalus (Spring 1993): 95-123.

Naughton, Barry. Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform. 1978-93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Needham, Joseph, and others. Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Translated with commentary by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vantage Books, 1989.

Nisbet, Robert A. Conservatism: Dream and Reality. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

Nivinson, David S., and Arthur F. Wright, ed. Confucianism in Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, ed. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Okebe. Tatsumi. “The Cold War and China.” hi The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 291

ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, 224-51. New York: Columbia University Press; Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977.

Oksenberg, Michel and Bruce J. Dickson. “The Origins, Processes, and Outcomes of Great Political Reform: A Framework of Analysis.” hi Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, 235-61. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Okun, Arthur M. Equality and Efficiency. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975.

Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

______. “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force.” Journal of Economic History 23 (1963): 529-52.

______. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 567-76.

Organski, A. F. K. Stages of Political Growth. New York: Knopf, 1965.

Pareto, Vilfred. The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. Edited by Arthur Livingston; translated by Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston. New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1935.

______. Sociological Writings. Selected and introduced by S. E. Finer and translated by Derick Mirfin. New York: Praeger, 1966.

______. The Rise and Fall of the Elites. Introduced by Hans L. Zetterberg. Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1986.

Parish, William L. “Destratification in China.” In Class and Social Stratification in Post- Revolutionarv China, ed. Watson, 84-120.

Peck, James. “The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America’s China Watchers.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 2 (October 1969): 59-69.

Pei, Minxin. From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 292

______. “Creeping Democratization in China.” Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 65-79.

Pennock, J. Roland. Democratic Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Perkins, Dwight H., ed. China’s Modem Economy in Historical Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Perry, Elizabeth J., and Ellen V. Fuller. “China’s Long March to Democracy.” World Policy Journal 8 (Fall 1991): 663-85.

Petracca, Mark P., and Mong Xiong. “The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique.” Asian Survey 30 (November 1990): 1099- 1117.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated, introduced, and noted by Francis MacDonald Comford. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941.

Poggi, Gianfranco. The State: Its Nature. Development and Prospects. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944.

Polo, Marco. The Travels of Marco Polo. Revised from Marsden’s translation; edited and introduced by Manuel KomrofF. New York: Modem Library, 1931.

Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Paul, 1969.

Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Pye, Lucian W. Chinese Negotiating Stvle: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles. New York: Quorum Books, 1982.

______. Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 293

______. “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism.” American Political Science Review 84 (March 1990): 3-19.

______. ‘Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge.” Asian Survey 30 (April 1990): 331-47.

______. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Pye, Lucian W., and Sidney Verba, ed. Political Culture and PoliticalDevelopment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Qi, Min. zhong-guo zheng-zhi wen-hua [Chinese Political Culture]. Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1989.

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

Rohwer, Jim. “China.” The Economist. November 28, 1992.

Ropp, Paul S., ed. Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Rosenbaum, Arthur Lewis. “Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910.” Journal of Asian Studies 34 (May 1975): 689-716.

Rosenbaum, Arthur Lewis, ed. State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1992.

Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Essential Rousseau. Translated by Lowell Bair; introduced by Matthew Josephson. A Meridian Book. New York: New American Library, 1975.

Rowen, Henry S. ‘The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy.” The National Interests (Fall 1996): 61-70.

Ruan, Ming. Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire. Translated and edited by Nancy Liu, Peter Rand, and Lawrence R. Sullivan; with a foreword by Andrew J. Nathan. Boulder, C.O.: Westveiw Press, 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 294

Rubin, Vitaly A. Individual and State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers. Translated by Steven L Levine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Rummel, R. J. China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991.

Russell, Bertrand. The Problem of China. London: Allen & Unwin, 1966.

Rustow, Dankwart A. ‘Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model.”. Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970): 337-63.

______. A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968.

Scalapino, Robert A., and George T. Yu. Modem China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order. 1850-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Schram, Stuart R. The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Schram, Stuart R., ed. Foundations and Limits of State Power in China Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1987.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

______. Imperialism and Social Classes. Translated by Heinz Norden; edited and introduced by Paul M. Sweezy. New York: Kelley, 1951.

Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Schurmann, Franz, and Orville Schell, ed. Republican China: Nationalism. War, and the Rise of Communism. 1911-1949. New York: Random House, 1967.

Schwartz, Benjamin Isadore. Chinese Communist and the Rise of Mao. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 295

______- In Search of Wealth and Power. Yen Fu and the West. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964.

______. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985.

Scott, James C. Political Ideology in Malaysia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Seagrave, Sterling. The Soong Dynasty. New York: Harper & Row, 1985.

Selden, Mark. The Political Economy of Chinese Development. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993.

Sen, Amartya Kumar. Resources. Values, and Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.

______. “Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Li Peng don’t Understand about Asia.” The New Republic (July 14 & 21, 1997): 33-40.

Shambaugh, David, ed. Peng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman. Oxford: Claredon, 1995.

Shaw, Chonghal Petey. The Role of the United States in Chinese Civil Conflicts. 1944- 1949. Salt Lake City, U.T.: Schlacks, 1991.

Shaw, Kinn Wei. Democracy and Finance in China: A Study in the Development of Fiscal Systems and Ideals. New York: Ams, 1970.

Shennan, J. H. Liberty and Order in Early Modem Europe: The Subject and the State. 1650-1800. London: Longman, 1986.

Sheridan, James E. Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsianp. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.

Shirk, Susan L. The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Simmel, Georg. Conflict and the Web of Group-AfRliations. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix. New York: Free Press, 1955.

Simon, Herbert A. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 296

______. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69:99-118.

Skocpol, Theda. State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France. Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Smil, Vaclav. China’s Environmental Crisis: An Inquiry to the Limits of National Development. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1993.

Smith, Arthur H. Chinese Characteristics. Shanghai: North-China Herald Office, 1890.

Snow, Edgar. The Other Side of the River. New York: Random House, 1961.

______. The Lone Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.

So, Alvin Y. Social Change and Development: Modernization. Dependency, and World- Svstem Theories. London: Sage Publications, 1990.

Solinger, Dorothy J. “Democracy with Chinese Characteristics.” World Policy Journal 6 (Fall 1989): 621-32.

Solomon, Richard H. Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Spence, Jonathan D. The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci. New York: Viking Penguin, 1984.

Spengler, Oswald. Decline of the West. New York: Knopf, 1962.

Starr, John Bryan. Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Stephens, John D. The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. Urbana: University of Dlinois Press, 1979.

Strand, David. “Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China.” Problems of Communism 39 (May-June 1990): 1-18.

Stuart, John Leighton. Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart. Missionary and Ambassador. New York: Random House, 1954.

Sun, Yan. “The Chinese Protests of 1989.” Asian Survey 3 1 (August 1991): 762-78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 297

______. The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism. 1976-1992. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Sun, Yat-sen. sun zhong-shan xuan-ii [Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981.

______. Prescription for Saving China: Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen. Edited with an introduction and notes by Julie Lee Wei, Ramon H. Myers, Donald G. Gillin; translated by Julie Lee Wei, E-su Zen, and Linda Chao. Stanford, C.A.: Hoover Institution Press, 1994.

______. San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People. Taipei: China Cultural Service, n.d.

Talmon, Jacob. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. New York: Praeger, I960.

Tan, Chester C. Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971.

Tawney, R. H. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1926.

Teiwes, Frederick C. Politics and Puree in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950-65. White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1979.

Teiwes, Frederick C., and Warren Sun. The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution. 1966-1971. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996.

Teng, Ssu-yu, and John K. Fairbank. China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey. 1839-1923. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Thomas, Clive Y. The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984.

Thomas, Elbert Duncan. Chinese Political Thought: A Study Based upon the Theories of the Principal Thinkers of the Chou Period. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1927.

Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner; with introduction and notes by M. I. Finley. London: Penguin Books, 1954.

Tien, Hung-mao. Government and Politics in Kuomintane China. 1927-1937. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 298

Tilly, Charles. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly, 3-83. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

______. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. New York: Doubleday, 1955.

Tonnies, Ferdinand. Community and Society. Translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957.

Townsend, James R. “Intraparty Conflict in China: Disintegration in an Established One- Party System.” In Authoritarian Politics in Modem Society: TheDynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, 284-310. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. Abridged by D. C. Somervell. New York: Dell, 1969.

Trimberger, Ellen Kay. Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan. Turkey. Egypt, and Peru. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978.

Trotsky, Leon. The Revolution Betrayed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1937.

Tsou, Tang. The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Tu, Wei-ming. “The Creative Tension betweenJen andL i." Philosophy East and West 18 (1968): 29-39.

Tucker, Robert C. The Marxian Revolutionary Idea. New York: Norton, 1969.

Tucker, Robert C., ed. The Marx -Engels Readers. 2d ed. New York: Norton, 1978.

Tung, William L. The Political Institutions of Modem China. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

Unger, Jonathan, ed. The Pro-democracv Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces. New York: Sharpe, 1991.

______. Chinese Nationalism. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1996.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 299

Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Penguin Books, 1967.

Viner, Jacob. “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” World Politics 1 (October, 1948): 1-29.

Vogel, Ezra F. The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Wade, Robert. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Wakeman, Frederic Jr. “A Note on the Development of the Theme of Bureaucratic- Monarchic Tension in Joseph R. Levenson’s Work.” In The Mozartian Historian: Essays on the Works of Joseph R. Levenson. ed. Maurice Meisner and Rhoads Murphey, 123-33. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Wakeman, Frederic and Carolyn Grant, ed. Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Walder, Andrew G. ed. The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Waldron, Arthur. “Warlordism versus Federalism: The Revival of a Debate?” The China Quarterly (March 1990): 116-28.

______. From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point. 1924-1925. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

______. “China’s Coming Constitutional Challenges.” Orbis 39 (Winter 1995): 19-35.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modem World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic, 1976.

______. The Capitalist World-Economv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

______. The Politics of the Capitalist World-Economv. Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 300

Wang, Shaoguang. “The Rise of the Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State Capacity in China.” hi The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary, ed. Andrew G. Walder, 87- 113. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N., and Elizabeth J. Perry, ed. Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modem China: Learning from 1989. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1992.

Watkins, Frederick, ed. Rousseau: Political Writings. Selections. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986.

Watson, James L., ed. Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Weale, B. L. Putnam. The Fight for the Republic in China. New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1917.

Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

______. The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. Translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth; introduced by C. K. Yang. New York: Free Press, 1964

______. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Weiner, Myron, and Samuel P. Huntington, ed. Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1987.

Westad, Odd Arne. Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War. 1944-1946. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

White, Gordon, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan. In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

White, Martin. Power Politics. Edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978.

White, Stephen. “Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy.” World Politics 38 (April 1986): 462-82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 301

Whyte, Martin King. “Popular Opposition to the Reforms in China.” hi Marxism and Capitalism in the People’s Republic of China, ed. Peter P. Cheng, 37-54. Lanham, M.D.: University Press of America, 1989.

______. “Prospects for Democratization in China.” Problems of Communism (May- June, 1992): 58-70.

Wilber, Charles K. ed. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Random House, 1973.

Wilcox, Delos F. Government bv all the People: or. the Initiative, the Referendum, and the Recall as Instruments of Democracy. New York: Macmillan, 1912.

Willoughby, W. W. Constitutional Government in China: Present Conditions and Prospects. Pamphlet no. 47. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1922.

Wilson, Dick, ed. Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Wittfogel, Karl A. Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.

Womack, Brantly. “In Search of Democracy: Public Authority and Popular Power in China.” Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective, ed. Brantly Womack, 53-89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Wright, Mary Clabaugh, ed. China in Revolution: The First Phase: 1900-1913. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Wright, Tim, ed. The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century: Recent Chinese Studies. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.

Wu, Yuan-li, Franz Michael, John F. Copper, Ta-ling Lee, Maria Hsia Chang, and A. James Gregor. Human Rights in People’s Republic of China. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1988.

Yeh, Milton D. “The Ideology and Politics of Teng’s Leadership in Post-Mao Mainland China.” Issues and Studies (May 1988): 64-81.

Yen, Chia-chi, and Kao Kao. The Ten-Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 302

Yoshihara, Kunio. Japanese Economic Development. 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Young, Dali. Calamity and Reform in China: State. Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Young, Ernest P. The Presidency of Yuan Shih-Kai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Earlv Republican China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.

Yu, George T. Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang. 1912-24. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Zakaria, Fareed. “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994): 109-26.

Zhang, Yumei. “China: Democratization or Recentralization.” The Pacific Review 8 (1995): 249-65.

Zhao, Suisheng. Power by Design: Constitution-Making in Nationalist China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995.

Zheng, Yongnian. “Development and Democracy: Are They Compatible in China?” Political Science Quarterly 109 (Summer 1994): 235-59.

Zhu, Jianhua, Xinshu Zhao, and Hairong Li. “Public Political Consciousness in China: A Empirical Profile.” Asian Survey 30 (October 1990): 992-1006.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.