By George C. Hildebrand and Gareth Porter Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution by George C
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a by George C. Hildebrand and Gareth Porter Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution by George C. Hildebrand and Gareth Porter Following the fall of the U.S,-supported Cambodian government of Lon Nol in April 1975, the new revo- lutionary government ordered a massive evacuation of Phnom Penh and other Cambodian cities, This was presented to the American public as a wildly irra- tional action by visionary fanatics bent on turning Cambodia into a primitive rural society, regardless of the human cost. The media made no attempt to ex- plain what was happening in Cambodia or to en- lighten Americans on the causes and consequences of their government's savage intervention in a small q t\RRR\qoN-) and defenseless country, Clearly, there was a crying need for an in-depth study of the truth about Cam- bodia and U.S,-Cambodian relations This need is brilliantly met by Gareth Porter and C G. C Hildebrand The authors, both Cornell-trained Asian scholars and researchers at the lndochina Re- source Center in Washlngton, show with a wealth of supporting evidence that, as a result of the United States' bombing and its refusal to send emergency food shipments, starvation was rampant in the cities of Cambodia by the end of the war. The evacuation of Phnom Penh was thus not an act of fanaticism but was the only possible way of bringing the food that existed in the countryside and the people in the cities together; it was not an infliction of suffering but an essential means of alleviating it. After reading the manuscript of this book, Paul Sweezy, co-editor ol Monthly Review, wrote: "This is a stunning piece of work, the reading of which is at once a searing, angering, and emotionally uplifting experience, lt is beautifully conceived and executed, with much wider implications than Cambodia and ln- dochina. The overall moral seems to be that humanity can solve its most intractable problems but that it re- quires ordeal by fire to prepare the human material and leadership required The authors achieve their result with careful research and steady understate- ment, All who have not read it have a disturbing yet uplifting experience ahead of them." (continued on back flap) George Hildebrand Gareth Porter CAMBODIA Starvation and Revolution Monthly Review Fress New York and Lclndon Contents Photo credits: Report of the Inspectar Generul of Foreign Assistance, U.S, State Departmert,p.26; \{illiam Goodfellow, p.35; Yves Billy, p. 43; RGNUC, pp. 55, 68, 72; Hsinhua News Agency, pp.73,80, 9l . Copyright A 1976 by George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter lirtrc.word by George McT. Kahin 7 All rights reserved Irr lroduction 11 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publicstian Doia Hildebrand, George C. I . The Politics of Starvation in Phnom Penh l9 Cambodia: starvation and revolution. 2. The Evacuation ofPhnom Penh 39 Includes bibliographical references. 1. Cambodia-Rural conditions. 2. Starvation. 3. Food supply- .]. Cambodia's Agricultural Revolution 57 Cambodia. 4. Cambodia-History-Civii War, 197A-1915. I. porter" Gareth, 1942-joint author. II. Title. ('onclusion 95 HN700.C32H54 320.9',596',O4 76-1646 ('hronology 99 ISBN 0-8s345-382-9 Notes 105 First printing Monthly Review Press Mup: Cambodia, May 18 62 West l4th Street, New York, N.Y. 1001I 1974 2l Theobalds R.oad, London WCIX 8SL Nlup: Carnbodia, Main Agricultursl Centers 58 Manufactured in the United States of America Foreword by George McT. Kahin Of all thc American interventions in Southeast Asia, the one rvlrose character and consequences are least known in this country is that launched against Cambodia. Because of the paucity of news ( ()vcrage and the efforts by the administration to suppress much ol the pertinent information, Americans have an even more dis- tortcd perception of realities in Cambodia than was the case with Victnam or Laos. The present study is the first substantial correc- tivc I have seen. In their documented and comprehensive rrtcount, George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter provide what is rrndoubtedly the best informed and clearest picture yet to emerge ol the desperate economic problems brought about in Cambodia lrrrgely as a consequence of American intervention, and of the wuys in which that country's new leadership has undertaken to rrrcct them. ln assessing the situation confronted by the new Cambodian govcrnment, the authors point out that when it took power Phnom l)cnh's population had increased from about 600,000 to between lirtrr and five times that number, and that in the other urban ce nters there had also been large increases. Altogether more than rr third of the country's rural population had moved to the cities to 8 Foreword Foreword 9 escape from the war, especially from the heavy American involved an intensive effort to harness Cambodia's water re- bombing. This enormously swollen urban population had sources that has made possible a major expansion of agricultural previously been dependent for much of its food upon American production through extensive double-cropping. Finally, they point airlifts and river convoys. However, these supplies had not been out that though Cambodia's new government has thus far focused sufficient, and as early as September 1974 there was a significant its efforts mainly on the rural areas and the need for increasing amount of starvation in the urban centers controlled by Lon Nol's fbod production, it is not ovedooking the cities, where industries government. Moreover, the bombing and ground fighting had torn are now being resuscitated and incorporated into a national pro- up many of the richest farming areas and reduced agricultural duction plan. manpower by killing or wounding between 10 and 15 percent of the Anyone who is interested in understanding the situation rural population. And, of course, many of the roads linking the obtaining in Phnom Penh before and after the Lon Nol govern- cities and most productive areas had been destroyed or seriously ment's collapse and the character and programs of the Cambodian damaged. government that has replaced it will, I am sure, be grateful to the Against this background it is easier to understand the evacua- authors ofthis valuable study. tion of Phnom Penh that ensued so soon after the collapse of Lon Nol's government and the ending of the American airlift. (It should McT. Kahin -George be recalled that the Ford administration was unwilling to make Cornell University arrangements so that the urban Cambodian population could con- tinue to receive food.) Lacking the means to bring sufftcient food into the cities, the new government decided to take the people to the food, substantial stocks of which it had stored in rural areas. These mass movements were not, then, applications of some irra- tional ideology, but reflected pragmatic solutions by leaders who had to rely exclusively on Cambodia's own food resources and who lacked facilities for its internal transport. The authors follow their account of living conditions in Phnom Penh and the evacuation with what is, I believe, their major contri- bution. This is an extensive analysis of how in the years leading up to the National United Front's assumption of power, it managed to turn a shattered rural economy into a strong enough base from which to wage a successful war against Lon Nol's American-sup- ported regime, and then move rapidly on to develop the extensive additional agricultural resources that enabled it to feed an urban populace nearly as large as the predominantly rural population previously under its control. The authors describe how the new government's methods of meeting these problems involved nothing less than an agricultural revolution. They show that in addition to an apparently effective social mobilization, this has Introduction One year after the conclusion of the second Indochina war there sccnls little inclination in the United States to examine critically an ..stopped t'xperience that, in the words of one commentator, the 'Anrerican Century' cold in its second decade." yet without a thorough investigation of this now historical period, Arnericans i'annot understand this country's first overseas defeat and its Irrture implications. Nowhere was the war so trtutal, so devoid of concern for human Iile , or so shattering in its impact on a society as in Cambodia. But while U.S. government and news media commentary have con- 1r'ived to avoid the subject of the death and devastation caused by thc U.S. intervention in Cambodia, they have gone to great lengths t. paint a picture of a country ruled by irrational revolutionaries, rvithout human feelings, determined to reduce their country to barbarism. In shifting the issue from U.S. crimes in Cambodia to thc alleged crimes of the Cambodian revolutionary government, tlrc United States has offered its own version of the end of the ('ambodian w'ar and the beginning of the new government. This s(udy is aimed at setting the record straight orr these crucial cvcnts. Although we have focused on the policies followed by the It 12 Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution Introduction 13 two sides toward the problem of feeding the population-an issue Ngoc Thanh, one of the masterminds of the 1970 coup, told an of fundamental importance to any society-we have also dealt with American journalist in 1972, "Sihanouk had power. We wanted it. aspects of the historical drama that became intertwined with the 'f he way to get it was to attack the Vietcong. " politics of food: corruption, medical care, the U.S. bombing cam- Within forty-eight hours of the coup the United States recog- paign, and the problem of economic development. nized Lon Nol's regime. Within six weeks President Nixon The U.S.