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COMMENTARY | Why Is 2021 a Crucial Year for the EU's COMMENTARY Why is 2021 a Crucial Year for the EU's Engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina? *This Commentary was written by Valentina Grganovic|21 March 2021 Rue de la Science 14, 1040 Brussels [email protected] + 32 02 588 00 14 WHY IS 2021 A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA? Vocal Europe Rue De la Science 14B, 1040 Brussels Tel: +32 02 588 00 14 Vocaleurope.eu twitter.com/thevocaleurope Facebook.com/Vocaleurope Youtube.com/vocaleurope instagram.com/vocaleurope Disclaimer and Copyright This document is prepared for, and addressed to Vocal Europe and its audience. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of Vocal Europe. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged. 1 WHY IS 2021 A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA? Background Following the new challenges in the international sphere caused by the global COVID pandemic and changes in the US Administration, it is crucial to reflect on the developments in the Western Balkan region, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In December 2020, Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the rest of the world, marked a quarter of a century after the Dayton Accords' signature that brought the civil war to an end. However, until today Bosnia and Herzegovina is a deeply divided state inside its borders and is often explained as a vague, two-levels confederation with three ethnic communities “hardly manageable at the central level”1. After the announcement of Joe Biden's win, interestingly enough, Sarajevo's national library was coloured in the US flag with a picture of Joe Biden's visit to Sarajevo thirty years ago2. That was a clear message that Bosnia and Herzegovina expect more attention from the new US administration than the “see-no-evil economic approach” of the Trump administration3. However, in Republika Srpska – one of BiH’s two entities – the US elections results were not satisfying for many. The European Union's position in the Western Balkan region has often been erratic. In 2014 shortly after taking the new office, the new President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, clearly stated that there would be no further enlargement until the end of his term4. That left a great vacuum for other international players like China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States to interfere in the region. The European Commission comprehensively changed this rhetoric by introducing ‘A credible enlargement perspective for an enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ in February 2018 after realising the threats to stability and democracy of other external actors meddling. Finally, the new European Commission and its President Ursula Von der Leyen from the very beginning announced that her Commission would work diligently on (re)building closer relations with the Western Balkan region5. Continuation of this was also confirmed while Croatia was preceding over the European Council because the youngest EU member state decided to bring to the foreground the question of enlargement and organised the EU-Western Balkans summit in May 2020. This new approach shows that the Western Balkan region is of utmost importance for the European Union. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union have seen little progress in the last years. On the one hand, the reasons for this can be found in corruptive political elites that are benefiting from the status-quo and capturing the state every day more. On the other hand, external actors like Turkey, Russia and China are often producing many destabilising factors in BiH and slowing down the process of EU integration. Therefore, the question emerges: why is it crucial for the EU to work closely with the US Administration in 2021 on bringing more stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 1 Dabrowski, M., & Myachenkova, Y. (2018). The Western Balkans on the road to the European Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution. https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/untitled-133335-ea.pdf 2 Al Jazeera Balkans - Why Biden’s victory may present an ‘opportunity’ for Bosnia. 13 November 2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/bosnia-biden 3 Edward P. Joseph (28 October 2020). How Trump Lost the Balkans. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/28/how-trump-lost-the-balkans/ 4 Juncker, J.-C. (2014). A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Retrieved from https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker---political- guidelines.pdf 5 Ursula von der Leyen. 2 WHY IS 2021 A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA? Current State of Play The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)6 is an imperfect but lasting peace agreement7 that ended the war and established a new state organisation model in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the high recurrence rate in post-war societies, this success should not be underestimated. However, the same agreement created a complex state structure. Today, BiH is a community of three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) and two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBIH), covering 51% of the territory and inhabited mostly by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. The second entity is Republika Srpska (RS), governing the remaining 49% and inhabited mainly by Bosnian Serbs8. Furthermore, the Federation of BiH is divided into ten autonomous cantons, which often slows down the quick and efficient decision-making process. Breakdown of the political structures within Bosnia and Herzegovina9 The crisis of the state apparatus of the “world’s most complicated system of government”10 can be presented with the parliamentary elections from October 2018. Eight months after the elections, the House of Representatives of the BiH Parliament, except for the constituent session on 6 December 2018, did not have any further sessions. At that moment, there were 25 laws and 35 international agreements pending, more than a hundred different documents, such as information, decisions, resolutions, declarations11. Thus, significant issues for society remain on hold. Finally, after criticising the political situation and political elites for not forming needed institutions, the EU 6 General Framework Agreement For Peace. (1995, November 30). Retrieved from peacemaker.un.org: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_Dayt onAgreement.pdf 7 Carl Bidt, (28 January 2021) Bosnia to war, to Dayton, and to its slow peace. https://ecfr.eu/publication/bosnia-to- war-to-dayton-and-to-its-slow-peace/ 8 Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.statistika.ba 9 Center for Strategic & International Studies (2018) Bosnia and Herzegovina. https://www.csis.org/programs/european-election-watch/2018-elections/bosnia-and-herzegovina 10 Nardelli, A., Dzidic, D., & Jukic, E. (2014, October 08). Bosnia and Herzegovina: the world's most complicated system of government? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina- elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government 11 Đugum, Aida (2019, June 12). BiH već osam mjeseci bez vlasti. Radio Slobodna Evropa. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bih-vlast-formiranje/29995828.html 3 WHY IS 2021 A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA? Delegation in BiH took the lead in these negotiations. The Special Representative, Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, put pressure on the three main parties’ leaders in BiH. These party leaders signed a draft agreement on forming a new Council of Minister on 5 August 201912. However, until today, two and a half years after the elections (!), the Federation of BiH does not have its government. The economic situation is not stable, either. According to The World Bank Regional Economic Report13, BiH, together with the whole Western Balkan region, faces a challenging economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic that will influence the already high unemployment rate, incomes, education and jobs. What is more, a country with just 3.5 million citizens has to finance five presidents (including those at the level of entities), 13 governments and parliaments, and 149 ministries, mostly inefficient, disorganised, and very slow. According to the Index of Public Integrity14, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks as the 113th country out of 117 in Administrative Burden. Further, in the last years, many young people are leaving to the EU countries seeking better life and wages, and according to Labor Force Survey, 36,3% of the employed labour is over the age of fifty15. Despite all this, what is seen as the primary concern today in BiH is the state capture by the political elites16 and the complex structure that started with DPA. Many researchers and political representatives (mainly Bosniak) call for building a unitary state and/or rewriting the Dayton Agreement. However, the problem of DPA is not in preserving and ensuring national and ethnic identities but in a big difference in the structure of two entities. Therefore, the prominent nationalist party leaders in Republika Srpska often call for secession, and Croats in the Federation seek reforms that will ensure equal representation on all levels. However, a unitary state is not a solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina and it can be compared with “getting the Scots to accept total integration with England, or the Catalans or the Basques to accept a completely unitary Spain”17 To stabilise these relations, the international community has been introducing reforms in BiH from the beginning of Dayton Agreement, successfully or not. The most important international institution in BiH is the Office of High Representative that is in BiH to oversee the peace process. OHR reports to the Peace Implementation Council, which is made of 55 countries and agencies, including the EU, US, Russia, Turkey18.
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