Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY & d Public Disclosure Authorized

Report No. 2573 Public Disclosure Authorized PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

MALAYSIA - KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Public Disclosure Authorized June 29, 1979 Public Disclosure Authorized

Operations Evaluation Department

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. 4 e FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

MALAYSIA - KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Table of Contents

Page No.

PREFACE iii

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET iv

HIGHLIGHTS v

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I. Background 1 II. Implementation 1 III. Conclusions 4

Annex

Borrower's Comments 5

ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. Introduction 7 II. Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 9 III. Project Implementation and Cost 13 IV. Institutional Performance and Development 16 V. Economic Reevaluation 17 VI. Bank Performance 21 VII. Conclusions 23

Tables

1. Principal Resource Documents 24 2. Alternative Design Schemes Presented for Feasibility Analysis 25 3. Actual and Expected Project Implementation 26 4. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs 27 5. Detailed Estimates of Construction Cost 28 6. Comparison of Actual and Appraisal Estimate of Disbursements 29 7. Number of Daily Hours Highway Capacity Equaled or Exceeded Without Project 30 8. Actual and Forecast Daily Traffic, 1971-80 31 9. Actual and Forecast Traffic Composition Between Jalan Pantai Baharu and Jalan University 1978 32 10. Kuala Lumpur Vehicle Registrations 33

IThis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oMcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. - ii -

Page No.

Tables

11. Sensitivity Testing of Economic Rate of Return 34 12. Operating and Personal Time Costs per Hour: 1975 35 13. Ex-post and Appraisal Estimates of Economic Rates of Return 36 14. Listing of Staff and Consultants on Missions 37

Figures

1. Variation of Cost: Other Materials, Transport, O/H (Staff) Salaries, Consumer Price Index (CPI) 38

2. Variation of Cost: Bitumen, Copper Cable, Cement, Diesoline, M.S. Reinf 39

Maps

IBRD 2919 : Revised Scheme - Petaling Jaya Intersections IBRD 3702 : Klang Valley Region IBRD 3708R : Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project: Urban Federal Highway Improvement IBRD 10050R2: Third Highway Project IBRD 11701 : Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project: Location of Major Project Components PR6JECT PERiFOR0ANCE AUDIT REPORT

MALAYSIA - KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Preface

This report presents a performance audit of the above project for which Loan 851-MA for US$16.0 million, made in July 1972, was fully disbursed in January 1978. It consists of a memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Bank's Urban Projects Department. OED discussed the PCR with Bank Projects staff, reviewed the appraisal report, project files and the minutes of the Executive Directors' meeting which considered the project. During his visit to Malaysia in connection with other proj- ect audits, a consultant to OED had opportunities to meet with Government officials to obtain their views and clarifications on certain aspects of the PCR, which have been taken into account in preparing the audit memo- randum. The draft of this report was sent to the Borrower and he replied that he has "no further commencs to add" and that the "statements made in the said report are substantially accurate and reflect discussions" held between OED staff and the Borrower's Public Works Department. The Bor- rower's reply is attached as an annex to the audit memorandum. The as- sistance of the Government is gratefully acknowledged.

On the basis described above, the audit concurs with the prin- cipal conclusions of the PCR that by and large the project has been suc- cessfully implemented. The project has led to the Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project, still under implementation, for which a Bank loan was made in March 1976. OED's comments are reflected in the present ver- sion of the PCR; the audit memorandum briefly enlarges on the comment on certain aspects of the project experience, especially on the quality of Bank supervision.

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

MALAYSIA - KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Highlights

Malaysia - Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project financed the im- provement of a six-mile urban section of Federal Highway 2 between the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, and the adjacent town of Petaling Jaya, and various studies, including the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Study. The project's total estimated cost was US$31.6 million, of which US$16 million was financed by the Loan 851-MA.

The construction part of the project was completed with a cost overrun of 30% due to inflation, and a delay of 16 months (44% time over- run) as a result of slow land acquisition and associated problems of squat- ters, and inadequate performance of the contractor during the initial period of the project (para. 4). All but one of the studies were satisfactorily carried out. The exception was the important study of the transportation problems in metropolitan Kuala Lumpur which, although it produced a useful planning framework, left certain important aspects untreated (para. 7). The reestimated economic rate of return ranged between 26% and 30% com- pared with the appraisal estimate of 37%. The reduced return, which still is satisfactory, was due to the slower than expected traffic growth (para. 9).

Points of special interest are:

- the need for obtaining agreement, during loan negotiations, from the Borrower that effective arrangements would be made with those third parties whose timely actions and cooperation are required for project implementation (para. 5);

- the Borrower's constructive action to re- negotiate with the contractor a new escala- tion formula when, due to unforeseen price increases, the existing escalation clause was found to be inadequate to give reasonable protection to the contractor (para. 6); and

- the need for more effective deployment of the Bank's supervision manpower (para. 8).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

MALAYSIA - KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

I. Background

1. About 80% of West Malaysia's population and economic activities are located west of the north-south mountain range which divides Peninsular Malaysia into western and eastern regions. Most activities take place in or near the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area in the western region. Klang Port (previously called Port Swettenham), located about 30 miles west of Kuala Lumpur, is the country's main port, and the Klang Valley between Kuala Lumpur and the port is the major growth center of the country's econ- omy. Federal Highway 2, which runs through the valley, was inadequate to meet the fast growing traffic in this corridor. This was particularly true for the 6-mile section between Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya, the improve- ment of which was the objective of Loan 851-MA, made in 1972 in an amount of US$16.0 million.

2. Since the above project was to be only the first in a series of similar projects, it was realized from the beginning that the physical com- ponent of the project would serve to only partially alleviate the difficult traffic situation in this largely urban section. Therefore, studies were included in the project for further planning of the region's future land use and transportation needs. As future projects would put heavy loads on the Roads Division within the Federal Government's Public Works Department, strengthening the competence and capability of that agency was an implicit objective of the project (PCR, para. 2.09).

3. The project's total estimated cost was US$31.6 million and in- cluded the improvement of Federal Highway 2 (US$28.8 million) and three studies (US$2.8 million). The construction work was to be carried out in three years between April 1973 and April 1976, and the studies at various times between September 1972 and December 1973. The studies included were: the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Study, the Road Maintenance Study and De- tailed Engineering of Federal Highway 1. In addition, under UNDP financing, a regional planning study for Klang Valley was included in the project, for which the Bank acted as executing agency.

II. Implementation

4. The construction part of the project has been completed with a delay of about 16 months (only 53% of the work was completed by the sched- uled completion date) and a cost overrun of about 30% in US dollars (15% measured in Malaysian Ringgits due to appreciation of the Malaysian cur- rency vis-a-vis the US dollar). Much of the cost overrun was due to the rapid inflation following the oil crisis of 1973/74 and scarcity of mate- rials, which was not possible to foresee at the time of appraisal in 1971/ 72. Delays were caused by slow land acquisition and the associated problem of squatters, and inadequate performance of the contractor during the ini- tial period of the project. - 2 -

5. The right-of-way acquisition required the cooperation of the State Government. Whereas project implementation was the responsibility of its Public Works Department, the Feder:' Gvernment at the time did not have the right of eminent domain which was vested in the State govern- ments. By the same token, the Federal Government had no direct control over the public utility agencies which were responsible fcr moving cables, pipes and other utilities. Since neither the State nor the public utility agencies were party to the Loan Agreement (PCR, para. 3.04), agreement should have been obtained from the Borrower, during loan negotiations, that effective arrangements would be made with such third parties.

6. As to the contractor's performance (PCR, paras 3.05-3.07) for the construction of the highway, his progress was slow in the beginning due to lack of experience in works of the project's scale, but that should have been known when he was prequalified for the bidding. However, his management improved and the quality of his work was quite satisfactory throughout, even when he was adversely affected by unforeseen price in- creases and delays. Since prices had been quite stable in Malaysia before and at the time of award of the construction contract, a simple variation of prices (VOP) clause was included in the contract. However, after the 1973/74 oil crisis, this clause did not adequately protect the contractor. It was therefore decided by the Government, following the recommendations of the consultants and the Bank, to re-negotiate with the contractor a more reasonable escalation formula (PCR, paras 3.06-3.07).

7. All but one of the studies were satisfactorily completed. The exception was the important study of the transport problems in metropolitan Kuala Lumpur. According to the PCR (para. 3.16), although it produced a useful planning framework, the study left certain important aspects of transport problems untreated and suggested a large investment program with- out establishing a clear justification. Specifically, the consultants did not take sufficient account of financial constraints, and employed unduly sophisticated modelling techniques which are deemed inappropriate in the Malaysian context. The PCR recognizes (para. 3.16) that the formulation and supervision of this particular part of the project by the Bank staff were inadequate, and that critical comments were made by the Government and Bank staff on the draft final report only after the consultants had completed the report, while no suggestion was made to the consultants on how to improve the study methodology. It appears that the consultants were left largely by themselves during the execution of the study.

8. In recognition of the Government's lack of experience with proj- ects of this size, the Bank's involvement in project preparation was un- usually thorough; the project was, overall, very well prepared and vir- tually no change in the major components of the project were called for during execution (PCR, para. 6.03). With the exception of the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan study, supervision also has been quite intensive (PCR, para. 6.06). However, there is a question whether the supervision manpower de- ployment had been organized in an optimal fashion. One question that arises is why the intensive supervision operation did not adequately over- see the consultant study of Kuala Lumpur metropolitan transport. There were 13 supervision missions during a 51-month period between the first mission in August 1972 and the last (before the project completion mis- sions) in November 1976, altogether devoting 58 man-weeks of time with some missioa visits lasting for four weeks.l/ The average interval of supervision visits works out to about four months, which represents a high frequency. Parts of the studies included in the project were super- vised by the East Asia Regional Office while the responsibility for the main part of the project lay with Central Projects Staff. This division of labor was justified by the difference in the nature of the individual studies; nevertheless, the involvement of two different parts of the Bank in the project, plus frequent changes in supervision personnel, has caused, according to the Borrower, some confusion in dealing with Bank missions. Eleven different individuals participated in the 13 supervision missions, which were led by six different mission leaders. During the entire proj- ect period from identification to the last (of the two) completion missions, altogether there were 22 missions with 19 staff members participating in them. The Government has been critical of this lack of continuity in the Bank's supervision staff on this project.

9. As to the economic return of the project, it would appear on the basis of limited traffic counts, taken especially for the PCR in Sep- tember 1978, that the quantifiable benefits (savings in time and cost) are somewhat lower than estimated at the time of appraisal: between 26% and 30% instead of the estimated 37% (PCR, paras 5.09-5.11 and Table 13). This reduction results from slower than expected traffic growth. The reduced levels of return, however, remain highly satisfactory. Moreover, without the project,traffic on the existing road would have come to a vir- tual standstill during certain periods of the day. There are also unquan- tifiable benefits of the project (PCR, para. 5.12), such as traffic inte- gration between the two parts of the Petaling Jaya town, which were sepa- rated by the congested highway, accident reduction, and institutional dev- elopment through strengthening of the Roads Division of the Public Works Department.

10. The project's contribution to the improvement and strengthening of the project execution agency is especially noteworthy. At the time of appraisal, there were only five engineers in the Roads Division, including its director. Now there are over 40, and many of the additional engineers have benefitted from their involvement in this project and other road proj- ects for which Bank loans have been made at a later date. Transfer of know- - how and experience has been an important side effect of the project (PCR, para. 4.03).

1/ It is recognized that this manpower input was not solely to supervise the project under review; the supervision missions dealt also with other projects in Malaysia. III. Conclusions

11. Notwithstanding delays, the project has overall been success- fully completed. Its cost overrun is not exceptionally high, considering that the oil crisis sharply affected costs in the earlier years of imple- mentation. The project's reestimated economic return of 26% to 30%, al- though lower than the appraisal estimate, is very satisfactory, and there are several additional non-quantifiable benefits. The project has con- tributed substantially to institutional development by strengthening man- agement and performance of the Roads Division of the country's Public Works Department.

12. This project produced some useful lessons for both the Bank and the Borrower, which are not necessarily novel but nonetheless useful re- minders for efficient project formulation and implementation. First, there is need for a realistic assessment of borrower capability to carry out obligations entered into as part of loan/credit agreements (such as the right-of-way acquisition) if they entail cooperation of third parties, e.g., State governments. In the latter event, obtaining the agreement of the other entities involved could usefully be made a condition of loan/ credit effectiveness. Second, the Borrower's handling of the contractor's problem of cost increase due to an unforeseen event was rational and con- structive, resulting in minimizing further cost increases and delays; this offers an example that could be followed in similar circumstances elsewhere.

13. The project also suggests the need for improved Bank supervision in certain respects. The Bank expended a large amount of manpower for supervision of this project; a better balance in supervision coverage of project components and continuity of supervision personnel would have im- proved the cost-effectiveness of this substantial effort. From the Bor- rower's viewpoint, poor continuity became an issue. Also, the supervision effort appears to have been largely centered on the construction part of the project, with relative neglect of some of the studies. The important Kuala Lumpur urban transport study suffered as a consequence; at least an opportunity to obtain a better product was missed. Close supervision of thoughtfully organized studies by the Bank would appear very much worth- while, to help allocate resources rationally in investment projects which normally follow. -5 - ANNEX

BORROWER' S COMMENTS

64145 u0RLD9A!Q-

64145 OORLD9ANK

FEDTRY MA30242

MR. SHIV KAPUR

WORLD9ANK WASHDC

JUNE 14, 1970

RE PROJECT PERFOR"ANCE AUDIT REPORT ON MALAYSIA - KUALA LU9PUR,

URRAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA). REPORT HAS DEEq REVIEVE

BY PURLIC WORKS DEPARTIENT (AS THE IMPLEMENTING AGE"CY), AND

THEY HAVE NO FURTHER COIMENT TO ADD. STATE"ENTS !ADE IN THE

SAID REPORT ARE SURSTANTIALLY ACCURATE ANQ R7FLECT DISCUSSInnS

HELD BY "R. VAN HELDEN AND PWD. REGARDS

NIK MOHAIED SIDEK

TREASURY

KUALALUMPUR

NN NN 4-

64145 MORLDqANKO

64145 WORLDRAN!'

FEDTRY MA30242

FEDTRY IA3n242

-7 - MALAY S IA

KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT - (LOAN 851-MA)

Project Completion Report

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Sectoral Context

1.01 During the years leading up to the project covered in this report, there was (and remains) a concern among government officials regarding the uneven distribution of economic development among the different races and the different regions of Malaysia. The Government accordingly aimed to eradicate poverty and to restructure society through a "New Economic Policy" which was first announced in June, 1971 and was included in the Second Malaysian Plan (1971-1975). The policy called for a sharp increase in public expenditures, much of it in the Transport and Urban Sectors.

1.02 While recognizing the long term need to reduce racial and regional disparities, which implied heavy investments in rural and secondary city areas of the nation, the Government was faced with the fact that over 80% of the West Malaysian population and an even higher percentage of its economic activities were concentrated west of the central mountain ranges, especially in the Klang Valley around Kuala Lumpur. At the time of project inception (1970), the Kuala Lumpur-Petaling Jaya Metropolitan Area had a population of approximately 700,000 and was growing at a rate of over 5% per annum. Furthermore, the locational advantages of the valley made it the main natural focus for growth in the modern urban sector of the economy. This development has been accompanied by serious problems of unemployment, housing (especially for the poor), traffic congestion, and poor and deteriorating public transit. Thus, while recognizing the long-term needs to place the primary share of public investments outside of the Klang Valley, the Government also recognized the need to make wise selective investments in the capital region in order to assure its continued economic vitality. It was within this context that the subject project was formulated.

B. Bank's Role in Transport and Urban Sectors

1.03 Prior to investing in the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project, the Bank had made eighteen loans to Malaysia totalling approximately US$318 million, of which only two were for transport (ports at US$16.1 million, and railways at US$16.0 million). There were no prior investments for roads, urban transport, or any investment specifically for the urban sector. The project was, by its formulation, designed to be the first of a series of projects aimed at improving road transport and urban conditions in the nation.

C. Specific Conditions Leading to the Project

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capital, Kuala Lumpur on the eastern terminus and the nation's principal seaport, Port Klang, on the western terminus (see Map IBRD 3702). Lying near Kuala Lumpur is the satellite city of Petaling Jaya, which had approximately 140,000 persons in its greater urbanized area at the time of project inception. Further west lies the Subang International Airport, Shah Alam (another satellite city under development) and the city of Klang. All of these developments were major traffic generators that were expected to yield increasing amounts of traffic due to an expected rapid increase in industrial development, trade, and population in the corridor. All of this development was linked together by essentially one good road, Federal Highway 2, constructed in 1957. Since 1963 this route was a dual 2-lane (4-lane) roadway the entire distance between Kuala Lumpur and Port Klang.

1.05 The principal problem area along this route was the section between the coalescing urban centers of Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya where much of the transport movement consisted of cross commuting. About half of the resident labor force of 50,000 in the Petaling Jaya area commuted to Kuala Lumpur where they filled essentially government and service jobs. Nearly half of the 45,000 jobs in Petaling Jaya were filled by commuters from Kuala Lumpur, principally for industrial employment. This cross commuting resulted largely from the inability of the Government and local authorities to create sufficient new low-income housing in the new town and areas for industrial expansion in Kuala Lumpur.

1.06 The seriousness of the problem was illustrated by the rapid increase in traffic on the Kuala Lumpur-Petaling Jaya section of Route 2 which experienced a traffic volume increase in one section from 48,000 to 67,000 vehicles in comparable 16 hour periods during a short two year (1967-1969) period. There were approximately 1,400 accidents and ten fatalities on this section in 1969 alane, and queues of several miles in length were not uncommon. It was estimated that by 1980 average daily traffic demand would exceed 150,000 vehicles--double the conditions prevailing at project identification in 1970.

1.07 The project resulting from a response to these conditions (Loan 851-MA) had a total estimated cost of US$31.6 million and a loan amount of US$16.0 million. It was signed on July 20, 1972 with the Federal Public Works Department as the executing agency.

D. Principal Report Sources

1.08 The principal documents used in preparation of this completion report, other than supervision reports and general correspondence, are summarized in Table I. - 9 -

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

A. Origin

2.01 The project's basic shape began to be developed as part of a 1968-69 study financed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), entitled "Transportation Development in Malaysia". The study was prepared by Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. (United States consultants), with the Bank acting as executing agency. The consultants initially recommended the construction of three interchanees along Federal Highway 2 in Petaling Jaya, the reconstruction of Jalan Damansara as a 4-lane northern bypass, and the reconstruction of Jalan Klang as a 4-lane southern bypass (see Map IBRD 2919). The Public Works Department subsequently proposed that the consultants' recommendations be modified by suggesting new interchange locations, the elimination of the Jalan Klang bypass, the widening of Jalan Bangsar, and the improvement of Jalan Damansara including a 980 feet tunnel. An Identification Mission in April, 1970, stated that the project should consist solely of improvements to Federal Highway 2 citing problems with interchange design, the environmental and financial costs to correct the inadequate alignment of Jalan Damansara, and the tendency of the proposed solution to shift the traffic problem from Petaling Jaya to Kuala Lumpur. The Bank Mission suggested that by concentrating on Federal Highway 2 the following objectives could be met:

(1) Relieve present traffic problems at Petaling Jaya sooner;

(2) Make full use of existing facilities and rights-of-way already acquired for widening the Federal Highway;

(3) Reduce commitment to construct new facilities until an area- wide transportation plan is formulated; and

(4) Initiate a comprehensive and orderly transportation planning and development process.

2.02 The Mission's recommendations eventually prevailed and four alternative schemes, three advocated by the Bank (Alternatives A, B and C as shown in Table 2) and a fourth advocated by the Public Works Department were subjected to a thorough feasibility study. The feasibility analysis conducted by Freeman-Fox and Partners was useful in selecting the appropriate option and in refining the concept. Based on their studies Scheme "C" (with modifications) was developed and resulted in a project cost which was significantly less than if earlier hunch estimates as to the appropriate design were utilized. Basically, the modified Scheme "C" called for the elimination of two grade separated interchanges at the west end of the project, and the simplification of two others. - 10 -

B. Preparation and Appraisal

2.03 While there was some input from the Public Works Department it must be concluded that the basic project parameters were established by Bank missions and were refined subsequently by the consultants, Freeman-Fox and Partners, who were commissioned both to do the feasibility study and the detailed design work. The consultants were selected through a process in which the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) approached the British Overseas Development Ministry for economic assistance in preparing feasibility studies. Freeman-Fox and Partners was chosen from among four British consulting firms to undertake the work. Based on their success in completion of this exercise they were selected to do the detailed design work.

2.04 Overall, the project was very carefully prepared, which is supported by the fact that no major design changes occurred during the course of the project. The project preparation and approval process proceeded on a steady, deliberate basis. The project took approximately two years from the Identification Mission to Board Approval.

C. Project Description

2.05 The project included the improvement of about six miles of Federal Highway 2 between Kuala Lumpur and the adjacent town of Petaling Jaya., It also included studies to explore ways of improving urban transport in the greater metropolitan area.

2.06 Improvement of Federal Highway 2 consisted of:

(1) Widening the highway from two to three lanes in each direction, with a dual 4-lane segment of approximately 4,000 feet;

(2) Five grade separated intersections;

(3) Dual 12 ft wide cycle lanes parallel to the roadway;

(4) Three pedestrian bridges across the highway;

(5) Relocation of services including electric and telephone cables, water pipes and transmission towers;

(6) Detailed engineering of the above.

2.07 The project also included studies as follows:

(1) Urban transportation policy and planning studies for the metropolitan Kuala Lumpur area;

(2) Road and maintenance organization study of the Public Works Department;

(3) Dztailed engineering of a 137 miles of Federal Route 1 (see Map IBRD 10050R2). - 11 -

2.08 Beyond the project proper the Bank was involved as executing agency for the Klang Valley study, (begun January 1972) which was designed to improve comprehensive planning in the region and to identify specific high priority projects for later investment.

D. Project Objectives

2.09 While the Appraisal Report did not specifically state the following project goals,they were strongly implied:

(1) To provide short-term traffic relief on a critical section of highway between Petaling Jaya and Kuala Lumpur;

(2) To set the stage for a comprehensive transportation planning and development effort in the greater Kuala Lumpur area:

(3) To strengthen the Public Works Department's capability of handling road improvement projects of much greater complexity and scale than were handled previously.

2.10 The physical portions of the project, in addition to reducing traffic bottlenecks and reducing accidents along the Federal Highway 2, were to assist in accomplishing two additional objectives:

(1) To facilitate cross-town vehicular and pedestrian movements in Petaling Jaya by physically separating them from high speed and high volume vehicular traffic on Route 2:

(2) To facilitate bicycle and motorcycle movement in the corridor through provision of separate cycle lanes.

2.11 Given that the physical portion of the project was essentially viewed as a stop-gap solution to solve an obvious pressing transportation problem, the remainder of the project, consisting of three consultant studies, was aimed at establishing a basis for balanced transportation investment in the region, and at improving the performance of executing agencies. These additional studies were also to serve as the foundation for further Bank loans in the region. The Urban and Transportation Planning Study for Metropolitan Kuala Lumpur, served as the basis for the 2nd Kuala Lumpur Urban Transportation Project (Loan 1214-MA). The detailed engineering of 137 miles of Federal Route 1 served as technical input to the 2nd Highway Project (Loan 931-MA). The Road and Maintenance study was intended to strengthen the Department of Public Works' road maintenance function--an objective which would have an impact on several highway loans.

2.12 The principal institutional and managerial improvement intended by the project was the strengthening of the Public Works Department to the point where it could handle large and sophisticated construction projects through international competitive bidding. At the time of project preparation the Roads D)IviIaon w i,'nff the Pl"D con isted of onl, five engineers including its rec-or: wicn the help of consultants if appeared capable of handling the project. - 12 - many of these impediments during the early phases of the project. They were significant, however, toward the end of the project and contributed toward giving the contractor a time extension and increased compensation. Land acquisition delays were caused in part by the lack of eminent domain power on the part of the Federal Government which at that time could only be exercised by the State government. Since the State was not a party to the loan agreement, continuous pressure had to be put on the State by the PWD supported by the Bank. Land acquisition problems were exacerbated by the presence of squatter settlements along the right-of-way which were difficult to control. The project was designed to limited access highway standards which required fencing off most of the project right-of-way. This has been difficult to enforce in practice. As to utility relocation, (mostly cables and pipes), these works appear to have been well beyond the capacity of the utility agencies and required the PWD to call in a Japanese contracter to complete the job. 3.05 During the first several months of the project the contractor was not sufficiently mobilized. It took him at least six months to become fully deployed and once deployed clearly did not have management personnel capable of handling a project as complex as the one at hand. The contractor finally improved his staff after experiencing strong pressure from the Bank and the Public Works Department.

3.06 Just as the contractor was beginning to become sufficiently organized and staffed, the oil crisis of 1973-74 occurred, raising prices very dramatically over a short time period. As indicated in the attached. Figures 1 and 2, prices for many materials escalated over 50% within a matter of months. These sharp price escalations created a considerable hardship on the contractor, whose bid was very low (18% under the next lowest bidder). This resulted in a substantial reduction in the speed of his performance, even though the quality of work remained high. The contractor also had problems in importing steel and other raw materials which could not be supplied in Malaysia as originally anticipated.

3.07 The Government initially took a hard line in negotiating with the contractor citing inadequate variation of price (VOP) provisions in his contract. However, after extended negotiations with Bank assistance and the technical assistance of the resident engineer. a formt4a v de.yand4or granting incEresed compensation to the contractor with the government s help. The contractor's cash position subsequently improved and construction activity increased up to the projected pace. Not only was this solution reasonable, it was also wise since much more delay and still higher cost would have resulted if the contractor would have become insolvent. 3.08 In summary, part of the contract delay was due to unexpected price increases which could not have been foreseen; part of the delay was associated with start-up activities of a contractor who was clearly not used to a project of this scale and complexity; and part of the delay was due to a lack of the State government performance in securing land, and timely moving utilities by the responsible agencies.

C. Costs

3.09 The actual project costs as displayed in Table 4 can be directly compared with appraisal estimate costs since the project elements as con- structed did not vary significantly from the project as appraised. Final project costs are estimated to be approximately 29% higher than the appraisal - 13 -

As a means of accomplishing this objective, the Department agreed to establish a new unit in the Roads Division, with exclusive responsibility for implementing and managing all works included in the project. It was further agreed that the unit would be headed by an experienced project manager, who would be directly responsible to the Director of the Roads Division for all aspects of project implementation. The road maintenance study was also designed to strengthen the Federal Public Works Department by improving the management capabilities of this departmental activity.

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST

A. Start-Up

3.01 There were no major problems up to the time of contract award beyond typical delays associated with detailed design and the international competitive bidding process. In total there was an approximate five months discrepancy between the Appraisal Report estimate for commencement of work (April,1973), and the actual beginning of work (September,1973). The contract was actually awarded in June,1973 only two months later than the originally expected starting date.

B. Implementation Schedule

3.02 The construction of Route 2, which constituted the bulk of the project effort, began slightly behind schedule and became progressively further behind schedule during the early phases of the project. The contractor was never able to fully catch up, resulting in the project being completed 16 months behind the Appraisal Report schedule (see Table 3). The other project elements consisting of the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Study, the Road Maintenance Study, and detailed engineering of Route 1, also were behind schedule, but these were not of major consequence to the project as they did not affect its overall timing.

3.03 There were three principal reasons for construction delays as follows:

(a) Land acquisition and utility relocation management

(b) Management and organizational delays on the part of the contractor;

(c) Unforeseen price escalation in 1973 and 1974 (due largely to the oil embargo) which created a financial hardship on the contractor.

3.04 The land acquisition and public utility delays initially were not the key reasons for overall construction delay as the contractor was able to work around - 14 -

estimate in U. S. dollars. However, this results largely from the decline in the dollar value after appraisal. Measured in Malaysian Ringits the overrun was only approximately 13%. Considering the rampant inflation which occurred during the construction period resulting from the oil crises, which could not have been foreseen at the time of appraisal, the cost overrun was quite modest. As is indicated in the Basic Data Sheet, the consumer price index in Malaysia increased from 106.2% in 1972 to 144.0% in 1975, an increase of nearly 36%. This compares with only a 20% price contingency as established in the appraisal estimate. The average exchange rate between the US Dollar and the Malaysian currency dropped from 2.82 in 1972 to 2.40 in 1975, changing 17%. Thus when both the exchange rates and consumer price index were taken into account an effective inflation of over 40% may have incurred for some materials or services during the period of construction. (This observation is supported by Figures 1 and 2).

3.10 The cost estimates for the basic construction activity (which accounted for nearly 60% of the total final project costs) were reasonably close to the appraisal estimate (see Table 5). The final estimated cost of construction was approximately 60.4 million ringgit as opposed to an appraisal estimate of 54.6 million, or approximately 11% more than the appraisal estimate. Most claims have now been settled; only about M$2.2 million are still under review but are still ircluded in the above actual cost.

3.11 The biggest variances between appraisal cost ana actual cost were for service relocation and land acquisition. Based on rough estimates provided by the Department of Public Works each of these project elements cost approximately M$12 million as compared to appraisal estimates of M$8.5 million and M$10 million respectively for service relocation and land acquisition.

3.12 All the consultants' studies also were somewhat over original appraisal cost estimates. Due to the substantial increases in consultant studies the second phase of the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Study, which was to include detailed recommendations regarding connecting the northern terminus of the First Kuala Lumpur Project with the proposed Second Kuala Lumpur Project, was struck from the project. This consulting effort subsequently became part of the Second Highway Project (Loan 931-MA), and was executed by Valentine, Laurie and Davies (Australia).

D. Disbursements

3.13 Project disbursements quite rapidly fell behind appraisal expecta- tions and never caught up during the project (see Table 6). While disburse- ments lagged behind appraisal expectations, they basically reflected the overall delay in project execution. Disbursement procedures did not cause any unusual problems during the course of the project. - 15 -

E. Performance of Contractor, Consultants and Borrowers

3.14 Contractor. Once logistical and management problems associated with project start-up were resolved, and the consequences associated with an unanticipatEd spurt of inflation were satisfactorily remedied, the Korean contractor (Sambu-Pernas) performed adequately on the project. The quality of work performed was of the highest calibre. It can be assumed that the contractor's management abilities have substantially increased as a result of this project. The contractor currently has the largest contract of the Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport (Loan 1214-MA) which connects directly with the northern terminus of the First Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project.

3.15 Project Engineer. Freeman, Fox and Partners performed very high quality work in project feasibility, project design, and project supervision. Their work was very well received by those Bank staff members and members of the Malaysian Department of Public Works associated with the project. However, one apparent design flaw was the under dimensioning of drainage works leading to flooding of some road sections during heavy rains. j.16 Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Study. This transportation study for the metropolitan Kuala Lumpur area was carried out by Wilbur Smith and Associates (U.S.A.) in the time period of 11 months. The objective of the study was to recommend appropriate transport policies and investments leading to a second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project. The study examined wide range policies and recommended that public transport be encouraged and private transport discouraged. The recommended restraint method was restricted to parking in the central area. "Road pricing" was considered as a method of restraint but not recommended, apparently on the grounds that it was con- sidered politically unacceptable. Recommendations were made for improving public transport within the existing framework of licensing and regulation, but the consultants did not examine the possibilities of freeing or reducing economic regulation on this service. The complex modeling activity utilized, while common in western countries, was beyond the prevailing level of technical expertise of the Malaysians and may not have been necessary had a shorter range thrust been given to the overall study effort. The consultants examined three highway investment programs and recommended one involving expenditures of 700 million Malaysian dollars. This investment program was subsequently criti- cized as being inadequately justified, but neither the Government nor the Bank suggested to the consultants a methodology for arriving at a better esti- mate. On the balance, the study did provide a useful framework for establish- ing a workable traffic dispersal scheme for the second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project. This scheme was subsequently designed in detail (by Valentine, Laurie and Davies) and was partly financed by the Second Highway Project (Loan 931-MA). Overall performance on the study might have been improved had the terms of reference been more carefully tailored, the super- vision been more frequent, and the study term been somewhat longer.

3.17 Road Maintenance Study. This work was contracted to Kampsax (Denmark) and was considered to be an overall success. Even though it was found to be limited in scope, it was useful. Their recommendations have been implemented in three - 16 - pilot States, and will be implemented in two more States during the current Five Year Plan. Implementation is planned in all remaining States during the next plan. However, further work is required and the Government plans to further develop its maintenance policy over the next three years.

3.18 Route 1 Study. This work, undertaken by Valentine, Laurie and Davies, was generally adequate. Sections I and II (see Map IBRD 10050R2) were in- cluded for construction in the Second Highway Project (Loan 931-MA) and are close to completion. Due to changed development conditions beyond the con- sultant's control the designs for Sections III and IV required further review and modifications.

3.19 Borrower's Performance. The Borrower's overall technical and managerial performance during the project was mixed. While the Public Works Department's team had a generally competent small staff for routine project management, it clearly did not have the capability to handle with dispatch some of the contractual problems which occurred. This executing agency was severely hampered by its lack of eminent domain power and the lack of direct authority over agencies in charge of utility relocation. Timely intervention by the Bank and the construction supervision engineer helped to "nurse" the project back to health. While the PWD did not perform as well as might have been hoped at the outset of the project, it did gain valuable experience and its performance improved as the project proceeded towards completion.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

4.01 The project had relatively modest institutional development goals aimed principally at strengthening a reasonably strong federal agency, the Highway Division of the Public Works Department (PWD). The anticipated principal institutional growth area was that of assisting the Highway Division in anag4ng a 1qrge and complex highway project through the emplaymet _(f pei- enced foreign consultants and by means of international competitive bidding. Recognizing that this would be the first time that the subject organization would utilize ICB procedures, the PWD was requested to establish a new unit within the Roads Division with exclusive responsibility for implementa- tion and management of all works included in the project. It was to be head- ed by an experienced project manager who would be directly responsible to the Director of Roads Division.

4.02 Recognizing the sophisticated nature,of the proposed construction effort, the Bank required that the design and supervision of the project be accomplished largely by foreign technical assistance. In retrospect this was undoubtedly a wise decision due to the numerous challenges to the project's success which occurred including (a) rapid price increases, (b) the contractor's initial poor management and financial instability, and (c) land acquisition and utility relocation problems. The inclusion of a road maintenance study in the project was also an appropriate decision aimed at improving the PWD's manage- ment capabilities. - 17 -

4.03 Based on subsequent supervision of the Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project, within which the PWD is the agency responsible for most heavy civil works, it appears that PWD's management capabilities have increased substantially, even though foreign technical advisors are again being used for design and some construction supervision. Whereas at the time of project preparation there were only five engineers in the Highway Division including its director, there are now over 40 engineers. Many of these additional engineers have benefited from exposure to the consultants financed under the project. Based on PWD's current performance it may be appropriate in following projects to reduce foreign technical assistance in final project design and supervision.

4.04 The project had a very positive impact on strengthening contractor performance. All contractors participating in the bidding were pre-qualified and some, including the selected bidder, had never before contracted for work on the scale required in the project. While this lack of experience clearly showed in the early stages of the project, the contractorts management ability clearly increased during project execution. The same Korean contractor, as well as the Government of Malaysia. is. currently benefiting from this experience as the contractor currently has the largest construction responsibility in the Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project.

V. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION

A. Method of Computing Benefits at Appraisal

5.01 The project was evaluated for economic rate-of-return using a fairly standardized process in which (a) personal travel time and (b) vehicle operating costs were used as the primary means of benefit. The primary costs considered were the construction costs, although maintenance costs and construction delay costs were also used in the calculations. The "ex-post" evaluation presented here does not take issue with the original economic evaluation process, which appears sound, but rather attempts to indicate how the benefits of the project may have increased or decreased now that the project is completed.

5.02 The consultants computed construction benefits at the time of appraisal based on the following general expression:

Benefits = 1/2 [(a + b) x (c - d)]

a = number of trips from point A to point B before project b = number of trips from point A to point B after project c = costs of a trip before project d = costs of a trip after project - 18 -

5.03 As is seen from this expression, the project could produce benefits from either (a) increasing the number of trips if costs per trip remain the same, or from (b) maintaining an equal number of trips but reducing costs per trip. The expression takes into account the fact that a substantial number of trips were expected to be suppressed by the practical capacity of the roadway. The cost of a given trip was determined largely as a function of estimated travel speeds, and speeds were estimated largely on the basis of expected traffic volume in relation to the practical capacity of the roadway. Thus, the most important determination in the economic analysis was a prediction of traffic volume by type of vehicle by year.

5.04 The consultants predicted very substantial capacity restraints if only limited roadway improvements were made as is indicated in Table 7. They estimated that by 1975 traffic volumes would be at or exceeding the roadway capacity between intersections 3 and 4--the most critical link in the existing roadway system--approximately 12 hours per day (see Map 3708R). In succeeding years severe capacity problems for long periods of the day were expected at the remaining intersections. The problem was to become so serious by 1980 that the "do nothing" solution was considered to be ludicrous by the consultants. They accordingly suggested that a modified "do nothing" approach costing US$8 million (and named Scheme "A") would be utilized as the condition against which the selected project alternative would be evaluated.

B. Existing Traffic Volumes

5.05 Recognizing the importance of obtaining traffic volumes in determin- ing an ex-post economic rate of return, special vehicle-specific traffic counts were requested of the Public Works Department. The PWD responded with appropri-- ate classified counts for three days in September 1978. As is shown in Table 8 the average daily traffic (16 hour counts) increased in a range of 5% to 15% annually during the period 1971-1978. While these increases have been sub- stantial, they are still somewhat below the projected traffic level as indicated in the feasibility report by Freeman Fox and Partners.

5.06 It is interesting to note that the data suggests that some constraints to travel are already occurring at the Kuala Lumpur terminus. As is shown in Table 9, car and taxi traffic increased only a modest 38% between intersections 3 and 4 during 1971-1978 period. By contrast, motorcycle traffic (which had access to completely separated lanes) increased 72% and bus traffic increased over 200%. However, it should be recognized that much of this bus traffic increase resulted in a transfer of patronage from large stage buses to smaller mini-buses which were introduced in the interim.

5.07 Overall, the percentagewise traffic increase along this highway was somewhat less than the increase in vehicle registrations in the Kuala Lumpur area for a comparable period (see Table 10). Given the rapid growth of the PJ-KL corridor, one might have expected that trip increases might have been roughly comparable to vehicle increases, again suggesting some travel restraint. - 19 -

5.08 Once the traffic dispersal schemes currently under construction as part of the Second Urban Transport Project (see Map IBRD 11701) are completed, it can be expected that the traffic volumes along that portion of Route 2 which was upgraded by the First Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project will increase substantially. This, of course, has obvious implica- tions for th9 computed stream of travel benefits.

C. Current Estimated Rate of Return

5.09 Based on the recently collected traffic volume data--admittedly limited to only three days,--and the sensitivity testing of the economic rate of return as originally undertaken by Freeman Fox and Partners, (see Table 11), a revised estimate of the economic rate of return to the project can be attempted. As is indicated in this table, a 20% lower traffic volume would result in the economic rate of return being decreased from 38% as originally projected (subsequently reduced to 37% at appraisal) to 28%. If one were to further assume that cost of construction was to be 20% higher (in U.S. dollars) than originally estimated (it was actually 29% higher but completed a year later), the rate of return would drop an additional 2% to 26%. However, it must be recognized that concurrently with the higher construction costs the value of personal time and vehicle operating costs also increased faster than the consultants projected (see Table 12). Thus an upper bound of rate of return might be closer to 30%. In summary, the current rate of return for the road improvement is estimated to be in the range of 26-30%, as opposed to the appraisal estimate of 37% (see Table 13).

5.10 It should be emphasized that this current estimate of the rate of return is based on very conservative assumptions. It does not take into account the anticipated sharp increase in traffic expected once the improvements men- tioned in para 5.08 are completed. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the Federal Highway may be subjected to special high occupancy vehicle (HOV) treat- ment as part of the Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project which will further increase the person-trip capacity of this roadway segment.

5.11 Finally it should be acknowledged that the rate of return as calculated at time of appraisal assumed quite substantial "do nothing" conditions against which the project benefits were computed. These were an initial US$0.8 million involvement followed up by a US$8.0 million investment by 1980 as the minimum steps necessary to avoid a total collapse of the roadway system from a traffic capacity standpoint. Such "do nothing" costs,which approached half the cost of the proposed project,could be considered questionable if the rate of return of the project were to be evaluated in comparison with other Bank sponsored projects. In fact, the "true" or "absolute" rate of return for the project assuming current traffic conditions is unquestionably higher than the original appraisal estimate of 37%.

D. Non-Quantifiable Benefits

5.12 Most of the non-quantifiable benefits cited in the Appraisal Report remain valid at the time of this review. These are briefly discussed below: - 20 -

(a) Integration of Petaling Jaya. The provision of several grade separated interchanges facilitated cross-town traffic between the north side and the south side of Petaling Jaya lying on either side of Federal Highway 2. Prior to the provision of these interchanges, cross-town traffic was substantially delayed, the benefits of this delay reduction were not quantified.

(b) Provision of Cycle Lanes. Provision of cycle lanes, princi- pally for motorcycle and moped users, must be regarded as a very major plus of the project. As is indicated in Table 10 motorcycle registrations increased more rapidly than car registrations in Kuala Lumpur, between the years 1970-1977, both in absolute and in percentage terms. Given the very heavy traffic volumes on the federal roadway, it could have been expected that a substantial percentage of motorcycle traffic would either have been forced off the roadway or accident rates would have continued to increase; neither has happened.

(c) Accident Reduction. Prior to improvement of the roadway, approximately 1,400 accidents occurred along this stretch of Route 2 in one year. Although no accident data was collected as part of the project completion effort, it can be safely assumed that the accident rate has been substantially reduced due principally to the elimination of at-grade intersections and provision of better lighting. However, it took some time before the users showed the discipline'required to safely travel on three and four lanes. Accidents occurred on the at-grade interchanges until better traffic lights were installed. Speed limits will shortly be raised from 40 to 50 m.p.h.

(d) Traffic Management Flexibility. The roadway widening and grade separation elements of the project provide future options in instituting special traffic management treat- ments, such as metering access to the roadway,as a means of giving preference to high occupancy vehicles. These improvements can be made at very marginal additional costs which would not have been possible without the.project.

E. Utility of Specific Components

5.13 Cycle Lanes. Particular attention might be directed toward the economic feasibility of the cycle lanes that were included in the project. It was estimated at the time of appraisal that the cycle lanes cost about US$0.7 million (two-thirds of which was for tunnels underneath interchanges) which represented a marginal increase in the total cost of construction. While no attempt was made to quantify a marginal rate of return for including these lanes, there is little question that they are an unqualified success. For example, assuming there are 20,000 cycle trips on these lanes daily, and assum- ing that the cyciasts value these lanes at 10c per trip, the improvement would pay for itself in one year . Recent traffic counts indicate that motorcycle traffic is approximating 20-25% of all traffic in this heavily used corridor. - 21 -

Volumes in the range of 2,000-3,000 cycles per hour are common during the morning and evening rush hours.

5.14 Shortly after the cycle tracks were opened in 1977, cyclists were required by law to use only the cycle lanes. While no studies were made to determine whether or not cyclists would have continued to use the highway if they had the alternative, it was generally concurred in discussions with members of the Public Works Department that the dominant majority of cyclists would use the separate track due to safer conditions and the good surface being provided. Perhaps the only design flaw was the lack of good lighting along the cycle tracks, a feature which could be easily corrected.

5.15 Utility of Interchanges at Intersections 6 and 7. Members of the Public Works Department indicated that they thought it would have been more appropriate to have included interchanges as originally proposed in the project at Intersections 6 and 7 (see Map 3708R), but which were removed as a result of the feasibility study. Their construction will be included in the next road section for which detailed engineering, again by Freeman Fox, has just started. PWD officials are pursuing this activity as traffic volumes have reached the point where delays are becoming excessive and accident rates are unacceptably high. Traffic volumes as shown in Table 8 tend to support their contention, particularly when it is recognized that this highway is intended at least partially for high speed inter-city travel. It should be recognized, however, that there was never any question whether the interchanges were eventually needed; timing was the only issue. The penalty, if any, for the delay in con- struction should be considered minor as these additional improvements can be considered separately from the original project.

5.16 Pedestrian Overpasses. In retrospect, the engineers of the Public Works Department suggested that there were probably not enough pedestrian bridges provided for crossing the highway. Keeping in mind that the average interchange spacing was approximately 3/4 of a mile, and that Petaling Jaya was rapidly urbanizing on either side of the highway, it could be argued that more overpasses would have been economically justified. (These were estimated to cost less than US$100,000 for the three structures provided.)

VI. BANK PERFORMANCE

A. Project Justification

6.01 The Bank's interpretation of the Borrower's sector priorities which resulted in the subject Project appears entirely correct in retrospect. The stretch of highway which was upgraded was in great need of improvement from a national economic development standpoint and, had the improvement not been made, substantial economic disbenefits would have resulted. While it could be reasoned that the Government might have made the improvement also without the Bank's assistance, it is highly unlikely that the project would have been as well conceived and as economically resolved. Furthermore, the project was viewed - 22 -

as a first step leading to a larger Bank involvement in transport matters within Malaysia; in this regard the project v7s very successful.

B. Project Content and Scheduling

6.02 The project size, scheduling and complexity were probably appro- priate for the circumstances. The project was relatively straightforward and not too ambitious by current urban project standards, but was a good lead-in effort. There were enough problems during the course of the project as exemplified by (a) the need to improve the construction contractor's pertormance and (b) the delays in land acquisition and utility relocation to- suggZst tMat a more ambitious project might have substantially increased the risk of overall project failure.

C. Project Implementation Outcomes

6.03 Preparation Requirements. The Bank's preparation requirements were very thorough, methodical and time-consuming. The project took approximately two years from formal identification in 1970, and over three years from the time the concept was originally proposed. While it could be reasoned that this was a long period of time, an equally valid counter-argument could be forwarded that the project was extremely well conceived by virtue of the fact that virtually no changes were made after project initiation and the results were highly successful.

6.04 Borrower's Implementation Capacity. It appears that the Bank's assessment of the Borrower's implementation capacity at the time of project ppeparation was correct. The insistence on employing consultants for design, feasibility analysis and construction supervision, in retrospect, appears correct. The creation of a special project unit within the Highway Department of PWD also appeared appropriate in view of the problems associated with the project.

6.05 Scheduling of Implementation. It could be argued that the scheduling of implementation was a bit optimistic. Yet had the substantial inflation of 1973-1974 period (which caused project delays) not occurred, and had thA construction contract been given to a more experienced contractor, it is conceivable that the project could have been completed quite close to the appraisal schedule.

6.06 Bank Supervision. Overall, the Bank's supervision of the project was adequate. Missions were scheduled roughly on a six-month time frame, which appeared appropriate for a project of this scope and complexity, particularly when considering there was a highly qualified foreign technical advisor working as a full-time resident engineer on the project. Supervision could have been better on the consultant studies, especially the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Study, which quite clearly was not as well directed as it - 23 - might have been. However, this study's duration was only slightly more than a one-year time period, thus not permitting a substantial amount of Bank supervision. The continuity of Bank supervisory staff on the project was not as good as it might have been (see Table 14). However, some continuity was provided through the Bank's use of an engineering consultant, a previous Bank staff member, who was retained throughout most of the project.

6.07 Implication of Project Outcomes. The Bank's principal contributions to the project were:

(a) Very thorough appraisal and feasibility studies which set the project in the proper direction.

(b) Timely intervention in problem areas particularly with regard to settlement of disputes with the contractor.

(c) The innovative addition of cycle tracks to the project.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

7.01 The project was a relatively low-risk effort directed at removing a serious bottleneck in an important section of a major highway. The project was a necessity and unequivocally will become an economic success regardless of what assumptions are made regarding the methods of calculating the economic rate of return.

7.02 The principal project innovation which should be emulated in other Bank projects, was the inclusion of a well-designed cycle lane system. The success of this project element was so high that it leads to the conclusion that in all future urban transport projects the potential for such lanes should be systematically considered if cycle registration levels, right-of-way space, and general geometric conditions are favorable. It is clear that without the inclusion of cycle lanes in this project a higher share of project benefits would have gone to relatively wealthy car owners as opposed to lower- income cycle owners.

7.03 While the project was a modest effort, it was well conceived as a first step leading towards a greater Bank involvement in more sophisticated urban transport and rural highways projects. The high degree of success experienced with this project leads to the tentative conclusion that design innovations and institutional reforms might be kept to a minimum in the first project when a series of projects in the same sector are envisioned.

7.04 The principal project drawbacks, minor by comparison with its success, were the land acquisiton and utility relocation problems which were not very well handled during the course of the project. Some of these problems might have been avoided or at least minimized by a more careful appraisal of the related legal and institutional problems at project inception. Secondly, more careful supervision of some of the project studies, expecially the urban transport study, might have led to a more productive outcome. - 24 - Table 1

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Principal Resource Documents

Report No. Name Date

Reconstruction of Federal Highway 2, September 1971 Kuala Lumpur--Petaling Jaya, Phase 1 --Feasibility Study, Volume I (Main Text) and Volume 2 (Appendices); Freeman, Fox and Partners.

PS-10a Appraisal of the Kuala Lumpur May 31, 1972 Urban Transport Project, Malaysia

Loan Number 851-MA Loan Agreement (Kuala Lumpur July 20, 1972 Urban Transport Project) between the Government of Malaysia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

P-1094 Report and Recommendation of the June 8. 1972 President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to Malaysia for the Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project

Proposals for Extended Variation December 4, 1975 of Price Provisions, Letter to Director-General, (Jabatan Kerja Raya) from Freeman, Fox and Partners

929a-MA Appraisal of Second Kuala Lumpur February 12, 1976 Urban Transport Project

Loan Number 1214-MA Loan Agreement (Second Kuala Lumpur March 11, 1976 Urban Transport Project) between Malaysia and International Bank for n_zonstruction and Development

1594-MA Malaysia: New Perspectives on October 14, 1977 the Third Malaysia Plan

Letter to Mr. W.P. McCulloch October 11, 1978 from Foo Chee Eng (for Director- General of Public Works Department, Peninsular Malaysia) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Alternative Design Schemes Presented for Feasibility Analysis

General Design Parameters Estimated /1 Grade Cost Travel Demand Restrictions Design Alternative Lanes - Separations LanesU S$ 1975 1985 millions) Peak Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak

Existing Conditions dual 2 none - - (unacceptably high)

Scheme A dual 3 none - 8 25% 10% 55% 40%

Scheme B dual 2,3 8 - 17 - - - 25 5 1

Scheme C dual 3,4 /2 9 x - 26 - - - -

Scheme D dual 4 viaduct 46 - - - -

Modified Scheme C dual 3,4-/2 5 x 17

Source: Reconstruction of Federal Highway 2, Kuala Lumpur-Petaling Jaya, Phase I Feasibility Study, Freeman Fox & Partners, September 1971.

L The project was approximately 6 miles in length. P) /2 The extra lane was to be provided between interchanges 3 and 4 (Map 37081). /3 The cycle lanes were to be provided between interchanges 1 and 5 (Map 37081).

/4 These construction costs were subsequently modified slightly. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Actual and Expected Project Implementation

Percentage of Works Completed Contract Beginning of Work Completion of Work by Expected Contractor/Consultant 2 :oject Component and Nationality Award Actual Expected/ Actual Expected" Completion Date/

Road Construction Sambu-Pernas (Korea) 6/19/73 9/06/73 4/--/73 8/05/77 4/--/76 53% Route 2 (Malaysia)

Feasibility StudyL Freeman-Fox & Partners - 2/22/71 - ll/--/71 -- Route 2 (U.K.)

Detailed Engineering Freeman-Fox & Partners - 11/--/71 - 11/22/72 10/--/72 9 2 7I Route 2 (U.K.)

Construction Super- Freeman-Fox & Partners - 2/--/73 - 12/--/77 4/--/76 57%L . vision, Route 2 (U.K.)

Kuala Lumpur Wilbur Smith & Assoc. - 2/12/73 9/--/72 4/--/74 12/--/73 79% Transport Study (U.S.A.)

Road Maintenance Kampax (Denmark) - 9/15/73 10/--/72 12/--/74 10/--/73 33% Study

Detailed Engineering Valentine Laurie & - - 12/--/72 2/--/74 4/--/73 33%/6 Route 1 Davies (Australia)

Kiang Valley Study - Shankland Cox (U.K.) - 1/--/72 - 2/--/73 3/--/73 100%

11 As indicated in Chart 2 of Appraisal Report. LZ Percentage of all consultant work completed computed on basis of amount of calendar time extension required to complete effort using "expected" starting date and "actual" completion date. M /3 Funded separately by British Overseas Development Ministry. /A Funded separately by UNDP, but administered by woria Bank. 73 Compared against actual start date. T6 Numerous revisions to original scope. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs (in Millions)

Actual Cost Appraisal Estimate of Cost Actual Cost as a Proportion of Appraisal /1 /2 Malaysian US$- Contract Malaysian US$-- Estimate Contract Pcoject Component Ringgit Equivalent Amount Ringgit Equivalent of Cost (%) Amount (1) (2) (3) (l)4(3)xlOO (l)4(2)xlOO

CoLstruction cost 60.43-3 24.67 24.14 54.60 19.50 127. 102 D,t-Iled engineering 3.88 1.58 1.51 3.63 1.30 112 105 Suprervision of project works 4.08/4 1.67 1.67 3.63 1.30 128 100 Serv.ice relocation 12.00 4.90 - 8.53 3.04 161 (Govt.) Land acquisition 12.:0- 4.90 - 10.00 3.57 137 (Govt.) Project management 0.30 0.12 - 0.30 0.11 109 (Govt.)

Sub-total 92.69 37.84 27.32 80.69 28.82 131 138

Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport studies 0.88 0.36/5 0.36 1.82 0.65 55/5 100 Study of road maintenance 1.70 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.24 288 108 Detailed engineering of Route 1 5.60 2.29 1.90 5.32 1.90 121 121

Sub-total 8.18 3.34 2.90 7.81 2.79 120 115

TOTAL 100.87 41.18 30.22 88.50 31.61 130 136

/1 Using an exchange rate of US$1 - 2.45 M$ based on weighted average of exchange rates using actual disbursement schedul /2 Using an exchange rate of US$1 = 2.80 M$. 73 Based on assumed settlements of M$12.55 million; see Table 5. /4 Rough estimates by Public Works Department (JKR). 7T Scope of work reduced from appraisal estimate. -28 - Table 5

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Detailed Estimates of Construction Cost (Malaysian ringgit)

/1 /2 Appraisal-- Actual-- Item Estimate Cost

1. General 3,482,800 2,929,800 2. Site clearance 634,800 650,900 3. Fencing 1,045,100 241,000 4. Earthworks 5,651,300 6,670,700 5. Drainage 3,933,700 4,015,200 6. Paving 8,017,600 11,274,400 7. Road markings 195,600 121,900 8. Signs 474,300 411,700 9. Electrical installation 2,024,000 1,935,900 10. Signals 314,700 382,500 11. Bridges 12,532,400 13,535,200 12. Other structures 2,829,500 2,807,800 13. Services (contract) 796,500 1,223,500 14. Dayworka - 358,700 15. Additional works constructed after October 1977 - 35,500 /3 Sub-total (basic contract) 42,000,000'- 46,594,700

Physical contingencies (10%) 4,200,000 - Price contingencies (20%) 8,400,000 Variation of price for cement, 4,161,000 steel, bitumen, copper, etc. Variation of price of other 3,200,000 materials Transportation and Spares, 2,566,000 dther Claims Claim resulting from time 3,170,000 extension Minor claims 740,000

Sub-total (contingencies) 12,600,000 13,837,000

TOTAL 54,600,000 60,431,700

/1 Source: Freman, Fox & Partners, May 1972. 72 Source: Foo Chee Eng for Director-General of Public Works Department, Peninsula Malaysia, October, 1978 /3 Rounded to 42,000,000 for total prcject estimating purposes: above numbers actually total 41,931,300. - 29 - Table 6 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Comparison of Actual and Appraisal Estimate of Disbursements

Disbursements (US$ millions) Actual Disbursements IBRD Fiscal Actual Disburse- Appraisal as a Percentage Year & Quarter ments Estimate of Appraisal Estimate (%)

1972/73 December 31, 1972 0 1.4 0 March 31, 1973 0 1.4 0 June 30, 1973 1.5 1.8 83

1973/74

September 30, 1973 1.6 2.7 59 December 31, 1973 1.6 3.8 42 March 31, 1974 1.8 5.1 35 June 30, 1974 3.5 6.4 55

1974/75

September 30, 1974 4.7 7.8 60 December 31, 1974 6.0 9.3 65 March 31, 1975 7.4 10.7 69 June 30, 1975 8.5 12.1 70

1975/76

September 30, 1975 9.1 13.2 69 December 31, 1975 10.4 14.3 73 March 31, 1976 10.8 14.8 73 June 30, 1976 12.3 15.2 81

1976/77

September 30, 1976 13.5 15.2 89 December 31, 1976 14.0 16.0 88 March 31, 1977 14.5 90 June 30, 1977 15.3 96

1977/78

September 30, 1977 15.6 98 December 31, 1977 15.8 99 January 19, 1978 16.0 100

Closing Date (Legal) April 30, April 30, - '978 1977 - 30 - Table 7

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Number of Daily Hours Highway Capacity Equaled or Exceeded Without ProjectLl

Location Hours Highway Capacity Exceeded--1 (Between Interchanges as Shown on 197512- 198013 1985/3 Map 3708R) "Do Nothing" "Scheme A" "Scheme A"

1 - 2 4 most of day most of day

3 - 4 12 12 13

5 - 6 2 4 12

7 - 8 4 9 11

Source: Freeman, Fox and Partners, Federal Highway 2, Kuala Lumpur-Petaling, Jaya; Phase 1 - Feasibility Study, September 1971.

/1 Defined as Level-of-Service "D" or worse.

/2 The "Do Nothing" scheme entailed minor civil works costing approximately US$0.8 million equivalent.

/3 Scheme "A" was estimated to cost US$8 million; see Table 2. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Actual and Forecast Daily Traffic, 1971-80/=/1

/2 Location Actual Traffic-- Actual 1978 (Between 1971-78 Traffic as a Interchanges Total Annual Projected Traffic- Percentage of as Shown on 1971 1978 Percentage Percentage 1975 197&/4 1980 Projected Map 3708R) (1000s) (1000s) Increase Increase (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) 1978 Traffic

1 - 2 48.8 106.8 119% 12% 133.8 170.0 194.1 63%

2 - 3 51.2 75.5 47% 5% - - - -

3 - 4 72.5 104.8 45% 5% 103.7 135.7 157.0 77%

7 - 8 23.1 60.6 162% 15% 41.1 72.3 93.1 84%

/1 16-hour counts, 6 a.m. - 10 p.m. /2 As measured on average weekdays, September 1978, by JKR. /3 As estimated by Freeman-Fox Feasibility Study, September 1971. /4 Interpolated between 1975 and 1980 estimates by Freeman-Fox.

OD - 32 - Table 9

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Actual and Forecast Traffic Composition Between Jalan Pantai Baharu and Jalan University 1978 (1000s Vehicles Daily)

Actual Traffic 1978 Actual 1971- Traffic as a /1 /2 1978 Forecasted Percentage of 1971- 1978-- Percent Traffic 1978 Forecasted Vehicle Type Actual Actual Change 1978 Traffic

Car/Taxi 47.0 64.9 + 38% 88.7 73%

Motorcycle 15.0 25.8 + 72% 32.4 80%

Light truck 4.3 5.8 + 35% 6.4 91%

Heavy truck 4.5 2.7 - 40% 6.3 43%

Bus 1.7 5.613 +229% 1.9 195%

TOTAL 72.5 104.8 + 45% 135.7 77%

/1 Source: Freeman, Fox and Partners, Federal Highway 2, Kuala Lumpur - Petaling, Jaya; Phase 1 - Feasibility Study, September 1971.

/2 Source: September 1978 counts by Public Works Department.

/3 Mostly mini-buses introduced after project inception. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Kuala Lumpur Vehicle Registrations

Vehicles (1000s) Fleet Share (%) Total Total Car and All Percent Percent Year Bus/1 Taxi Truck Car Motorcycle Motorcycle Vehicles Car Motorcycle Other

1965 0.9 1.0 14.2 52.5 43.3 95.8 97.7 54% 44% 2%

1970 1.6 1.7 20.5 83.0 86.5 169.5 172.8 48% 50% 2%

1972 1.8 1.9 24.5 99.4 110.0 209.4 213.1 47% 52% 1%

1975 2.5 3.3 35.4 147.6 173.8 321.4 327.2 45% 53% 2%

1976 2.9 3.9 40.1 164.3 196.1 360.4 367.2 45% 53% 2% 45% 54% 1% 1977 2 .1L 4.2 42.9 176.8 213.9 390.6 396.9 - 1972-77 +17% +121% +75% +78% +94% +87% +86% - -

1970-77 +31% +147% +109% +113% +147% +130% +130% - - -

/1 Apparently does not include mini-buses.

/2 Decline may be due to mini-bus competition and retirement of old buses.

0 - 34 - Table 11

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Sensitivity Testing of Economic Rate of Return

Including or Traffic as Estimated 20% Less Traffic Excluding Value Estimated Costs Estimated Costs of Personal Time Costs 20% Higher Costs 20% Higher

Including personal time 38.0% 35.5% 28.0% 26.0%

Without personal time 23.5% 21.5% 15.0% 14./.

Note: Slight modifications in the ERR amounting to 1-2% were made by the date of the Appraisal Report, reflecting more recent cost estimates.

Source: Freeman-Fox & Partners, Reconstruction of Federal Highway 2, Kuala Lumpur - Petaling Jaya; Phase 1 - Feasibility Study, September 1971. - 35 - Table 12

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Operating and Personal Time Costs per Hour: 1975 (M)

Personal Operating Time Total /1 Vehicle Type Costs Costs Mi (US$)-

Car 54.8 253.9 308.7 1.10

Taxi 187.4 129.5 316.9 1.13

Motorcycle 12.5 52.0 64.5 0.23

Light truck 154.2 - 154.2 0.55

Heavy truck 258.3 - 258.3 0.92

Bus 298.5 347.5 646.0 2.31

Source: Freeman Fox & Partners, Federal Highway 2, Kuala Lumpur- Petaling, Jaya; Phase 1 - Feasibility Study, September 1971.

/1 Assuming 280 Mi = 1.0 US$ PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Ex-post and Appraisal Estimates of Economic Rates of Return

Percent of Project Cost Actual CostLl Road Total Rate of Return (%) Major Components (US$ million) Improvement Project Ex-post Estimate Appraisal Estimate

Road construction 24.67 65.2% 59.9% -

Detailed engineering 1.58 4.2% 3.9% - -

Project supervision 1.67 4.5% 4.0% -

Service relocation 4.90 12,9% 11.9% -

Land acquisition 4.90 12,9% 11.9% -

Project management 0.12 0.3% 0.3%

Total road improvement 37.31 100.0% 91.9% 26-30% 37%

Total other components 3.34 N.A. 8.1% N.A. N.A. H

Total project 40.65 N.A. 100.0% N.A. N.A.

Ll Based on US$1 MM$2.45; see Table 4. - 37 - Table 14

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MALAYSIA: KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 851-MA)

Listing of Staff and Consultants on Missions

Month/Year Mission Type Mission Members of Mission

Identification D. Strombom, G.J. Roth, G.E. Madavo 1/70

Preparation D. Strombom, J. Yenny 7/70

Preparation D. Strombom 10/70

Preparation J. Yenny 3/71

Preparation S. Hara, N. Noon, R. Woodford, 8/71 A. Bergan (c)

Appraisal S. Hara, R. Woodford, N. Noon 11/71 A. Bergan (c)

Appraisal R. Mulligan, W.P. McCulloch 1/72

Supervision I S. Agra, R. Woodford 8/72

Supervision II S. Hara, A. Bergan (c) 9/72

Supervision III S. Hara, G.J. Roth 11/72

Supervision IV S. Hara, A. Bergan (c) 4/73

Supervision V H.J. Schlechtriem, H.R. Young 11/73

Supervision VI R. Venkateswaran, G.J. Roth 2/74

Supervision VII A. Bergan (c) 3/74

Supervision VIII A. Bergan (c) 9/74

Supervision IX S. Sandstrom, A. Bergan (c) 2/75

Supervision X S. Sandstrom, A. Bergan (c) 6175

Supervision XI S. Sandstrom, A. Bergan (c) 10175

Supervision XII S. Sandstrom, A. Bergan (c), D. Williams (c) 8/76

Supervision XIII S. Sandstrom, K.H. Willen 11/76

Completion I A. Walters 6/78

Completion II R. Podolske 10/78

Note: Most missions combined with supervision of other projects. FIGURE 1.

VAkIATION OF COST OTHER t(ATERIALS, TRANSPORT, O/H(STAFF)SALARIES, CONStMER PRICE INDE (CI)

230

220

210 - STARTý OF SPGN LICGHTS 4 TENDER PERI D CONT9ACT 200 - L:

190 -

Source: Freeman Fox & Partners moIA LIFLTER PIPES 8o. ("The Contractor's Claim for Reimbursement of Extra Costs ... ") June 1975 170 -

W 160 -

150

140

XXX LANTERNS

1o0 LIMESTOE AGGIBRICKS - FLEXCELL/TH"OFLEX

120 S ET PILES/H -PIL

110 -IMBER-

100 .

F M A M J J A s O N D J F A M J J A 5 O N 0 J FM A J J A S 0 i N DjJ A 5 0 1c 72 - 197 9 .... 1 75 FIGURE 2 VARIATFON OF COSt T BITUMEN,COPPER CABLE,CEMEN , DIESOLINE, M S REINF. (INCLUDES STATISTICAL BULLETLN(S.5) F3R CEMENT & M S RENFT)

BITUMEN START OF TENDER PERIOD CONTRACT -E 2

2CC Source: Freeman Fox & Partners ("The Contractor's Claim for Reimbursement of Extra Costs .") June 1975

__DIESOLINE

S REINFT I9RNAS

cEMENT(S C EB) - N ) W '<'~.CE1N1ENIPUCAS-

MSREINF (OPEN MARKET) L1

COPPER CABLF

120

110

J J A 5 0 N 0 J F M AM J J AS OND J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O D ,J F M A M 1972 -1973 -974 1975

MALAYSIA REVISED SCHEME PETALING JAYA INTERSECTIONS 3KUALA Alternative LUM PUR Proposal by Mission Cansultants P.W.D.

6e.ee e . e Proposed highway

0 Proposed grade 0 ~separated interchange

Existing roads

University

Malaya f

INTERSECTION No. INTERSECTION N., 2

UTAR

JAYA

A Aý INTERSECTIONNo.

2-Lone (P.W.D.) 0 1/2 11/2 2

Miles

APRIL 1970 IBRD-2919

MAP 2 TOTELOK ANSON TOH T~oKATAN 101°00' 11 30 102°00'

-3°30' 3°30'

Kuala Selangor

MALAYSIA

KLANG VALLEY REGION Kuang -a ca- --

Federal Highways . .. Raiiways - Rivers Klang Valley Region Boundary Boundary.State KUALA LUMPUR International Airport Proposed Urban Federal Highway mp rovement N O Administrative District Boundaries Petahng Jai Built-up Areas

MILSS

s T R Al TKlang -3O001 -3°00 O F3°00'- OJPort Klang (Prt Swettenham)- |VÍ ~~K ajang

WESTMALAYSIA THAILAND

PotKla MLAA L AApur y s K.Lumpur Th, b /,o,,,, .då,, r-ap do lo, ,SINGAPORE KALIMANTAN fmply entdorsement or acceplance by the SUMATRA l01dBank ad its afflis SAMATRA SINGAPORE N D 0 S 10101 30' FEBRUARY1972 IBRD- 3702 m MALAYSIA . KUALA LUMPUR URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECI URBAN FEDERAL HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT

a- |.n I.

KUALA LUMPUR

~J~1J

.E,HR O/G PETALING JAYA

10140' 4

18RD IO05OR2

「낙 ‘

IBRD 11701 101°35' To lpoh To Kuantan 101-45' 701501 OCTOBER 1975

Batu caves MALAYSIA Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project LOCATION OF MAJOR PROJECT COMPONENTS ToKuala Selangor Proposed project: New roads Improved roads Interchanges L Intersection improvenents - Sites and services Squatter area upgradings Previous projects; Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport Project (Loan 851 MA) Second Highway Project (Loan 931 MA) - Interchanges

Existing: -1Federal highways 3'1o - - Principal roads - _ _Railways ibbr U Al Rivers Built-up areas Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory boundary -- Petaling Jaya municipal boundary -r .ang Intersection improvements: Gurney/ Pekeliling Gurney/ Perumahan Gurney \!, Bulatan Raja Muda

MILES 6 -ý 0 l 2 3 4 5 6 KILOMETERS PETALifj... Î5

3 8 305'. - - -8 ToPort Klang

01 C hina PeninsuJar 3 Sea Ipoh SMa aysi a Sun i Tesi uojton

rt Kon KUALA LUMPUJ

Johore Bah ru $unmotera. PORE1a 10 5 0.4'To Serernban 101-,45' To Kojang ý1 1 N-, D O,N N