COMMENTARY İBRAHİM DALMIŞ

COMMENTARIES

A Quick Glance at the History of Elections Elections in Iraq: What Does the in Future Hold? İBRAHİM DALMIŞ RANJ ALAALDIN The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey Hezbollah and Syria: From Regime Proxy and Polarization to Regime Savior E. FUAT KEYMAN RANDA SLIM The Structural Causes of Political Crisis The Impact of the “New” Zero in Turkey Problems Policy and the Arab Spring OSMAN CAN on the Relations Between Turkey and Lebanese Factions Strengths and Constraints of Turkish Policy MUSTAFA YETİM and BILAL HAMADE in the South Caucasus BAYRAM BALCI

6 Insight Turkey COMMENTARY A QUICK GLANCE AT THE HISTORY OF

A Quick Glance at the History of Elections in Turkey

İBRAHİM DALMIŞ* ABSTRACT Generally speaking, two traditions – right-wing politics and the Left – have dominated Turkish politics over the years. This study aims to analyze historic election results in order to deter- mine roughly how much popular support each political movement enjoys in the country. Starting from transition to multi-party sys- tem in Turkey, one can see the emergence of several ideologies, groups and political parties that appeal to various social classes. Although military interventions caused a rupture in the democ- ratization of the country, there has been a lively political environ- ment with dynamic party politics and elections. During the span of Turkish democracy, a number parties were established and closed. This article examines the trajectory of elections and par- ty perfomances with a special emphasis on ideology and electoral base of the parties.

n the months leading up to the lo- glorified projections were more in cal elections on March 30, 2014, line with wishful thinking and pipe ITurkey’s political scene set the dreams rather than real-life facts. stage for an unusually intense debate. As soon as the election results start- During this period, various anti-gov- ed flowing in, the opposition began ernment media outlets expressed sharing anecdotes about the late Aziz their firm belief that the country’s po- Nesin, a secularist writer and humor- litical landscape was on the brink of a ist who once famously claimed that major transformation. So strong was 60 percent of Turkish citizens were their conviction that opposition com- idiots. Timeless classics such as how mentators had begun to speculate terribly ignorant the voters were and that the ruling AK Party government that the country indeed was suffering would have no choice but to call for from Stockholm syndrome began to * PollMark early elections and possibly find itself quickly circulate around social media Market and Public Opinion removed from power. The elections, outlets. Research however, yielded unsurprising results as the balance of power between the As a matter of fact, the pre-election Insight Turkey Vol. 16 / No. 2 / political parties remained largely un- overexcitement and post-election 2014, pp. 7-17 altered. Thus, it became clear that the emotions of this nature have tradi-

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Polling clerks while counting the votes of Turkey’s 2014 local elections. AA / Cem Öksüz

tionally been common features of politics, social liberalism and a stat- elections in Turkey. Furthermore, ist economic policy. Having attained there is no indication that the current considerable popularity in the final situation will change in the foresee- years of the Ottoman Empire, this able future. Generally speaking, two political tradition had a serious fol- traditions – right-wing politics and lowing among the elites who founded the Left – have dominated Turkish the Republic in 1923. Their adversar- politics over the years. This study ies, understandably enough, made aims to analyze historic election re- the case for a decentralized admin- sults in order to determine rough- istrative structure that would bolster ly how much popular support each local values, social conservatism and political movement enjoys in the economic liberalism, with a particu- country. lar emphasis on democracy and po- litical liberties. The Ottoman Empire’s gradual dis- integration and its failure to compete From the Republic’s establishment with the West gave rise to two polit- until its transition to a multi-par- ical traditions, which evolved into ty system in 1946, the Republican distinctly opposite camps as a result People’s Party (CHP) single-hand- of numerous developments in the late edly ruled the country as a handful 19th and early 20th century. In gen- of attempts to facilitate opposition eral terms, one of the groups aspired parties proved futile and occasional- to reach the ideal of Western values ly bloody. It was in this context that through a centralized administration, the Democrat Party (DP), which a fundamentally secularist brand of emerged immediately after the adop-

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tion of multi-party politics, was Before proceeding with our analysis, founded by none other than former a methodological explanation might CHP politicians, including Celal Ba- be necessary: In every given election, yar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü the results are calculated with ref- and Refik Koraltan. For the purposes erence to the number of registered of this study, however, we shall ig- voters that participate in the election nore otherwise significant nuances without any procedural mistakes. In and describe the CHP and its succes- other words, election results ignore sors as the Left, while political parties registered voters that do not partici- tracing their heritage to the DP will pate in the election as well as invalid be referred to as the Right. votes. For instance, let us consider that two candidates run for public Figure 1 provides a list of political office in a district with 100 registered parties that participated in parlia- voters and that the top candidate re- mentary elections since 1950 and ceives 40 votes while the runner-up identifies their position within the wins 20 votes, meaning 40 people broader Left-Right dichotomy: did not participate in the election. In

Figure 1: A categorization of political parties in parliamentary elections since 19501

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this case, the official results would in- 1950 and 2011 with reference to the dicate that the winner received 66.7 total number of registered voters. As percent of the vote while their closest such, the figure also identifies the opponent won 33.3 percent. As such, percentage of voters that did not par- 40 percent of all voters would effec- ticipate in the election(reactionary) tively translate into 66.7 percent of as well as the popularity of contend- valid votes, just as the loser’s 20 per- ers, such as independents, whom we cent would show up in the official re- cannot designate as part of either sults as 33 percent. It would be mean- group (uncategorized). ingless, of course, to expect election results to be reported with reference As the data suggests, the Right re- to the total number of registered vot- ceived over 50 percent of the vote ers. In the same spirit, assuming that in the first free and fair elections in failure to participate in the elections 1950 and recorded an approximate- indicates apathy and a lack of interest ly 5-percent gain four years later. In might entail misleading assessments the 1960s and the 1970s, the Right’s of election results. All quantitative share of the total votes remained con- data that this study presents, unless sistently below the 50-percent mark, otherwise stated, reflect the distribu- although the first elections after the tion of votes with reference to the to- 1980 military coup drastically im- tal number of registered voters since proved the movement’s popularity. we conceptualize the decision to not Despite some losses in the 1990s, the participate in elections as a political has been a consistent upward trend in reaction or a lack of viable options as support for the Right since 2000. opposed to a passive stance. Meanwhile, the Left had a slightly Figure 2 demonstrates the popu- different experience. First of all, it lar appeal of the Right and the Left is important to note that the CHP’s in parliamentary elections between share of the vote in the 1950 elections

Figure 2: Distribution of all registered voters in parliamentary elections, 1950-2011.

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represented a historic high for the camp. While the Left’s popular ap- Right-leaning voters have a peal diminished in subsequent elec- tions, the CHP’s increasing popular- tendency to not participate ity under Bülent Ecevit in the 1970s in the elections at times when partially reversed their losses, while contemporary circumstances failing to break the 30-percent mark. In the aftermath of the 1980 military restrict the domain of coup, the Left came close to receiving parliamentary politics 30 percent of the vote in 1987 and 1999, but the overall trend has been downward. While reactionaries could also ac- count for the fluctuations in the Left’s A closer examination would also re- vote, the coefficient (0.33) makes this veal that the Right and the Left fol- explanation less meaningful. Simply lowed similar trends in the 1960s and put, right-leaning voters have a ten- again after 1980, as a decline in the dency to not participate in the elec- former camp’s popularity typically tions at times when contemporary coincided with a drop in the latter’s circumstances restrict the domain of votes, and vice versa. This phenome- parliamentary politics. Furthermore, non would attest to the limited elec- the high number of right-wing par- toral volatility between the Right ties participating in the contest often and the Left. More specifically, the draws the two camps closer with ref- correlation coefficient between their erence to valid votes. votes amount to a meager 0.03, which means that volatility is practically A case in point is the struggle between non-existent. A case of high elector- the CHP and the DP, which con- al volatility would have generated a tinued throughout the 1950s. Con- higher correlation coefficient. ventional wisdom suggests that the electorate, having had enough of the If there is virtually no electoral vola- single-party regime, opted to give the tility between the Right and the Left, opposition party a chance in the 1950 how can we account for the positive elections. By 1954, the DP’s popular- and negative changes in their popular ity climbed to 58 percent thanks to support? Quite simply, the number of the government’s impressive perfor- voters that do not participate in elec- mance. During this period, the CHP’s tions provides an explanation for this share of the vote inevitably dropped phenomenon. The correlation coeffi- to 35 percent. As the DP, however, be- cient between right-wing voters and came increasingly authoritarian, per- reactionaries remains at 0.92 – a sig- formed poorly and found itself faced nificantly high number. Accordingly, with charges of corruption and brib- an increase in the number of voters ery, the party won the 1957 elections that choose not to go to polls leads to with a less comfortable margin (DP a drop in the Right’s popular support. 48%, CHP 41%). Unwilling to change

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its ways after the 1957 vote, the DP ward the CHP. Instead, a large group was removed from power by the mil- of voters who opted to withdraw their itary three years later. While election support from the DP simply chose to results alone might corroborate this not participate in the elections. There narrative, adding the reactionaries to was, however, no electoral volatility the mix would immediately and radi- between the Right and the Left. cally change the outlook. The 1960 military coup, which According to Figure 3, the DP’s share abruptly ended the DP’s decade-long of the vote indeed increased in 1954 rule, represented new heights in the

Figure 3: Support for the DP and the CHP with reference to total number of voters, 1950-1957.

while the CHP suffered some loss- establishment’s interference in ci- es. As mentioned above, however, vilian politics. As Prime Minister the 1950 elections marked a historic Adnan Menderes, who won three high for the CHP, as the party failed consecutive parliamentary elec- to attain this level of popular sup- tions with historically high popular port in later years. Meanwhile, the support, was executed following a Left won 30 percent of all votes in the show trial, the junta rule gave rise to 1954 elections – a level that the camp widespread distrust of the political reached just twice in the history of process. Consequently, the reaction- multi-party politics in Turkey. The aries rose from 20 percent to 40 per- 1954 vote, in this regard, manifested cent by the end of the 1960s –which the extent of the CHP’s actual voter made it necessary for the military base while positioning the DP as a to act again in 1970. The trauma of political party on its path to self-actu- the DP experience, however, contin- alization. While the DP experienced ued to affect the masses throughout significant losses in 1957, the phe- the 1970s as right-leaning voters nomenon did not reflect a shift to- found themselves split between five

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political parties to facilitate the rise in the elections, the CHP managed to of Ecevit, a legend for the Left who win elections in 1973 and 1977. won 33.3 percent in 1973 and 41.4 percent in 1977 to outperform the Another common misconception Right. Again, conventional wisdom that emerged out of the political regards the Ecevit episode as an in- landscape of the 1970s was that the dication that an honest, trustworthy electorate had a tendency to opt for and knowledgeable leader can draw leftist candidates in municipal elec- a substantial amount of votes to the tions, which, by extension, meant CHP. Figure 4, however, would in- that the Left was inherently gifted in

Figure 4: Support levels in parliamentary elections with reference to all voters, 1960-1980. stead suggest that Ecevit’s victories managing local governments. This owed a great deal to the weakness of once-popular notion dated back to the Right. the 1970s, when the CHP won the Metropolitan Municipality Taking into account all registered with Vedat Dalokay in 1973 (42.4%) voters in the country, the Left’s share and Ali Dinçer in 1977 (48%). An hardly exceeded 20 percent in the oft-ignored fact about these mayoral 1973 elections and was closer to 30 races, however, was that the turnout percent four years later. As men- rate was 53.5 percent in the former tioned above, this level represented election and 50.6 percent in 1977. As a ceiling for the movement, which such, the CHP candidates claimed 20 means that Ecevit owed his status percent and 22.8 percent of all pos- as a political legend to his ability to sible votes, respectively, in 1973 and court leftist voters. Since a multitude 1977. The extremely low turnout of right-wing parties competed over reflected the overall sense of disen- votes and large chunks of otherwise chantment among right-wing voters right-wing voters did not participate due to military interventions in 1960

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and 1971, while the Left was particu- a lesser evil compared to the CHP, larly eager to score a victory. The lack which is why the party, along with of interest among right-wing voters the AP of the 1960s and the 1980s was notably more common in local as well as the ANAP and the DYP of elections. the 1980s and the 1990s, represented center-right organizations. Mean- In this respect, the situation in the while, right-wing movements, which 1960s and the 1970s specifically re- typically placed greater emphasis on sulted from the Right’s failure to nationalism and conservative values, unite under a single party’s banner engaged in parliamentary politics at as it did throughout the 1950s. As a the earliest possible time. In terms of matter of fact, just two years after the electoral competition, both subcate- DP’s establishment, public figures in- gories of the Right sought to attract cluding Ret. Gen. Fevzi Çakmak and the same voter base. Figure 5 would

Figure 5: Popular support for center-right and peripheral right parties, 1950-2011.

Osman Bölükbaşı accused the op- attest to this tradeoff between the position of playing a game of “guid- two traditions. ed democracy” with the Republican leadership and left the DP to form The correlation coefficient between the Nation Party. They reasoned that the center-right and peripheral right the DP’s founders had previously votes has traditionally been high and served under the CHP and, in this negative (-0.89). In other words, as sense, were loyal to the Republican peripheral right parties became in- ideology. The DP leadership’s dis- creasingly popular, the center-right agreements with the CHP amount- votes dropped. By the 2011 parlia- ed to little more than nuances and mentary elections, there was prac- therefore failed to live up to the ex- tically nothing left of the once over- pectations of right-wing voters. Giv- whelmingly popular center-right en the circumstances, the DP was but parties.

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When we distinguish between center platforms. The tipping point in this and peripheral right votes, we also transition would appear to be the observe a drastic change in their cor- 1994 local elections, when the Wel- relation to the Left: The correlation fare Party became the first peripheral coefficient between the center right right party to win elections in Tur- and the Left stands at 0.67 and there- key and, one year later, proceeded to fore is positive. In this regard, the two form a coalition government with a sets of political parties tend to experi- center-right party. During this peri-

Figure 6: Metropolitan mayoral contests in the 1994 local elections2. ence increases as well as drops in their od, the ’s ability to de- popular support simultaneously. At a velop a platform with national appeal time when the establishment enjoyed proved crucial (See Figure 6). support from the general population, both groups experienced periods of In the 1994 local elections, the Wel- greater popularity. By extension, the fare Party claimed conservative-lean- correlation coefficient between the ing peripheral areas such as Konya, peripheral right parties and the Left Kayseri and Erzurum, as well as İs- is notably negative (-0,60). As Figure tanbul and Ankara, the two largest 5 would suggest, the perpetrators of urban centers in the country. Diyar- the 1980 military coup specifically bakır, the only metropolitan munic- banned all peripheral right parties ipality in the predominantly Kurdish from the elections – a decision that Southeast, also went to the party. The effectively pushed the center-right elections not only marked a huge vote to a historic height of around 60 success for the Welfare Party but also percent. In later years, the inclusion represented Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s of peripheral right parties resulted debut on the country’s political scene in a notable decrease in center-right as the newly-elected mayor of İs- votes as conservative and nationalist tanbul. The decrease of center-right voters clustered around political par- votes, coupled with divisions among ties with ideologically more suitable left parties and the constant increase

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right parties as failure to impress vot- Aside from the secular ers pushed the center-right parties to the fringes of Turkey’s politics. Kemalists, the Left appeals to two additional social groups: Figure 7 offers a brief summary of the Alevi community and the how center-right, right and left par- ties performed in parliamentary immigrant population from elections since 1950. In recent years, the Balkans center-right parties have effectively disappeared from the political land- scape with theoretically no chances of revival. Meanwhile, the periph- in peripheral right votes, threatened eral right’s level of support from the the establishment, which responded general population nears its peak. In by organizing the 1997 ‘postmodern’ contrast, we observe a slow yet nota- coup. In doing so, the establishment ble decline in popular support for the falsely assumed that the Left and the Left. If the above trends rest on cer- center-right parties would experi- tain social groups and therefore are ence a revival, only to witness the largely durable, then how can we ac- rise of peripheral right parties such count for the Left’s decline? First and as the Nationalist Movement Party foremost, we must note that leftist (MHP) and the (FP), voters, at least for the time being, have the outlawed Welfare Party’s political not crossed over to the Right. Instead, successor. Shortly after the Constitu- center-left parties lost ground to their tional Court shut down the FP, the far-left competitors, whose share of AK Party entered the country’s poli- the vote has become more notewor- tics. Briefly put, right-leaning voters thy over the years. In the early 1990s, remained largely loyal to peripheral the Left lost a significant number of

Figure 7: Voting trends in parliamentary elections, 1950-2011.

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votes to the Kurdish political move- This group, lacking any form of eth- ment, whose party organizations such nic or ideological background, might as the HADEP, the DEHAP and the be willing to retract their support BDP robbed the center-left of rough- from the Republic’s founding party ly 4 points in each election thanks to and side with a new political party their emphasis on the Kurdish ethnic that is able to influence the state ap- identity. As such, the Left’s potential paratus. However, the overall voting has dropped from 30 percent to 25 trends are likely to continue without percent of the vote. Aside from the any significant changes in the fore- secular Kemalists, whose share of the seeable future. vote remains unclear, the Left appeals to two additional social groups: the Alevi community and the immigrant Endnotes population from the Balkans who 1. MP: Nation Party, CMP: Republican Nation reside in the country’s western prov- Party, TKP (1954): Villagers Party of Turkey, HP: Liberty Party, AP: , YTP: New Turkey inces. After a handful of attempts to Party, CKMP: Republican Villagers Nation Party, form their own political party failed TİP: Workers Party of Turkey, BP (1969): Union to attract the majority of Alevis, the Party, GP (1969): Reliance Party, MHP: National- ist Movement Party, TBP (1973): Union Party of former group opted to become part Turkey, MSP (1973): National Salvation Party, CGP of a larger whole. The BDP experi- (1973): Republican Reliance Party, HP: People’s ence, however, provided a valuable Party, ANAP: Motherland Party, MDP: Nationalist , SHP: Social Democratic Peo- lesson to the Alevi community about ple’s Party, DYP: True Path Party, DSP: Democratic influencing political debate through , RP: Welfare Party, MÇP: Nationalist La- a smaller but well-organized political bor Party, IDP: Reformist Democracy Party, SP: So- party rather than joining forces with cialist Party, İP: Worker›s Party, MP (1995): Nation Party, YDP: Rebirth Party, YDH: New Democracy other groups with distinct political Movement, HADEP: People›s Democracy Party, agendas. Perhaps as a consequence YP: , ÖDP: Liberty and Solidarity Party, of the BDP’s considerable success, SİP: Socialist Power Party, EMEP: , DBP: Democracy and Peace Party, BP: Peace Par- the Alevi community might consid- ty, DTP: Democratic Turkey Party, FP: Virtue Party, er forming their own political party BBP: Grand Union Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic in the future, which would result in a Party, YTP: New Turkey Party, TKP (2002): Commu- decrease in the Left’s popular support nist Party of Turkey, SP: , GP: Young Party, DEHAP: Democratic People Party, BTP: In- (approximately 6 percent). Mean- dependent Turkey Party, HAS: People’s Voice Par- while, the immigrant communities ty, MP (2011): Nation Party, MMP: Nationalist and have a tendency to support politi- Conservative Party, HAKPAR: Rights and Liberties Party, HYP: People’s Rise Party. cians that share their Balkan back- 2. RP – İstanbul, Ankara, Konya, Kayseri, Erzurum ground, which was demonstrated by and Diyarbakır; DYP – İzmir, Antalya and Eskişehir; the Young Party’s (GP) performance ANAP – Bursa, Mersin and Adana; SHP – Kocaeli in the 2002 parliamentary elections. and Gaziantep; CHP - Samsun.

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OUR W IS O S R I L H D T

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