Discussion Paper

January 2015

Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond

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Logo drawn as seperate elements with overlaps coloured seperately Cover photo: A view of Lachin town. © Conciliation Resources Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 3 A reflection of a street sign in the vicinity of Barda. © Conciliation Resources

Introduction The paper is based on discussions at a meeting supported by Conciliation Resources of the Geography, and questions of access to territory, Karabakh Contact Group (KCG), a platform are key concerns driving conflict between for collaborative thinking on issues facing the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Armenians and Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. Over three Azerbaijanis have for many years had no access to days in Tbilisi in late 2014, the KCG brought each other’s societies or territories controlled by together Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society the other side. All Armenian-Azerbaijani borders analysts and international experts on access, are closed and fortified, and many of them are movement regimes (rules administering the subject to regular strafing and sniper fire of movement of people), and the Nagorny Karabakh varying intensity. Yet a peace agreement would (NK) conflict. envisage the opening of borders, and requires the careful management of movement in a highly sensitive political context. Framing access This paper incorporates a number of perspectives The territorial isolation of NK from Armenia through which the access issue is understood today. (what Armenians see as ‘enclavisation’) has While identifying areas of clear disagreement, been a consistent Armenian concern since the it also explores points of convergence, asking early twentieth century. Armenians argue that a whether the access issue can be reframed as permanent, legally ratified access corridor is a a solution to a common problem. It looks at a guarantee against NK again becoming an island number of areas of policy relevance, including the surrounded by Azerbaijani territory in the future. potential for access to be a confidence-building Even if Azerbaijanis accept, in theory, the need for measure, options for sequencing or phasing access between NK and Armenia, it is seen as a access and ways of conceptualising joint security. temporary measure to be enacted simultaneously Finally, it offers possible entry points for further with the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue on access. It territory between NK and Armenia, as well as the argues that access is one policy area that can be return of this territory to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. decoupled from intractable political frameworks Yet the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to NK would and that could in fact be deployed to transform also raise issues of these returnees’ access to – understanding of those frameworks. and communications with – central Azerbaijan.

Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 3 TheRUSSIAN issue of access FEDERAhas never beenTION intensively more politically-charged issues, such as status ABKHAZIA discussed in public. It appears at the negotiating determination and displaced community return, table in the official talks between the Presidents may explain the low public profile of the access Sukhum/i of Armenia and Azerbaijan, mediated by the OSCE issue. KCG participants reflected on the difficulties Minsk Group, in the form of the ‘Lachin corridor’, of isolating access scenarios from other issues, Zugdidi the shortest overland corridor connecting Armenia while acknowledging that this is the situation and NK via Lachin (see map below). The fact that confronting negotiators. SOUTH Kutaisiaccess arrangementsOSSETIA* are contingent on other BLACK SEA GEORGIA Tbilisi RUSSIAN FEDERATION CASPIAN SEA

AZERBAIJAN Baku ARMENIA Shaumyan Barda Yerevan Kelbajar NAGORNY KARABAKH Agdam Stepanakert TURKEY Lachin Shusha NAKHCHEVAN

TERRITORY *known in some sources as Tskhinvali region AZERBAIJAN UNDER ARMENIAN CONTROL

IRAN Line of Contact

This map is for illustrative purposes only. Conciliation Resources takes no position on the political validity of this map or its contents. © Conciliation Resources © Conciliation Resources. This map is intended for illustrative purposes only. Borders, names and other features are presented according to common practice in the region. Conciliation Resources take no position on whether this representation is legally or politically valid. www.c-r.org Lachin forms part of the mountainous plateau that covers parts of eastern Anatolia, Armenia, and the south-western parts of Azerbaijan (see map above). Early Soviet territorial delimitations resulted in Lachin becoming an area lying between the Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’ (NKAO) and Soviet Armenia. By 1989 it was home to 47,400 Azeris and Muslim Kurds. In the 1990s, as Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict escalated, the Lachin road connecting the NKAO with Armenia was closed, rendering the NKAO dependent on airlifts for basic and military supplies. Recovering the overland connection was an Armenian priority in the war and Armenian forces took control over Lachin on 18 May 1992; it became the first of what would eventually become seven districts of Azerbaijan surrounding the NKAO falling wholly or partially under Armenian military control (Lachin, Kelbajar, Qubatly, Zangilan, Cebrayil, Fizuli and Agdam). Lachin’s entire Azeri and Kurd populations were displaced to other parts of Azerbaijan, where they live to this day. In the 1990s the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic enacted a revision of its internal boundaries, by which Lachin was amalgamated with the two regions to the south, Qubatly and Zangilan, to form a new de facto province, Kashatagh. The town of Lachin was renamed Berdzor. Despite official support and incentives, Armenian settlement of the area remains limited. Official figures for 2013 put the population of Kashatagh province (larger than Lachin) at 8,700, and of the town of Lachin/Berdzor at 1,800.

4 • Conciliation Resources Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 5 A cafe run by people displaced from Lachin. © Conciliation Resources

1. K ey points of disagreement

Armenians and Azerbaijanis have come to interpret pending the fulfilment of other conditions. But access through the respective prisms of issues these two regions are still seen as requiring longer they consider more urgent. In the words of one KCG or indefinite Armenian control, on account of their participant, “Azerbaijan wants to return territory, geographical position between Armenia and NK, Armenia wants to strengthen security.” This gives as well as their importance as a source of water rise to the following key points of disagreement. for both.

A. The meaning of access Armenians understand the issue of access through When Armenians talk about the prism of security. Access is envisaged as a “the corridor, they mean all the permanent structure solidifying the connection territory between Armenia and between NK and Armenia. This approach first and foremost concerns those living in NK today NK; when Azerbaijanis talk about for whom the current borders of the de facto it, they see only a road. Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) – which ” establish territorial contiguity with Armenia – have Azerbaijanis interpret the issue of access become natural. From the perspective of Karabakh primarily through the prisms of the return of Armenians any territorial withdrawals are displaced communities to territory, and the return unacceptable: their general position has hardened of territory to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. Access over time. Even when territorial withdrawals from corridors are therefore read as giving up parts the seven regions under Armenian control are of Azerbaijani territory temporarily for Armenian considered, Lachin and Kelbajar are separated from use, thereby tolerating a number of compromises the other five. The resulting ‘5+2’ formula might for Azerbaijani sovereignty for a period of time. see withdrawals from the other five as acceptable Access is therefore understood as a concession

Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 5 that needs to be limited in space (that is, any The wider the corridor the more access corridor should not include Kelbajar), and “ time. In this perspective, there should be a clear salient the issue of demography time frame for the Lachin corridor’s eventual will be. return to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. ” Azerbaijani understanding of access as a temporary B. The duration of access derogation of Azerbaijani territorial integrity Armenian and Azerbaijani positions here reflect encourages a minimalist understanding of the their respective interpretations of access. The Lachin corridor. This applies in both space – it should former seek prolonged or indefinite control over a be narrow and sharply defined vis-à-vis the rest of corridor crossing Lachin. The latter seek to tie such Lachin that would return to Azerbaijani jurisdiction control to fixed timelines and defined modalities. – and time. As one KCG participant observed, “the wider the corridor, the more salient the issue of Azerbaijani thinking is furthermore influenced by demography will be.” Reported distinctions between the impact of the passage of time on its displaced ‘corridor Lachin’ and ‘non-corridor Lachin’ in the communities. As Azerbaijanis born to displaced OSCE Minsk Group negotiations reflect this logic, parents are also given displaced status, natural and allegedly derailed the June 2011 presidential growth is expanding the community of potential meeting in Kazan. returnees. This generates a perceived demographic advantage that is progressively increasing, and that favours Azerbaijanis displaced from Lachin (who D. The power to control access official figures suggest now number over 60,000), Issues of access put disagreement regarding and other areas, over the Armenian population the structure of the conflict into the spotlight by living in de facto NKR-controlled territory. Many emphasising issues of control on the ground. displaced Azerbaijanis acknowledge that return Armenian positions point to the de facto NKR becomes more problematic with each passing year, as the primary Armenian party to the conflict. creating a sense of urgency, yet the prospective Furthermore, since it is the de facto NKR that is return of a majority Azerbaijani population is cited in control on the ground, access issues cannot be by Armenians as a reason why any return should be decided without it. Azerbaijani interpretations of prevented. For some this would also allow Armenian the conflict focus on Armenia with no independent settler communities to become progressively more role for Karabakh Armenians. The formal structure numerous and entrenched, although in reality the of the peace process reflects this view, in which extent of settlement is exaggerated on all sides. Armenia and Azerbaijan are the parties mandated to negotiate. This structure might encounter C. The breadth of access problems when it comes to negotiating change on the ground with actors that have local control Armenian security concerns, as well as the and legitimacy, but are internationally perceived wider trend towards securitisation, encourage as illegitimate. the expansion of access to its maximum possible territorial extent. This approach transforms an When envisaging the realities of control on the access corridor into a wider space encompassing ground on ‘agreement day + 1’, it is evident that all of the territory between Armenia and NK. The Karabakh Armenian security forces will be in influence of militarised imagery is evident in a now control of the relevant territory. It is therefore outmoded stereotype, popular in the 1990s, that important to consider how these forces would be the Lachin corridor should be 62 kilometres wide incorporated into access arrangements in such – twice the range of a GRAD missile. Alternative a way that they would share responsibility and visions of narrower access, cutting into territory accountability for the post-agreement movement now held by Armenian forces, would involve a regime. This is one example of a missing lengthening of the Line of Contact (LOC) with conversation between Baku and Stepanakert Azerbaijani forces. For Armenians it is more (known as Khankendi to Azerbaijanis) where the popular to accept the current territorial delimitation facts of control on the ground suggest the necessity and the de facto NKR’s borders as permanent, of engaging in dialogue – without prejudicing indefinitely postponing any discussion of territorial eventual status. withdrawals. This links the issue of access to the politically charged issue of the legitimacy of the NKR and manifests itself physically in the submerging of Lachin within the province of Kashatagh (see box on p.4).

6 • Conciliation Resources Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 7 Street sign indicating the Armenian name for Lachin town, Berdzor. © Conciliation Resources

2. Points of convergence

Despite these differences, there are several Reframing access corridors as a solution to the points where Armenian and Azerbaijani shared problem of secure access for ‘stranded perspectives converge. communities’ may facilitate a cooperative framework for resolving this problem. This is A. Access corridors as a solution to a not to suggest that an identical model should common problem be replicated for different corridors. Human and physical geographies differ and infrastructure and Access is usually framed as a core Armenian its management should reflect this variety. Yet the demand, reflecting and satisfying Armenian needs. potential for access corridors to solve a common However, it is assumed displaced community problem may create common interests in making return would follow a comprehensive agreement, them work. entailing the return of Azerbaijanis to areas within the former NKAO. These communities would face a comparable problem of becoming ethnic Azeri B. Access corridors or total access? enclaves surrounded by Armenian-populated The KCG discussions emphasised the contradictions territory. For example, Shusha (known as Shushi to in current Armenian and Azerbaijani thinking Armenians), previously the major Azeri settlement about movement. By their nature, access corridors in the region, is located not only in the heart of NK assume continued confrontation, through which but also on strategically vital heights above the ‘safe passage’ is needed. This thinking obscures capital Stepanakert. Returnees in this situation an alternative vision of open communications or could reasonably be expected to need comparable what might be called ‘total access’ which envisages security guarantees on a route passing via Askeran the eventual disappearance of all restricted and Agdam to central Azerbaijan. Beyond the movement regimes. Compared with total access, immediate context in NK, Azerbaijan also seeks which involves an ambitious re-imagining of the an overland route to its exclave in Nakhchevan, entire region, access corridors offer a narrower currently divided from the mainland by Armenia. and more militarised concept of movement. While Negotiations on movement also need to address there is convergence on this point, it is stronger on this issue. the Azerbaijani side. If according to one Azerbaijani participant, “the access corridor is a remnant of If we open some routes but militarist thinking”, this is a view much less likely “ to be accepted in NK, where security is seen as not all, we preserve a model of primary. Yet if ‘enclavisation’ is the problem that an confrontation.” access corridor is intended to solve, access corridors Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 7 lose relevance when the context that gives rise to D. Securitising access embeds the that ‘enclavisation’ is removed. territorial status quo KCG participants agreed strongly that the current The access corridor is a remnant rhetorical climate, public expressions of interethnic “of militarist thinking. antagonism and military displays all preclude ” meaningful discussion of access. Total access could only become realistic On the Armenian side, this climate drives the pending fundamental changes in the direction of perception that ‘no contact is good contact’, and normalisation of the regional political, economic strengthens hard-line positions hostile to change and security situation. Yet in the short term, the and supportive of the ethnic ‘reclamation’ of idea of total access may be useful in challenging territory through settlement. current, more transactional approaches to access, rooted in deals exchanging access for territory. This For as long as we hear this militant transactional approach embeds a zero-sum logic “ and assumes exclusive, rather than interdependent rhetoric and threats of war, the gains, by pitting ‘widest possible security’ against only thing we consider is our ‘widest possible territorial returns’. Total access security. recasts the access corridor as an interim measure ” On the Azerbaijani side, Armenian rhetoric that temporarily retains a restricted movement labelling territories as ‘liberated’, including regime to benefit particular groups on specific territory presumed to form a future Lachin routes. In this scenario, access corridors would corridor, provokes frustration and drives reciprocal however become redundant over time, giving way to emphases on the return of occupied territory. the mutual gains of total access. These underscore a territorially narrow and temporary framing of access, in turn confirming C. External security providers and stoking Karabakh Armenian fears of renewed The deployment of an international peacekeeping vulnerabilities as an enclave. operation in a post-framework agreement scenario (responsible amongst other things for securing E. Postponed access is different access access corridors) constitutes another core principle Even if implicitly, all sides agree that the passage in the peace proposal on the table today. Yet, with of time is changing the context, fundamental a few exceptions, there is perhaps a surprising parameters and relevant actors for any discussion degree of Armenian-Azerbaijani convergence of access. These changes involve multiple in questioning and rejecting long-term roles for complicating factors. They include the growth external security providers in post-framework of settler and displaced communities, new agreement scenarios. The identity, mandate, infrastructure on the ground, and the naturalisation location and timeframe for any peacekeeping of competing cartographies of the same areas. operation are highly contentious for all sides. These questions are also vulnerable to ongoing In the words of one KCG participant, “We are on shifts in the geopolitics surrounding the Karabakh the verge of the point where the situation has conflict. Armenians and Azerbaijanis voice distinct so changed, so evolved, that the language and reservations, including an underlying lack of trust in categories we are using are outmoded and no the security guarantees external security providers longer adequate to describe the realities we face.” would offer; lack of trust in the independence of The attaching on the Armenian side(s) of the same any such forces from the geopolitical agendas of security and access imperative to the Kelbajar the states providing them; fears that once installed region as to Lachin is evidence of this kind of such forces would be impossible to remove; and shift, or ‘content creep’, whereby modalities fears that peacekeeping forces might become part attaching to specific and limited items widen of embedded shadow economies in their areas and attach to previously unrelated items. As of deployment. Armenian KCG participants highlighted, no such However, despite convergence on doubts regarding attachments towards Kelbajar were evident in the a long-term international presence, a follow-on Armenian negotiating strategies of the 1990s. It conclusion that it is local security providers and is nonetheless the reality that NK is not densely joint security mechanisms that would need to take populated and space is not an issue. The problems their place remains implicit, undeveloped, and of cohabitation between settler and returnee confronts a severe lack of trust. communities lie more in the political realm.

8 • Conciliation Resources Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 9 3. Ar eas of policy relevance

A. Access as a confidence-building measure considering their options can choose return on the basis of personal experience and knowledge Access features in the Karabakh conflict as both of their former places of residence as they an abstract principle to be included in a future exist today. agreement, and as a reality in the present- day interactions between Armenians and B. Phasing and sequencing Azerbaijanis. In this second aspect, access has significant potential as both a short and medium- Armenians and Azerbaijanis have for many term confidence-building measure. There are years had no access to each other’s societies or many examples where movement policy has territories controlled by the other side. All borders shaped and influenced political change. ‘Access between Armenians and Azerbaijanis are sealed, breakthroughs’, such as Cyprus in 2003 and militarised and subject to regular sniper fire. There Berlin in 1989 have shown how closed movement has been no displaced community return, and there regimes can quickly break down in a de- are no mixed communities left. Discussions of securitised context. opening up access therefore challenge 20 years of mutual isolation and alienation between Armenian Wary of embedding a situation in which Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani societies. Managing insecurities territory is occupied, Azerbaijani policymakers and perceptions of being outnumbered need to be reject confidence-building measures as solidifying handled through public awareness, gradual steps the status quo. Yet in recent years it has been and incremental change. blockades, isolation and unstable frontlines rather than confidence-building measures that Armenian fears regarding the ceding of exclusive have hardened Armenian demands for exclusive, control over a Lachin corridor and Azerbaijani fears permanent and militarised access in the form of that sovereignty over the corridor would never be a territorially-maximalist sovereignty for the de returned motivate aggressive bargaining strategies facto NKR. Although ‘peace pipelines’ or ‘peace on access. These fears could be allayed by public roads’ have in the past been mentioned in policy debate and education on the sequencing of different statements, these ideas have never been developed types of access. In an initial phase, only Armenian or seen as alternatives to strategies of closure and international traffic might have access to the and isolation. Future access arrangements would Lachin corridor. Over a series of agreed interim have greater legitimacy if they built on already phases, different categories of Azerbaijani access functional movement across the conflict. Today’s could be gradually introduced, for example closed movement regime precludes the kind of beginning with transit only, then goods, to civilian autonomous social and commercial networking access for citizens over a certain age and eventually seen among Armenians and Azeris in Georgia, to universal access. A corresponding schema Russia and elsewhere. Closed movement regimes could operate for Armenian access to a corridor have become a tactic for embedding conflict, connecting Azerbaijanis in Karabakh to central as opposed to deploying access as a part of a Azerbaijan. Each stage implies a different security peace strategy. vision that is contained and where the change envisioned is incremental. There are numerous ways in which access can be included in the spectrum of confidence-building C. Conceptualising joint security measures: The eventual opening of access corridors to traffic  Reversing the securitisation of Armenian- from all concerned societies, displaced community Azerbaijani contacts by endorsing cross-border return, local ambivalence about international contact and exchange; security, and likely risks of ethnic segregation,  Institutionalising cross-border access for require thinking on eventual joint management of policymaker and analytical communities on access corridor security. Numerous angles were specific policy areas such as agriculture, the explored in the KCG discussions with regard to environment and hazard management; jointly securing access in the future, including:

 Presenting infrastructure projects for public  Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani monitoring teams debate that emphasise access as a solution to (modelled on bi-ethnic/bi-racial police teams shared problems; and in other contexts), which ensure that citizens of  Facilitating displaced community visits to either nationality have ‘their’ person in any unit support ‘informed return’ whereby those they might encounter;

Negotiating access and security: Scenarios for corridors and movement in Lachin and beyond • 9  The recruitment of returnee Azerbaijanis with D. Avoiding corruption appropriate legal records into the Karabakh KCG participants agreed that under current police force; governance conditions in Armenia and Azerbaijan,  Planning for specific risks such as vandalism, control over the movement of people through property and ownership disputes, revenge access corridors would be likely to generate actions and settling scores, possession and sales corruption and rent-seeking. Risks include the of small and light weapons, contraband and proliferation of regulation and bureaucratic controls trafficking; and (for example through the issue of travel permits), and the transformation of access corridors into  Investigation of how chip and other technologies shadow micro-economies inhibiting rather than facilitating security checks of vehicles and enhancing access. In the words of one participant, travellers may be relevant to Armenian- this likelihood highlights the “fundamental tension Azerbaijani contexts. between creating a security corridor and planning It is evident that successful joint security would for its eventual dismantlement.” These points also require fundamental shifts in the attitudes underscore the importance of incorporating of ordinary citizens to police and security forces flexibility into the design of the management, (and vice versa), regardless of their ethnicity. KCG infrastructure and monitoring of access corridors. participants noted the necessity of assuming that there will inevitably be violations and breaches of There is a fundamental tension new movement regimes, potentially violent ones. In “ the words of one participant, “you have to create a between creating a security corridor mechanism that works in such a way that a breach and planning for its eventual doesn’t start a war. You need a security force that dismantlement. knows how to react to such breaches, not to ” over escalate.”

This publication is based on a meeting of the Karabakh Contact Group (KCG), an initiative established by Conciliation Resources in 2010 aimed at generating policy-relevant thinking about the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. Held over three days in Tbilisi in late 2014, this meeting brought together 15 participants, including representatives of the expert and analytical communities in Baku, Yerevan, Stepanakert (Khankendi), and international experts. This publication was made possible by the generous support of the European Union, through the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK). Although drawing on the KCG discussions, the views presented here (with the exception of quotes) are Conciliation Resources’ own, and cannot be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or individual participants in the KCG.

10 • Conciliation Resources Possible entry points for further dialogue

A. Reconceptualising access corridors maximalist visions of territorial control on Military imagery tends to dominate visions of the Armenian side. For the Armenian side(s), future access corridors connecting mutually de-securitising access could establish a cross- isolated Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. conflict stake in reduced frontline tensions. Access corridors need to be reconceptualised as ordinary highways, indistinguishable from any other, except for additional security D. Closed borders, closed markets guarantees for those travelling on them. While The frontlines, blockades and closed they may be required for a lengthy period, communications that demarcate the Armenian- they are ultimately an interim measure. They Azerbaijani space have resulted in closed become redundant at the point when the markets, shortages, monopolies and distorted confrontation requiring their existence ceases economies. The political leverage assumed and a broader vision of total access takes by strategies of economic isolation remains their place. unproven. Yet the cost to societies in the form of lost development opportunities and socio- B. Access for all economic inequality is evident. Per capita, Specific groups have specific access and South Caucasian GDPs lag far behind many security needs. These need to be addressed other post-Soviet states. through tailored movement regimes. However, if movement regimes are not to embed ethnic E. Time works against viable access segregation they need to be designed with arrangements sufficient flexibility built in, to allow for their incremental modification and ultimately their Considering access arrangements offers a dismantling. Access infrastructure, and the clear prism into the effects of the passage of restricted movement regimes that this implies, time. This discussion paper provides evidence should aim, eventually, to disappear. of how the passage of time is altering mental, human and physical geographies in ways that impose limited shelf life on any given range C. The cost of securitisation for access of solutions. Ideas that might have worked in Current rhetorics of securitisation, militarism 1997 and 2001 are unviable today, suggesting and ethnic segregation drive visions of wide, that ideas currently being discussed may look permanent and militarised access corridors. similarly obsolete in the future. However, Securitising contact between Armenians access is one policy area that can be decoupled and Azerbaijanis makes planning for future from intractable political frameworks. access scenarios unreal and unpopular. For Indeed, deployed as a confidence-building the Azerbaijani side, de-securitising access measure, access could be used to transform may be one of the few routes to undercutting understandings of those frameworks.

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