Some Reflections on Manuel Castells' Book “Communica- Tion Power”

tripleC 7(1): 94-108, 2009 ISSN 1726-670X http://www.triple-c.at

Some Reflections on Manuel Castells’ Book “Communica- tion Power”

Christian Fuchs

Unified Theory of Information Research Group, University of Salzburg, http://www.uti.at, http://fuchs.icts.sbg.ac.at, [email protected]

Abstract: Manuel Castells deals in his book Communication Power with the question where power lies in the network society. In this paper, I discuss important issues that this book addresses, and connect them, where possible, to my own works and reflections. The book is discussed along the following lines: the concept of power, web 2.0 and mass self-communication, media manipulation, social movements, novelty & society.

Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 592 pp., 234x156mm, ISBN 978-0-19-956704-1, Hardback, $34.95 / £20.00 / €24.99

Keywords: Manuel Castells, communication power, network society, mass self-communication, web 2.0, networking power, network power, networked power, network-making power

1. Introduction

he task that Manuel Castells has set ased/scandal media politics and insurgent himself for his book Comunication Power, grassroots media politics. is to elaborate answers to the question: Four kinds of power in the network society “where does power lie in the global network are introduced: networking power, network society?” (p. 42). He tries to show that com- power, networked power, network-making munication is the central power in contempo- power (pp. 42-47, 418-420). Network-making rary society by analyzing and presenting nu- power is for Castells the “paramount form of merous empirical examples and by drawing power in the network society” (p. 47). It is held on data from many studies. The discussion and exercised by programmers and switchers. that follows does not engage with every detail Programmers have the power “to constitute of Castells’ voluminous 570 page book be- network(s), and to program/reprogram the cause this is in my opinion not the task of a network(s) in terms of the goals assigned to reflective review essay. Therefore I will con- the network”. Switchers have the power “to centrate on a selective discussion of those connect and ensure the cooperation of differ- aspects that I personally find most important. ent networks by sharing common goals and In Communication Power, Castells contin- combining resources, while fending off com- ues the analysis of what he has termed the petition from other networks by setting up network society, from a specific perspective – strategic cooperation” (p. 45). Castells gives the one of power. He argues that global social numerous examples in his book for the usage networks and social networks of social net- of “programming” and “switching” networks in works that make use of global digital commu- order to enact power and counter-power. He nication networks are the fundamental source illuminates how power and “resistance to of power and counter-power in contemporary power is achieved through the same two society. The relation between power and mechanisms that constitute power in the net- counter-power is analyzed in respect to the work society: the programs of the networks contradictions between multinational corpo- and the switches between networks” (p. 47). rate media networks and the creative audi- The basic analysis is applied to power strug- ence, framing and counter-framing, bi- gles between the global corporate multimedia

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networks and the creative audience (chapter ties. This also means that there is a huge 2), the development of media policies in the difference between Castells’ approach and USA (chapter 2), framing and counter-framing Giddens’ structuration theory, which as such in political campaigns, especially the framing is not problematic, but should also be expli- of the US public mind before, during, and after cated, especially because Castells says that the Iraq war (chapter 3); to scandal politics in he builds on Giddens’ structuration theory (p. Spain in the 1990s (chapter 4), media control 14), which he in my opinion does not. The and censorship in the USA, Russia, and problem with Castells’ notion of power is that China (chapter 4); the environmental move- he sees coercive, violent, dominative power ment, the global movement against corporate relationships as “the foundational relations of globalization, the spontaneous citizens’ society throughout history, geography, and movement that emerged in Spain after the al- cultures” (p. 9). Such power is for him “the Qaeda attacks in 2004, and the Barack most fundamental process in society” (p. 10). Obama presidential primary campaign (chap- Furthermore, Castells dismisses the “naïve ter 5). image of a reconciled human community, a normative utopia that is belied by historical 2. The Concept of Power observation” (p. 13). Is it really likely that all history of humankind and that all social situations and systems, in which we live, are al- Castells defines power in a Weber-inspired ways and necessarily shaped by power strug- way as “the relational capacity that enables a gles, coercion, violence, and domination? social actor to influence asymmetrically the Relationships of love, intimacy, and affection decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that are in modern society unfortunately often favor the empowered actor’s will, interests, characterized by violence and coercion and and values” (p. 10). Power is associated with are therefore frequently (in Castells’ terms) coercion, domination, violence or potential power relationships. But isn’t love a prototypi- violence, and asymmetry. He refers to the cal phenomenon, where many people experi- power concepts of Foucault, Weber, and ence feelings and actions that negate vio- Habermas and argues that he builds on Gid- lence, domination, and coercion? Isn’t the dens’ structuration theory. However, Giddens phenomenon of altruism in love the practical conceives power in a completely different falsification of the claim that coercive power is way, a way that is neither mentioned nor dis- the most fundamental process in society? My cussed by Castells. For Giddens, power is claim is that not coercive power, but that co- “’transformative capacity’, the capability to operation is the most fundamental process in intervene in a given set of events so as in society (Fuchs, 2008a, pp. 31-34, 40-58), and some way to alter them” (Giddens, 1985, p. that indeed it is possible to create social sys- 7), the “capability to effectively decide about tems without coercive power (in Castells’ courses of events, even where others might terms) and with a symmetric distribution of contest such decisions” (Giddens, 1985, p. 9). power (in Giddens’ terminology). Conceiving Power is for Giddens characteristic for all power as violent coercion poses the danger of social relationships, it “is routinely involved in naturalizing and fetishizing coercion and vio- the instantiation of social practices” and is lent struggles as necessary and therefore not “operating in and through human action” (Gid- historical qualities of society. The problematic dens, 1981, p. 49f). ideological-theoretical implication is that in the In Giddens’ structuration theory, power is final instance war must exist in all societies not necessarily coercive, violent, and asym- and a state of peace is dismissed and consid- metrically distributed. Therefore it becomes ered as being categorically impossible. possible to conceive of and analyze situations Castells surely does not share this implication, and social systems, in which power is more as his analysis of communication power in the symmetrically distributed, for example situa- Iraq war shows. tions and systems of participatory democracy. One problem that I have with Castells’ book Power as transformative capacity seems in- is the rather technocratic language that he deed to be a fundamental aspect of all socie- tends to use for describing networks and

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communication power – social networks, technology and has emergent qualities that technological networks, and techno-social stem from the synergetical interactions of networks are all described with the same human beings. Technology is one of many categories and metaphors that originate in results of the productive societal interactions computer science and computer technology: of human beings, it has therefore qualities that program, meta-programmers, switches, are on the one hand specifically societal, but switchers, configuration, inter-operability, pro- on the other hand different from the qualities tocols, network standards, network compo- of other products of society. That there are nents, kernel, program code, etc. I have no nodes and interactions in all networks is a doubt that Manuel Castells does not have the common aspect of social and technological intention to conflate the difference between networks, but an important task that should social and technological networks. He has not be forgotten is to differentiate between the argued for example in the past that social different emergent qualities that technological networks are a “networking form of social networks and social networks have – emer- organization” and that information technology gent qualities that interact when these two is the “material basis” for the “pervasive ex- kinds of networks are combined in the form of pansion” of social networks (Castells, 2000b, techno-social networks such as the Internet p. 500). But even if the terminology that so that meta-emergent techno-social qualities Manuel Castells now tends to employ is only appear. understood in a metaphorical sense, the prob- Castells carefully argues that power is dif- lem is that society and social systems are ferentiated in the network society and that the described in technological and computational power structure is not fully determined by one terms so that the differentia specifica of soci- group or one kind of power structure. But he ety in comparison to computers and computer also avoids a relativistic position that only networks – that society is based on humans, sees different types of power without the reflexive and self-conscious beings that have analysis of the relations between these types. cultural norms, anticipative thinking, and a Relativism categorically excludes the possibil- certain freedom of action that computers do ity of the domination of a certain kind of not have – gets lost. It is no surprise that power. Castells in contrast gives a realistic based on the frequent employment of such analysis of power. He says that there is no metaphors, Castells considers Bruno Latour’s deterministic control of the power structure by actor network theory as brilliant (p. 45). It is an one group and asserts that “whoever has important task to distinguish the qualities of enough money, including political leaders, will social networks from the qualities of techno- have a better chance of operating the switch logical networks and to identify the emergent in its favor” (p. 52). qualities of techno-social networks such as the Internet (Fuchs, 2005; Fuchs, 2008a, pp. 3. “Web 2.0” and Mass Self- 121-147). Castells acknowledges that there is a “parallel with software language” (p. 48) in Communication his terminology, but he does not give reasons for why he uses these parallels and why he The rise of integrative information, communi- thinks such parallels are useful. Obviously cation, and community-building Internet plat- society is shaped by computers, but is not a forms such as blogs, wikis, or social network- computer itself, so there is in my opinion sim- ing sites has not only prompted the develop- ply no need for such a terminological confla- ment of new concepts – web 2.0, social soft- tionism. Computer metaphors of society can ware, social media, etc –, but also a new just like biological metaphors of society be- techno-deterministic optimism that resembles come dangerous under certain circumstan- the Californian ideology that accompanied the ces so that in my opinion it is best not to start commercial rise of the Internet in the 1990s. to categorically conflate the qualitative differ- So for example Tapscott and Williams claim ence between society and technology. Tech- that the “new web” brings about “a new eco- nology is part of society and society con- nomic democracy (…) in which we all have a structs technology. Society is more than just lead role“ (Tapscott & Williams, 2007, p. 15;

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for a critique of this approach, see Fuchs, in a refreshing techno-dialectical way that 2008b). Kevin Kelly, who preached the neo- avoids the deterministic pitfalls of techno- liberal credos of liberalization, privatization, optimism and techno-pessimism. For Castells, and commercialization in relation to IT in the a novel quality of communication in contem- 1990s (see for example Kelly, 1998), argues porary society is mass self-communication: “It that the “new web”, where people “work to- is mass communication because it can poten- ward a common goal and share their products tially reach a global audience, as in the post- in common, (…) contribute labor without ing of a video on YouTube, a blog with RSS wages and enjoy the fruits free of charge” links to a number of web sources, or a mes- (Kelly, 2009, p. 118) constitutes a “new social- sage to a massive e-mail list. At the same ism” – “digital socialism”. The new socialism is time, it is self-communication because the for Kelly a socialism, in which workers do not production of the message is self-generated, control and manage organizations and the the definition of the potential receiver(s) is material output they generate. Therefore this self-directed, and the retrieval of specific notion of socialism should be questioned. For messages or content from the World Wide Kelly, socialism lies in collective production, Web and electronic networks is self-selected. not in democratic economic ownership. If “so- The three forms of communication (interper- cialism seeks to replace capitalism by a sys- sonal, mass communication, and mass self- tem in which the public interest takes prece- communication) coexist, interact, and com- dence over the interest of private profit“, “is plement each other rather than substituting for incompatible with the concentration of eco- one another. What is historically novel, with nomic power in the hands of a few“, and “re- considerable consequences for social organi- quires effective democratic control of the zation and cultural change, is the articulation economy“ (Frankfurt Declaration of the Social- of all forms of communication into a compos- ist International, 19511), then Kelly’s notion of ite, interactive, digital hypertext that includes, socialism that is perfectly compatible with the mixes, and recombines in their diversity the existence of Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, and whole range of cultural expressions conveyed other web corporations (as indicated by the by human interaction” (p. 55, see also p. 70). fact that he lists Google, Amazon, Facebook, Castells theorizes mass self-communication and YouTube in his history of socialism), is based on Umberto Eco’s semiotic model of not at all a notion of socialism, but one of communication as the emergence of “the capitalism disguised as socialism. creative audience” (pp. 127-135) that engages Castells discusses the recent develop- in the “interactive production of meaning” (p. ments of the web and the Internet, but in con- 132) and is based on the emergence of the trast to the new web 2.0 ideology he does so figure of the “sender/addressee” (p. 130). Castells analyzes the economic operations of ten global multimedia networks (pp. 73-84) 1 Of course one should mention that the Socialist – Apple, Bertelsmann, CBS, Disney, Google, International today makes more modest claims and Microsoft, NBC Universal, News Corporation, argues that “the democratic socialist movement Time Warner, Yahoo! – and of the second-tier continues to advocate both socialisation and public of multimedia conglomerates (pp. 84-92). property within the framework of a mixed economy” Important trends that he points out are an (Stockholm Declaration of Principles of the increasing economic concentration, the usage Socialist International, 1989). This meaning of of a diversity of platforms, the customization socialism is not fully divergent, but far apart from and segmentation of audiences, and econo- the one advocated by central historical figures of mies of synergy. These corporate networks socialism, such as Rosa Luxemburg, who argued stand in a contradictory relation to mass-self that socialism is “a society that is not governed by the profit motive but aims at saving human labour“ communication. (Luxemburg, 1951/2003, p. 301) and that the “aim For Castells, the contemporary Internet is of socialism is not accumulation but the satisfaction shaped by a conflict between the global mul- of toiling humanity’s wants by developing the timedia business networks that try to com- productive forces of the entire globe“ (Luxemburg, modify the Internet and the “creative audi- 1951/2003, p. 447). ence” that tries to establish a degree of citizen

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control of the Internet and to assert their right is conceived as spontaneous order that of communicative freedom without corporate should be left to itself and should not be control: “Among the global media giants and shaped by political rules (Hayek, 1988)? Does other media organizations, the digitization of it refer to freedom of speech, taste, and as- information and the expansion of networks of sembly – “the liberty of thought and discus- mass self-communication have facilitated a sion” – in line with the harm principle, as pos- preoccupation with how to monetize these tulated by John Stuart Mill (2002)? Or is networks in terms of advertising” (p. 80). “All autonomy the existence of functionally differ- the major players are trying to figure out how entiated self-referential subsystems of society to re-commodify Internet-based autonomous (Luhmann, 1998)? Or does it in a less indi- mass self-communication. They are experi- vidualistic sense refer to the combination of menting with ad-supported sites, pay sites, individual autonomy, understood as subjectiv- free streaming video portals, and pay portals. ity that is “reflective and deliberative” and (…) Web 2.0 technologies empowered con- “frees the radical imagination” from “the en- sumers to produce and distribute their own slavement of repetition” (Castoriadis, 1991, p. content. The viral success of these technolo- 164), and social autonomy, “the equal partici- gies propelled media organizations to harness pation of all in power” (Castoriadis, 1991, p. the production power of traditional consum- 136; see also Castoriadis, 1998)? Does ers” (p. 97). “The interactive capacity of the Castells’ notion of autonomy confirm one of new communication system ushers in a new the two poles of the theoretically unreconciled form of communication, mass self- relationship of private autonomy and public communication, which multiplies and diversi- autonomy that Habermas (1996, p. 84) has fies the entry points in the communication critically examined, or does it refer to the dia- process. This gives rise to unprecedented lectic of autonomy that Habermas has in mind autonomy for communicative subjects to when he speaks of a “cooriginality of private communicate at large. Yet, this potential and public autonomy” (Habermas, 1996, p. autonomy is shaped, controlled, and curtailed 104) achieved in a “system of rights in which by the growing concentration and interlocking private and public autonomy are internally of corporate media and network operators related” (Habermas, 1996, p. 280) and “recip- around the world. (…) However, this is not rocally presuppose each other” (Habermas, tantamount to one-sided, vertical control of 1996, p. 417)? Or does autonomy mean the communicative practices (…) As a result, the “status of an organized people in an enclosed global culture of universal commodification is territorial unit” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 19, for a culturally diversified and ultimately contested critique of this approach see Habermas, by other cultural expressions” (p. 136). 1989)? Or is autonomy a postmodern project Castells gives a techno-dialectical analysis of plural democracy with a multiplicity of sub- here, but it remains unclear what he means by ject positions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985)? In the rise of autonomy for communicative sub- short: There are all kinds of meanings of con- jects. cepts such as autonomy, and it is one of the The notion of autonomy in mass self- tasks of social theory to clarify which ones are communication is first introduced on page feasible and suitable for the situation of con- 129, but it is not defined, which leaves the temporary society. reader wondering what Castells wants to tell If we define “web 2.0/3.0” platforms as her/him by using this normatively and politi- world wide web platforms that are not pre- cally connoted term (see also p. 302). The dominantly sites for information consumption meaning of the concept of autonomy is not or search, but sites for social networking, self-explanatory. Is it autonomy in the sense community building, file sharing, co-operative of Kant, understood as the autonomy of the information production, and interactive blog- will as the supreme principle of morality (Kant, ging – platforms that are more systems of 2002, p. 58), the “quality of the will of being a communication and co-operation than sys- law to itself” (Kant, 2002, p. 63)? Or does tems of cognition (for details of this definition autonomy mean the “true individualism” that see Fuchs 2009c, 2008a) –, then this allows Hayek (1948) had in mind, in which capitalism us to analyze the ownership structures and

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usage data of the top 20 “web 2.0/3.0” plat- nomic data about these platforms (see table forms. I have gathered statistical and eco- 1).

Rank Website Ownership Country Year of Economic 3 Month Aver- Domain Orientation age Daily Share Creation of Global Page Views 3 Facebook Facebook Inc. USA 2004 Profit, adver- 2.99% tising 4 YouTube Google Inc. USA 2005 Profit, adver- 4.06% tising 7 Blogger Google Inc. USA 1999 Profit, adver- 0.56% tising 8 Wikipedia Wikimedia Founda- USA 2001 Non-profit, 0.54% tion Inc. non- advertising 11 Myspace MySpace Inc. USA 2003 Profit, adver- 1.25% tising 15 Twitter Twitter Inc. USA 2006 Profit, adver- 0.27% tising 16 Rapidshare Rapidshare AG CH 2002 Profit, non- 0.23% advertising 19 WordPress Automattic Inc. USA 2000 Profit, adver- 0.13% tising 32 VKontakte V Kontakte Ltd. RU 2006 Profit, adver- 1.48% tising 33 Flickr Yahoo! Inc. USA 2003 Profit, adver- 0.23% tising 37 hi5 Hi5 Networks Inc. USA 2004 Profit, adver- 0.44% tising 39 Photobucket Photobucket.com USA 2003 Profit, adver- 0.11% LLC tising 43 Orkut Brazil Google Inc. USA 2002 Profit, adver- 0.11% tising 48 Youporn Midstream Media USA 2005 Profit, adver- 0.15% tising 49 Blogspot Google Inc. USA 2000 Profit, adver- 0.06% tising 50 Pornhub Pornhub.com USA 2000 Profit, adver- 0.13% tising 58 Orkut India Google Inc. USA 2005 Profit, adver- 0.06% tising 59 ImageShack ImageShack Cor- USA 2002 Profit, adver- 0.05% poration tising 60 Tudou Quan Toodou CN 2004 Profit, adver- 0.08% Technology tising 62 Odonoklassniki Odonoklassniki RU 2002 Profit, adver- 0.34% tising Total: 13.27% Table 1: The top 20 web 2.0/3.0 platforms, ranked based on a composite index that takes into account the number of average page views over the past three months and the number of average daily visitors, data accessed on July 31st, 2009, data source: alexa.com The ranking in table 1 is based on an index goods or services over the platform). A web- that takes into account the average share of site is considered as advertising-based if the page views during the past three months and organization owning the domain sells adver- the average number of daily visitors of web tisements that are placed on its sites to cus- platforms. A website is considered as profit- tomers in order to generate profit. Platforms oriented if the organization owning the domain can be profit-oriented without being advertis- takes measures in order to accumulate money ing-based. A number of observations can be profit with the help of the website (as for ex- made: 16 of the 20 dominant web 2.0/3.0 ample in the case of advertising-based reve- domains are owned by organizations that are nue models, the selling of platform member- registered in the USA. 19 out of 20 of the ships or premium memberships, the selling of dominant web 2.0/3.0 platforms are profit-

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oriented, the only exception is Wikipedia, many communication. Due to the permanent which is advertising-free and non-profit. The activity of the recipients and their status as most frequently encountered business model produsers/prosumers, we can say that in the in this sample is one that gives platform ac- case of the Internet the audience commodity cess to the users for free, offers services for is a produser/prosumer commodity (Fuchs, free, and generates profit by advertising. forthcoming; Fuchs, 2009a). The category of However, there are also other models. So for the produser commodity does not signify a example Rapidshare, a file exchange service, democratization of the media towards a par- is advertising-free and generates profits by ticipatory or democratic system, but the total selling premium memberships. YouPorn, commodification of human creativity. During PornHub and ImageShack are advertising- much of the time that users spend online, they based and offer some free services, but also produce profit for large corporations like Goo- sell premium accounts. Odonklassniki, a Rus- gle, News Corp. (which owns MySpace), or sian social networking site, requires all new Yahoo! (which owns Flickr). Advertisements users to pay a membership fee and is adver- on the Internet are frequently personalized; tising-based. Flickr is an advertising-based this is made possible by surveilling, storing, photo sharing community. Uploading and and assessing user activities and user data viewing images is for free, Flickr sells addi- with the help of computers and databases. tional services such as photo prints, business Economic surveillance is a mechapnism that cards, or photo books. The 20 most accessed underlies capital accumulation in web 2.0/3.0. web 2.0 platforms accounted for 13.24% of That web 2.0/3.0 users constitute an audience the global average daily page views. 12.73% commodity means that they produce surplus of these 13.24% were page views on profit- value and are exploited by capital (Fuchs, oriented platforms, which means that 96.15% forthcoming). We can therefore say that Inter- of all views of the top 20 web 2.0/3.0 plat- net users constitute an exploited class of forms were conducted on profit-oriented sites. knowledge workers (Fuchs, forthcoming). I These data show that web 2.0/3.0 is a think that Manuel Castells is right in arguing strongly commodified space, there seems to that there are potentials for counter-power be only a tiny minority of non-profit platforms. within web 2.0 that can create autonomous Given these empirical results, one can spaces (which are autonomous from capital question to which degree web 2.0/3.0 users and state power). But unfortunately these are autonomous from capital. On the vast autonomous spaces are hardly existent in majority of platforms that they visit, their data web 2.0, they do not automatically exist, but and usage behaviour is stored and assessed must be struggled for. An autonomous web in order generate profit by targeted advertis- 2.0 is a mere tendency and potential that is ing. The users who google data, upload or today subsumed under the corporate logic watch videos on YouTube, upload or browse that dominates, but does not determine web personal images on Flickr, or accumulate 2.0. friends with whom they exchange content or Mass-self communication for Castells al- communicate online via social networking lows subjects to “watch the powerful” (p. 413), platforms like MySpace or Facebook, consti- but those in power “have made it their priority tute an “audience commodity” (Smythe, 1981) to harness the potential of mass self- that is sold to advertisers. The difference be- communication in the service of their specific tween the audience commodity on traditional interests” (p. 414). Therefore they engage in mass media and on the Internet is that in the enclosing the communication commons: “the latter case the users are also content produc- commons of the communication revolution are ers; there is user-generated content, the users being expropriated to expand for-profit enter- engage in permanent creative activity, com- tainment and to commodify personal freedom” munication, community building, and content- (p. 414). Castells speaks of a dialectical proc- production. That the users are more active on ess in relation to mass self-communication: the Internet than in the reception of TV or On the one hand web 2.0 business strategies radio content is due to the decentralized struc- result in “the commodification of freedom”, the ture of the Internet, which allows many-to- “enclosing of the commons of free communi-

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cation and selling people access to global their solitary despair by networking their de- communication networks in exchange for sur- sire. They fight the powers that be by identify- rendering their privacy and becoming adver- ing the networks that are” (p. 431). The prob- tising targets” (p. 421). On the other hand, lem is that there are also forces of power in “once in cyberspace, people may have all contemporary society, such as ideology and kinds of ideas, including challenging corporate coercion, that might forestall such fights, that power, dismantling government authority, and keep people occupied with struggling for sur- changing the cultural foundations of our ag- vival so that they have no time, energy, and ing/aching civilization” (p. 420). The typical thoughts for counter-power struggles. What I web 2.0-business strategy in my opinion is not am saying is that the workings of counter- “selling people access”, but giving them ac- power should not be overestimated, but only cess for free and selling the people as a pro- assessed as potentials. sumer commodity to third parties in order to Castells argues that in mass self- generate profit. As I have tried to show, this communication “traditional forms of access relationship is highly unequal, the actual control are not applicable. Anyone can upload power of corporations in web 2.0 is much a video to the Internet, write a blog, start a larger than the actual political counter-power chat forum, or create a gigantic e-mail list. that is exercised by the produsers. Castells Access in this case is the rule; blocking Inter- acknowledges this at some instances in his net access is the exception” (p. 204). In my book, for example when he speaks of “une- opinion, a central filter of the Internet that qual competition” (p. 422), but on the other benefits powerful actors is formed by visibility hand he contradicts this realism at some in- and the attention economy. Although every- stances by a certain web 2.0 optimism, for one can produce and diffuse information in example when he says that “the more corpo- principle easily with the help of the Internet rations invest in expanding communication because it is a global decentralized many-to- networks (benefiting from a hefty return), the many and one-to-many communication sys- more people build their own networks of mass tem, not all information is visible to the same self-communication, thus empowering them- degree and gets the same attention. The selves” (p. 421). The power of corporations problem in the cyberspace flood of information and other powerful actors on the web is not to is, how in this flowing informational ocean a similar extent challenged by actual counter- other users draw their attention to information. powers that empower citizens. The dialectic of So for example Indymedia, the most popular power is only a potential, but not an automatic alternative online news platform, is only actual or necessary dialectic. Political counter- ranked number 4147 in the list of the most power on the Internet is facing a massive accessed websites, whereas BBC Online is asymmetry that is due to the fact that the rul- ranked number 44, CNN Online number 52, ing powers control more resources such as the New York Times Online number 115, money, decision-making power, capacities for Spiegel Online number 152, Bildzeitung On- attention generation, etc. Power struggles are line number 246, or Fox News Online number struggles of the less powerful against the 250 (data source: alexa.com, top 1 000 000 powerful, there is no guarantee that they can 000 sites, August 2nd, 2008). This shows that emerge, that they can mobilize significant there is a stratified online attention economy, resources so that they do not remain precari- in which the trademarks of powerful media ous, and that they are successful. There are actors work as powerful symbols that help the examples for relatively successful counter- online portals of these organizations to accu- power struggles that have made use of the mulate attention. This is not to deny that Internet, as Castells shows in an impressive “mass self-communication” platforms such as manner, but I am not so optimistic that it will Blogger (ranked number 3) or Facebook be possible to seriously tackle the existing (ranked number 7) are heavily used, but po- economic, political, military, and cultural litical information generation and communica- power structures in the near or medium-term tion on such sites is much more fragmented, future. It is only a potential, not an automatism which is the reason why Jürgen Habermas that citizens “overcome the powerlessness of speaks in relation to the Internet of a danger

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of the “fragmentation of large but politically from the notion of sociality that underlies the focused mass audience into a huge number of concepts of web 2.0 and 3.0? What is the isolated issue publics” (Habermas, 2006, p. difference between web 1.0, 2.0, 3.0? In 423). In 2008, a year characterized by a huge short: The talk about “web 2.0”, “social me- interest of the US public in politics due to the dia”, and “social software” compels us to an- presidential election and the grassroots ap- swer some basic questions: What is social peal of the Obama campaign, only 14% of US about the Internet? Which different forms of Internet users posted political comments on sociality do we find on the Internet? For an- social networking sites and 8% on blogs (Pew swering these questions, we need to enter Internet & American Life Project: The Inter- conceptual sociological discussions and net’s Role in Campaign 2008). 64% of online therefore social theory becomes important for political users in the US "got their information understanding the contemporary Internet (for about the November elections from network a discussion of these sociological and social TV websites such as cnn.com, abcnews.com, theory foundations of “web 2.0” see Fuchs, or msnbcnews.com; 54% visited portal news 2009c). Users do have the counter-power services like Google or Yahoo, 43% visited capacities to use web 2.0 against the inten- the websites of local news organizations, 40% tions of the corporate operators in progressive read someone else’s comments in a news ways and political struggles, but the corporate group, website, or blog; 34% visited the web- platform owners possess the power to switch sites of major national newspapers", 26% vis- users off the networks or to switch off entire ited political or news blogs, "12% visited the networks. Furthermore they also have an website of an alternative news organization" interest in and power to permanently control (Pew Internet & American Life Project: The the online behaviour and personal data of Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008). If we as- users in order to accumulate capital with the sume that the general interest in online poli- help of targeted advertising (Fuchs, 2009b). tics is in general somewhat lower than in Economic surveillance is at the heart of capi- 2008, then these data give a realistic picture tal accumulation in web 2.0 (Fuchs, 2009b). of political information and communication The power relationship between the corporate online: The major platforms for political infor- media and the creative users that Castells mation are the online versions of the estab- describes is an asymmetrical one that privi- lished news sources and corporate mass me- leges the first. dia, political “mass self-communication” is clearly present and forms an important ten- 4. Media Manipulation dency that nonetheless remains subsumed under and dominated by established powerful Castells shows the importance of inter- and media actors. transdisciplinary research for analyzing the Castells employs the terms web 2.0 and 3.0 contemporary world by combining cognitive (see for example pp. 34, 56, 65, 97, 107, 113, science and the analysis of communication 421, 429) that he defines as “the cluster of power in order to understand how misinforma- technologies, devices, and applications that tion and the creation of misperception work as support the proliferation of social spaces on forms of communication power. For power to the Internet” (p. 65). Questions that should work it must also be cognitively reproduced in also be asked and answered in relation to the the neural networks of the brain. Political cog- notion of “web 2.0” are in my opinion: To nition works with emotions, especially anxiety which extent are the claims about the “new and anger. Framing, agenda-setting, priming, Web” ideological and serve marketing pur- and indexing are for Castells the four main poses? What is novel about “web 2.0” and mechanisms of communication power that are how can this novelty be empirically validated? used in politics for influencing the public mind. What does it exactly mean to say that the The first three are concrete strategies em- Web becomes more social? Which notions of ployed by the media for trying to manipulate the social are employed when people speak their audiences, so to speak, whereas index- of “web 2.0”? Which notion of sociality under- ing is connected to what Herman and Chom- lies “web 1.0” and how does this notion differ

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sky (1988)2 have termed the third filter in me- by image making. Media politics involves for dia manipulation: the tendency of mass media him four processes: securing access of pow- to rely on information that is provided by powerful actors to the media, the production of erful actors (such as governments and corpo- images that serve the interests of powerful rations). Castells shows the communication actors, the delivery of these messages in di- power of framing and the counter-power of verse formats and through diverse technolo- counter-framing with the example of the fram- gies combined with the measurement of its ing of the US public in the Iraq war. The me- effectiveness, and the financing of these ac- dia frames of the war on terror and patriotism tivities. Castells describes the tendency in activated the emotional and subliminal fear of media politics that the media exert communi- death of the audience, created mispercep- cation power with the help of sensationalism, tions, and contributed to the successful secur- theatrical politics, personalization, dramatiza- ing of public support for the war. This analysis tion, the fragmentation of information, nega- parallels Herman’s and Chomsky’s (1988) tive stereotyping, attack politics, and scandali- stress on anti-communism and anti-terrorism zation. These are politics that focus on human as ideological control mechanisms that they emotions. He sees direct government control have studied for the media coverage of Gua- as well as corporate ownership and leader- temala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Vietnam. ship as two important filters in media politics. Castells shows that relation to Iraq, counter- The second aspect corresponds to the first frames could only be successfully employed two filters that Herman and Chomsky (1988) after hurricane Katrina induced a public feel- have stressed in their propaganda model: ing of mismanagement about the Bush ad- size, ownership, and profit orientation of the ministration, after a series of political scan- mass media; and advertising-orientation. dals, and with the help of citizen journalism. Castells also discusses the role of political He concludes this analysis by saying that “by think tanks in informational politics, a lobbying activating networks of association between that Herman and Chomsky (1988) have events and mental images via communication termed flak and that they characterize as the processes, power-making operates in multi- fourth filter of media manipulation. Castells layered dynamics in which the way we feel analyzes political censorship and control of structures the way we think and ultimately the the media with the help of three case studies way we act” (p. 192). that cover the USA, Russia, and China. Castells argues that media make power For Castells, there are the following new and have the capacity to shape human minds aspects of media politics: the use of the Inter- net in political campaigns (p. 230), the multi- plication of entry points of political reports, on 2 Once one brings up the names Chomsky, Her- which an interaction between mainstream man, or McChesney, some readers tend to invoke media and the Internet is based (p. 234), an the cultural studies-inspired negative sentiment that unprecedented prevalence and significance of the propaganda model and these authors advance scandal politics (p. 246), the easy and imme- an elitist agenda that considers the recipients as diate diffusion of scandal politics over the stupid and passive and neglects possibilities for active reception. Such readers should be advised Internet by everyone (pp. 247f), an increase of that Herman and Chomsky are mainly analyzing the publicity and perception of corruption and strategies in media production, no matter how of the impact on public trust (p. 289). The these strategies that are crystallized in media result would be a worldwide crisis of political products are decoded and enacted by the audi- legitimacy, a decline in public trust, and a ences, and, more importantly, that Chomsky, Her- crisis of democracy. These crises could pos- man, and McChesney stress the political impor- sibly, but not automatically result in depolitici- tance of alternative media production, diffusion, zation, and would in many cases also create a and reception, which is an aspect of political activ- desire for insurgent politics, social move- ity and counter-power of the media (see for example: Herman & Chomsky, 1988, pp. 306f; Herman ments, and new public spaces. & McChesney, 1997, pp. 189-205; for this discus- Castells continuously stresses that the sion, see also Herman, 1996a, 1996b, 2003; communication structures that are used by Klaehn, 2002). powerful actors can also be used for counter-

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power strategies. A question that remains West, especially the USA: “These tragedies unanswered for me after having read chapter and calamities are only a few examples of 4 of Communication Power, is if Castells your oppression and aggression against us. It thinks that it is possible and fruitful if insurgent is commanded by our religion and intellect movements try to exert counter-power with that the oppressed have a right to return the the help of the mediated politics of scandaliza- aggression. Do not await anything from us but tion, stereotyping, and attacks, or not. Scan- Jihad, resistance and revenge. Is it in any way dalization, stereotyping, and attacking are the rational to expect that after America has at- communication power-mechanisms that tacked us for more than half a century, that Castells analyzes in chapter 4, but it remains we will then leave her to live in security and unclear if the dialectic of power and counter- peace?!!” (bin Laden: Letter to America3). On power that Castells has in mind also applies the other hand he formulates a project iden- here and if these strategies can be empirically tity, a clear societal project that al-Qaeda pur- observed in counter-power movements. In sues: “to make the Shariah the supreme law”, chapter 5, he gives the example of how the “the religion of the Unification of God; of free- Obama campaign that he characterizes as a dom from associating partners with Him, and form of insurgent politics resisted the scandal rejection of this; of complete love of Him, the and attack politics directed against Obama by Exalted; of complete submission to His Laws; the Hillary Clinton campaign without resorting and of the discarding of all the opinions, or- to the same tactics. This therefore also leaves ders, theories and religions which contradict open the question if insurgent politics are with the religion He sent down to His Prophet necessarily non-scandal politics or not. Muhammad (peace be upon him)” (Ibid.; 9). Bin Laden’s vision sounds terrifying, but it is 5. Social Movements clear that what he has in mind and what he and al-Qaeda struggle for is a large societal

project – a fundamentalist theocracy. In I have always been somehow sceptical about Communication Power, Castells seems to Castells’ (2004) distinction between proactive stick to this distinction between proactivism and reactive social movements. The first – and reactivism of social movements (p. 300). Castells (2004) discusses the Zapatistas, the The difference between certain movements American militia, Aum Shinrikyo, and al- cannot be found in their proactivism or reactiv- Qaeda – have primarily a “resistance identity” ism, two features that are characteristic for all (Castells, 2004, p. 70), are “defensive move- of them, but in their political content that ments built around trenches of resistance” ranges on a continuum from progressivism to (Castells, 2004, p. 73), “stigmatized by the anti-progressivism (Fuchs, 2006; 2008, p. logic of domination” (Castells, 2004, p. 8), 290). “primarily identity-based mobilizations in reac- For Castells, the movement for democratic tion to a clearly identified adversary (…) rather globalization stands for “the old anarchist than purveyors of a societal project”, whereas ideal of autonomous communes and free indi- the second – Castells (2004) mentions the viduals coordinating their self-managed forms movement for democratic globalization, envi- of existence on a broader scale, (…) the ronmentalism, feminism – develop resistance promise of self-managed networks enabled by identity into “project identity” (Castells, 2004, technologies of freedom” (pp. 345f). So one p. 70) and “seek the transformation of overall can say that this movement enacts and repre- social structure” (Castells, 2004, p. 8). All sents the project of establishing a society that social movements are reactive and proactive, is based on “voluntary associations” that are they have adversaries and a societal project. based on “free agreements concluded be- So for example environmentalism is not purely tween the various groups” and that “represent proactive, but also opposes pollution and pol- an interwoven network, composed of an infi- luters as adversaries, whereas al-Qaeda is nite variety of groups and federations of all not only reactive, but also proactive: So bin Laden on the one hand expresses a resis- 3 tance identity that is oriented against the http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/ theobserver, accessed on August 2, 2008.

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sizes and degrees, local, regional, national networking of scientists, activists, opinion and international temporary or more or less leaders, and celebrities; the use of entertain- permanent - for all possible purposes” (Kro- ment and popular culture for political causes; potkin, 1910, p. 284). For me, the movement mobilization and networking with the help of for democratic globalization is not just this, but social networking sites (MySpace, Facebook, even more (see Fuchs 2006, 2007; 2008a, pp. etc); celebrity advocacy; event management; 290-294): it is the contemporary universal alternative online media; video sharing plat- social movement, a movement of movements forms (YouTube, etc); actionism; street thea- that unites the diversity of other protest tre; hacking; electronic civil disobedience; movements, creates a unity in diversity that flash mob activism supported by mobile articulates the topics of all contemporary pro- phones (“instant insurgent communities”, p. test movements with the topics of capitalism 363); online fund-raising; Obama’s emotional and class. This unity in diversity can for ex- political style that promised hope and change ample be observed by taking a look at the in order to stimulate enthusiasm and grass- structure of Indymedia, which is one important roots activism; online petitions; political blog- voice of the movement: The US website of ging; or delocalized mobilization and micro- this platform is structured into 48 different targeting tactics supported by the Internet. topics, such as anti-war, environment, gender & sexuality, human & civil rights, labour, race 6. A New Society? & racism, etc. Historically, a single movement has existed for each of these topics, but now Manuel Castells has advanced the disputed this diversity is combined within one move- claim that the network society is a new society ment. The central movement of the “pro- (Castells, 2000a, p. 371; see Garnham, 1998; grammed society” that Alain Touraine has so Webster, 1997a, b) in the sense that the rela- long been looking for (compare Touraine, tionships of production, power, and experi- 1985), might now have emerged. ence “are increasingly organized around net- Castells argues that social movements that works” that “constitute the new social mor- engage in insurgent politics – “the process phology of our societies” (Castells, 2000b, p. aiming at political change (institutional 500). One can note that in prior publications change) in discontinuity with the logic embed- power seems to have been conceived by ded in political institutions” (p. 300) – “in a Castells as a typical political process, world marked by the rise of mass self- whereas now it seems to signify a broader communication, (…) have the chance to enter phenomenon, which brings up the theoretical the public space from multiple sources. By question how power, the political, and the using both horizontal communication networks non-political differ and are connected. Castells and mainstream media to convey their images considers informationalism as the “material and messages, they increase their chances of foundation” of the network society (Castells, enacting social and political change – even if 2000a, p. 367) and characterizes the eco- they start from a subordinate position in insti- nomic sphere of the network society as infor- tutional power, financial resources, or sym- mational capitalism or global economy, the bolic legitimacy” (p. 302). With the help of four political sphere as network state, and the cul- case studies he shows how social movements tural sphere as culture of real virtuality try to reprogram “the communication networks (Castells, 2000a, pp. 366-391). Within this that constitute the symbolic environment for approach that stresses the centrality of net- image manipulation and information process- works, informationalism, and communication, ing in our minds, the ultimate determinants of it is a logical step that Castells argues in individual and collective practices”: the envi- Communication Power that “power in the net- ronmental movement, the movement for de- work society is communication power” (p. 53) mocratic globalization, the spontaneous and that “communication networks are the movement that emerged in Spain after the al- fundamental networks of power-making in Qaeda attacks in March 2004, and the Obama society” (p. 426). But take a sphere such as presidential campaign. Methods of media the capitalist economy. Figure 1 shows the counter-power that are discussed include: the

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distribution of the capital assets of the world’s 7. Conclusion largest 2000 corporations at the end of the fiscal year 2008, a year that will be remem- In sum: Manuel Castells’ Communication bered for the emergence and intensification of Power is a powerful narrative about the con- a global economic crisis. Although finance nection of communication and power in con- capital suffered large profit losses in 2008, it temporary society that presents rich empirical still accounted for 74.86% of the total assets details, illuminating case studies, and repre- of the world’s largest companies. The oil and sents an original and insightful approach. It gas industry accounted for 6.21%, which will shape the disciplinary and transdiscipli- shows the economic importance of fossil fuels nary discussions about communication and – a resource over which wars are fought, power in the coming years. The central new which points out the military and political rele- category that the book introduces is the one of vance of this part of the economy. The infor- mass self-communication. Good books bring mation industry made up 4.59% of the total up many new questions, so I do have ques- assets of the world’s largest corporations4. tions and also doubts about Castells’ notion of This suggests that the capitalist economy is power, the use of computer science terms for not dominated by the information economy analyzing society, the assessment and cate- and is not predominantly an informational gorical description of the power distribution capitalism, but besides an informational capi- between global multimedia corporations and talism also new imperialism (Harvey, 2003), the creative audience, the feasibility of the finance capitalism, hyperindustrial capitalism, notion of web 2.0, his notion of social move- etc. Capitalism is a complex economic field ments, the role of the movement for democ- that is shaped by multiple interacting tenden- ratic globalization in contemporary society, cies such as communication power, finance and the centrality of informationalism and power, imperial power, hyperindustrial power, communication power. When all this is being etc. Castells leaves no doubt about the large said, it remains no doubt that this book em- influence of finance capital in contemporary powers the academic discourse about com- capitalism. He says that “the structure and munication power. dynamics of financial networks” are “at the Contemporary society is a society of global heart of capitalist power” (p. 424). In my opin- economic crisis. This has resulted in a return ion notions such as “informational capitalism” of the importance of economic questions, and “communication power” should be used in which are also questions about class, in social a modest sense so that they signify only those theory and has shown which huge power the parts of the economy or society that base global financial and economic networks have specific operations on information and com- over our lives. The central political task might munication. Depending on which variables we now be to develop counter-power against the observe (such as capital assets, profits, la- commodification of everything. That this is bour force, value added, transnationality in- easier said than done was communicated dex, etc in the economy), we can empirically recently by the result of the elections to the calculate to which extent a certain aspect of a European Parliament. The task for social the- subsystem of contemporary society is infor- ory in the contemporary situation is to develop mation-based. This approach is different from analyses of power and potential counter- saying that contemporary capitalism is pre- power. Manuel Castells reminds us that the dominantly informational and that the central role of communication certainly should not be power in contemporary society is communica- neglected in such endeavours. tion power.

4 The information economy consists for statistical purposes in these calculations of the following realms: media, semiconductors, software & services, technology hardware & equipment, telecom- munications services.

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Figure 1

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About the Author Christian Fuchs Christian Fuchs holds a venia docendi from the University of Salzburg in the field information and communication technologies & society. His areas of research are: social theory, critical theory, information society studies, media & society, ICTs & society. He is author of more than 100 academic publications, among them the book Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age (New York: Routledge 2008) and the study Social Networking Sites and the Surveillance Society. A Critical Case Study of the Usage of studiVZ, Facebook, and MySpace by Students in Salzburg in the Context of Electronic Surveillance (Vienna 2009).

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