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Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News ( Aug 13-19) 2020)

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Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News ( Aug 13-19) 2020) iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Hazard Incidents Flash News (13 - 19 Aug 2020) 104 30 17 14 2 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES Security Forces 16/AUG/2020 NINEWA GOVERNORATE Found and cleared two caches of explosives, containing Austarian rockets and six IEDs in Hawija district. An Armed Group 13/AUG/2020 An IED explosion injured a civilian, west of Mosul. An Armed Group 16/AUG/2020 An IED exploded and injured a civilian in an agricultural land near Al-Majid village of Riyadh Military Intelligence 13/AUG/2020 subdistrict. Found and cleared an explosive cache containing IED vests and mortar shells in Badush mountain of Mosul district. Popular Mobilization Forces 17/AUG/2020 Destroyed two ISIS hideouts and cleared eight IEDs in the vicinity of Al-Shahid area, Iraqi Military Forces 15/AUG/2020 southwest of Kirkuk. Found and cleared three IEDs near Al-Athba village of Al-Shoura subdistrict, south of Mosul. SALAH AL-DIN GOVERNORATE Security Forces 15/AUG/2020 Found and cleared a cache of explosives containing five IEDs, five armor-piercing An Armed Group 13/AUG/2020 rockets, and six mortar shells in Til Al-Abta subdistrict. Three Katyusha rockets landed in Balad airbase in Salah Al-Din. Security Forces 16/AUG/2020 An Armed Group 19/AUG/2020 Found a corpse with torture marks and a gunshot wound near the Tigris river in An IED explosion struck two vehicles, killing two Police members and four civilians in the Al-Namrood subdistrict. Al-Dijil area. An Armed Group 16/AUG/2020 An Armed Group 19/AUG/2020 An IED explosion struck a military patrol vehicle, injuring two soldiers in Al-Qairra Attacked the Federal Police Forces in the Al-Dijil area and killed two Police in addition to subdistrict, south of Mosul. five civilians. An Armed Group 17/AUG/2020 An IED explosion injured three civilians in the Badush area, 25km northwest of Mosul. ANBAR GOVERNORATE Security Forces 18/AUG/2020 ISIS 13/AUG/2020 Found and cleared a cache of explosives containing eight mortar shells, an RPG7 rocket, An IED explosion killed a civilian in the Al-Rihana subdistrict, south of Ana district. an SPG9 rocket, and TNTs in Sheikh Ibrahim mountain in Tal Afar district. Iraqi Military Forces 18/AUG/2020 Security Forces 19/AUG/2020 Launched an airstrike destroying an ISIS hideout in the Albu-Majbal area. Found a corpse in Old Mosul. DIYALA GOVERNORATE BAGHDAD GOVERNORATE An Armed Group 16/AUG/2020 An Armed Group 13/AUG/2020 Killed a Tribal Mobilization Forces member using a sniper rifle in the vicinity of Shaqraq Shot and killed a Federal Police member inside a barbershop in the Tarmia district. area, west of Muqdadiya district. An Armed Group 14/AUG/2020 ISIS 13/AUG/2020 Three Katyusha rockets landed in the vicinity of Baghdad airport. The rockets were Killed a civilian and injured another during an attack on Al-Islah village of Jalwla launched from the Al-Radwaniyah area, south of the capital. subdistrict in Khanaqin district. An Armed Group 15/AUG/2020 Two Katyusha rockets landed in the Taji airbase. The rockets were launched in the ERBIL GOVERNORATE Al-Rashdiyah area. Coalition Forces 18/AUG/2020 Security Forces 16/AUG/2020 Launched several airstrikes, destroying nine ISIS hideouts and killing ten insurgents in Found two corpses of a retired Military officer and his sister inside their house in the Qara Chough mountain of Makhmur district. Al-Kadhimiyah area. An Armed Group 18/AUG/2020 A Katyusha rocket landed in the vicinity of Baghdad airport. The rocket was launched in Al-Fayadih village southeast of the airport. An Armed Group 19/AUG/2020 Shot and killed a civilian in the Tunis neighborhood. KIRKUK GOVERNORATE Popular Mobilization Forces 13/AUG/2020 Killed two insurgents on a motorcycle while trying to smuggle IEDs to Kirkuk. Federal Police Forces 14/AUG/2020 Destroyed four ISIS hideouts and cleared two IEDs in Al-Chai valley, south of Kirkuk. An Armed Group 16/AUG/2020 An IED explosion killed a civilian and injured two others in Neweshin village , west of Kirkuk. People Killed & Injured Per Governorate People Killed & Injured Per Incident Type 10 10 10 Killed 10 Killed 9 9 Injured Injured 8 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Anbar Baghdad Diyala Erbil Kirkuk Ninewa Salah Al-Din Air Strike Explosive Hazard Crime Direct Attack/Clashes iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazard Incidents Risk Level in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates from 13 to 19 August 2020 Turkey Dahuk Zakho Erbil Amedi Ninewa T u r k e y Dahuk Syria Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk Iran Mergasur Sumel D A H U K Salah Al-Din !. Diyala Dahuk Soran Baghdad Shikhan Akre J Anbar o ÆQ r d Wassit a Kerbala Babylon ÆQ I r a n n Telafar ÆQ ÆQ I r a n ÆQ Choman Qadissiya Missan Tilkaif Najaf Thi-Qar Shaqlawa Basrah Muthanna Saudi Arabia Mosul K !. ÆQ u w ÆQ ai HamdaniyaÆQ Rania t Sinjar Erbil Pshdar !. Explosive Incident Risk Level ÆQ ÆQ ÆQ Erbil Mosul High Low E R B I L Koisnjaq N I N E W A Dokan !\ Capital ÆQ Makhmur !. Governorate Center ÆQÆQ Sharbazher Penjwin ÆQ IDPs Camp Dabes Sulaymaniah Ba'aj !. S y r ii a ÆQ Kirkuk Primary Road !. Sulaymaniya Hatra Shirqat Kirkuk Chamchamal Iraq Boundary ÆQÆQÆQ S U L A Y M A N I Y A H Hawiga K I R K U KÆQ Governorate Boundary DarbandihkanHalabja Daquq District Boundary Kalar Baiji ÆQ ÆQ Tooz Ru'ua ÆQ ± Tikrit Tikrit ÆQ!. 0 50 100 Kifri ÆQ Km S A L A H A L - D I N Daur Haditha Khanaqin ÆQ Samarra D I Y A L A Ka'im ÆQ ÆQ Khalis A N B A R Thethar Balad Ana Muqdadiya Heet Fares !.ÆQBa`aqubah Tarmia Ba'quba Baladrooz Ramadi KadhimiaAdhamia ÆQ !. ÆQ Thawra1 Ramadi ÆQÆQ Thaw!\.ra2 Abu Ghraib Resafa ÆQ Karkh Mada'in Falluja ÆQ ÆQ B A G H D A D JJ Rutba Badra Mahmoudiya oo Azezia rr dd Suwaira aa Hindiya nn Kerbala W A S S I T !. Mahawil Kut Ain Al-Tamur Musayab Na'maniya Kut K E R B A L A Hilla !. Hashimiya !. iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates from 13 to 19 August 2020 Turkey Dahuk Zakho Amedi Erbil T u r k e y Dahuk Ninewa T u r k e y Syria Sulaymaniyah Mergasur Kirkuk Iran D A H U K Sumel !. Salah Al-Din Dahuk Diyala Soran Shikhan Akre Baghdad ÆQ J Anbar o ÆQ r ÆQ d Wassit Telafar ÆQ a Kerbala Babylon ÆQ n à Choman II r a n Qadissiya Missan Tilkaif Najaf Thi-Qar à Shaqlawa Basrah à à Mosul Muthanna Saudi Arabia !. ÆQ ÆQ K ÆQ u à Hamdaniya Rania w Sinjar Pshdar a it à Erbil à à ÆQ ÆQ !. ÆQ Erbil Mosul ġ Airstrike àc E R B I L Koisnjaq N I N E W A Dokan c Armed Clash Area à ÆQ ÆQàMakhmur à Explosive Hazard ÆQ Sharbazher ġ Penjwin Dabes Sulaymaniah !\ Capital Ba'aj !. ÆQ Kirkuk S y r ii a !. Sulaymaniya !. Governorate Center Hatra Shirqat Kirkuk à ÆQÆQ Chamchamal ÆQ àà à c ÆQ S U L A Y M A N I Y A H IDPs Camp Hawiga à KàI R K U KÆQ Darbandihkan Halabja Primary Road Daquq Iraq Boundary Kalar Governorate Boundary Baiji à ÆQÆQ Tooz District Boundary Ru'ua ÆQ Tikrit Tikrit ÆQ!. Kifri ÆQ S A L A H A L - D I N Daur Haditha c ÆQ ± à Khanaqin ÆQ Samarra 0 50 100 D I Y A L A Km Ka'im ÆQ ÆQ Khalis A N B A R Thethar à Balad Ana à Muqdadiya Heet Fares cà !.ÆQBa`aqubah Tarmia Ba'quba à Baladrooz Ramadi KadàhimiaAdhamia ÆQ !.à ÆQ Thawra1 Ramadi àÆQÆQ à Thaw!\.ra2 àResafa à Abu Ghraib Karkhà Mada'in à ÆQ à à Falluja ÆQ ÆQ B A G H D A D Mahmoudiya Badra JJ Rutba Azezia oo ġ rr Suwaira Musayab dd Mahawil W A S S I T aa Kerbala !.Kerbala Kut nn Hilla Ain Al-Tamur K E R B A L A !. !. Hindiya Kut Na'maniya Hilla Hashimiya Diwaniya Afaq Hai Najaf Disclaimer: All information is the best available from various sources including public, national and international sources, and has been cross-checked by iMMAP as best as possible. iMMAP accepts no responsibility for the use of this information. Publication Date: 24 AUGUST 2020 - For more information contact: [email protected] Copyright © iMMAP,IHF Humanitarian Access Response - 2020. All rights reserved.This report is related to iMMAP-IHF project: Multi-Dimensional Risk Mitigation Information Management Center for Humanitarian Access Response - 2020..
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