Quads and Triangles: Locating Japan in India's Act East Policy

A Journal of Global Afairs and Comparative International Development

ENGLISH EDITION Vol. 1 · No. 1 · Spring 2016

Honorary Chairman ADAM PRZEWORSKI New York University

Editor-in-Chief FATOS TARIFA University of New York Tirana Associate Editors Afërdita Cesula Ilir Kalemaj Eltion Meka

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Pranab Bardhan University of California, Berkeley Timothy Besley London School of Economics and Political Science Jagdish N. Bhagwati Columbia University Judith Blau University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Michael Bratton Michigan State University Bruce Bueno De Mesquita New York University David Cameron Yale University Tomas Carothers Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Daniel Chirot University of Washington, Seattle Stephen W. K. Chiu Chinese University of Hong Kong Jae Ho Chung Seoul National University Rory J. Conces University of Nebraska, Omaha Larry Diamond Stanford University Amitai Etzioni George Washington University Pierre Hassner Centre d’Ėtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris Michael D. Kennedy Brown University Ronald Inglehart University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Charles Kurzman University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Edward Mansfeld University of Pennsylvania Scott Mainwaring University of Notre Dame Juna Miluka University of New York Tirana Klejda Mulaj University of Exeter Claus Ofe Hertie School of Governance, Berlin Blerim Reka South East European University, Tetovo James Robinson Harvard University Dietrich Rueschemeyer Brown University Swaran Singh Jawaharlal Nehru University Max Spoor Erasmus University, Rotterdam Kathleen Telen Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ilter Turan Istanbul Bilgi University Bryan S. Turner Te City University of New York Christian Welzel Leuphana University Lueneburg Contents

ARTICLES

A Sectoral Approach to the Study of International Relations 1 Amitai Etzioni George Washington University

Revisiting Transitions: Pathways and Obstacles 19 Claus Ofe Hertie School of Governance, Berlin

What Was 20th Century Transition Culture and What Has Come Next? 27 From Capitalism and Democracy to Refexivity and Solidarity Michael D. Kennedy Brown University

Te Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed 51 Rory J. Conces University of Nebraska at Omaha

GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS

Quads and Triangles: Locating Japan in India’s Act East Policy 111 Swaran Singh Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Lilian Yamamoto São Paulo University, Brazil

NATO and the European Union CSDP in the Global Security Architecture 125 Alketa Dumani University of New York Tirana

Combating a Shared Security Treat through Unifed Narratives: 135 Politicized Terrorism in Western Balkans Sidita Kushi Northeastern University

Emerging New Treats in the Balkans: 145 Cold War Split between Russia and the West Blerim Reka South East European University at Tetovo Swaran Quads and Triangles Singh Lilian Locating Japan in India’s Act East Policy Yamamoto

Swaran Singh Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Lilian Yamamoto São Paulo University, Brazil

Japan has come to be a major friend and partner of India’s engagement with East Asia. At the face of it, their growing proximity seems to be driven primarily by their shared concerns about rising and assertive China yet it has also been reinforced by last decade Abstract of India’s growing closeness to the United States and its other friends and allies as also by several Following India’s growing proximity with the United States, Japan other factors and forces. Te celebrated example of has emerged as India’s most reliable Japan having played a critical role in ensuring India regional ally. Te hope for the efcacy of their partnership fows from becomes the founding member of the East Asian their use of “minilateral” format in Summit in 2005 has since witnessed their bilateral addressing their shared regional and global development and security con- and regional cooperation emerging as a major cata- cerns. India and Japan have been lyst in India’s growing acceptance across East Asian participating in several forums such as the Quad of Democracies (US, countries. It is in this backdrop that experts see Japan, Australia, India), Triangular India’s shift from ‘Look’ to ‘Act’ East policy as if in Ministerial Dialogue (US, Japan, India), and the quad of the G4 (Ger- conjunction with United States’ ‘Pivot’ to Asia. And, many, Japan, Brazil, India) which it is in this specifc context that this paper exam- seeks UN reforms and permanent ines the evolving contours of India’s Act East policy seats for them in the UN Security Council. Te present article seeks to as also what makes Japan increasingly central and examine the role of Japan in India’s critical for the success of this proactive paradigm foreign policy as it undergoes a paradigm shift from “Look” to “Act” shift in India’s foreign policy. It does so in four sec- East, where India seeks to go beyond tions: frst examining the contours of this paradigm ASEAN and explore what place Japan occupies in the India’s Act shift from ‘Look’ to ‘Act’ East; then second section East policy. plots India’s decade long eforts to move its ‘Look

Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 111-124 111 Quads and Triangles: East’ policy beyond ASEAN. From here, No doubt in this larger picture the Locating the third section seeks to locate Japan in U.S. plays a pivotal role in the creation Japan in India’s Act India’s Act East policy in the framework of facilitating environment that has ce- East Policy of “minilateralism” of quads and triangles mented India-Japan cooperation. But it followed by closing section making a brief has also contributed to how Japan-India assessment of future trajectories. rapprochement is more often than not To begin with, there is no denying projected to be an important counter- that India-Japan relations have witnessed weight to China’s ambitions especially transformation since the beginning of this in South China Sea. Tese insinuations millennium. Both have not only been en- about their being the counterweight have hancing their much agreeable economic surely been, at least partly, triggered by and diplomatic engagements but also their the aggressive Chinese maritime moves discreet defense and strategic partnership such its muscle fexing on Senkaku issue which includes fnding common strategic and its construction of artifcial islands vision on the evolving Asian geopolitics and this brinkmanship have triggered that goes much beyond their immediate concerns from the international commu- concerns about China’s aggressive pol- nity potentially threatening to spark even icies with regard to islands across East an armed confict (Singh and Yamamoto and South China Sea area. Tough more 2015: 78). But it will be unfair to restrict recent U.S. proactive interventions are India-Japan engagement to these nar- making these waters regular at headlines row and immediate security challenges. yet Japan-India rapprochement remains To quote from India’s Foreign Minister, much wider and older to say the least. Sushma Swaraj, from her September 2015 meeting with her counterparts from It begin from year 2000, when the two US and Japan, which was their frst trilat- had launched their Global Partnership eral meeting in that format, held in New to identify possible convergent strategies York, the trilateral partnership of India, and their interactions have never looked 1 Japan and the US “has a strong connect to back ever since. What is most promising the Indian’s Act East Policy”.2 And, giv- is that their relations are no longer con- en that U.S. will always have a rather dif- fned only to bilateral agreements but ex- fused global focus, it makes Japan a major tend their cooperation in various regional partner for India’s growing engagement and global forums where they coordinate with East Asian countries. and evolve joint strategies and common Tis paper, accordingly, locates Japan policy positions on various security and partnership with India in this emerging development challenges and initiatives.

2 U.S. Department of State. “Remarks with 1 Ministry of External Afairs of India. “India- Indian External Afairs Minister Sushma Swa- Japan relations”. July 2014. (http://www.mea. raj and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Ki- gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_July_ shida” (http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks 2014_.pdf, p.2. /2015/09/247485.htm).

112 Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development Swaran Asian geopolitics where Japan has not just Rao in his famous September 1994 lec- Singh been target of China’s aggressive policies ture in Singapore though it owed a lot to Lilian but Prime Minister Abe has been a major his predecessor’s (Rajiv Gandhi) eforts Yamamoto proponent of Asia-Pacifc Community from mid-1980s especially latter’s ofcial and has repeatedly articulated his vision visits to Indonesia and Tailand during on Japan’s long-term future role in the October 1986 (Muni 2011). In the lat- Asia-Pacifc. It is from that larger per- er half of 1990s, ASEAN itself expand- spective that Japan’s close cooperation ed to include Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia with India is expected to become an au- and Myanmar which brought ASEAN tonomous stand-alone catalyst for India’s to India’s land borders and in 2003, the “Act East Policy” and it has already begun agenda of India’s “Look East” expanded to accelerate India’s economic and secu- further east to include Australia and rest rity engagement across East Asian coun- of East Asia, and it also become a strat- tries. Tis must also be read in the larger egy to seek access to various multilateral context of India’s own hyperactive foreign and bilateral channels of economic and policy under Prime Minister Narendra defense cooperation (Rajendram 2014: Modi who formally enunciated this para- 3). Indeed, over years, India’s Look East digm shift from “Look” to “Act” East Asia had come to be the most proactive and policy (Rossow et al. 2014). It surely does celebrated component of India’s foreign not underestimate the fact that India’s policy. partnership will be equally benefcial for Last year, soon after taking over as Japan’s continuing engagement with East India’s Foreign Minister, during her Asia though that is not the focus of this frst visit to Vietnam in August 2014, Sushma Swaraj was to enunciate this article. policy as she outlined Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision to give boost to From ‘Look’ to ‘Act’ East Policy India’s Look East policy, turning it into “an Acting East Policy” of India.3 Tis is not a simple upgrading of the Look East Look East policy had originally begun policy as India seems to clearly indicate under Narasimba Rao government in the its readiness to play a far more active early 1990s. Tis occurred in the back- and prominent role in the region and drop of economic recession in India this has since translated into India’s en- which had pushed India to open up its hanced diplomatic footwork across East markets and undertake structural reforms and Southeast Asia (Rajendram 2014: 4). that pushed India in search for econom- In the following month, Prime Minister ic opportunities with newly emerged ti- Modi visited Washington DC where ger economies of ASEAN. Historically speaking, S. D. Muni calls it “fourth wave” 3 Press Trust of India, “Time for ‘Act East Po- of India’s Look East that was formally licy’ and not just ‘Look East’: Swaraj,” Busi- launched by Prime Minister Narasimba ness Standard (New Delhi), 25 August 2014.

Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 111-124 113 Quads and Triangles: India-U.S. Joint Statement further elabo- India, Pranab Mukherjee visited Vietnam Locating rated this policy by underlining this par- and Sushma Swaraj visited Myanmar, Japan in Vietnam, Tailand, and Singapore. When India’s Act adigm shift in following words: “Noting East Policy that India’s ‚Act East’ policy and the India’s Vice-President, Mohd. Hamid United States’ rebalance to Asia, the lead- Ansari undertook a four-day visit to ers, committed to work more closely with Laos and Cambodia in September 2015, other Asia Pacifc countries through con- Secretary (East) of Ministry of External sultations, dialogues, and joint exercises. Afairs accompanying him told media Tey underlined the importance of their how it was “part of our Act East policy” trilateral dialogue with Japan and decided which says a lot about ofcial preoc- to explore holding this dialogue among cupation with “Act” East formulations. their Foreign Ministers” (emphasis add- Expectedly, these visits have been preced- ed).4 Later in November 2014 again, ad- ed and followed by a whole lot of accel- dressing world leaders at the East Asia erated diplomatic exchanges in engaging Summit in Myanmar, Prime Minister East Asia thus giving momentum to what Narendra Modi outlined his vision saying has come to be called as a major paradigm “Since entering ofce six months ago, my shift in India’s foreign policy. India’s East Asia policy is now being seen clearly in government has moved with a great sense two phases: frst “Look” East since 1992; of priority and speed to turn our “Look and now, from 2014, in its reincarnation East Policy” into “Act East policy...Te as India’s “Act” East policy seeking deeper East Asia Summit is an important pillar engagement in connectivity, culture and of this policy.”5 Understandably, media commerce. Given that most political par- has since been debating this “Act” East ad ties in India share a consensus on most is- nauseam calling for serious analysis on its sues of foreign policy, most of them have emerging contours and categories. been support of Prime Minister Modi ac- Tis ofcial articulation of new vision celerating some of these visions and ini- on “Act East” has also been accompa- tiatives of his predecessors. But as the old nied and encouraged by Prime Minister Chinese saying goes, quantity has quality Modi’s high-profle and well-publicized of its own, which explains why Modi’s visits to Japan, Australia, Fiji, Myanmar, hyperactive pace is being projected as a China, South Korea, while President of watershed of sorts.

4 Joint Statement during the visit of Prime India: Moving Beyond ASEAN Minister to USA, September 30, 2014”, Mi- nistry of External Afairs, Documents (http:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm? As its most visible evolution, “Act East” dtl/24051/Joint+Statement+during+the+ policy seeks to move beyond its tradi- visit+of+ Prime+Minister+to+USA). tional limited focus on ASEAN and 5 Press Trust of India, “‘Look East’ policy now turned into ‘Act East’ Policy: Modi,” Te ASEAN-centric forums, which is also Hindu (New Delhi), 15 November 2014, p. 1. not unprecedented. Some of this had

114 Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development Swaran been sporadically tried by various for- in expanding EAS beyond ASEAN-plus- Singh mer prime ministers of India since Rajiv Tree (APT) i. e. ASEAN plus China, Lilian Gandhi if not before. Given that founding Japan, and South Korea; and it was indeed Yamamoto father of India’s foreign policy, Jawaharlal desirous of holding the inaugural summit Nehru, and his immediate successors, had in Beijing (Men 2008: 76). Tis would largely neglected Southeast Asia, experts have made EAS a far more Sino-centric. believe it was bound to take “few decades Tere was a strong possibility that given to transform India’s ASEAN-centric the backdrop of China’s game-chang- ‘Look East’ policy into an ‘Act East’ pol- ing role in East Asian fnancial crisis of icy that seeks to assert India’s presence in 1997 this Sino-centric EAS would have various parts of Asia from Myanmar to carried deeper connotations of mak- Japan and Australia and the two Oceans.” ing Tokyo and New Delhi feel far more (Kapur 2015: 232). In this transforma- alienated in their own periphery. Tis was tion of sorts, while rise of China has neg- also being read in the backdrop of how, atively triggered India’s rising pan-Asian in 2003, China had become Convener of consciousness and interest, its evolving Six Party Talk (SPT) to address nuclear closer relations with United States and proliferation of North Korea that refect- Japan have been the most critical positive ed growing U.S. endorsement of China’s force in India’s deepening and widening centrality in Asian Afairs. Especially for engagement with East Asian countries. India, the June 2000 U.S.-China joint While growing closeness of India to U.S. Statement when Bill Clinton visited has critical implications, Japan shows the Beijing post India’s nuclear tests, had al- potential to become the fulcrum of these luded to their joint management of South evolving trajectories. Te U.S. for in- Asian nuclear competition pressing pan- stance, often does not fully share India’s ic buttons in New Delhi. Unlike U.S., anxieties about China’s forays into Indian Japan could never be expected to endorse Ocean though it supports India’s lead- China’s leadership at cost of India. India’s ership in the Indian Ocean region. But expanding relations with Japan therefore that’s it. India’s close relations with Japan bear a far more direct co-relation to last underline their shared Asia-centric con- decade of Look East culminating into cerns including China’s increasing asser- Act East policy exuding promise and po- tive policies. Tis clearly makes Japan a tential of making India integral to much far more reliable partner for India’s Act of pan-Asian partnerships. East initiatives. One could even go back to Japan’s gro- Japan, along with Singapore, had play- wing centrality to India’s “Look East” ed most critical role in ensuring that India policy being accelerated following the became the founding member of the East collapse of former Soviet Union. End Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 (Acharya of easy loans and friendship prices from 2014: 186). What made it especially no- former Soviet Union was aptly respond- ticeable is that China was not interested ed to by Japanese; frst extending and

Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 111-124 115 Quads and India-Japan: Quads and Triangles Triangles: expanding Japanese ODA to India, fol- Locating lowed by their economic cooperation Japan in India’s Act and creating of an FTA and fnally an Aforementioned method of working East Policy India-Japan CEPA leading to increase in through quads and triangles has been Japanese investments into India. A fresh seen as particularly efective mechanism promise of $34 billion of Japanese invest- in literature on global governance which ment was made during Prime Minister calls it “minilateralism” that was original- Modi’s visit to Japan during September ly popularized by Miles Kahler in early 2014. As a result, New Delhi views any 1990s and revived in 2009 by Moises formation of Asian economic commu- Naim and Tomas Wright in their high- nity increasingly “as the culmination of ly debated article respectively in Foreign India’s ‘Look East’ policy” (Bhattacharya Policy and Washington Quarterly (Kahler and Mukhopadhyay 2015: 102). Tough 1993; Wright 2009; Naim 2009). Naim, this period has also witnessed India rein particular, points out that minilateral- iterating its commitment to “strategic ism is a smarter approach because is more autonomy” as critical element of its non- targeted and has the largest possible im- alignment, New Delhi has taken substan- pact on solving a specifc problem. Using tial steps towards the United States and this potent mechanism, India and Japan its Asian allies which have “transformed have not only been in spotlight for their India’s relationship with Japan into a ro- expanding cooperation but also how these bust strategic partnership with substantial have contributed to New Delhi’s visual- eforts in maritime cooperation” (Harsh ization of “Act” East policy that seeks to and Super 2015: 758-759). In making add vigor and substance to India’s extant India welcome in East Asia, Japan has engagement with East Asian countries. also not only been a friendly voice in all At the most visible love, India and Japan the multilateral forums where both these have been demonstrating their growing are members but India and Japan have mutual coordination at various bilateral worked closely in several “minilateral” fo- and regional forums. At the bilateral lev- rums like the Quad of Democracies (U.S., el, security arrangements such as “Joint Japan, Australia, India) and Triangular Ministerial Dialogue (of U.S., Japan, Declaration on Security Cooperation India) as also as their recently revived between India and Japan (2008) and quad of the G4 (of Germany, Japan, the Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Brazil, India) which seeks UN reforms Special Strategic and Global Partnership and permanent seats for them in the UN (2014) are major milestones. India was Security Council. Ever since 2005, when amongst the frst receivers of the Japanese 6 UN Secretary General had proposed var- Ofcial Development Assistance (ODA) ious methods for reforming the Security Council, prospects of India and Japan 6 Mofa, Overview of Japan’s ODA to India working together at UNSC have also in- (http://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan- spired positive vibes. India-Relations/ODA_Eng_ Jun2011.pdf ).

116 Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development Swaran and is now one of the top recipients of the Cold war, the Japanese diplomacy in Singh that. At the regional and multilateral lev- Asia developed mainly in the Pacifc re- Lilian el, India and Japan support each other gion, and emphasized the U.S. and Japan Yamamoto in the claim for a permanent seat in the security alliance. However, Japanese UN Security Council. Other areas, such foreign policy was mainly based on aid, as energy security, joint naval exercises, trade and foreign investment and China anti-piracy patrolling, and environmental was also one of the major recipients of issues remain important factors in their ODA and has since become their largest mutual cooperation (Mathur 2013: 39). trading partner of Japan (Mathur 2012: Tis efcacy of India’s engagement 43). Japan has invested over $300 billion with Japan indeed has also created expec- in China and has over 80,000 companies tations in the United States and amongst operating from Chinese soil. If in the its friends and allies who see India as trading they continue to be great part- their would-be counterweight to China’s ners, the same cannot be stated when it rising infuence. It is partly in “channeling comes to issues of territorial sovereignty. their frustrations” and expectations that Teir intensifying dispute over Senkaku/ Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, during Diaoyu islands and the fast paced in- her visit to India during was back in 2011 crease of their maritime presence in the had said: “We encourage India not just to Indian Ocean and South China Sea, and look east, but to engage East and to act China’s questioning of the Japanese legit- East as well” (Racine 2015: 148; see also imacy over the Exclusive Economic Zone 7 Sarin 2015: 16). Recognizing the import- of Okinotori reef are among the reasons ant role that India and the United States that may have triggered Japan’s interest to can play in promoting peace, prosperity, develop a strong security policy with New stability and security in East Asia and Delhi (Kamiya 2014: 51). Furthermore, the Indian Ocean region, leaders of both oscillations of the U.S. policies towards countries have repeatedly underlined that China also push Japan to fnd other pos- India’s “Act East Policy” and the United sible partners and alliances. States’ rebalance to Asia provide oppor- At the trilateral level, the cooperation tunities for both and other East Asian between the U.S., India and Japan was es- countries to work closely to strengthen tablished primarily to maintain maritime regional cooperation (Chaturvedy 2015: security, and until this year it was main- 371). But, at core of this transformation tained at a low profle. Te challenges for for India lies its bilateral relations with developing this trilateral dialogue further Japan that underwrite their mutual coor- included the burden of public opinion dination in multilateral forums. 7 For much of cold war period, rela- Te Chinese government states that these are rocks which cannot sustain economic and tions between India and Japan were as human life and therefore, Japan cannot ob- “cordial, as might be expected from two tain an Exclusive Economic Zone around the democracies” (Laurence 2007: 195). After Reef.

Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 111-124 117 Quads and Triangles: with regard to history of Japanese mili- Regional Forum meeting at Manila in Locating tarism, while Indian politicians believed 2007, even then had a component of Japan in India’s Act there was “mileage to be gained from an- developing a more meaningful strategic East Policy ti-American posturing.” Te U.S., in ad- and military cooperation (Lee 2016: 37). dition had also been reticent about Japan’s However, after the changes of Australian emergence as military power ( Jaishankar and Japanese leadership soon after 2014). Spite of these challenges, the last that, military exercises were suspended. trilateral dialogue held in June 2015 dis- Kevin Rudd, the new prime minister of cussed the U.S. rebalance to Asia, India’s Australia by that time, sought to enhance Act East Policy and Japan’s more active its relations with China and Australia was security role. Tis momentum of in- the frst to withdraw from the dialogue creased convergent interests has since and eventually, the frst attempt of the enabled then to upgrade this dialogue Quad demised unceremoniously (Kliman to the ministerial level in September and Twining 2014: 16). 2015, which was followed in the 5-day Recently, its initiatives towards its re- joint naval exercise in October in the of constitution have been triggered by the coast of the Bay of Bengal. Te exercise fact that in the changed circumstances, Malabar included one of the world’s larg- new assessment shows how their advan- est carriers, the USS Teodore Roosevelt as tages seem to have increased while their well as the U.S. missile cruiser and a nu- disadvantages reduced. China’s rise has clear-powered submarine (Rajagopalan brought increased risks to East Asian 2015) and included Japan as permanent peace and stability making an urgent dip- member of these exercises. lomatic engagement necessary. Tus, the Furthermore, Indian Navy also made Quad could use their meetings and joint a joint maritime exercise with the Royal defense exercises to negotiate with China Australian Navy in the Bay of Bengal in from position of strength and expect September 2015. Te Australian Defense positive diplomatic outcomes from such Minister Kevin Andrews stated that the posturing. Te changed domestic political Australian government would be will- environment in all four countries has also ing to be part of a quadrilateral initiative contributed to the reconstruction of this with the U.S., Japan and India (Singh quad. Australian prime minister Tony 2015). It would not be the frst time that Abbott’s has been interested in nuclear these four countries (quad) would unify cooperation with India, China’s demand their eforts in terms of maritime secu- for Australian commodities is decreasing, rity. A frst attempt was made by Pri- and Prime Minister Abe has re-interpret- me Minister Shinzo Abe’s frst term ed the constitution to be able to partic- that had witnessed launching of their ipate in military exercises (Pof-Webster Quadrilateral Partnership of four democ- and Chotani 2015). But at the same time racies. Originally launched as a ministeri- China has also been building bridges with al level quad at the sidelines of ASEAN these four and other East Asian coun-

118 Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development Swaran tries. Indeed, China does not just have ance systems. But gradually, fuctuations Singh enormous economic engagement with in the U.S. policies have begun to trigger Lilian the quad but has also sought to rede- shades of diference between Japanese Yamamoto fne Asian geopolitics using its econom- and American perceptions. Te speech ic prowess through new initiatives like of the Defense Secretary Chuck Hegel, One Belt One Road, Asian Infrastructure at the 19th Japanese-American Security Investment Bank and so on. Seminar held in March 2013, for in- stance, argued that in order to make a peaceful and prosperous future in the Evolving Asian Geopolitics region “[T]he U.S. and other countries should maintain and strengthen the ex- In fact, the post-2011 U.S. discourses on istent alliance, and make new partnerships rebalance and “pivot” to Asia, accompa- based on mutual proft”, and “in order to nied by U.S. and Australia propping the support this aim, the U.S. is executing the new Indo-Pacifc geopolitical framework, rebalance, which is mainly a diplomatic, been accompanied by post-2013 Chinese economic and cultural policy” (Kamiya discourses on One Belt One Road that 2014: 53). Such allusions at the highest seeks to connect western Pacifc to Baltic level have often left Japanese perplexed Sea through building infrastructure proj- about U.S. commitments which have al- ects for connectivity and commerce. Tis ready been cast with questions in view of has left the Japanese often far too uncer- increasing gap between their word and tain on whether they still are on the same deeds from mid-1995 Taiwan Strait crisis page with regards to U.S. visions on how with China. to develop their shared security strate- It in this backdrop that, in view of gies for East Asia. In 2012 U.S. National India-U.S. rapprochement following India’s Defense Strategic Guidance, had stated nuclear tests of May 1998, India-Japan that: had established a “Global Partnership” from year 2000 and the two began to U.S. economic and security interests talk about “institutionalizing a dialogue are inextricably linked to develop- between the ministries of defense and ments in the arc extending from the foreign afairs for coordinated actions on Western Pacifc and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, security and foreign policy related issues, creating a mix of evolving challenges such as the security of sea-lanes, joint na- and opportunities (U.S. Department val exercises to combat piracy and disas- of Defense 2012: 2). ter management” (Baruah 2010). Abe’s government which is known for being Japanese were perfectly at home with favorably inclined towards India and is U.S. seeking to ensure their leadership also known to have noble security strat- in promoting stability in Asia through egies at the domestic level. So in spite of their conventional hub-and-spokes alli- widespread opposition, Abe got the bill

Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 111-124 119 Quads and Triangles: that seeks to reinterpret the pacifst arti- both countries were confdently show- Locating cle 9 of Japanese Constitution, passed in casing strengthening of their relation- Japan in India’s Act September 2015. Tis opens up chances ship. Tis was followed by Modi’s visit to East Policy for Japan deepening its cooperation with Japan in September 2014 that resulted in the U.S. but also engage with new formu- the Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India lations like the Indo-Pacifc framework Special Strategic and Global Partnership (Ford 2015). Te new interpretation or providing detailed directions on future of article 9 allows the Japanese Self-Defense their relations. In the security feld as well, Forces to send military aid to the U.S. and it underlined Japanese policy on technol- friendly countries under attack. In addi- ogy transfers and defense exports as both tion, as it was announced in the “2+2” Abe and Modi underlined their shared meeting of foreign and defense ministers interests in security of maritime and cy- 8 of Japan and the U.S., the Defense guide- ber domains. Japanese defense frms are lines have eliminated geographic restric- to participate in the weapons market of tions on their military cooperation; these India and Japan also committed to invest were previously restricted to surrounding around $34 billion in infrastructure proj- areas of Japan (Horimoto 2015). Tis ects in the next 5 years (Gokhale 2014). clearly opens new avenues for expanding Aware of the U.S. oscillations regarding defense and strategic cooperation be- their policy towards China, their recent- tween Tokyo and New Delhi as well. ly upgraded trilateral dialogue was held As regards Japan building military co- at the end of September 2015 expressed operation with India, it remains rooted their continued support for ASEAN and in various factors including assessments East Asia Summit (Parameswaran 2015). Tis again shows their focus on larger that the U.S. may not be able to ofer it canvass where both Japan and India see any military support if it were already them cooperating in infuencing the fu- involved with other parallel conficts. ture evolution of East Asia. It would be important, therefore, that other friendly countries, such as India, are engaged, leaving the U.S. with room Conclusion to maneuver their full support (Nagao 2013: 109-110). Since 2013, high level To sum up, experts increasingly are read- mutual ofcial visits demonstrate that ing India’s “Act East” policy and U.S. “piv- such partnership is seen as high priority ot to Asia” as being largely reciprocal and and this is refected in frequent high lev- focused on their shared concerns about el visits. Emperor Akihito visited India China rise (Bergsten 2015: 13; see also in December 2013 followed by Prime Bahl 2015: 32). What makes U.S. support Minister Abe holding a summit level

meeting in New Delhi January 2014 and 8 his presence as the chief guest of India’s Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership, paragraph Republic Day parade demonstrated that 10.

120 Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development Swaran to India’s Act East policy promising is the al and global responsibilities. With this Singh bipartisan support (indeed enthusiasm) shared stakes in creating common goods Lilian for it in the U.S. and both sides see this in for East Asia, Japan’s commitments and Yamamoto conjunction with their own policy objec- collaborations can strengthen India’s Act tives (Blackwill and Tellis 2015: 30). But East vision especially by closely moni- most such headlines driven commentar- toring and appreciating India’s strengths ies often miss the point that though such and limitations. In this, Prime Minister infections of the U.S. global leadership Abe’s passing the bill that seeks to rein- are precious these are relatively symbolic terpret article 9 of the Constitution will compared to solid cooperation amongst be seen as an important milestone in en- those sitting on China’s periphery and abling Japan to diversify its security part- especially those who feel directly threat- nerships with new stakeholders like India ened by China’s rise and even see possi- which aims to expand its participation in bilities of existential threats from it. Tis reformulation of this region’s geopolitical makes Japan a natural partner for India’s framework and to move away from its Act East policy in not just dealing with limited colonial South Asian framework China’s rise but also in seeking to to- to the larger 21st century canvass of the gether mold larger Asian decision-mak- larger Indo-Pacifc region. ing through norm-entrepreneurship and consensus building as basis for regional good governance. India’s Act East policy References aims to achieve precisely this and Japan has not only been India’s strongest pillar Acharya, Amitav. 2014. Constructing a Security of seeking this expanded engagement but Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and promises to remain a critical interlocutor the Problem of Regional Order. New York: in India’s increasing acceptance and par- Routledge. Bahl, Raghav. 2015. Super Economies: America, ticipation in building peace and stability India, China & the Future of the World. across East Asia. Gurgaon: Penguin Books. And fnally, other than the promis- Baruah, Pranmita. 2010. “Changing Contours ing pictures of their likely growth tra- of the Japan-India Defense Relations” jectories for their bilateral relations, (http://globalpolitician.com/printasp?id U.S. support to India’s Act East policy =6267). also presents the potential for allowing Bhattacharya, Biswa Nath, and Kakali Muk- the desired broad-basing Japan’s role as hopadhyay. 2015. “A Comprehensive Eco- nomic Partnership between India and Ja- India’s most important partner as it se- pan: Impact, Prospects and Challenges,” eks to expand beyond South Asia and Journal of Asian Economics 39: 94-107 engage its extended neighborhood even Blackwill, Robert D., and Ashley J. Tellis. beyond ASEAN. U.S. indulgences will 2015. Revising U.S. Grand Strategy toward likewise facilitate Japan’s expanding role China. Special Report No. 72 (March). and its rise as a normal state with region- New York: Council on Foreign Relations,

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122 Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development Geometry of South Asia’s Geopolitics,” dian Defense Review 30, 3 ( July-Septe- Swaran Singh in Siegfried O. Wolf et al. (eds.), Politics mber). Lilian in South Asia: Culture, Rationality and U.S. Department of Defense. 2012. Sustaining Yamamoto Conceptual Flow. New York: Springer. U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai and Sylvia Century Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Mishra. 2015. “India-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Department of Defense. Dialogue Gains Additional Traction,” Wright, Tomas. 2009. “Towards Efective Asia Pacifc Bulletin (Honolulu), No. 327 Multilateralism: Why Bigger May Not (October). Be Better?”, Washington Quarterly 32, 3: Rajendram, Danielle. 2014. India’s New 163-180. Asia-Pacifc Strategy: Modi Acts East, Lowy Institute for International Policy, December (www.Lowyinstitute.org). Notes on the authors Rossow, Richard, Toro Ito, Anupam Srivasta- va, and Brad Glosserman. 2014. “A Trila- Swaran Singh is Professor at the School of teral Whose Time has Come: U.S.-Japan- International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru India Cooperation,” Te National Interest , University, New Delhi. He is President of October 21. the Association of Asia Scholars, General Sarin, Brig M. N. Sarin. 2015. Mending Fences, Secretary of Indian Congress of Asian and Cross Infltration and Confict Challenges: Pacifc Studies, and a Guest Professor at Line of Actual Control. Delhi: Gaurav China’s Yunnan University of Economics Book Centre Pvt Ltd. and Finance. Singh. Abhijit. 2015. “Malabar 2015: Strategic Power Play in the Indian Ocean,” Te Dr. Lilian Yamamoto holds a PhD in inter- Diplomat (October). national law from Kanagawa University, Singh, Swaran and Lilian Yamamoto. 2015. Japan. Currently she is a Postdoctoral Fe- “Spectre of China’s Artifcial Islands,” In- llow at São Paulo University, Brazil.

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