WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Space Transportation Technology Roadmap

A Collaboration by Government and Industry To Address U.S. Government and Commercial Space Transportation Needs

Release 1.0

21 October 2010

WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Please direct any suggestions on this roadmap to:

Paul E. Damphousse LtCol, USMC Chief of Advanced Concepts National Security Space Office Pentagon, Washington DC / Fairfax, VA W (571) 432-1411 C (571) 405-0749 [email protected]

- 1 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...... …6 1 ROADMAP OBJECTIVES...... 8 2 ROADMAP BACKGROUND...... 10 3 ROADMAP METHODOLOGY...... 18 3.1 MODELS AND REFERENCES EMPLOYED FOR THE ROADMAP…………..… ..18 3.1.1 FUNDAMENTALS OF TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPPING…………………. ..18 3.1.2 DOD RECHNOLOGY READINESS ASSESSMENTS DESKBOOK……….....18 3.1.3 SPACE-BASED SOLAR POWER STUDY…………………………………… ..19 4 PHASE 1: PRELIMINARY FOUNDATION PHASE...... 20 4.1 SATISFYING THREE (3) ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS...... 20 4.1.1 THE THREE CONDITIONS DEFINED………………………………………. ..20 4.1.2 ASSUMING THE 1ST CONDITION IS MET…………………………………. ..20 4.1.3 ADDRESSING THE 2ND AND 3RD CONDITIONS…………………………... ..20 4.2 GOV AND INDUSTRY INCLUSIVITY – THE 2ND CONDITION…..……………. ..21 4.2.1 EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES – OVERVIEW…………………………………. ..21 4.2.1.1 SUSTAIN CONOPS CONFERENCE…………………………………… ..21 4.2.1.2 SUSTAIN TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE……………………………. ..21 4.2.1.3 AIR FORCE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION………………………… ..21 4.2.1.4 INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO FIRST DRAFT OF TECH ROADMAP…. ..21 4.2.2 ROADMAP DEVELOPMENT PARTICIPANTS…………………………….. ..21 4.2.2.1 GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS……………………………………… ..22 4.2.2.2 INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS…………………………………………… ..22 4.2.2.3 ROADMAP CO-AUTHORS ……………………………………………. ..22 4.2.3 SUSTAIN CONOPS CONFERENCE - PARTICIPANT INPUT INCL………. ..23 4.2.3.1 SUSTAIN CONOPS CONFERENCE CONDUCT…………………….. ..23 4.2.3.2 SUSTAIN CONOPS CONFERENCE OUTCOME…………………….. ..23 4.2.4 SUSTAIN TECH CONFERENCE - PARTICIPANT INPUT INCLUSION….. ..23 4.2.4.1 – 4.2.4.32 INCLUSIVE GOV AND IND ROADMAP INPUTS…….....23-95 4.2.4.33 SUSTAIN TECH CONF BREAK-OUT GROUP DISCUSS…...….. 95-114 4.2.4.34 SUSTAIN TECH CONFERENCE OUTCOME………………………. 114 4.2.5 THE AIR FORCE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI)…………….…..... 114 4.2.6 RFI – NEAR-TERM SOLUTIONS – RESPONDENT INPUT ………...... 115-125 4.2.7 RFI – LONG-TERM CONCEPTS - RESPONDENT INPUT …………….125-134 4.3 GOV & INDUSTRY SPACE TRANSPORT NEEDS – THE 3RD CONDITION…… 134 4.3.1 NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE TRANSPORTAION NEEDS……... …….... 135 4.3.2 INDUSTRY SPACE TRANSPORTATION MARKETS …………….. ……… 139 4.3.3 NASA SPACE TRANSPORTATION NEEDS………………………... ……… 145 4.3.4 OTHER GOVERNMENT SPACE TRANSPORTATION NEEDS………….... 150 4.4 ROADMAP LEADERSHIP AND SPONSORSHIP………………………… …….. . 152 4.5 DEFINING ROADMAP VISION, SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES…. ……… ……… 152 4.5.1 PRODUCT VISION AS BOUNDING REQUIREMENTS…….…………...... 153 4.5.2 THE ROADMAP SCOPE DEFINED...... ……………………………………… 154 5 PHASE 2: DEVELOPMENT PHASE...... …….... 156 5.1 DEFINING THE PRODUCT THAT FOCUSES THE ROADMAP...... ……… 156

- 2 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

5.2 CRITICAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR TARGETS...... ……. . 159 5.3 MAJOR TECHNOLOGY AREAS (MTA)...... ……. . 159 5.3.1 MTA I: SINGLE STAGE AND UPPER STAGE TRANSPORT VEHICLES....161 5.3.2 MTA II: LAUNCH AND BOOSTER VEHICLES…...…………….………….. 161 5.3.3 MTA III: SPACE TRANSPORTATION ENABLEMENT…………………..... 162 5.3.4 MTA IV: MANNED SPACE TRANSPORT, INSERT AND EXTRACT...... 162 5.4 TECHNOLOGY TARGETS………………………….………………………………162 5.5 TECHNOLOGY ALTERNATIVES……………………………………………….... 162 5.6 GRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP DEPICTIONS…………...…………...... 163 5.7 GRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT PROFILES……………………..….... 166 6 PHASE 3: FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES PHASE…………………………………….…….. 170 6.1 GENERAL…………………………………………………………………………..... 170 6.2 OVERARCHING THEMES AND ASSUMPTIONS……………………….……….. 170 6.2.1 SPACE TRANPORTION AND NATIONAL STATURE………………..…… 170 6.2.2 LAWS RELEVANT TO SPACE TRANPORTION…………………...……..... 172 6.2.2.1 INTERNATIONAL LAW………………………………………………... 172 6.2.2.2 NATIONAL LAW……………………………………………………….. 173 6.2.2.3 CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………………………. 174 6.2.3 CONTRIBUTION OF SPACE TRANSPORT TO HUMAN SURVIVAL…..... 175 6.2.4 RELEVANCE OF 2009 AUGUSTINE REPORT TO THE ROADMAP…….. 177 6.2.5 ONE ARGUMENT FOR A MILITARY SPACE SERVICE………………….. 179 6.3 RECOMMENDED TECHNOLOGY THRUSTS……………………………….…… 180 7 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS……………………….... 182

ANNEX A SPACE TRANSPORT TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP CONTACT LIST………. 187

- 3 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Space Transportation Technology Roadmap proposes a path that enables the U.S. to maintain indigenous full spectrum space access. In parallel it presents opportunities for cross- pollination and collaboration between Government and industry stakeholders in support of shared near, mid, and long term objectives. As a tertiary benefit, it could lead to a new generation of scientists and engineers in industry, academia, and Government, dedicated to mainstreaming space transportation for multiple missions and markets. SUSTAIN, to include an eventual reusable human-rated capability, represents one visionary objective for DoD, and served as the genesis of this roadmap. However, roadmap stakeholders concur that this particular national security application of space transportation is merely a niche in the full spectrum of utility. Furthermore, in the nearer-term much can be accomplished with mature, multi-use technologies for multiple customers and markets. Stakeholders concurred that the following can serve as starting points in defining a fully integrated and coordinated National spiral initiative addressing overlapping needs and spurring progress, namely for:

. Space transportation vehicles capable of transporting cargo of up to 30,000 pounds internally sub-orbitally. In the near term internal payload capacities of 500 pounds are operationally useful for both Government and industry.

. Sub-orbital vehicles capable of achieving an altitude of at least 50 miles, and optimally 62.5 miles for the purpose of pop-up and limited point-to-point (P2P) missions in the near-term, and global access in later spirals. In the near term P2P missions limited to as little as 1,000 miles (500 in space) are operationally useful for some DoD missions.

. A family of space transportation vehicles capable of transporting cargo of up to 15,000 pounds internally to LEO.

. Space transportation vehicles that enable a launch cost of no more than $300 per kilogram to LEO from between the 25th and 50th Parallels, once the launch frequency is sufficient high to achieve economy of scale.

. Space transportation vehicles that are capable of being human-rated, with a desired objective that they are in fact human-rated in future spirals.

. Launch preparedness that allows mission-tailored vehicles to be launched on the order of hours following a decision to execute, with two hours as the objective.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that are capable of returning to the terrestrial surface in a controlled reentry with reduced acoustic, optical, and radio frequency (RF) signatures.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that are of low-cost, highly reliable, and responsive.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that in the near-term make use of mature expendable launch and upper stage technologies, and have as a spiral development objective fully reusable launch and upper stage systems.

- 4 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. A family of space transportation capabilities that employ variety of complimentary technical approaches. These include, vertical and horizontal launch (towed, piggy-back, Bimese), vertical and horizontal landing, ground/sea/air launch, orbital and suborbital space injection, and modular platform reconfiguration. This need is based on the shared perspective that no single technical option will enable the fulfillment of all space transportation user needs.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms having the ability to modify flight plans mid-mission, whether they are pop-up, short-range P2P, global P2P, or LEO missions.

The roadmap development participants concurred that the following major technology areas (MTAs) and their associated enabling critical technology elements (CTEs) must be developed as a prerequisite to fulfilling the aforementioned overlapping requirements.

. MTA I: Single Stage and Upper Stage Transport Vehicles. CTEs: 1) Vertical Take Off and Vertical Landing; 2) Vertical Take Off and Horizontal Landing; 3) Horizontal Take Off and Horizontal Landing; and 4) Horizontal Take Off and Vertical Landing.

. MTA II: Launch and Booster Vehicles. CTEs: 1) Vertical Booster Stack; 2) Vertical Parallel Stage (Shuttle Derivatives); 3) Vertical Bimese; 4) Horizontal Mothership; 5) Horizontal Piggy-Back; and 6) Horizontal Bimese Launch.

. MTA III: Space Transportation Technological Enablement. CTEs: 1) Materials; 2) Rocket, and 3) Air-Breathing Hypersonic Propulsion; 4) Fuel; 5) Electrical Power Generation and Storage; 6) System Autonomy; 7) Human-rating and Flight Safety; 8) Spaceport, Ground, and Range Operations; 9) Aerospace Situational Awareness; and 10) Ground Test Facilities.

. MTA IV: Manned Space Transport Insertion and Extraction. CTEs: 1) High Altitude Vehicle Exit; 2) Ground Insertion; 3) Extraction Via Insertion Vehicle; 4) Extraction Via Other Vehicles; and 5) Tactical and Operational Alternatives to Vehicle Extraction.

The roadmap development participants make four recommendations, namely:

. Recommendation #1: The U.S. Government should support and encourage development of a National suborbital and orbital space transportation initiative, including an associated roadmap, with NASA supporting the risk-mitigation in all new human-rated initiatives.

. Recommendation #2: The U.S. Government should absorb a major portion of the technical risk for suborbital and orbital space transportation capability development.

. Recommendation #3: The U.S. Government should create a policy, strategy, regulatory, legal, and ITAR environment for the more effective development and execution of space transportation.

. Recommendation #4: The U.S. Government should incentivize space transportation development by becoming an early demonstrator, adopter, and customer of mature unmanned and manned space transportation capability off-ramps.

- 5 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

1. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

ROADMAP OBJECTIVES

1.1 Present the Case for Coordinated Development

The primary objective of developing a technology roadmap for space transportation is to articulate a developmental path that enables the U.S. to maintain indigenous full spectrum space access. However, whether space transport capabilities are unmanned or manned, development could remain a cost-prohibitive endeavor if it is not fully coordinated between and cosponsored by the Government and industry working in a cost and risk sharing partnership. Therefore, any space transportation roadmap stands the best chance of successful realization if it transparently integrates commercial and Government efforts pursuing similar technologies and systems.

1.2 Articulate the Technological Feasibility

Another objective is to provide sufficient non-proprietary technical detail such that enabling technologies can be presented as realistic in accordance with that timeline. This includes the recognition that the affordability of fully reusable launch systems in the earliest iterations is likely unrealistic. Attempting full scale developments without technology maturation adds program risk. Instead, reusability can evolve from suborbital to orbital system spiral development off-ramps. By developing a balanced mix of low-cost, reliable, responsive sub- orbital and orbital space vehicles along a brisk evolutionary path, Government and commercial customers will have a variety of multi-use options for specialized manned and unmanned needs.

1.3 Capture the Broader Needs and Requirements

As a third objective the roadmap seeks to capture of the multitude of national security, U.S. Government, NASA, and industry-commercial needs and requirements for space transportation. Roadmap development was sparked by a validated military need for space transportation, namely the DoD SUSTAIN capability. In this regard the roadmap addresses requirements articulated in the National Security Space Plan, the draft National Security Space Strategy, and the National Defense Authorization Act, Title 10 US Section 23 74A. However, the roadmapping effort has revealed that SUSTAIN represents a mere niche application within the full range of potential that space transportation offers the Nation. Accordingly, the roadmap also addresses requirements articulated in the 2010 National Space Policy, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-40, the U.S. Space Exploration Policy, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act.

1.4 Build a Broad-Based Advocacy Foundation

Finally, a roadmap provides a forum for Government and industry suborbital and orbital space transportation advocates to be able to present a coherent and living tool to their respective resource decision makers. A roadmap will assist those decision makers in gaining confidence that a cost-effective path to solving critical national security gaps and exploiting competitive market opportunities can be accomplished in a realistic timeframe, and in a coordinated effort.

- 6 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

[This page is intentionally left blank]

- 7 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

2. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

ROADMAP BACKGROUND

2.1 Purpose

This roadmap is broadly inclusive in capturing the multitude of U.S. national security, civil, and industry-commercial interests in space transportation that exist today. Still, it is useful to discuss its national security military origins. Roadmap development was most recently sparked by a validated military need for space transportation, namely the Marine Corps Small Unit Space Transport and Insertion (SUSTAIN) capability. Although SUSTAIN represents a mere niche within the full range of potential space transportation applications, the idea harkens back to the birth of the American space program. Reciting the vision of DoD leaders with respect to the exceptional potential of space transportation, even during an earlier age of immature space- related capabilities is useful. It serves as a testament to both the inexorable inevitability of space transportation and our specific National interest in maintaining leadership in developing the enabling technologies.

2.2 Roadmap Genesis

2.2.1 National Security Space Transportation Roadmap Origins

. While the full history of national security of space transportation is summarized in 2.3 to 2.7 below, this roadmap has as its immediate genesis a 2002 Marine Corps operational need for a space transport capability, namely the SUSTAIN capability. It is noteworthy that the DoD Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) need serves as a complimentary roadmap foundation as well. Throughout the Corps‘ history, Marine expeditionary forces have been victorious because of their unique ability to arrive quickly with organic fire support and sustainment in order to gain and maintain the initiative by shaping the battlespace early. In the past, the Corps‘ amphibious quality has proven more than adequate to answer a wide variety of worldwide emergencies. Today, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the sea- based Navy-Marine Corps Team remain the envy of the military world as a force in readiness. However, the USMC recognizes a need to build on its amphibious legacy and evolve into a truly expeditionary force capable of flexibly exercising combined arms effectiveness across the spectrum of modern conflict anywhere on the globe. In coming decades this will require assault support platforms that can move and maneuver with a tempo and reach that overmatches accelerating events and extends well beyond the littoral regions where the sea-based MAGTF now thrives. Likewise, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), including their integral Marine Forces, will have a similar requirement, with the MV-22/CV- 22 Osprey serving as an example of the common SOF need to insert and extract on ever- shortening timelines. The surprise enabled by speed and operational reach affords an unprecedented degree of strategic impact to tactical forces. 21st Century technologies present the Marine Corps and Joint Forces new opportunities to set the tempo of operations again, by expanding beyond the terrestrial littoral to considering the earth littoral.

- 8 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 2.2.2 National Security Space Office Role

Appreciative of SUSTAIN‘s Joint utility, in 2008 the NSSO agreed to help the Marine Corps further advance their operational concept. The Marine Corps PP&O subsequently proposed an X-Prize construct for accelerating SUSTAIN technology development to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs. The proposal was favorably received. This led to NSSO-Marine Corps collaboration in the development of a Jointly-coordinated draft SUSTAIN CONOPS, and culminated in an NSSO-sponsored conference dedicated to CONOPS refinement. In early 2009 the NSSO suggested that the development of a space transportation technology roadmap was the foundation of any SUSTAIN or SUSTAIN-like effort. In his guidance to the roadmap development authors, the Director of the NSSO, Mr. Joseph Rouge recognized that any roadmap must capture the broader Government and commercial perspective on a general need for space transportation, as well as the state of the technological art. SUSTAIN defines only one niche application of space transportation. The visionary SUSTAIN need was critical in initiating development. However, this roadmap is founded on the combined interests of a Government and industry team dedicated to space transportation solutions that include, but extend well beyond the military SUSTAIN need.

2.3 U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) General Henry Harley "Hap" Arnold

The conceptual roots for the employment of orbital space for the attainment of military objectives reach back to the 1940s.

. 2.3.1 General of the Air Force Henry Harley "Hap" Arnold was one of the nation‘s foremost aviation pioneers and visionaries. He served as both a five-star general officer in the AAF and later in the modern United States Air Force (USAF) of which he is a father. GEN Arnold was a powerful advocate for both the creation of an independent Air Force and for technological research and development in air and space. In this spirit, in 1945 GEN Arnold founded the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation as well as the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to ensure that the AAF (and later USAF) would benefit from the best scientific research U.S. scientists could provide.

. 2.3.2 At the direction of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for R&D, then-MG Curtis E. LeMay, RAND completed its first report on 2 May 1946, a space-focused study examining the potential of future space systems. The resulting Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship was a comprehensive engineering analysis that included a concept for a U.S. satellite program. The analysis concluded in part: "A satellite vehicle with appropriate instrumentation can be expected to be one of the most potent scientific tools of the Twentieth Century. The achievement of a satellite craft would produce repercussions comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb..." The publication formed an early conceptual cornerstone of what would decades later become the national security space program we know today.

. 2.3.3 Following the RAND proposal, GEN Arnold‘s SAB came to embrace the concept of ballistic missiles as a means to orbit satellites that might serve as platforms for communications relays and many other potential capabilities. One of the possibilities

- 9 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

considered by the USAF was the concept of a boost-glide vehicle. First proposed by the Germen rocket scientist Eugene Sänger, a boost-glide vehicle could act as both as an intercontinental bomber and a reconnaissance vehicle. On 24 October 1957 the boost-glide concept was developed under the USAF Dynamic Soaring (Dyna-Soar) Program. In 1962 Dyna-Soar evolved into the X-20 Program but was cancelled in 1963 before any flight testing was conducted.

Figures 1-4. GEN Hap Arnold (L), RAND Proposal, Dyna-Soar, and GEN Curtis LeMay (R).

2.4 U.S. Army Major General John B. Medaris

Similarly, the conceptual roots for the employment of sub-orbital space for the movement of forces reach back to the early 1950s.

. 2.4.1 As early as 1959 U.S. Army General John Bruce Medaris projected the utility of space for the execution of future warfare. General Medaris originally enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1918 and fought in France during WWI. Following his honorable discharge as a Marine Corporal he was educated as an engineer and later commissioned as an Army Officer.

. 2.4.2 In November 1955 then-BGen Medaris was designated the first Commanding General of the newly created U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). In 1956 he assumed responsibilities for development, production, and weaponization of the U.S.‘ earliest successful launch and satellite systems. As the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) in 1958 MajGen Medaris managed most of the major capabilities that later evolved into NASA. This included his initiation of the Saturn I booster, and his proposal that the Saturn Rocket capabilities be employed as a means for the global deployment of Army paratroopers.

. 2.4.3 It is particularly noteworthy that in 1959 the visionary MG Medaris told the House Subcommittee on Research and Development: "I believe the US Army must make long-range plans for the transport of small combat teams by rocket. I also believe that cargo transport by rocket is economically feasible." He had in mind the use of Saturn-related technologies. He later oversaw the launching into outer space and recovery of two living primates, as well as

- 10 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

NASA‘s Project Mercury development flights that would lead to CDR Alan B. Shepard‘s historic suborbital flight around the Earth in May 1961.

. 2.4.4 Following his retirement from the Army in 1960 MG Medaris dedicated his efforts to creating a public understanding of the challenges and promises of the Space Age. His dedication marked him as one of the nation's leading authorities on, and pioneers of the space program that led to the successes of NASA and U.S. national security space today.

Figures 5-7. Gen Medaris (L), Saturn I (C), and Medaris, von Braun, and NASA‘s Glennan (R).

2.5 U.S. Marine Corps General Wallace M. Greene

In 1963 another Marine visionary would pick up on the opportunity for the suborbital manned transport in support of military missions.

. 2.5.1 In 1963 General Wallace M. Greene was nominated by President John F. Kennedy to serve as 23rd Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). From the time of his nomination at the White House in 1963 to the end of his CMC tour in 1967 General Greene advocated the utilization of sub-orbital space to transport Marine expeditionary forces to objectives around the world. His concept involved larger vehicle platforms that could be considered challenging even today and even more so in 1963. For example, Gen Greene proposed that one transport vehicle could embark an entire 1,200-Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at Camp Lejeune, NC and fly 5,000 miles at 4,000 miles per hour to central Africa. Just 80 minutes following launch the transport could reenter and insert the BLT into a trouble spot on the ground. Resupplies of ammunition, food and water could arrive in the same fashion. General Greene envisioned such a capability within five years of his statements. He predicted that space would become ―another all-embracing ocean,‖ and that rocket-enabled operations might come to supplement or replace conventional amphibious operations.

- 11 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 8. Gen Wallace Greene‘s 1963 concept for suborbital space Marine transport.

. 2.5.2 Largely in response to General Greene‘s vision, in 1964 Douglas Aircraft Company engineers Philip Bono and George Goldbaum jointly authored a paper titled ―Ithacus – A New Concept of Intercontinental Ballistic Transport (ICBT).‖ The Ithacus paper described a concept for a single stage to orbit (SSTO) rocket for intercontinental troop transport sized for a payload of approximately 800,000 pounds to orbit, and subsequent reentry. They proposed a SSTO using high specific impulse liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen engines as simpler and cheaper. Afterwards Bono proposed to make these vehicles reusable. He advocated vertical takeoff and landing (VTVL) space launch vehicles without wings, and patented a reusable plug nozzle rocket engine which had dual use as a heat shield for atmospheric reentry. Two complimentary configurations of Ithacus were proposed:

o 2.5.2.1 Ithacus Senior was proposed as a 64 meter tall and 24 meter diameter vehicle. It was to possess a weight of approximately 6.4M kg at take-off and approximately 500,000 kg upon landing following reentry. Ithacus Sr. was designed to produce 8M kg of thrust at lift-off using eight hydrogen drop tanks and the patented plug-nozzle aerospike engine. In addition to landing 1,200 combat equipped Marines on the ground it could also achieve a 185 km altitude low earth orbit (LEO) at 28 degrees inclination:

- 12 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 9-11. Artist renditions of Ithacus Senior prelaunch (L), reentering (M), and landed (R).

o 2.5.2.2 Ithacus Junior was proposed as a smaller, expeditionary configuration for sea- based launch from Enterprise-class nuclear aircraft carriers. Ithacus Jr. was scaled so as to employ pairs of assault support platforms that land approximately 600 meters apart. One would transport 260 combat-equipped Marines while the other would contain cargo and equipment that was presumably not man-portable. The 260 combat-equipped troops were assumed to constitute a payload of approximately 33,500 kg. One of the reasons that the Enterprise-class nuclear powered carrier was selected as the launch platform was because such a ship would be capable of producing liquid oxygen and hydrogen fuels needed for Ithacus Jr. from seawater. The Ithacus Jr. was an early concept of SSTO that eventually was realized as the Delta Clipper:

Figures 12-13. Ithacus Junior mock-up (L), and artist rendition of expeditionary sea-basing (R).

. 2.5.3 Many of General Greene‘s predictions are now recognized realities. Indeed, accelerating technology trends have caused space, like the seas, to evolve into a useful military domain. While his Battalion Landing Team (BLT) transport platform will remain challenging into the future, and the designs of Philip Bono and George Goldbaum were not fully developed, this roadmap will show that human-rated spacecraft tailored as traditional small unit assault support platforms could be within the state of the art much sooner. It is also noteworthy that Bono‘s reusable VTVL and SSTO concepts influenced later designs like the 1990s Delta Clipper that will be discussed later in this roadmap.

2.6 U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Emil R. (Buck) Bedard

- 13 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Recognizing these 21st Century opportunities, and perhaps inevitabilities, Lieutenant General Buck Bedard, then Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, signed a Universal Need Statement (UNS) on 22 July 2002 calling for a SUSTAIN capability.

. 2.6.1 As described in the UNS this high-speed assault support transport would be capable of delivering Marines anywhere on the globe in a greatly shortened timeframe, and subsequently extracting them to their launch point origin. Ideally, a SUSTAIN platform would be capable of performing such missions without refueling and without violating intermediate foreign airspace restrictions during transit. Such a capability would allow the USMC to intervene in a crisis situation at the earliest possible time. Such early intervention has been shown throughout history to be a key factor in mitigating volatile situations while they are still in their formative stages by means of spoiling operations.

. 2.6.2 Further, a SUSTAIN platform could host a family of manned and unmanned autonomous configurations to include transport, terrestrially-tailored gunship, and logistics variants that would enable Marine forces to exhibit maximum MAGTF flexibility. The need recognized that space is the only domain that can permit movement and maneuver at high velocity having global reach so that the MAGTF might enjoy an extended asymmetric advantage over most of its potential 21st Century adversaries. This is especially true in the realms of Irregular and Hybrid Warfare. SUSTAIN assault support transports and terrestrially-tailored gunship and attack variants that employ space for transit could augment or supplant V-22s, C-17s, and even certain Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) missions as partial follow-on capabilities to all.

. 2.6.3 Even before he had signed an operational need calling for a SUSTAIN capability, LtGen Bedard had discussed the Marine Corps central role as a forward-leaning Service with respect to operationalizing space for the warfighter. Speaking before The Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization in 2000 (a.k.a. the Rumsfeld Space Commission) he reminded the Commissioners of the Marine Corps place in space history. This not only included General Greene‘s early 1960‘s concepts, but also Marine Corps Colonel John Glenn‘s pioneering flight into LEO. LtGen Bedard went on to discuss the increasing technological feasibility of exploiting space as a warfighting domain, whether manned or unmanned, and even suggested the possibility of a needed evolution to a Military Space Corps or Service.

- 14 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 14. A Popular Science Magazine artist‘s rendition of a notional SUSTAIN capability.

2.7 U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Richard C. Zilmer

. 2.7.1 During the period 2002 and 2004 following the UNS signature on 22 July 2002, the Marines actively socialized their validated need statement throughout Government and Industry under the leadership of then-BGen Richard C. Zilmer. This included briefings to senior leaders throughout the Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the White House, and Industry developers. Concurrently, the Marines have formally approached members of Congress, culminating in the well-received testimony by BGen Zilmer before the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space on 30 July 2003. At that hearing BGen Zilmer stated:

“The SUSTAIN need frames a capability to transport a strategic capability from CONUS to any other point on the globe within two hours of an execution decision. It is important to note that SUSTAIN does not deliberately seek out space for its own sake. However, we are also aware that the hypersonic transport speed requirement, combined with the need to overfly non-permissive airspace enroute may necessarily drive the material solution into space.”

. 2.7.2 Throughout the need socialization process the audience consensus has been that the future will unquestionably involve high-speed travel, and that aerospace technology is being driven in that direction. While it is unclear what the exact final products will be or how they

- 15 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

will operate, all audiences agreed that the technology for the type of transport that is identified in the validated Marine Corps need is currently being researched. The Marine Corps has determined that as America‘s force in readiness it is imperative that it make an effort to drive the technology in such a manner so as that it supports the Corps‘ unique needs when it matures. Throughout SUSTAIN‘s socialization, common audience feedback highlighted the need for the Marine Corps to develop a CONOPS and a technology roadmap to achieve this capability.

Figures 15-17. Gen Wallace Greene (L), LtGen Buck Bedard (C), and LtGen Rick Zilmer (R).

- 16 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

[This page is intentionally left blank]

- 17 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

3. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

ROADMAP METHODOLOGY

3.1 Models and References Employed for the Roadmap

Three documents are employed as primary examples for the format and academic underpinning of this roadmap. They are:

. 3.1.1 Fundamentals of Technology Roadmapping

The development of this technology roadmap adhered to the principles, structure, and phased sequencing presented in an April 1997 essay titled ―Fundamentals of Technology Roadmapping‖ authored by Marie L. Garcia and Olin H. Bray of the Sandia National Laboratories Strategic Business Development Department in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The National Security Space Office (NSSO) extends its appreciation to the authors and Sandia Labs for the unlimited release of this reference. The methodology for creating a technology roadmap as presented in the reference describes three phases of a deliberate process:

o 3.1.1.1 Phase 1: Preliminary Foundation Phase

The first phase consists of 3 steps: 1) satisfy essential conditions, 2) provide leadership / sponsorship and 3) define the scope and boundaries for the technology roadmap. In this phase the key decision makers must demonstrate that they have a problem and that technology roadmapping can help them in solving the problem. It is also in this phase that roadmap leadership and sponsorship are discussed.

o 3.1.1.2 Phase 2: Development Phase

In the second phase, the development of the technology roadmap phase consists of 7 steps: 1) identify the ―product‖ that will be the focus of the roadmap, 2) identify the critical system requirements and their targets, 3) specify the major technology areas, 4) specify the technology drivers and their targets, 5) identify technology alternatives and their timelines, 6) recommend the technology alternatives that should be pursued and 7) create the technology roadmap report. These steps were followed faithfully in the creation of this roadmap.

o 3.1.1.3 Phase 3: Follow-Up Activity Phase

During this phase the roadmap must be critiqued, validated, and hopefully accepted by the group involved in any implementation. There must also be a period review and update point, as the needs from the participants and the technologies are continuously evolving. In this respect this roadmap is a ―living document.‖ Each subsequent evolution of the document will have a new designation, with this first titled ―Release 1.0.‖

- 18 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 3.1.2 DoD Technology Readiness Assessments Deskbook

The ―DoD Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook,‖ prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Science and Technology (S&T), and published in May 2005 was also leveraged for this effort. A TRA is a systematic, metrics-based process that permits stakeholders to assess the maturity of key technologies, called Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) needed to operationalize systems. CTEs are then grouped beneath overarching Major Technology Areas (MTAs). Once the overarching MTAs subsuming the individual CTEs for suborbital and orbital space transportation were identified, those numerous CTEs were independently assessed for maturity in accordance with the TRA Deskbook. The TRA will thereby surface data and assess information relevant to the maturity of the CTEs so that the present roadmap becomes a useful and defensible document. As per the DoD Deskbook, the TRAs within this roadmap do not assess or compare the performance of the technologies or the systems, nor do they assess the quality of systems architectures, designs, or integration plans. They simply report on what has been accomplished for those important technology subsets that will enable space transportation.

. 3.1.3 Space‐Based Solar Power Study

The third document employed as a model for roadmap creation was the ―Space‐Based Solar Power (SBSP) as an Opportunity for Strategic Security - Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study.‖ The study was coordinated by the NSSO and published as a Report to the Director, NSSO in the form of an ―Interim Assessment - Release 0.1‖ dated 10 October 2007. The SBSP Study has been credited as a particularly effective tool for its intended advocacy objectives. An open question for both SBSP and space transportation is the degree to which these two significant undertakings can or should benefit from international cooperation in planning, execution, and operation. These are policy issues beyond the scope of this particular roadmap, however, if feasible to any degree cost sharing would increase efficiency and rapidity of development in higher risk technology and system demonstrations.

Figures 18-20. Fund of Tech Roadmapping (L), TRA Deskbook (C), & NSSO SBSP Study (R).

- 19 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

4. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

PHASE 1: PRELIMINARY FOUNDATION PHASE

4.1 Satisfying Three (3) Essential Conditions

This roadmap is founded upon conditions that must be met prior to efficient execution. This approach reduces the risk of over-promising technologies that have yet to be developed, and efficiencies gained will mirror the ―pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)‖ policies of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The essential conditions are discussed below.

. 4.1.1 The Three Conditions Defined

For any technology roadmapping effort to succeed, three essential conditions must be satisfied. The purpose of this section is to describe those three conditions, and to present evidence that they have either been met in the Space Transportation Technology Roadmap, or document that actions are being taken to meet them:

o 4.1.1.1 The 1st essential condition is that there must be a perceived need for a technology roadmap that enables a collaborative development between Government and industry. The validity and articulation of the distribution of overlapping needs amongst stakeholders will assist the definition of sponsorship responsibilities.

o 4.1.1.2 The 2nd essential condition is that the roadmap needs to demonstrate that its development included input and participation from several different groups and individuals, each bringing different perspectives and planning horizons to the process.

o 4.1.1.3 The 3rd essential condition is that the technology roadmap demonstrates a needs- driven basis rather than a solution-driven one so that clear boundaries can be specified for the effort, i.e. identifying what is and is not within the scope of the technology roadmap.

. 4.1.2 Assuming the 1st Condition is Met

In this document the 1st essential condition is assumed to be fully satisfied. There is a perceived need for a technology roadmap that encourages collaborative space transportation development between Government and industry. As evidenced earlier under background, SUSTAIN socialization triggered direction from several DoD and U.S. Government leaders and offices to create a roadmap, as well as the draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that preceded it. It was and is recognized that the cost of new space-related developmental initiatives can be prohibitively expensive if teaming and partnerships are not achieved to share costs and risks. Industry‘s constructive responses to Government efforts to garner full inclusion in the development of this document serve as further evidence of the need for a space transportation roadmap that extends well beyond the DoD SUSTAIN capability.

. 4.1.3 Addressing the 2nd and 3rd Conditions

- 20 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

The remainder of this section is dedicated to providing confidence that the 2nd and 3rd essential conditions have also been met. Specifically, detailed discussions, events, activities, conference proceedings, and RFI responses will show inclusiveness. Likewise, a cataloging of military, NASA, commercial, and other Government needs that call for space transportation capabilities will show that the roadmap is founded on a needs-driven process. This catalog is drawn out in significant detail later in this section.

4.2 Participant Inclusivity – The 2nd Essential Condition

The second essential condition pertains to participant agreement that the creation of this roadmap respected the full and equitable inclusion of all of the inputs provided by the entire Government and industry technology roadmap development team. The creation of this document represents the culmination of several events, activities, and individual contributions that have occurred since the NSSO has been assisting in advocating space transportation capabilities.

. 4.2.1 Events and Activities - Overview

For maximum inclusivity the roadmap captures multiple inputs received at, from, and through the following events and activities. Additionally, numerous independent presentations relating to space transportation needs, technologies, and potential markets have been communicated to the NSSO following the events and activities defined below. Those additional inputs are also included in this document for completeness:

o 4.2.1.1 The SUSTAIN CONOPS Conference held at NSSO Headquarters, Fairfax, VA from 18 to 19 Sep 08.

o 4.2.1.2 The SUSTAIN Technology Conference held at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), San Antonio, TX from 23 to 27 Feb 09.

o 4.2.1.3 The Government and industry responses to the 10 Feb 09 Air Force Request for Information (RFI) titled: ―Request for Information for Rapid Delivery of Military Capabilities via Space‖ received by 15 Mar 09.

o 4.2.1.4 The comments received following the initial staffing of the draft of Version 1.0 of the space transportation technology roadmap to all groups and individuals participating in its development, dated 27 Aug 2009.

. 4.2.2 Roadmap Development Participant Inclusion

Through broader inclusion this roadmap is intended to provide a ―wide view‖ on the challenges of developing suborbital and orbital space transportation capabilities in support of a way forward towards multi-use capabilities that could grow from a militarily-focused SUSTAIN need. All participants of the roadmap development team have seen and are satisfied with the contents of this iteration of what will remain a ―living document,‖ in that it satisfies their essential inclusion condition for further roadmap participation. The participants noted below constitute team members who contributed to the development of

- 21 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

this unclassified and non-proprietary document. Participation came in the form of attendance and presentation at one or both of the aforementioned conferences, responding to the RFI, commenting on the initial draft (Version 1.0) of this document, and/or interacting with the NSSO directly with supplementary information following the noted events:

o 4.2.2.1 Government Participants

Government participants in the development of this roadmap included, but were not limited to: Office of the Secretary of Defense (NSSO); Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS); National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); U.S. Air Force Security Forces (AFSF); U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC); Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) Department; and the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL).

o 4.2.2.2 Industry and Academic Participants

Industry participants in the development of this roadmap included, but were not limited to: Alliant Techsystems Inc.; Steve Alonso; Andrews Space; Armadillo Aerospace; Blue Origin; Boeing; Conceptual Research Corporation; Robert Conger; Hubert Davis; Disposable Launch; E‘Prime Aerospace; Exquadrum; General Dynamics; David Hook; John Jurist, Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences, University of North Dakota; Kelly Space; KT Engineering; David Livingston, Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences, University of North Dakota; Lockheed Martin Corporation; MastenSpace; Matador; MSE Technology Applications; Neotopica; Northrop Grumman Corporation; Oceaneering International; Orbital Transport und Raketen AG; PlanetSpace; Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne; Daniel Raymer; Raytheon; Scaled Composites, LLC; Schafer Corporation; Space Exploration Partners; Space Propulsion Inc.; SpaceX; TGV Rockets; Tom Taylor; Universal Spacelines; Paul Webb; Wayne White; and XCOR. Annex A contains a more comprehensive list of participants and contact info.

o 4.2.2.3 Roadmap Co-Authors

The co-authors of the roadmap are: Paul Damphousse (NSSO); Bart Denny (SOCOM); Alan Dunham (NSSO); Franz Gayl (USMC); Roosevelt Lafontant (Shafer Corporation); Bob Lancaster (USAF); Amy Pointer (NSSO); Paul Rancatore (NSSO); David Smith (NSSO); and Christopher Stone (NSSO).

. 4.2.3 SUSTAIN CONOPS Conference - Participant Input Inclusion

On 18-19 Sep 2008 the NSSO facilitated a government-only conference on the SUSTAIN capability. The purpose of the conference was to receive feedback on a SUSTAIN CONOPS that had been drafted and distributed in advance of the event. The focus of the conference was to further develop the CONOPS that had been drafted by the Marine Corps for Joint consideration. The impetus for creating the CONOPS was NSSO evidence of increasing expressed Joint interest in SUSTAIN and guidance from DoD leadership during

- 22 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

socialization. The NSSO‘s role in the development in the CONOPS document was to facilitate Joint coordination amongst various potential users so that together they can refine it for Joint operational utility. The CONOPS conference participants included representatives from the NSSO, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), Air Force Security Forces (AFSF), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Headquarters U.S. European Command (EUCOM), Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), AF Space Command (AFSPC), Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL).

o 4.2.3.1 CONOPS Conference Conduct

During the conference the draft Marine Corps SUSTAIN CONOPS was employed as the basis for discussion and refinement by the applicable Joint community needing a SUSTAIN-like capability. The SUSTAIN CONOPS Version 1.0 dated 12 August 2008 captured the known military utility of suborbital and orbital space transportation as it is comprehended today. The CONOPS described the employment of a SUSTAIN capability that enables rapid expeditionary presence across the globe. It is a capability focused on the specific needs of SOCOM, Marine Corps and Air Force Security Forces as per their unique global contributions to Joint Forces. SUSTAIN is considered a technology opportunity-based leap-ahead capability wherein the possible platforms, vehicles, and support concepts are by physical necessity led to a family of space-dependent solutions for the purpose of achieving speed, global reach, and unconstrained overflight. Many perspectives were expressed by the participants and suggestions made leading to a way-ahead towards a subsequent improved and more inclusive draft of the CONOPS.

o 4.2.3.2 CONOPS Conference Outcome

The military user inputs received at the conference were collected and employed to Version 2.0 draft of the SUSTAIN CONOPS. Version 2.0 now contains the following improvements: 1) the current technology discussion was removed from the document and made the foundation for a complementary Space Transportation Technology Roadmap (i.e. the present document), 2) a classified CONOPS annex that ties SUSTAIN to Joint standard / validated gaps and scenarios will be added, and 3) the SUSTAIN CONOPS was rewritten to provide a ―laser focus‖ on SOCOM‘s core missions in CONOPS Version 2.0.

. 4.2.4 SUSTAIN Technology Conference – Participant Input Inclusion

From 23 Feb through 27 Feb 2009 the NSSO and HQ Air Force Security Forces Center (HQAFSFC) co-sponsored a SUSTAIN Technology Conference at AFSFC Headquarters at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX. The timing of the forum was intended to assist prospective respondents to an RFI that had been issued by the Air Force in advance of the conference with a better understanding of DoD sub-orbital and orbital space transportation requirements. Many, if not most of the

- 23 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

San Antonio conference attendees presented ideas at the conference, either publically to all or at the proprietary level to a Government only audience. In preparing this document the roadmap authors approached all conference attendees to offer each an opportunity to update and consolidate their concepts and ideas into a descriptive subchapter for faithful inclusion. This offer also was extended to others who attended the conference or responded to the RFI, but were not able to attend or present at the conference. A non-proprietary summary of SUSTAIN-related ideas was requested to afford equal billing to each concept applicable to the challenge. Some participants opted not to provide any such materials, preferring instead to maintain proprietary confidentiality of their concepts. What follows are the individual concepts in their approximate order of presentation during the conduct of the conference. Additional write-ups that were not presented but submitted for inclusion follow the conference participant submissions.

o 4.2.4.1 SUSTAIN Primer

The first day of the conference was dedicated to restating the original military need for SUSTAIN, as well as describing its envisioned CONOPS. LtCol Paul Damphousse, the NSSO conference host, introduced and moderated this discussion. This initial portion of the conference also allowed Air Force and SOCOM to reiterate in their own words the perceived operational utility of the Marine Corps SUSTAIN capability for their respective Services. Finally, the DoD research and development organizations that were familiar with or had actually conducted studies in support of SUSTAIN-like capabilities were invited to speak. The reason that SUSTAIN was such a prominent topic at the conference was that all participants had tailored their comments, concerns, and developmental ideas toward an operational need to transport and insert a squad of 13 combat-equipped Marines to any point on the globe from any other point within two hours of launch. While the larger Government and Industry interests in the capabilities that might evolve from such a narrow focused need extended far beyond SUSTAIN, the Marine Corps‘ stated need was a useful start point. It was also the most challenging considering implications for human-rating, global reach, and extraction. As a stated objective capability, SUSTAIN needed to achieve and loiter in low earth orbit (LEO) to optimize the time of insertion, and have the ability to self-extract from the contingency area without a need for transport refueling during insertion, terrestrial mission execution, or during extraction and egress. These challenges would set the baseline for Government and Industry developer presentations as well as the break-out group discussions later during the conference. First, USMC, USSOCOM and Air Force were asked to describe their respective CONOPS.

o 4.2.4.2 USMC SUSTAIN CONOPS

The PP&O representative, Mr. Franz Gayl, discussed the USMC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for SUSTAIN. The current draft Marine Corps CONOPS for the SUSTAIN capability is dated 12 Aug 2008. That document captures the known military utility of suborbital and orbital space transportation as it is comprehended today. The CONOPS described the employment of a SUSTAIN capability that enables rapid expeditionary

- 24 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

presence across the globe:

. 4.2.4.2.1 Mr. Gayl reiterated that SUSTAIN is considered a technology opportunity-based, leap-ahead capability wherein the possible platforms, vehicles, and support concepts by physical necessity lead to a family of space-dependent solutions. Only space permits the required speed, global reach, and unconstrained overflight. At the conference the Marine Corps stated that as a threshold SUSTAIN needs to be capable of at least 1,000 miles point to point transportation, with at least 500 miles being through space at a minimum altitude of 50 miles, all within two hours of a launch order. As an objective SUSTAIN should be able to transport 13 combat equipped Marines globally within two hours from CONUS. As objectives, an individual SUSTAIN vehicle would ideally have an internal payload capacity of between 15,000 and 30,000 pounds. A payload capacity of 15,000 lb (6,800 kg) corresponds to the internal payload capacity of the C/MV-22 Osprey assault support vehicle, and 30,000 lb (13,600 kg) corresponds to the internal payload capacity of the CH-53E Super Stallion assault support vehicle. As a threshold of utility the USMC sees operational utility in pop-up missions for HAHO/HALO insertions or pop-up ISR missions of as few as two personnel (200 kg). As with any traditional assault support platform such as the V-22, the SUSTAIN capability would eventually deploy and operate in sections and squadrons.

Figure 21. SUSTAIN mitigation of anti-access strategies and over-flight restrictions.

. 4.2.4.2.2 Sanitized vignettes taken directly from the CONOPS were employed by the Marine Corps presenter for better audience understanding of the utility of SUSTAIN. An example scenario and three associated vignettes are presented here:

- 25 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.2.2.1 Background: Terrorist extremists in a West African nation have exploited an incident of perceived religious offense perpetrated by an American employee of a Western oil concern. A few days later the U.S. embassy suddenly comes under siege from a well organized mob. The embassy reports that host nation police and military outside the compound were taken by surprise themselves, and so far have been less than effective in deterring mob proximity to the secure facility. The Marine Security Guard (MSG) detachment is completely outnumbered for the contingency that is rapidly developing. A Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU SOC) is currently in the mid-Atlantic, but well out of range to immediately assist the MSGs with any conceivable refueled V-22 mission. The East Coast- based Air Contingency Force (ACF) is also many hours away, and there is no confidence that the Capital airport is even under the control of local authorities. A breach of the embassy compound and a hostage scenario can be envisioned within hours or less in the absence of armed U.S. reinforcements. o 4.2.4.2.2.2 Direct Action (DA) Vignette: It is known that shots have been fired at the embassy and several individuals have managed to scale the embassy‘s external barriers. A grenade was thrown by one of the militants killing a local security guard and injuring two of the Marines. As the situation deteriorates two horizontally-launched SUSTAIN SOCOM DA teams are dispatched from a carrier in the Mediterranean Sea within an hour of being directed to conduct a DA to relieve pressure on the embassy from the outside. Then, following link-up with embassy security and gaining entry to the compound itself, the team reinforces the MSG detachment until an ACF can be coordinated and given the chance to arrive, in order to reinforce local host nation authorities. o 4.2.4.2.2.3 Airfield/Port Seizure Vignette: Reinforced by the two SOCOM DA teams, the MSG detachment was able to stave off a breach of the embassy. Nevertheless, the Ambassador has directed that all Mission families and nonessential non-combatant staff prepare to evacuate the country as soon as practical. With the MEU SOC still quite distant and time short, the Ambassador asks for an ACF to secure the local airfield to prepare to reinforce local forces, as the airport is determined to still be under government control. But the feasibility of a secure ACF insertion is still in question. Having been repelled from the embassy, militants aboard ―technical vehicles‖ are now marauding throughout the city. The host nation has agreed not to obstruct the ACF reinforcement, but police appear to be challenged at restoring city-wide order. Therefore, a Special Purpose MAGTF trained for the MEU (SOC) airfield seizure mission and reinforced with an AF Team dedicated to assessing the initial needs for Base Opening and Security Operations is dispatched from Diego Garcia aboard several SUSTAIN vehicles within two hours of being directed to secure the local airport in preparation for ACF arrival.

- 26 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.2.2.4 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Vignette: Immediately following the lift-off in the Indian Ocean the SUSTAIN force is informed that the airport has indeed been seized by militants, and some are reported by the media to be armed with shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles. The chaotic airport situation has escalated beyond the ability of a SUSTAIN- transported small force to seize the airport or for AF Base Opening Teams to guarantee the safe landing of the ACF. Fortunately, the host nation Army has achieved sufficient security outside the embassy to allow Americans to arrive from throughout the city for temporary sanctuary in the compound, in readiness for a NEO. With the ACF option deterred, the Ambassador now asks the MEU to steam towards the Capitol soonest to conduct a NEO via the coast or the port. The SUSTAIN force enroute from Diego Garcia is diverted to a location near the port facilities so as to survey, establish initial communications ashore, and provide surveillance of prospective landing zones and lines of communication (LOC) in preparation for the arrival of the MEU for a combined surface and V-22 NEO.

. 4.2.4.2.3 Audience members agreed that they would consider the West African nation scenario as a baseline example of a SUSTAIN mission in proposing material solutions for later discussion in the break out groups on specialized topics. o 4.2.4.3 USSOCOM SUSTAIN CONOPS

The Special Operations Forces Space Enabling Concept (SOFSEC) was briefed by the SOCOM representative to the conference, Mr. Bart Denny. The SOFSEC CONOPS exploits a SUSTAIN-like capability for SOF missions. Specifically, SOFSEC states that SOCOM needs the ability to expeditiously deliver special teams to any point globally via orbital or suborbital space transportation. The SOFSEC also states that SOF spacelift and transport require low visibility, low probability of identification, detection, and exploitation to maintain and preserve force protection and operational security. SOF spacelift will require flexible orbital insertion or have maneuverable capability to obtain target orbits or positions once launched. For extra vehicular operations in space, SOF would continue to leverage existing skills of the Astronaut Corps to provide human surveillance from space orbiting vehicles or platforms. o 4.2.4.4 AFSFC SUSTAIN CONOPS

The notional Air Force Security Forces concept for exploiting the utility of a SUSTAIN-like capability for certain specialized operations missions that AF Security Forces has been assigned within DoD was briefed by the AFSFC host, LtCol Robert Lancaster. AF Security Forces could employ SUSTAIN whether such missions were executed in a permissive environment, a semi permissive environment, or a non- permissive environment following the execution of a Joint forced entry capability. For the worst case scenario requiring forced entry, suborbitally transported Joint Forces can forcefully secure the expeditionary airbase and then seamlessly set in motion the four subsequent doctrinal AF stages of the expeditionary airbase life cycle, namely Airbase

- 27 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Opening, Establishment of the Airbase, Operation of the Airbase, and Closing the Airbase. By offering speed and surprise, the space-enabled insertion of AF Security Forces along with and as follow-on to Joint seizure forces may simplify opening by enhancing speed, surprise, and Joint interoperability. o 4.2.4.5 USAF Space and Missile Command (SMC) X-Plane Initiative

Mr. Bob Hickman presented USAF SMC‘s initiatives leveragable for SUSTAIN. In support of SMC‘s Spacelift Development Plan, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) is entering the follow-on phase of the Future Responsive Access to Space Technologies (FAST) program. The primary objective of the development plan is to achieve a replacement for the EELV with an IOC of such a capability in 2025. IOC for a smaller launcher is anticipated for the period of 2018 to 2020, preceded by demonstrations during the period of 2011 to 2014.

. 4.2.4.5.1 To date FAST has focused on several ground experiments into baseline technology for the future demonstrator. These included an all-composite airframe with warm, cryogenic structures, load-bearing tanks attached to wing box carry- through, and thrust structures and thermal protection systems with operable seals and mechanical attachments. Other ground experiments included adaptive guidance and control sub-systems with the ability to re-shape trajectories on-line and mission replanning in response to sub-system failures. Another aspect of FAST has involved development of a laboratory for exploring concepts for operating a quick- turnaround, reusable space launch vehicle, rapid mission planning, in-flight command and control and ground operations. Originally dubbed the ORS integrated ground experiment, the new program is expected to be re-named along the lines of the reusable booster system integrated demonstrator to emphasize the X-plane aims of the effort. The aim of SMC and AFRL is to mature technology in areas such as structures, guidance and control and fault tolerance.

. 4.2.4.5.2 The Reusable Booster System (RBS) Concept (see Figure 22) is a central conceptual component of the SMC Spacelift Development Plan and FAST. Key technology goals of the program include the development of a new first stage engine and the demonstration of modular construction. In addition to a CONOPS that calls for booster fly-back, RBS seeks to achieve a 50 percent reduction in payload launch costs to LEO and a spacecraft turn-around of no more than 48 hours.

. 4.2.4.5.3 Overall, SMC‘s plan will be to demonstrate a high level of integration, culminating in a scaled X-plane vehicle that will show capabilities to Technology Readiness Level 6 by 2018. Concepts include a vertical takeoff, horizontal landing rocket boost-back vehicle, a winged booster, and a similar winged booster with a rocket-powered payload module carried piggy-back resembling scaled model boosters flight tested by industry in 2008. These tests, conducted in New Mexico, were primarily to investigate guidance and control concepts for a two-stage to orbit

- 28 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

vehicle that will be autonomously controlled at speeds for up to Mach 6 for the first-stage and up to Mach 9 and beyond for the second-stage.

Figure 22. SMC Reusable booster System (RBS) and booster fly-back capability. o 4.2.4.6 Air Force Research Lab Strike/Persistent Engagement Capability Mr. Bruce Thieman and Ms. Marty Fallon presented AFRL‘s initiatives that are applicable to SUSTAIN. In conjunction with the SMC advocated FAST, AFRL is developing the HTV-2 that from an AF S&T Plan perspective HTV-2 corresponds with ―Area 7 - Mobility.‖ As a two stage to orbit capability (see Figure 23) its objective has been the reinforcement of logistics, though it may have the eventual potential to deliver 11 personnel to LEO. AFRL is looking for operator inputs to define what ―responsive‖ in the realm of ground operations, fly-back, and vehicle turn-around. The Strike/Persistent Engagement Capability area within the AFRL portfolio also relates to FAST and RBS. The Strike/Persistent Engagement Capability area seeks to achieve precise and scalable effects from the air with global reach, quick reaction, persistence, and significant payload. This capability area includes three attributes related to high speed hypersonics and suborbital space transportation, namely:

. 4.2.4.6.1 Time Sensitive Regional Strike – This attribute reflects the performance characteristics of high speed / hypersonic cruise standoff weapons with nominal range of 600-1000 nm, capable of precision engagement of high-payoff, time-

- 29 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

sensitive, fixed/relocatable, moving, and deeply buried targets within 10-20 minutes of tasking.

. 4.2.4.6.2 Time Sensitive Global Strike – This attribute reflects the performance characteristics of boosted hypersonic glide weapons with global range, capable of precision engagement of high-payoff, time-sensitive, fixed/relocatable, moving, and deeply buried targets within ~60 minutes of tasking.

. 4.2.4.6.3 Responsive Global Force Delivery with Persistence – This attribute reflects the far term vision of fully reusable hypersonic aerospace platforms capable of global reach and repeatable sortie generation for persistent and sustained force application. An operational demonstration is the near-term AFRL focus over the next 2 ½ years, however additional funding is being sought to realize the full potential of such a demo.

Figure 23. Family of AFRL/SMC RBS capabilities of potential applicability to SUSTAIN.

o 4.2.4.7 DARPA Rapid Eye Aboard EELV Booster

As briefed at the conference by Dr. Wade Pulliam, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is hoping to develop a state-of-the-art long-range unmanned surveillance and intelligence (ISR) aircraft. The ISR aircraft could be carried by rocket from a launching pad in the U.S. to any location in the world, where it could gather vital

- 30 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

imagery while loitering overhead for up to seven hours (see Figure 24). The DARPA program, dubbed "Rapid Eye," would provide a dramatic new capability for the U.S. military by being able to arrive on station significantly faster than existing U.S.-based surveillance systems.

. 4.2.4.7.1 Noteworthy technology aspects of Rapid Eye include: 1) the planned employment of the Minotaur IV as a baseline launch and delivery system, though only 40 remain in the inventory, 2) a ―Glove‖ program that seeks to fold a winged unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) into a ballistic shell, with an A/C mass goal of 200 pounds, 3) the achievement of global delivery, anywhere on earth within two low earth orbits, and 4) novel shielding protection for the folded aircraft during reentry deceleration.

. 4.2.4.7.2 "It is envisioned that this program will, at a minimum, develop and demonstrate all the technologies necessary for the rocket delivery of a High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV)," said a broad agency announcement released by DARPA on 21 Nov 2008. The Rapid Eye system would enable military leaders to monitor unexpected events anywhere in the world and maintain that coverage until other assets could be put into place.

. 4.2.4.7.3 The broad agency announcement focuses on the various technologies involved in delivering the UAV to the chosen location and decelerating its speed once it arrives so it can loiter in that area. The announcement did not spell out the types of intelligence-gathering and surveillance equipment that would comprise the UAV‘s intended payload. DARPA expects Rapid Eye to unfold in four phases: (I) system conceptual design, (II) preliminary design, (III) detail design, and (IV) demonstration system fabrication and flight test.

Figure 24. DARPA employing a re-entry vehicle to shield a UAV during insertion. o 4.2.4.8 Air Force Space Command Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)

- 31 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

While ORS did not formally present at the conference, many of ORS‘ objectives coincide with and are programmatically integrated with the interests of AFRL and SMC and therefore applicable to SUSTAIN discussions. ORS is dedicated to the timely satisfaction of the urgent space-enabled needs of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and other National users. In execution, ORS will use the most expeditious requirements, resource allocation and acquisition processes available as appropriate to the urgency of each need. ORS requirements accelerate existing capability needs that have been validated by the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS) process, or urgent new JFC needs articulated in Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS). ORS acquisition will utilize the broader space community and accept increased risk tolerance for operational gain. Rapid delivery of capabilities to, through, or from suborbital or orbital space will serve as key enablers of the ORS mission. For example, a transport capability could insert entire constellations of micro and nano- satellites for the purpose of reconstitution in a single mission in support of ORS. Another applicable ORS mission would be short-notice execution of pop-up Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) whereby a manned or autonomous vehicle rapidly accesses suborbital space altitudes locally in order to exploit a superior vantage point. o 4.2.4.9 Commercial Synergies of Orbital and P2P Missions

This particular discussion was guided by LtCol Damphousse of the NSSO. As background LtCol Damphousse provided a report of a recent trip that the NSSO and HQMC had made to the New Space industries located at Mojave, CA. There the Government was exposed to many technologies and industry visions by individual developers. In summing up shared interests it was clear that in the near-term industry and Government both see utility in responsive and affordable, routine single-stage to space and multi-stage to space capabilities that return to the point of origin, both manned and un-manned. It was also clear that over the longer term industry and Government share interests in similarly responsive systems for point to point (P2P) and orbital missions and markets. The following rationale Government and industry teaming was generally concurred with by the conference participants:

. 4.2.4.9.1 The Limitations of Industry Success Alone

This document assumes that the mere achievement of TRL 7 by industry for a commercial market does not translate into TRL 7 for military utility. If military specifications and requirements are not built into commercial systems from the beginning of R&D and into a production line in all likelihood it would be cost- prohibitive in terms of both time and resources to modify systems for operationally demanding military needs. Analogous parallels can be found throughout the industry, from weapons to equipment. So, the near-term achievement of commercial success is a poor measure of Government utility if that success occurs in the absence of a partnership.

- 32 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.9.2 The Limitations of Government Led Development Alone

Conversely, from NASA to the DoD, the Government has permitted itself to grow risk averse in the development of human-rated space transportation. The spirit of innovation and forward-leaning development has passed to the New Space industry as well as some global competitors and potential adversaries. Risk aversion extends now even extends to the development of unmanned systems, with requirements creep, cost over-runs and severe delays in operationalizing new space-related systems becoming the norm rather than the exception. This bureaucratic inertia continues in spite of strong National Security Space leadership desiring to overcome it. Top-down advocacy is required or it will remain difficult to overcome the inertia of the bureaucracy and the processes on which it is based. Without a reliable partnership with the forward-leaning New Space industry an overcoming of the old space programmatic paradigm and risk aversion is unlikely, thus slowing progress.

. 4.2.4.9.3 The Value of a Government and Industry Team

The fundamental premise of this document is the assumption that teaming leads to the greatest likelihood of successful outcomes, especially when it comes to accelerating the pace of R&D returns. This is particularly critical when it comes to a teaming arrangement between Government and industry. The Government possesses the resources to buy down the risk of forward-leaning entrepreneurs in a fashion, and to a degree that the entrepreneurs could not hope to accomplish using only their own limited IRAD accounts. In this regard a deliberate and thoughtful teaming between industry and Government would achieve shared space transportation objectives sooner, and this is reflected in the roadmaps that follow. o 4.2.4.10 Emerging Commercial Human Spaceflight Industry

Mr. Bretton Alexander discussed the importance of communicating the need for advocating commercial human spaceflight as a means of sustaining and advancing U.S. manned space capabilities after the retirement of the Space Shuttle. With this objective in mind, the ―Next Step in Space Coalition,‖ has launched an ongoing campaign to raise awareness of the role of commercial companies in supporting NASA's efforts to send astronauts to space.

. 4.2.4.10.1 The coalition is a group of businesses, organizations, and individuals engaged in a campaign seeking to educate both government officials and the general public on the current role of commercial companies in space transportation and the potential role of commercial companies in the future of human spaceflight.

. 4.2.4.10.2 Commercial spaceflight, defined as space transportation carried out by vehicles owned and operated by private companies, is uniquely positioned to service the low Earth orbit (LEO) market, which includes servicing the

- 33 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

International Space Station (ISS). In addition, investing in commercial spaceflight will allow NASA to focus its resources and expertise on the exploration beyond low-Earth orbit - to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Commercial spaceflight was also stressed as being a solution to limit U.S. reliance on Russia for access to the International Space Station during the projected 5 year gap in U.S. human spaceflight capability brought on by the Shuttle retirement.

. 4.2.4.10.3 It is of note that Bretton Alexander has been appointed as the President of the Personal Spaceflight Federation. In his capacity of President, he acts as chief advocate for commercial human spaceflight and work to address regulatory, legislative, and policy issues facing the personal spaceflight industry. o 4.2.4.11 The Potential of Prizes

. 4.2.4.11.1 The prize discussion was led by Mr. Will Pomerantz. The NSSO moderator, LtCol Damphousse. As background, he noted that in 2008, prior to the San Antonio conference, the Marine Corps proposed to the NSSO and the AF the idea of offering an X-Prize as a means of accelerating the development of SUSTAIN-enabling technologies. In the PP&O-generated presentation the Marines discussed the advantages and disadvantages of three points along the spectrum of possible SUSTAIN developmental approaches:

o 4.2.4.11.1.1 Program of Record. The most ambitious yet least cost-effective approach discussed was a SUSTAIN Program of Record (POR). A well- funded RDT&E effort would have all of the control and stability advantages of any POR. However, the disadvantages of a declining DoD budget and immediate warfighting priorities would make a SUSTAIN POR cost- prohibitive.

o 4.2.4.11.1.2 Wait and See. The least ambitious, but arguably the most cost- effective approach discussed was a ―wait and see‖ approach. This would have the advantage of reducing or eliminating early DoD risks and costs as we allow the relevant technologies to mature elsewhere. However, the disadvantage would be that well-funded competitors and adversaries would be able to exploit the capabilities first delivering a significant blow to U.S. space superiority, both commercial and military.

o 4.2.4.11.1.3 X-Prize. At the center of the spectrum of options discussed as an X-Prize or multiple X-Prizes. Prizes would offer a means of stimulating and perhaps accelerating the development of higher risk, yet potentially disruptive, SUSTAIN-related technologies in the nearer term absence of commercial or military markets due to capability immaturity. The advantages of prizes are that industry, NASA, academia, and entrepreneurs can be inspired through the incentive of prizes for maximum leverage. In so-doing, the U.S. can control the pace and direction of development, i.e. set the tempo for space transportation development generally. From a military perspective, however,

- 34 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

the disadvantages (in addition to those already noted above) include an overwhelming bias towards commercial transition rather than military program new starts.

. 4.2.4.11.2 In their presentation, the Marines also proposed a specific technological challenge that might lure the participation of investors and developers, given that the size of the prize was commensurate with the cost and risk of development. The proposed technical challenge was thought to represent something technologically feasible in the near term, namely the global delivery of a fragile payload with the following parameters for success:

o 4.2.4.11.2.1 Mass: Deliver an operationally or commercially relevant fragile payload.

o 4.2.4.11.2.2 Handling: Deliver the fragile payload without damage.

o 4.2.4.11.2.3 Accuracy: Deliver payload to any point on the earth‘s surface starting on the ground in the US.

o 4.2.4.11.2.4 Timeliness: Deliver payload within two (2) hours of an order to execute.

. 4.2.4.11.3 Following the brief introduction to the potential applicability of prizes to SUSTAIN a general discussion ensued. Much of the discussion revolved around the physical scope of the challenges. The first was range of a notional insertion capability. Theater ranges of approximately 1000 NM would permit the confinement of missions between CONUS military bases such as Edwards AFB and WSMR, or between spaceports such as those extant or proposed at Mojave, CA and Las Cruzes, NM.

. 4.2.4.11.4 Another issue discussed was the degree of complexity and ultimately difficulty that should be introduces for a single prize. Many suggested that insertion-delivery might be challenging enough at first without immediately taxing a demonstration with a need for extraction. For example, during the first DARPA Grand Challenge no winner emerged. Building on the simplicity of the first, the second Grand Challenge and the Urban Challenge represented incremental increases, not only in challenge but also demonstrated success. Introducing the extraction phase in a follow-on prize was suggested. The same scaling of difficulty in a sequence of prizes was suggested for incrementally going from theater to global distances and from sub-orbital P2P to orbital transport.

. 4.2.4.11.5 In consideration of some of the complexities and technical risks of the SUSTAIN concept breaking the SUSTAIN challenge into smaller, though more achievable prizes initially resonated with the audience. Later, when sub-systems and sub-capabilities have been demonstrated larger prizes can be offered for full cycle operations. NASA and perhaps the Air Force can offer multi-million dollar

- 35 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

prizes for more challenging demonstrations. It was agreed by both Government and Industry participants that a detailed study will be required to optimize SUSTAIN X-Prize parameters.

. 4.2.4.11.6 With respect to the monetary value of prizes it was stated that prize history has shown competitors are willing to invest approximately 2.5 times the actual value of the prize out of their own funds in an effort to win prizes. For example, if a prize has a value of $10M history has shown that a well-funded inventor or industry might be willing to invest $25M in venture capital or IRAD, respectively to win it. However, for any developer-competitors the initial challenge is securing the seed money from wealthy entrepreneurs, private individuals, or institutions. For those bankrolling a competitor there first needs to be some assurance that demonstrated success will lead to profitable capability transitions and contracts on the other end in order to get the seed money. In other words there needs to be a market and procurement program that follow-on following the winning of a prize, as the fame and prize money are short-lived. In the end, competitors and their supporters would rather receive contract assurances than cash prizes. o 4.2.4.12 Crew Survivability in Spaceflight: Human Factors Implications

. 4.2.4.12.1 On 24 Feb 2009 Dr. Jonathan B. Clark, from the National Space Biomedical Research Institute of Baylor College of Medicine, presented a brief titled ―Crew Survivability in Spaceflight Human Factors Implications‖ before the 2009 National Security Space Technology Forum on Suborbital Missions and the Small Unit Space Transport and Insertion (SUSTAIN) Concept. Dr. Clark issued a disclaimer at the beginning of his presentation stating that the opinions and assertions expressed therein were his own and did not reflect the views of the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI), Baylor College of Medicine (BCM), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), or the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB). Dr. Clark‘s presentation is the sole reference used in the following discussion. All graphics are his own or come from sources so-annotated by him on those images. The text of the following discussion is either directly extrapolated from Dr. Clark‘s presentation slide bullets or constitutes recollections from his brief and conference discussions.

. 4.2.4.12.2 Human Rated Space Systems. Generally, the characteristics of human rated space systems can be categorized as: 1) Capability, 2) Sustainability, 3) Affordability, and 4) Survivability. With respect to Crew Survival, it is defined as the collective implementation of abort, escape, emergency egress, safe haven, emergency medical, and rescue throughout the mission to keep the crew alive and return them safely to Earth in response to a catastrophic condition. In practice Crew Survival is about options that serve to mitigate health threats during ascent and entry, while still permitting mission accomplishment.

- 36 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 25. A graphic describing the phases of spaceflight, their risks, and survival options.

. 4.2.4.12.3 Dr. Clark introduced the audience to the nature of various spaceflight phenomena that threaten spacecraft crews, the physical characteristics of those threats, the altitude range at which they are encountered, their potential biological effects on crew members, and the countermeasures needed to mitigate each.

- 37 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 26. Matrix of health threats at relevant spaceflight altitudes, and their countermeasures.

. 4.2.4.12.4 Projects Strato-Lab and Manhigh

o 4.2.4.12.4.1 Project Strato-Lab was a high-altitude manned balloon program sponsored by the United States Navy during the 1950s and early 1960s. The Strato-Lab program developed out of the Navy's unmanned balloon program, Project Skyhook, and lifted the first Americans into the upper reaches of the stratosphere. The program was developed to accomplish research required for the manned rocket program to follow. This program provided biomedical data that was used for subsequent efforts in space. Five numbered balloon flights to the stratosphere were made during the program.

o 4.2.4.12.4.2 Similarly, the Air Force‘s Project Manhigh, along with Project Excelsior, was a pre-Space Age military project that took men in balloons to the upper layers of the Earth‘s atmosphere. The project started in December 1955 to study the effects of cosmic rays on humans. With the pilot and the scientific payload, the Manhigh II gondola had a total mass of 748 kg (1,650 lb). At maximum altitude, the balloon expanded to a diameter of 60 m (200 ft) with a volume of over 85,000 m3 (111,000 cu yd). Three numbered balloon flights to the stratosphere were made during the program.

- 38 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.12.4.3 Between the Strato-Lab and Manhigh Projects several balloon ascent records were established. They were: 8 Nov 1956 - Malcolm Ross, Lee Lewis (US Navy) Strato-Lab 1 86,000 feet; 2 Jun 1957 - Joseph Kittinger (US Air Force) Manhigh 1 96,000 feet; 19 Aug 1957 - David Simons (US Air Force) Manhigh 11 101,500 feet; and 4 May 1961 - Malcolm Ross and Vic Prather (US Navy) Strato-Lab 5 113,740 feet. They have been documented in detail in ―The Pre-Astronauts: Manned Ballooning on the Threshold of Space‖ by author Craig Ryan. Some were even reported in the press immediately following their occurrence, such as Life Magazine in Aug 1960.

Figures 27-29. The covers of Pre-Astronauts and the Life Magazine issue of 29 Aug 1960.

. 4.2.4.12.5 Project Excelsior. Project Excelsior was closely related to Project Manhigh. It constituted a series of high-altitude parachute jumps made by then- Captain Joseph Kittinger of the United States Air Force in 1959 and 1960 to test the Beaupre multi-stage parachute system. In one of these jumps Kittinger set world records for the highest parachute jump, the longest parachute freefall, and the fastest freefall, all of which still stand. The three jumps are described below:

o 4.2.4.12.5.1 On 16 Nov 1959 Captain Joe Kittinger participated in Excelsior I. Suspended beneath a three-million cubic foot volume helium balloon he ascended to an altitude of 76,400 feet in an open gondola. At altitude he exited, but unintentionally his drogue stabilization chute deployed prematurely. Kittinger entered a flat spin and shrouds entangled around his neck. Unconscious, Kittinger spiraled downward uncontrollably reaching 120 revolutions per minute. His reserve chute deployed automatically at 12,000 feet and he landed safely.

o 4.2.4.12.5.2 On 11 Dec 1959 Captain Kittinger again ascended to an altitude of 74,700 feet in Excelsior II, and this time his jump was successful.

- 39 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.12.5.3 Kittinger executed Excelsior III on 16 Aug 1960. This time he ascended to an altitude of 102,800 feet before exiting. With a small stabilizing chute deployed, Kittinger fell for four minutes, 36 seconds until his 28-foot main parachute opened at 17,500 feet. He landed safely after his 13 minute, 45 second descent. Kittinger‘s right glove developed a leak during balloon ascent. As a result his hand became swollen, causing extreme pain, but it had completely returned to normal three hours after landing. During Excelsior III Captain Kittinger was exposed to temperatures as low as -94 degrees Fahrenheit, and he attained a maximum freefall speed of 614 mph.

Figures 30-33. Capt Kittinger: USAF museum display, pre-ascent, and post descent photos.

. 4.2.4.12.6 Russian High Altitude Parachute Program. On 1 Nov 1962 Colonel Pyotr I. Dolgov and Major Eugene N. Andreev ascended to an altitude of 86,156 feet in a pressurized gondola as part of the ―Volga Balloon Flight.‖ At an altitude of 83,524 feet Major Andreev exited the gondola to initiate a High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) Jump. His parachute opened at 3,117 feet, following a 80,360 foot freefall without the benefit of a drogue chute. Then, at an altitude of 86,156 feet Colonel Dolgov exited the gondola. His mission was to execute a High Altitude High Opening (HAHO) jump, so immediately upon exiting he intentionally opened his parachute. However, in the process his faceplate was damaged and breeched, and he died at altitude during his decent.

Figures 34-36. Russian parachutists Colonel Pyotr I. Dolgov and Major Eugene N. Andreev.

- 40 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.12.7 Project Strato Jump. In his book ―Magnificent Failure‖ author Craig Ryan describes the experiences of Nick Piantanida who set several world altitude and human performance records in a series of experiments titled ―Projects Strato Jump I, II, and III.‖ On 1 Oct 1965 Piantanida jumped from a balloon gondola at 22,700 during Strato Jump I. During Strato Jump II on 2 Feb 1966 Piantanida reached record altitude of 123,500 feet. While he intended to jump he was unable to disconnect himself from onboard O2 causing ground controllers to cut his gondola away from the balloon for a parachute decent, which he and the gondola survived. Piantanida‘s final ascent came on 1 May 1966 during the execution of Strato Jump III. During the ascent and at an altitude of 57,600 feet ground controllers overheard a sudden gush of air on radio and heard Piantanida's voice, screaming "Emergency!" Ground controllers cut the gondola away from the balloon, and the drogue chute opened as planned. However, during decompression and a subsequent slow 25 minute descent Piantanida suffered fatal injuries, and in spite of his surviving the landing he died in a hospital four months later without ever regaining consciousness.

Figures 37-38. Author Craig Ryan‘s book cover, and Nick Piantanida‘s final ascent.

. 4.2.4.12.8 Human Experience in High Altitude Pressure Chambers. Humans have survived incidents of Rapid (Explosive) Decompression following accidental near- instantaneous exposure to high altitude conditions. For example:

- 41 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.12.8.1 A space suit technician was subjected to rapid decompression through near-instantaneous exposure to 120,000 foot altitude conditions. The technician recalled the saliva boiling off his tongue as he passed out. He regained consciousness once the pressure chamber reached 14,000 foot altitude conditions. The technician suffered no neurological sequelae and was not hospitalized (Roth EM, "Rapid (Explosive) Decompression Emergencies in Pressure-Suited Subjects," NASA CR-1223, 1968).

o 4.2.4.12.8.2 In another case, in 1982 a technician was decompressed to greater than 74,000 feet (22,555 m), and remained there for 60 seconds. By the time the chamber was opened the victim had been above 63 millibar for 1 to 3 minutes. The patient was cyanotic, frothing, and had bilateral pnuemothorax and grade 4 otic barotrauma. He was subsequently given IV Decadron and recompressed to 6 ATA using NITROX (50% nitrogen 50% oxygen) 5 hours after the exposure. By 24 hours after exposure he was awake and alert. He was extubated at day 5, and at a 1 year follow-up he had neurological performance superior to testing before the accident (Kolesari GL, Kindwall EP Aviation, Space, Environmental Med 1982; 53:1211-4).

. 4.2.4.12.9 1966 SR-71 Blackbird Mishap. On 25 Jan 1966 an SR-71 Blackbird traveling Mach 3.18 at an altitude of 78,800 feet became unstable, broke up, and disintegrated in-flight. An engine inlet spike control system malfunctioned resulting in a shock wave that caused an "inlet unstart." The system malfunction reduced longitudinal stability, and the consequent increased AOA, supersonic speed, high altitude, and g forces resulted in a breakup of the airframe over a period of two to three seconds. The pilot was temporarily rendered unconsciousness, but suffered only minor bruises. However, the navigator sustained a fatal neck injury. Neither the navigator nor the pilot ejection seats fired, but both of the crew parachutes deployed automatically. On the ground the aircraft cockpit was discovered 10 miles from main aircraft, with the total wreckage scattered over a debris field 15 miles long and 10 miles wide (AW & ST 08/08/2005, p 60, Bill Weaver).

Figure 39-40. SR-71 Blackbird spike control malfunction, and newspaper article on mishap.

- 42 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.12.10 1967 X-15 Mishap. On 15 Nov 1967 X-15 Flight 191 flown by test pilot Michael J. Adams experienced catastrophic in-flight failure. A payload electrical anomaly on ascent distracted the pilot, resulting in the X-15 heading to gradually drift while it was at an altitude of 266,000 feet, or 81 km. Having misinterpreted the flight display the pilot allowed the X-15 to yaw at a right angle to the flight path. The X-15 entered a Mach 5 spin at 230,000 feet in the absence of any supersonic spin recovery procedures under those conditions. After achieving spin recovery at 118,000 feet the X-15 entered a Mach 4.7, 45 degree inverted dive. The adaptive flight control system became saturated and developed a pitch oscillation causing the X-15 to experience greater that 15 +/- Gz and 8 g lateral Gy. Finally, the X-15 underwent structural breakup at 65,000 feet at a speed of Mach 3.93.

Figures 41-43. X-15 Flight 191, X-15 flight instruments, and vehicle wreckage.

. 4.2.4.12.11 Health Threats Experienced During Ascent - 1975 Soyuz-18A Ascent Abort. On 5 Apr 1975 Cosmonauts V. Lazarev, O. Makarov launched aboard Soyuz-18A. During stage separation the third stage ignited while still attached to second stage. With severe vehicle vibration from aerodynamic forces the Soyuz capsule separated at an altitude of 192 km. The capsule and crew experienced a 20.6 G ballistic reentry, only to land in the mountains near the Chinese border, tumble down a mountainside, and get snagged on bushes just short of a cliff edge. The capsule was discovered by Russian locals an hour after landing. Lazarev suffered internal injuries from the reentry and subsequent tumble down the mountain side.

. 4.2.4.12.12 Health Threats Experienced During Ascent - 1986 Challenger Mishap Lessons Learned. On 28 Jan 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds into its flight over the Atlantic Ocean, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members.

o 4.2.4.12.12.1 Disintegration began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster failed at liftoff. The O-ring failure caused a breach in the SRB joint it sealed, allowing pressurized hot gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB's aft attachment and the structural failure of the external tank.

- 43 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 44. The Challenger explosion and debris plume prior to debris descent.

o 4.2.4.12.12.2 Aerodynamic forces promptly broke up the orbiter. The crew compartment and many other vehicle fragments were eventually recovered from the ocean floor after a lengthy search and recovery operation. Although the exact timing of the death of the crew is unknown, several crew members are known to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. However, the shuttle had no escape system and the astronauts did not survive the impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface. As it pertains to crew survival, several observations have been made:

. The forces leading to vehicle breakup were survivable.

. The crew module dynamics following breakup were survivable.

. The crew module likely attained stable attitude during descent.

. Three of the four recovered personal egress air packs were activated.

. The available time to egress during freefall was adequate.

- 44 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. The crew module remained intact until water impact.

. As a consequence of the Challenger investigation it was recommended that crew escape equipment, procedures, and techniques should be developed and implemented for the Space Shuttle Program.

Figures 45-47. Debris decent and close-ups of intact crew compartment prior to impact.

. 4.2.4.12.13 Health Threats Experienced During Entry - 1971 Soyuz 11 Cabin Depressurization. On 6 Jun 1971 Soyuz 11 Cosmonauts Dobrovolsky (commander), Volkov (flight engineer), and Patsayev (research engineer) were descending following a successful 22 day mission as the first crew of the Salyut 1 space station. During launch and reentry pressure suits were not employed by the crew. During reentry a pressure equalization valve opened early as a result of vibrations experienced during the separation of the descent and orbital modules. Patsayev was found with a bruised hand from his vain attempt to manually close the valve, which was a lengthy procedure. The Soyuz cabin fully depressurized within 212 seconds, but depressurization was fatal to crew within just 30 - 45 seconds.

- 45 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 48-49. Soyuz 11 crew, and rescue team efforts following depressurized descent.

. 4.2.4.12.14 Health Threats Experienced During Entry - 2003 Columbia Mishap Lessons Learned. On 1 Feb 2003 the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated during entry into the Earth's atmosphere, with the loss of all seven crew members, shortly before it was scheduled to conclude its 28th mission. The loss of Columbia was a result of destructive thermal heating of a damaged left wing. The wing damage was sustained during launch when a piece of foam insulation broke off the Space Shuttle external tank during launch. The debris struck the leading edge of the left wing, damaging the Shuttle's thermal protection system (TPS), which protects it from atmospheric heating generated during re-entry.

Figures 50-52. Columbia (STS 107) vehicle and crew module reentry breakup frame sequence.

o 4.2.4.12.14.1 A major post-incident investigation finding was that crew module depressurization occurred between 181,000 and 140,000 feet, and final destruction of the crew module took place between approximately 148,000 and 138,000 feet. The cabin atmospheric pressure was normal until the forward fuselage separated from shuttle body. There was also evidence of hull penetrations due to thermal and dynamic loads that resulted in cabin pressure loss, quickly exposing crew to near vacuum, resulting in loss of useful consciousness through hypoxia, ebullism, and barotrauma. The death of the crew members was due to blunt trauma and hypoxia.

- 46 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.12.14.2 Another investigation finding was that major anatomical disruptions involved crew member interactions with the seats, restraints, and surrounding objects, mainly during dynamic mechanical forces. Crew members had spinal column transection, and it was found that the seat restraints contributed to those injuries. None of the restraint inertial reels locked, allowing bracing and flail injuries to occur. The non-conformal helmet allowed helmet skull injury, and helmet neck rings resulted in serious neck injury. Also, life support equipment was not in a survival configuration (visors up). However, the report determined that the acceleration levels the crew module experienced prior to the cabin‘s catastrophic failure were not lethal.

o 4.2.4.12.14.3 Finally, the investigation found in videos of the crew during re- entry demonstrate that prescribed procedures for use of equipment such as full- pressure suits, gloves, and helmets were not strictly followed. In fact, of the seven crew members one was not wearing a helmet, and the others had their visors in the up position, three were not wearing their gloves, and one crew member did not have the restraint harness secured. Nevertheless, under the extreme circumstances, these personal measures did not affect their chances of survival.

Figure 53. Timeline of Columbia vehicle and crew module entry breakup.

. 4.2.4.12.15 Health Threats Experienced During Entry – Vostok 1. Vostok 1 was the first human spaceflight. The Vostok 3KA spacecraft was launched on April 12, 1961, taking into space Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin of the Soviet Union. The Vostok

- 47 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

1 mission was the first time anyone had journeyed into outer space, and the first time anyone had entered into orbit. After retrofire, the Vostok equipment module unexpectedly remained attached to the reentry module by a bundle of wires. The two halves of the craft were supposed to separate ten seconds after retrofire, but this did not happen until 10 minutes had passed. During entry the spacecraft went through wild gyrations before the wires burned through and the descent module settled into the proper entry attitude.

. 4.2.4.12.16 Health Threats Experienced During Entry – Vostok 2. Vostok 2 was a Soviet space mission which carried Cosmonaut Gherman Titov into orbit for a full day in order to study the effects of a more prolonged period of weightlessness on the human body. The flight suffered a troublesome entry when the entry module failed to separate cleanly from its service module.

. 4.2.4.12.17 Health Threats Experienced During Entry – Vostok 5. Vostok 5 was a joint mission of the Soviet space program together with Vostok 6. As with the previous pair of Vostok 3 and Vostok 4 the two Vostok spacecraft came close to one another in orbit and established a radio link. In preparation for entry, a similar problem to that experienced on Vostok 1 and Vostok 2 was experienced on Vostok 5, in that the re-entry module failed to separate cleanly from the service module when Cosmonaut Valery Bykovsky prepared to return to earth.

. 4.2.4.12.18 Health Threats Experienced During Entry – Voskhod 2. Voskhod 2 was a Soviet manned space mission in March 1965. Cosmonauts Belyayev and Leonov were launched in the Vostok-based Voskhod 3KD spacecraft, which was equipped with an inflatable airlock. Russian documents reveal that Leonov‘s space suit ballooned, making bending difficult after he had violated procedure by entering the airlock head-first. As a consequence he became stuck sideways when he turned to close the outer hatch. He was forced to lower his space suit pressure so he could bend to free himself, and this subjected him to decompression sickness. Doctors reported that Leonov nearly suffered heatstroke as his core body temperature increased by 1.8°C (3.2°F) in 20 minutes.

. 4.2.4.12.19 Health Threats Experienced During Entry – Soyuz 5. On 18 Jan 1969 the Soyuz 5 spacecraft piloted by Cosmonaut Boris Volynov experienced an unstable re-entry attitude due to the incomplete separation of the crew module from service module. The Russian Soyuz spacecraft is composed of three modules; namely an Orbital (Habitation) Module (BO), a Reentry Module (SA), and a Service Module (PAO). In addition to other functions, the PAO contains the liquid-fuel propulsion main engine for maneuvering in orbit and initiating the descent back to Earth.

- 48 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 54-57. Nominal separation of Soyuz modules before atmospheric entry and landing.

o 4.2.4.12.19.1 In a nominal re-entry the spacecraft is first turned PAO and engine-forward, and the main engine is then fired for de-orbiting, fully 180° ahead of its planned landing site. Early Soyuz spacecraft such as Soyuz 5 would then have the service and orbital modules detach simultaneously. The Soyuz craft is designed to come down on land, usually somewhere in the deserts of Kazakhstan in central Asia.

o 4.2.4.12.19.2 However, on 18 Jan 1969 the Soyuz 5 crew module did not separate from the service module because the multiplex connector failed to disconnect when so-commanded by Cosmonaut Volynov. As a consequence the crew module entered the atmosphere nose-first leaving Volynov hanging by his restraining straps with entry G forces reversed. As the craft aerobraked, the atmosphere burned into the crew module structure. But the Service module finally separated and the re-entry vehicle righted itself before the escape hatch was burned through. Then, the parachute lines tangled and the soft-landing rockets failed, resulting in a hard landing which broke Volynov's teeth.

Figures 58-59. Soyuz 5 SA entering inverted still strapped to the PAO by multiplex connector.

. 4.2.4.12.20 Health Threats Experienced During Entry – Soyuz TMA-11. On 19 Apr 2008 the Soyuz TMA-11 suffered a separation failure from the International Space Station (ISS) prior to entry. Although the vehicle landed safely following

- 49 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

entry, due to a partial separation failure it followed a ballistic re-entry, that in-turn caused it to land in Kazakhstan 475 km from the intended landing point. Although the crew members were recovered with no injuries, the spacecraft's hatch and antenna suffered burn damage as the ship may have entered the atmosphere hatch- first. It has been determined that the ballistic re-entry was caused by a pyro-bolt malfunction that resulted in a failure of the service module to separate normally from the ISS.

Figure 60. Health threats experienced during entry – major Russian events summary. . . 4.2.4.12.21 Health Issues Experienced During Landing – Parachute Landings. Russian crews returning from space normally land on dry land in Central Asia. Since 1967 the Russians have launched over 100 crewed missions. During this period the Russians have also experienced several landing anomalies and failures. The most significant incidents include the following: 1) A parachute failure on Soyuz 1 resulted in a fatal impact; 2) High G ballistic re-entries affected the landings of the unmanned Kosmos-140 as well as the manned Soyuz 1, Soyuz 5, Soyuz 33, T-11, and TMA-1; 3) Double bounces and hard impacts upon landing effected TM-7, TM-12, TM-14, TM-19, TMA-1, and TMA-11; and finally 4) Landing site hazards affected the landings of Soyuz 6 (school), Soyuz 21 (lake shore), Soyuz 23 (frozen lake), T-7 and TM-15 (hillside, rolled), and TM-4 (lakebed). The Apollo 15 experienced a failed parachute opening prior to water landing.

- 50 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 61-63. Health threats experienced during landing – parachute landings.

. 4.2.4.12.22 Health Issues Experienced During Landing – Landing Gear Failures. An X-15 landing rollover occurred on 9 Nov 1962 when an engine failure forced NASA research pilot Jack McKay to make an emergency landing at Mud Lake, Nevada. When the landing gear collapsed the X-15 flipped over on its back. McKay was promptly rescued by an Air Force medical team standing by near the launch site, and eventually recovered to fly the X-15 again, but his injuries eventually forced his retirement from NASA.

. 4.2.4.12.23 Health Issues Experienced During Landing – Landing Gear Failures. On 17 Dec 2003 the first rocket-powered flight of the SpaceShipOne occurred, during which it achieved a speed of Mach 1.2 and an altitude of 68,000 feet. However, after it flew back to land at its Scaled Composites home base at Mojave California the spaceplane was damaged due to a landing gear failure. No injuries resulted from the landing gear failure.

Figures 64-65. 9 Nov 1962 X-15 and 17 Dec 2003 SpaceShipOne landing gear failures.

- 51 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 66. Matrix of health threats during entry, landing and their countermeasures.

Figure 67. Events and incidents in human spaceflight with respect to flight phase. (Red indicates fatalities, yellow indicates injuries)

- 52 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.12.24 Dr. Clark discussed the operational approach to crew survivability in spaceflight. Included in his discussion were human factors implications of: 1) intact vs. non-intact spacecraft; 2) the operational coverage of the mission phase; 3) full envelope vs. partial envelope, crew protective systems options; 4) the pros and cons of suited or non-suited crew members; 5) issues related to crew member restraints, seats, and life support systems; 6) crew duties in an emergency; and 7) post-landing support.

. 4.2.4.12.25 Entry Corridor Constraints Entry corridor is constrained by vehicle and crew limitations -- Lift/ Drag versus Volumetric Efficiency -- Occupant Protection Design Drivers -- Crew Survival -- Jolt, acceleration, impact, vibration - - Crew Safety and Mobility -- unassisted egress, pressurized suit compatible – Anthropometric -- fit, access, reach, view, and operation of humansystem – interfaces -- Vehicle Control and Reach -- Crew Health and Medical -- access to incapacitated crew -- Vehicle Issues (habitable volume, console proximity).

Figure 68. The Human Flight Survival Envelope and several tragedies that serve as experience.

- 53 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.12.26 Dr. Clark also discussed various spacecraft crew escape systems, beginning with the ascent phase. A SUSTAIN crew Launch Escape System (LES) would have to provide solutions to several requirements in order to guarantee crew survival. First, it must be able to pull the crew capsule from an exploding vehicle. The Apollo system benefited from such a nose-mounted extraction rocket cluster, as do Russian Soyuz launches. Next, the LES must have the ability to be separated from the crew capsule once the combination has cleared free of the catastrophic environment. Then, the LES must possess survivable crew parameters that consider the dynamic pressure, the Mach number, and the flight path angle. Finally, the LES must enable the crew capsule to be released with the appropriated attitude for entry and parachute deployment.

. 4.2.4.12.27 Extraction Rocket System and Launch Pad Abort Experience. On 27 Sep 1983 Cosmonauts V. Titov and G. Strekalov were preparing to launch aboard Soyuz T-10A. 90 seconds before the scheduled launch a fuel line ruptured and caught fire. The Launch Control Center attempted to activate the escape system by means of the control cables, but the fire had already burned through them. 20 seconds later controllers were able to activate the escape system via radio command. Explosive bolts then fired to separate the descent module from the service module, and the upper launch shroud from the lower shroud. The escape motor then fired, dragging the orbital and descent module within the shroud, and free of the booster. Seconds later the booster exploded, destroying the launch complex. Although the crew was subjected to between 14 and 17 Gs for a period of five seconds, they were unharmed.

Figures 69-70. Soyuz launch escape system, like the one that saved the Soyuz T-10A crew.

- 54 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.12.28 In-flight Bailout. The concept of bailing out of a spacecraft in flight has been a serious consideration of the manned space program from its infancy. In addition to the balloon assisted high altitude parachute jumps of the U.S. and Russia, the early Cosmonauts actually executed such bailouts as a deliberate phase of re-entry. The effects of exit velocity, falling velocity, deceleration, and atmospheric heating must be considered by all practitioners of an in-flight spacecraft bailout.

Figures 71-73. Velocity, acceleration, and temperature considerations for spacecraft bailout.

. 4.2.4.12.29 Personal Parachute in Project Mercury. Serious consideration was not given to the use of a personal parachute, with which the astronaut might bail out from his explosive side hatch, until May 1960, when Lee McMillion and Alan Shepard suggested the idea for the Mercury-Redstone flights at least. The exploits of the Air Force balloonist, Captain Joseph W. Kittinger, Jr., who had been making solo stratospheric ascents for the Air Force since 1957, were a significant factor in this reevaluation of the personal parachute. In Project Excelsior, Kittinger began a series of record-breaking sky dives. On November 16, 1959, he jumped from an open gondola at an altitude of 76,400 feet. Three weeks later, from Excelsior II, he bailed out at an altitude of 74,700 feet to establish a free-fall record of 55,000 feet before pulling his ripcord. STG knew of Kittinger's plans for Excelsior III, which he fulfilled on August 16, 1960, by diving from his balloon at 103,000 feet and falling 17 miles before opening his chute at 17,500 feet. If Kittinger could do it, so might the Mercury astronaut in case the escape tower would not jettison or both main parachutes failed on a Mercury-Redstone flight. Memo, Shepard to Project Dir., "Personal Parachute Application to Mercury," June 27, 1960. The results of these studies were summarized in memo, William C. Mosely, Jr., for Aleck Bond, "Procedure for Personal Parachute Usage During Mercury-Redstone Missions," April 18, 1961. As a consequence, instruction was provided to the Mercury astronauts to develop techniques and procedures for using the personal parachute as an additional safety feature in that program. However, this parachute was only used during the Mercury-Redstone 3 (MR-3) mission manned by Alan Shepard.

. 4.2.4.12.30 Space Shuttle Crew Bailout Option. Shuttle In-Flight Abort Modes permit crew bailout during controlled, gliding flight. This is defined by NASA as ―Mode 8 Egress.‖ This required hardware changes to the orbiters to enable the flight crew to equalize the pressurized crew compartment with the outside pressure

- 55 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

via the depressurization valve opened by pyrotechnics in the crew compartment aft bulkhead. This would be manually activated by a flight crew member in the middeck of the crew compartment. Next, the crew ingress/egress side hatch would be pyrotechnically jettisoned, again a manual command from the middeck of the crew compartment. The crew would then be able to bail out from the middeck through the ingress/egress side hatch opening after manually deploying the escape pole through, outside and down from the side hatch opening. One by one, each flight crew member would attach a lanyard hook assembly, which surrounds the deployed escape pole, to his or her parachute harness and egress through the side hatch opening. Attached to the escape pole, the crew member would slide down the pole and off the end. The escape pole provides each crew member with a trajectory that takes the crew member below the orbiter's left wing.

Figures 74-76. Werner von Braun‘s escape concept, and today‘s Shuttle in-flight bailout pole.

. 4.2.4.12.31 The Russian Vostok Ejection Seat System. On 12 Apr 1961 Soviet Air Force Lieutenant Yuri A. Gagarin became the first human to be launched into space aboard a Vostok spacecraft. The manned module was a sphere covered with an ablative material to protect it during reentry into the atmosphere. It contained automatic and ground-activated controls, but there were emergency manual controls for the cosmonaut. The pilot sat in an aircraft-type ejection seat with a parachute and communications equipment. Small rockets at its base could propel the seat through a circular hatch in the module in case of emergency. Later 'Voskhod' versions replaced the ejection seat with fixed couches. The Vostok capsule ejection seats used in the earliest Russian human space flights were actually designed to be used for the final stage of reentry. The cosmonaut would reenter the atmosphere in the capsule and descend under parachutes to an altitude in the 6000 meter range before ejecting from the capsule and descending under a personal parachute pack.

- 56 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 77-78. The Russian Vostok Ejection System.

. 4.2.4.12.32 The Gemini Program Ejection Seat System. The Gemini program used ejection seats for emergency egress. The seat was designed based on use during the pad, liftoff and late reentry stages. Once in the upper atmosphere after launch the seat firing handle (located between the astronauts‘ legs) was stowed out of the way so that it would not be inadvertently actuated in space. The leg guards on the sides of the seat were retractable to allow more freedom in the cramped capsule once in space. This seat used the most powerful Rocket Catapult (ROCAT) ever developed in the United States for propulsion. It was specifically designed based on a projection of the radius of the expected fireball should the Titan II rocket explode on the pad. The projection required the seat to outrun the fireball for a distance of about 800 ft fast enough that the nylon parachute would not be damaged by the heat pulse of the exploding fuel.

- 57 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 79-81. The Gemini Ejection System in theory and testing.

. 4.2.4.12.33 The system was tested extensively by the technicians at Weber Aircraft. Boilerplate capsule mockups were launched at high speeds down sled tracks and seat ejections were filmed to verify high speed ejections were possible. Boilerplate capsules were mounted in launch attitude on top of a high tower and seats were fired across the desert to prove the 800 foot mark could be reached, and the parachute system would deploy properly.

Figures 82-83. Rocket sled tests with animals, and the Gemini ejection system in practice.

. 4.2.4.12.34 The Russian Buran Ejection Seat System. The Buran Space Shuttle was planned to be fitted with the Zvezda K-36RB ejection seats. In the end the Russian shuttle was unmanned during its single flight, and the seats were never installed. However, the ejection seat system did fly on an atmospheric test vehicle used for the approach and landing evaluation of the Strizh ―swift‖ full pressure suit. It has been operationally tested to Mach 3.0 at an altitude of 30 kilometers and to Mach 3.5 at an altitude of 35 kilometers from aboard a Mig 25 RU. The ejection seat has also undergone sled tests, and it can be initiated automatically, by the crew,

- 58 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

or by ground controllers. High Altitude Tests have been conducted on 5 Progress Launches between 1988 and 1990, with ejections initiated at altitudes of 35 to 41 kilometers and at speeds of Mach 3.2 to Mach 4.1.

Figures 84-85. The Russian Buran Escape System.

. 4.2.4.12.35 The Space Shuttle Ejection Seat System. Early flights of the NASA's Space Shuttle were executed with a crew of two. The Shuttle was fitted with ejection seats board Columbia for the landing tests at Edwards AFB, and those seats continued to be employed on Columbia orbital Missions 1, 2, 3, and 4. The modified Lockheed SR-71 ejection seats were installed for both crew members. The Shuttle version had a tilting back to position the pilots closer to the instrument panel while the shuttle was on the pad. This seat, with the necessary pressure suit known as the David C. Clark suit, possesses the highest altitude and highest airspeed ratings of any ejection seats in current U.S. service. Following STS-4 the seats were removed and further development was stopped. This had several reasons, but two were primary:

o 4.2.4.12.35.1 Subsequent Shuttle missions carried seven person crews. It was determined by NASA to be very difficult to eject seven crew members when three or four are on the middeck (roughly the center of the forward fuselage), surrounded by substantial vehicle structure.

- 59 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.12.35.2 The Shuttle had a limited ejection envelope. The ejection seats would only work at a velocity of up to 3,400 mph (2,692 knots) and to an altitude of 130,000 feet (39,624 m). That constituted a very limited portion of the Shuttle's operating envelope, namely about the first 100 seconds of the 8.5- minute powered ascent.

Figures 86-87. The Shuttle ejection seat system that was installed aboard Columbia.

Figures 88-90. Rocket plume considerations for Shuttle ejection seats, and an improved design.

. 4.2.4.12.36 Encapsulated Seats – the B-58 Crew Pod Escape System. The U.S. Air Force's first operational supersonic bomber was the B-58. When it entered service in 1961, it had individual ejection seats for its three crew members. However, ejection at speeds above 665 mph was extremely hazardous. To improve ejection survivability, the Stanley Aircraft Corp. developed a high-speed high-altitude

- 60 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

capsule ejection system that would allow safe ejection at supersonic speed. The capsule was adopted for retrofit beginning in late 1962, making the B-58 the first USAF aircraft with a capsule ejection system. It was effective throughout the flight envelope up to 70,000 feet and twice the speed of sound. The capsule has airtight clam shell doors and independent pressurization and oxygen supply systems, with survival gear packed inside. The crew member could continue the ejection procedure and be catapulted upward by a rocket out of the aircraft by squeezing an ejection trigger or could remain encapsulated in the event of cabin pressure or oxygen loss until the aircraft reached a lower altitude. The pilot's capsule contained a control stick and other controls necessary to fly the aircraft while encapsulated. After ejection, a parachute lowered the capsule and shock absorbers eased the impact of the capsule on touchdown. The capsule floated if it landed on water and additional flotation cells could be manually inflated to provide stability on water, turning the capsule into a life raft.

Figure 91. The B-58 Crew Pod Escape System.

. 4.2.4.12.37 Modular Separation – Crew Cabin Ejection. An alternative to individual ejection seats for a larger crew is an escape crew capsule or cabin escape system, wherein the crew ejects in a protective capsule or the entire cabin is ejected. Such systems have been used on military aircraft. The F-111 and early prototypes of the Rockwell B-1 bomber used cabin ejection. For spacecraft cabin ejection would work for a much larger portion of the flight envelope than ejection seats, as the crew would be protected from temperature, wind blast, and lack of oxygen or vacuum. However, cabin ejection was not pursued with the Space Shuttle, as with ejection seats, capsule ejection for the shuttle would be difficult because no easy means exists to exit the vehicle. Other reasons included:

o 4.2.4.12.37.1 Within the cabin several crewmembers sit in the middeck, surrounded by substantial vehicle structure.

- 61 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.12.37.2 Cabin ejection is much more difficult, expensive, and risky to retrofit on a vehicle like the Shuttle that was not initially designed for it – it must be part of the original design for feasibility, as it was with the B-1 prototypes and the F-111.

o 4.2.4.12.37.3 Major modifications would have been required for the Shuttle, likely taking several years, during much of the period the vehicle would be unavailable.

o 4.2.4.12.37.4 Cabin ejection systems are heavy, thus incurring a significant payload penalty, not to mention requiring a very large parachute with a more complex extraction sequence.

o 4.2.4.12.37.5 Cabin ejection systems are much more complex than ejection seats. They require devices to cut cables and conduits connecting the cabin and fuselage, and the cabin must have aerodynamic stabilization devices to avoid tumbling after ejection.

o 4.2.4.12.37.6 To make on-the-pad ejections feasible, the separation rockets would have to be quite large.

o 4.2.4.12.37.7 In a situation where the vehicle is disintegrating, if the airframe twists or warps cabin separation might be prevented.

o 4.2.4.12.37.8 Air bags must deploy beneath the cabin to cushion impact or provide flotation, and if debris damaged the landing airbags, stabilization, or any other cabin system, the occupants would likely not survive.

o 4.2.4.12.37.9 There is added risk due to many large pyrotechnic devices which, even if not needed to separate the cabin, entail some risk of premature or uncommanded detonation.

. 4.2.4.12.38 F-111 Crew Escape Module. One of the largest egress systems in existence, is the F-111 Crew Escape Module. Containing the complete two man side by side cockpit, its instrumentation, the stabilization glove, a rocket system, and a recovery system including a parachute, impact attenuation bags and flotation bags. Weighing in at 3000 pounds, this capsule is a heavyweight in many ways.

- 62 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 92-93. Actual F-111 and drawing of notional Space Shuttle crew escape modules.

. 4.2.4.12.39 Decent Phase Escape and the Atmospheric Entry Corridor. The atmospheric entry corridor defines the physical path and rate of deceleration along that path, from orbital to landing velocities that is required to avoid exceeding the physical integrity and functionality capabilities of the vehicle and without harming the crew. With regards to the biological effects of G forces and the limits of human tolerance, this depends on the magnitude, direction and duration of those accelerations. With respect to heating, both the vehicle and the human crew have limits in terms of the total heat load and peak heating rate. Keeping these environmental constraints in balance throughout reentry will affect the accuracy of landing or impact as the balance is primarily a function of trajectory and vehicle design. In summary, the size of the entry corridor depends on three competing constraints, namely deceleration, heating, and accuracy.

Figure 94-95. Drag profile flown to stay within this corridor, and vehicle drag characteristics.

. 4.2.4.12.40 Inflatable Spacecraft Crew Escape Systems

For decades NASA has worked to develop a practical way for astronauts to bail out of a stricken spacecraft and safely return to Earth. The concept of a "lifeboat" that

- 63 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

could transport a crew safely home from an emergency in space has been an area of continued interest.

o 4.2.4.12.40.1 MOOSE. One past concept was called the ―Manned Orbital Operations Safety Equipment‖ or ―MOOSE.‖ This escape system required an individual astronaut to slip inside a large, foam-filled plastic bag, and then after exiting the spacecraft, to fire thrusters that are attached to the system in order to deorbit. The astronaut would rely on a built-in heat shield to survive reentry and await the automatic deployment of a parachute for a safe landing. The astronaut would need to be alert and conscious to follow the step-by-step procedures required for it. However, even its supporters saw MOOSE as extremely risky, not only physically, but also with regard to the physiological shock of an untethered jump into space and a free fall of hundreds of kilometers back to Earth.

Figures 96-98. Manned Orbital Operations Safety Equipment (MOOSE) Inflatable Escape Sys.

o 4.2.4.12.40.2 Ballutes. In response to the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, inflatable lifeboats have resurfaced as potentially viable spacecraft escape systems. Large, lightweight, inflatable ―ballutes‖ (short for balloon parachute) have been proposed as ―atmospheric decelerators.‖ These spherical or lens- shaped structures would provide a means of emergency descent and landing for crews who must abandon a spacecraft that is about to reenter the atmosphere, but is at risk of break-up or can‘t land safely. Such vehicles would act as atmospheric decelerators at supersonic speed in the upper atmosphere. Once at lower altitudes and slower velocities a smaller, central astronaut pod could then separate and parachute separately to Earth.

- 64 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 99. A Spherical Ballute (above) and a Lens-Shaped Ballute (below).

o 4.2.4.12.40.3 Russian Ballute Concepts. Russian and European engineers are working together on a project to develop reentry ballutes, with their versions of such shields known as ―Inflatable Re-entry and Descent Technology.‖ Taking the ballute concept beyond the purpose of crew escape, these inflatable craft could eventually bring either cargo or crew back to Earth from orbit. If the technology proves out, it could allow objects to be more easily returned from space. Small packets could carry scientific results from the international space station, and when the Space Shuttle is retired, bigger versions could provide a safe return for large space modules, rocket boosters and other containers.

- 65 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 100. Russian conceptions of inverted conical ballute as ISS escape pod.

o 4.2.4.12.40.4 Russian space engineers funded by the European Space Agency have been quietly preparing a new test of the vehicle. The low visibility of the Russian efforts is in large part due to previous test flights that have ended unsuccessfully.

Figures 101-103. Russian conceptions of spherical and inverted conical ballutes.

- 66 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 104-105. Russian backpack-stored ballute concept and conical demonstrator.

. 4.2.4.12.41 Summary. Dr. Clark emphasized that crew survivability should be the primary mission success criteria, and the main driver in vehicle design and mission architecture, for any SUSTAIN concept. Life support and personal protective equipment should be designed for with both nominal operations and anticipated catastrophic failure modes in mind. Crew survivability should incorporate advanced technologies where feasible and should be simple, reliable, and attainable. Finally, designing in crew survivability early is significantly more effective than post production modification.

o 4.2.4.13 Delta Clipper-Experimental (DC-X) Experience

. 4.2.4.13.1 James Ball provided the conference audience a historical overview of the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DC-XA). The DC-XA was a 1/3 scale single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO), vertical takeoff / vertical landing (VTOVL) reusable launch vehicle (RLV) concept, whose development was intended to significantly reduce launch costs. The DC-XA was primarily a NASA-sponsored effort, intended to provide a test bed for NASA VTOVL RLV technology. Air Force provided significant input to the program, including the Program Manager and the test facilities.

. 4.2.4.13.2 The DC-X was an experimental vehicle, 1/3 the size of a planned DC-Y vertical-takeoff/vertical-landing, single stage to orbit prototype. It was designed to test the feasibility of both suborbital and orbital reusable launch vehicles using the VTOVL scheme. The DC-X successfully flew in three test series that ran from

- 67 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

August 1993 to July 1996.

. 4.2.4.13.3 Phases I and II of the program involved McDonnell Douglas Aerospace being funded to fabricate an ‗X‘ subscale demonstrator (the DC-X) and the design of a 'Y' prototype vehicle. Primarily, Phase II sought to validate the turnaround and landing maneuver required for a complex nose-first entry concept. This approach was intended to provide a wide cross range, an operational feature attractive to DoD. The nose-first entry of DC-X would also reduce loads experienced by a crew and passengers from the 3G associated with base-first lifting entries to under 2G.

. 4.2.4.13.4 The program focused on using existing technologies and systems to demonstrate the feasibility of building both suborbital and orbital RLVs which were able to fly into space, return to the launch site, and be serviced and ready for the next mission within three days. Central to the program were the results from flight and ground turnaround tests of the DC-X that were to have been used during Phase III of the program. To this end, a systems ground test facility was activated at NASA's White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), and a launch and recovery site at WSMR. The aircraft-like flight test program was to begin with low altitude hover flights, gradually increasing in altitude and duration, leading to suborbital flights up to 5500 m.

. 4.2.4.13.5 By July 1995 the DC-X had completed eight flights in two series, reaching 2500 m. A DC-X ―Advanced‖ (DC-XA) replaced the DC-X. The DC- XA benefited from a lightweight graphite-epoxy liquid hydrogen tank, an advanced graphite/aluminum honeycomb intertank, an aluminum-lithium liquid oxygen tank, and an improved reaction control system. All of these improvements were COTS, and reduced dry vehicle mass by 620 kilograms. The lessons learned from the DC- X Program continue to have applicability to SUSTAIN, at a minimum.

- 68 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 106-107. DC-X launch (L) and artist‘s rendition of DC-XA (R). o 4.2.4.14 SUSTAIN Analysis and Potential Near-Term Solution

. 4.2.4.14.1 Dr. John Jurist presented an analysis of the SUSTAIN concept. The basic stated requirement of SUSTAIN is to develop a capability to place a squad of 13 Marines and field supplies anywhere in the world from the continental US within 2 hours.

. 4.2.4.14.2 A vertical take-off rocket-powered vehicle that decelerates and lands under rocket power and then returns under rocket power without refueling and refurbishing cannot be feasibly developed and fielded in a 5-10 year period. An aerospace plane would most likely require development for more than a decade and would also require a landing field at the target area. Placing and staffing a constellation of up to 12 space stations with re-entry vehicles is technically possible but economically implausible. Evolution from current suborbital tourism vehicle concepts will not allow antipodal range without significant costly and time consuming development.

. 4.2.4.14.3 An inexpensive approach to meet the stated military requirement for the 5-10 year time frame with current technology is a capsule on a pressure-fed, liquid-propellant (LOX and jet fuel) ablatively-cooled 3 stage vertical take-off rocket-powered launch vehicle. The capsule would decelerate aerodynamically during re-entry, decelerate further with a parachute or parasail, and cushion the final impact with small solid-propellant rockets. Cross-range capability on entry could be exploited to divert the landing zone from the line of the atmospheric entry

- 69 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

plasma trail. Extraction of individual team members could be accomplished by using Fulton Recovery Systems on individual team members or by lifting the capsule containing the team to several thousand feet AGL with the capsule abort rocket system and then snagging the capsule in midair with a cargo aircraft. Recovery aircraft could range from the C-130 to the C-17 or C-5 depending on capsule configuration. As described in a briefing provided at the conference, there are advantages and disadvantages for each of the aircraft types considered. In addition, various strategies and scenarios to maximize the odds of successful team recovery, including injured members, were briefed -- some involving multiple aircraft.

. 4.2.4.14.4 The Microcosm Scorpius Exodus concept would allow capsule launch and a fractional orbital trajectory followed by entry and approach to the landing zone from just about any azimuth angle to enhance ground team security. Since much of the developmental work on the Scorpius family has been performed, the major costs associated with this approach to SUSTAIN would be for capsule development and overall system integration.

Figure 108. The proposed Exodus concept.

- 70 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.14.5 An alternate approach could use individual personnel entry after ejection from a vehicle that enters the atmosphere short of the landing zone and then accelerates back out after disgorging the ground team. That would entail development of the entry rescue system investigated decades ago by NASA.

. 4.2.4.14.6 Trade space studies could further refine the concept. All of the technology required for this approach has been demonstrated over the past decade or more. Major impediments to implementing SUSTAIN fall within the political, economic, and policy arenas.

Figures 109-110. The Fulton Recovery System can extract individuals or entire crewed vehicles.

o 4.2.4.15 Scorpius Low-Cost Space Launch Capability from Microcosm

. 4.2.4.15.1 The family of Scorpius launch vehicles noted by Dr. Jurist is illustrated in the figure below. Based on a successful incorporation of all-composite cryogenic LOX tanks and other upgrades into an ―Operational System‖ version of Sprite, projected payload performance is 1050 lbs to LEO. Scaling this performance to larger Scorpius vehicles yields payload performances of 4200 and 19,500 lbs for a Liberty and an Exodus. These expendable vehicles provide the capability to deliver the ISR payloads or separable UAV vehicle as envisioned in Sustain for providing the capability in denied or difficult air space.

Figures 111-113. Scorpius family of vehicles, all-composite tanks, & low cost ablative engines.

- 71 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.15.2 Sprite has a total launch cost of approximately $5.2 million by the tenth production flight. Development and testing of the all-composite fuel and cryogenic tanks as well as pressure tanks have been flown, as has a smaller engine. The larger ablative pressure-fed engine as shown in test is well under way. Pressure- fed launch vehicles have the potential to be scaled up into even larger sizes. The Scorpius family of vehicles, for example, can be extended to twice and four times the size and payload of Exodus, to almost 40,000 and 80,000 lbs to LEO with Heavy Lift and Space Freighter. Payload and flight costs are shown in the following table.

Figure 114. Scorpius vehicles in support of cargo space launch infrastructure.

. 4.2.4.15.3 As described in a briefing provided, the Sprite launch system has been designed with a goal of launch within 8 hours of demand in virtually all-weather conditions with a small crew. Given the simplicity of the pressure-fed launch vehicle, its robustness due to the strong tanks and other structures, and its relative inexpensiveness, Sprite can become the first installment in a truly quick reaction capability to provide the ISR or cargo delivery of a space launch infrastructure. Larger Scorpius vehicles can be incorporated in a few years. In conclusion, pressure-fed launch vehicles with the new technologies become the start of a new generation of space capability to enable such visions as SUSTAIN and a first step in some manned systems. o 4.2.4.16 Risk Factors for Future Commercial Space Flight

. 4.2.4.16.1 This presentation was made by Dr. Melchor Antunano who serves as the Director of the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute within the Federal Aviation Administration. The presentation identified and prioritized medical screening considerations in order to preserve the health and promote the safety of spaceflight participants in commercial space flights (suborbital and orbital). The medical safety considerations discussed were generic in scope and were based on current analysis of physiological and pathological changes that may occur as a result of human exposure to operational and environmental risk factors present during space flight. This included the identification of pre-existing medical conditions that could be aggravated or exacerbated by exposure to the environmental and

- 72 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

operational risk factors encountered during launch, in flight, and during landing. Such risk factors include: acceleration, barometric pressure, microgravity, ionizing radiation, non-ionizing radiation, noise, vibration, temperature and humidity, cabin air, and behavioral and communications issues.

. 4.2.4.16.2 Because of the wide variety of possible approaches that can be used to design and operate manned commercial space vehicles (suborbital and orbital), it is very difficult to make unequivocal recommendations on specific medical conditions that would not be compatible with ensuring safety during space flight. However, space flight is associated with a number of physiological and psychological changes that may cause and/or aggravate certain medical conditions and could adversely impact a spaceflight participant‘s health and safety including significant deformities (congenital or acquired) of the musculoskeletal system, diseases, illnesses, injuries, infections, tumors, treatments (pharmacological, surgical, prosthetic, or other), or other physiological or pathological or psychiatric conditions that: 1) may result in an in-flight medical emergency, 2) may result in an in-flight death, 3) may compromise the health and safety of other passengers or space vehicle occupants, 4) may interfere with the proper use (don and doff) and operation of personal protective equipment, 5) may interfere with emergency procedures (including evacuation), or 6) may compromise the safety of the flight.

. 4.2.4.16.3 Dr. Antunano‘s presentation outlined recommendations on the medical history assessment, physical examination and medical tests of prospective spaceflight participants, as well as the recommended disposition of those individuals who have medical conditions that may preclude their participation in space flight. Other issues discussed included pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight medical considerations.

. 4.2.4.16.4 The first commercial space vehicles (suborbital and orbital) will have very limited or even absent medical intervention capabilities onboard, and it will be very difficult (if not impossible) to quickly divert a space flight in order to obtain more advanced medical care for spaceflight participants on the ground. Therefore, prospective spaceflight participants with significant medical conditions will have to be evaluated very carefully before allowing them to participate in space flights. Dr. Antunano extends his willingness to provide a copy to anyone interested in receiving the presentation. o 4.2.4.17 HOT EAGLE Suborbital Troop Transport Studies

. 4.2.4.17.1 Dr. Daniel Raymer, President of Conceptual Research Corporation, former Director of Advanced Design at Lockheed, Chief of Air Vehicle Design for X-31, and author of the industry-standard textbook on aircraft design, gave a presentation of his SUSTAIN-related work for AFRL/VA.

. 4.2.4.17.2 Under a contract called Hot Eagle (now FAST), Dr. Raymer's team developed design concepts for insertion of a standard Marine squad into hostile environments using a reentry vehicle launched with an expendable first stage. This

- 73 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

vehicle provides rapid response to global contingencies. Several alternatives for landing and subsequent takeoff and extraction flight were shown. The most- affordable and lowest risk option uses a steerable cargo parachute for landing, and for recovery uses a towed concept similar to the Fulton Recovery system. Other concepts use rockets for landing and/or takeoff.

. 4.2.4.17.3 Dr. Raymer stated that the overall proposition has no fundamental show-stoppers other than cost. o 4.2.4.18 Access to Parabolic Aircraft Flight Testing

. 4.2.4.18.1 Andrew Petro, the Program Executive for NASA‘s Facilitated Access to the Space Environment for Technology Development and Training (FAST) Program, provided an overview of FAST. Today FAST provides opportunities for emerging technologies to perform testing in the space environment, technologies that support NASA's missions but are not yet mature enough for adoption into on- going programs, effectively those technologies that might not otherwise be tested due to lack of funding. Small businesses, individuals, universities and research institutions make use of this NASA capability for projects in early development. Today, FAST utilizes commercially available flight test capabilities such as the Zero Gravity Corporation aircraft for parabolic flights. The current focus is on testing in micro-gravity, reduced-gravity or variable-gravity conditions on parabolic aircraft flights.

. 4.2.4.18.2 NASA has been flying parabolic flights on NASA-owned KC-135 and C-9B aircraft for decades under the management of the Johnson Space Center's Reduced Gravity Office. Those flights have made numerous contributions to scientific advancement and technology development. The aircraft can provide about 25 seconds of near-zero-gravity conditions during each parabolic maneuver. It can provide variable gravity levels between zero and one, including 0.16 g for lunar conditions and 0.38 g for Mars conditions. An increased gravity level of up to 1.8 g can be provided for up to one minute.

. 4.2.4.18.3 NASA awarded a microgravity services contract to the Zero Gravity Corporation in January 2008 to provide commercial parabolic aircraft flights to simulate variable gravity environments for research and development work. Each flight includes 40-60 parabolic trajectories. In the future the FAST program expects to provide opportunities to test technology on suborbital and orbital flights when those services are commercially available. As examples, the Lynx and SpaceShipTwo vehicles could greatly extend the duration of selected gravity conditions in support of U.S. and international space programs generally.

- 74 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 115-117. Current parabolic flight capabilities flanked by Lynx and SpaceShipTwo.

o 4.2.4.19 High Altitude Reconnaissance Rocket Plane (HARRP)

. 4.2.4.19.1 Robert Hickman of the Aerospace Corporation presented the AFSPC and SMC concept called HARRP as a capability having great synergy with SUSTAIN in its early demonstrations of utility. HARRP is a proposed automated, reusable, suborbital high-altitude reconnaissance vehicle designed to provide real- time, look down reconnaissance to military forces in the field. HARRP would be operated responsively by a crew of seven, with a turnaround time of several hours and being launched from and returned to the same base.

. 4.2.4.19.2 Another flight profile would be to drop it from a mothership aircraft, have the vehicle overfly an area, and be recovered by forces on the far side of the area to be surveyed or observed. The vehicle would have a range of about 950 nautical miles. HARRP ―pop-up‖ operations would not necessarily require overflight of an adversary‘s airspace. However, if that were required overflight could be accomplished at high altitudes of 200 to 400 NM and velocities of between Mach 7 and Mach 10. HARRP trajectories would also be planned so as to avoid enemy integrated air defense systems (IADS).

Figures 118-119. High Altitude Reconnaissance Rocket Plane (HARRP) Concept.

o 4.2.4.20 NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation System (COTS)

- 75 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Dennis Stone introduced the audience to the NASA COTS program. NASA COTS was announced on January 18 2006 and is dedicated to coordinating the commercial delivery of crew and cargo to the International Space Station. NASA has determined that commercial services to ISS will be necessary through at least 2015 in light of the high cost of individual Space Shuttle missions and the eventual retirement of the Shuttle fleet. In 2008 NASA entered into contracts with Orbital Sciences and SpaceX to utilize their COTS cargo vehicles Cygnus and Dragon, respectively for cargo delivery to the ISS through 2010 to finance the demonstration of orbital transportation services from commercial providers. Unlike previous NASA projects, the COTS spacecraft are intended to be owned and financed primarily by the companies themselves, and will be designed to serve both U.S. government agencies and commercial customers. COTS missions will be more challenging than existent commercial space transportation capabilities as they will require precision orbital insertion, rendezvous and docking with other spacecraft. COTS program solicits from industry the following four specific service areas:

. 4.2.4.20.1 Capability level A: External unpressurized cargo delivery and disposal.

. 4.2.4.20.2 Capability level B: Internal pressurized cargo delivery and disposal.

. 4.2.4.20.3 Capability level C: Internal pressurized cargo delivery, return and recovery.

. 4.2.4.20.4 Capability level D: Crew Transportation.

Figure 120-121. Current and future NASA COTS program capabilities. o 4.2.4.21 Northrop Grumman Hybrid Launch Systems

- 76 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.21.1 Dennis Poulos presented to the audience Northrop Grumman‘s current access to space initiative known as the Hybrid Launch Vehicle (HLV). The HLV is addressing U.S. Air Force requirements for responsive space access by developing a rapid-turnaround launch system capable of launching satellites or special purpose payloads into Earth orbit in as little as 48 hours. NG‘s HLV idea is dedicated to reducing launch costs by approximately two-thirds compared to the cost of using a medium evolved expendable launch vehicle.

. 4.2.4.21.2 The HLV concept combines a reusable, airplane-like first stage with throw-away upper stages. Launched vertically, the vehicle's winged first stage boosts the upper stages to speeds approaching seven times the speed of sound (Mach 7) before releasing them at an altitude of approximately 150,000 feet. The upper stages then boost the satellite payload to orbit or deliver a sub-orbital vehicle to a distant target, Meanwhile, the first stage flies back and lands at its home base as an autonomous, unmanned aircraft. The first stage of the HLV will use a rocket engine during the boost portion of its mission, and an integrated set of air-breathing jet engines for its return flight.

. 4.2.4.21.3 NGC is defining the architecture for an operational version of this hybrid launch system in support of the Air Force's Space & Missile Systems Center. The company will also define a concept for a subscale demonstrator version of the launch system, and the infrastructure required to execute a demonstration program. The subscale launch system, if developed, would be used to demonstrate the technologies, processes and key attributes of an operational system.

. 4.2.4.21.4 In addition to the HLV, the NG team has other products and concepts of utility in realizing the SUSTAIN capability. The projects include, but are not limited to:

o 4.2.4.21.4.1 Future Access to Space Technology (FAST) Design and Ops Demo, including: 1) conceptual vehicle design for a RLV flight demo, 2) ground operability experiment & simulation, 3) rapid engine R&R experiment, and 4) operations control center experiment & simulation.

o 4.2.4.21.4.2 FAST Wind Tunnel Contract to perform low speed wind tunnel testing on four RLV configurations.

o 4.2.4.21.4.3 Advanced Development of Integrated Warm Structures (ADIWS) including: 1) the design, development and testing of Lightweight Airframe/TPS concepts, and 2) the development of Polyimide structure, CMC TPS, PI/CMC hybrid stations.

o 4.2.4.21.4.4 Integrated Flight Control Actuator Health Management (IFCAHM) including the development of electro-mechanical actuator fault detection and prognostics.

o 4.2.4.21.4.5 The Full Envelope AGNC for RLVs (FEAR) constitutes a follow-on to the Integrated Adaptive Guidance Navigation and Control

- 77 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

(IAGNC), and includes the development of optimal fight paths, adaptive control laws, footprint generation, and abort capability for ascent and return trajectories.

o 4.2.4.21.4.6 Rapid Mission Planning Phase III SBIR to support the integration of the Barron Associates rapid mission planning tool into the FAST OCC.

o 4.2.4.21.4.7 The development of an Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance System to demonstrate a Lunar Lander hazard detection, avoidance, and autonomous landing system for both manned and unmanned missions.

o 4.2.4.21.4.8 The development of the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as an alternate launch abort flight test vehicle that has already undergone a low cost demo flight test in 2009.

Figures 122-123. NGC Hybrid Launch Vehicle (L) and Max Launch Abort System (R).

o 4.2.4.22 Heliosat Hybrid Launch

Roger Lenard of Heliosat, Inc. introduced the conference audience to Heliostat‘s hybrid launch concept for launch, in potential support of many programs to include operationalizing a Space Based Solar Power (SBSP) space segment. Heliostat intends to employ a 2 stage RSV in a reverse tether technique known as skyhook. This will achieve a 6,500 fps reduction in delta V requirements at launch, and perhaps an overall 20X reduction in launch costs. Heliostat Hypersonic Unmanned Space Vehicles (HUSVs) and MEO Tethers operating autonomously in conjunction with IOSTAR

- 78 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Corp. NEP Tugs may lower the cost of placing satellites or other objects in GEO by an order of magnitude or more as a direct function of flight frequency. o 4.2.4.23 Microcellular Solid Propellant Green Technology – The NSEP

. 4.2.4.23.1 Darron Purifoy of Eprime Aerospace Corporation introduced the audience to Microcellular Solid Propellant Green Technology. As background he observed that the ―Modern Era‖ of solid propellants first began with the introduction of composite solid propellants in the mid-1940s. The first composite propellant to see use was based on Potassium Perchlorate as oxidizer, and asphalt as the binder/fuel. The performance and properties of these solid propellants continued to improve until introduction of the currently used APAL (Ammonium Perchlorate (oxidizer), pyrophoric Aluminum powder (―fuel‖), HTPB, Hydroxy Terminated Polybutadiene, (binder/fuel)) in mid-1975. Between 1945 and 1975, the delivered specific impulse increased from about 170 sec to 247 sec (45%), but between 1975 and 2009, the delivered specific impulse has only increased by 1-2%. The APAL formulations essentially remained unchanged, although better, more energetic oxidizers exist (HNF, ADN, CL-20, Nitronium Perchlorate and others). AP is also toxic and has become an environmental problem. Combustion of these propellants also produce significant acid gas and particulate air pollution. The high quantities of Al (~15%) used cause significant propellant and motor performance issues, both in the rocket‘s combustion chamber, and in nozzle flow characteristics due to the existence of three phases of Aluminum (solid particulate, liquid and gas) and two phases of Oxides of Aluminum (abrasive solid particulate and liquid). Finally, both the current manufacturing process, which is not a Green technology, as well as the physical composition of the propellant, severely restrict the ability to develop new, Greener, higher performance propellants that are as safe and usable as the current propellant.

. 4.2.4.23.2 The NSEP Propulsion Technology Over 65 years of research and ―lessons learned‖ have developed an extensive knowledge base that has allowed the design of a New Generation of composite solid propellants. Key factors that entered into the development of these New Generation propellants are: 1) the internal ballistic properties of the combusting propellant grain are intimately linked to and determined by the microscopic structure and reaction chemistry of the propellant; 2) although the specific impulse (a thermodynamic property) is dependant on the chemical identities of the fuel(s) and oxidizer(s), the burn rates (a kinetic property) are dependant on the sub-surface, surface, and near surface reaction rates and reaction Q-values of the principal energetic components used in the formulation; 3) the manufacturing process should be Green, and capable of processing a wide variety of oxidizers, high energy, low molecular weight, fuels, catalysts, and combustion modifiers in a standardized manner; 4) the process must be scalable to commercial levels, while still being able to accurately and reproducibly create a micro-scale composite structure (NSEPs – Nano-structured Energetic Particles), with accurate and reproducible nano-scale features (see figure).

- 79 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 124. NSEP Microcells and NSEP-based propellants.

. 4.2.4.23.3 The internal features of the NSEP must provide a controlled, safe, contained environment for separation of highly reactive components, while also providing a mechanism for deterministic triggering of reactions. NSEP production based on scalable, Supercritical Fluids based, Green technology has already been successfully demonstrated in the laboratory which is capable of meeting all technology requirements needed to manufacture a New Generation of solid rocket propellants that will significantly outperform current composite propellant technology, as well as be safer, tailorable and cost effective. o 4.2.4.24 US-Spaceplane Systems – ―Real Technology in an Accomplishable Package‖

. 4.2.4.24.1 Jon Stephenson presented US-Space Plane Systems‘ approach to SUSTAIN. Specifically, it is an MTA II (Launch and Booster Vehicle) Horizontal Mother ship Launch system capable of meeting SUSTAIN near-term requirements as well as meeting all or most of the longer-term objective requirements, depending on the mission package requirements. It uses proven lifting body technologies and tested to Technology Readiness Level Five through scale model flights, including water take offs and landings, as well as simulations. Both airframes are stable at a wide range of angles of attacks at sub-Mach, Mach, and high Mach speeds and

- 80 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

require less control surface than conventional supersonic airframes. The system is well suited for military, non military governmental, industrial, scientific, and commercial tourism applications.

. 4.2.4.24.2 The heart of the system is the two airframe approach: a Space Utility Vehicle (SUV) and Carrier STV (Suborbital Transport Vehicle). The STV can take off and land from a commercial airfield and operate above the 100 km Karman line. It is capable of a 2 hour time-on-target for a maximum 7,000 nautical mile range with payloads up to10,000 kg. In addition to transporting the SUV to its launch altitude it could launch other payloads ranging from UAVs to special payloads to other manned orbital vehicles. This provides a supersonic transport suitable for a variety of tasks in addition to orbital insertion support.

. 4.2.4.24.3 The SUV can achieve Low Earth Orbit (LEO) when launched from the STV or using established Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) platforms. It lands horizontally and can launch horizontally on its own for suborbital flight, such as a military strike team insertion/extraction. The SUV can be remote controlled or human piloted, with human-rated cargo space of 120 cubic meters. The payload weight will depend on mission variables. This airframe supports a wide range of orbital missions, ranging from transporting goods and guests to space hotels to supporting scientific orbital efforts. The SUV can also use suborbital flight above the Karman line to reach anywhere on the globe, providing strategic capabilities needed for military, governmental, scientific, and commercial applications. Both systems can be used on their own as well as together, providing the greatest mission flexibility as well as extending the value of existing systems. These ships could exhibit vertical takeoff and landing capabilities with amphibious operations for unprecedented Marine assault.

Figures 125-126. US Space plane System‘s test models for its Space Utility System; Sub- orbital Transport Aircraft ―manned‖ (L) and Orbital Space Utility Vehicle ―manned‖ (R).

- 81 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.25 XCOR Status and SUSTAIN Concept

. 4.2.4.25.1 Jeff Greason provided the audience an update on the status of XCOR and the applicability of Lynx to SUSTAIN. XCOR was founded in 1999 and is located at Mojave Air & Spaceport. XCOR has developed ten different rocket engine designs with over 3,500 firings. XCOR has also built and flown two generations of rocket powered vehicles, and is now designing the sub-orbital Lynx & Lynx II spacecraft. XCOR is funded by angel investors, and has customers at NASA, AF, SpaceX, ATK, Aurora Flight Systems, NRO, and DARPA.

. 4.2.4.25.2 XCOR‘s engine technology offers low cost, low weight, high reliability and re-usability, and environmentally friendly fuels. XCOR single stage to space (SSTS) systems provide many operational advantages. These include low cost ($95k per flight), a four sortie per day capability, vehicle availability on four hours notice, and multi-mission capability including passenger, scientific, recon, and payload launch.

. 4.2.4.25.3 Specific capabilities include 1) Surveillance missions calling for pop-up reconnaissance - Lynx is easy to transport anywhere in world and fly from any 6- 8000 ft runway and able to fly at unpredictable times, multiple times per day; 2) Small satellite launch using the Mark 2 with upper stage - Re-usable launcher, with small expendable upper stage priced at 500k per launch of 10 kg payloads with a lead time of less that three days; and 3) Technology demonstrations to use Lynx to augment other programs by improve TRL of subsystems before inserting in to bigger programs and preventing any one avoiding subsystem failure from causing customer program delays since Lynx flights are so inexpensive.

. 4.2.4.25.4 Recent technology developments include 1) further test firings of XCOR‘s 2800 lbf LOX/Kerosene Lynx engine, 2) the first successful ―all-up‖ test of cryogenic multi-cylinder piston pump, and 3) engineering of the Lynx with the test article cockpit currently being fabricated.

. 4.2.4.25.5 XCOR‘s view is that neither XCOR nor any other single developer will be building a single vehicle platform that fulfills the SUSTAIN mission. If SUSTAIN is thought of as a single vehicle requirement it would be the equivalent of attempting to define all of the physical elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit in one requirements document. However, when SUSTAIN is more accurately viewed as a system, as a subsystem the platform is just one component. In fact no other military manned transport need calls for transport from CONUS to a target in theater by single vehicle either. Therefore, XCOR suggests that the SUSTAIN requirements be disaggregated so that the threshold of SUSTAIN utility (i.e. rapid transport and insertion of a payload equal or greater that 2000 pounds) can be efficiently met.

. 4.2.4.25.6 In addition to the responsive manned pop-up surveillance and small satellite launch missions noted earlier, other SUSTAIN purposes can be achieved with a SSTS plane like Lynx:

- 82 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.25.6.1 Space Paratroopers. Teams can be released from a space delivery system, and employ TPS built into suits or MOOSE-like solo systems to safely achieve aero deceleration high in the atmosphere. GPS-guided chutes can then permit formation flight automatically, keeps forces on-target and in formation unlike WW2 drops.

o 4.2.4.25.6.2 Capsule Troopers. Disposable capsules sized for teams of two operators and their equipment could carry troops and equipment to target. Capsule doors can permit rapid egress on landing following the formation delivery via GPS-guided parafoils as discussed above. Capsules could conceivably carry a variety of systems in addition or instead of manned teams. For example, some capsules might include remotely operated or even autonomous fixed or mobile weapons for securing landing zones.

. 4.2.4.25.7 Other SSTS Employment Options. One could launch a number of UAV‘s to target that exceeds manned insertion capabilities. As a retrieval boat Lynx could be launched as a payload to target area, landing vertically under a steerable chute aided by Soyuz-like retro rockets. As an extraction system it takes off vertically under rocket power to clear denied airspace with its crew on-board and then employs air-breathing cruise to a remote recovery zone.

. 4.2.4.25.8 XCOR emphasized that if one breaks up the pieces of a mission sequence one does not have to decide on an ideal best method. In the case of SUSTAIN these pieces constitute: 1) launch, 2) ingress, and 3) egress. Each segment of the sequence can proceed by itself, fitting into the combined arms approach in an optimal fashion. This approach is no different than the proven utility of gliders, parachutes, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters in past operations. Multiple combined arms options and modes would coexist, each suited to a specialized purpose. In light of the need to optimize and the historical success of such combined arms optimization, one system or vehicle does not need to, and perhaps should not ―do it all.‖ XCOR concluded with the observation that small scale demonstrations are feasible now with their systems.

- 83 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 127-128. Lynx flight profile and artists‘ depiction of Lynx executing small sat launch.

o 4.2.4.26 General Dynamics Contributions to SUSTAIN

Matthew Leavitt introduced the audience to GD‘s expertise and ideas as they might contribute to the spiral development path of SUSTAIN specifically, and orbital and suborbital space transportation generally.

o 4.2.4.27 Kelly's Space Solution to SUSTAIN

. 4.2.4.27.1 Michael Gallo of Kelly Space & Technology, Inc. (KST) introduced the audience to Kelly Space‘s general capabilities, and specifically to the EXPRESS- Lander suborbital point-to-point transportation approach. KST was founded as a private company in 1993. The company‘s technology focus sectors are aerospace, defense, renewable energy. KST is based at San Bernardino International Airport (former Norton Air Force Base), with East Coast operations in Warwick, Rhode Island since 2008.

. 4.2.4.27.2 KST has developed proprietary and patented technologies for EXPRESS-Lander, the world‘s only Tow-Launch System for RLV. A tow launch system permits the towing of a 2-stage piggy-back spacecraft by an existing, mature, and affordable large aircraft that serves as the ―first stage.‖ In comparison, all other air-launch systems are limited to a carrier aircraft and one space vehicle/lander. Also, the size and form factor of the space vehicle are unconstrained by the tow aircraft, in contrast with other air-launch carry options. KST‘s EXPRESS-Lander system can satisfy SUSTAIN program missions utilizing currently existing hardware and components; no new technology breakthroughs required. KST has patented technologies and NASA study contracts related to realizing the EXPRESS Demonstrator, 1, 2, and 3 variants.

- 84 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.27.3 In contrast with the efficiencies of tow launch, Air-Launch options for SUSTAIN program would likely require development of two main systems for rapid delivery of military units anywhere in the world. Specifically, 1) a huge first stage carrier aircraft, and 2) a Spacecraft/ Lander, and a Space Vehicle/Lander to carry a squad of 13 Marines plus equipment. Using scaling factors one can employ existing commercial air launch concepts and systems as reference points. It is noteworthy that KST has already developed and flight-demonstrated the first- stage/carrier aircraft for the SUSTAIN program. NASA‘s The Eclipse Project published in NASA‘s ―Monographs in Aerospace History‖ also proved the value of the towrope concept.

. 4.2.4.27.4 The advantages of the tow launch method is that it permits air-launching of much larger payloads compared to other air-launch systems due to superior efficiency. An analogy is the advantage of pulling a box on a trolley rather than carrying that same box. Also, there is no need to build a new carrier aircraft each time that the lander size is increased. Such a system is available now for SUSTAIN program. For example, the tow-launch efficiency of a Boeing 747 is such that it can easily air-tow another 747. In contrast, other air-launch systems would need a carrier aircraft nearly four times the size of a Boeing 747 to carry a space vehicle/lander size of 747. With such robust margins in weight and performance all means, processes, and ultimately costs of making a SUSTAIN spacecraft/lander as light as possible do not have to be employed.

. 4.2.4.27.5 The KST EXPRESS capability comes in four planned configurations:

o 4.2.4.27.5.1 The Express Demonstrator will initially demonstrate the world‘s first tow launch to space, to include its low cost and rapid space launch turn around.

o 4.2.4.27.5.2 The Express 1 will permit sub-orbital space tourism, microgravity and other research, and small satellite missions with an upper stage.

o 4.2.4.27.5.3 The Express 2 will permit suborbital P2P missions with passengers and equipment, high speed passenger service, satellite launches, and 2-passenger manned orbital missions with an upper stage.

o 4.2.4.27.5.4 The Express 3 will permit suborbital P2P missions with increased passenger and equipment payloads, large satellite launches, multi-passenger manned orbital flights with Crew Cargo Transfer Vehicle (CCTV) upper stage, and even lunar missions from an orbital platform.

. 4.2.4.27.6 The KST First Stage for all EXPRESS configurations is a standard Boeing 747-200 modified to carry the tow equipment which is attached to the underside of the 747. On the upper deck of the 747 reside the Launch Control; EXPRESS Spaceplane Command, Control and Monitoring; Satellite Command,

- 85 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Control, and Monitoring; Voice and Data Comms; Telemetry Ground Link; and Guidance, Navigation and Control.

. 4.2.4.27.7 In summary, the KST EXPRESS-Lander System can satisfy SUSTAIN suborbital point-to-point mission using existing technologies. This is particularly true for the EXPRESS-Lander 3 equipped with the CCTV that can be used to transport up to 19,250 lb of ―up and down mass.‖ Also, the flexibility of Tow- Launch System enables it to be integrated with many other suborbital point-to-point space vehicle/lander systems.

Figure 129. Kelly Space Express 3 Lander with CCTV in support of SUSTAIN mission.

o 4.2.4.28 SUSTAIN Military Utility: Boeing Phantom Works

. 4.2.4.28.1 In order to justify the cost of a revolutionary military system such as SUSTAIN, it must demonstrate a high-level of military utility in a variety of scenarios. Thus, a military utility analysis was performed to assess the value of SUSTAIN. We chose an invasion of a friendly nation by a hostile nation as our test case, as it would stress intelligence collection and prompt negation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) time-critical targets. We compare this conflict occurring in 2010 without SUSTAIN with the same conflict occurring in 2025 with SUSTAIN, while keeping everything else in the war game the same.

- 86 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.28.2 During our 100 war game runs [simulation runs], SUSTAIN was able to deliver a covert Special Forces team to a hostile nation within 12 hours of an American Intelligence Community request to verify a potential nuclear attack and successfully sabotage the nuclear delivery system hours before the attack to prevent a catastrophe to American and allied nation military forces. This resulted in a stunning and overwhelming victory to American and allied forces using SUSTAIN vs. a surprising victory by hostile forces when SUSTAIN was unavailable.

. 4.2.4.28.3 SUSTAIN significantly improves the blue (allied) force exchange ratio - - 98% of blue forces survive, while 50% of red (hostile) forces are neutralized in 2025. This is compared to 80% of red forces surviving and 50% of blue forces being neutralized in a 2010 invasion without SUSTAIN. Attrition rates for the two sides with and without SUSTAIN are shown below.

. 4.2.4.28.4 To conduct this military utility analysis, we utilized three modeling and simulation tools: Satellite Tool Kit from Analytical Graphics, Inc. to model the orbital and suborbital SUSTAIN geometries, EXTEND from Imagine That, Inc. to model the communication nodal data flow, and Systems Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) from the United States Air Force to model the war.

Figure 130. Attrition rates for red (hostile) forces and blue (allied) forces with and without SUSTAIN - SUSTAIN causes increased attrition for the red forces and decreased attrition for the blue forces.

. 4.2.4.28.5 Conclusions. SUSTAIN employment can revolutionize the twenty-first century battlefield. U.S. military force projection capabilities could be greatly enhanced by a rapid-response Prompt Global Transport capability that will provide over-flight of denied territory by at least 50 miles altitude. SUSTAIN should consider using a family of multiple architectures and designs for maximum mission adaptability. The SUSTAIN trade space should encompass various options such as

- 87 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

ballistic sub-orbital flight, flight largely within the atmosphere, and ―atmospheric skipper‖ near-space trajectories. Although the non-recurring engineering as well as the operation of a Prompt Global Transport system are likely to be costly, the savings resulting from crises averted should make it well worth the investment. o 4.2.4.29 Proposal by Tom Taylor of Global Outpost

. 4.2.4.29.1 Introduction: What follows is a one page summary of two recent papers (AIAA-2009-6816, 6724) and a one page graphic both presented twice at the AIAA Space 2009 Conference, 14-17 Sep 2009. The topic is a privately financed commercial privatization proposal of the space shuttle focused on specific future markets in an attempt to move America toward a space industrialized aerospace environment and away from the service based economy America seems to be moving toward more each year.

. 4.2.4.29.2 The Goal: To create a privately financed commercial privatization of the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) focused on specific future space transportation markets to move America toward a space industrialized aerospace environment and beyond our service based economy.

. 4.2.4.29.3 The Purpose: To stimulate cost reduction by conceptualizing, designing, fabricating, operating and disposing of a Cm Carrier by reusing the launch hardware in orbit for further uses. To provide a profitable cargo Cm Carrier program capable of penetrating future markets, stimulating increased sales and unlocking future creative concepts including follow-on SSP, two-way capsule module, satellite servicing and third party cooperative developments.

. 4.2.4.29.4 The Methods: To finance the space shuttle operations in cooperation with others to focus on commercial markets and capture future global orbital markets. To expand existing agreements and develop new cooperation with government, hardware producers and existing customers. To start small and expand on profits as markets and customers emerge. To evolve the external tank (ET) and increase the NSTS payload volume to 8.7 times the original 60‘ long payload bay, because the 135 ETs to date have had many changes providing much design data and opportunities for innovation. To convert the existing two way crewed space shuttle into a one directional cargo only launch vehicle capable of reusing some launch hardware in orbit and re-entering only valuable components like engines, avionics, RCS pods and feedlines with engine pod, etc. for reuse. To re-enter NSTS recoverable components with parachutes and airbags in a non-ocean landing, and SRBs with the existing recovery system. To accommodate NASA and private industry upgrades to NSTS propulsion and technology as appropriate and to assist in its development and support. To expand the space shuttle market from taxpayers paid government budget to commercial capable of transporting any ―Heavy Lift‖ payload as required.

- 88 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.29.5 Design: To incrementally change the ET using innovation, previous design engineers and shuttle suppliers to evolve at a rate slow enough, so as not to trigger recertification of the ET or other hardware, but to test with commercial launch operations. To reduce safety factors as appropriate given the change from crewed to unmanned vehicle design safety factors.

. 4.2.4.29.6 Business Expansion: To develop commercial logistics operations to and from the moon‘s surface using the Shuttle Cm as a continuing commercial launch vehicle, possibly expanding to 33‘ in diameter to cost effectively handle the gravity well to all comers by providing affordable space transport to Earth orbit and allowing larger space vehicles to be assembled in Earth orbit for the exploration/ commercial development of the solar system and beyond. As the lunar materials are developed as a source, Space Solar Power collectors in Earth orbit will be reduced in cost by approximately 60%. Eventually, mass will travel both directions on the emerging lunar trade route driven by economics and not government budget limitations.

. 4.2.4.29.7 Ideal Scene: To create a safe, functioning commercial Cm solution with reduced cost spaceport facilities/staff, supporting the SBSP and SSP markets by providing affordably priced transportation to a low earth orbit with customer capable of commercial financing, launching, maintaining, effective recovering of the fleet hardware and the ability to expand into a large variety of future market opportunities in the first segment of developing the rest of the universe. It‘s time mankind conquers our gravity well with affordable transportation and transport our species beyond a single planet to insure our survival from impact extinction events.

. 4.2.4.29.8 Valuable Final Service: To provide valuable commercial transportation service is a commercial spaceport supporting the orbital operations in providing cost effective transportation logistics support and other cost reduction services to the Customer at a profit.

. 4.2.4.29.9 Summary: The family of companies represented in this paper are willing to join with others to expand the consortium of companies capable of putting the SBSP demo into reality and capturing a huge future global series of space markets. The consortium has submitted two separate CCDev proposals to NASA-JSC detailing a plan and consortium ability to raise the resources required for privatizing the Space Shuttle and using it to build a commercial transportation system.

- 89 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 131. Commercial Cm as proposed by Tom Taylor.

- 90 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.30 Spacemaster -- A Potential Successor to the Space Shuttle

. 4.2.4.30.1 William E. Grahame of Advanced Engineering Applications provides a summary description of his idea that proposes the Spacemaster concept as a potential successor to the Space Shuttle. As envisioned by William Grahame Spacemaster would accomplish three purposes. These are:

o 4.2.4.30.1.1 Fly support missions to the ISS.

o 4.2.4.30.1.2 Fly space science missions.

o 4.2.4.30.1.3 Fly suborbital missions to destinations of 10,000 miles or more in 2-3 hours with cargo and/or passengers, and signifying Spacemaster‘s applicability to the SUSTAIN mission.

. 4.2.4.30.2 The basic design of Spacemaster would include a two-stage winged vehicle combination where stage 2 is mounted above stage 1. Both stages are equipped with air-breathing as well as rocket propulsion for take-off, ascent and fly back to base. In comparison to current all rocket propulsion vehicles , the advantages of incorporating air-breathing propulsion include:

o 4.2.4.30.2.1 Airline-like flight operations at sub-orbital altitudes.

o 4.2.4.30.2.2 Reduced liquid oxygen requirements.

o 4.2.4.30.2.3 Lower take-off weights.

o 4.2.4.30.2.4 Increased payload weight capability.

. 4.2.4.30.3 Detailed design studies and analyses followed by tests would be required to establish a verifiable two-stage vehicle design as well as the ultimate benefits of the complete system considering all technical issues. Air-breathing propulsion would include: Integrated turbojet, ramjet and scramjet propulsion which would operate in the air-breathing mode to Mach=15 at 125,000 ft. At this condition, Stage 1 separates from Stage 2 and returns to base under turbofan thrust. Thereafter Stage 2 flight continues under rocket thrust to perform specified missions and returns to base under turbofan power. Both stages would have low aspect ratio wings. Under current consideration is the application of a towline to tow the two-stage combination to a launch altitude of approximately 35,000 ft. using a modified 747 as a tow vehicle. A study of the overall benefits of this system compared to a conventional take-off of the two-stage vehicle combination will be analyzed.

. 4.2.4.30.4 Also for comparative purposes the two-stage vehicle combination would be flown at low speeds and altitudes during take-off and landing under turbofan power and under rocket thrust for all other flight conditions. In all cases both Stage

- 91 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

and Stage 2 would be winged vehicles for conditions of take-off, climb, approach and landing. The concept of Spacemaster combines new technologies such as air- breathing propulsion at hypersonic speeds along with ramjet/scramjet propulsion methods. It is recognized that a large effort in overall analysis and preliminary design would be required to verify the potential benefits that Spacemaster would provide for future space travel.

Figures 132-134. Spacemaster as a potential successor to the Space Shuttle. o 4.2.4.31 Commercial Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Roadmap Study

. 4.2.4.31.1 Objective: The ongoing Commercial Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Roadmap Study is sponsored by the NASA Innovative Partnership Program in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). This study will focus on identifying technologies and assessing their relative utility for enabling future space access capabilities, with the primary goal of accelerating development of Commercial Reusable Launch Vehicles (CRLV‘s) that have significantly lower cost, and improved reliability, availability, launch turn-time, and robustness compared to current launch systems.

. 4.2.4.31.2 Approach: Four categories of space access vehicles for consideration are:

o 4.2.4.31.2.1 Reusable, sub-orbital vehicles (e.g., Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, XCOR, Masten, Armadillo, Rocket Plane, etc.).

o 4.2.4.31.2.2 Expendable and partially reusable, orbital vehicles (e.g., SpaceX, Orbital, etc.).

o 4.2.4.31.2.3 Reusable, two-stage orbital vehicles (e.g., Kistler).

o 4.2.4.31.2.4 Advanced vehicle concepts (e.g., single stage to orbit, air- breathing systems, in-flight refueling, tethered upper stage).

. 4.2.4.31.3 Execution: NASA/USAF will begin the study by soliciting feedback from the emerging commercial space industry regarding technologies that would most benefit their existing and near-term vehicle systems lining up within the three

- 92 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

vehicle categories given above. NASA/USAF will add to that list technologies needed for advanced vehicle concepts, as well as longer range technologies needed for the first two vehicle categories. For this work NASA/AFRL will draw upon agency vehicle systems studies and analyses. Then NASA/USAF will evaluate the combined inventory of needed technologies and sort them with respect to their value for accelerating CRLV development. In order to organize inputs and analyses, NASA/USAF will initially divide the technologies into the following areas, though these technology areas maybe expanded, condensed or modified as the study progresses.

o 4.2.4.31.3.1 Entry, Descent and Recovery Systems, (including TPS). o 4.2.4.31.3.2 Propulsion, OMS and ACS. o 4.2.4.31.3.3 Structures and Materials. o 4.2.4.31.3.4 Avionics, Communications and Flight Control. o 4.2.4.31.3.5 Vehicle (Internal) Energy & Thermal Management Systems. o 4.2.4.31.3.6 Life Support and Safety Systems. o 4.2.4.31.3.7 On-orbit Operations and Equipment. o 4.2.4.31.3.8 Ground Support, Operations and Processing Equipment. o 4.2.4.31.3.9 Advanced Concept Technologies.

. 4.2.4.31.4 Products: Roadmaps with recommended government technology tasks and milestones for the three different vehicle categories will then be compiled and documented, along with initial budget and resource requirements estimates.

. 4.2.4.31.5 Organization: This study will be pursued in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory, and under the sponsorship of the NASA Innovative Partnership Program. The NASA and USAF leads for this activity are: Daniel J. Rasky, PhD, NASA Ames Research Center and W. Jesse Glance, Jr., Lt Col, USAFR, Air Force Research Laboratory. o 4.2.4.32 MICHELLE-B

. 4.2.4.32.1 The Naval Research Laboratory and TGV Rockets Inc. are currently developing a reusable sounding rocket called the Modular Incremental Compact High Energy Low-cost Launch Example (MICHELLE-B), based on the design of Kent Ewing of TGV Rockets. The design called for a vertical takeoff and rocket- powered vertical landing. The vehicle would liftoff under power of six pressure-fed lox/kerosene engines, firing for 80 seconds. During the ascent, the pilot would vary the engine power level to manage dynamic pressure loads. After engine cut-off the vehicle would make a ballistic arc to a maximum altitude of 104 km. A flexible aero-shield was deployed for re-entry to reduce speed and moderate re-entry temperatures. At 3 km altitude, the shield would retract and landing power applied by the pilot. The spacecraft would hover to a zero-velocity touchdown.

- 93 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.32.2 The modular design featured redundant independent propulsion modules which each contained propellant tanks, a pressurization system and a single engine. The crew compartment, flight deck and payload bay were isolated from the propulsion modules. The deployable aerodynamic decelerator was of flexible mesh. Stowable landing gear would be deployed for touchdown. The spacecraft was to have a full avionics suite, with INS, Radar, GPS, and a self contained precision approach system. There was no need for external tracking, range safety or ground based telemetry systems. The vehicle had minimal ground support requirements, consistent with aircraft operations. All that was needed was a ground power cart, fuel and oxidizer supply tankers, and payload support systems.

. 4.2.4.32 .3 The Michelle-B would reliably and inexpensively loft 1000 kg of payload to an altitude of 100 km. The flight profile provided 200 seconds of high quality micro-gravity environment. Maximum acceleration would not exceed 4.5 g's. The vehicle would return for a soft landing at its take-off location. Once it has landed, it can be refueled, checked out, and relaunched within 3 hours.

. 4.2.4.32.4 In terms of SUSTAIN applications, MICHELLE-B can serve as a jet wing-equipped space diver launch platform capable of accomplishing the HAHO insertion of individuals and small teams as was conceived for the XCOR‘s nearer- term SSTS Lynx. Conservatively estimating a 5:1 glide ratio, one space diving SUSTAIN team could covertly travel over denied airspace for a ground track of 500 km from the elevated dive platform, providing the enemy no detectable insertion platform signature. Similarly, MICHELE-B could be employed to loft, unfold/inflate, and deploy autonomous LTA and UAV platforms.

. 4.2.4.32.5 Low intensity and asymmetric warfare implies that future combatants may seek to degrade or destroy American Space Assets. As a precursor to armed conflict, depriving US Forces of Low Earth Orbit would dramatically reduce ISR capabilities. UAVs can provide infill but they lack the big picture view commanders need. A theater deployed pop-up capability such as HARRP or TGV Rockets would provide vital infill capability under the command of local forces.

- 94 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 135-136. Artist‘s conceptions of MICHELLE-B, ready to launch and in flight. o 4.2.4.33 Specialized Topic Break-Out Groups and Discussions

The NSSO and Air Force-sponsored technology conference culminated in break-out discussions, the themes of which roughly coincided with 5 technology and expertise groupings. The SUSTAIN capability remained the focus of these discussions, however it became abundantly clear early on the physical, safety, policy, and cost considerations for SUSTAIN overlapped with and were in many cases identical to those of industry. The specialized topic break-out groups were titled: 1) Vehicle Design, 2) Insertion and Extraction, 3) Human Factors-Related, 4) Spaceport, Ground, and Range Operations, and 5) Other Suborbital and Point-to-Point (P2P) Issues. Each specialized break-out group is discussed below:

. 4.2.4.33.1 Vehicle Design Discussion

o 4.2.4.33.1.1 The vehicle design break-out group benefited greatly from the various SUSTAIN-related industry, NASA, and Government lab briefs that had already been presented. With a better non-proprietary insight into what the whole community of developers was considering or already working on the discussion was able to focus on the issues of technology readiness and spiral off-ramps. Discussions of SUSTAIN upper stage vehicles were largely inseparable from launch vehicle technology options. Those alternatives ranged from space basing (no launch requirement) to towed launch, vertical booster stack launch, vertical parallel stage launch (i.e. Shuttle derivatives), vertical Bimese launch, horizontal mothership launch, and horizontal piggy-back or Bimese-like launch (again, Shuttle derivatives).

- 95 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.33.1.2 The overriding question for the upper stage SUSTAIN pertained to the survivability of any and all vehicles concepts during ingress and possible egress. The challenge is the non-permissive environment that SUSTAIN could find itself in upon insertion. The question therefore was should the military accept risks and field an initial capability using existing technologies to achieve an asymmetric strategic advantage in SOF operations, or should fielding be delayed until risks are mitigated. There was a consensus that a limited number of missions of shorter range, longer lead time, and perhaps limited combat capability could be executed today in relatively permissive environments. Such vehicles and launch systems could constitute early off- ramps of a spiral development. At the same time the question was asked, under what conditions would the risks and costs of such a small unit be justified? The group concluded that in the near term few military missions came to mind, though all agreed that the confiscation of a ―loose nuke‖ or similarly valued HVTs justified those risks. However, in order for sections and squadrons of SUSTAIN capabilities to become a main-stream DoD option, significant development will be required. o 4.2.4.33.1.3 Various critical SUSTAIN vehicle components and subsystems were discussed in terms of their current maturity. The group estimated technology readiness levels (TRL) for each:

. 4.2.4.33.1.3.1 In terms of propulsion, RAMJETS capable of achieving Mach 3.5 were determined to be at TRL 9, SCRAMJETS capable of Mach 7 at TRL 5, and reusable rockets at TRL 6. With respect to solid fuel rockets significant research is required on oxidizers in order to achieve mid-operation stopping and starting while still maintaining high ISP, a research and development area that presently is limited to TRL 3.

. 4.2.4.33.1.3.2 With regards to thermal management, thermal protection systems (TPS) and their enabling materials were perceived as the key challenges. Hot structures capable of lower temperature survival were determined to be at TRL 7-9, durable legacy TPS used on the Shuttle was stated to be at TRL 5-6, and ceramic TPS at TRL 4-5. Another related issue to thermal management was force protection. Considering that SUSTAIN vehicles that are designed to survive reentry may also require a degree of limited blast, fragment, and small arms protection. While this is a worst case to be avoided for SUSTAIN as with any other aerospace assault support platform, its occasion could be catastrophic if unprotected. The concept of TPS structures doubling a vehicle armor protection was discussed. Also suggested by LtCol Paul Damphousse was the concept of retaining the modularity and detachability of the dual purpose tiles for attachment to other surfaces, including personal protection equipment (PPE).

- 96 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.33.1.3.3 Individual insertion and extraction technologies separate from the crew vehicle itself were also discussed in the break-out group. The focus again was the TRLs of various systems. Space jumping technology was estimated to be at a TRL of 4. For high altitude HAHO the TRL was estimated at 5. For HALO the TRL is 9. Though it has been in demonstrated existence since the 1950s, Fulton Recovery remains at a TRL of 4, as does vertical launch rockets for the same extraction purpose. Parafoil chutes for individuals, and potentially for crewed vehicles are at TRL 9, as are winged hypersoar technologies from the 1950s.

o 4.2.4.33.1.4 Finally, military and commercial users in the break-out group discussed notional off-ramps for specific technology areas in a spiral development of SUSTAIN. These off-ramps would signify that useful capabilities‘ had matured to the point that they have immediate application at reasonable risk, even though they fall short of the ultimate program requirement. With respect to range those off-ramps were determined to be 1,000, 4,000, and 12,000 NM. For payloads the unmanned SUSTAIN capability was generally perceived to have immediate applicability even before a human-rated capability achieves lower risk. In terms of payload mass the early-initial off-ramps were thought to be 1,500, 3,500, and 6,900 kg. In terms of reusability the off-ramps included optimizing current expendable technologies, a reusable 1st stage, a reusable 2nd stage, and ultimately a fully reusable combination of launch and upper stage systems.

. 4.2.4.33.2 Insertion and Extraction Techniques Discussion

o 4.2.4.33.2.1 The overarching theme of this break-out discussion was the technological difficulty that the extraction requirement imposed on the SUSTAIN need. Using today‘s technologies the transport and insertion segments of a SUSTAIN mission are quite feasible. However the issue of energetically returning to the place of origin, or even space is a separate problem beyond the state of the art today. The difficulty of extraction was more evidence that SUSTAIN is conceived as a capability that is improved over time along a spiral development path:

. 4.2.4.33.2.1.1 In the near term space insertion combined with terrestrial extraction is doable. In short, a two-stage or single-stage to space vehicle inserts forces into contingencies from sub-orbital altitudes. Following insertion on the ground or in the air forces would receive mission execution support, extract, and egress by means of in-theater terrestrial capabilities. Terrestrial alternatives include linking up with a more heavily armed penetrating ground force, as per doctrinal vertical envelopments that employ light helicopterborne and airborne forces. For smaller units the Fulton air or ground self-extraction techniques are conceivable. In some instances small units such as SOF may not require extraction as an

- 97 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

extended covert presence is planned, and friendly force link up on the ground an eventual certainty.

. 4.2.4.33.2.1.2 One topic discussed by the group was the possibility that the vehicle asset would, under some circumstances, require destruction following insertion. If in an early spiral of SUSTAIN the vehicle is not capable of self-extraction it could become a security liability. Adversary acquisition of the vehicle could have grave implications due to its expected technology sophistication. Therefore, the deliberate, methodical destruction of SUSTAIN vehicles could be planned into nearer term spirals when landers will still be considered expendable.

. 4.2.4.33.2.1.3 Later when technologies mature, following space insertion of forces can be followed by self-extraction given that vehicles can be refueling in-theater. This would involve the development of a family of assault support vehicles capable of being refueled in the field, either with locally obtained fuels or with LOX and H obtained locally from water sources through electrolysis. A refueled vehicle, much like any combat rotary winged or tilt rotor tactical aircraft today could then extract the crew following mission accomplishment. The horizontal range of terrestrial extraction might be on the order of tens if not hundreds of kilometers.

. 4.2.4.33.2.1.4 Ultimately, when technologies mature and break-through fuel and/or propulsion options are available space insertion and extraction without any need for refueling may be possible. However this is a futuristic vision with no practical solution on the immediate horizon. If enabled in the future SUSTAIN assault support vehicles could constitute a family of combined arms alternatives including transport, gunship and logistic variants. With the exception of range, speed and flexibility SUSTAIN will have then evolved to an advanced assault support capability no different in principle to today‘s combinations of V-22s, CH- 53s, Cargo UAVs, and Cobra and AC-130 gunships. o 4.2.4.33.2.2 Another challenge discussed by the group was the issue of SUSTAIN signature during mission execution. Covertness must be maintained to the maximum extent feasible with SUSTAIN, especially during insertion, in fact the SUSTAIN UNS specifically identifies that requirement. The thermal signature and plasma trail must be minimized, and the transition to subsonic decent speeds should be achieved as far above or laterally from the intended objective as possible to negate the sonic boom. While benefiting from restrictive terrain at landing zones, retro-rocket-assisted vertical landings such as those of DC-X-like capabilities produce a significant smoke, fire, and noise signature on the ground. Likewise, while lift producing, subsonic winged vehicles minimize noise, and perhaps eliminate smoke and head in a glider mode, they also require a runway and likely an improved surface. The horizontal path of a winged vehicle also presents a significant visible signature.

- 98 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.33.2.3 At the end of the discussion there was a group consensus that what is required is an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to determine what the optimal family of systems and sets of capabilities are in fulfillment of the SUSTAIN need, both near-term and longer-term.

. 4.2.4.33.3 Ground and Spaceport Operations Discussions

o 4.2.4.33.3.1 One of the questions asked was how many bases will be required to operationalize SUSTAIN specifically, and space transportation generally. Various inputs related to sea-basing some space port capabilities. Drill ships and platforms were suggested as candidate off-shore launch platforms. With respect to CONUS and U.S. territory spaceports it was agreed that initiatives to stimulate space faring commercial enterprises in Florida, Virginia, New Mexico, California, and several other locations will be within a 1,000 miles or less of an adjacent spaceport. Certain military bases may also develop such facilities in support of ORS. Finally, remote U.S. states and territories such a Hawaii, Alaska, Diego Garcia, and Guam could serve as expeditionary spaceports for SUSTAIN. An on-orbit high state of readiness SUSTAIN capability was also discussed.

o 4.2.4.33.3.2 With respect to spaceports in general, another discussion item was the state of readiness that could be expected to be maintained by a SUSTAIN capability. The challenge of meeting a two hour timeline from launch to insert at any point on earth is the least difficult to meet given the stages of preparation that must precede the actual launch. Liquid refueling by itself is a process that can take three hours under ideal conditions. Integration of a payload, however well modularized and packaged, can also be a time consuming process, especially if it involves a specialized payload different from what is already on-board. Alert statuses would have to be established based on the specific national security issue or incident at stake, as SUSTAIN crews could not possibly remain on such a short tether (especially with regards to the fueling constraint) 24/7 indefinitely. The single exception is perhaps a space-based SUSTAIN capability with frequent crew reliefs in place.

o 4.2.4.33.3.3 Another issue that was discussed extensively was the procedure or procedures that will have to be in place at spaceports for turning around launch vehicles that have flown back and making them ready for subsequent missions. One of the principle points that arose from the discussion of turning around reusable launch systems was the fact that the Nation may be forced to live with expendable systems in the near term while reusable fly-back and other systems are first matured. While there was consensus that basic SUSTAIN mission of insertion can be executed today with existing technologies, rapidly turned around reusable systems are still a few years away. There was also consensus that when reusable systems mature commercial airline maintenance, refurbishment procedures, and ground operations will be a good model for space transportation generally.

- 99 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.4.33.4 Human Factors Working Group Discussions

o 4.2.4.33.4.1 The human factors discussion had a solid discussion foundation going in as Dr. Clark had already presented his comprehensive expert view on the topic. Reemphasizing, the other experts within this group concurred with Dr. Clark‘s conclusion that crew survivability should be the primary mission success criteria, and the main driver in vehicle design and mission architecture, for any SUSTAIN concept.

o 4.2.4.33.4.2 Emphasis was also placed on the need for life support and personal protective equipment to be designed with both nominal operations and anticipated catastrophic failure modes in mind. Crew survivability should incorporate advanced technologies where feasible that are at the same time simple, reliable, and attainable. Also, designing in crew survivability early, in a full systems approach, is significantly more effective than post production modification. Of critical importance is that the insertion and extraction life- support systems be highly integrated with the vehicle system to optimize performance for mass and power.

o 4.2.4.33.4.3 Setting the stage for further discussion was a presentation titled ―Human Factors Design and Architecture Considerations for a Point to Point Suborbital Mission.‖ Employing the presentation as a guide, the methodology was to employ a representative manned SUSTAIN mission in order to better understand the context of human factors. The primary mission objectives of the SUSTAIN capability was to safely deliver a team to any selected landing site on Earth within hours of an order to execute an assigned mission via a suborbital profile. Additionally, the SUSTAIN capability needed to return the team from the insertion site to a secure location within some number of hours. Finally, the SUSTAIN capability needed to provide a physiologically safe environment for the team for the period of time that it transported the team from the launch site to the landing site. As a secondary objective the SUSTAIN capability needs to make a best effort at returning one or more injured team members.

o 4.2.4.33.4.4 The group began with some assumptions based on the sample SUSTAIN CONOPS scenarios that had been presented earlier. For the purpose of discussion, the manned payload was assumed to be 13 combat- equipped Marine SOF personnel. The crew required to operate the vehicle could be assumed to be two, yet it could also be a fully autonomous vehicle operating off of its own or with the assist of remote piloting. Given that the transported forces are combat-equipped, hazardous cargo can be assumed in the form of ammunition explosivity, toxicity, and flammability, as well as communications and ISR electromagnetic signatures. In terms of time permission factors, recall, rapid planning, and embarkation delays had to be

- 100 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

taken into consideration, as did the possibility that systems failures could force the employment of an alternate, back-up vehicle.

o 4.2.4.33.4.5 Employing this as a context, the presentation posed several questions to the group for discussion. These included: 1) Could the SUSTAIN mission architecture and vehicle design parameters be flexible enough to accommodate human factors considerations; 2) Would an autonomous delivery system be feasible; 3) Are all potential off-nominal scenarios identified; 4) Could a clandestine insertion be accomplished considering the RV plasma trail and sonic boom associated with reentry; and 5) Is it politically acceptable to have an insertion vehicle in the hands of the enemy should the mission be compromised? It was clear that the SUSTAIN mission presented a new set of challenges and constraints when it was compared to purely civil or scientific missions.

Figure 137. Photo of the Shuttle plasma trail during reentry under low level light conditions.

o 4.2.4.33.4.6 Vehicle factors were the next topic of discussion. They included, but were not limited to vehicle dimensions, mass budget, propulsion, environmental control, electrical power, main construction material, launch configuration, communications infrastructure, systems hardware, launch, coast, reentry, and landing configurations.

- 101 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 138. Spider chart displaying all major SUSTAIN vehicle sub-systems.

o 4.2.4.33.4.7 For a generic SUSTAIN capable vehicle many fundamental issues related to the spider chart above were discussed. They included, but were not limited to: 1) the main vehicle construction material, 2) the internal structure of the pressure shell, 3) launch configuration(s), 4) launch vehicle, 5) launch site, 6) expendable vs reusable launch and upper stage vehicles, 7) flight rates, 8) communications infrastructure, 9) reentry configuration(s), 10) nominal mission duration, 11) off nominal situation mission duration, 12) lift/drag (L/D) profiles, and 13) crew number and seat configuration. It was noted that the characteristics of the reentry vehicle will have significant influences on landing accuracy and P2P capabilities. In this the Cone (blunt capsule), Biconic capsule, and Winged reentry vehicle options were compared. As a basic principle the group agreed that as vehicle design L/D is increased, cross- range capability is increased, however at expense of increased complexity and decreased volumetric efficiency.

o 4.2.4.33.4.8 For a generic SUSTAIN capable vehicle there were both sub- orbital and orbital capability design nuances.

. 4.2.4.33.4.8.1 In the case of an orbital SUSTAIN capability P2P missions would benefit from the vacuum of space. For reentry the simplicity and compactness of the symmetric blunt cone. However, the higher orbital velocities present several reentry-related sub-system requirements including, but not limited to: 1) a de-orbit-propulsion stage adding length; 2) the additional mass of the de-orbit propulsion stage; 3) the de-orbit propellant; 4) TPS; and 5) attitude control for the vacuum environment.

. 4.2.4.33.4.8.2 In the conduct of a sub-orbital mission the higher horizontal velocities needed for orbit could be avoided, and aerospace vehicle design considerations such as robust TPS and retro-rocket deceleration mechanisms might not be required. However, lift over drag

- 102 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

(L/D) parameters would take on greater importance to guarantee atmospheric flight efficiencies. This is especially the case for vehicles seeking to execute longer range P2P missions. With the increased aerodynamic performance comes the down-side of increased complexity and decreasing volumetric efficiency, i.e. deviations from the blunt cone:

Figure 139. Spider chart displaying all major SUSTAIN vehicle sub-systems.

o 4.2.4.33.4.9 For the sample SUSTAIN mission the strengths and weaknesses of several terrestrial team delivery options were considered. These included a landing of the entire intact spacecraft with crew and team still embarked, parachute insertion, personal encapsulated reentry system insertion, team reentry module insertion, and deliberate hybrid system alternatives. Here, above ground vehicle exit was not just considered as a reaction to emergencies but as integral to the mission. Hybrid parachute systems have been successfully demonstrated in the Soviet and now Russian space programs and U.S. abort systems had considered such above ground exits as well. SUSTAIN crews could individually execute HALO or HAHO exits from the insertion vehicle equipped with parafoils or jet powered rigid wings. Both have been suggested in the SUSTAIN CONOPS as a means of conducting the final leg of insertion. Finally, this particular technique could be employed from a vehicle that lands following crew exit or from one that only enters the upper atmosphere long enough to discharge the HAHO or HALO-readied crew. High altitude exits will require pre-breathing in preparation.

- 103 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 140-144. Various military and commercial space diving and winged HAHO concepts.

o 4.2.4.33.4.10 Another issue discussed by the group regarded the need for the mission architecture to be prepared for the unexpected to a much greater extent than civil and scientific missions. The necessity to abort, either an intact or non-intact vehicle, would have a higher likelihood in a non-permissive operational environment than any other. Questions were asked regarding abort initiation. Would it be an automated procedure such as the Autonomous Emergency Detection System (EDS), a still-functional crew member, or would it be initiated from the Command Center controlling or tracking the mission on the ground? Also, would the mission be recalled prior to point of no return and if after what contingencies should be planned? Other discussions revolved around spacecraft system autonomy and to what extent critical decisions and functions can be activated manually by vehicle crew members, and the in- flight duties assigned to personnel. Crew responsibilities during off-nominal scenarios were of primary concern such as an inaccurate landing, excessive and health endangering vibration, and/or unintended excessive G forces. Finally, the degree of fault tolerance for mission critical systems was discussed, as well as the tradeoffs between reliability and redundancy.

o 4.2.4.33.4.11 Cabin layout, human-rating suitability, and ease of crew interfaces with flight and life-support systems were topics also discussed. This included the need for an optimal seating arrangement given the cabin volume. It also included the need for seat liners and restraint straps. The issue of the need for seat landing force attenuation through the employment of ―stroking seats‖ was evident to improve crew protection from acceleration forces along all axes, especially those impact geometries that potentially compress the spine. Emergency egress components and procedures were proposed. Finally, the location and redundancy of displays and controls was brought up, namely who should have access - just the flight crew (if not autonomously piloted), the

- 104 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

crew and the passenger unit leader, or all members of the crew and transported small unit? Many of these issues are being looked at by NASA in support of the Orion Project, and many of NASA‘s findings can be directly leveraged for SUSTAIN.

. 4.2.4.33.4.11.1 NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Seat Attenuation Designs. The Orion Project requested that NESC develop and analyze alternate seat attenuation designs for the Orion Vehicle with primary emphasis to provide improved crew survivability for nominal and Contingency Land Landing (CLL). An emphasis was placed on improving robustness and maximizing crew protection from acceleration forces given project directed requirements and goals. The NESC assessment team consisted of designers and analysts from multiple NASA centers including GSFC, JSC, JPL and LaRC, contractors, academia, NASCAR seat design experts and engineers from the Apollo era. Prior to developing alternate concepts, assessment members had the opportunity to evaluate the seat layouts in the Apollo 17 capsule, and in mockups of the Soyuz and Orion vehicles at JSC. Due to the team‘s in-depth knowledge of the problem and work with isolation systems, the NESC was later asked to evaluate design options in the crew seat area for the Ares Thrust Oscillation problem and its effect on landing loads.

. 4.2.4.33.4.11.2 With respect to biodynamics modeling, experience with both race car and military aircraft occupant protection suggests significant benefits can be gained from improved seat and restraint systems. Existing NASA occupant protection requirements are tied to the Brinkley injury risk model, which cannot adequately account for seat/restraint systems and their associated injury responses to a range of landing loads. These additional inputs are critical as the Orion landing approach orients the capsule such that the reclined crew impacts the earth surface (water or land) ―feet first.‖ The result is that a major portion of the crew impact force vector is along the axis of the crew‘s spine and maximum energy absorbing stroke would be required in this direction. Off-nominal scenarios present even greater modeling and equipment challenges.

- 105 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 145-146. NESC Z-Axis stroking seats to mitigate Y & Z-axis forces, like those of X-38.

. 4.2.4.33.4.11.3 In addition to the NASA and industry teams working this problem, the NESC is funding Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Pennsylvania State University (PSU), and the University of Maryland to investigate new innovative ideas for addressing the landing attenuation problem. The University of Maryland provided a smart material concept that could offer both isolation and attenuation using shape memory alloys. Their evaluation results were provided to the NESC team with some improvement from standard spring, flexure isolation systems.

. 4.2.4.33.4.11.4 Graduate and undergraduate students at MIT and PSU teamed together to evaluate a concept that was the result of a one week ―Innovative Engineering,‖ NESC Academy class. They designed and built a test article for a crewmember personal airbag system. The advantage of such a system is its low weight and potential for low risk of impact injury due to its conformity and attenuation stroke. It could also provide additional on-orbit free volume by easily deflating and stowing. Testing of this system is ongoing.

- 106 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 147. Landing attenuation in PSU & MIT Personal Airbag Project concept.

. 4.2.4.33.4.11.5 Based on a review of the alternate concepts, the NESC team focused detailed design and analysis effort on investigating the effectiveness of incorporating an isolation system between the seat pallet and the Orion pressure vessel structure. Two concepts for a new pallet interface emerged. The first concept tilted the crew pallet during landing to provide a greater stroking distance to absorb more energy in the spine axis direction. The second concept focused on providing isolation at the strut-pallet interface.

. 4.2.4.33.4.11.6 The NESC team also developed simplified dynamic response models and utilized the Orion baseline models to examine a range of pallet isolation properties for crew landing attenuation. The analytical tool development and the pallet isolation analysis performed by the NESC led to an additional request from the Orion Project to examine mitigating the effects of Thrust Oscillation (TO) from the Ares stage 1 solid rocket booster on the crew using isolation concepts. Coupled loads models for launch and landing models were used to examine the optimal TO isolation frequency that would minimize crew loads during all phases of the Orion flight.

Figure 148-149.. Baseline (L) and Isolated (R) System results from NESC attenuation study.

- 107 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.33.4.12 In addition to the NESC progress, much of the human factors discussion was dedicated to the impact of space suits on SUSTAIN missions. The reason for this is that in a nominal mission Marines and SOF will not want to exit their vehicle following low altitude or ground insertion in their pressure suits.

. 4.2.4.33.4.12.1 Pressure suits are optimized for high altitude safety, not terrestrial suitability. They would presumably serve as an impediment to mission accomplishment if not immediately removed for operations on the ground, and posing a danger themselves in their lack of terrestrial operational suitability.

. 4.2.4.33.4.12.2 Conversely during high altitude and exoatmospheric transport wearing pressurized suits is critical to survival at 50,000 feet and above, especially during ―off-nominal scenarios.‖ At about 50,000 feet humans experience the minimal survivable cabin pressure when the integrity of a cabin has been violated, namely 6.5 psi. o 4.2.4.33.4.13 Therefore, the need to develop rapid personal transition means into and out of pressure suits is a central challenge for a human-rated SUSTAIN. The pressure suit must be worn with full functional integrity above 50,000 feet, coming and going. With respect to the above, suit doff and don time must be reduced to a minimum. Suits must be tailored to individuals for both sizing and custom form fit. Suits must be modular and adjustable and offer and allow ease of entry into and out of the suit itself. The mobility needs of individuals need to be a priority in design, within the vehicle, when exiting and entering the vehicle, and in the case of off-nominal circumstances even external to the vehicle on the ground.

. 4.2.4.33.4.13.1 Even though the space suit will always be suboptimal for operations on the ground, all contingencies needed to be taken into consideration. Dexterity and mobility need to be maximized for motion outside the vehicle on the ground to the maximum extent possible, without violating the suit‘s on-board functionality.

. 4.2.4.33.4.13.2 The design of the helmet was also discussed, namely whether it should be conformal or non-conformal, the degree of ballistic protection that it should afford. Could the helmet or portions of it serve a dual purpose for operations on the ground? If it could have a dual purpose on the ground a restricted field of view must be avoided and avoided.

. 4.2.4.33.4.13.3 Other protection drivers pertained to NBC protection, thermal control to mitigate thermal load build-up in the suit and helmet, and bailout capability, as well as the trade-offs related to the degree of integration of life support systems within the suit. Finally, the amenability

- 108 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

of the suit and helmet to rapid access for medical care, suit trauma, hot spots, vehicle egress difficulty, and inadvertent support system detachment were noted by the group. o 4.2.4.33.4.14 In terms of environmental control there was discussion of cabin pressure and air quality. The consensus of the group was that maintaining a pressure above 8.5 psi is preferred. It was noted that commercial aircraft maintain between 10.9 and 11.8 psi. 6.5 psi is the minimum permissible pressure to avoid decompression sickness (DCS) – it is the zero pre-breathe limit. It was also observed that all pressurized military airframes have experienced unintended cabin pressure loss at some point in their operational lifetime. SUSTAIN vehicles will likely be no different in terms of the potential for such occurrences. There were also suggestions that perhaps a cabin leak could be compensated for by drawing off the O2 fuel supply to over-match the rate of pressure loss, or at least maintain pressure equilibrium. Establishing an acceptable cabin temperature band was discussed, as well as possible means for CO2, CO, and H2O vapor removal via ECLSS. Finally, cabin noise amplitude, crew exposure duration, and mitigation were discussed. o 4.2.4.33.4.15 A large fraction of the human factors discussion was dedicated to the dynamic environment, or G-Profile that would potentially confront a SUSTAIN crew. This included the onset of G forces.

. 4.2.4.33.4.15.1 For the purpose of modeling several parameters must be taken into account when estimating crew tolerance and survival. These must be considered simultaneously in modeling as each will have an impact on the others with cumulative effects being non-linear, more than the sum of the effects and to the non-linear detriment of tolerance and survivability along the other parameters. Parameters included: 1) onset and duration of force exposure, 2) acceleration, 3) absolute magnitude of forces along any axis (X, Y, or Z), 4) impact acceleration, and 5) vibration.

. 4.2.4.33.4.15.2 The Brinkley Model is currently used by NASA and the military to determine the risk of injury to vehicle occupants based on seat acceleration. The model calculates a Dynamic Response (DR) using a lumped mass modeled with a spring and damper attached to the seat. An injury classification based on injury probability is then determined using pre-defined DR limits for each axis. Probabilities of are classified as 1) Very Low: <0.05%, 2) Low: 0.05 - 0.5%, 3) Medium: 0.5 – 5%, 4) High: 5 – 50%, and 5) Very High: >50%.

- 109 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 150-151. The NASA Brinkley Standard model.

. 4.2.4.33.4.15.3 Profiles for take off/launch, cruise, coast, reentry, and landing, as well as nominal and off-nominal variations of each were considered by the group. Other considerations included ascent rate, maximum altitude, descent rate, duration of the flight, cabin/suit pressurization profile, and noise/vibration exposure during flight. Again, any change in one parameter can effect the level of tolerability by an occupant along another parameter – i.e. they are overwhelmingly interdependent.

o 4.2.4.33.4.16 The X-38 was discussed as a representative example of a wingless lifting body reentry vehicle whose basic design and operation might be considered useful for SUSTAIN modeling. As background, the X-38 was intended to serve as the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) for the International Space Station (ISS), and was developed to the point of a drop test vehicle by NASA. Although the crew size of the X-38 was limited, extrapolations on performance could be made for a larger, notional SUSTAIN-capable vehicle.

Figure 152-154. X-38 in flight during drop test (L), 3 views (C), and parafoil assisted landing (R).

- 110 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.33.4.17 The different sources of accelerations during a notional X-38- like vehicle reentry flight profile are many. In the order of their occurrence they include: vehicle are varied. 1) auto or manned piloting control during flight, 2) parachute deployment, 3) parachute opening shock (parachute area- dependent), 4) attitude control during parachute-retarded decent, 5) landing configuration, 6) horizontal landing speed, 7) vertical landing speed, 8) landing G force, and 9) landing impact shock attenuation. Off nominal considerations could include failure of the parachute, engagement of a braking rocket, airbag effects, inaccuracy of the landing, or an abnormal landing site. Once the variables were listed the various stages of the actual X-38 drop test were observed by the group. What stood out was the variety of axes along which force vectors could be seen to be at work, at different times:

Figures 155-160. X-38 parachute deployment as example of multi-axis G-force influences.

o 4.2.4.33.4.18 Other considerations include differing bodily tolerances to identical force profiles along different axes. This is referred to as the vehicle occupant alignment with the ―gravito-inertial vector.‖ For example, forces that are parallel to the spinal column, especially compression, are particularly concerning and must be mitigated. The body‘s relation to the direction of acceleration is referred to as either ―eyes up,‖ ―eyes down,‖ ―eyes in,‖ and ―eyes out‖ in NASA models that employ the Brinkley Standard.

- 111 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 161-164. Eyeballs Down (TL), Out (BR), Up (BL), and In (TR) G-load limits for crews.

Figure 165. Cumulative G-load limits for crews.

- 112 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.33.4.19 As a notional vehicle for the SUSTAIN mission being considered, the following design parameters were selected by the group: 1) a Blunt Cone Capsule vehicle type, 2) a 4-meter length cabin, 3) a 4.8-meter propulsion stage length, 4) a 4.5-meter diameter cabin, 5) a 35 cubic meter cabin internal volume, 6) a vehicle mass of 9,200 kg, 7) a propulsion stage mass of 2,700 kg, 8) an aluminum pressure shell structure, 9) a Ceramic Matrix Composite heat shield for TPS, 10) a landing system composed of a ballistic parachute w/retro-rockets and impact collapsing airbags, 11) crew accommodations having energy dissipating crew seats, 12) an international docking system, 13) and a cockpit display and computer for communications and navigation:

Figure 166-167. Notional SUSTAIN seat configuration (L) and notional design parameters (R).

Figure 168. Relating G-Force exposure with functionality and survivability..

- 113 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.4.33.4.20 The human factors break-out group also went over abort options. These included the intact and non-intact alternatives noted by Dr. Clark earlier. In terms of procedures the question was asked, who should initiate a recall of a SUSTAIN mission and under what circumstances. Also discussed was the assignment of crew duties in the event of off-nominal scenarios, such as an inaccurate landing, excessive and health endangering vibration, and unintended excessive G forces. The role of autonomous systems to correct off-nominal situations was discussed at length, namely when and to what extent automated systems should override human commands under the assumption that the crew is less than fully functional.

o 4.2.4.33.4.21 Finally, the human factors concluded that for any SUSTAIN concept life support and personal protective equipment should be designed with both nominal operations and anticipated catastrophic failure modes in mind. Crew survivability should incorporate advanced technologies where feasible and should be simple, reliable, and attainable. Also, designing in crew survivability early is significantly more effective than post production modification.

. 4.2.4.33.5 Additional Space Orbital & P2P Missions Discussion

The detailed discussion of additional space orbital and P2P missions is contained later in this roadmap under Paragraph 4.3 titled: ―Government and Industry Space Transportation Needs – The 3rd Essential Condition.‖

o 4.2.4.34 SUSTAIN Conference Summary

The San Antonio conference served as an effective kick-off for the development of the roadmap. By fully including industry respondents in the technology roadmap development from its inception, the Government has benefited from a more comprehensive insight into the state of the art, thereby leading to a more useful advocacy product. Similarly, industry has benefited from the visibility granted to their ideas and products, many of which are not considered within the larger context of synergies and opportunities that the conference sought to exploit. Conference participants confirmed having a better understanding of the SUSTAIN and similar SOCOM concepts at the conference conclusion than before the event. Furthermore, the extensive inputs and content editing that the conference participants have since provided in support of the completion of this roadmap is evidence that the San Antonio conference was a worthwhile event.

. 4.2.5 The Air Force Request for Information (RFI) - Overview

On 10 Feb 09 the Air Force published an RFI in the name of the NSSO. The RFI was titled ―Request for Information for Rapid Delivery of Military Capabilities via Space.‖ It is noteworthy that the SUSTAIN Technology Conference was deliberately held in San Antonio after the RFI was submitted, but before the responses were due, namely on 15 Mar 09. The reason for this sequencing was the intent of the NSSO organizers to have the RFI questions

- 114 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

stimulate thought amongst prospective conference participants in advance to fuel discussions and recommendations at the event. Then, armed with both the discussions and a better understanding of Government thinking with respect to SUSTAIN respondents to the RFI would have full insight to the issues as they crafted their responses. What follows is a detailed discussion of the RFI contents and the Government and Industry responses received by the NSSO by the RFI submission deadline. The questions contained within the RFI were divided into two sections. The RFI stated in part: ―The purpose for this RFI is to identify (1) near-term industry solutions that could provide the DoD the capability to rapidly deliver military capabilities via space, and (2) long-term advanced space transport concepts that could evolve from near-term capabilities.‖

. 4.2.6 RFI – Near Term Solutions - Respondent Input Inclusion

The first section of the RFI sought to identify information on existing commercial systems or low risk systems in development that could potentially apply to a DoD capability to rapidly transport militarily relevant capabilities through sub-orbital space to a remote location on short notice. The RFI suggested that this nearer-term capability could serve as the first phase of a spiral developmental effort. The following specific definitions were applicable to this first section of the RFI. The ―transport altitude regime‖ was defined by upper and lower sub-orbital space boundaries, namely between an altitude above 50 nautical miles and an altitude below that which requires prior USSTRATCOM coordination. The term ―Rapidly‖ was defined as two hours or less of flight time, preceded by a launch preparation period, with the combined total of flight time and preparation time not to exceed four hours. The reference to ―Militarily relevant payloads‖ was defined as an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) or an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), either alternative having a mass of 200 kilograms; a transported payload volume of 2 cubic meters; and either system had to be fully operational upon delivery. The ―target destination‖ was defined as any point within 5,000 nautical miles of the launch site, including an option to launch a UAS directly into target airspace at high altitude or land a UGV on the ground at a prepared or unprepared site. Finally, the delivery vehicle, whether a single stage vehicle or the upper stage of a multi-stage vehicle, needed to be recoverable and reusable. What follows are the RFI questions in the order they appeared in the document, immediately followed by a non- respondent-specific / non-proprietary synopsis of the answers received back on each question:

o 4.2.6.1 The RFI asked: ―What plans would improve sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport capabilities in these areas: (1) Space-based capabilities; (2) Terrestrial capabilities; (3) Enabling capabilities; (4) Non-material aspects including policies, procedures, and operations concepts?‖

. 4.2.6.1.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that the U.S. must plan a renewed national commitment to the exploration and utilization of space. The degree of commitment required is identical to, if not even more pressing than the focused national program that took America from the surprise of Sputnik to the first manned moon landing within just 12 years. We must recognize that America‘s legacy in space is perishable in a competitive global environment.

- 115 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

If our space accomplishments to date are not to be relegated to historical footnotes, we must be prepared now to make the collective sacrifices that have always been required in conquering new frontiers and overcoming impending threats alike. The space, terrestrial, and the enabling capabilities of each space segment will be costly, and we should be willing to bear those costs, even in the face of zero sum gain resource constraints.

. 4.2.6.1.2 With respect to policy we must be prepared to tolerate higher risks in terms of our preparedness to accept developmental failures without a loss of momentum. Similarly, the resilience of a committed national effort must be capable of enduring the risks and possible tragedies associated with accelerated manned space efforts, without slowing the tempo of those efforts. There was general consensus that in the absence of such a renewed national commitment to space, led by the Government, the U.S. will rapidly relinquish the country‘s hard- earned position as a leader in this important domain. In the process the U.S. will suffer not only a loss of prestige, but also open itself to the predictable resulting national security vulnerabilities and commercial disadvantages. o 4.2.6.2 The RFI asked: ―What technologies are needed to achieve, maintain, or improve sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport capabilities? What is the practical limit of these technologies?‖

. 4.2.6.2.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that in the nearer term several technologies at various levels of maturity must be either nurtured, developed to demonstration, or transitioned for a wide customer base and market.

o 4.2.6.2.1.1 In synopsizing the mature technology areas, responses focused on: 1) pop-up and point-to-point (P2) manned capabilities, and significant Government cost and risk sharing in the accelerated development of hopeful commercial space tourism initiatives, 2) heavy lift capabilities, with an emphasis on capturing lessons learned and successful systems from now retired programs such as Apollo as well as follow-on advances such as the F- 1A engine that were planned but shelved, 3) aerospace plane technologies, including building on the successes of the outgoing Space Shuttle Program and even larger and smaller, older tactical concepts such as the X-20 Dyna Soarer and Tsien Spaceplane that were designed, but did not transition.

o 4.2.6.2.1.2 In synopsizing technology areas still requiring Government- sponsored maturation so as to lead to useful demonstrations, responses focused on: 1) novel rotary wing, fixed wing, parafoil, and other reentry technologies that bleed energy accumulated during launch and transport while reentering, thereby enabling controlled precision landings, 2) novel concepts for the expeditionary launch and recovery of manned and unmanned space transport vehicles for both commercial and government purposes, and 3) maturation of

- 116 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

horizontal take off single stage to orbit (SSTO) and horizontal mothership- launched SSTO vehicles with P2P capability.

o 4.2.6.2.1.3 In synopsizing the immature technology areas that must be advanced, responses focused on: 1) materials that enable stronger, lighter weight, and temperature resistant vehicle structures that guarantee both crew survivability and reusability, 2) new fuels concepts that increase energy density per given mass and volume, 3) solid fuels that permit reliable thrust adjustment, and in-flight extinguishing and reignition, 4) tailored solid fuel designs that permit the safe storage of oxidizers within micro-scale distances from fuel, 5) compact electrical power generation and storage, and 6) directed energy technologies that compliment the operational considerations of space transport vehicles in military applications. o 4.2.6.3 The RFI asked: ―What technologies are considered high payoff for future sub- orbital and/or orbital space transport capabilities, including those without current funding support or U.S. Government sponsorship?‖

. 4.2.6.3.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that high payoff technologies include but are not limited to immediate investment in science and technology and studies related to the following areas:

o 4.2.6.3.1.1 Development of Advanced Materials including, but not limited to: 1) high strength, light weight composites, ceramics, and carbon structures of superior strength and temperature resilience, 2) appliqué heat shielding that can be employed for dual purposes following reentry and insertion, including disassembly for utilization in support of force protection, and 3) industrial machines and processes that permit the rapid, macro-scale assembly of nanotube structures allowing for the mass production of large, lightweight fuselages and aerodynamic flight surfaces.

o 4.2.6.3.1.2 Development of Advances Subsystems Technologies including but not limited to: 1) dual cycle hypersonic engine technologies, 2) morphing wing and lifting body technologies that leverage advances at DARPA and in industry, 3) electrical power generation and high energy density storage systems, including compact nuclear and electrohydrodynamic (EHD) power generators, and advanced capacitor and fuel cell designs, for on-orbit ion engine propulsion, payload operation, and even directed energy capabilities, 4) reusable lift capabilities that permit the routine, cost effective space transportation delivery/return vehicles and on-orbit, infrastructure support transportt, and 5) redundant life support systems that preserve vehicle human- rating even in an operational environment where modest combat damage is routine, so as to prevent catastrophic loss from such damage.

o 4.2.6.3.1.3 Development of Infrastructure Technologies and Procedures that lead to future: 1) on-orbit depot facilities for fueling and maintenance, 2) safe

- 117 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

spaceport vehicle and fuel handling procedures that permit terrestrial airfield- like throughput, including payload integration, crew and passenger embarkation, and 3) development of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) technologies to permit vehicle landings and extractions from unimproved surfaces and later from within urban or otherwise compartmented terrain.

o 4.2.6.3.1.4 Some respondents suggested that organizational changes be concurrently considered to complement technology investment, especially within the DoD. Specifically, some suggested that the DoD consider the creation of: 1) a separate Title 10 Space Service Department, or 2) a Title 10 Space Force coequal with the Title 10 Air Force beneath a Secretary of Aerospace, following the successful model of the Secretary of the Navy overseeing a Title 10 Marine Corps and Title 10 Navy.

o 4.2.6.3.2 Respondents also highlighted the importance of existing technologies that were matured, demonstrated, and routinely operated in support of past programs that can be leveraged for near term space transportation systems and their demonstrations. Examples include the F-1A rocket engine designed for future Saturn V rockets post Apollo era, the Modified T-58 engine designed for a notional SR-71 follow-on aircraft, and the Dynasoar hypersonic glider, designed, built, but never flown in the 1960s. These are but a few of the leveragable past efforts. o 4.2.6.4 The RFI asked: ―To what extent should autonomy or automation be implemented in ground and sub-orbital and/or orbital space systems to support space as a transport medium?‖

. 4.2.6.4.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that autonomy is critical to reducing the manned footprint in space in all cases where manned presence is not critical to mission accomplishment or commercial objectives. All concurred that the progress being demonstrated in largely autonomous Unmanned Arial Vehicle/Systems (UAV/S) and fully autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) (such as the DARPA Grand Challenges) show great promise. Whenever the missions of space transport vehicles do not require man-in-the-loop piloting, the efficiencies gained by fully autonomous vehicles can be significant. In the case of fully mature autonomous transport systems that have demonstrated both reliability and operational versatility, pilotless systems that transport passengers are conceivable and attractive.

. 4.2.6.4.2 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that in the case of human-rated space transportation systems human strength augmentation may be a prerequisite to mission accomplishment, especially in the case of search and rescue and other military missions. Electrically powered exoskeletons will be maturing separately and concurrently with the development of space transportation systems. It is therefore critical that the developers of exoskeletons for military operations at remote sites take into consideration space force needs and constraints

- 118 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

in design. This will insure a minimum of redesign for compatibility when the systems become operational. o 4.2.6.5 The RFI asked: ―What sub-orbital and/or orbital capabilities should the U.S. Government provide? Which commercial capabilities do you believe could enhance U.S. Government-provided sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport capabilities?‖

. 4.2.6.5.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that Government should begin to view itself as a partner in sub-orbital and orbital space transportation capabilities. Under past models, such those that brought into existence the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs, the Government and NASA were clearly the leaders in development. From the spark of the idea to the research and development to the actual experimentation and demonstration the Government monopolized concepts and programs, and industry supported as directed. Today the landscape is much different. Expertise has moved to the commercial realm and the NASA and military laboratories no longer can be assumed to have an advantage. Now that space has proven itself to be a potentially profitable domain, it is industry that is on the cutting edge of vision and intellectual capacity.

. 4.2.6.5.2 What industry lacks, and will always lack is the reserve capacity to buy down its own risks. This is where the Government must accept a new role as a partner, with its largest contribution being resource sponsorship. In return the Government can expect to have the industry build in more robust and flexible in basic designs, such as mil spec and multi-purpose modularity. This will permit the DoD in particular to directly leverage the economies of scale enjoyed by industry in commercial mass production, while being assured that adapted for military use are operationally suitable and survivable. In short, the Government should pay industry to be the provider of such capabilities, and industry should build in more robust military specifications in all systems in anticipation of military adoption.

. 4.2.6.5.3 As for the range of commercial capabilities that would benefit the Government the list is long, perhaps endless. Space sport operations and security, ground-based and on-orbit space situational awareness, and commercially leased orbital space debris mitigation are just a few of the support services that would benefit Government and particularly military space transport operations. What stands are the multiple beneficiaries of such support. For example, Government‘s sponsorship of commercially executed orbital debris mitigation has an instantaneous and transparent effect of protecting industry‘s own space investments. And the space domain is by its singular nature no different than the cyberspace and terrestrial environmental domains in that such protections and improvements are of automatic international benefit. But again, the Government must be a humble partner with the rising new space industries, i.e. the societal realm where many of the best ideas and talent are resident.

- 119 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.6.6 The RFI asked: ―In order to achieve needed sub-orbital and/or orbital space transportation capabilities through the 2025 time frame, what international cooperation will be required?‖

. 4.2.6.6.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) serves as one of the most significant obstacles to U.S. progress and competitiveness in space. Implemented at a time when the U.S benefited from an asymmetric technological advantage that enjoyed a wide margin, its goal of safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering US foreign policy objectives were rational. The risks of international space partnerships and enterprises, and of foreign investment or technology sharing in commercial space endeavors, were obvious, even on balance with lost opportunities.

. 4.2.6.6.2 However, today‘s globalized, multi-polar world has changed the dynamics, and the balance of that risk. Some respondents observed that the Department of State‘s enforcement of ITAR may hamper the ability of DoD and U.S. Industry to exploit fleeting opportunities. Others observed that ITAR does not recognize the global and egalitarian shifts in technological advantages placing a self-insulated U.S. at great risk in terms of both commerce and national security. Profitable technology and investment opportunities can by missed on many fronts, and the U.S. can lose awareness of the actual state of the art.

. 4.2.6.6.3 In fact, certain foreign technologies are evolving to the asymmetric advantage of our competitors, all the more so because ITAR prohibits the sort of commercial teaming that would permit our deeper insight. The reality today is that U.S. national security benefits from a deep insight of the space technologies of international commercial competitors just as much as those competitors benefit from understanding ours. In fact, in the realm of advanced technologies generally, not just those that are space-related, it is difficult to imagine any that are not dual and multi-purpose. In conclusion, with respect to ITAR there was a Government and industry consensus that ITAR regulations need to be substantively revised in a way that recognizes that broader international space partnerships are in our national security interest. o 4.2.6.7 The RFI asked: ―What interrelationship is planned or desired with the U.S. Government through the 2025 time frame from a sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport perspective? What Position, Navigation, Timing (PNT) capabilities are expected from the U.S. Government?‖

. 4.2.6.7.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that the Government is needed as a resource sponsor which can mitigate the risks of demonstrating maturing commercial space transportation concepts. For the Department of Defense (DoD) this means an investment in commercial demonstrations that can be rapidly morphed in fulfillment of the increasing number of validate space transportation needs the Department now has on the books. Joint

- 120 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Concept Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) are the primary accelerated paths to such multi-purpose/multi-customer initiatives.

. 4.2.6.7.2 Another example of a Government and industry consensus relates to the significant potential contribution that could be made by the Government by investing in testing facilities. Creating and making advanced test facilities available to industry (perhaps at subsidized rates) is another way the Government can help industry shorten development time and buy down risk. Ground test capabilities to investigate and optimize technologies without the risk and expense of flight test, especially in the hypersonic regime, are too costly for any single private group to develop. If, however, their creation and operation were government sponsored they could be made available to all, for the benefit of all. Significant fiscal efficiencies could be enjoyed, and capabilities could be matured more rapidly.

. 4.2.6.7.3 Additionally, there was a consensus that the Defense Advances Research Projects Agency (DARPA) could initiate the development of Service needs that call for advanced technologies and capabilities that remain beyond the state of the art. Service S&T programs normally focus on maturing and transitioning technologies that have already shown military relevance at the applied research (6.2) level. On the other hand DARPA is charged with bridging the gap from basic research and phenomenology (6.1) through to the development and transition of advanced technologies, accelerated leaps that are beyond the charters and risk acceptance of Service S&T Programs. The expansion of DARPA‘s scope, to encompass selected Service technologies and capabilities, might require an increased level of funding for DARPA by DoD.

. 4.2.6.7.4 With respect to Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), the government should continue the practice of making available to commercial partners in space transportation all operating system data at the highest levels of positional accuracy. This includes the provision of such PNT during times of military hostilities when military grade accuracy is denied to commercial users and society at large. The reason for this guaranteed access to the best U.S. PNT available at any time is two- fold: 1) on-orbit and even sub-orbital systems share the space domain with our military systems and are similarly vulnerable, not just to outside threats, but also to each other, and 2) this allows the dual/multi-use space transportation systems of industry to be confidently built knowing that military PNT access (and other space infrastructure) will be available, helping to buy down both risk and overhead. o 4.2.6.8 The RFI asked: ―What interest is there in providing selected sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport capabilities?‖

. 4.2.6.8.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that the provision of various space transportation capabilities will quickly find a large customer base. Earlier in this document those various known Government and commercial customers and their selected needs were summarized in detail. As will be discussed below, economies of scale will quickly be realized if the basic

- 121 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

vehicles and supporting systems and infrastructure are viewed as multi-customer from the onset. o 4.2.6.9 The RFI asked: ―What interest is there in providing a full range of sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport services to the U.S. Government?‖

. 4.2.6.9.1 Again, industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that the provision of various space transportation capabilities will quickly find a large customer base. Earlier in this document those various known Government and commercial customers and their selected needs were summarized. As will be discussed below, economies of scale will quickly be realized if the basic vehicles and supporting systems and infrastructure are viewed as multi-customer from the onset. o 4.2.6.10 The RFI asked: ―What analytical tools or simulations are recommend for assessing the performance, cost, and utility associated with sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport capabilities?‖

. 4.2.6.10.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded with proposals to employ many different analytical tools for the purpose of simulations in support of both technical and operational testing, as well as in evaluating cost effectiveness. The proposer decisions to employ certain tools, and some of the tools themselves were all treated as proprietary and are not discussed in any detail here. What can be said however is that industry and government respondents were in overwhelming agreement that the analytical tools and simulations that currently exist and are available are more than adequate to successfully develop the threshold space transport capability envisioned in the RFI. o 4.2.6.11 The RFI asked: ―How do purchasers of sub-orbital and/or orbital space transport end-user equipment make their needs known to the provider?‖

. 4.2.6.11.1 Industry generally responded with the value of such forums as the NSSO- sponsored Technology Conference at San Antonio. It was in this collegial setting that all potential users, whether Government-NASA, DoD, or space passenger advocates could share with industry their requirements at a general level. They also responded that it was of high value to also have present DoD laboratories such as the Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), the Naval Research Lab (NRL), and the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), as these Government labs will be partners and need to have visibility of purchaser needs, most significantly DoD. Respondents also noted that the Air Force RFI that preceded the conference was also very useful as the military requirements tend to lean forward and stress the state of the art causing industry and labs to prepare for a greater range of applications.

. 4.2.6.11.2 Earlier in this document those various known Government and commercial customers and their selected needs were summarized. As will be

- 122 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

discussed below, economies of scale will quickly be realized if the basic vehicles and supporting systems and infrastructure are viewed as multi-customer from the onset. Recognizing the inherent costliness of technologies related to space transportation, expecting a range of product options like automobiles is unrealistic. Today‘s terrestrial aerospace industry is a better comparison in that a handful of major platforms are extensively developed and thoroughly tested, and are readily adaptable to a broad end-user market.

. 4.2.6.11.3 For example, the Boeing 767 platform is adaptable to passenger, cargo, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) (E-767); and military tanker (KC-767) applications and variants alike. The now retired Boeing 707 was similarly versatile. Such robust basic platforms also remain viable for many decades, unlike other commercial products. Like airplanes, space transportation developers must be exposed to the full range of potential end-user requirements in their infancy so as to be ready for basic platform adaptation. However, it is here that the Government must fund the built-in robustness of the basic platforms, especially if interested in future, potential military end-users. o 4.2.6.12 The RFI asked: ―In general, what are the most important attributes of sub- orbital and/or orbital space transport services (or combinations of services) for a consumer?‖

. 4.2.6.12.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that from a civilian consumer standpoint safety, reliability, and price of systems and their services are the most important attributes, and in that order:

o 4.2.6.12.1.1 For the civilian space tourist or experimenter there must be a degree of demonstrated safety in the space transportation system to provide the confidence needed to buy a seat or manned experiment space aboard such a vehicle. For routine commercial use of those systems to be expected, the safety of space transport must compare favorably to acceptable survivability and mishap rates that commercial passengers and crews have grown accustomed to in the terrestrial aerospace industry.

o 4.2.6.12.1.2 Closely related to safety is reliability. A system that does not have a history of reliability does not give a customer confidence in the safety of a vehicle, even if a lack of reliability has not led to mishaps (such as the case where there are repeated non-catastrophic launch failures). With some certainty one can predict that the consumer will not parse out safety and reliability and they will be viewed as inextricably intertwined. An unreliable vehicle in any respect will be viewed as an unsafe vehicle. Lowering the price of a seat will make little difference if the ride is viewed as unsafe, just as any other transportation industry. This is critical for commercial space transportation, the key end-user market for industry profitability. Also, experimenter and anticipating passengers will have little patience for systems that do not fly as scheduled.

- 123 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.6.12.1.3 Regardless of how safe and reliable a space transportation vehicle or systems architecture may be, the price of a seat or experiment space must be affordable to the commercial customer. Today space tourism is available only to the wealthiest adventurers. At hundreds of thousands of dollars per ride, per passenger to space, and for only a few fleeting minutes only to return to the spaceport of origin, the market will clearly remain limited. Likewise, Government and even military demand will be small compared to the actual passenger throughput that will drive down passenger price through economy of scale. Even the Concorde and the proposed Supersonic Transport (SST) did not generate the passenger volume and mass platform production that would have permitted a drop in price, and these now-retired programs were not profitable or sustainable. o 4.2.6.12.1.4 Government and industry respondents agreed that the customer capacity to afford a seat on space transport systems (and thereby the industry profitability case for producing and operating them) can only be achieved through the development of multi-purpose platforms that are reconfigurable for different needs. Government partnership and resource sponsorship is therefore critical for buying down the industry risk of developing a handful of safe, reliable, multi-purpose (i.e. robust) platforms modeled on the success of the commercial aircraft industry. o 4.2.6.12.1.5 Safety, reliability, and multi-purpose/customer market attributes will certainly converge in favorable reduction in cost per passenger. In 1990 the Journal of Space Technology and Science published an article authored by Patrick Q Collins titled "The Coming Space Industry Revolution and its Potential Global Impact." In that piece Collins wrote: ―…only passenger traffic offers the opportunity to achieve rates of growth of commercial launch traffic sufficient to achieve economies of large-scale operation and eventually production. Likewise the investment of [billions of dollars] in the development of fully reusable launch vehicles would be commercially justified only if they were designed for commercial passenger transportation.‖ It is the Government and industry consensus that Collins‘ projection remains true today:

- 124 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 169. Collins‘ demand curve for space flight: price per passenger vs throughput.

. 4.2.7 RFI – Long Term Advanced Concepts - Respondent Input Inclusion

The second section of the RFI sought to identify industry concepts that could lead to a future DoD capacity to rapidly transport a full spectrum of militarily relevant capabilities through sub-orbital and/or orbital space to any point globally on short notice. Such concepts might constitute advanced phases of the spiral developmental effort described above. Accordingly, information is solicited on the following advanced capabilities, capabilities that are formulated as questions for RFI responses. Likewise, for the purposes of the present roadmap, this second section can be said to have described the RFI initial notion of an objective requirement, again in the absence of responses. What follows are the RFI questions in the order the they appeared in the document, immediately followed by a non- respondent-specific / non-proprietary synopsis of the answers received back on each question:

o 4.2.7.1 The RFI asked: ―Can capabilities be scaled up for the purpose of delivering unmanned payloads of up to 30,000 pounds suborbitally to any point on the globe, including the poles? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖ The RFI also asked: ―Can capabilities be scaled up for the purpose of delivering militarily relevant payloads to low earth orbit? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖ These RFI questions are discussed together, as the spiral

- 125 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

development paths for high mass delivery and low earth orbital (LEO) attainment largely overlap:

. 4.2.7.1.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that an integrated and coordinated spiral development that can lead to the delivery of a militarily relevant payload of 30,000 pounds to any point on the globe can be achieved. In fact, manned and unmanned payloads for both could even exceed that mass, and are deliverable sub-orbitally, or to various orbits of differing eccentricity or circular altitude. For industry the primary requirement was a reliable Government partner that is more accepting of the risks of an accelerated program and correspondingly prepared to buy down the risks of such a program(s).

. 4.2.7.1.2 With respect to a notional spiral evolution that would permit us (nationally) to the objective of delivering 30,000 pounds to anywhere on earth via sub-orbital or orbital space, the detailed responses are proprietary. However, certain general commonalities can be communicated here:

o 4.2.7.1.2.1 Heavy Lift. It is a national priority for the US to develop an indigenous heavy lift capability that enables the routine and affordable placement of payloads of 60,000 pounds or greater to LEO. Ideally, such a launch vehicle would be 100 percent reusable, employing either a fly-back booster capability such as winged horizontal or vertical take-off Bimese designs, or a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) configuration like the Delta Clipper – Y (DC-Y). In the absence of reusability, mature concepts such as the Aries V should be considered for the launch of larger sub-orbital or orbital space transport vehicles and/or larger LEO-based infrastructure. Economies of scale can be realized as hopeful endeavors such as the space based solar power (SBSP) leverage of heavy lift.

o 4.2.7.1.2.2 Early Warning. In the case of sub-orbital space transportation many vehicle concepts plan to assume trajectories that mimic those of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). More ominously, space planes may employ atmosphere skipping techniques or the outright depressed trajectories of maneuvering reentry vehicles (RV). In the case of global space transportation missions that originate in the U.S. or from expeditionary spaceports hosted on U.S. territories, competitor or adversary mischaracterization of a space transportation launch as an ICBM launch could lead to unintended escalation. This will especially be the case with larger payloads that produce significant signatures. Either the selective sharing of technologies/capabilities or the Cold-War-like joint manning of early warning facilities will be necessary to provide international confidence and allow space transportation of all classes to become routine.

o 4.2.7.1.2.3 Treaties. Some respondents observed that current space–related treaties to which the U.S. is a cosignatory are unrealistically restrictive in consideration of the accelerated international pace of space exploitation and

- 126 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

commercialization. Restrictions on the militarization of space do not recognize the inevitability of its evolution into a warfighting domain, comparable to the recognized land, sea, undersea, and air domains, or the global cyberspace domain within the information environment. Concurrent with an accelerated effort to mature space transportation for multiple national customers, the U.S. should lead the international community in revisiting old treaties that do no recognize modern realities. For example, if the berthing of manned forces in space is found necessary for some DoD purposes, treaties can be amended to allow the presence of such forces without running afoul of the meaningful weaponization concerns. These RFI respondent perspectives are presented for completeness, and are neither the positions of the NSSO nor necessarily accurate with respect to existing law. o 4.2.7.2 The RFI asked: ―Can capabilities be integrated with Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) launch vehicles such as the Atlas, Delta, and future families of launch vehicles? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖

. 4.2.7.2.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that in the near term, i.e. for the enablement of threshold space transportation capabilities, that the aforementioned legacy launch systems and their Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) successors will have utility and can be enablers for nominal space transportation capabilities. They will suffice for the demonstration of a limited number of capabilities, and perhaps even some Initial Operational Capabilities (IOC) of systems and architectures that depend on vertical launch.

. 4.2.7.2.2 However, it was also observed by all respondents that those legacy systems in general, and legacy vertical launch vehicles in particular will serve as the potential options for a shrinking if not negligible portion of space transportation options in the future. Even now, space tourism providers are focused on novel horizontal launch techniques. They include launching upper stage space transport vehicles from horizontal flight motherships, to vehicles that take off from and return to spaceports as single stage aerospace planes. Furthermore, space transportation will require launch systems to become routinely available, and therefore reusability will be critical. Bimese, winged vertical launch booster stage systems that fly back for refurbishment and reuse will be in high demand. Similarly, reusable, winged piggy-back booster stage / upper stage combinations will be required for affordability. Expendable boosters will become relics of the past if routine access to space and space transportation are to become routine.

. 4.2.7.2.3 Vertical launch systems appear as an unattractive means of space access or transportation for commercial passengers who are looking for rapid global P2P transit. For Government and military, passenger comfort is not essential, but for paying commercial passengers relative comfort will be essential. Also, rapid embarkation and payload integration must be as familiar and comforting as terrestrial airline travel to be attractive. Bimese systems, mothership-launched, and

- 127 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

SSTS horizontal take-off systems are the only answer for attracting routine commercial end-users.

. 4.2.7.2.4 Finally, legacy vertical launch booster technologies like the Atlas, Delta, EELV will be insufficient in their capacity to boost the manned and unmanned capabilities that are envisioned for the future. As noted earlier, space transportation profitability will depend on capacity. Large passenger and cargo mass requirements will overtax these aging and underpowered booster systems. The same applies for military systems that will be in need of additional fuel capacity for tactical maneuver following reentry, tactical gunship support, and even extraction following mission accomplishment. In summary, over the longer term there is a Government and industry consensus that the vertical launch Delta, Atlas, and EELV booster systems will not meet the needs of space transportation requirements. o 4.2.7.3 The RFI asked: ―Can individual vehicle capabilities be human-rated to enable the insertion of a squad-sized, combat-equipped team into any global contingency? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖ The RFI also asked: ―Can capabilities evolve to a family of assault support vehicles capable of launch on demand and refueling-assisted transport and insertion of systems and forces? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖ These RFI questions are discussed together, as the spiral development paths for a human-rated family of vehicles largely overlaps:

. 4.2.7.3.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that, yes, the insertion of a squad-sized, combat-equipped team into any global contingency anywhere on earth is technologically feasible and within the state of the art. In fact at least one respondent proposed a relatively mature solution that permitted the insertion of 26 combat-equipped personnel aboard a single vehicle.

. 4.2.7.3.2 However, the mere possibility of developing such capabilities does not address cost-effectiveness or any incentive for industry or the Government to proceed with such development. Industry respondents emphasized the significant risks and R&D costs of such a program. Spiral development paths can be defined, however, without a committed Government partner willing to ―buy down‖ the risks for industry such development(s) would be cost-prohibitive. What was emphasized throughout the responses is the attractiveness of dual and multi-use space transportation platforms, systems and architectures that answer needs for multiple Government and commercial customers and markets simultaneously. This was the spirit of developing shared threshold and objective space transportation criteria noted earlier.

. 4.2.7.3.3 With respect to capabilities at every spiral off-ramp evolving into a family of assault support vehicles capable of launch on demand and refueling- assisted transport, the uniform answer was again yes. Assault support was understood to encompass gunship, logistics, and other operational vehicle variants

- 128 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

that enable any inserted capability to be a combined arms capability. Government and industry respondents were in complete agreement that without the insertion of a combined arms capability, that includes multiple vehicles which integrate both mutually supportive complementary characteristics as well as vehicle redundancies, any small inserted unit will be limited in capability.

. 4.2.7.3.4 A common theme in the design of such a combined arms space transport capability was the proven model of the Marine Air Ground task Force (MAGTF). The Air Combat Element (ACE) of any MAGTF will integrate maneuver, fires, command and control, and logistics in the formation that is flown. The passengers of this formation would constitute the Ground Combat Element (GCE). For example, the combined arms MAGTF model requires that the Composite Squadrons deploying as part of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) always contain a mix of the above-noted tactical air capabilities. When a helicopter or MV-22-borne vertical assault is executed there will always be an armed escort(s) (rotary or fixed wing, or tilt-rotor) accompanying the force. Additionally, the ground force being transported or inserted will often benefit from dedicated logistics platforms in the same wave. In the case of the space transport and insertion of small teams and tactical units these MAGTF principles should be adhered to as well in concept and development.

. 4.2.7.3.5 The Government and industry respondents noted that in pursuit of an objective space transportation and insertion capability for military operations some material and infrastructure advances will be needed to fulfill a true MAGTF model:

o 4.2.7.3.5.1 Refueling capabilities and requirements remain unknown, as the vehicle and architecture have yet to be developed. Also, on-orbit depot infrastructure does not yet exist and won‘t until policies with respect to military applications in and through space are revisited or refined. All of these challenges could be mitigated if a requirement for refueling were eliminated.

o 4.2.7.3.5.2 While this potential simplification of the challenge was acknowledged by respondents, it was uniformly agreed that breakthroughs will be required in solid fuels, hybrid fuels, and expeditionary production of liquid fuels in an operational environment before any such hope can be realized. Some respondents did present novel fuel concepts that could be considered sufficiently advanced in terms of energy density and rheostatic throttle control, but these concepts remain at the theory and at best basic research level of maturity.

o 4.2.7.3.5.3 Other technological advancements required for the realization of the objective space transportation capability related to the ―family of vehicles‖ vision. For example, a gunship variant of a military or agency space transport capability would likely require electrically driven directed energy weapons and electromagnetic launch systems. Advances in pulse power, electrical energy

- 129 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

storage density, and nuclear or EHD in-flight electrical generation systems will be required.

o 4.2.7.3.5.4 Admittedly, compact, high power solid state laser technologies are making remarkable advances, as are electromagnetic gun technologies. Nevertheless, breakthrough improvements in miniaturization, thermal management, atmospheric propagation, and EM Gun projectile varieties are still required to suit such weapons to space transportation platforms. o 4.2.7.3.6 The RFI asked: ―Can capabilities be scaled up to permit the insertion of unmanned capabilities or manned teams that is still capable of self-extraction without refueling? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖

. 4.2.7.3.6.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that this is the most challenging of the objective requirements. This complete global transport cycle is beyond the state of the technological art today and will remain beyond the reach of most advanced concepts well into the future. That is not to say that it is an impossible objective.

. 4.2.7.3.6.2 As noted earlier, it was uniformly agreed that breakthroughs will be required in solid fuels, hybrid fuels, and expeditionary production of liquid fuels in an operational environment before any such hope can be realized. Some respondents did present novel fuel concepts that could be considered sufficiently advanced in terms of energy density and rheostatic throttle control, but these concepts remain at the theory and at best basic research level of maturity. o 4.2.7.3.7 The RFI asked: ―Can capabilities allow for a low earth orbit (LEO) loiter- like capability?‖ The RFI also asked: ―Can capabilities be increased into an on-orbit support infrastructure for space-based support, allowing for the timed injection of into any contingency from orbit? If so, describe a notional spiral evolution to the future capability?‖ These RFI questions are discussed together, as the developmental paths and concepts of operation for human-rated orbital infrastructure and manned vehicles largely overlapped:

.4.2.7.3.7.1 Industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that the technologies enabling the housing of a dozen or more mission-equipped personnel have been fully matured in conjunction with the operation of the International Space Station (ISS):

o 4.2.7.3.7.1.1 ISS has perfected systems and techniques to include spaceplane docking, crew transfer, emergency evacuation, space situational awareness, redundant global communications, debris avoidance, and modular expansion. It is significant here that the capabilities pertaining to habitable space-based support infrastructure demonstrated on ISS are equally, and almost indistinguishably applicable for Government S&T, energy, manufacturing, space tourism and military needs.

- 130 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.2.7.3.7.1.2 With respect to achieving economies of scale if multiple facilities are maintained continuously in orbit, each can fulfill the needs of multiple customers simultaneously. For example, commercially operated, for-profit fuel and repair depots in LEO could serve a variety of clientele simultaneously. Customers might include a mix of Government, partner nation, and global commercial space transportation operators. In the case of fuel, water could be transported to orbit in bulk and stored, only to be distilled into its volatile oxygen and hydrogen components on-orbit, at a facility with sufficient electrical power to perform electrolysis over time. These liquid fuels can then be provided to docking customer space transportations systems just as multiple Government and commercial customers employ gas stations on earth. Much like the global need to access and use of the internet, all space faring nations will have a need for fuel and repair. If this is left to the for-profit commercial providers, allegiances will be to paying customers and universal access will cause such outposts to be coveted by all, and much less lucrative as military targets. o 4.2.7.3.7.1.3 Another example pertains to the on-orbit berthing of large teams of mission-equipped personnel. Large teams of engineers and specialized craftsmen will be required for the assembly of large structures in LEO, MEO, or GEO for civil and commercial projects. Once Space Based Solar Power (SBSP) graduates beyond the demonstration phase large numbers of personnel will be required for extended periods to assist automated systems in assembling and calibration huge solar arrays and RF apertures. This will require berthing facilities that are augmented with sufficient exercise and entertainment capabilities to enable such prolonged periods in space. These facilities can be leased to the military for crew berthing when construction is complete, or even during SBSP construction in fulfillment of a dual use, thereby enabling the on-call posture of an orbital spaceplane readied for terrestrial insertion or on-orbit reaction. o 4.2.7.3.7.1.4 A last example, though by no means the final example, might relate to a manned orbital facility for the recycling of orbital debris and non- functional, expired space systems. In the past the preferred fate of such materials was a fiery atmospheric demise following deorbiting. In consideration of the cost of placing into orbit materials of any kind, perhaps in the future old satellites and debris can be recycled in orbiting facilities for reuse or conversion to solid fuel. Aluminum structures could be reduced mechanically to powders suited for combustion. Space transportation vehicles of all sorts would be the primary beneficiaries. Other rare earth metals can be recast to order, and wiring can be collected for the metal cores and the petroleum-based plastic wiring, or reused for repairs and even novel systems. Such facilities would of course depend on debris collection and delivery, but as the problem of orbital debris increase each year a commercial business case for such collection and delivery is only a matter of time. As with the previous

- 131 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

examples, the berthing capabilities of such facilities can have a dual use, and be leased to the military as needed. o 4.2.7.3.8 The RFI asked: ―Can capabilities allow for an entire mission cycle from launch, through transit, insertion, terrestrial or space execution, extraction, and finally egress to any global point of origin, without the need for refueling?‖

. 4.2.7.3.8.1 As noted previously, industry and Government stakeholders generally responded that this is the most challenging of the requirements. However, if the objective is modified it may be realizable sooner. Specifically, if a complete global transport cycle can be accomplished without the need for any infrastructure or devices not organic to the vehicle, the objective becomes more realistic, sooner.

. 4.2.7.3.8.2 For example, the future presence of a compact nuclear reactor aboard a vehicle will permit the production of prodigious quantities of continuous electrical power during flight and following the landing of a space transport vehicle. Employing this surplus generation and storage capacity, electrolysis is a potential method for using an electric current to drive an otherwise non-spontaneous chemical reaction in water for the separation/production of hydrogen and oxygen. Given the availability of water and ice across the surface of the earth, electrolysis makes expeditionary fuels generation an attractive option.

. 4.2.7.3.8.3 Other options might include vehicle structures that are made partially of energetic materials that can be employed for consumption as fuel during a return launch and transit. As a case in point, if a fraction of the mass of the vehicle itself is made of aluminum, and much of that structure can be dispensed with following insertion, then perhaps those aluminum parts can be converted to fuel for the purpose of self-extraction to the point of origin. On-board electrically-powered devices could mechanically reduce those structures to energetic powders for recycling as solid fuel, all on site and without the need for supporting infrastructure.

. 4.2.7.3.8.4 Another example might be the vehicle capability to harvest asphalt and/or roofing tar from the urban or developed terrain following landing and insertion and prior to extraction. Specifically, if those common petroleum-based products can be employed in concert with liquid oxygen (LOX) (separated on site by means of electrolysis or collected-liquefied during the hypersonic phase of reentry), another source of hybrid fuel can be retrieved from the operational environment for extraction.

. 4.2.7.3.8.5 Breakthrough advances in solid, liquid, and hybrid fuels technology are also conceivable that would permit the vehicle to benefit from higher useful energy density of fuels in the future. Such breakthroughs might enable a full cycle of un- refueled sub-orbital or orbital space transport from launch through insertion and then extraction to the terrestrial point of origin, at any point on the globe. The New Space industry is actively researching such potential advances.

- 132 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.2.7.3.8.6 Navy-funded research into Dr. Robert Bussard's Inertial Electrodynamic Confinement (IEC) Fusion technology currently shows promise for developing a fusion reactor suitable for aerospace vehicle applications. Energy from charged particles is collected directly, instead of using heat exchangers and turbines. Heavy shielding requirements are greatly reduced due to a mostly aneutronic fuel cycle. IEC Fusion would provide for both propulsion and on-board electrical power requirements discussed earlier.

. 4.2.7.3.8.7 The capability to produce thrust in aerospace vehicles, especially at launch, by directing ground or sea-based high energy laser beams to heat airspikes are evolving beyond basic research and into the realm of small scale demonstrations. Similarly, pulsed laser propulsion engines for future ultra- energetic craft using beamed laser energy delivery are maturing. Recent laser propulsion experiments have provided insight on how to build hypersonic aircraft that can leverage this particular power source for the launch of spacecraft into Earth orbit. This class of vehicles is known as "Lightcraft.‖ Multi megawatt average power Free Electron Lasers (FEL) will be within demonstrable grasp over the coming decade. High average power sea-based and/or ground based FELs could make the Lightcraft launch a viable concept for space transportation launch and/or horizontal propulsion.

. 4.2.7.3.8.8 Finally, at the website www.nuclearspace.com/LibertyShip.aspx Anthony Tate published an article titled ―Opening the Next Frontier.‖

o 4.2.7.3.8.8.1 In the article the author proposes the employment of a nuclear powered heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV). The rocket would employ nuclear technologies and techniques that have already been demonstrated to super heat hydrogen fuel. The author titles the vehicle the ―Liberty Ship.‖ It would be of approximately the same size as the Saturn V, but be capable of boosting eight times the payload mass of the Saturn V to LEO:

Figures 170-171. GCNR powered Liberty Ships having size comparable to the Saturn V.

o 4.2.7.3.8.8.2 The Liberty Ship vehicle would be powered by Gaseous Core Nuclear Reactor (GCNR) engines that are categorized as the Nuclear Light

- 133 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

bulb GCNR sub variant. Since in a GCNR all of the structure of the UF6 fuel mass is dynamic the gas core reactor of each engine is expected to operate at temperatures of 25,000 C. The much higher temperature gradients make the thrusters inherently more efficient as the hydrogen gas is radiatively superheated without direct material contact, thereby preventing radioactive contamination of the exhaust:

Figures 172-173. NERVA design (left) and GCNR concept (right).

. 4.2.7.3.8.8.3 The light bulb is actually a transparent silica bulb that allows the free transmission of ultraviolet light radiation from the fission-excited UF6 to pass directly into the hydrogen fuel flow path without escaping the confines of the bulb. For a Saturn V sixed vehicle seven nuclear engines would produce 1,200,000 pounds of thrust each for a total of 8,400,000 pounds of vehicle thrust capable of delivering 1,000 tons to LEO and returning to earth under power for reuse. Such a massive launch capability would benefit the entire aerospace community, and scaled down versions of these highly compact and efficient propulsion systems could clearly be leveraged for the future objective SUSTAIN capability.

4.3 Government and Industry Space Transportation Needs – The 3rd Essential Condition

The third essential condition pertains to participant agreement that the comprehensive list of identified Government and Industry user needs for suborbital and orbital space transportation below is complete. Technology roadmapping for both government and industry is a needs- driven planning process. The development of sub-orbital and orbital space transportation cannot be done for its own sake, i.e. based on a fascination with developing space planes or similar systems as ends in themselves. Only a consensus on the practical utility and multi-mission value of such systems can justify the national expenditure of limited resources. Validated needs will then help to identify, select, and develop the technology alternatives to satisfy a set of space- enabled product needs. As will be seen, the capability needs foundation of this roadmap narrowly leads to maturing space related technology areas that can be considered conceptually concrete, by logical necessity. Stakeholders concur that validated orbital and suborbital transportation customer needs include, but are not limited to:

- 134 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.3.1 National Security Space (NSS) Transportation Needs

o 4.3.1.1 Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Program

As noted earlier, ORS is dedicated to the timely satisfaction of the urgent space-enabled needs of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and other National users. In execution, ORS will use the most expeditious requirements, resource allocation and acquisition processes available as appropriate to the urgency of each need. ORS requirements accelerate existing capability needs that have been validated by the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS) process, or urgent new JFC needs articulated in Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS). ORS acquisition will utilize the broader space community and accept increased risk tolerance for operational gain. Rapid delivery of capabilities to, through, or from suborbital or orbital space will serve as key enablers of the ORS mission. For example, a transport capability could insert entire constellations of micro and nano-satellites for the purpose of reconstitution in a single mission in support of ORS. Another applicable ORS mission would be short-notice execution of pop-up Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) whereby a manned or autonomous vehicle rapidly accesses suborbital space altitudes locally in order to exploit a superior vantage point.

o 4.3.1.2 Space and Missile Center (SMC) X-Plane Initiative

In support of SMC‘s Spacelift Development Plan the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) is entering the follow-on phase of the Future Responsive Access to Space Technologies (FAST) program. To date FAST has focused on several ground experiments into baseline technology for the future demonstrator. These included an all-composite airframe with warm, cryogenic structures, load-bearing tanks attached to wing box carry-through, and thrust structures and thermal protection systems with operable seals and mechanical attachments. Other ground experiments included adaptive guidance and control subsystems with the ability to re-shape trajectories on-line and mission replanning in response to sub-system failures. Another aspect of FAST has involved development of a laboratory for exploring concepts for operating a quick-turnaround, reusable space launch vehicle, rapid mission planning, in-flight command and control and ground operations. Originally dubbed the ORS integrated ground experiment, the new program is expected to be re-named along the lines of the reusable booster system integrated demonstrator to emphasize the X-plane aims of the effort. The aim of the AFRL is to mature technology in areas such as structures, guidance and control and fault tolerance. The plan will be to demonstrate a high level of integration, culminating in a scaled X-plane vehicle that will show capabilities to Technology Readiness Level 6 by 2018. Concepts include fly-back winged booster and a similar winged booster with a rocket-powered payload module carried piggy-back strongly resembling scaled model boosters flight tested by industry in 2008. These tests, conducted in New Mexico, were primarily to investigate guidance and control concepts for a two-stage to orbit vehicle that will be autonomously controlled at speeds for up to Mach 6 for the first-stage and up to Mach 9 and beyond for the second-stage.

- 135 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.3.1.3 Marine Corps SUSTAIN Universal Need Statement (UNS)

The Marine Corps needs a capability to transport manned and unmanned capabilities through space from any point on the globe to a contingency at any other point on the globe within minutes of a National Command Authority (NCA) decision to introduce such capabilities. As an objective, this includes a need to achieve and loiter in low earth orbit (LEO) to optimize the time of insertion, the ability to be extracted from the contingency area without a need for transport refueling during insertion, terrestrial mission execution, or during extraction and egress. The need is discussed in detail earlier in this document. o 4.3.1.4 Special Operations Forces (SOF) Space Enabling Concept (SOFSEC)

The SOFSEC states that SOCOM needs the ability to expeditiously deliver special teams to any point globally via orbital or suborbital space transportation. The SOFSEC states that SOF spacelift and transport require low visibility, low probability of identification, detection, and exploitation to maintain and preserve force protection and operational security. SOF spacelift will require flexible orbital insertion or have maneuverable capability to obtain target orbits or positions once launched. For extra vehicular operations in space, SOF would continue to leverage existing skills of the Astronaut Corps to provide human surveillance from space orbiting vehicles or platforms. o 4.3.1.5 Space Transportation Joint Concept Technology Demonstration (JCTD)

In the nearer term the DoD lacks rapidly deployable, flexible, low-cost-to-operate launch systems for the high altitude placement of wide area, persistent communications on the move (COTM) for data and voice. Similarly, DoD lacks the ability to flexibly and responsively launch, and place at high altitude high resolution imagery and real- time video collecting apertures. A JCTD entitled: ―Tactical Insertion of Global Exo- atmospheric Resources (TIGER)‖ has been proposed for the purpose of demonstrating: 1) suborbital pop-up ISR and/or 2) suborbital launch of nanosatellites into LEO. The launch technology under consideration for the proposed JCTD is a maturing sub-orbital space transportation vehicle. o 4.3.1.6 Advanced Special Operations Forces (SOF) Air Mobility Platform (M-X) Special Operations Forces will need the ability to conduct covert deep insertions over great distances in coming decades. AFSOC therefore has a requirement for an Advanced SOF Air Mobility Platform (M-X) that can deliver SOF teams anywhere at anytime globally. The M-X needs to possess speed and range that significantly exceeds the capabilities of the MC-130 and CV-22, while complimenting those current aircraft without replacing either. The M-X is envisioned as a vertical- or ultra-short- take-off and landing platform for clandestine transport of troops and supplies into and out of heavily defended hostile territory in all terrains and environmental conditions. It is intended to accomplish operations in moderate to highly defended and/or non- permissive airspace. Key M-X design considerations include but are not limited to: 1)

- 136 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Capability to conduct operations anywhere in the world within 48 hours when staged from bases in the US; 2) high probability of zero detection by an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) for both airland and airdrop missions; 3) high probability of surviving threat system engagements if detected; 4) high cruise speeds at altitude and low level; 5) and high probability of successful take-off and landing on unimproved landing areas. M-X will reduce SOF need for additional force protection assets and extended cross- country maneuver vehicles to support operations. The M-X is also intended to reduce SOF‘s dependence on large runways and the need for two-stage operations where troops or equipment are transferred to or from rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft. The M-X will be part of a Family of Aircraft designed to fill a variety of missions requiring low detectability and/or high survivability such as advanced cargo transport, advanced tanker, and future gunship. The M-X also needs to have agility in the objective area, i.e. a capacity to support SOF in the objective area following insertion. AFSOC has proposed an M-X Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date of 2018. o 4.3.1.7 Global Rapid Logistics Delivery and Rapid Data Exfiltration

There exists a need within the national security community for an ability to rapidly transport materials and systems to points within a Theater of Operations with precision from the Continental United States (CONUS) or secure forward bases. Likewise, there exists a need for operators to be able to exfiltrate materials and systems out of theater and back to forward bases or even CONUS. Speed, security, and precise intact delivery are the key prerequisites in both cases with suborbital space transportation being an attractive alternative under many special circumstances where the timely arrival of data has strategic implications. o 4.3.1.8 Air Force Base Opening and Security Operations

Air Force Security Forces (AFSF) have been assigned this mission within DoD. This is the case whether such an operation is done in a permissive environment, a semi permissive environment, or a non-permissive environment following the execution of a Joint forced entry capability. For the worst case scenario requiring forced entry, suborbitally transported Joint Forces can forcefully secure the expeditionary airbase and then seamlessly set in motion the four subsequent doctrinal AF stages of the expeditionary airbase life cycle, namely Airbase Opening, Establishment of the Airbase, Operation of the Airbase, and Closing the Airbase. By offering speed and surprise, the space-enabled insertion of AF Security Forces along with and as follow-on to Joint seizure forces may simplify opening by enhancing speed, surprise, and Joint interoperability. o 4.3.1.9 Air Force Global Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

The Air Force has been designated by DoD as the lead service for CSAR. The primary operational task of CSAR is to locate, communicate with, and recover downed aircrews and isolated personnel. To accomplish the primary task, the Air Force currently employs HC-130N/P and HH-60G aircraft. The limited range and

- 137 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

speed of these tactical aircraft can be complemented with a global suborbital or orbital space transport capability in order to provide a Pararescuemen (PJ) first response within minutes and hours of a distress signal being sent. The space-enabled PJ first responders could then provide basic assistance and protection until a larger refueled aircraft contingent links up. The specially trained PJ teams could be dropped from suborbital altitudes to stabilize survivors and prepare them for recovery. o 4.3.1.10 Air Force Satellite Delivery, Inspection, Repair, and Recovery

Space-based systems are becoming ever-more complex and costly. Larger buses are capable of correspondingly higher power requiring larger solar arrays. Larger buses also tend towards housing ever-greater numbers of disparate payloads, whether they be sensor or communications related. These larger systems are expected to operate over extended lifetimes just as so many legacy systems have served the national security community for decades. In order to guarantee lifetimes comparable to legacy systems these more complex and capable may require more hands-on care. Routine manned and unmanned access to orbiting space systems will be required for troubleshooting, parts replacement, refurbishment and any other care necessary to keep satellites operational while minimizing anomalies. This includes an ability to capture satellites for terrestrial or on-orbit maintenance or the function of a space tug capable of significant changes in orbit and inclination when the on-board delta V of the satellite does not suffice. o 4.3.1.11 Air Force Strike/Persistent Engagement Capabilities Needs

The Strike/Persistent Engagement Capability area seeks to achieve precise and scalable effects from the air with global reach, quick reaction, persistence, and significant payload. This capability area includes three attributes related to high speed hypersonics and suborbital space transportation. 1) Time Sensitive Regional Strike – This attribute reflects the performance characteristics of high speed / hypersonic cruise standoff weapons with nominal range of 600-1000nm, capable of precision engagement of high- payoff, time-sensitive, fixed/relocatable, moving, and deeply buried targets within 10- 20 minutes of tasking. 2) Time Sensitive Global Strike – This attribute reflects the performance characteristics of boosted hypersonic glide weapons with global range, capable of precision engagement of high-payoff, time-sensitive, fixed/relocatable, moving, and deeply buried targets within ~60 minutes of tasking. 3) Responsive Global Force Delivery with Persistence – This attribute reflects the far term vision of fully reusable hypersonic aerospace platforms capable of global reach and repeatable sortie generation for persistent and sustained force application.

- 138 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 174-176. NASA X-48B wind tunnel mock-up and artist‘s full-scale rendition.

o 4.3.1.12 Rapid Global Delivery of Tactical ISR

The goal of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Rapid Eye Program is to develop a high altitude, long endurance unmanned aircraft that can be rocket-deployed from the continental United States world-wide within 1-2 hours to perform intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and communication missions. The enabling technologies are inflatable/folding structures, stable and dense energy storage, and low-oxygen propulsion. Rapid Eye will provide decision makers rapid- reaction ISR and persistent communication capability for emerging situations. The 1-2 hour timeline and global delivery requirement of Rapid Eye overlaps and complements the objectives of ORS, USMC, and SOCOM with regards to employing space transportation for terrestrial objectives.

o 4.3.1.13 Joint Heavy Lift (JHL)

The Joint Heavy Lift (JHL) is an advanced Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) capable aerospace system that is intended to overcome enemy anti-access strategies. In this regard it seeks to enable operational maneuver from the seabase in order to enhance Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) capabilities. This includes the execution of vertical envelopments, aerial deliveries, and sustainment operations. In the future, a Joint Force capable of full spectrum dominance must possess unmatched speed and agility in positioning and repositioning tailored forces from widely dispersed locations to achieve operational objectives quickly and decisively. As Services evolve towards a lighter and more lethal Joint Force, the need for a JHL solution that permits the rapid concentration of forces from multiple globally dispersed locations has been recognized. This Joint need is now documented in the form of a draft JHL Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). Concurrently, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and DARPA have investigated a jet powered VTOL transport category aircraft. This aircraft may be suitable for both suborbital and orbital space transportation capabilities. It could provide the DoD a possible end-to-end solution for moving assets globally, into and out of urban and austere environments with unprecedented speed and agility.

. 4.3.2 Industry Space Transportation Markets

o 4.3.2.1 Vertical Ascent Space Tourism

- 139 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

The first manifestation of the space tourism industry is already taking the form of passenger service to the edge of space followed by a controlled decent to the spaceport from which the spaceship was launched. The vehicles for achieving this feat take many forms including mothership-launched space vehicles, singled stage to space vehicles, vertically boosted vehicles, and variations of those configurations. Passengers benefit from the thrill of rapid ascent, an unobstructed view of the universe, several minutes of weightlessness, and the thrill of the controlled descent and landing. The initial cost per passenger is sufficiently reasonable to establish nominal business viability. In coming years individual costs will drop generating profits through greater numbers of passengers and sorties and thereby mainstreaming the space tourism experience. Point- to-point tourist travel at or above the Kármán Line will soon follow as more spaceports are established nationally and worldwide.

Figures 177-178. SpaceShipOne prototype and artist‘s depiction of XCOR Lynx vehicle. o 4.3.2.2 Global Passenger Service

The value of rapid transoceanic passenger service has always been acknowledged in the business and luxury market places. As early as the 1960s the business case was strong enough for the U.S. to prototype the Supersonic Transport (SST) airliner, even though it was eventually bested by the European Concorde. While the Concorde has since been retired, the market for responsive and flexible corporate jet travel has only grown. The need for passenger-certified hypersonic transports to fill short executive days with highly valued face-to-face interactions at widely separated locations will continue to increase. Given the existence of affordable hypersonic suborbital space executive travel alternatives, the competition of globalization may cause that market to quickly expand. Executive transport affordability will evolve from the synergy between the budding point-to-point space tourism industry, military service and special operations community interests in rapid global transport, and the efficiencies gained in numbers. This expanded customer base could overcome some of the economic disadvantages experienced with the Concorde. o 4.3.2.3 Commercial Orbital Services for Researchers

- 140 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 4.3.2.3.1 Space entrepreneur Mr. Art Dula has identified a significant market for LEO science and industrial missions that are not suited for execution aboard the International Space Station (ISS). Lack of ISS suitability relates to any project requiring only a lesser period in LEO, a longer anticipated waiting period for ISS participation, a lower ISS mission priority, or some combination of these constraints. The market identified by Mr. Dula is large enough to justify a commercial gap-filling capability that is more accessible and perhaps affordable than ISS. Such space missions would be more that tourist trips, yet less demanding than ISS operations.

. 4.3.2.3.2 In response, Mr. Dula is leading a commercial venture titled Excalibur Almaz Limited (EA) to provide the capability that fulfills this market niche. EA intends to employ the Almaz reusable reentry vehicle (RRV) previously developed by the Soviet Union to operate in conjunction with the Almaz manned military space station that was the heart of the military space reconnaissance system. The Almaz RRV and space station will form the backbone of this U.S./Russian commercial venture to carry paying research crews on one week missions into Earth orbit by 2013. In addition to buying several Almaz RRVs, EA has also purchased two complete Almaz space station hulls. The project's primary technical partner in Russia is NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPROM), the producer of Almaz.

. 4.3.2.3.3 The reusable Russian systems that have been purchased to initiate the venture were built more than 30 years ago as part of a large Soviet space reconnaissance program. The U.S. had developed a similar capability. However, the Soviet concept progressed much further as several reusable Almaz crew RRVs were flown during nine flight tests, with two RRVs having been launched to orbit several times in order to demonstrate their reusability. The actual service modules that will fly in the new program will be lighter and exploit higher technology than the older Soviet designs, as NPROM will develop what EA orders. One novel design feature that will remain is the hatch that is built into the RRV heat shield that permits the crew to move between the service module and the bell- shaped RRV.

. 4.3.2.3.4 The EA management team includes some of NASA's senior Apollo and space shuttle program managers, including former directors of the Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers. EA intends to begin flight tests of the Almaz hardware by 2012 and to launch its first revenue flight as early as 2013. Each mission will be piloted by an experienced cosmonaut or astronaut and can carry 2 researchers.

- 141 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 179-181. Almaz service module (L), RRV (R), and Almaz space station (Bottom).

o 4.3.2.4 On-Orbit Commercial Space Stations for Industrial Processing

Companies such as Bigelow Aerospace are working on large, low-cost commercial space station concepts for continuous industrial processing and observation which would be available to commercial entities and non-space-capable nations. Technology demonstrators such as the Genesis I and II have already flown successfully, and are proving the technologies for low-cost space stations for industrial processing and experimentation:

- 142 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 182-183. Genesis I (L) and Genesis II (R).

. 4.3.2.4 Beginning in 2014 Bigelow Aerospace plans to launch inflatable crew quarter modules, a smaller one in 2014 and a larger one in 2016. Together, these habitable modules will constitute the world‘s first private space station for paying customers. The two Bigelow stations will serve as home to 36 people at a time; six times as many as currently live on the International Space Station. As noted above, the company currently has two fully inflated test modules in orbit having been successfully launched from Russia using converted ballistic missiles. In 2017 and beyond Bigelow plans to by buy 15 to 20 rocket launchings per year, providing an ample business-case for the Obama administration‘s so-called commercial crew initiative.

. The idea of inflatable spacecraft dates back the beginning of the space age with the large Mylar Echo I and Echo II balloon satellites being launched by NASA in 1960 and 1964. The Bigelow designs improve upon NASA‘s modern inflatable work in the form of TransHab modules. Bigalow‘s design improvements include replacing Kevlar protection with Vectran, a superior micrometeoroid-penetration- resistant fabric. Alternating layers of aluminized fabric and foam absorb and disperse the impacts of micrometeoroids, providing better protection than metal structures. Bigelow has also added small windows that are currently installed aboard the Genesis I and II.

- 143 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. Bigalow‘s TransHab is planned as a crew quarters module for the International Space Station. A habitat called Sundancer, having an inflated volume of about 6,400 cubic feet, would launch first in 2014. A separate rocket would then transport two Bigelow astronauts so they can take up residence in Sundancer. A second, larger Sundancer habitat of about 11,700 cubic feet, and a central connecting node are launched will be launched later. The modules will dock themselves, with astronauts present to fix any glitches. Once the station modules are up, Bigelow intends to demonstrate support logistics operations, such as the provisioning of food, water and air, as well as fixing the systems on-orbit:

Figures 184-186. Bigelow‘s Sundancer specs, mock-ups, and the Echo I/II inflatable legacy.

o 4.3.2.5 On-Orbit Hotels and Resorts

In addition to Bigelow Aerospace, other new space entrepreneurs have discussed the concept of establishing hotels in earth orbit. While such undertakings will depend on first lowering the cost of material transport to orbit, there is little doubt that such space stations will generate a large market when they eventually become fiscally feasible. 21st Century adventurers will pay well to comfortably observe earth and the universe from Low, Highly Elliptical, or Geosynchronous (LEO, HEO, or GEO) orbit. Access to such space resorts will require orbital space transport, not to mention the need for such transports to economically transport substantial masses of construction materials and systems of all sorts to the proposed ―sites.‖ Here again, the synergy between other space tourism transport technologies, government, and military interests will cause the business case for space tourism to become attractive sooner.

.

- 144 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 187-188. Other artist renditions of space resort and space hotel concepts.

o 4.3.2.6 Global Logistics Services

The competition for capturing market shares by rapidly introducing new products en mass is an accelerating phenomenon associated with globalization. An example of the need for speed in commercial logistics can be found in the fashion industry. Today, when a new piece of apparel is well-received at a fashion show in Milan, manufacturers in East Asia, standing by for orders, execute mass production and immediate shipping. It is said that companies often reserve small fleets of Federal Express, DHL, or other logistics carriers to flood markets with new fashions quickly. This need is also extending to electronics and potentially to biotechnology product areas where the rate of change and improvement is exponential. As suborbital transport becomes more affordable due to multiple mainstream applications a competitive edge will be provided to the companies that use it. Furthermore global transport of perishable organs for the purpose of life-saving transplants is envisioned to be not only useful. o 4.3.2.7 Zero-G Access Services to Support Industry and Education

The ability to observe organic behavior, crystal formation and nano-scale molecular growth or assembly in the absence of gravitational forces is critical in the scientific and manufacturing communities. Given that the cost of access to suborbital and orbital space will decline as the commercial market for such trips increases, routine access to the Zero-G environment will become an affordable option for researchers and students. Single exposures to weightless conditions would typically measure several minutes, a leap beyond current atmospheric alternatives. Later, as orbital access becomes more affordable, periods of weightless can routinely be extended to hours and days, with the Excalibur Almaz Limited (EA) initiative noted earlier as a concrete example. o 4.3.2.8 Contracted Rapid Orbital Insertion of Small Payloads

Several New Space industries envision that their space tourism platforms will be expandable into multi-purpose reusable boosters for piggyback upper stages that can place small payloads into Low Earth Orbit (LEO). This commercial interest dovetails

- 145 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

with the ORS mission for rapid reconstitution of degraded constellations. Clearly, the sortie rates will both drive the profitability of these space transportation entrepreneurs, and keep individual sortie costs lower. There will therefore be a pull on ORS customers from the transportation providers to complement the push from ORS and companies producing smaller space-based systems to keep the tempo and flexibility of sorties high as the industry establishes itself.

o 4.3.2.9 Contracted Orbital Space Debris Mitigation Services

The number of uncontrolled space objects and pieces of orbiting space debris continues to grow every year. The most useful polar and equatorial LEO altitudes are becoming increasingly hazardous for functional space systems, and especially threaten human- rated systems. Tens of thousands of apparent objects have been catalogued. Perhaps many times that number of objects escape surveillance through their smaller size, but present significant hazards nonetheless. The objects and debris constitute dangers for all users of space, so a significant world market exists for the clean-up of orbital space as much of the world evolves towards a space faring community. Many solutions must continue to be explored if near-earth space is to remain a useful physical domain for mankind. Whether a solution is space transport based or transported to space to act autonomously, a common need exists in an affordable transport system that can access orbit repeatedly and reliably. A transport will be particularly critical for manipulating larger defunct objects that will increasingly clutter valuable GEO real-estate. Finally, in conjunction with mitigation, there may be a justification to capture more massive non- functional systems for possible on-orbit recycling into reconfigurable/remanufacturable materials. This is because every ton of useful deorbited debris will have an associated cost of a future launch of a similar mass. Space stations and depot facilities may negate the necessity or desirability of deorbiting defunct systems.

. 4.3.3 NASA Space Transportation Needs

o 4.3.3.1 Follow-On Spaceplane

With the retirement of the Shuttle Fleet there is the appearance of a capability gap that places the U.S., arguably one of the greatest space faring pioneers, in the prolonged and unenviable position of total dependency on space competitors for routine manned access to space. This manned access gap is a blow to American national pride and will certainly invigorate any and all efforts by NASA and industry to close and eliminate the gap quickly so that the U.S. can return to a forerunner position in space. Efforts are being considered by some to human-rate the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) to hastily provide such access to the International Space Station (ISS) access. Still this would seem to be a less than optimal stop-gap solution for a nation that mastered the first reusable space plane. A follow-on to the Shuttle needs to become a developmental imperative for NASA as a national objective. Later in this roadmap the findings of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Review Committee will reaffirm the urgency from the perspective of science and exploration. NASA has foreseen this gap and over the years has pursued many initiatives to solve it. They have included the

- 146 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Orbital Space Plane (OSP), Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART), and Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) initiatives, and supporting technology demonstrations have included the X-40, X-37, and the X-38 Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). 21st century follow-on to Shuttle success needs to incorporate all past government and industry lessons so as to lead to an affordable, reliable, and highly flexible spaceplane that can act as the workhorse for all manner of future space projects.

Figure 189. One artistic rendition of commercial spaceplane concept as follow-on to Shuttle.

o 4.3.3.2 Follow-On to NASA COTS for Space Station Access

Ideally, the SUSTAIN capability calls for a permanent manned space segment. With SUSTAIN-equipped specialized small units geographically dispersed across the globe, in CONUS, sea-based, and forward deployed at expeditionary spaceports, an eventual military space station completes the set of options. A military space station in LEO provides several advantages. First of all an operationally significant SUSTAIN capability is continually fueled, rested, and has access to a variety of mission-equipment sets, not just the single equipment and skill options it was launched with. Also, under optimal circumstances, once safely on-orbit the SUSTAIN could amount to a fully fueled drop ship that is as little as 90 minutes distance from its terrestrial objective.

. 4.3.3.2.1 Crews would of course have to be frequently rotated, but the experience of ISS and other extended space programs lowers the risk of maintaining a force-in-

- 147 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

readiness in space. Although there will certainly be political and diplomatic issues related to basing military personnel in space, the experience, technology advances and value gained will jumpstart U.S. aerospace needs for the remainder of 21st Century space operations.

. 4.3.3.2.2 The ISS provides a rich resource in determining how a space station should be operated and led. It also establishes a baseline psychological and physical environment for prolonged operations in space. However, a military space station may call for a degree of physical readiness that exceeds the fitness and bone strength requirements of ISS crews. For this reason some past space station design and operation concepts might be considered superior to the ISS for SUSTAIN and other military space missions.

. 4.3.3.2.3 For example, the ISS suffers the fundamental disadvantage that its occupants remain in a continuous state of weightlessness. All physical exercise is contrived and artificial from the perspective of momentarily inducing forces on the bodies of ISS occupants that in any way simulate normal Earth gravity. For a SUSTAIN military space station it is perhaps worth considering a rotating structure that produces artificial gravity continuously, perhaps not to the acceleration of the earth‘s surface, but at least enough to be a representative stress environment.

Figure 190. Depiction of Shuttle docked to the ISS.

- 148 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 4.3.3.3 Large Structure and Raw Material Delivery

As the nation and the global community search for alternatives to carbon-based energy sources, space based solar power (SBSP) has emerged as a significant untapped opportunity. SBSP holds great potential, as arrays benefit from unobscured exposure to a full 1360 W/m² of solar radiance on orbit and huge solar collecting surfaces can be expanded into unoccupied space with little restriction. Furthermore, the utility of SBSP is increased many fold if the infrastructure stabilizing the large arrays can be made multi-purpose, serving as a platform(s) for untold numbers of civil, scientific, and tourist applications, in-stride.

. 4.3.3.3.1 An affordable, reliable, and highly flexible spaceplane such as that suggested as a Shuttle-derived follow-on would be essential to the creation, operation, and maintenance of a viable SBSP enterprise. Admittedly, SBSP will be ignited with a limited demonstration of economical scope, but full operationalization of a successful plant will be a much different matter.

. 4.3.3.3.2 The delivery of massive amounts of prefabricated and raw materials to space for assembly and integration will be required. The First and Second Generation SBSP will be characterized by Large-Scale Photo-Voltaic Arrays and Mirrors requiring some human intervention for construction in space. However, the Third Generation SBSP will be characterized by the overwhelmingly autonomous placement of this equipment in self-sustaining arrays in space. Launch and material manipulation processes will include Hybrid Launch involving HUSV‘s, MEO Tethers, Rotating Machinery (CCGTs), and Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) Space Tugs. o 4.3.3.4 Routine High Altitude Atmospheric Research

NASA remains committed to better understanding the earth‘s atmosphere and to monitoring its metamorphosis due to all causal factors, both natural and man-made. Teamed with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), NASA could conduct manned and/or unmanned missions to space for sampling and observations on short notice, and globally. This routine and flexible access to suborbital space (at a minimum) would permit an unprecedented volume of data to be collected and analyzed in real-time for models and decision makers, not only in the U.S. but for the international community.

- 149 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 191 and 192. Current methods of periodic high altitude atmospheric sampling.

o 4.3.3.5 On-Orbit Refueling and Depot Facilities

. As NASA executes its space exploration roadmap, to include manned missions to the Moon and Mars, the need for intermediate support facilities in earth orbit will become critical. Storage of fuels, raw materials, sustenance, spare systems, and the coexistence of repair facilities are only a few of the many on-orbit services that will be required to reduce the risk of space exploration missions and hedge against uncertainties. Such depot facilities and their contents will require efficient and repeated access to earth orbits from the terrestrial surface of the earth. The routine delivery of systems and materials will require a reusable space transport vehicle to deliver depot components and later to supply the depots throughout their operational lives in support of an ambitious NASA exploration roadmap, permitting its cost-effective and reliable execution. Propellant depots can decouple mission performance from launch vehicle capability.

. With respect to on-orbit refueling the Final Report of The U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Review Committee states that: ―The Shuttle-derived family consists of in- line and side-mount vehicles substantially derived from the Shuttle, thereby providing greater workforce continuity. The development cost of the more Shuttle- derived system would be lower…[with the] lower lift capability…offset by developing on-orbit refueling…If on-orbit refueling were developed and used, the number of launches could be reduced…It would also require that NASA and the Department of Defense jointly develop the new system. All of the [NASA exploration] options would benefit from the development of in-space refueling…A potential government-guaranteed market to provide fuel in low-Earth orbit would create a strong stimulus to the commercial launch industry.‖ Therefore, there is independent confirmation that there will be a growing market for such facilities.

- 150 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figures 193-196. Artists‘ renditions of LEO fuel and spacecraft maintenance depot concepts.

. 4.3.4 Other Government Space Transportation Needs

o 4.3.4.1 State Department Shuttle Diplomacy

The U.S. Department of State (DoS) continues to place a high value on the face-to-face interaction of senior diplomats and National leaders, especially during periods of international crisis. A historical example that comes to mind was the importance of face-to-face shuttle diplomacy during the 1973 Yom Kipper War when the direct presence of the Secretary of State in various capitals over a period of days and hours narrowly averted a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Since the rapidity of crisis development has only increased with technology, the need for such senior U.S. representation for direct and unambiguous communication will increase accordingly.

o 4.3.4.2 National Lab WMD Counter-Proliferation Monitoring

The Department of Energy (DoE) and other agencies such as the Office of Nuclear Counter-Terrorism (NCT) are tasked with assisting in countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through accurate monitoring and assessments. National assets look for electromagnetic (EM) signatures of events and devices. Yet,

- 151 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

the ability to rapidly attain air, soil, and other samples in a timely fashion is often the key to making a defensible assessment. A recent example involved the suspected detonation of a fission weapon by a rogue state. It took some time, perhaps days and even weeks before air samples were obtainable to verify that the detonation indeed occurred. This was an inefficient means to ascertain the truth or fiction of rouge state propaganda. A space transportation capability could reduce such certainty to mere hours, with significant information operations (IO) benefits to the U.S. o 4.3.4.3 Global Dignitary Transport Services

Similar in spirit to the use of suborbital or orbital space transportation for shuttle diplomacy, such transportation can be employed for Heads of State and other dignitaries whenever time is critical. This could constitute the provision of a vehicle to foreign VIPs to the U.S. and their return so as to minimize schedule interruptions, and essentially make the meeting possible when it would otherwise not be possible. These instances fall short of the urgency of crisis shuttle diplomacy, however the strategic value of such meetings could certainly be of similar significance. o 4.3.4.4 Global Secure Courier Services

The State Department and other agencies of the U.S. Government have depended heavily on the ability to provide secure courier services over long distances on short notice. Often a manned courier requirement exists, though just as often the security afforded by other commercial and government transportation is considered adequate. What has lacked is speed of transport when a difference of a few hours can offer the U.S. a strategic information or insight advantage, national security or otherwise. Suborbital or orbital transportation capable of hypersonic speeds and unimpeded international overflight would provide the U.S. a valuable tool when telecommunications cannot substitute for the package itself. o 4.3.4.5 Global Delivery of Humanitarian Relief Advance Teams

America has been and must remain a world leader in offering aid and assistance to any countries impacted by natural or man-made disasters. This humane intervention has come to define the civility and generosity of Americans, and it continues to set an example for the rest of the world. One shortfall that has plagued humanitarian assistance missions in the past has been the delay between the catastrophic events and the arrival of first-responder experts who can make rapid assessments that optimize the delivery of relief. To-date sustained Air Force airlifts and the timely presence of forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) have provided welcome relief. However, MEUs and ARGs are generally confined to the littorals and airlifts are ever-more constrained by non-permissive airspace enroute. Suborbital space transportation can enable effectively immediate arrival of a lead echelon of advance party of specialists from the U.S. These early arrivals can conduct assessments and plan for follow-on echelons of U.S. and

- 152 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

international aid. Though this utilizes space transportation in a humanitarian capacity, it is not unlike the military SUSTAIN concept of early intervention.

4.4 Roadmap Leadership and Sponsorship

. 4.4.1 As the facilitator of much of this effort, the NSSO is interested in encouraging Government and industry stakeholders to further this work. The SUSTAIN need served as a visionary catalyst as it overlapped with other Government and industry space transportation needs, while also embodying the ―essentiality‖ characteristic of a national security need. Stakeholders in suborbital and orbital space transportation capabilities can use this document and others to garner further advocacy amongst DoD, non-DoD Government, and industry decision makers, including Congressional champions. Beyond its role as an advocate for DoD space transportation needs and technology interests, the NSSO‘s role is necessarily limited.

. 4.4.2 The NSSO has neither the charter nor the capacity to fund any projects that this roadmap might inspire. In fact the timing of this study coincides with an era during which space-related new-start programs may not compete well against other National priorities. As noted earlier, S&T and IRAD resources are limited. With respect to space, the recent report of the ―Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee‖ (a.k.a. the Augustine Commission Report) highlighted the fact that the current NASA budget is very constrained, thus large space access new starts are unlikely.

. 4.4.3 Lacking a National imperative that would justify Apollo and Shuttle-like commitments, the Federal Government does not have the resources to aggressively invest in space access. A collaborative effort that employs Government and industry teamed for the purpose of developing multi-purpose common platforms for many users is the only feasible route to realizing any aspect of this roadmap in the near term. Such a partnership will be critical to the wise expenditure of future resources and the building of a sustainable industrial base. A partnership will guarantee the investment efficiencies needed in the development, integration, demonstration, and operationalization of the technologies discussed in this roadmap.

. 4.4.4 In projecting leadership and sponsorship beyond this roadmap, the DoD should consider leading an effort, using a jointly developed roadmap to help guide resource allocation decisions internally and collaboration with industry externally. The visionary Marine Corps SUSTAIN and SOCOM space transportation-related capabilities serve to help drive a roadmap requirement that would benefit the U.S. aerospace industry as a whole, not to mention help address a plethora of non-DoD user needs. In order to set a collaborative, multi-user, multi-developer process in motion DoD will need to be assured that the United States Congress shares the perception that there is a National benefit from such an initiative.

4.5 Defining a Vision, Scope, and Boundaries for the Technology Roadmap

This step in roadmap development leads to the specification of the ―context‖ for capability development. This context is primarily represented in a product vision that is shared by all roadmap development team participants. It is also defined by scoping the technology roadmap

- 153 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

scope in terms of time horizons, stakeholder involvement, stakeholder technological detail requirements, and degree of stakeholder participation. Finally, in practically bounding the technological challenges presented in this roadmap, a more concrete conceptual product can emerge from the roadmap one benefiting from a concrete user needs foundation and realistic technological expectations: 4.5.1 The Product Vision Defined in Terms of Bounding Requirements

Based on the common stakeholder need themes identified throughout this document, several concrete product requirements can be articulated to serve as starting points for a user-based, spiral National program, with SUSTAIN as a stated national security need. In order to mature the military capabilities expressed in a SUSTAIN program the following multi-purpose capabilities are needed:

. Space transportation vehicles capable of transporting cargo of up to 30,000 pounds internally sub-orbitally. In the near term internal payload capacities of 500 pounds are operationally useful for both Government and industry.

. Sub-orbital vehicles capable of achieving an altitude of at least 50 miles, and optimally 62.5 miles for the purpose of pop-up and limited point-to-point (P2P) missions in the near-term, and global access in later spirals. In the near term P2P missions limited to as little as 1,000 miles (500 in space) are operationally useful for some DoD missions.

. A family of space transportation vehicles capable of transporting cargo of up to 15,000 pounds internally to LEO.

. Space transportation vehicles that enable a launch cost of no more than $300 per kilogram to LEO from between the 25th and 50th Parallels, once the launch frequency is sufficient high to achieve economy of scale.

. Space transportation vehicles that are capable of being human-rated, with a desired objective that they are in fact human-rated in future spirals.

. Launch preparedness that allows mission-tailored vehicles to be launched on the order of hours following a decision to execute, with two hours as the objective.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that are capable of returning to the terrestrial surface in a controlled reentry with reduced acoustic, optical, and radio frequency (RF) signatures.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that are of low-cost, highly reliable, and responsive.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that in the near-term make use of mature expendable launch and upper stage technologies, and have as a spiral development objective fully reusable launch and upper stage systems.

. A family of space transportation capabilities that employ variety of complimentary technical approaches. These include, vertical and horizontal launch (towed, piggy-back, Bimese), vertical and horizontal landing, ground/sea/air launch, orbital and suborbital space injection,

- 154 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

and modular platform reconfiguration. This need is based on the shared perspective that no single technical option will enable the fulfillment of all space transportation user needs.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms having the ability to modify flight plans mid-mission, whether they are pop-up, short-range P2P, global P2P, or LEO missions.

4.5.2 The Roadmap Scope Defined

The scope of this space transportation roadmap and its technology subsets seeks to capture the complete spectrum of utility of suborbital and orbital space transportation that includes, but is in no way limited to SUSTAIN. The spectrum of utility takes several factors into account in order to set the boundaries of the document.

4.5.2.1 Differing Stakeholder Time Horizons

Industry, DoD, NASA, and other Government stakeholders all have different planning horizons with regards to specific space transport capabilities. For example, New Space industries may find it profitable to aggressively pursue vertical ascent technologies for space tourism. These developers may perhaps be satisfied with such a capability for some number of years. They might determine that a business case for a substantial IRAD investment in long-lead S&T for a point-to-point capability does not exist now. Conversely, the DoD and NASA may see a necessity for immediate investment in such P2P capabilities since it is the point-to-point applications that dominate projected needs in the nearer term. As a consequence, the time horizons for both Government and Industry extend out 20 years. This will capture the nearest term needs, such as those associated with first generation space tourism, as well as the longer term projections that look towards overcoming the most difficult challenges defined in some NASA and DoD transportation needs. Therefore, the time boundaries of this roadmap extend from 2010 to 2030.

4.5.2.2 Differing Scopes of Stakeholder Technology Involvement

The many space industry participants are specialized in different areas, with those specialties determining the level of individual participation in the development of larger end-to-end capabilities. For the most part component producers and even integrators will maintain a focus that reinforces internal business cases that justify any involvement. Alternatively, Government stakeholders always remain focused on the end-to-end solution, i.e. the capability determined to solve the identified the gap or need. This is especially true within the DoD. The scope of the challenge to be overcome is always broadly bounded in a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) associated with a statement of need. A CONOPS has been drafted for SUSTAIN, but more are required for other capabilities. In order to capture the full scope of the broadest community of operational users the scope of technologies will be correspondingly broad, i.e. focused on end-to- end capabilities defined in the DoD needs.

4.5.2.3 Differing Stakeholder Detail Requirements

- 155 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

The level of required detail in planning for technology investment also differs from stakeholder to stakeholder. For example, the DoD operational community is often satisfied with a well defined capability statement that does not lead to any particular material solution, so long as the capability is realized. This is the spirit and intent of the JCIDS process, which favors the CONOPS over the material systems that might enable that CONOPS. Alternatively, industry requires great specificity in planning as they will serve as the actual developers of particular material solutions. For industry the envisioned engineering tasks must be concrete earlier than the purposefully nebulous early JCIDS documents permit. Therefore, the scope of the spectrum of technological detail in this roadmap is bounded by, and favors the greater granularity required by material developers, that is one of the primary beneficiaries of any space transportation roadmap.

4.5.2.4 Differing Scopes of Stakeholder Participation

As is evident in the needs discussions above, every stakeholder will have a time and capability- determined on-ramp for roadmap participation and a corresponding off-ramp. These participation decisions are based on the unique user and developer perspectives on the value of suborbital and orbital space transportation capabilities, based on organizational charter and expertise. The scope of roadmap participation is intentionally maximized. This permits the needs and potential solutions discussed in the previously documented RFI responses to be captured in a broadly bounded tradespace. Correspondingly, the threshold and objective space transport parameters defined herein reflect that broad tradespace.

- 156 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

[This page is intentionally left blank]

- 157 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

5. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

PHASE 2: DEVELOPMENT PHASE

5.1 Defining the Product that Focuses the Roadmap

The product defined herein is based on the stated requirement. A spiral development is the intended approach to fulfilling the requirement. During each successive spiral short of that objective goal stakeholder users of sub-orbital and orbital space transportation will have some immediate needs fulfilled with mature material solutions. These users will then be able to employ those technologies for their respective Government needs and industry markets while the spiral development continues concurrently. The SUSTAIN-focused RFI was intended to start the process by defining a realistically achievable product that serves as one off-ramp for such a spiral development.

. 5.1.1 The Influence of RFI Responses on Government Expectations

The responses from industry to the RFI, as well as the discussions at the technology conference that followed the RFI issuance, changed several of the Government‘s expectations on its own concepts of near and far-term space transportation capabilities. The RFI had been issued in a technological vacuum as per its intended purpose. Responses to it generated a new understanding of both the state of the art and the state of the possible for spiral development, with SUSTAIN capabilities constituting a mere niche market.

o 5.1.1.1 The Transport Altitude Regime

The RFI had defined the lower sub-orbital space altitude boundary as being an altitude above 50 miles, with an upper altitude being the maximum at which prior coordination with USSTRATCOM is not required. The U.S. has purposely never agreed to any specifically set boundary between terrestrial aerospace and space. Nevertheless, 50 miles was identified in the Marine Corps SUSTAIN need as it seemed a usable upper boundary for airspace. It is noteworthy that the RFI responses frequently indicated a need to attain space vehicle altitudes of 100 km (62.1 miles), i.e. the internationally accepted Kármán line, or above. There is a space tourism business case justifying that goal as passengers want to certify that they have been ―in space.‖ Since this roadmap is a consensus product for efficiency and focus, while the lower boundary remains 50 miles, 62.1 miles has been added as a ―desirable objective‖ altitude minimum for the sub-orbital aspect of SUSTAIN. This consensus altitude overlaps with, and therefore assists advocacy synergy regarding multi-purpose pop-up and P2P space tourism platforms.

o 5.1.1.2 The Term ―Rapidly‖

The RFI had defined the threshold understanding of rapidly to mean two hours or less of flight time, preceded by a launch preparation period, with the combined total of flight time and preparation time not to exceed four hours. This time constraint became a

- 158 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

topic of focused discussion at the technology conference that followed the issuance of the RFI. There was little dispute regarding the period of time it would take for an exoatmospheric vehicle to reach space and the velocities it could, and must achieve there for point-to-point transport, nor regarding the velocities terrestrial aerospace motherships must achieve. Two hours was considered within the state of the art for the launch and space transport segment. However, the planning time that preceded launch execution was debated. Flight planning including FAA aerospace coordination, USSTRATCOM space object deconfliction, fuels and payload preparation, personnel alert status, and friction associated with mission approval add unknown complexities. Even Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) crisis planning templates of six hours well exceed the RFI. The consensus reflected in the threshold product requirement eliminates any specific time constraint. It is agreed that exoatmospheric travel is by necessity fast, but at this early stage of capability development a DoD mission preparation time requirement does not lend itself to quantification. o 5.1.1.3 The Concept of a ―Militarily Relevant Payload‖

The RFI had defined the concept of a militarily useful payload as 200 kilograms. The Government had estimated that this mass constraint would encompass and thereby permit the terrestrial insertion of an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) or a Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) as a near-term minimum. However, 200 kilograms was well below the masses that the New Space industries had envisioned as their industry- internal thresholds for space transport systems. As a result of querying the formal RFI responses and as a result of the technology conference discussions, the figure of 1,000 kilograms emerged as a space tourism demonstration goal. However, a payload requirement of 200 kg remains the DoD threshold. Even for a manned pop-up ISR mission, 200 kg permits two operators to be vertically lofted. In this regard, the ability to man-rate the vehicle took on significance, even for threshold capabilities. Two personnel is a near term goal for some space tourism projects and two personnel would conceivably have operational value for a handful of military missions. Therefore, the consensus of the Roadmap Developmental Team is that some vehicles that become products of this roadmap should be at least capable of being human-rated in its earliest iterations for pop-up ISR and some SOF missions. In the final analysis the concepts of, and expectations for payload mass are interchangeable between DoD and all other National users, and therefore constitute a 100 percent overlap in developmental interest. o 5.1.1.4 The Target Destination

The RFI had defined the target destination of military interest to be any point within 5,000 nautical miles of the launch site as a threshold capability. The unintended implication was that no mission short of 5,000 miles would have any military utility, which is incorrect. The issues of range and utility were discussed at length at the technology conference. Industry has a business case for simple, local vertical ascent to space and a controlled landing at the point of launch, without any down-range capability. Furthermore, when industry does evolve to its first point-to-point missions

- 159 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

there will be a market for 2,000, 1,000, and even less than a thousand miles since spaceports will be distributed at such distances from one another across the U.S. So, at a minimum, a significant fraction of the roadmap development team has an interest in a vehicle down-range capability of fewer than 5,000 miles. Finally in the open conference discussion it became clear that the Government‘s threshold interest in a point-to-point capability was also less than 5,000 miles, perhaps as little as 1,000 miles at suborbital space altitudes, in other words to transit non-permissive sovereign airspace. The agreed threshold for an initial vehicle P2P capability is determined by the roadmap development team to be a 1,000 mile down-range capability, with at least 500 miles of those 1,000 occurring at an altitude above 50 miles. o 5.1.1.5 The Delivery Vehicle

The RFI had defined the conceptual space vehicle as needing to be recoverable and reusable, whether that vehicle is a single stage vehicle or the upper stage of a multi- stage vehicle. The issue of human-rating the vehicle was not noted in the RFI for two reasons. First, the Government expects that the initial iterations of USMC SUSTAIN or similar SOCOM SOF capabilities will involve a capability to insert unmanned UAV and UGV platforms, as well as autonomously deliver cargo, rather than assault support transport of small units in the near term. Secondly, human-rating any vehicle can become the cost and performance drivers on such systems. At the same time, in reviewing the RFI responses the importance of being able to man-rate a common vehicle in its earlier iterations became evident, as it is in manned space transport that tourism and other industries can make a business case. Therefore, with the objective of consensus, the threshold nearer term vehicle capability should have the capability of being human-rated, and this is reflected in the requirements noted earlier. o 5.1.1.6 Economies of Scale

Patrick Q. Collins has observed, and this roadmap concurs, that there exists the potential for a large demand for passenger space transportation services from a range of users. These include the military, commercial transport, Government and academic S&T, and a number of potentially profitable (and related) endeavors noted earlier in this roadmap. Satisfying these varied demands rooted in diverse markets would appear to offer the prospect of reaching sufficiently high traffic levels to achieve major economies of scale, reducing launch costs to LEO to perhaps as little as $300 per kilo, or some one percent of present costs. This has major implications for current plans in the U.S. and partner nations for the development of fully reusable launch vehicles which are necessary to provide commercial passenger launch services. Because of this, the development of fully re-usable launch vehicles represents a fundamental strategic technology, just as machine-tools, computers, automobiles, and internet access have been previously. Once identified, large-scale, long-term investment in space transportation technologies is justified due to the very long-term commercial returns that can be anticipated. It is noteworthy however that optimization of launch vehicle design for passenger market requirements will lead to more truly commercially profitable results, and economies

- 160 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

than would a narrow emphasis on military, satellite launch, and S&T requirements.

o 5.1.1.7 Objective Capability Definitions

The second section of the RFI sought to identify industry concepts that could lead to a future capacity of DoD and all other National stakeholders to rapidly transport a full spectrum of relevant capabilities through sub-orbital and/or orbital space to any point globally on short notice. Such concepts might constitute advanced phases of the spiral developmental effort described earlier. For the purposes of the present roadmap development, this second section can be said to have described an RFI notion of an objective requirement. As previously observed, in reviewing the RFI responses the importance of being able to man-rate a common vehicle, or common vehicles in their earlier iterations became evident in supporting the business cases for manned transport off-ramps of a National spiral development. Again, with the achievement of team consensus in mind, the objective capability explicitly calls out human-rating in long- term vehicle development. Also, the RFI responses expanded the realm of the possible for manned transport to beyond the 13 combat equipped personnel defined in the RFI.

5.2 Critical System Requirements and their Targets

. 5.2.1 The requirement collaboratively developed in the preceding sections has a useful purpose. The expertise, product offerings, development horizons, and incentives amongst the stakeholders was quite diverse, yet the SUSTAIN capability provided focus, and served to develop some consensus. SUSTAIN defined one specific game changing application of space transportation in sufficient detail that the benefits to and capabilities of all stakeholders could be visualized. If the Nation possessed multi-use vehicles that could routinely transport heavy payloads to LEO at no more than $300 per kilogram, execute controlled reentries, and be rapidly reconfigured for subsequent missions a range of capabilities considered very hard today would become economical.

. 5.2.2 Nevertheless, the SUSTAIN-originated requirement merely serves as a space transportation rallying point, a point of departure to begin considering the actual enabling technologies, infrastructure, policies, and legal foundations that will benefit all stakeholders. The break-out discussions at the NSSO and Air Force-sponsored technology conference set the stage for addressing the specifics, taking a rough stab at grouping technologies and expertise in a useful way for the roadmap. Again, those groupings were: 1) Vehicle Design, 2) Insertion and Extraction, 3) Human Factors-Related, 4) Spaceport, Ground, and Range Operations, and 5) Other Suborbital and Point-to-Point (P2P) Issues. The groupings may not represent ideal delineations, but they are at least a good starting point for proceeding with critical sub-system development and establishing timelines and maturity targets.

5.3 Major Technology Areas (MTA)

The next step in roadmapping is to marry-up the five space transportation technology and capability groupings with technology development doctrine. What follows is a detailed discussion of the space transportation Major Technology Areas (MTA), their associated Critical

- 161 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Technology Elements (CTE), and a brief Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) of each CTE. The CTEs and their projected timelines for maturation are displayed on corresponding graphic roadmaps presented later in this document.

. 5.3.1 Technology Readiness Level (TRL) - Definition

When considering the MTAs and their subordinate CTEs in the context of this document, one has in effect a ―roadmap of overlapping roadmaps,‖ each of which feeds into the material solution space that addresses a common and evolving space transportation capability. The MTAs for space transportation constitute overarching families of related CTEs, with each CTE having a separate roadmap. The dominant theme of the individual CTEs pertains to the common metric used to assess each, i.e. the DoD-defined TRLs depicted and defined in Figure 190 below. Generally, the assigned TRLs within this document represent a Technology Roadmap Development Team consensus. In those cases where a consensus was not reached the Government (i.e. the NSSO) served as the final arbiter. It is critical to note that TRLs are just one measure of the readiness of SUSTAIN to proceed. Integration Readiness Levels (IRL), system readiness; material, manufacturing, and process readiness; capability readiness; and software readiness will also need to be assessed. Like TRLs each has metrics, so the TRL is merely a representative of all.

. 5.3.2 Technology Readiness Levels – Graphic Depictions

Figure 197. TRL levels as defined in DoD 5000.2-R.

- 162 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 5.3.3 Space Transportation Technology Drivers and Their Targets

The San Antonio conference also addressed the technologies that will be necessary to enable the systems and architectures discussed throughout the roadmap. Employing the DoD- defined TRLs as a maturity measuring stick, this section identifies the space transportation technologies that stakeholders have determined must be ―driven‖ in order to achieve earliest demonstration and operationalization of those systems and architectures. As drivers their development must be accelerated with robust resourcing and an acceptance of increased risk of intermittent failures. Risk aversion must be overcome by developers in an effort to bridge the technological gap from theory, basic phenomenology, and applied research to the demonstration of novel space transport concepts quickly. The Apollo Program was particularly successful in this regard with many full-scale demonstrations being launched without the benefit of risk-reducing intermediate steps, for the sake of staying on a rigid schedule. This space transportation roadmap focus on key technology drivers and their targets permits the similar pursuit of ambitious, concrete developmental goals having earlier demonstrable utility.

. 5.3.4 Space Transportation Technology Drivers as TRL MTAs

In translating the information gleaned from non-proprietary industry sources, unclassified government sources, the RFI responses, and technology conference inputs a refined set of technology areas (MTAs) and elements (CTEs) are employed in this document. In the process, the five specialized topics that defined the space transportation technology conference break-out discussion groups and their summaries noted earlier have been morphed into new MTAs for the purpose of this roadmap. The topic areas of: 1) vehicle design, 2) insertion and extraction techniques, 3) ground and spaceport operations, 4) human factors, and 5) additional space orbital and P2P missions have been now come under four MTAs noted below. The maturation of the following space transportation technologies and subsystems was determined by Government and industry stakeholders to be crucial for an accelerated, multi-customer space transportation program to proceed. The technology drivers are categorized under MTAs and subcategorized as CTEs, in accordance with DoD 5000.2-R:

o 5.3.4.1 MTA I: Single Stage and Upper Stage Transport Vehicles:

. CTE: Element: Vertical Take Off and Vertical Landing . CTE: Vertical Take Off and Horizontal Landing . CTE: Horizontal Take Off and Horizontal Landing . CTE: Horizontal Take Off and Vertical Landing

o 5.3.4.2 MTA II: Launch and Booster Vehicles:

. CTE: Vertical Booster Stack Launch . CTE: Vertical Parallel Stage Launch (Shuttle derivatives) . CTE: Vertical Bimese Launch . CTE: Horizontal Mothership Launch

- 163 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. CTE: Horizontal Piggy-Back Launch . CTE: Horizontal Bimese Launch

o 5.3.4.3 MTA III: Space Transportation Technological Enablement:

. CTE: Materials . CTE: Rocket Propulsion . CTE: Air-Breathing Hypersonic Propulsion . CTE: Fuel . CTE: Electrical Power Generation and Storage . CTE: System Autonomy . CTE: Human-rating and Flight Safety . CTE: Spaceport, Ground, and Range Operations . CTE: Aerospace Situational Awareness . CTE: Ground Test Facilities

o 5.3.4.4 MTA IV: Manned Space Transport Insertion and Extraction:

. CTE: High Altitude Vehicle Exit . CTE: Ground Insertion . CTE: Extraction Via Insertion Vehicle . CTE: Extraction Via Other Vehicles . CTE: Tactical and Operational Alternatives to Vehicle Extraction

5.4 Technology Targets

Government and industry roadmap stakeholders share a consensus that the most significant measure of space transportation technology progress is a successful demonstration in a realistic, ―operational‖ environment. Therefore, it has been determined for the purpose of this roadmap that the uniform ―technology target‖ for all MTAs and CTEs is a technology readiness level (TRL) of ―7.‖ According to DoD 5000.2-R the achievement of TRL 7 enables a system prototype demonstration in an operational environment. With TRL 7 as the quantitative and qualitative objective for each of the technology drivers and their various alternatives, a timeline can be estimated for how those technologies will mature with respect to that objective. It is assumed that if a technology or system can be matured to the point of successful demonstration in an operational environment that given a proven production method and guaranteed resources economical mass production and customer satisfaction can soon follow.

5.5 Technology Alternatives

The technology alternatives are limited to what has already been discussed earlier. Given that this document is developed for public viewing and broadest advocacy, the material alternatives within it are necessarily limited. With the exception of broad category generalizations under MTAs and CTAs, they cannot go beyond the brief references to past the non-proprietary industry and unclassified Government initiatives that are noted throughout.

- 164 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

5.6 Graphic Space Transportation Technology Roadmap Depictions

What follows are the graphic depictions of the MTA and CTE roadmaps that represent one purpose of this public document. The graphic roadmaps represent a best guess at a stakeholder community consensus on what technologies, systems, and/or capabilities can be expected to achieve over time given different resource and partnership scenarios. In accordance with spiral development off-ramps, TRL 7 is the developmental objective of each for practical application.

. 5.6.1 Roadmap Legend

o 5.6.1.1 Again, these graphic roadmaps are the products of well-informed subjective guesswork. It lacks a formal modeling foundation, one that will be expected from an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), if an AoA is directed in support of a future Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). It is in this same subjective spirit that the roadmap TRL- 7 milestone achievement markers were designed. Within the roadmap legend below, diamond marker colors have the following meanings: 1) Blue Diamond - Government Development Effort Only; 2) Yellow Diamond - Industry Development Effort Only; 3) Green Diamond - Industry and Government Risk Sharing Partnership; and 4) Red Diamond - Advanced Global Competitors:

Figure 198. Legend markers show developer achievement of TRL-7 under various scenarios.

o 5.6.1.2 The CTE markers within each MTA are intended primarily to show expected maturation trends under different developmental circumstances. It should be noted that green (partnership) markers always precede blue (government) and yellow (industry) markers in time. This relates to the assumed value of risk-sharing partnerships as discussed above. Green similarly precedes instances where blue and yellow are coincident. The reason for this is that industry and Government could certainly achieve similar goals at the same time, and in isolation. At the same time green precedence restates the assumption that as a risk-sharing team they could reach the same objectives sooner, and certainly more efficiently from a resource expenditure perspective.

- 165 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 5.6.2 MTA I: Roadmaps

Figure 199. Roadmaps for the TRL-7 maturation of MTA I capabilities.

. 5.6.3 MTA II: Roadmaps

Figure 200. Roadmaps for the contingency-based TRL-7 maturation of MTA II capabilities.

- 166 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 5.6.4 MTA III: Roadmaps

Figure 201. Roadmaps for the TRL-7 maturation of MTA III capabilities.

. 5.6.5 MTA IV: Roadmaps

Figure 202. Roadmaps for the TRL-7 maturation of MTA IV capabilities.

- 167 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

5.7 Space Transportation Enabling Technology Investment Profiles

What follows are the graphic depictions of the MTA investments that represent another purpose of this public document. As with the graphic maturation roadmaps, the 20 year funding profiles that follow represent stakeholder community best guesses on what funding is required in addition to that already programmed in support of the MTAs. The following specifics should be considered when referring to the graphic funding profiles for the MTAs that follow:

. 5.7.1.1 The funding profiles are ―National‖ in nature, i.e. components of a fully integrated and Government-led national initiative. This means that an MTA funding profiled in an individual or the superimposed graph are conglomerates of all U.S. funding including national security space, commercial space, NASA, and other government space, working as a team. This assumes the best case of deeply interconnected partnerships and mutual leverage, and the Governments purchase of risk.

. 5.7.1.2 When correlating the funding profiles with the milestone expressed roadmap graphics this best case corresponds with the ―Green Diamonds‖ for each CTE and MTA, i.e. the ultimate objective of this roadmap. As before, TRL 7 is the objective for each. These ―Green Diamond‖ funding profiles represent a stakeholder agreement on U.S. National treasure optimally and most efficiently expended in support of multiple space transportation customers and markets.

. 5.7.1.3 The MTAs I, II, III, and IV are intended to be developed concurrently over the 20 year time span depicted in the bar graphs, namely from 2010 to 2030. For each MTA (and indeed every CTE beneath those MTAs) there is an accompanying proposed 5-phase development program, with gates for selective capability transitions, or cancellations, in accordance with a spiral development:

o 5.7.1.3.1 Phase 1: Concept Phase – Now through mid- FY2011.

o 5.7.1.3.2 Phase 2: Architecture and Studies - FY2011 through FY2012.

o 5.7.1.3.3 Phase 3: Business, Policy, Finance, and Procurement Phase - FY2012.

o 5.7.1.3.4 Phase 4: Development Phase – FY2013 through FY2016.

o 5.7.1.3.5 Phase 5: Test, Integration and Launch Phase – FY2017 through FY2019.

. 5.7.1.4 IOC for the first generation of a multi-use space transportation capability with SUSTAIN applicability would be in 2019. A similar phased process would be employed for the second generation of a multi-use development process between FY2020 and FY2028, with the IOC of the second generation occurring in 2028. What is achievable in each generation will be defined in architecture, trades and funding studies in Phase II of that respective generation. What can‘t be done or paid for in execution of the 1st generation defer to the second generation capability. As will be seen below, $130B is the projected

- 168 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

cost of the entire program through 2030, and this total assumes all RDT&E, procurement, and O&M costs.

. 5.7.1.5 Over-the-top extraction with a return rocket capability is anticipated for the second generation capability, one that was called for in the original SUSTAIN need and of guaranteed utility to all users and markets. Also, an upsized vehicle and booster is anticipated in the second generation based on a scalable design developed in the first generation. Clearly, the total payload must greatly increase in order to incorporate a return capability. The steep peak in 2015-2016 is the lead time in facilities, materials and subassemblies related to building a new booster and vehicle, including new processes and manufacturing technologies. As stated elsewhere in this roadmap, the scale of these proposed activities have not been experienced since the 1970s when the Space Shuttle Program was taking form. There may be some synergies with recent changes in NASA‘s direction that move it away from the Constellation program while bolstering the development of enabling technologies. Insuring that a major space transportation milestone occurs within this decade, whether it be commercial, NASA, or SUSTAIN-related, is an important psychological objective as well. The argument for such an accelerated path is buttressed by the essential nature of space transportation to the national security mission:

Figures 203-206. Investment roadmaps for U.S. MTA investments 2011-2030.

- 169 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 5.7.1.6 With 2011 being the baseline year, as noted above the total cost of a highly leveragable SUSTAIN spiral development over 20 years is approximately $130B, or an average of $6.5B above currently programmed funding. This would be considered cost- prohibitive if only one niche capability were fulfilled in the end product. In reality DoD needs would pale in comparison to the National benefits of a Government-led program. Also, considering that NASA‘s largely identical heavy lift and on-orbit infrastructure requirements during the same timeframe will overlap, and present a substantial savings in a fully integrated National program.

. 5.7.1.7 In this light is useful to compare the costs of past National space endeavors. According to NASA the final cost of the 13-year Apollo Program was approximately $145B in 2008 dollars. Similarly, by the time of its scheduled retirement the final cost of the 38- year Space Shuttle Program is projected to be $174B. Looking back many would agree that both of these great scientific and technological accomplishments represent National treasure well spent in ―times of plenty.‖ With few exceptions, they were overwhelmingly science and exploration projects with pure knowledge as ends and cost-effectiveness a secondary concern. Their lasting leveragable benefits for the Nation have been coincidental rather than deliberate, since from their respective outsets both Programs had a narrow set of ―users‖ in mind.

. 5.7.1.8, The effort described in this document will significantly benefit, just as Apollo did, from ground testing certain key concepts and technologies to achieve program cost savings and risk reduction. However, as a National initiative the entire modern aerospace industry will benefit from a robust Government investment in the risk reduction of more advanced technologies. For example, a robust and sustained Government investment in Ground Test Facilities, as noted under MTA III, would be particularly beneficial. It would be made available to Government and industry partners, and thereby help to equitably buy down the risk of all potential National developers and users.

- 170 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

Figure 207. Superimposed profiles of proposed U.S. MTA investments, 2011-2030.

. 5.7.1.9 Here, the value and cost of human-rated systems are worthy of discussion. The need for human-rated capabilities was an operational necessity for Shuttle and Apollo. However, given today‘s computational and robotic technology vectors human rating could be considered costly luxuries for many missions where passenger transport is not a specific objective. Machine autonomy has advanced to the point that exploration, pure knowledge, and even simple cargo transport can be accomplished without a human presence. UAV and commercial flight automation are rapidly advancing and such efficiencies will extend to space transport as well. It should be remembered that DoD seeks to globally insert military capabilities. Commercial users will certainly discover benefits in an unmanned global sub-orbital P2P capability as well. Yet, even if relegated to a future spiral, the necessity for human rating is considered an essential capability whenever the situational curiosity and psychological impact of ―boots on the ground‖ forces are critical for mission accomplishment. It goes without saying that passenger transport is the exact commercial equivalent.

- 171 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

6. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

PHASE 3: FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITY PHASE

6.1 General

The activities of this follow-on phase are intended to capture remaining considerations that must be taken into account as the roadmap is prosecuted. In this follow-up activity phase the authors have attempted to place space transportation capabilities and their enabling technologies into a broader context, namely their potential to offer the Nation intangible benefits that extend far beyond mere national security or profitable commercial activities. These broader considerations are confined to four ―contextual themes‖ that identify this additional value of a Government-led space transportation initiative. Once these intangible considerations are taken into account the tangible benefits can be recalculated and recommendations can be made with regard to overall investment levels in broader technology areas.

6.2 Five Overarching Themes

Over the course of building the roadmap five overarching contextual themes have emerged. The authors conclude that these themes can be summarized as American space leadership, laws impacting space transportation, space transportation and human survival, overlaps between the findings of this roadmap and the 2009 Augustine Commission Final Report, and national security space management and organization:

. 6.2.1 Beyond the Roadmap - America‘s Need to Preserve its Position of Space Leadership

o 6.2.1.1 It is difficult to quantify the objective value of this particular measure. Of what value is ―national stature?‖ It is after all an emotional state of individual and societal mind that cannot be translated directly into commercial profit, or degrees of national security. Yet, in the final analysis it does translate to those vital areas in the form of leadership. In fact today, national space stature and its preservation can safely be assumed to be the most important measure of the value of a highly leveragable National space transportation initiative.

o 6.2.1.2 Conversely, the consequences of America‘s failing to maintain a global leadership role in the exploitation of space, to include space transportation, are not future events – those consequences are being felt today. In a 19 Nov 2009 hearing before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, Marty Hauser of the Space Foundation and Dr. Scott Pace of George Washington University testified that the U.S. is rapidly losing its lead in space. Highlights from their testimony included:

. 6.2.1.2.1 Russia leads the world in space launches.

. 6.2.1.2.2 China has built a state-of-the art launch capabilities and facilities, and has become the third nation to send its own astronauts out for a spacewalk.

- 172 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 6.2.1.2.3 Sixty nations now have their own space agencies; thirteen nations have active space programs, and eight are capable of launching their own satellites into orbit.

. 6.2.1.2.4 In the last 10 years, the number of countries with communications and or navigation satellites or GPS-like capabilities in orbit has increased from 27 to 37. o 6.2.1.3 The 2009 Final Report of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Review Committee (a.k.a. Augustine Commission) expressed similar concerns. With respect to the U.S. indigenous human spaceflight gap and the pending end of the operational life of the International Space Station, the Committee found that:

. 6.2.1.3.1 ―Under current conditions, the gap in U.S. ability to launch astronauts into space will stretch to at least seven years. The Committee did not identify any credible approach employing new capabilities that could shorten the gap to less than six years. The only way to significantly close the gap is to extend the life of the Shuttle Program.‖

. 6.2.1.3.2 ―The return on investment to both the United States and our international partners would be significantly enhanced by an extension of the life of the ISS. A decision not to extend its operation would significantly impair U.S. ability to develop and lead future international spaceflight partnerships.‖

. 6.2.1.3.3 It is noteworthy that since the publication of the Augustine Commission Final Report a decision has been made by the President to extend the life of and participation of the U.S. in the ISS. Furthermore, though the Shuttle will fly out its remaining missions and be retired, the President has also announce the decision to invest heavily in space-related enabling technologies that will help insure the U.S. space leadership role into the future. Finally, the President has emphasized the critical centrality of the entrepreneurial private sector to maintaining America‘s space-faring character. These announcements present significant reinforcement for advocating a Government-led space transportation enabling technology development path, as defined in this roadmap. o 6.2.1.4 Space transportation capabilities in support of multiple Government and commercial customers and markets are not envisioned to be developed as manned capabilities in their initial iterations. The business case must first exist for an aggressive pursuit of human-rating space transportation technologies generally, or it would quickly become cost-prohibitive. However, over the longer term space transportation is certainly envisioned as being frequently manned, and that eventual quality has not only a practical value, but more importantly a nationally inspirational value. America‘s many manned space achievements including Apollo and Shuttle have come to define our technological greatness on the world stage. In spite of globalization and multi-polarity, Americans continue to desire to define ourselves as a civilization with a technological leadership role. The President‘s recent guidance to NASA confirms this National self-image. Clearly, this deliberate focus on enabling

- 173 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

technologies will serve to firm-up that international position, one that otherwise might be in jeopardy with respect to space. As a specific beneficiary of enabling technology thrusts, space transportation presents strategic opportunities to reinvigorate our Nation‘s position as a technological leader in space access for the 21st Century and beyond. Furthermore, the leveraged benefits of reinvigorating U.S. space and aerospace industry capacities and enhancing national security in-stride are predictable. This is based on impressive precedents set by the DoD and NASA in transitioning many technologies for the general benefit of society.

o 6.2.1.4 Manned and unmanned suborbital and orbital space transportation capabilities are more technically achievable today than ever before, and current technological vectors point to break-through improvements. In the spirit of the President‘s new direction for NASA, the New Space Industry, in partnership with Government appears to have an opportunity to assume the inspirational lead in America‘s resumption of global space leadership. A spiral development with proof-of-concept demonstrations and subsequent transition off-ramps, with risks shared by the Government, could serve to catalyze commercial sector development. For this to occur, suborbital and orbital space transportation requires a coordinated National program benefiting from the highest level of leadership, advocacy, and resourcing commensurate with its promise.

. 6.2.2 Beyond the Roadmap - Laws Relevant to Space Transport as Potential Issues

The competitive global context challenges the U.S. to move forward with a superior tempo in the rapid development and operationalization of space transportation systems to make space a routinely accessible domain for U.S. and partner nation government, science, and industry. At the same time the U.S. must remain a responsible member of a community of civilized nations, and abide by international law. In this regard, use of recognized terminology and definitions is important. For the purposes of legal analysis, the space transportation capabilities discussed throughout this document are best described as ―Hybrid Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs)‖. This is because they utilize both aviation and aerospace technology in order to traverse both airspace and space. This hybrid characteristic bridges the two domains, and in doing so, introduces unique issues pertaining to national and international law. In an effort to assist the roadmap development team in framing the broader legal issues, Wayne White, a space law expert employed by Oceaneering International, Oceaneering Space Systems division contributed the following discussion of legal restraints, and opportunities:

o 6.2.2.1 International Law

. 6.2.2.1.1 With respect to international law, the fundamental question is ―What law applies— air law or space law?‖ Surprisingly, neither air nor space law specifies the boundary between airspace and outer space. Some nations espouse a boundary at 100 kilometers, or 62.14 miles (the ―Karman Line‖). Other countries, including the U.S., say it is not necessary to define the boundary at this time.

. 6.2.2.1.2 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits territorial claims in outer

- 174 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

space, but Article VIII makes it clear that parties to the Treaty otherwise have full jurisdiction and control (authority) over national space objects and personnel. Pursuant to Article III, parties retain all of the rights accorded to sovereign nations under international law.

. 6.2.2.1.3 All vehicles that enter outer space necessarily pass through airspace when they are launched, and when they return to Earth. However, it is apparent from Article II of the Liability Convention that space law applies to space objects from the time they leave the Earth, until the time they return, including periods when they are traveling through airspace.

. 6.2.2.1.4 Although the UN space treaties are not specific on this point, the custom and practice of states indicates that space law applies to, among other things, objects that nations place in orbit. Consistent with the Registration Convention, nations that launch objects into orbit register those objects on the United Nations international registry of space objects. The Liability Convention specifies that ―The term ‗space object‘ includes . . . its launch vehicle and parts thereof‖, so space law also applies to launch vehicles that place an object in orbit, even if the vehicle does not complete a full orbit of the Earth. Compare sounding rockets, which reach an altitude well above the minimum altitude at which an object can maintain orbit, yet they do not orbit the Earth and generally remain in space for no more than 30 minutes. Nations do not register sounding rockets as space objects.

. 6.2.2.1.5 Another issue is whether some uses of Hybrid RLVs will violate international prohibitions of military space activities. A strict interpretation of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty would indicate that the only outright prohibition of military activity in the Outer Space Treaty is the prohibition against placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies. Article IV also prohibits, on celestial bodies, construction and operation of military bases, installations, and fortifications, and conduct of military maneuvers. However, the Treaty does not prohibit these activities in other areas of outer space, including without limitation, Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

. 6.2.2.1.6 The Outer Space Treaty specifically states that ―the use of military personnel to conduct scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.‖

. 6.2.2.1.7 The recent destruction of an orbiting satellite by an Earth-launched missile, and the resulting cloud of dangerous debris, makes it clear that national defense of space assets and personnel is both necessary and prudent. The Outer Space Treaty incorporates the UN Charter by reference, and Article 51 of the Charter codifies nations‘ right of self defense as a fundamental right under international law. Support for the conclusion that defensive military activities are permissible in outer space is the widespread use of surveillance satellites, including satellites to detect missile launches, which nations do not regard as a violation of international space law.

- 175 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 6.2.2.2 National Law

. 6.2.2.2.1 Federal Aviation Regulations specify the criteria that the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST) uses to differentiate civil aircraft subject to aircraft certification and operating standards for flight in airspace, from suborbital and orbital launch vehicles subject to licensing under the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended (CSLA). The CSLA defines a launch vehicle as ―a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket.‖ An FAA Notice published in the Federal Register at 68 FR 59977, on October 20, 2003 provides a great deal of further guidance: ―A vehicle that relies chiefly upon lift generated by its wings in maintaining its intended course during powered flight is an aircraft subject to regulation under the Federal Aviation Regulations. A rocket-propelled civil aircraft that relies upon wing-borne lift for the majority of its powered flight is not a suborbital rocket requiring a license for operation.‖ ―. . . a suborbital rocket subject to CSLA licensing is a rocket-propelled vehicle intended for flight on a suborbital trajectory, whose thrust is greater than its lift for the majority of the powered portion of its flight.‖

. 6.2.2.2.2 ―The FAA regards a suborbital trajectory as the intentional flight path of a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, or any portion thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous impact point (IIP) does not leave the surface of the Earth. The IIP of a launch vehicle is the projected impact point on Earth where the vehicle would land if its engines stop . . . The notion of a ‗vacuum‘ IIP reflects the absence of atmospheric effects in performing the IIP calculation. If the vacuum IIP never leaves the Earth‘s surface, the vehicle would not achieve Earth orbit and would therefore be on a suborbital trajectory.‖ AST would presumably consider a vehicle whose IIP leaves the surface of the Earth to be an orbital vehicle, which would require a CSLA license.

. 6.2.2.2.3 An issue not addressed by these regulations is the procedures that commercial suborbital Hybrid RLVs will follow with respect to Air Traffic Control and Space Situational Awareness/Space Traffic Control. Currently air traffic control systems monitor and control airspace to a maximum altitude of 60,000 feet. The only United States suborbital vehicles known to travel from one point on the Earth to another in the airspace between 60,000 feet and the air/space boundary have been aircraft flown by the military and other government agencies. Due to the fact that such high-altitude vehicles may increasingly have the hybrid capability of achieving orbit, it may be more appropriate to transfer monitoring and control of commercial suborbital traffic from air traffic control to space traffic control at 60,000 feet. This begs the question of which agency will operate commercial space traffic control. Such regulations are yet to be determined. o 6.2.2.3 Conclusions

- 176 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 6.2.2.3.1 Pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty, nations have full authority over their space objects and personnel in outer space, and all of the rights of a sovereign nation under international law, except that they cannot make territorial claims.

. 6.2.2.3.2 Hybrid RLVs that go into orbit are classified as ―space objects‖. International space law applies to space objects, and vehicles that place them in orbit, even while they are passing through airspace.

. 6.2.2.3.3 Hybrid RLVs on a suborbital trajectory are not subject to space law, even if they fly above the air/space boundary.

. 6.2.2.3.4 Hybrid RLVs can generally undertake military missions to LEO without violating international space law, so long as they do not place weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

. 6.2.2.3.5 If the creation of a Title 10 military space organization were ever eventually considered, it would likely not be barred by space treaty provisions. A military service with missions of science and exploration, protection and defense of national assets and personnel, and preservation of international peace and security, is permissible under existing international space law.

. 6.2.2.3.6 Commercial Hybrid RLVs that orbit the Earth, or which place objects in orbit, are regulated and licensed by the FAA/AST pursuant to the CSLA.

. 6.2.2.3.7 Commercial launch vehicles that fly suborbital trajectories are regulated and licensed by the FAA/AST.

. 6.2.2.3.8 The definition of suborbital launch vehicles in the CSLA and FAA regulations only includes rocket-powered vehicles; a much broader definition will be necessary to include methods of Hybrid RLV propulsion that do not qualify as ―rockets‖ (e.g. ramjets, scramjets, pulse detonation engines, electromagnetic launch, and beamed energy).

. 6.2.2.3.9 Further regulations will be required to govern commercial space traffic control in suborbital and orbital spaces.

. 6.2.3 Beyond the Roadmap - Environmental Threats to Human Terrestrial Survival

The survival of humanity can confidently be listed as a contextual concern, as mankind may be running out of time to mitigate the damage it has inflicted upon planet earth. It has been said that the major ecological and environmental protection initiatives begun in the 1960s were ahead of their time, and this contributed to a decline in urgency of the ecology movement in the late 20th Century. Indeed, a world population of 6 billion has been exceeded without catastrophic results. Nevertheless, in spite of 20th Century environmental efforts the dire ecological predictions of the past century are in the view of some being realized in this century:

- 177 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 6.2.3.1 In the view of some, from deforestation to severe ocean pollution to dwindling fresh water supplies, the earth has entered a period of environmental crisis. Beyond the terrestrial shell, aerospace pollution now extends to low earth orbit as an area of concern, with debris threatening the longevity of unmanned systems, and the safety and integrity of inhabited space platforms. The ability of the U.S., and indeed all conscientious peoples to be able to routinely and cost-effectively access space will be critical in enabling a reversal of those dire trends and return to a sustainable and steady state terrestrial balance to end the current crisis. High altitude atmospheric monitoring and sampling, orbital debris collection and deorbiting, rapid global eco-crisis reconnaissance and surveying, nuclear and/or biological hazardous materials accident containment, and numerous other modern scenarios will call for near instantaneous, global, and routine access to LEO.

o 6.2.3.2 Alternatively, in the case that the cascade of environmental consequences cannot be reversed on earth, humanity may have to develop alternatives elsewhere in the solar system beginning during the first half of the 21st Century. The space transportation vehicle and platform, architectures and designs developed for employment in suborbital terrestrial aerospace, LEO, HEO, and GEO will certainly be leveragable for the unmanned or manned exploration of Mars, other planet‘s, and their respective moons, including our own. Considering the exploration funding shortfalls identified by the Augustine Commission, a robust enabling technology initiative such as that announced by the President having space transportation as a foci would certainly mitigate some of those shortfalls, with respect to LEO access at a minimum. In fact applications could extend to many destinations possessing an atmosphere of sufficient density to enable some lift generation on an aerodynamic structure during entry and possibly even landing. At the very least, cost effective, routine access to earth orbit will permit the delivery of materials, supplies, and infrastructure needed for LEO to become the springboard to inner solar system destinations.

. 6.2.4 Beyond the Roadmap - The Relevance of the Augustine Report to this Roadmap

The U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Review Committee, referenced above, recently concluded a review of ongoing U.S. human space flight plans, programs, and alternatives. The Committee made recommendations related to optimizing a future trajectory for safe, innovative, affordable, and sustainable human space flights. The immediate programmatic foci of the Committee were NASA‘s way-ahead for the exploration of the Moon and Mars, the roles of the ISS and the soon-to-be-retired Space Shuttle in those endeavors, and the criticality of heavy lift to all exploration options. While the Committee charter had a different set of specific objectives than does this space transportation technology roadmap, both come to similar conclusions in several areas. What follows is an incomplete discussion of the commonalities between the Committee‘s findings and this roadmap, enough to demonstrate similarities of perspectives:

o 6.2.4.1 With respect to NASA‘s budget the Final Report of the Committee found that:

- 178 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

. 6.2.4.1.1 ―Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline, Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less constrained budget, increasing annual expenditures by approximately $3 billion in real purchasing power above the FY 2010 guidance.‖ Also, the Committee stressed that: ―NASA‘s budget should match its mission and goals. Further, NASA should be given the ability to shape its organization and infrastructure accordingly, while maintaining facilities deemed to be of national importance.‖

. 6.2.4.1.2 The dilemma of under-funding effects not only space exploration, but also national security space and the many potential civil and commercial markets noted throughout this roadmap. For overlapping plans that support human space flight in the realms of science and national security purposes, a greater sustained national commitment of resources will be required over a longer period. But it is in the market and mission overlaps that real savings will be discovered in efficiencies identified and duplications of expensive efforts avoided.

. 6.2.4.1.3 Interestingly, the recommended increases in the National funding of space transportation over the next 20 years are similar in magnitude to the $3 billion in real purchasing power above NASA‘s FY 2010 budget. While there does not exist a one-for-one overlap, there is a significant overlap in the heavy lift requirements for national security space, commercial space, and NASA‘s exploration objectives. Having identified the larger space transportation user needs community in this roadmap it is clear that a robust National investment in a heavy lift vehicle or family of vehicles as technology enablers for many customers and markets will serve a much larger community than that addressed by the Augustine Commission. A larger community means a larger number of flights, and as per the roadmap requirement this will drive down the cost per kilo to LEO sooner. o 6.2.4.2 With respect to international partnerships the Final Report of the Committee found that: ―The U.S. can lead a bold new international effort in the human exploration of space. If international partners are actively engaged, including on the critical path to success, there could be substantial benefits to foreign relations and more overall resources could become available to the human spaceflight program…the ISS, and particularly its utilization, may be at risk after Shuttle retirement…the return on investment from the ISS to both the United States and the international partners would be significantly enhanced by an extension of its life to 2020. It seems unwise to de- orbit the Station after 25 years of planning and assembly and only five years of operational life. A decision not to extend its operation would significantly impair the U.S. ability to develop and lead future international spaceflight partnerships.‖ In the his reaffirmation of support for highly leveraged NASA way-ahead, the President acknowledged that the knowledge gained from the ISS is critical to understanding the effects on humans who would under this roadmap inhabit spacecraft, stations, and depot facilities in LEO for prolonged periods. The prolonged life of and U.S. commitment to the ISS will greatly enhance the execution of this roadmap.

- 179 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 6.2.4.3 With respect to heavy lift the Final Report of the Committee found that: ―A heavy-lift launch capability to low-Earth orbit, combined with the ability to inject heavy payloads away from the Earth, is beneficial to exploration. It will also be useful to the national security space and scientific communities.‖ All heavy lift enabling technology development activities, especially those that are Shuttle-derived following the Shuttle‘s retirement, will be 100 percent leveragable in support of space transportation generally.

o 6.2.4.4 With respect to U.S. manned access to space the Final Report of the Committee found that: ―The United States needs a means of launching astronauts to low-Earth orbit, but it does not necessarily have to be provided by the government. As we move from the complex, reusable Shuttle back to a simpler, smaller capsule, it is appropriate to consider turning this transport service over to the commercial sector…potentially accelerates the availability of U.S. access to low-Earth orbit by about a year, to 2016. If this option is chosen, the Committee suggests establishing a new competition for this service, in which both large and small companies could participate.‖ This perspective on the roll of industry as a partner with the Government on manned access to space is in complete harmony with the President‘s guidance on the space program. It also matches the philosophy and objectives of this roadmap.

o 6.2.4.5 With respect to employing commercial options to launch crews to low-Earth orbit the Final Report of the Committee found that: ―Commercial services to deliver crew to low-Earth orbit are within reach. While this presents some risk, it could provide an earlier capability at lower initial and life-cycle costs than government could achieve. A new competition with adequate incentives to perform this service should be open to all U.S. aerospace companies‖ Again, this perspective is in harmony with the President‘s guidance on the space program, especially if Government buying of some of the industry‘s developmental risk is one of the incentives offered.

o 6.2.4.6 With respect to technology development the Final Report of the Committee found that: ―Technology development for exploration and commercial space: Investment in a well-designed and adequately funded space technology program is critical to enable progress in exploration. Exploration strategies can proceed more readily and economically if the requisite technology has been developed in advance. This investment will also benefit robotic exploration, the U.S. commercial space industry, the academic community and other U.S. government users.‖ This emphasis by the Committee is completely consistent with the President‘s new direction on enabling technology development. Furthermore, the Administration recently announced the: ―Educate to Innovate Campaign.‖ Enabling technology development and the educated cadre needed for space-related technologies are complementary opportunities.

. 6.2.5 Beyond the Roadmap – The Potential Need for a Military Space Service

The suggestion that a military space Service may be a timely DoD transformation is not new. Furthermore, the need for such an improvement to the National Security and Goldwater Nichols Acts is far from consensus. Many in the National Security community have and continue to present arguments for the preservation of the National Security Space

- 180 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

status quo. These advocates contend that the U.S. maintains an asymmetric advantage over all adversaries in military space today because of the current National organization and assigned missions. However, there are others in the space capabilities stakeholder community that take a different position. For the sake of faithful representation of all stakeholders in this roadmap, the following discussion is included:

o 6.2.5.1 The Commission to Assess National Security Space (NSS) Management and Organization suggested that NSS leadership and advocacy be assigned to an existing Title 10 Service in the form of an Executive Agent (EA) for NSS. This was to serve as an initial step towards greater NSS unity of effort, leadership, and space advocacy. However, it was the view of some participants in this study that the chronic difficulty for a single Service to simultaneously advocate and fund two environmentally disparate domains, and programmatically competing sets of technologies and responsibilities is today well documented. If the DOTMLPF material responsibilities for Joint Force space transport capabilities are assigned to any Service with competing terrestrial interests the capability could languish and not be ready when the nation needs it.

o 6.2.5.2 Threat and opportunity needs-based NSS budget requirements will exert increasing pressure on any Service assigned EA responsibilities for NSS. All Services act on an obligation to assign top priority to traditional roles and missions. NSS resource needs like SUSTAIN would represent a conflict for any EA decision maker. Clearly, the EA alternative should be seen as a temporary fix only until a permanent solution can be found for space leadership and advocacy, and the assumption of a greater role in NSS decision making by OSD is a sign that it is temporary.

o 6.2.5.3 The fault of competing internal roles and missions lies in a National Security Act and in Title 10 authorizations that may be out-of-date. Considering the dilemma, a next step in NSS organization and management may be in order, namely the establishment of a separate, Title 10 empowered Space Service or Corps focused only on NSS warfighting capabilities.

o 6.2.5.4 Two objections to a separate Title 10 Space Service have prevailed to-date. One states that space is merely an ―information medium;‖ with space warfighting restricted by past UN treaties such as a ban on orbital nuclear weapons and continuing pressure to ban all weapons in space. The other is that there exists no identifiable martial mission for a U.S. Space Service comparable to the employment of weapons from manned and unmanned platforms in other warfighting domains. Both objections run counter to current global threats, as well as the emergence of Joint Force opportunity-based needs such as SUSTAIN and SOFSEC. With the world-wide proliferation of WMD and an increasing ease of foreign access, space has indeed evolved to a warfighting domain. The threat comes not only from peer and near-peer competitors, but especially from morally unconstrained state and non-state adversaries equipped with money to purchase a commercial launch, and a determination to use space as a medium for covert weapons storage and surprise delivery.

- 181 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 6.2.5.5 Space is an exposed U.S. flank, and an immediate Service martial mission exists for its defense. Offensive and defensive U.S. Space Service missions relating to space system protection, space negation, global strike, missile defense, transport, assault support, and other capabilities must follow now to avert surprises later.

o 6.2.5.6 The key proto-Space Service organizations and personnel positions are already in existence, and could largely fulfill the initial Service resource needs. For example, the Air Force Professional Space Community could immediately form the core of a new Space Service. This core could be augmented with members of the civilian and military space cadres of the other Services by means of permanent inter-service transfers. The AF Space and Missile Systems Center could be absorbed as the Space Service acquisition arm. The National Reconnaissance Office could likewise be absorbed as-is, along with its specialized functions and personnel mix. The precise organization of the Service organization and the intersection with the Intelligence Community (IC) can be negotiated and refined. However, the endstate must include from the outset that the Service is Title 10-empowered at a minimum, and that it has full/coequal Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Requirements Oversight Council membership.

o 6.2.5.7 As noted earlier, the Marine Corps and SOCOM have validated space- dependent needs to overcome the constraints of thick air travel and non-permissive airspace for responsive expeditionary transport and insertion. They recognize that some Joint Forces will require heretofore-unimaginable unmanned and manned assault support speed, range, and altitude in order to achieve strategic surprise in the future. This need alone could spur an evolution of Service roles and missions so that they reflect the impact of emerging NSS technological opportunities for both friend and foe.

o 6.2.5.8 Strategic surprise enabled by an adversary‘s use of the space medium could cause damage to our national security from which we cannot readily recover. A potentially non-attributable High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) attack from a concealed on-orbit WMD is one example. Likewise, opportunities for USMC or other Joint Forces to employ space transportation capabilities to intervene early when fleeting terrestrial threats and high value targets appear will be lost because such capabilities will not be ready when the nation needs them. The establishment of a Space Service or Corps now will prepare the nation to exploit our adversary‘s 21st Century vulnerabilities while shoring up our own open and vulnerable National flank.

6.3 Recommended Technology Thrusts

The technology thrust recommendations within this roadmap framework are deliberately general in nature. This is because the bounding requirements call for an entire family of space transportation capabilities that employs a mixed variety of complimentary technical approaches. However, the MTAs and CTEs detailed earlier along conditionally-based maturation timelines provide sufficient granularity in themselves to double as technology thrust investment recommendations. The recommendations contained in this report are dedicated to suggesting a National direction for a successful accelerated space transportation enabling technology development program that can employ SUSTAIN and relevant SOCOM needs as catalysts.

- 182 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

[This page is intentionally left blank]

- 183 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

7. SPACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP:

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

. 7.1.1 During the period that this roadmap was developed significant progress towards the routine use of space for commercial space transport has been made concurrently. The best example of this concurrent progress is the Virgin Gallactic SpaceShipTwo (SS2), mentioned earlier in the roadmap and now undergoing testing in California:

o 7.1.1.1 On 7 December, 2009 AOPA Online reported that Virgin Gallactic unveiled SS2 in Mojave, CA. SS2 is the sequel to Virgin Galactic‘s SpaceShipTwo (SS1), which completed the world‘s first manned private space flights in 2004. The spacecraft was unveiled with its mother ship, WhiteKnightTwo (WK2) which is the largest all-composite aircraft ever built. WK2 will carry the spaceship to above 50,000 feet powered by four Pratt & Whitney PW308A engines. There, SS2 will detach and fire its hybrid rocket motor and launch into space. Like its SS1 predecessor, SS2 is designed by Burt Rutan and features carbon composite construction, though it is about twice the size of SS1 and is designed to carry six passengers and two pilots. Virgin Galactic founder Sir Richard Branson stated in a press release: ―The unveiling of SS2…continues to provide tangible evidence that this ambitious project is not only moving rapidly, but also making tremendous progress towards our goal of safe commercial operation.‖

Figure 208. The SS2 at its Mojave, CA sundown unveiling (Photo by Jack Brockway).

- 184 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

o 7.1.1.2 On 23 March, 2010 Guy Norris of Aviation Week reported that Scaled Composites had begun captive-carry flight testing of the SS2 beneath the wing of the WK2 launch aircraft at Mojave, CA. Following a series of short ground tests under the wing of WK2, the 23 March 2010 flight marked the start of testing that will culminate in a series of glide tests to be conducted from various release altitudes. The test format will build on the procedure adopted for flight testing SS1, and include far more evaluations to meet general aviation-level safety standards.

Figure 209. The SS2 in captive flight testing beneath the WK2 over the Mojave Desert.

o 7.1.1.3 The relative lack of Government and industry coordination in the development of SS2 and other current commercial space transportation and tourism initiatives today serves to illustrate why an integrated partnership is beneficial. For example, the current generation of private space planes might be able to fill a limited range suborbital P2P mission. However, global reach, much less access to LEO, are for the time being out of reach for SS2-like craft short of significant technology maturation. In a Popular Mechanics article, Burt Rutan, the founder of Scaled Composites, noted that SS1 and SS2 were not designed to travel at the Mach 25 velocity needed to get to orbit. Also, commercial spaceplanes designed with space tourism in mind are not designed to withstand the thermal loads of re-entry from LEO. Rutan emphasized that ambitious national security related goals of attaining and returning from LEO will require a new design. The point made here is not that such designs are infeasible – they are well within the state of the art, but that without stating and funding the requirements for dual and multi-purpose / multi-customer market systems, designs will be limited to the commercial business case. In the case of SS2 the business case supports the space tourism market, and perhaps a missed opportunity for Government participation.

. 7.1.2 NSS applications for the rapidly evolving technologies of New Space entrepreneurs are inevitable, if not first in the U.S. then elsewhere. Government and other space transportation stakeholders possess a justification for advocating reinvigorated U.S. leadership in space transportation. In this effort, the roadmap seeks to identify all known suborbital and orbital space transportation needs of U.S. Government and industry, and to integrate the associated

- 185 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

technology thrusts of both user and developer communities. Further, it imparts the necessity for deliberate technology planning and its criticality for the efficient realization of new innovative orbital and suborbital space-enabled transportation capabilities that are common to all stakeholders. As noted in the beginning, the current competition for ever-scarcer resources defines a challenge that only meticulous and cooperative technology planning can overcome in the nearer term. This technology roadmap framework is the first step to justifying the expenditure of public and private resources on new space endeavors that will yield measurable return for commerce, national security, and ultimately our optimistic and future-focused American society.

. 7.1.3 Equipped with this roadmap framework stakeholders can present their respective decision makers in DoD, industry, NASA, Government, and Congress with a credible case for a new National space transportation initiative. What would appear to make the case strong is the fact that it is founded on at least one ―essential‖ national security needs of Joint interest. The roadmap can provide those decision makers a concrete idea of what can be developed and fielded to satisfy various markets, and an initial cost estimate. Perhaps most importantly, the roadmap catalogues the growing multitude of users that a coordinated technology effort can satisfy.

. 7.1.4 As a new National initiative like Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the other American examples that proceeded, new space transportation systems will have significant ancillary benefits for the nation as a whole. In contrast with the NASA-sponsored examples stated above, this initiative while including NASA, has exploration and pure knowledge as a secondary benefit and national security and commerce as its primary concerns. It will also serve to mobilize the National Labs, DARPA, the Service Labs, and all major aerospace companies in a fashion that has not been experienced since the 1960s and 1970s.

. 7.1.5 This time transitions will be assured through up-front Government and industry risk- sharing, coordination, and in-stride developmental integration. Transitions will be mere off- ramps of a spiral development that continues unabated. For example, if an intercontinental or global heavy lift space plane is developed for a military customer a commercial spin-off would not be an afterthought. Rather, immediate-concurrent commercialization of that multi-purpose platform will be a deliberate intention, and planned into the program with industry participating as a full partner. By these means, when a manned DoD space transportation capability is operational, a demilitarized version of the same platform could be operated by industry for hypersonic global executive transport, a leap-ahead and profitable follow-on to the Concorde. Models of dual-use aerospace platforms are abundant, including the Boeing 707, 767, and countless other aircraft platforms.

. 7.1.6 As for the New Space industries, they are seeking to prove themselves, and this can only be done by demonstrating success in the realm of their bold and imaginative innovations. What better area to demonstrate a leap-ahead capability than in fulfillment of essential national security space missions alongside their commercial ventures. Industry success, in partnership with Government, in the area of space transportation could prove to be ―disruptive‖ on the global stage, and to the asymmetric advantage of the U.S.

7.2 Conclusions

- 186 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

The roadmap stakeholders conclude that a particular set of articulated space transportation requirements represents the most useful advance for the benefit of all. If an integrated and coordinated Government- led initiative is bounded by those requirements in a spiral development, it would fulfill the greatest number of stakeholder needs in the near, mid, and long term. The user and development stakeholder community concludes that the following product requirements serve as starting points for a user-based, spiral National program, with SUSTAIN serving as one compelling national security need:

. Space transportation vehicles capable of transporting cargo of up to 30,000 pounds internally sub-orbitally. In the near term internal payload capacities of 500 pounds are operationally useful for both Government and industry.

. Sub-orbital vehicles capable of achieving an altitude of at least 50 miles, and optimally 62.5 miles for the purpose of pop-up and limited point-to-point (P2P) missions in the near-term, and global access in later spirals. In the near term P2P missions limited to as little as 1,000 miles (500 in space) are operationally useful for some DoD missions.

. A family of space transportation vehicles capable of transporting cargo of up to 15,000 pounds internally to LEO.

. Space transportation vehicles that enable a launch cost of no more than $300 per kilogram to LEO from between the 25th and 50th Parallels, once the launch frequency is sufficient high to achieve economy of scale.

. Space transportation vehicles that are capable of being human-rated, with a desired objective that they are in fact human-rated in future spirals.

. Launch preparedness that allows mission-tailored vehicles to be launched on the order of hours following a decision to execute, with two hours as the objective.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that are capable of returning to the terrestrial surface in a controlled reentry with reduced acoustic, optical, and radio frequency (RF) signatures.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that are of low-cost, highly reliable, and responsive.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms that in the near-term make use of mature expendable launch and upper stage technologies, and have as a spiral development objective fully reusable launch and upper stage systems.

. A family of space transportation capabilities that employ variety of complimentary technical approaches. These include, vertical and horizontal launch (towed, piggy-back, Bimese), vertical and horizontal landing, ground/sea/air launch, orbital and suborbital space injection, and modular platform reconfiguration. This need is based on the shared perspective that no single technical option will enable the fulfillment of all space transportation user needs.

. Space transportation vehicle platforms having the ability to modify flight plans mid-mission, whether they are pop-up, short-range P2P, global P2P, or LEO missions.

- 187 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

7.3 Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions, the U.S. Government and industry Technology Roadmap stakeholders make four recommendations:

. Recommendation #1: The U.S. Government should support and encourage development of a National suborbital and orbital space transportation initiative, including an associated roadmap, with NASA supporting the risk-mitigation in all new human-rated initiatives.

. Recommendation #2: The U.S. Government should absorb a major portion of the technical risk for suborbital and orbital space transportation capability development.

. Recommendation #3: The U.S. Government should create a policy, strategy, regulatory, legal, and ITAR environment for the more effective development and execution of space transportation.

. Recommendation #4: The U.S. Government should incentivize space transportation development by becoming an early demonstrator, adopter, and customer of mature unmanned and manned space transportation capability off-ramps.

- 188 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

[This page is intentionally left blank]

- 189 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 190 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 191 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 192 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 193 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 194 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 195 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 196 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 197 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM WWW.NASAWATCH.COM

- 198 - WWW.NASAWATCH.COM