State Homophobia in Indonesia Securitization of LGBT People in Indonesia 2000-2016

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State Homophobia in Indonesia Securitization of LGBT People in Indonesia 2000-2016 State Homophobia in Indonesia Securitization of LGBT People in Indonesia 2000-2016 Bella de Lange S2019566 [email protected] MA Thesis International Relations December 24, 2019 Supervisor: Rizal Shidiq Abstract This thesis aims to answer the question of why the Indonesian state has increasingly securitized LGBT people in Indonesia from 2000 to 2016, by focusing on two factors: public homophobia and state homophobia. Data on public attitudes toward the LGBT community in Indonesia will be drawn from various surveys conducted after 2000s. These surveys measure attitudes on existing heteronormative ideals in Indonesian society and capture the conservative turn starting from 1998 during the post- democratic transition period. The increasing threat of homosexuality as propagated by the Indonesian state will be historically and systematically analyzed through a number of statements made by political elites. Strong evidence is found on public and state homophobia increasing in Indonesia and this materializing politically and legally. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review 3 2.1 State Homophobia 3 2.2 Securitization 6 2.3 Public Opinion and Political Tolerance 8 3. Research Method 10 4. Empirical Findings 12 4.1 The Rise of Indonesian State Homophobia since 2000 12 4.1.1 Historical Context 12 4.1.2 Democratic Indonesia 12 4.2 Voters’ Preference in Democratic Indonesia 19 4.3 The State Securitizing LGBT Indonesians 29 5. Conclusion 37 Bibliography 39 1. Introduction “LGBT must be banned, like we banned communism and drug trafficking.” This statement, made by Berliana Kartakusumah, Secretary-General of the People’s Conscience Party in Indonesia, explicitly aligns the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) movement in the same category as a dangerous political ideology (Singgih 2016). Kartakusumah’s remarks reflect the view that the LGBT community represents a social and political threat to the state, one which it feels it needs to securitize. This came amongst a chain of political statements in 2016, an exceptionally troublesome year for the LGBT community in Indonesia, when many attempts to hold conferences, meetings, informal gatherings and cultural events were attacked by extremist vigilantes and conservative Islamic groups (Kwok 2016). Since then, many public officials have expressed increasingly negative attitudes toward LGBT people. This is part of a wider trend of political homophobia which emerged in 2016 and, as evidence shows, has been accelerating steadily since (Boellstorff 2004; Lamb 2017a). To investigate this further, this thesis focuses on answering the following research question: Why has Indonesia increasingly securitized LGBT people in Indonesia in 2000-2016? This timescale reflects a critical period in Indonesia’s democratic transition, which first emerged two years prior in 1998 (Liddle 2002). According to media sources, within this timeframe, Indonesia also bore witness to the most hostile environment the LGBT community has ever had to face (Oetomo 2001; Boellstorff 2004; Firdaus 2018). The analytical framework employed to answer the research question above is structured around the theme of voters’ preference and the state securitization, based on the hypothesis that increasing homophobia in Indonesia is a result of changes in public opinion and rhetoric employed by official state organs. To gauge public opinion, voter preference in a number of public votes will be analysed in relation to the relevant issues being voted upon. The results of these votes are found in the public opinion polls. The extent to which rising homophobia is a direct result of state securitization policy toward the LGBT community will also be analysed, a process by which the state (that consists of democratically elected officials) perceive LGBT as a national threat that needs to be controlled by political measures, or an “extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). This is distinct from public opinion as it focuses purely on the realm of public policy, where up until this time had not been a matter of public policy. To analyse public policy, the security framework established by the state to limit LGBT rights and same-sex legalization will be outlined and evaluated, evincing the extent to which it is perceived to be a national and political threat to Indonesia’s culture and identity. 1 Data sources used in this research comprise surveys conducted by The Indonesian Survey Circle, The Pew Research Center and Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting. Statements made by Indonesian political elites in response to the topic of LGBT rights and same-sex legalization will also be examined. Finally, key contextual information will be drawn from secondary sources, such as academic papers and news articles related to the topic at hand. It will be shown from the analysis of voter behavior that the majority of the Indonesian public do not tolerate LGBT in the state, especially when someone from the LGBT community holds a political position. The public’s negative attitude towards the LGBT community seems to be increasing in parallel with increasing public awareness of its presence (Hidayana 2018; see Figure 4 & 5). Furthermore, since 2016, the Indonesian state has increasingly securitized LGBT people in public statements (Knight 2016). These statements, made by Indonesia’s political elite, have effectively snowballed, as influential politicians made statements causing more politicians to come out with similar views on homosexuality and same-sex legalization (ibid). A number of statements have established a discourse of securitization, declaring LGBT people as a threat to the nation, culture and children in Indonesian society (ibid). This research contributes to the existing literature on discourses of securitization toward minorities in society, as well as how public opinion shapes or is shaped by these discourses, looking specifically at how certain minorities are framed as a threat in the rhetoric of public political statements. The research also seeks to reinforce the significance of language (through speech) in political discourse and its relation to culture and norms. The following chapter is a literature that provides an overview of conceptual discussions on state homophobia, public opinion and tolerance, and state securitization. The existing literature on emerging and rising state homophobia will also be identified and evaluated for its relevance to the topic at hand. This serves as the foundation of the analytical framework employed in this research. This will come to light in the following chapter on methodology, where a data collection strategy will be outlined to identify state homophobia and changes in voter preferences and the perception of threat perceptions. The empirical analysis and findings are presented in Chapter 4, starting with a detailed background of increasing state homophobia in Indonesia since 2000, followed by analysis on voters’ preference and state securitizing LGBT people in the country. A conclusion is provided in Chapter 5. 2 2. Literature Review This section discusses the definition of state homophobia and the ideology of the political elite when making homophobic public statements. Furthermore, I explore two factors related to rising homophobia in Indonesia, the role of public opinion and its relation to political output and the theory on securitization. 2.1 State Homophobia Homophobia can be understood through the lens of psychoanalysis, referring to the emotions and thought processes of the individual (Adam 1998). However, scholars also argue how homophobia is a political and social phenomenon that is reproduced structurally (Plummer 1981; Kitzinger 1987 in Adam 1998). Bosia and Weiss (2013) conducted global as well as local research on the phenomenon of political homophobia, finding that states use homophobia as a strategy for political purposes through policies, laws and overall political strategies that may not be documented in a state law or policy (Bosia 2013: 31). Most scholars adopt similar definitions to state homophobia in analyzing their own cases. Adam (1998) theorizes homophobia at the discourse level is an important instrument through which heterosexism and heteronormativity are achieved and sustained. Similarly, Bosia (2014) defines state homophobia as “the set of practices and rhetorics about homosexuality used by social actors to defend, to solidify, or to contest state authority” (261). This may occur as a response to a critical phenomenon in society, as interpreted by the state (ibid). In other words, if there are elements in society that are perceived as a threat to the state, the state will take action. The emergence or increase of state homophobia is a phenomenon recognized globally. Some states have strengthened policies to enforce their heteronormative ideals or repress sexual minorities (Maietta 2019; Bosia 2013). Maietta (2019) and Bosia (2013) describe and analyse the purposes of state homophobia and thus, why it emerges. Specifically, Bosia (2013) discusses the reasons in his article “why states act?”; the first is to “re-establish authority” (32) in circumstances where national sovereignty is threatened within the international domain, second, political homophobia may be used strategically to declare state sovereignty in crises that threaten a state’s survival. Finally, Bosia considers state capacity building as a purpose of state homophobia. All mentioned purposes of state homophobia are described as occurring in “periods of instability”
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