CREATIVE APPROACHES to MANAGING CONFLICT in AFRICA Findings from USIP-Funded Projects

CREATIVE APPROACHES TO MANAGING CONFLICT IN AFRICA Findings from USIP-Funded Projects

Edited by David R. Smock

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONTENTS

Summary v

1 Innovative Diplomatic Initiatives 1

2 NGOs Engaged in Preventive Action 5

3 Democratic Reform and Reform of African Militaries 8

4 Training for Peacemaking 14

5 Building on Locally-Based and Traditional Peace Processes 16

6 Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention 22

7 Culture of Peace 25

Notes 27

About the Grantees 28

About the Editor 29

About the Institute 31 v

chaos and tragedy that warring African countries are not the norm. Nor will the existing wars last forever. Many wars have ended, and even in countries where tension and violence still prevail there are impressive examples of efforts to manage conflict. This publication identifies some programs, projects, and interventions that have succeeded, and indicates the wide applicability of some. Lessons are SUMMARY drawn from each case about how either to replicate successes or turn past failures into future success. Case material is drawn from many parts of the African continent—from Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Uganda, Zaire, Mali, Benin, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The cases cited are not isolated anecdotes, but provide empirical findings linked to broader theories of peacemaking.

- Innovative American Diplomatic Initiatives Her- man Cohen asserts that the United States has a special image in Africa and in turn a unique role to play in peacemaking and peacebuilding there. To he purpose of this essay is to share some play this role effectively, the State Department’s lessons of projects which have identified or im- Africa Bureau needs to make full use of U.S. em- Tplemented innovative approaches to managing bassies in key African countries; give American Africa’s conflicts, and examine their potential applica- ambassadors in the field maximum leeway; coopt bility to other conflicts there or elsewhere. All the pro- the U.S. national security community in its efforts; jects described in this Peaceworks have been start early; and bring multilateral agencies into the supported by grants from the U.S. Institute of Peace. process at an early stage. Each of the directors of these Institute-assisted projects was asked to distill project lessons regarding - African Mediation Gilbert Khadiagala points out peacemaking in Africa with applicability beyond the that the greatest strength of African mediators lies specific cases dealt with in their projects. Their state- in their proximity to the disputes and their under- ments were then edited and adapted for inclusion in standing of historical context. But neighborly in- Peaceworks. terest does not necessarily translate into capacity for effective mediation. African mediators often do INNOVATIVE APPROACHES not have the necessary information available to them to be effective. The use of heads of state as The need for innovative approaches to managing con- mediators is usually constrained by their inability flict in Africa is immediately evident from daily head- to devote the extended time that intensive and lines about war and killings in such countries as prolonged mediation requires. Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Zaire, and Somalia, and growing tensions in others such as Nigeria. - NGOs Engaged in Preventive Action Barnett In assessing the state of war and peace in Africa one Rubin describes the effect of the Burundi Policy must, however, balance the daily tragedies in these Forum in assisting NGOs to form innovative part- countries with the impressive achievements of peace nerships with governments and multilaterals that and increasing normalcy in others like South Africa, are trying to limit further violence in Burundi. Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Eritrea, and Zim- Elizabeth Cabot and Sir John Thomson report babwe. The fact that there are remarkable stories of on a collaborative project between the Minority successful peacemaking in many African countries Rights Group and the United Nations in planning helps to remind the predictors of continent-wide a strategy for the UN and other external powers to vi

help reverse the process of state and societal col- the importance of local peace initiatives in the lapse in Zaire. Their principal recommendation is Horn countries which use the traditional peace- that priority be given to the stimulation of civil so- making roles of elders and rely on traditional ciety in Zaire from the grassroots upward. The peacemaking methods. Wal Duany describes a role of external actors should be limited to that very significant peace process in 1993, built on of catalyst, offering information and modest traditional practices, organized to manage intra- financial support. ethnic conflict among the Nuer of southern Su- dan after 1,300 people had been killed. Maxwell - Democratic Reform and Reform of African Mili- Owusu describes the critical peacemaking roles taries Julius Ihonvbere argues that religious con- of traditional chiefs as well as church leaders in flict in Nigeria largely arises from political Ghana. Wolfgang Heinrich reveals the very lim- manipulation, and that the most effective means ited effectiveness of the introduction of district of managing it is through the introduction of gen- councils to manage conflict in Somalia during uine democratic reforms. Robin Luckham points 1993-95, primarily because the councils were out that the democratic transition underway in viewed as rivals of traditional clan structures, as many African countries must include special at- well as because the UN was too rigidly prescrip- tention to the future role of African militaries, tive and hasty in its efforts to organize them. civil-military relations, and consideration of whether the military is best controlled by exclud- - Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention Pren- ing it from politics or by recognizing and institu- dergast outlines a series of guidelines to ensure tionalizing its political role. Eboe Hutchful that humanitarian aid contributes to peace rather describes the instructive process through which than exacerbating conflict. Aid givers, he says, Ghana’s civil authorities have achieved democra- need to do independent assessments of needs, be tic control over Ghana’s military. The process was astute and flexible in the types of aid provided, facilitated by the fact that Ghana’s democratically study the effects of targeting and distribution elected president has a military background and methods, commit to independent monitoring brought special knowledge of the military to his and evaluation, and promote intercommunal civilian leadership. trade and exchange.

- Training for Peacemaking Hibaaq Osman de- - Culture of Peace Carolyn Nordstrom points out scribes the effectiveness of a training program for the degree to which a “culture of peace” that rein- Somali women in conflict resolution and the im- forces progress toward peace and reconciliation pact it is having at village and district levels. The has developed in Mozambique in the post-settle- most notable finding is the impact that women ment period. She also contrasts Mozambique can play as peacemakers even in a male-domi- with Angola, where no parallel culture of peace nated society like Somalia. has appeared.

- Building on Locally Based and Traditional Peace Processes John Prendergast illustrates 1

conflict were unique. In addition, the countries’ political and economic systems differed widely and the conflicts were at different stages when the Africa Bureau launched an initiative. Nevertheless, there are some general conclusions worth drawing from the Bureau’s experiences in dealing with these conflicts. NNOVATIVE First, says Cohen, working-level decision-making I and willpower can make a difference. As assistant sec- DIPLOMATIC retary, Cohen decided to push the policy envelope as much as possible. He and his colleagues pursued a 1INITIATIVES highly activist approach, with considerable energy exerted by American embassies in Africa, and with extensive personal diplomacy by American diplomats. The Africa Bureau also engaged in a vigorous policy of bringing other national security agencies on board. (If the Africa Bureau had decided to pursue a relatively passive policy, higher political levels would probably not even have noticed, much less criticized them.) While the Bureau did not justify its activist approach as “vital to U.S. national security interests,” Cohen and his colleagues were able to demonstrate that they could pursue their goals within existing resources uring the 1980s and early 1990s, the and without damaging other U.S. interests. The high- United States was the most active and effec- est-level policymakers understood this approach, had Dtive diplomatic force in efforts to resolve confidence in their judgment, and let them proceed. Africa’s many civil wars, though after the debacle in The United States has a special image in Africa Somalia, the United States has progressively with- that no other country has. The sole remaining super- drawn from its activist program and more of the bur- power exercises a special influence in Africa, particu- den of peacemaking has been passed to Africans. One larly in conflict situations where frightened project examining diplomatic initiatives draws protagonists need psychological bolstering by a neu- lessons from American intervention in Africa during tral entity. The experience of the Africa Bureau in the the Bush administration, and another assesses prob- seven conflict situations Cohen describes demon- lems and prospects faced by African mediators who strated that one or both sides to a conflict usually wel- have intervened in East African conflicts. comes American involvement because of the perception that only the United States can supply the AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION security guarantees that will ensure that agreements are implemented. The United States has to be careful When the Bush administration took office in 1989, to use its influence constructively, as was demon- the Cold War rationale for assisting specific African strated decisively in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozam- countries was virtually gone, but assisting Africa to bique. achieve self-sustaining economic growth remained In Ethiopia, for example, the Bureau’s intervention very compelling. As a consequence, the State Depart- had some unintended consequences. After the United ment’s Bureau of African Affairs had a highly activist States took over the mediation of the war between policy of diplomatic intervention in African conflicts Ethiopia and Eritrean insurgents, the Ethiopian during Bush’s presidency. army’s will to continue the war eroded rapidly. With With a USIP grant Herman J. Cohen, assistant sec- the United States involved, the assumption was that retary of state for African affairs during the Bush ad- the war would be over soon, and nobody wanted to ministration, is writing a book to reflect on American be the last to be killed in combat. The weight of Amer- diplomatic intervention in seven significantly differ- ican influence also became evident during detailed ent internal conflicts in African countries. Each coun- military negotiations in Mozambique and Angola; try has its own character and the root causes of each American military experts were able to persuade 2

negotiators to accept certain dispositions for the accords between June 1991 and September 1992, combatants where others had failed, because the Defense, AID, and USIA contributed innovative and negotiating parties had confidence in the United low-cost solutions to a number of problems. Who States. Cohen and his colleagues also found that would have imagined, for example, that the Arizona African government leaders were sometimes able to Air National Guard could be persuaded to do its 1992 overcome internal opposition to negotiations by in- annual exercises flying ballot boxes and election voking the influence of the American government. workers to the farthest reaches of Angola? This was particularly true in the case of Mozambique, Starting early is better than starting late. This was where President Chissano exploited the “pressure” illustrated best in Somalia, where the Bureau could he said was being exerted by Presidents Reagan and discern the beginnings of a severe crisis when govern- Bush. ment forces essentially destroyed the city of Hargeisa The network of U.S. embassies in selected African in 1988 in the course of suppressing a rebellion. Co- countries is a vital element to an activist approach. hen and his colleagues were inhibited from taking an The Bureau’s efforts to advance conflict solutions in activist approach with the regime by the ongoing Angola, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Liberia benefited American requirement to maintain access to the naval considerably from information supplied, and actions and air facility at Berbera on Somalia’s north coast, taken, by neighboring U.S. embassies. Keeping them the strategic back door to the Persian Gulf and the well informed paid off handsomely in advancing the Arabian peninsula. So long as this access was re- Bureau’s objectives. Thanks to the embassy in Khar- quired, the State Department was reluctant to rock toum, for example, the Bureau’s relations with the the boat by applying diplomatic pressure on the Siad Ethiopian insurgents were key to its ability to help Barre regime. When the United States finally did in- bring about the end of that war with a soft landing in tervene militarily in December 1992, the cost was 1991. Intensive diplomacy by U.S. ambassadors in very high and the United States ended by losing the Gabon, Congo, Zaire, and Cape Verde helped stimu- facility anyway. Exerting “tough love” with friends at late Angolan negotiations in 1989. Extending the “in- an early stage of conflict, says Cohen, is the best way formation net” to embassies in western Europe, to uphold American strategic and economic interests. especially London, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, Geneva, Talk to everyone. When high-level U.S. diplomats and the Vatican, was also very fruitful. London was a talk to insurgent groups, they gain instant legitimacy— very active center of valuable information on the Su- and a delicate balance must be maintained if the dan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Lisbon was naturally a United States also wants to maintain good relations hotbed of Angolan politics. The UN agencies and in- with the regime in power. Cohen and his colleagues ternational NGOs in Geneva were a rich source of in- learned the value of talking to everyone without wor- formation and insights about conflict situations. Since rying about injured sensibilities. The Bureau began a sensitive United States interests were not involved in dialogue with RENAMO in Mozambique after their any of the conflicts, there was no need for the Bureau predecessors had snubbed it, helping hasten the on- to replicate the tight secrecy of the Kissinger era. set of negotiations, Cohen believes. The Sudanese Coopting the U.S. national security community is regimes objected to American dialogue with the SLPA essential. The Bureau used the national security coor- rebels in the south, but privately used American chan- dinating system intensively in order to make sure it nels to send messages to the south. The United States, would not encounter opposition at the working levels as a global power, can pull this off, indicates Cohen, of other agencies, and more importantly, to solicit and should exploit the technique to the fullest. The their advice and support. This was especially impor- Bureau’s dialogue with the Ethiopian insurgents was tant in the case of the Department of Defense, the CIA, especially fruitful in bringing that conflict to an end. and the National Security Council (NSC). But work- Bring the multilaterals in early. If the UN is going ing with the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the to be involved in a final peace agreement, it should be U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in at the beginning. Cohen believes that he and his was also very fruitful. In Somalia, for example, the Bu- colleagues made a mistake in the Angola negotiations reau worked closely with AID’s Office of Foreign Dis- by including UN peacekeeping and election monitor- aster Assistance (OFDA) to call higher-level attention ing as part of the peace process without requesting to the growing tragedy between May and October UN experts to sit at the negotiating table. If UN ex- 1992. During implementation of the Angolan peace perts had been there, they would have informed those 3

involved how inadequate and unworkable some of the Bureau’s diplomatic interventions in the relatively the arrangements would turn out to be. The same short period of four years was all the more astounding mistake was not made in the Mozambican negotia- given the fact that its strategy was entirely self-gener- tions, where the UN was brought in at an early stage. ated and not the result of direction from higher levels. Don’t be obsessed with signing ceremonies. Diplo- The Bureau stayed out of trouble, avoided embarrass- matic mediators, whose countries do not have a direct ment for the administration, and did not incur extra stake in the outcome, are usually so happy to see war- costs beyond extensive travel for negotiators and ex- ring protagonists agree that they are willing to acqui- perts. esce to inadequate and unworkable formulas just for Cohen concludes that in the final analysis the most the sake of agreement. This was true in Angola and promising outcome of these policies began to unfold Rwanda, and both the Rwanda agreement and the in 1992, when the Organization of African Unity fi- original Angola agreement had serious flaws. In An- nally recognized the anomaly of Africans doing little gola there was a severe problem, which was pre- to help resolve the continent’s civil wars, while the dictable, of the sequencing of implementation. In the Americans were intensely engaged. By mid-1996, with case of Rwanda, the Arusha agreement was a model the number of civil wars decreasing, Africans were on paper. There was only one problem: the real Rwan- taking the lead in the search for solutions to the most dan government—the people with the guns—were not intractable in Burundi, Liberia, and Sudan, with the really part of the process. Mediators and observers United States and other external parties playing sup- should be ready to blow the whistle on such porting roles. Potemkin agreements even if the protagonists are ready to sign. Frequently, such flawed agreements AFRICAN MEDIATION constitute a signal that the protagonists see the peace process more as a continuation of the war in another African interventions—in the Liberian civil war, the form—and an opportunity to rest and regroup be- threat to public order in Lesotho, and the threat of tween battles—than as a new peaceful beginning for chaos and genocide in Burundi—demonstrate a new their countries. This was clearly the case in Angola, level of assertiveness in African internal conflicts. Rwanda, and Liberia. African mediators addressing conflicts in East and Give ambassadors maximum leeway. The empha- Central Africa have only had limited success, but their sis of Cohen and his colleagues on conflict resolution experiences help highlight the requirements for the as a high priority for U.S. policy in Africa sent a strong future. The most promising process is that led by for- signal to American embassies in the field. In those mer Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, to try to countries where the precursors to violent conflict manage the tragic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis were particularly obvious, American ambassadors did in Burundi. not feel they needed permission to play active roles in Gilbert Khadiagala of Kent State University, with conflict management. All Cohen required was that support from a grant from the Institute of Peace, has they keep Washington informed. In Togo the U.S. am- undertaken a study of several cases of African media- bassador was part of a U.S.-French-German troika tion in East and Central Africa, highlighting some of working to safeguard a very fragile transition to multi- the shortcomings of past mediation and the require- party democracy. In Congo, the embassy played a key ments for the future. Although in the past African me- role in defusing political tensions connected to the diators, usually heads of state, confined their efforts to country’s first free and fair elections. In the Central conflicts between states, there has recently been a re- African Republic, the ambassador took the lead in markable shift toward mediation of domestic con- preventing the outgoing military regime from hijack- flicts, consistent with the OAU’s recent shift to ing democratic elections. In South Africa there is still a considering domestic conflicts a legitimate concern. valuable story to be told about how American ambas- This shift has been reinforced by the involvement of sadors engaged in significant “invisible” mediation to regional organizations in West Africa, southern Africa, help the transition from apartheid to majority rule. and East Africa in mediation of civil conflict in their By the end of the Bush administration, the experi- respective regions. ences of the Africa Bureau had yielded a wide variety The greatest strength of African mediators lies in of results, from euphoric to disappointing to incon- their proximity to the disputes and their understand- clusive. Cohen concludes that the immense range of ing of the historical context. African diplomacy has 4

been characterized by mediation originating from when heads of state stake their domestic and regional geographically proximate states. Khadiagala asserts reputations on successful outcomes, the quest for that this pattern will remain a fixture of African inter- quick agreements overshadows the mediation vention, largely because conflicts in regional neigh- process. Tanzania partially overcame this problem borhoods heighten interest that galvanizes response during the Arusha negotiations by assigning the medi- by local actors. Kenya and Tanzania were drawn into ation to a professional foreign ministry official, thus mediating conflicts in Uganda and Rwanda largely be- reducing the overexposure of the head of the state. cause of the perception that their civil wars had signif- The credibility and character of mediators is even icant repercussions for regional stability. The same more critical in internal conflicts than in interstate conceptual base underlies the ongoing intervention conflict. For example, African mediators who pre- by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development scribe power-sharing arrangements as a possible basis (IGAD) in Sudan’s civil war. for resolution of conflict confront credibility prob- But neighborly interest does not necessarily trans- lems when they lack such arrangements in their own late into capacity for effective mediation. Frequently countries. Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi’s medi- civil wars and refugee flows propel neighbors to inter- ation role in both the Uganda and Sudan talks raised vene in contiguous conflicts without the resources questions of credibility along these lines, reinforcing and capacity for effective mediation, says Khadiagala. the perception that his intervention might have been Thus Kenya, inspired by the mission of helping its an attempt at diversion from Kenya’s internal prob- “Ugandan brothers,” intervened in 1985 without lems. sufficient information about either the parties or the IGAD’s multilateral effort to help Sudan enabled a course of the conflict. In the end, a protracted and pooling of resources that seemed to provide an an- unsuccessful mediation severely affected Kenya’s swer to the perennial power constraints that bedevil relationship with post-settlement Uganda. African mediators. But the IGAD mediators have been In all three cases, enormous information gaps unable to articulate common visions of their roles and negatively affected the mediation processes. In all sustain adequate attention to their intervention. In ad- three cases that Khadiagala studied, the mediators dition, regional mediators, insofar as they are inter- groped in the dark for crucial information on such ested parties, are vulnerable to manipulation by the basic issues as cease-fire compliance, the identity of disputants, a device employed by the warring parties negotiating parties, and negotiating parameters and in Sudan. In addition, conflicts among the IGAD positions of parties. states themselves have sometimes overshadowed the Information gaps are most easily overcome when primary conflict. Thus, IGAD’s initial intervention to there are credible African mediators who command check the contagious effects of the Sudanese civil war the trust of the disputants. For example, Rwandan has produced new sets of regional conflicts of equal parties perceived Tanzania, because of its record of concern. successful nationbuilding, as a “natural” mediator in Nyerere’s current efforts in Burundi partially the Arusha talks on Rwanda’s civil war, rather than demonstrate how some of these dilemmas can be suc- Zaire. cessfully addressed. He is a mediator with a credible While mediation by heads of state (as in the IGAD domestic and international record, unencumbered by talks on Sudan and the Nairobi talks on Uganda) national tasks, but backed by strong regional action lends credibility to the process, the slow and and a strong international consensus that his peace- painstaking nature of mediation often cannot com- making is the best hope for settling civil conflict in pete effectively with other burdens of state. Moreover, Burundi. 5

on civil-military relations, democratization, human rights, and other activities. What was lacking was a forum to coordinate the activities of NGOs working in Burundi as well as to coordinate them with the U.S. government and the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in Bujumbura. A forum was also con- ceived as a way of sharing information on the rapidly NGOS ENGAGED IN evolving situation in Burundi. The Burundi Policy Forum (BPF) was organized in PREVENTIVE ACTION January 1995 and has functioned since as a mecha- 2 nism to share information and coordinate strategies. It convenes representatives of dozens of humanitarian, advocacy, and conflict resolution organizations working in Burundi, together with officials of international organizations and governments. These organizations include several bureaus of the Department of State, the OAU, USAID, the CIA, the NSC, the Depart- ment of Defense, the embassies of Burundi, Rwanda, Canada, and France, the UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the many NGOs which work in fforts to prevent and contain internal conflicts Burundi. The Forum constitutes a unique configura- in Africa have recently moved beyond govern- tion of organizations unlike any group addressing is- Ements and intergovernmental organizations. sues on any other country. It convenes both regular While intervention in Africa’s conflicts has tradition- public meetings and closed meetings of special work- ally been the realm of official diplomacy, NGOs are ing groups focused on security and refugee repatria- beginning to become important actors. In part this de- tion, most of which are held in Washington. rives from the increasing reluctance of foreign govern- Individual humanitarian NGOs often work with ments to assume the burdens of peacemaking. But it official humanitarian agencies, but rarely coordinate also reflects a recognition that NGOs have special their work with those in the political field. NGOs fre- competence and access that can supplement the capa- quently compete for funding, seeking to stake out bilities of governments and intergovernmental orga- positions for themselves, which complicates coordi- nizations. The case of the Burundi Policy Forum and nation and cooperation. The Forum provides a frame- the efforts of the Minority Rights Group (USA) to as- work in which a variety of participants can exchange sist the UN deal with Zaire illustrate this. information and develop ideas and strategies collec- tively. It has also served as an instrument for early BURUNDI POLICY FORUM warning. Since the situation in the entire Central African Great Lakes region is interconnected, the Bu- In early 1995 four organizations—the Center for Pre- rundi Policy Forum has also served to monitor and ventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations, mobilize reaction to events in Rwanda and Zaire, par- Search for Common Ground, Refugees International, ticularly in regard to refugee repatriation and the flow and the African-American Institute—with funding from of weapons into the region. the U.S. Institute of Peace, organized the Burundi Pol- Since its foundation, the Forum’s schedule of icy Forum to address the growing crisis in Burundi. regular meetings has generated more continuous Principal responsibility for the Forum rests with Bar- attention to the ongoing Burundi crisis by the U.S. nett Rubin of the Center for Preventive Action. government, NGOs, and such other participants as At the time various NGOs were providing humani- the UN and the media than otherwise would have tarian assistance to refugees from Rwanda in Burundi occurred. The relevant government officials working and to displaced persons within Burundi, offering on Burundi know that the Forum exists as a venue for conflict resolution training in Burundi, and working many Burundi-concerned organizations, and they are 6

regularly expected to brief and interact with the conflict in Burundi. However, prominent Burundi offi- group. The Forum has also provided a venue for cials know of the Forum and are thus aware that a nu- persons knowledgeable about Burundi to ask govern- cleus of Washington organizations is watching their ment officials tough questions in a non-confronta- country with considerable interest. This spotlight ef- tional, constructive, and problem-solving setting. fect may itself have some importance on moderating The Forum provides an opportunity for Burundi of- the conflict. Nevertheless, the Forum’s main impact ficials to be heard in Washington. In October 1995 Bu- comes indirectly, by influencing the process by rundi’s president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya spoke at which important international actors understand the Forum. This event was televised in Burundi, where and deal with conflict and coordinate their actions many felt it had some effect in protecting Ntibantun- and interventions. ganya from assassination by Tutsi extremists in the military. Pierre Buyoya, who came to power through a MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP ADDRESSES military coup in late July 1996, was the main speaker ZAIRE at the June 1996 Forum. The Forum has also strengthened the ability of mid- Minority Rights Group (USA), a small NGO with its level staffers within the U.S. government and the UN office in New York, received a grant from the Carnegie to promote more attention to the conflict and advance Corporation to explore “concepts and mechanisms to new policy ideas with their superiors within the bu- prevent ethnic conflict.” A crucial part of this program reaucracy. The Forum provides them with a place out- was concerned with improving preventive diplomacy side the regular system to gain information, discuss through the United Nations. A project focusing on ideas, and get broader perspectives on the crisis than Zaire, supported by the Institute of Peace, was part of are fostered by their bureaucratic milieu. It is particu- this wider program, and is included here because of larly helpful when Burundi officials and representa- the innovative nature of the collaboration between an tives of Burundi NGOs speak to the Forum, which NGO and the UN over an African crisis. also provides a place for the U.S. government to pre- MRG (USA) has special qualifications in this area sent the nuances and reasoning in government policy because it is linked with MRG (International), in Lon- that cannot be provided through press conferences don, which has a quarter century’s experience in the and press releases. field of minority rights and ethnic conflict, and be- As a result of its work on the Forum, the Center for cause Sir John Thomson, formerly British Ambassador Preventive Action has been involved in continued in- to the UN, is a member of the Councils of both organi- formal consultation with the mission of the Special zations. Moreover, Elizabeth Cabot, formerly the MRG Representative of the Secretary General, the special (International) representative at the UN, is presently envoys of President Clinton to Burundi, the Carter the Executive Director of MRG (USA). Center, the Community of Sant’ Egidio in Rome, Inter- The situation in Zaire was chosen as a test case for national Alert in London, and International Crisis trying innovative cooperation procedures between the Group on peacemaking efforts in the region. Partly at UN and an NGO (even though some would not be the urging of the Center for Preventive Action, former considered unusual within sophisticated government president Jimmy Carter began to pay attention to the structures). Zaire was selected for a mix of reasons. situation in Burundi and Rwanda. Carter’s staff began The situation at the outset of the project was serious to attend the Forum regularly, and Carter then con- but not desperate; some goodwill existed between dif- vened a meeting of the heads of state of Rwanda, ferent groups and communities within the country; Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania in Cairo in the gathering crisis was in a pre-military phase appro- November 1995 and in Tunis in March 1996. Lionel priate to preventive diplomacy; and the costs of pre- Rosenblatt, president of Refugees International and ventive diplomacy looked manageable. Thus, Zaire a co-sponsor of the Forum, attended the Cairo and seemed a fair, if hard, test of new procedures which, if Tunis conferences as a special advisor to former Presi- successful, might be duplicated elsewhere. dent Carter. The essential elements of the procedure are the Being intended as mainly a focal point for exchang- appointment of a research leader and the preparation, ing information among mostly Washington-based in- discussion, and amendment of a report by the research dividuals and organizations, the Forum is inherently leader and circulation of the report to those concerned limited in how much it can directly alleviate the with monitoring and policy, followed by a series of 7

discussion workshops. Subsequent action depends neglecting, the official structure of the collapsed state upon the conclusions of the workshops and the UN and build on existing self-help, grassroots activities staff involved. The MRG (USA) involvement was natu- taking place in some parts of Zaire and aim to expand rally greatest in the early steps of the procedures, but them to other parts of the country. They suggest pro- as more policy members were involved, the more they cedures by which the international community, espe- came to “own” both the process and the product. For cially the UN and its agencies, acting in imaginative this reason, the following brief account of the project’s ways through normal channels, might assist the conclusions on Zaire concentrate on MRG (USA)’s in- growth of civil society. The emphasis is all on assisting sights and should not be understood as necessarily Zairians at the local level who show a real inclination representing the views of UN policymakers. to help themselves. It is not proposed that outsiders The international community has found Zaire a should come forward with new and expensive eco- frustrating case. For example, the World Bank felt nomic development programs. obliged to suspend its operations there in 1993 and On the contrary, the chief function of the outsiders has made it clear that it will return only if the Zairian should be to act as a catalyst for action, to provide a authorities actually put the agreed-upon policies into source of information and encouragement, and to effect. The timetable of political reforms has slipped fund—at a very modest level, for a limited time— by at least two years and those involved have in conse- promising local initiatives. There is no part of Zairian quence lost a great degree of credibility. The “troika”— society, including the government and the army, that is, the governments of Belgium, France, and the which could not contribute to the regeneration of eco- United States working together—have found it difficult nomic activity and political democracy through the to make progress in helping Zaire emerge from its pro- benevolent and cooperative activities of given individ- longed economic and political malaise and the pace of uals. The emphasis is away from heavy-handed bu- negotiations has slowed to a walk. There is a great deal reaucracy toward the initiation and regulation of such of discussion about elections in Zaire with UN moni- activities through informal local groups. NGOs, both toring in summer 1997, but many doubt the timetable Zairian and international, could be expected to play will be met. major roles. Zaire presents the remarkable spectacle of a col- The prospects for success along these lines are lapsed state. Sovereign and governmental institutions brighter than those for progress along other paths, in- still exist but do not operate effectively. The political cluding those linked to presidential and parliamen- classes are concerned only with their own interests, tary elections, the authors assert. But any progress and the official economy has been overtaken by the depends fundamentally on avoiding an increase in vi- unofficial, even though Zaire is richly endowed with olence. Such an unfortunate development is a real natural advantages. Altogether (and despite serious possibility. conflict in eastern Zaire), it is surprising that the coun- The report proposes that the office of the UN Secre- try has not lapsed into total chaos. This situation and tary General’s Special Representative in Zaire should the reasons for it are analyzed in the recently pub- be revived to orchestrate the peacemaking and politi- lished report “Zaire: Predicament and Prospects, A cal transition strategy coherently, and that the Zairian Report to the Minority Rights Group (USA)” by pro- government be kept in touch with developments. It is ject research leader Jean-Claude Willame et al. (Peace- recommended that the Special Representative should works No. 11, United States Institute of Peace, 1997). operate in a low-key way with a small staff who should The main political and economic recommenda- be mainly in the field to encourage the flowering of tions are designed to revive civil society in Zaire local initiatives. from the grassroots upward. They bypass, without 8

they so predominant in the northern part of the country? What were the interests behind the conflicts, and why did they become so violent and destructive? Why has the state been unable to manage or prevent the conflicts? Is there a correlation between Nigeria’s deepening economic crisis and the acts of violence? EMOCRATIC EFORM What is the way out of the problem? D R The research—against the background of Nigeria’s AND REFORM OF history, the foreign origins of both religions, the effects they have had on the construction of socioeconomic 3AFRICAN MILITARIES and political institutions and relations, and the overall character of the struggle for power and hegemony within classes, communities, regions, and other locations—reached the following conclusions. It is very difficult to attribute a purely religious ex- planation to any of the nominally religious conflicts in the country, including those in Kano, Kaduna, Bu- lumkutu, Kafanchan, Ilorin, Bauchi, Zango Kantaf—especially the more violent, destructive, and publicized ones. Virtually all the conflicts had direct and/or indirect political undertones and were encouraged, plotted, or ost observers would agree that while ex- sponsored by prominent political/religious elements ternal intervention can help resolve inter- who had specific and broad interests to protect and Mnal conflicts in Africa, the best long-term advance. cure is the introduction of democratic reforms. A key Religion was in many instances only a cover for component of a democratic reform movement is civil- deep-rooted strains and divisions in the body politic, ian control over the military, often a key instigator of which erupted into acts of violence and destruction as conflict. powerful political elements tried to protect their politi- The movement for democratic reform in Africa has cal domains, make political points, and reclaim as- made very impressive strides over the last decade. But sumed spheres of influence. there has been some backsliding in countries like Where religion was involved, conflict usually arose Kenya, Niger, and Burundi. The movement needs rein- not just from intolerance and provocative pronounce- forcement and the three studies cited in this section ments and actions by leaders of both religions, but offer guidance about how this can be accomplished. from fundamentalist proclivities of many Christians and Muslims. For example, the Christian Association THE NEED FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM of Nigeria (CAN) was created less as a religious than a IN NIGERIA political organization to challenge the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), its Muslim equivalent. Strident evangelical Julius Ihonvbere of the University of Texas at Austin is Christian groups have their Muslim equivalent in the completing a USIP-funded study of religious conflict Muslim Studies Society (MSS). Both are very militant, in Nigeria. Its primary objective has been to examine well funded from abroad, intolerant of others within the causes and politics of religious violence in contem- and outside their faiths, and have very little or no re- porary Nigeria. Religion has become a major source of gard for the secularity of the Nigerian state. conflict challenging not just the survival of Nigeria as The religious, regional, ethnic, cultural and other a nation, but also the possibility of national recon- ramifications of violence in Nigeria cannot be clearly struction, growth, development, and peace. It has di- understood, according to Ihonvbere, outside a holistic vided Nigeria between north and south, Christian and and dialectical understanding of the crises, coalitions, Muslim, rich and poor. Among the questions Ihon- contradictions, and conflicts of Nigeria’s distinctive vbere has tried to address are: What were the remote political economy, the struggle for power, class contra- and immediate causes of religious violence? Why were dictions and conflicts, the weaknesses of civil society, 9

the failure of the peripheral state and the withdrawal was inherited intact by the new nationalists at political of the populace into the security of organizations independence in 1960. It has remained largely irrele- based on primordial identities. As well, foreign med- vant to the conditions of the people. According to dling in religious matters, and the propensity of the Ihonvbere, under the control of a tiny, corrupt portion Nigerian power elite to manipulate rather than medi- of the Nigerian bourgeoisie, the state has been used ate religious intolerance, differences, and conflicts for private accumulation rather than the public good. have served the interests of an unsteady state and a Lacking political control, the Nigerian state has main- largely decadent and unproductive elite which domi- tained its power through the suffocation of civil soci- nates and controls it. ety, the manipulation of ascriptive loyalties, Religion will continue to play a major role in Niger- intimidation, and proceeding as a kleptocracy. ian life and politics. What is uncertain is the ability of Grossly inefficient, and lacking viable national sym- the state and the dominant classes to continue to ma- bols, the Nigerian state is perceived as an exploitative, nipulate religion for their political goals. Of course, decadent, and unstable force to be evaded and sub- foreign interest groups, religious and non-religious, verted at the slightest opportunity. The Nigerian state will continue to strive for influence within Nigeria. If has never been a state of the people, according to the religiously-based political violence is not curtailed, Ihonvbere. It has never been truly democratic, ac- it will get more destructive and more violent as drug countable, open, and sufficiently powerful to respond dealers, currency traffickers, scammers, and oppor- to the needs of Nigerian citizens in general. This has tunistic politicians capitalize on popular frustration to allowed adventurers and opportunists to manipulate advance their narrow political interests. Moreover, religion and use violence to create diversions and gain these disturbances could degenerate into deeper con- access to state power and resources. Ihonvbere argues flicts, sustained over longer periods, if the parties in that profound reconstruction is necessary if the state conflict are propelled by ethnic, religious, or regional is not to continue to provide cover for the very inter- forms of fanaticism. ests that seek to subvert it. It is possible to make all sorts of suggestions for Civil society must also be strengthened. Unlike in ending the conflicts; for example that dialogues be cre- the 1960s and 1970s, contemporary Nigeria is almost ated, patriotism encouraged, tolerance advocated, and awash with popular politically engaged groups. Nige- adherence to the pacific teachings in the Bible and Ko- ria’s political landscape is beginning to benefit from ran supported. But Ihonvbere concludes they are gen- the activities of organizations ranging from human erally cosmetic and superficial. In fact, these rights groups and environmental movements, to pro- admonitions, preached by various political, ethnic and democracy and women’s organizations, to profes- religious leaders over the last two decades, have not sional and cultural associations as well as the press. If stopped the recurrence of religious conflicts. The these organizations practice internal democracy, mo- Nigerian state remains extremely repressive and dis- bilize and educate their members and the public, and tant from popular constituencies and incapable of ef- take openly democratic positions, the ability of the fectively mediating conflict. Deteriorating living politicians and the military to manipulate them will be conditions continue to encourage primary identifica- reduced. In fact, Ihonvbere argues, a viable and vi- tion with narrow cultural and social interests, since brant civil society is the only check to military adven- the state’s incapacity to manage conflict or improve turism, political irresponsibility, unbridled corruption things hardly inspires loyalty. Declaring Nigeria a sec- and waste, and the manipulation of cultural symbols ular state in the constitution has proven equally insuf- and primordial loyalties. The goals of the popular ficient, since the constitution is not respected, the movements, in this instance, should include the strug- judiciary is not independent, and there are no pro- gle for basic freedoms, the empowerment of commu- grams designed to foster a national agenda. nities and constituencies, and accountability of Ihonvbere asserts that three main issues need to be government. addressed: the reconstruction of the Nigerian state Finally, Ihonvbere asserts, there is no alternative and the basis of power and politics; the strengthening to genuine democratization. Democracy makes it pos- of civil society; and the genuine democratization of the sible for ideas and ideals to be debated and resolved political system. without resort to violence. It also requires that politi- The nature of the Nigerian state is the main prob- cal rules be definite and be made known to all actors. lem. Constituted as an exploitative colonial system, it Where ideas, interests, and opportunities are 10

suppressed, they go underground and express threaten the existence of the state itself, as in Somalia, themselves in extra-legal and violent forms. Even Liberia, Uganda (pre-1986), or Ethiopia (pre-1991). oppressed segments of society might use religious Africa’s new democracies have thus had not only to fanaticism as an excuse to attack institutions per- rebuild democracy, but at the same time the state, to- ceived as bases of oppression and exploitation. As the gether with the military and security bureaucracies economic crisis deepens, political interests might also which assure the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. manipulate public frustration to spread violence. This A number of lessons can be learned from the fail- becomes even more dangerous when there are mar- ures of earlier “transitions to democracy” in countries ginalized or alienated elites who can take advantage like Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan between the 1960s of such dispossession and oppression to advance and the early 1980s. Most of these transitions were narrow and political goals. agreed to and cooperatively managed by the military Ihonvbere argues that popular groups must inten- and the civilian elites. There was little serious attempt sify the struggle to put a permanent stop to military to transform narrowly-based political institutions or intervention in politics, and work for the eradication civil-military relations to increase their popular legiti- of those institutions and practices which have stifled macy and enhance their developmental capacity. civil society and repressed mass organizations for What has been different about a number of the cur- decades. While procedural democracy will open up rent transitions is that they have arisen from popular the political terrain for deeper and more embracing rebellions against existing state and military author- politics, only genuine, systematic political empower- ity; in some cases through military and/or urban in- ment of the citizenry would check religious manipula- surrections bringing down existing regimes, as in tion and violence, Ihonvbere says. Only democracy Mali or Ghana; in others through protracted armed can guarantee freedom of worship, the coexistence of struggles defeating an authoritarian government, as in different faiths, and the protection of their adherents, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea; or forcing it to negoti- and significantly reduce political opportunists’ ability ate, as in Namibia and South Africa. Democratization to manipulate religion. has thus been associated with broader transforma- tions of the state and of military institutions. Paren- ACHIEVING DEMOCRATIC CONTROL thetically, this implies that conflict is not always OVER THE MILITARY something to be “resolved” or avoided. More analysis is required to understand the conditions in which it Robin Luckham of the Institute of Development Stud- facilitates struggles for democracy and social justice, ies at the University of Sussex has undertaken a series as well as those in which it does not. of USIP-supported case studies of democratization of These transitions have been distinctive as well, in Africa’s repressive yet fragile state structures. Luck- that they have been tempered by greater realism re- ham has focused on an especially crucial aspect of garding the goals and limits of transformation than that democratization—how to assure democratic con- was the case with armed struggles during the immedi- trol over Africa’s military and security establishments. ate post-colonial era. For the most part popular partic- Democratic control of the military has a direct bearing ipation has been reinstitutionalized within the frame on how, and by whom, conflicts are managed, and of liberal multi-party democracy; market-oriented eco- with what prospects of success. nomic restructuring has taken precedence over ef- The transitions to democracy that swept across forts to achieve socioeconomic justice; and dissident Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s were driven troops or guerrilla forces have been restructured as by a complex interplay of external and internal deter- professional armies. minants. Above all, Luckham asserts, they were the The transfer of power to a democratically elected product of state failure, of the incapacity of authoritar- government is only the first chapter of a long and ian (often military) regimes to provide the benefits of complicated story: Ensuring that military and security development, or indeed basic physical security, to the establishments continue afterwards to accept democ- mass of their citizens. The legacy of state failure was ratic control is just as important. Broadly speaking, distinctly double-edged. On the one hand it reduced says Luckham, the African experience reinforces re- the capacity of incumbent regimes to resist emergent searcher Alfred Stepan’s contention—based on studies pressures to democratize, as in Mali, Benin, or Tanza- of civilian-military relations in democratizing Latin nia. On the other, it unleashed conflicts that could America—that not only should the civilian executive 11

be enabled to exercise firm political and military au- characteristics as “people’s armies” acquired during thority over the armed forces, but institutions in polit- their struggles against authoritarian rule? ical and civil society also need to be empowered so as Luckham points out that an essential aspect of mil- to be able to hold both the executive and military to itary restructuring has been the reintegration and de- account.1 Yet South Africa is so far the only country in mobilization of the armed forces, welding members which such a broad process of empowerment seems of previously conflicting armies or military factions to have been occurring, above all through its ex- into unified national forces and providing demobi- tremely active parliamentary committees on defense lized ex-combatants with livelihoods adequate to and security. Other countries such as Ghana and Mali avert the danger of their drifting back to banditry and have established such committees, but they have been war. In countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, and South less vocal and less well-supported by the press, civil Africa, reintegration and demobilization have been es- society organizations, and research bodies capable of sential not only for the termination of conflict, but for contributing to informed public debate of defense the restoration of functioning democratic institutions and security issues. capable of exercising control over their armed forces. The constitution-making exercises in a number of Reintegration and demobilization are also con- the countries studied have given rise to interesting de- nected to another issue faced by most African coun- bates about whether the military is best controlled by tries: how to assure the involvement in democratic excluding it from politics or by recognizing and insti- institutions of all groups in a multi-ethnic state. Some tutionalizing its political role, for instance by giving it of the new African democracies—Ethiopia, for exam- representation in the government and/or parliament ple—have introduced plural or federal constitutional (as in Uganda), or by formalizing procedures for con- arrangements; others have continued to pursue na- sultation with the armed forces over defense and se- tional integration within the framework of a multi-eth- curity policy as (in theory) in Ghana’s Armed Forces nic state. In addition to such constitutional and National Security Councils. Tanzania is a particu- arrangements, most have adopted military recruit- larly interesting case in point. On the one hand the ment policies aimed at making the armed forces more previous close relationship between the Tanzanian representative of the population as a whole. However, Peoples’ Defense Force (TPDF) and the ruling Chama adjustments in recruitment are by themselves insuffi- cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party facilitated the country’s cient, Luckham points out. Military and security bu- enviable record of civilian control and political stabil- reaucracies (and governments) have to learn to ity. On the other, the advent of multi-party democracy handle conflicts involving ethnic and other minorities after 1992 has necessitated the TPDF’s disengage- with a modicum of restraint and understanding of mi- ment from the CCM. Alternative means must now be nority aspirations. If they do not, they risk perpetuat- found of assuring the military’s loyalty to democratic ing conflicts, like the current rebellion in northern institutions. Uganda, that may wear away at both the legitimacy of The institutional legacies of authoritarian gover- democratic institutions and their ability to hold the nance and of the struggles against it have varied. In military in check. some countries, like Nigeria, over-powerful and politi- cized military and security establishments remain en- CONTROLLING THE MILITARY IN trenched at the heart of the state. In others, like Mali, GHANA they have been fractured and weakened by internal revolts. In others they have been displaced by the Eboe Hutchful of Wayne State University has used an guerrilla armies waging war against them. But in each Institute grant to assess how successful Ghana has case new democratic governments have of necessity been in achieving civil control over its military and se- had to restructure and reprofessionalize the armed curity agencies in the process of its democratic transi- forces. The issue has been how they can do so without tion. Before the current transition began in 1992, rekindling military reaction and intervention. The Ghana had suffered a succession of successful coups dilemmas have been posed in an especially interest- (in 1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981) and short-lived tran- ing way in countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, and sitions to democratic rule (in 1969 and 1979). Histor- Eritrea, where former guerrilla forces are being trans- ically, civil control over the military and (to a lesser formed into standing armies. Can they be profession- extent) over police and intelligence agencies in Ghana alized while still retaining some of their democratic has been weak or nonexistent. By “civil control” is 12

meant the ability of civil rulers to set or determine the the delegitimation of the command system, and the defense and security doctrines, goals and structures; decline of military authority, with a consequent shift to monitor the performance of security and intelli- of power from the military hierarchy to subaltern gence agencies to ensure their consistency with con- strata. This decline was intensified by internal mis- stitutional and national goals; and to exercise effective management of the armed forces and severe contrac- oversight of defense and security budgets. tion in military budgets. The crises of civil and As in many African countries, Ghanaian civil insti- military authority fed off each other in a cumulative tutions such as the Ministry of Defense are poorly process of instability and decline that was to prove ex- equipped to execute these roles. The reasons for this tremely damaging to the nation. are both structural and historical, and include initial Ghana’s security apparatus, Hutchful argues, has lack of interest by civilian governments in military is- been riven since independence by rivalries and con- sues and low institutional capacity and expertise on flict, between internal cliques and factions, between the part of the Defense Ministry (the Ministry has the armed forces and police, between these institu- been staffed mainly by junior level civil servants and tions and the intelligence organs (the Military Intelli- clerks, the majority of whom are female). The Min- gence and Special Branch) as well as between the istry is made up of a civil wing and a military wing, intelligence agencies themselves, and between the se- with the former theoretically in control of the latter. In curity community as a whole and the political authori- reality, however, the Ministry is the Armed Forces, un- ties. This vitiated their effectiveness and power. Again der marginal ministerial control. While the functions these cleavages are historical and structural in origin, of the Ministry were limited from the very beginning, outgrowths of unstable corporate hierarchies, lack of since independence in 1957, over time even they were clear lines of authority and control, lack of a clear de- whittled down, with the military takeover of govern- fense policy and security mandate, poor communica- ment resulting in further role contraction for the civil- tion between government, security and intelligence ian staff and assumption by the military of direct agencies (as well as between command and subaltern control of budgeting, allocation, accounting, and pro- levels within the armed forces and police), and differ- curement functions. ences between corporate and political cultures. Cu- In its democratic form the efficiency of civil control mulatively, these have produced multi-dimensional depends on the authority and control of military com- conflicts which were expressed in, or contributed to, manders over the institution. However, in Ghana the the persistent instability and militarization of Ghana- command systems inherited at independence were ian politics. weak and poorly institutionalized. The very concept Hutchful argues that it is, ironically, precisely the of “professionalism” appeared problematic in this implosion of both civil and military authority that context. Post-colonial African governments adopted provides the essential key to understanding the rela- the former colonial military formations (which had in tive success of the most recent democratic transition, fact been already in process of dissolution) for essen- in 1992. While earlier transitions had collapsed igno- tially emblematic reasons, their being seen as an es- miniously within three years, the Rawlings regime ap- sential artifact of “modern statehood.” These pears not only to have survived but to have succeeded discarded military structures carried at best only the in bringing the military and security agencies under veneer of professionalism, lacking both the historical political control, subsequently initiating the first de- logic which propelled professionalism (interstate mil- mocratic transition in Ghana since the 1960s with a itary competition and the industrialization of war), real possibility of consolidation. and the social origins required to bind them to the Several factors explain this positive development. state and the ruling class. Their major (if sporadic) First, Rawlings was able to exploit the decomposition function was not external defense but internal secu- of the military system (in particular the split between rity. the officer corps and the ranks which bedeviled the Hutchful points out that military usurpation of po- previous regime) as a window of opportunity to reor- litical power was to have corrosive consequences for ganize the institution from below, in turn neutralizing the military itself and to contribute in a second and the officer corps and then the ranks who had fur- more intractable sense to the difficulty of restoring nished his support base. Second, Rawlings was able civil control and authority. Politicization of military to create countervailing forces based (unlike previous institutions led to the disintegration of the military, attempts) in part within the regular military itself, 13

including the Committees for the Defense of the tures of regulation and control. In their absence, we Revolution (CDRs), the Forces Reserve Battalion, and see a mutually destructive failure of the main players so on. The domestic security complex has been exten- in the security game—the government, the armed sively reorganized and made much more effective and forces, the police and the intelligence agencies—to de- coherent. Third, unlike previous transitions where the velop viable operational relationships and mecha- extrication of the military from power was formally nisms of dispute resolution. complete, this latest transition involves the constitu- Third, civil control demands the development of a tionalization of the existing military-backed regime. cadre of civilian defense and strategic analysts and Unlike previous regimes, Rawlings’ government planners. This is crucial but only the beginning. Politi- has (not surprisingly, given Rawlings’ military back- cal command of the armed forces in Africa has tradi- ground) demonstrated much greater familiarity with tionally meant executive control. Responsibility for the political terrain in the armed forces. At the same oversight must be shared more equitably with the leg- time there is some evidence that the military has be- islature, the public, and the press if control is to be de- come more amenable to political control. Not only has mocratized. Stepan has rightly emphasized the need Ghana avoided a successful military coup since De- for legislative self-empowerment with regard to mili- cember 31, 1981—the longest period of political stabil- tary issues and policies, through enhancement of the ity in its post-independence history—military budgets legislature’s own research, information, and monitor- have also been scaled back to levels lower than at any ing expertise, and so forth, and for the development of time since the early post-independence period. Fi- autonomous intelligence on military and defense is- nally, Rawlings, again unlike the previous regime, was sues by the organizations of civil society (including able to articulate these (sometimes repressive) secu- the media) as well as the need for civil society to con- rity measures in a populist discourse which presented duct its own dialogue with the military.3 his regime as a “developmental dictatorship” operating Finally, as the Rawlings experiment reminds us, selflessly on behalf of the nation. Thus while the for- civil (or political) control is an essential component mal framework of civil-military relations in 1992 repli- of, but not necessarily to be confused with, democratic cates that of earlier constitutions, the underlying control. The structures and practices that have en- policies have been quite different. sured the subordination of the military in the current According to Hutchful, the case of Ghana suggests Ghanaian transition have frequently embodied self- certain lessons regarding the restoration of civil con- imposed restraint. Public accountability and parlia- trol in democratic transitions in Africa. First, restora- mentary oversight remain weak. In addition to the tion of civil control in the context of democratic factors discussed above, a second element of democra- transitions may involve reconstructing not only civil tic control is the use of force in a manner in keeping but military authority and professionalism. In addi- with respect for legal and constitutional rights. This tion to redefining the military’s relationship with the dimension also remains weak in Ghana. It is precisely political process, the structures, role, mission and doc- the previous success of unorthodox policies that now trine of the armed forces may need fundamental redef- inhibit the development of more professional and de- inition, to enhance both operational efficiency and mocratic forms of control, posing the possibility of a democratic control. Even so, it is unlikely that consti- progression from “hard” to “soft” authoritarian con- tutional constraints alone will be sufficient to keep the trols which would rely on special security and intelli- military in barracks in the short term. Some form of gence units and manipulation of ethnic divisions countervailing mechanism may be required pending rather than on real democratization. the longer-term development of professional re- straints. Second, as Robin Luckham has insisted in another context, an understanding of the micropolitics of the military and security agencies is essential for unravel- ing the dynamics of democratic transitions.2 Analysis of the different power, interests, and roles of the agencies that comprise the security community must be nuanced. Ghana’s experiences again suggest the importance in any political system of a clear security and defense mandate and reasonably unambiguous struc- 14

for each workshop. Most participants were members of established or nascent women’s groups, and represented diverse communities and social groups. The five- to seven-day workshops addressed strategies for conflict management within the context of current clashes in Somalia and Somaliland (a northern province which has asserted its independence from RAINING FOR the rest of Somalia), focusing on techniques of negoti- T ating, mediating, implementing solutions, and devel- PEACEMAKING oping personal leadership skills. 4 CSIW’s previous training of fifteen Somali women enabled the organization to conduct cost-effective training with local facilitators at Somali sites. Partici- pants were clearly delighted to be working with women facilitators who shared many of their experiences and concerns. Bonding among women from the same locality was rapid and efficacious. The most frequently identified obstacles to peacemaking included lack of knowledge among a broad cross-section of Somali women that they can effectively participate in conflict management; lack of TRAINING WOMEN IN SOMALIA communication among women from diverse backgrounds, localities, and districts about their peace- Training in conflict resolution can make an important building strategies and resources; and violent clashes contribution to the management of conflict in Africa. in some areas, preventing women from approaching The Institute of Peace has supported such training ac- combatants to initiate negotiations. tivities, particularly the “training of trainers,” in Nige- Because participants and facilitators in each work- ria and South Africa, as well as for the staff of the shop represented diverse backgrounds, they had an OAU. But a training program for Somali women is opportunity to explore their own prejudices in role- particularly noteworthy. playing and simulation exercises. Heated exchanges With financial assistance from an Institute grant, occurred, followed by analysis of the need to put the Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women aside bias and to assume an impartial position for ef- (CSIW), led by Hibaaq Osman, initiated four commu- fective conflict management. Many participants were nity-based conflict management training workshops surprised at the ease with which they could recognize for Somali women during the first six months of and overcome their prejudices to forge agreements 1996. The primary objectives of the workshops were with other participants. to train women in conflict management techniques, Immediately following the workshops, many to build their capacity for training other women, and women used their newly developed skills, demonstrat- to expand Somali women’s participation in local and ing a strong desire to become proactive mediators. national peacebuilding. Workshop trainers, who de- Several workshop participants successfully negotiated veloped extensive conflict management and training the release of a Swedish woman who had been kid- skills during a 1995 CSIW-sponsored “training of napped by a clan gang. Women from the Merca work- trainers” series held in South Africa and financed by shop placed themselves physically between clashing USIP, served as workshop facilitators. clan members and effectively stopped the fighting. Par- Each workshop was designed and implemented by ticipants from the Save Somali Women and Children a Somali grassroots women’s organization, or coali- group held a “peace feast” for women from both sides tion of women’s organizations, in consultation with of Mogadishu’s “Green Line”—the divide between war- CSIW. The implementing organizations considered ring clans—after they effectively negotiated an end to recommendations from local women’s groups, fighting between two clans. women community leaders, and local authorities or Participants in most workshops began intensive elders in choosing twenty to thirty-five participants networking well before their training ended. The 15

advantages of sharing ideas and resources and of power excluded them in many situations from pre- women’s coalition-building soon became clear even venting or managing conflicts. Even women with no to those who were initially reluctant to merge agendas immediate interest in assuming political roles ex- with other women. They were offered the model of pressed their intention to build coalitions between the influential Coalition of Grassroots Women’s Orga- women’s peace groups and local political authorities. nizations in Somalia, founded in 1995 following a Virtually all workshop participants expressed their CSIW training project in Nairobi. Women from Mo- determination to transmit their new conflict manage- gadishu reported that they now cross the Green Line ment knowledge to other women and women’s at night to discuss peace initiatives with each other. groups by organizing local training sessions. Signifi- Other women are striving to expand their local net- cant numbers of participants have also taken their works into national coalitions. These examples sug- training skills outside women’s groups—a trainee gest a vast potential for linking grassroots women’s from Mogadishu gathered twenty boys, who have groups across Somalia and Somaliland to create weapons and frequently use them, into a training strong, committed peace networks. class in north Mogadishu. Several of these boys have Many participants have successfully assumed in- changed their orientation and life goals and gotten rid fluential local peacebuilding roles, despite gender of their weapons. Another group of trainees conducts prejudices, and have gained new respect in their com- weekly conflict management workshops in a camp munities by effectively mediating conflicts instigated near Mogadishu for internally displaced Somalis. among men. Women have also induced local authori- Three overarching lessons can be drawn from this ties and elders to begin their own negotiation training program. First, women can play important processes and served as trusted “shuttle” diplomats peacemaking roles even in societies where they have among opposing clan leaders. At the same time, ac- traditionally been excluded from most political au- cording to numerous participants, they have achieved thority and responsibility. This is particularly true a viable balance between their traditional domestic when the population blames the men for the pro- roles and their expanded peacebuilding roles. They longed conflicts plaguing their society. Second, train- expressed great satisfaction in simultaneously main- ing in negotiation techniques, conflict management, taining both roles, sometimes viewing their domestic and peacemaking can enhance the capabilities and responsibilities as enhancing their public peacemak- confidence of potential local peacemakers. Third, ing credibility. other African countries can benefit from the experi- A significant result of the women’s conflict man- ence South Africans have gained both in resolving agement workshops is expanded political interest conflicts and in training peacemakers. The training among participants. In exploring both causes and these Somali women obtained in South Africa enabled solutions to conflicts, they often found themselves them, upon their return to Somalia, to share their confronting essentially political dilemmas. Women newly acquired skills with other Somali women. in all workshops recognized that their lack of political 16

regional crises and national conflicts. For elders and chiefs, for local commanders of government and rebel armies, and for local militias, local conflict in the Horn often takes precedence over national conflict. Opportunities for asset-stripping and revenge often dictate local relationships, and local warlordism can BUILDING ON be a problem. The consequences of local conflict are LOCALLY-BASED AND often more destructive and deadly for civilian populations that those of national-level conflicts. While sub- TRADITIONAL PEACE national conflicts usually have some kind of tie to 5 higher-order national wars, they often have lives and PROCESSES logical frameworks of their own, for which national- level peace efforts are irrelevant. Local conflicts are frequently organized along ethnic or lineage lines, and leaders organize around themes of group vulnerability and demonization of the “other.” Given the precarious survival contexts in which many Horn populations find themselves, the ease with which fear and insecurity may be manipu- lated is not surprising. When specific incidents—attacks, asset raids, rapes—do occur, they often escalate, producing grievances which live on sometimes for t is tempting to seek innovative approaches to generations. conflict management in Africa on the assumption Prendergast explains that there are layers of causal- Ithat the failure of more traditional methods is in ity to local conflicts in the Horn, ranging from the large part responsible for ongoing conflict. But three legacy of the divide-and-rule policies of colonial and projects funded by the United States Institute of Peace post-colonial regimes and rebel groups; to what he demonstrate that more traditional methods may not calls the pathological modernization pursued by and have outlived their utility, especially when adapted to urged for many African states, which deepened in- modern realities. In addition, analysts’ emphasis on equalities and further warped national and local regional and national conflict often obscures the fact economies away from rational production and con- that many African conflicts are more localized, and sumption patterns. Other causes have included ma- that local conflict management is an essential ingredi- nipulation of ethnic rivalry as an easy vehicle for ent in addressing Africa’s civil wars. social mobilization and for political and economic gain, and demographic trends and shifts resulting THE HORN OF AFRICA from the violent accumulation of such assets as valuable land. This is producing a historic realignment of Based on his USIP-financed research on local conflict population and political power, fueled by a hyper- management in countries of the Horn—particularly exploitative quest for resource consolidation. Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia—John Prendergast of Less and less manpower and community support the Center of Concern and the University of Maryland is required to successfully wage war in the Horn. A concludes that local conflict in the Horn is growing small number of disaffected or opportunistic people increasingly intense and violent as arms become more can acquire sophisticated weaponry and, if backed by plentiful and state authority structures slowly erode. a few businessmen, elders, or politicians, can create In response, there is growing interest in local conflict serious instability. management and resolution processes, particularly There are numerous initiatives attempting to ad- those that draw on traditional approaches of inter- dress local conflict in the Horn. The focus of Prender- communal reconciliation. gast’s research has been on traditional processes, Prendergast asserts that local dynamics of violence mechanisms, and methods used by local communi- must not be forgotten, even in the context of serious ties to reduce and manage—and sometimes resolve— 17

conflicts at the sub-national level. These range from context of state erosion or collapse, or the achieve- councils of elders or chiefs (for example, the shir or ment of self-determination, as in the case of Eritrea. traditional assemblies in Somalia which use elders as External efforts at peacemaking, observes Prender- negotiators in close proximity to the location of the gast, are often thwarted for a number of reasons, conflict), local courts, kinship mechanisms, compen- including the erosion of the authority of traditional satory processes, and healing ceremonies. leaders and politicians, thus creating major difficul- There are many types of initiatives which might be ties in negotiating with legitimate community repre- used at any given time to address local conflict. Some sentatives who are able to implement agreements; the are initiated locally, some at the national level. They use of peace processes by negotiators and warring include such diverse undertakings as attempts to bro- parties to build their own reputations or fame; the in- ker peace by local NGOs and associations, such as the ternal logic of conflict, in which asset-stripping, pre- New Sudan Council of Churches in southern Sudan; dation, insecurity, and continued mobilization support for peace-building programming by such in- reinforce the authority of war leaders; and the gulf be- ternational NGOs as Search for Common Ground tween national processes and local implementation. and International Alert, which provide conflict man- These and other factors greatly hinder conflict management training, or other international organizations agement, particularly the initiatives of outsiders engaging in mediation, such as the conference USIP whose interests usually do not coincide with those of helped organize to bring together southern Sudanese local war leaders. factions. In other instances, relief and development In contrast, locally initiated conflict management agencies have changed their programs to incorporate and resolution processes often involve significant seg- peace-building objectives, like the peace education ments of local authority structures, and often signify initiatives of UNICEF, and national-level peace community desires for stability, enhanced produc- processes have attempted to address local conflict dy- tion, increased trade and other benefits which war of- namics, such as the UN efforts to broker peace in sub- ten denies to civilians resident in a war zone. For regions of Somalia during the intervention. Efforts conflict prevention and resolution processes to take have been made to build, strengthen, or expand jus- hold, Prendergast asserts, requires the participation tice systems at the district or municipal levels, of all segments of society. Traditional authorities (el- whether state-controlled or traditional, as in the re- ders and chiefs), women’s organizations, local institu- building of the system in Ethiopia. Local military lead- tions, and professional associations have critical roles ers have negotiated cessation of local hostilities, for to play in the development of grassroots peacebuild- example to bring about the Lafon Declaration in 1995 ing. in southern Sudan. There have been national govern- Some of the recent locally-initiated peace confer- ment policies devolving or decentralizing decision- ences and agreements which Prendergast has studied making authority to local levels, particularly in the in Sudan include grassroots peace conferences in Ethiopian federal experiment, and national govern- eastern and western Torit District which involved the ments redrawing boundaries to enhance ethnic ho- Catholic church and community leaders; the intra- mogeneity, such as in the redivision of Ethiopia’s Nuer peace conference described in the next section, regions. which involved the Presbyterian church and Nuer Other attempts to mitigate or resolve local conflicts chiefs; and the Dinka-Misseriya peace agreements in have involved businessmen in initiating or support- the transitional zone between north and south which ing conflict management processes to enhance trade have generally held since 1989, but are under ex- and other wealth-building opportunities, exemplified treme threat recently. by a myriad of examples from Somalia. Local elec- Local dispute resolution processes in Somalia have tions in Somalia have been designed to increase stake- included the peace and governance-building confer- holder participation. The Swedish Life and Peace ence held between February and June 1995 among Institute sponsored an October 1992 meeting to offer the Rahanweyne in the Bay and Bakool Regions, peacebuilding and problem-solving workshops and which helped tamp down intra-Rahanweyne violence, skillbuilding. Local conflicts have been contained but was not successful in its objective of deterring at- through greater support of civil institutions in the tacks by neighboring clan militias from Mogadishu, Gedo region, or the central regions. A series of peace 18

conferences in Absame areas in the Juba Valley have Nuer was contained within a geographical area under reduced intra-Absame conflict and aim to galvanize a the control of the SPLM/A–United. The larger context movement toward peace with neighboring Majerteen was the civil war between the rebel movements and in Kismayu and Marehan in Gedo region. Peace con- the government of Sudan, which has been fought over ferences sponsored by elders in Somaliland include thirty of the last forty years. the Erigavo peace conference which has kept the In July 1993 the leadership of the Presbyterian peace in Sanaag despite major external pressures, and Church of the Sudan and local chiefs made efforts the Boraama Peace Conference which maintained the to resolve this conflict among the Nuer but failed. peace in volatile Somaliland for nearly two years. SPLM/A–United also mounted a major intervention. Finally, a significant peace conference was held in A peace conference was then called to seek resolution. eastern Ethiopia. The Qabri Dahar conference in Re- The conference was initiated and implemented by the gion Five (the Ogaden), brought together a significant indigenous peoples with relatively little assistance cross-section of the political and traditional leader- from external parties, and held in Akobo during Au- ship of the Ogaden, stopped the planting of land- gust and September, 1994. It involved the active par- mines, reduced tensions between the army and local ticipation of hundreds of persons representing each population, drew many of the Ogadeni National Lib- of the two clans in conflict. The conference succeeded eration Front fighters out of the bush, increased com- in reaching agreement. merce, and temporarily brought some consensus Duany has drawn several lessons from his study of about the future of the region. the Akobo Peace Conference that may have wider ap- In the Horn, where vast areas are ungoverned in plicability in Africa. the conventional sense, it is evident that local political Particularly in a conflict over grazing, water, and fish- organizing is alive and well. Formal processes involve ing rights, the environmental conditions underlying basic questions about the distribution and limits of the dispute must be fully explored and understood if power, checks and balances, conflict resolution, etc. the basis for peace is to be identified. And where men have previously dominated the dis- Serious account must be taken of the philosophical cussion, women are becoming important agents of and religious ideas that lie behind the disputants’ un- conflict management in some locations. Internal derstanding of the world, how they think of them- schisms erupt regularly, often violently, but one or an- selves, and how they relate to one another and to other kind of peace initiative almost always emerges outsiders. This means that third-party participants in in response. the mediation process must either be knowledgeable about the cosmologies and theologies or be thor- A CASE FROM SOUTHERN SUDAN oughly briefed by those who are. For example, the Nuer system of order is based upon a covenantal the- Wal Duany of the University of Indiana is analyzing a ology that in turn informs the structure of civic bod- conflict which occurred in southern Sudan in 1993, ies. The fundamental guiding principle expected to based upon his role as participant observer in the sub- govern behavior is “to do unto others as you would sequent peace process. The conflict occurred between have others do unto you.” the Lou Nuer and the Jikany Nuer, who fought each Methods of conflict resolution should be drawn other as they competed for grazing lands, water, and from the traditional culture with the guidance of tra- access to fishing pools. It is probably the most de- ditional leaders. This includes communication styles, structive internal conflict in the history of the Nuer leadership choices, methods of negotiation, participa- people: approximately 1,300 people were killed, tion of parties to the conflict and the third-party, deci- 75,000 cattle raided, and as many as 150,000 people sion-making structures, the system of recompense for displaced by the fighting. wrongdoing, determination of wrongdoing and ap- This intra-ethnic conflict must be viewed within propriate punishment, processes for remorse, confes- the context of a larger conflict between two rebel sion, forgiveness, and reconciliation, and rituals for movements, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Move- marking closure and new beginnings. ment/Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLM/A) and The underlying structure of social institutions and the SPLM/A–United, currently known as the South the principles guiding interaction must be under- Sudan Independence Movement/South Sudan Inde- stood. These are particularly important in relation to pendence Army (SSIM/A). The conflict among the the rules and relationships that govern property 19

rights, marriage and the role of women, and kinship THE ROLES OF CHIEFS AND THE ties as resources for settling disputes. CHURCH IN GHANA Peace resolutions must address not only root causes of the conflict but make provision for institu- Professor Maxwell Owusu of the University of Michi- tional arrangements that can successfully implement gan has been undertaking an Institute-assisted study agreements. This can be aided by cultural revitaliza- of the role of chiefs and the church in conflict manage- tion of traditional systems of order, justice, and wel- ment in Ghana. Since the late nineteenth and early fare. twentieth centuries, if not long before, with the Understanding the system of governance and lead- growth of towns, the expansion of Christianity, and ership is critically important. Among the Nuer, lead- the establishment of colonial rule, Ghanaian society ers are drawn from and are responsible to the people, has witnessed the spontaneous and continuous although ultimately all are responsible to God. The growth of hundreds of voluntary associations in rural key leadership systems from the parties in conflict and urban areas, many of them with membership that must be a part of the conflict resolution process. In cuts across ethnic, religious, and occupational lines. this case, that included the elders, custodians, age-set Two surveys of Accra (in 1953–1956) and Sekondi- leaders, women leaders, civil administrators, rebel Takoradi (in 1948) shortly before independence attest military personnel, indigenous militia, Christian to the proliferation and growing importance of volun- church leaders, and traditional religious leaders. tary organizations with both modern and traditional Much of the internal political history of the Nuer roots in Ghana and to the vibrancy of the evolving revolves around the balance of power among those civil society. Most of the sixty-seven mutual benefit who are seen as representatives of God’s will and societies with Christian-inspired names like “Perfect those whose authority stems from the people. This Peace Society” and “Society of God” were more than fundamental division of powers is crucial and is re- thirty years old at the time of the Accra survey in the flected in modern Nuer society in the deference early 1950s. The Christian Council of Ghana was es- shown in conflict resolution processes to those recog- tablished in 1929, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference nized as representatives of religious bodies. Those in 1950, and the most recent, the Ghana Pentecostal vested with significant moral authority must be at the Council, in 1969. Many of the early voluntary associa- heart of the process. In this case that included the tra- tions and their members were mobilized for the strug- ditional custodians, leaders of the Christian churches, gles leading to Ghana’s independence in 1957. the women leaders, elders, age-set leaders, and tradi- The Christian Council of Ghana is a fellowship of tional religious leaders. over a dozen non-Pentecostal Christian denomina- Understanding of traditional conflict management tions in Ghana, representing a large majority of the 62 processes is essential. In the case of the Nuer such percent of Ghana’s population which is Christian. Its processes include the convocation of assemblies of role is advisory and it acts through consultation and people, councils of elders, aggregation of age-sets, reli- cooperation among its constituent church members. gious associations, and functional organizations of The Catholic Bishops’ Conference meets annually to citizens. discuss urgent matters facing both the church and the The peace process must be seen as a long-term nation, and declares the church’s position on these is- process of cultural and human interaction between sues. The Ghana Pentecostal Council represents the traditions and modernity, not as a quick fix for a par- fastest growing Christian churches, over seventy-eight ticular conflict. different sects in Ghana today. The leadership of these The involvement of international organizations or three Christian bodies are among the most respected governmental agencies needs to be kept to a minimum and influential persons in Ghanaian society. and strategically employed to address specific gaps in Before the Proclamation of 1874, which established the process and not as a substitute for indigenous the British Crown as the central authority in Ghana leadership. In this case external parties usefully pro- (then the Gold Coast), the supreme executive, legisla- vided food and other relief assistance for the partici- tive, military, and judicial power for the maintenance pants, some assistance with transportation, and some of law and order, peace, and justice was vested in the funding for conference supplies, as well as travel for natural rulers—kings, chiefs, and elders. The chiefs’ international participants and for documentation of statutory functions today include membership and the process. participation in judicial and other capacities in regional 20

and national houses of chiefs whose existence is the re- Ghana where the timely intervention of church leaders sult of constitutional provision and statutory enact- reduced the escalation of political conflicts by delaying ments. Importantly, under customary law, a chief is the implementation of controversial policies, allowing “father” of the state, the leader of his people. Among tempers to cool and time to reconsider positions and other things, the chief is duty-bound to promote peace, move toward compromise. The peacemaking motives order, and good-neighborliness in his domain; to settle of Christian leaders were based on a conviction that disputes extra-judicially; and to promote reconciliation the maintenance of law and order was essential for between his subjects, providing a social framework for the spread of Christianity, the promotion of socio-eco- the management or settlement of a broad spectrum of nomic development, and spiritual and material well- interpersonal and communal disputes. Ghana’s 1992 being. Constitution recognizes this “fatherly” conflict man- Clearly, according to Owusu, Ghanaian respect for agement role of chiefs, and provides for their non-parti- the establishment and preservation of peace, order, san, active involvement in national affairs. There are and justice is based on theological, moral, and cul- over 32,000 recognized chiefs providing local leader- tural values. This foundation supports the pattern of ship in every hamlet, village, town, and city throughout controlling norms for the constitutional and social or- Ghana. Chieftaincy and the Christian church, along ganization of the country and a pervasive respect for with their various organizations, are the two oldest, orderly and harmonious existence rooted in the sanc- most enduring, ubiquitous, representative, influential, tity of ancestral family traditions, chieftaincy, and and truly national institutions. Their leadership is nat- Christianity. Thus, disruptive chieftaincy disputes urally crucial for peace, order, stability, and Ghana’s that threaten personal safety, security, peace, and or- overall development. der are grave matters of wide concern. Official state publications describe Ghana as a Church leaders and chiefs speak out clearly against Christian country even though there exist significant repressive and unjust laws and warn government and and influential minorities of non-Christians—Muslims the general public against actions that do not pro- and votaries of traditional religions. The national mote unity, reconciliation, and harmony, but create ethos justifies this self-image of Ghana as a Christian— rancor, resentment, and bitterness. The Ghanaian or more correctly, as a deeply religious—country, pas- public expects, indeed demands, the exertion of the sionately protective of her good name. The Ghanaian beneficial moral influence of the church and chief- ethos, with roots deep in ancestral traditions and taincy on state policies and actions. In the 1950s, the Christianity, disapproves of any form of avoidable Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Ghana intervened conflict or disorder in society, and considers the delib- and mediated the bitter, violent struggles between fac- erate provocation of conditions that stir up conflict tions of the Convention People’s Party and the Na- and threaten peace immoral, evil, or sinful. tional Liberation Movement in Kumasi, and helped to Accordingly, there is a long history of church or bring about a more peaceful transition to indepen- missionary intervention for peace and order in seri- dence. In the 1990s the churches and chiefs again ous political and social crises in Ghana. Christian acted as mediators in the protracted conflict between quarters, churches, and homes of clergy have long the government and opposition groups. been regarded as places of refuge, sanctuary, and It demonstrates the enormous moral authority and peace for individuals persecuted by society or victims influence exercised by the church in Ghana that on of inhumane customary practices. Chiefs’ palaces and May 17, 1992 the chairman of the ruling Provisional local shrines have served similar functions. National Defense Council used a church service plat- As early as the 1850s African church leaders in form to apologize to the whole nation and especially Ghana maintained a policy of not taking sides in to the families who in one way or another had been disputes between British colonial officials and local wronged by government action and policies, a coura- chiefs and people, remaining as neutral as possible geous and important symbolic act in Ghana’s transi- and ready to take the role of peacemakers and honest tion to democracy, which was well-received. The brokers, mediating to bring about reconciliation be- churches also organized national prayers to ensure a tween warring factions, and between government and violence-free and peaceful democratic transition. sections of the national populations. There are numer- Owusu’s principal conclusion is that the church ous examples in both colonial and post-colonial and chieftaincy in Ghana have contributed to the 21

evolution of a national culture favoring a national self- the UN. Communities were given insufficient time to image and vision that embodies a healthy paradox— agree on the basic principles for clan relations within it fosters both a mild form of nationalism based on the new district structures. The UN also too rigidly humane values and the acceptance of the best that in- imposed the formula for council structure and mem- digenous as well as foreign cultures have to offer. bership, including the provision that each must have Ghanaian patriotism has nurtured a national moral twenty-one members. And the councils were not effec- consciousness that encourages inter-ethnic, inter- tively linked to traditional clan structures and were religious, and inter-regional harmony by cultivating sometimes seen as rival organizations. Relationships every significant primordial, personal, sacred, and between the councils and such traditional authorities civil tie. In the Ghanaian popular view, a good Fante, as chiefs, religious leaders, and elders were not de- Ewe, Kokomba, or Asante, or a good Muslim or Chris- fined prior to the establishment of the councils, and tian, cannot be a bad Ghanaian—the virtues are recip- remained confusing after their creation. rocal. Indeed, Owusu concludes that Ghanaians have In Somaliland, the peace process was inspired and been remarkably successful due to enduring tradi- driven by traditional leaders and resulted in the estab- tions which build Ghanaian patriotism on the strong lishment of local peace accords within an informal framework of local, regional, communal, ethnic, and political structure. This included the formation of an sectarian ties and affinities. overarching assembly of elders which has played an active and recognized role as mediator throughout THE FORMATION OF DISTRICT the region. While Heinrich concludes that the much COUNCILS IN SOMALIA more successful process in Somaliland evolved with almost no outside intervention, the process in Soma- With strong encouragement from the UN starting in lia was heavily influenced by external forces, many of 1992, the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) of Sweden has whom did not fully understand Somali society and been supporting local initiatives for peace and recon- social structure. ciliation in Somalia, the largest component of which is The councils were expected to collect local taxes, support for rebuilding local district and regional ad- but when district residents recognized that the coun- ministrative structures. The organization of these cils could not deliver services, they generally stopped councils was authorized by the 1993 Addis Ababa paying taxes. In addition, most local NGOs failed to Agreement between Somalia’s various rival factions. coordinate activities with the appropriate district LPI’s training program for members of district coun- councils, thereby undermining the councils’ legiti- cils is the only NGO program which has operated on macy. Difficult relations also existed between the a country-wide scale in Somalia in recent years. With councils and local police forces. grant support from the Institute of Peace, LPI com- Despite these shortcomings, the fact that the coun- missioned a German anthropologist, Wolfgang Hein- cils have continued to function in most parts of Soma- rich, to undertake an evaluation of the effectiveness of lia with only very limited UN support is an indication its approach to conflict management. that the councils are perceived as useful by the local Heinrich’s study concluded that the councils have communities. Where councils have attained some generally not turned out to be effective mechanisms level of legitimacy it usually results from a mutually for local conflict management, though in some cases supportive relationship having been worked out be- they provide an effective institutional framework for tween the council and the traditional clan authority the management of everyday life at district level. In structures. Heinrich anticipates that when national general, traditional clan authorities, using traditional political structures are once again established in So- methods of negotiation, continue to bear primary re- malia, the district councils should receive additional sponsibility for handling local conflicts, with the new resources, and they will enjoy enhanced legitimacy councils playing an important supportive role. and authority as intermediate structures which can Several factors account for the councils’ limited ef- mediate between local communities and the national fectiveness. First, they were too hastily organized by government. 22

and military strategies and balance. They must take account of the risk that unequal inputs given to opposing sides will intensify tensions. Proper timing of intervention is key; e.g., it is counterproductive to provide food aid during harvests. Planning for community participation should be a major factor in HUMANITARIAN AID building internal accountability. The chain of incon- sistent accountability begins with poor planning, and AND CONFLICT war economies are reinforced as a result. Agencies need appropriate education on the local context, 6PREVENTION through knowledgeable personnel, literature, and other resources. This helps reduce mistakes which fuel conflict. Conduct appropriate and independent assessments of need. Improper assessments leading to inflated population figures or a misunderstanding of the local food economy usually result in an environment where diversion of aid is easy. Assessments must an- swer the question of why people are vulnerable. Agen- cies must talk to widely diverse people and organizations during assessments, at a variety of LESSONS FROM THE GREATER HORN times, in order to get a clearer picture of the situation. Assessors must strive to meet minority groups and In most complex political emergencies, humanitarian women, and demand independence to the maximum aid is by far the most important arena of grassroots in- extent possible. Assessors need to ask not only what a teraction between the international community and community needs, but what it is already doing and the conflicting parties. Emergency assistance can fuel build on that. conflict and dramatically influence its dynamics.4 Ig- Study options for modes of access. The right choice noring the wider impact and potential of humanitar- between the various methods of negotiating and en- ian aid removes one of the most important policy suring access can help lessen the likelihood that aid instruments for preventing the escalation of conflict will exacerbate conflict. Among the options are nego- and for promoting long-term peace-building. tiated access, cross-border operations, military protec- With assistance from an Institute of Peace grant, tion, or commercial channels. John Prendergast of the Center of Concern has re- Be astute and flexible in the types of aid provided. searched these issues and developed a conceptual Certain kinds of assistance are more “lootable” than framework for preventing conflict escalation and others. A food’s market value, for example, can play a building peace with humanitarian assistance. Its four major role in whether it draws the interest of military key elements are integrating humanitarian principles forces and looters. An important rationale for increas- more fully into the emergency response regime; applying the ratio of non-food to food inputs is the lack of ing lessons from the field that can help prevent the ex- military utility of most non-food rehabilitative aid. acerbation of conflict by humanitarian aid; developing The responses of outside actors should be guided by conflict prevention and peace-building elements which what already works at the local level, what structures can be incorporated into humanitarian aid strategies; are in place and supported by the community, and and pursuing humanitarian aid conditionalities linked what the indigenous social welfare mechanisms and to conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution. kinship exchange dynamics are. According to Prendergast’s analysis, those who Study effects of targeting and distribution methods. plan to provide humanitarian aid in crisis situations Agencies must attempt to understand local patterns must of political and social marginalization to develop ap- Seek deeper analysis in the planning process, and propriate targeting and distribution methods. There diversify information sources. Donors and humanitar- are usually great differences in suffering along class ian organizations must ask how aid affects economic and identity lines. Navigating along these fault lines is 23

critical in minimizing the strengthening of warring and such manifestations of war as refugee flows, with parties. Flawed distribution systems facilitate diver- very little investment in peacemaking and preventing sion. Getting aid directly into the hands of families— the expansion of the war. Donors and operating agen- especially women heads of households—denies cies can move beyond treating the symptoms of crises military authorities an opportunity for easy diversion. and use aid to mitigate conflict and address the eco- At the local level, women should be involved in the nomic disruptions at the root of the emergencies. If planning process and identification of beneficiaries to employed more strategically, aid might be able to con- the maximum extent possible. Where the opportu- tribute to longer-term processes of peacebuilding. nity exists, alternatives to armed factions should be Aid has great potential for addressing some of the cultivated and supported through distribution mech- factors which ignite tensions, according to Prender- anisms which give priority to women’s groups, techni- gast’s report. Some promising possibilities include cal committees (water, health, food, etc.), and Creating intercommunal or cross-line aid commit- traditional leaders where appropriate. tees. In areas where communities or contesting militia Commit to independent monitoring and evalua- groups have frequently clashed and created emer- tion. A commitment to independent monitoring and a gency needs, priority should be given to the creation willingness to conduct continuous program evalua- or support of intercommunal mechanisms to discuss tion are key elements in reducing aid’s contribution emergency needs. Strengthening cross-line communi- to conflict. The more sophisticated warring parties be- cation may have no impact on the warleaders, but per- come in manipulating aid for their ends, the more crit- haps will lead the peace-seeking elements of ical is frequent evaluation of the effects of agencies’ neighboring communities to see mutual interests in humanitarian interventions. cooperation. With communication and cooperation Prioritize engagement and capacity-building. Ca- partially restored, neighbors can continue to trade, pacity-building in divided or collapsed states can sup- graze animals, and maintain other ties even while war- port grassroots governance, a tool of preventive leaders continue to fight. diplomacy. Providing training and other support can Promotion of intercommunal trade and exchange. enhance the professionalism of local authorities, Trade and exchange mechanisms are often the most which in turn may increase local populations’ stake in important means through which communities can them, enhancing local stability. In the context of survive times of conflict-induced scarcity. Economic emergency programming, there are many opportuni- exchange between communities keeps lines of com- ties to support indigenous non-governmental forms munication open. This is critical for addressing mis- of social organization. In every society, there are tradi- perceptions about the intentions of neighboring tional mechanisms of kinship and self-help which are communities. Operating agencies can encourage and often the primary contributors to a community’s sur- support these exchanges. vival in a complex emergency. Addressing the economic roots of conflict. Conflicts Integrate human rights monitoring, advocacy, and which have their roots in competition over resources capacity-building objectives. More attention should are obvious candidates for interventions which seek focus on building indigenous capacity to deal with to resolve the underlying resource-driven tensions. human rights abuses in a society. Early warning of Using aid in a manner which reduces local violence famine must systematically incorporate the human can ultimately produce greater gains than the direct rights surveillance which it now parallels, in order to benefits derived from the distribution of commodi- detect such human rights violations as forcible reset- ties. Local recruitment of militias is often fed by failed tlement, attacks on markets, and resource thefts that development and limited economic opportunities. In- are as crucial as weather monitoring in predicting vestment in those regions might draw back some of famine. The mandates of most operational agencies these militia to civilian life in their home areas. The prevent them from speaking out aggressively on hu- greater the potential for trade, the more vested inter- man rights issues, but many can provide key informa- est will develop in efforts to create stability and re- tion to human rights monitoring groups. There duce violence. should be greater coordination between those that Planning for peacebuilding. Some agencies are can speak out publicly and those that cannot. already bringing conflict resolution specialists into In most internal conflicts and complex emergen- planning and evaluation processes to advise on how cies, humanitarian agencies respond to the casualties the agencies can contribute to peace. Agencies can re- 24

main open to responding in ways that will support local reconciliation, including local peace conferences. Encouraging indigenous peace-building capacity. Emergency interventions can support local peacemakers by virtue of who the agencies adopt as local partners. The most important means to promote sustainable reconciliation is to build a peace con- stituency. Aid organizations should be particularly sensitized to the emergence of women’s groups which challenge conflict and promote peace and human rights. 25

eral community to reestablish a productive lifestyle and be reintegrated into the community. These structures were so widespread that every town and refugee camp Nordstrom visited in eight different provinces of Mozambique offered these or similar conflict resolution and resources, “to take the war out” of people who had been affected by it. The remarkable thing about these Mozambican CULTURE OF PEACE peacebuilding processes, Nordstrom reports, was that they were spontaneous and indigenous, not insti- 7 tuted through such formal structures as governmental or social services or forged by professionals or community leaders. They were developed across communities—including places so war-torn they were bereft of all formal infrastructure. She concludes that this culture of conflict resolution and peacebuilding has been largely responsible for the success of the Mozambique peace accords. This development in Mozambique was all the more remarkable when Nordstrom contrasted Mozambique with Angola. The country-wide culture MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA of peace which emerged in Mozambique was truly a powerful force in the ability to achieve and maintain Most of the cases described here involve external in- peace. Angola, on the other hand, does not show such tervention and focus on specific mechanisms to make a developed and shared culture of peace. While she and build peace. But in some settings intervention found in Angola pockets of the kind of culture she dis- and peacebuilding mechanisms are less important covered in Mozambique, they did not extend across in promoting peace than are broad cultural patterns. the country to link various political and conflict A mutually-reinforcing configuration of beliefs, pat- groups. Angolans knew what she was talking about terns, and practices may come to pervade a society when she asked these questions, but they explained which promotes and reinforces peace. that conditions in Angola had not yet allowed such a With grant support from the Institute, Carolyn culture to develop fully. Nordstrom of the University of California at Berkeley One could conclude that Mozambique was unique has discovered what she terms a “culture of peace,” rein forging such a sophisticated culture of peacebuild- inforcing progress toward peace and reconciliation in ing, or postulate that such a process can be achieved Mozambique, and concludes that other war-torn in any war-afflicted country. Nordstrom does not countries can generate a similar kind of culture. Nord- have firm empirical data to support either conclusion, strom reports that in the years she worked in Mozam- but her data suggest that the process discovered in bique, from 1988 to 1996, she carefully documented Mozambique can be replicated in any other war-af- the development of a popular culture concerned with flicted country. Moreover, the vast majority of An- conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She concluded golans she talked to said there were many areas where that she could show how this culture was developed such conflict resolution and peacebuilding ideologies and transmitted countrywide—across the many cul- existed in Angola to build on. tural and language groups, across gender and class Part of Mozambique’s success came through recog- groups, throughout Mozambique. Virtually every lo- nizing that war left a devastated country and a war- cale had an informal group that made sure any arrival traumatized population. The hundreds of who had been exposed to violence was seen by a Mozambican traditional doctors Nordstrom inter- health care practitioner for physical ailments, treated viewed said that people exposed to war learned vio- by a counselor for emotional problems, taught how to lence, aggression, and revenge as a way of life, and resume peacetime existence, and helped by the gen- would continue these actions in their lives unless they 26

were reeducated to peace. Every community she visited had resources to reeducate people. And in most places every person affected by the war was invited to use these resources, from the level of the individual seeking medical consultation, to primary schools where teachers instituted classes in healing the trauma of war for all students. Many NGOs were also encouraged to realize that the peace process and the rebuilding of society had to take into account the trauma the society had sustained. 27

NOTES

1. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1988), pp. x-xi.

2. Robin Luckham, “Faustian Bargains: Bringing Military and Security Establishments under Democratic Control,” in Robin Luckham et al., Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).

3. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics.

4. See David R. Smock, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa, (Washington: USIP Press, 1996), and John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy: Hu- manitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). 28

Maxwell Owusu is a professor of anthropology at the BOUT THE AUTHORS University of Michigan and author of many books and articles on African topics, including Uses and Abuses of Political Powers: A Case Study of Continuity and A Change in the Politics of Ghana.

John Prendergast is director of the Horn of Africa Pro- ject at the Center of Concern and a visiting fellow at the Elizabeth Cabot is Executive Director of the Minority University of Maryland. He is author of several books on Rights Group (USA) and previously represented Minor- Africa including Frontline Diplomats: Humanitarian Aid ity Rights Group (International) at the United Nations. and Conflict in Africa.

Herman Cohen is Senior Advisor to the Global Coali- Barnett Rubin is director of the Center for Preventive tion for Africa. He served in the State Department and Diplomacy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Security Council for a total of thirty-eight chairs the Burundi Policy Forum. He formerly taught at years, ending his career as Assistant Secretary of State for Columbia University and is the author of books on African Affairs from 1989 to 1993. Afghanistan and India.

Wal Duany is a faculty member at Indiana University. Sir John Thomson is chair of Minority Rights Group He was formerly a cabinet minister in the Upper Nile Re- (USA) and spent thirty-seven years in the British Diplo- gion of the Sudan and a member of the University of matic Service. He served as British ambassador to the Juba Council. United Nations, under-secretary of the Foreign Office, and head of the policy planning staff of the Foreign Wolfgang Heinrich is a German anthropologist and a Office. specialist on the Horn of Africa. Since October 1995 he has been a consultant to the Swedish Life and Peace In- stitute to evaluate its peacemaking program in Somalia.

Eboe Hutchful is professor of Africana studies at Wayne State University and previously taught in both Nigeria and Ghana. He has authored several books on Africa and edited The Military and Militarization in Africa.

Julius Ihonvbere is associate professor of African politics at the University of Texas at Austin. He has authored or edited thirteen books on African topics.

Gilbert Khadiagala is assistant professor of comparative politics and Africana studies at Kent State University. He authored Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975-1993.

Robin Luckham is at the Institute of Development Stud- ies, University of Sussex. He is the author of several books on the military in Africa, as well as the law and lawyers in Africa.

Carolyn Nordstrom is on the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley. Her book on war and peace in Mozambique will be published in 1997.

Hibaaq Osman is the Director of the Centre for Strategic Initiatives of Women in Washington, D.C., as well as a Senior Fellow of the Center for Political Leadership and Participation at the University of Maryland. 29 ABOUT THE EDITOR

David Smock is director of the Grant Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and Coordinator of the In- stitute’s Africa activities. He lived in Africa for many years as a staff member of the Ford Foundation. He has authored and edited six books on African topics. 31 ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s board of directors is appointed by the Presi- dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman President: Richard H. Solomon Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C. Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C. Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 1) Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (Peaceworks No. 2) From the Managing Chaos conference: Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3) Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4) NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5) Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6) Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 7) Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis by Vesna Pesic (Peaceworks No. 8) Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism by Denis McLean (Peaceworks No. 9) State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile by Wendy Hunter (Peaceworks No. 10) Zaire: Predicament and Prospects/A Report to the Minority Rights Group (USA) by J. C. Willame et al. (Peaceworks No. 11) Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to the Post–Cold War World by Colonel J. Michael Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis (Peaceworks No. 12) Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict? by Milton J. Esman (Peaceworks No. 13) Police Functions in Peace Operations by Roxane D. V. Sismanidis (Peaceworks No. 14)

Peaceworks No. 15. First published April 1997.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

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