CREATIVE APPROACHES TO MANAGING CONFLICT IN AFRICA Findings from USIP-Funded Projects Edited by David R. Smock UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONTENTS Summary v 1 Innovative Diplomatic Initiatives 1 2 NGOs Engaged in Preventive Action 5 3 Democratic Reform and Reform of African Militaries 8 4 Training for Peacemaking 14 5 Building on Locally-Based and Traditional Peace Processes 16 6 Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention 22 7 Culture of Peace 25 Notes 27 About the Grantees 28 About the Editor 29 About the Institute 31 v chaos and tragedy that warring African countries are not the norm. Nor will the existing wars last forever. Many wars have ended, and even in countries where tension and violence still prevail there are impressive examples of efforts to manage conflict. This publication identifies some programs, pro- jects, and interventions that have succeeded, and indi- cates the wide applicability of some. Lessons are SUMMARY drawn from each case about how either to replicate successes or turn past failures into future success. Case material is drawn from many parts of the African continent—from Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Uganda, Zaire, Mali, Benin, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The cases cited are not isolated anecdotes, but provide empirical findings linked to broader theories of peacemaking. - Innovative American Diplomatic Initiatives Her- man Cohen asserts that the United States has a special image in Africa and in turn a unique role to play in peacemaking and peacebuilding there. To he purpose of this essay is to share some play this role effectively, the State Department’s lessons of projects which have identified or im- Africa Bureau needs to make full use of U.S. em- Tplemented innovative approaches to managing bassies in key African countries; give American Africa’s conflicts, and examine their potential applica- ambassadors in the field maximum leeway; coopt bility to other conflicts there or elsewhere. All the pro- the U.S. national security community in its efforts; jects described in this Peaceworks have been start early; and bring multilateral agencies into the supported by grants from the U.S. Institute of Peace. process at an early stage. Each of the directors of these Institute-assisted pro- jects was asked to distill project lessons regarding - African Mediation Gilbert Khadiagala points out peacemaking in Africa with applicability beyond the that the greatest strength of African mediators lies specific cases dealt with in their projects. Their state- in their proximity to the disputes and their under- ments were then edited and adapted for inclusion in standing of historical context. But neighborly in- Peaceworks. terest does not necessarily translate into capacity for effective mediation. African mediators often do INNOVATIVE APPROACHES not have the necessary information available to them to be effective. The use of heads of state as The need for innovative approaches to managing con- mediators is usually constrained by their inability flict in Africa is immediately evident from daily head- to devote the extended time that intensive and lines about war and killings in such countries as prolonged mediation requires. Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Zaire, and Somalia, and growing tensions in others such as Nigeria. - NGOs Engaged in Preventive Action Barnett In assessing the state of war and peace in Africa one Rubin describes the effect of the Burundi Policy must, however, balance the daily tragedies in these Forum in assisting NGOs to form innovative part- countries with the impressive achievements of peace nerships with governments and multilaterals that and increasing normalcy in others like South Africa, are trying to limit further violence in Burundi. Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Eritrea, and Zim- Elizabeth Cabot and Sir John Thomson report babwe. The fact that there are remarkable stories of on a collaborative project between the Minority successful peacemaking in many African countries Rights Group and the United Nations in planning helps to remind the predictors of continent-wide a strategy for the UN and other external powers to vi help reverse the process of state and societal col- the importance of local peace initiatives in the lapse in Zaire. Their principal recommendation is Horn countries which use the traditional peace- that priority be given to the stimulation of civil so- making roles of elders and rely on traditional ciety in Zaire from the grassroots upward. The peacemaking methods. Wal Duany describes a role of external actors should be limited to that very significant peace process in 1993, built on of catalyst, offering information and modest traditional practices, organized to manage intra- financial support. ethnic conflict among the Nuer of southern Su- dan after 1,300 people had been killed. Maxwell - Democratic Reform and Reform of African Mili- Owusu describes the critical peacemaking roles taries Julius Ihonvbere argues that religious con- of traditional chiefs as well as church leaders in flict in Nigeria largely arises from political Ghana. Wolfgang Heinrich reveals the very lim- manipulation, and that the most effective means ited effectiveness of the introduction of district of managing it is through the introduction of gen- councils to manage conflict in Somalia during uine democratic reforms. Robin Luckham points 1993-95, primarily because the councils were out that the democratic transition underway in viewed as rivals of traditional clan structures, as many African countries must include special at- well as because the UN was too rigidly prescrip- tention to the future role of African militaries, tive and hasty in its efforts to organize them. civil-military relations, and consideration of whether the military is best controlled by exclud- - Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention Pren- ing it from politics or by recognizing and institu- dergast outlines a series of guidelines to ensure tionalizing its political role. Eboe Hutchful that humanitarian aid contributes to peace rather describes the instructive process through which than exacerbating conflict. Aid givers, he says, Ghana’s civil authorities have achieved democra- need to do independent assessments of needs, be tic control over Ghana’s military. The process was astute and flexible in the types of aid provided, facilitated by the fact that Ghana’s democratically study the effects of targeting and distribution elected president has a military background and methods, commit to independent monitoring brought special knowledge of the military to his and evaluation, and promote intercommunal civilian leadership. trade and exchange. - Training for Peacemaking Hibaaq Osman de- - Culture of Peace Carolyn Nordstrom points out scribes the effectiveness of a training program for the degree to which a “culture of peace” that rein- Somali women in conflict resolution and the im- forces progress toward peace and reconciliation pact it is having at village and district levels. The has developed in Mozambique in the post-settle- most notable finding is the impact that women ment period. She also contrasts Mozambique can play as peacemakers even in a male-domi- with Angola, where no parallel culture of peace nated society like Somalia. has appeared. - Building on Locally Based and Traditional Peace Processes John Prendergast illustrates 1 conflict were unique. In addition, the countries’ politi- cal and economic systems differed widely and the conflicts were at different stages when the Africa Bureau launched an initiative. Nevertheless, there are some general conclusions worth drawing from the Bureau’s experiences in dealing with these conflicts. NNOVATIVE First, says Cohen, working-level decision-making I and willpower can make a difference. As assistant sec- DIPLOMATIC retary, Cohen decided to push the policy envelope as much as possible. He and his colleagues pursued a 1INITIATIVES highly activist approach, with considerable energy ex- erted by American embassies in Africa, and with ex- tensive personal diplomacy by American diplomats. The Africa Bureau also engaged in a vigorous policy of bringing other national security agencies on board. (If the Africa Bureau had decided to pursue a relatively passive policy, higher political levels would probably not even have noticed, much less criticized them.) While the Bureau did not justify its activist approach as “vital to U.S. national security interests,” Cohen and his colleagues were able to demonstrate that they could pursue their goals within existing resources uring the 1980s and early 1990s, the and without damaging other U.S. interests. The high- United States was the most active and effec- est-level policymakers understood this approach, had Dtive diplomatic force in efforts to resolve confidence in their judgment, and let them proceed. Africa’s many civil wars, though after the debacle in The United States has a special image in Africa Somalia, the United States has progressively with- that no other country has. The sole remaining super- drawn from its activist program and more of the bur- power exercises a special influence in Africa, particu- den of peacemaking has been passed to Africans. One larly in conflict situations where frightened project examining diplomatic initiatives draws protagonists need psychological bolstering by a neu- lessons from American intervention in Africa during tral entity. The experience of the Africa Bureau in the the Bush administration, and another assesses