Attempts at Geopolitical Restauration
Chapter 4 Attempts at Geopolitical Restauration Apart from aspects of the empire’s internal politics (imperial ideology, divi- sions within the Constantinopolitan court elite, problematic imperial- Venetian relations) our astrological corpus also contains information regarding Baldwin ii’s foreign politics, especially on relations with the Castilian court. The estab- lished view on the Latin empire’s geopolitical position within the Byzantine region (Balkan, Aegean, Asia Minor) under Baldwin ii is that Constantinople and its dependencies were waiting to fall into the hands of the Nicaean em- peror comme un fruit mûr, as Jean Longnon has so eloquently put it: a pas- sive existence with an inevitable outcome.1 This, however, negates the fact that on the diplomatic level the emperor and his entourage in the 1240s and 1250s continued developing one project after another with a range of international partners with the aim at maintaining and ultimately restoring his empire: the 1237–1240 crusade (with papal support), the alliance with Konya in the early 1240s, the Cuman alliance in the 1240s, the diplomatic relations with the Mon- gols in the 1240s and 1250s (which appear to have inaugurated a “Black Sea policy,” as John Giebfried has suggested, although this presumably was pre- dominantly a Venetian attempt to dominate trade in the region), the project involving the Order of Santiago in 1245–1246 (again with papal support), the 1248 campaign in the Constantinopolitan region, the re-establishment of a more active imperial policy vis-à-vis the Latin Orient (Cyprus and Syria- Palestine) in the context of the Seventh Crusade (1248–1254), a possible mar- riage alliance with Trebizond in the 1250s (with the French king Louis ix mediating), and the “grand alliance” between Achaia, Epiros, Sicily, and Con- stantinople in 1257/58–1259.2 This dynamic diplomacy—although not always 1 Longnon, L’empire latin de Constantinople, 186.
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