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UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY ORDER OF BATTLE: GULF ALLIANCE - GULF AND TIJUANA CARTELS (OSIEL CÁRDENAS GUILLÉN AND BENJAMIN ARELLANO FELIX)

27 APRIL 2007 UPDATE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico are under siege as 2007 begins. Felipe Calderón, inaugurated as president of Mexico on December 1, 2006, took immediate action against the cartels by sending Federal police and troops into the state of Michoacán. Within days, there were arrests of senior members of the major DTOs, including men affiliated with the Gulf Alliance. This group, an alliance of the Gulf and Tijuana Cartels (the Tijuana Cartel is also known as the Arellano Félix Organization, or AFO) and some smaller DTOs, represents one major side of the ongoing war between the cartels in Mexico (the other major antagonist is the Sinaloa Alliance, consisting primarily of the Sinaloa and Juarez Cartels). In recent years, the Gulf Alliance has been difficult to track, due to the imprisonment of its primary leaders, its volatile and fluctuating nature, and the growth of its enforcer branch Los Zetas. As a result of the recent government action, its situation is even more unstable. To survive, it will have to regroup and battle for its position. It is far more likely that Los Zetas or another element of the Gulf Alliance will become dominant. (U//FOUO)

Many senior leaders of the Gulf Alliance have been imprisoned, and some, including the head of the Gulf Cartel, have been extradited to the United States. However, operations of the affiliated organizations continue. Within the partnership, the Gulf Cartel had been ascendant, largely as a result of the growing strength and presence of Los Zetas, which was begun by a group of former Mexican special forces troops who switched their allegiance from their country to the head of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén. The Gulf Alliance is battling for control of drug smuggling routes along the U.S.-Mexico border and routes and markets in Mexico. The violence that is characteristic of the cartels is now spilling over the border into the United States. The destabilization caused by the Mexican enforcement action is likely to increase the level of violence throughout Mexico, as the DTOs try to eliminate rivals, eliminate enforcement personnel, reestablish their primacy, and reorganize with new leadership, and as elements of this cartel battle each other. (U//FOUO)

Besides the immediate issues of DTO violence, crime, and drug trafficking, there is also concern that their smuggling routes may be attractive to terrorist organizations for bringing materiel and operatives into the United States. While it is generally accepted that there is no ideological affinity between the DTOs and Islamist terror groups, it is possible that the DTOs would contract their services to other organizations for the right price, as they do now with affiliated traffickers and other smugglers. To date, there is no evidence that this has occurred. (U//FOUO)

As with all such alliances, various groups and leaders may move in and out of the alliance umbrella. (U//FOUO)

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COMPOSITION

This alliance between the Gulf Cartel,1 which began operations out of Matamoros, Reynoso, Miguel Aleman, and Monterrey on the Gulf of Mexico (it once controlled nearly all trafficking into east Texas from Colombia around the Gulf of Mexico and the Yucatan peninsula), and the Tijuana Cartel,2 which has operated out of Baja California on Mexico’s west coast (and once controlled all drug routes into California), was created by the cartels’ respective leaders, Osiel Cardenas Guillen (“El Mata Amigos,” literally “the friend killer”) and Benjamin Arellano Felix, in a jailhouse agreement after their arrests.3 Until recently, the two had adjoining cells; to some degree, each has continued to exert influence, if not control, over their operations. (U//FOUO)

Of the two, in recent years the Gulf Cartel has been more organized, more violent, and dominant. (U//FOUO)

Each cartel has a corporate, hierarchical structure that includes state bosses, enforcers, transport bosses, and retail dealers, along with a host of support operations, including lookouts, surveillance, and communications. Structure is somewhat fluid given the vagaries of arrests, deaths, and injuries; this also allows for a steady flow of replacements and fairly constant upward mobility in the ranks. As of the first quarter of 2007, this alliance was particularly unstable, with most of the senior leadership of the Tijuana Cartel behind bars in Mexico or the United States4 and the Gulf Cartel’s Cardenas Guillen extradited and awaiting trial in the United States. (U//FOUO)

IDEOLOGY

The overriding interest of the alliance is to increase wealth and amass power in the interests of creating wealth. (U//FOUO)

Despite the prevalence of death images in Mexican culture (for example, annual Day of the Dead celebrations and profuse representations of skeletons in folk art), some recent reports have suggested a cultural connection between the DTOs and the worship of La Santa Muerte, usually described as a cult-like devotion to “Saint Death.”5 Statuettes of the figure—a robed skeleton holding a sickle—can be found in many Mexican shops on the border. Alleged worship of the figure, combined with promises made by DTOs that the family of anyone who dies in service of the cartels will be provided for, and recent use of beheadings as a tactic, have been cited in support of a cultural connection between DTOs and radical Islamist terrorism. (U//FOUO)

However, this most likely reflects local cultural characteristics overlaid with traditional organized crime behaviors (e.g., caring for the families of dead “soldiers”) and the unwitting influence of news and electronic media. Television news reports have inadvertently proliferated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used elsewhere (i.e., in Iraq) to disparate groups around the world, even while censoring the most gruesome material. The Internet has been a mechanism for radical groups to disseminate to the general public unedited video of beheadings and other tactics, which may serve as inspiration for other criminal and terrorist groups. (U//FOUO)

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OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

The Gulf Alliance has aimed to expand its markets and control the drug supplies and routes to, through, and from Mexico into the United States. The strategy is simply to eliminate those who stand in their way by cooption, bribery, intimidation, and assassination. (U//FOUO)

TARGET SELECTION

Government officials, including police authorities and elected officials, may be offered bribes for assistance or for looking the other way when confronted with the group’s activities. In 1997, bribes were estimated at $6 billion annually for all DTOs;6 they have undoubtedly increased since then. Bribes may be monetary or goods and services. If bribery does not work, the next step is usually intimidation in the form of threats or attacks on the targeted individual’s property or associates, including family. Those who still resist are subject to kidnapping, torture, and execution. The choice for officials, and increasingly for journalists, is commonly called plata o plomo—silver or lead, money or a bullet, life or death.7 (U//FOUO)

Examples of “plomo” carried out by Mexican DTOs include the following:

• On 13 June 2005, Edmundo Fernández Corral was executed on the outskirts of Ciudad Juárez. His assailants were not identified. He had been the Chihuahua Municipal Chief of Police Special Forces for less than nine hours. 8 • On 16 June 2005, Pedro Madrigal was shot and killed outside his home in Mexico City. Madrigal had been a member of the Policia Federal Preventiva (PFP, Federal Preventive Police) for nearly six years. In November 2004, he became Coordinator for PFP activities at the Mexico City International Airport. Subsequently, the PFP’s efficiency grew. In June 2004, Madrigal discovered 300 kilo of cocaine hidden in boxes containing winter clothing. The boxes had come from Colombia. Madrigal also developed a reputation for spotting illegal aliens and their traffickers.9 • In February 2006 the newsroom of the daily newspaper El Mañana was stormed by two gunmen with semi-automatic weapons and a grenade. A reporter was critically injured.10 The newspaper’s editorial director was murdered in 2004.11 • On Saturday, 21 April 2007, Durango state police commander Sergio Munoz was abducted as he left his house. At least 10 gunmen in two SUVs grabbed him. Following the abduction, two police officers manning a roadblock were killed in a shootout. Munoz’ body was dumped on a dirt road 250 miles north of Durango city.12

In early 2006, the Inter American Press Association rated northern Mexico along the U.S. border as the most dangerous place in Latin America for journalists. The Arellano Felix Organization is believed to have been behind the murder of Francisco Ortiz Franco, editor of the prominent magazine Zeta, which covered drug dealing extensively. (U//FOUO)

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Besides deterring enforcement, actions of this sort terrify the general population, discouraging them from going to the authorities and instead forcing them to cooperate with the cartels. (U//FOUO)

In addition to the kidnapping, torture, and murder of government officials and journalists,13 the narcotraficantes have also attacked performers.14

In November and December 2006, singer Valentín Elizalde was shot and killed in Reynosa after performing a song sympathetic to the Sinaloa Cartel; Javier Morales Gómez, of the musical group Los Francisco Ortiz Implacables del Norte, was Franco murdered in Michoacán state (the group had recorded songs about the Arellano Félix family); and threats have been made against the Tucanes of Tijuana, who have sung the praises of Sinaloa traffickers. Recently, threats and taunts, along with Valentín Elizalde video of Elizalde’s autopsy, have shown up on YouTube.15 As a result of the attacks and threats against musicians, concerts have been cancelled and disc jockeys have avoided playing songs by particular artists.16 (Songs about the drug trade and traffickers are known as narcocorridos and are an outgrowth of Mexico’s tradition of corridos, ballads that often relate local history.)17 (U//FOUO)

To expand markets and control routes, the Gulf Alliance targets other drug or criminal organizations that it believes are obstructing its business operations.18 This has been going on across Mexico and has become increasingly vicious, with torture and execution, including beheadings. There are also reports of bodies being thrown from airplanes, although it appears that this is a means of disposal for the dead rather than an execution method.19 (U//FOUO)

INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

Each cartel has a variety of operational organizations. Some have specific functions— transportation units, wholesale and retail sales units for distribution, money laundering units, and enforcement units (hit squads). Others may gradually become vertical organizations—mini- cartels dealing with all aspects of the business from production to street sales. These often evolve from the hit squads. (U//FOUO)

The most significant enforcement group in the Gulf Alliance is Los Zetas,20 affiliated with the Gulf Cartel. Los Zetas’ influence is growing, and the group is the likely successor to the Gulf Cartel; a separate Universal Adversary Order of Battle examines this group. Others groups of sicarios (hitmen) are Los Texas21 and Los Chachos,22 although occasionally Los Chachos, or another group with the same name, reportedly have worked with the Sinaloa Alliance. (U//FOUO)

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LOS TEXAS

Los Texas,23 a border gang in Coahuila and Tamaulipas with cells in San Antonio and Laredo, TX, has been run by Arturo Martinez Herrera, “El Texas,” from his prison cell. He is currently serving a 36-year sentence. Besides drug dealing, Los Texas is involved in kidnapping, violent enforcement for the Tijuana Cartel, and perhaps smuggling of illegal aliens. In 2000, Mexican authorities raided the prison La Loma in Tamaulipas, where many members of Los Texas were held. They found cocaine, marijuana, U.S. and Mexican currency, three 12 gauge shotguns, and “a number of sharp-edged weapons.” Some cells were welded shut so that they could not be searched by the authorities. Mattresses had been set on fire to keep officers from entering the prison. There was also a security monitoring system run from the cell of Guillermo Martinez Herrera (presumably Arturo’s brother). The gang also had a number of safe houses outside the prison. Sixteen officials, including the prison director, guards, and wardens, were held under suspicion of cooperating with the Los Texas inmates. (U//FOUO)

Los Texas has had a long rivalry with Los Chachos and engaged in a shootout with Los Zetas in February 2003.24. (U//FOUO)

LOS CHACHOS

The role of Los Chachos25 is somewhat more ambiguous than those of the other groups. Los Chachos began as a transborder car theft ring, and then turned to drugs. It was originally based in Anahuac, Monterrey, and Reynoso, with 50–60 core members. In the mid-1990s, it was one of two drug gangs that controlled the city of Tijuana.26 Two of its leaders were allegedly assassinated by the Cardenas Guillen faction in 2002, perhaps because there were signs it was aligning with the Sinaloa Cartel. It is believed to have reorganized under new leadership aligned with the Arellano Felix faction. Los Chachos was run by a former Judicial Police officer, Dionisio Román García, who was killed by Arturo Guzmán Decena, the first leader of Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel’s hit squad. This was allegedly the first task put to Los Zetas by Cardenas Guillen, who resented Los Chachos’ efforts to establish themselves in Ciudad Miguel Alemán, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and Reynosa, all Gulf Cartel plazas. (U//FOUO)

LOS ZETAS

Los Zetas are the most significant paramilitary group associated with this alliance. Unlike the others, the founding Zetas had a strong military background and brought the cartel a level of discipline and training not previously seen.27 Los Zetas have increased their role in the Gulf cartel to such an extent that, in conjunction with the arrests of senior leaders of the Gulf Alliance, they may be in a position to carry on the battle against the Sinaloa Alliance in their own right. Therefore, they warrant a separate Universal Adversary Order of Battle. (U//FOUO)

LA FAMILIA

La Familia is believed to be associated with the Gulf Cartel. Several days before the murder of singer Valentín Elizalde, it bought a half-page newspaper ad in Michoacán blaming other DTOs for the bloodshed in the area. La Familia, also known as La Familia Michoacana, gained some

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prominence in late 2006 with proposals to limpiar (clean) the state of all DTOs trafficking in methamphetamine.28,29 (This propaganda effort is reminiscent of ads by Sinaloa Alliance operative Edgar “La Barbie” Valdéz Villarreal, which claim that the police and other officials were demanding payments from him.) This call effectively was directed against the Sinaloa Alliance, which has become a major methamphetamine producer, serving both the U.S. and Mexican methamphetamine markets. La Familia reportedly has 4,000 members in the 113 cities of Michoacán, and each “employee” has a $1,500−$2,000 monthly salary. It employs only natives of Michoacán and operates like a modern business entity; indeed, it refers to itself as la empresa (the enterprise). It spends $1.5 million a month on bribes. Whether this is the same Familia that is believed to have tossed five severed heads onto the floor of a bar in Uruapán in September 200530 is unclear; there appear to be at least two groups in Mexico that have been called La Familia. La Familia may have provided an anonymous tip to the Mexican government of a shipment of ephedrine on a Chinese ship. The container holding the ephedrine, a precursor for methamphetamine, was seized on December 6, 2006 before it could be sent on to ”super labs” in Michoacán. (The Drug Enforcement Administration defines a super lab as a laboratory “capable of producing 10 pounds or more of methamphetamine within a production cycle,” and believes that about two-thirds of methamphetamine in the United States comes from these larger labs which are increasingly in Mexico.)31 (U//FOUO)

Across all the DTOs, once an individual or group reaches a certain level of achievement or leadership, they are potential competitors to higher-ranking members within the cartel. This rivalry may even transcend family bonds. Leaders work to control and co-opt potential rivals, and to prevent the perception that they are weak or ineffective. It is significant that both Cardenas Guillen and Benjamin Arellano Felix have apparently maintained a high degree of control over their organizations from their prison cells, at least until recently. Arellano Felix has a large family, and various members have taken over operations as the need arises. It is believed, for example, that his sister Enedina is running this cartel following the arrest in 2006 of their brother Francisco Javier Arellano Felix.32 Cardenas Guillen has had the expertise and loyalty of Los Zetas, although there are recent signs (especially since his extradition to the United States) that Los Zetas are operating more independently. Both Benjamin Arellano Felix and Cardenas Guillen are believed to have had access to cell phones while in Mexican prisons (as noted below, Mexican authorities are now making efforts to block cell phone signals to and from prisons), and both were allowed visitors, who may have been directly associated with their respective DTOs. (U//FOUO)

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL TIES

External and inter-organizational ties include suppliers in South America (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela), transshipment alliances with organizations in Central America,33 and wholesale/retail arrangements with domestic gangs in U.S. cities.34 There are also indications of links to Russian organized crime in Mexico.35 The Arellano Felix brothers have been accused of meeting with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the leftist rebel group in Colombia. A recent shipment of methamphetamine precursors was seized on a vessel from China36 (it is uncertain which drug group in Mexico was expected to receive the shipment). (U//FOUO)

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In July 2006, a Peruvian judge was assassinated by alleged hit men from the Tijuana Cartel as he ate at a restaurant near his office in Peru. Peruvian officials believe the order to kill the judge came from a prison holding members of the cartel.37 The judge was presiding over the trial of more than 20 men in Peru believed to be associated with the Tijuana Cartel.38 (U//FOUO)

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND STRENGTH

Since 2000, all of the Mexican DTOs have been attempting to expand their territory. The level of violence has increased along the U.S.-Mexican border, particularly around the “plazas” that serve as entry points to the United States, and has spilled over onto U.S. territory. Equally significant, Mexico’s increased role as a producer, processor, and transshipper and its growing population of drug users have led to previously unknown and vicious levels of violence within that country. Finally, current enforcement operations may significantly change the geographic locations and strength of particular groups. (U//FOUO)

There is no headquarters for either cartel in this alliance. Many leaders and lieutenants are in prison. Other members float in a network of operations, residences, and safe houses. (U//FOUO)

The Tijuana Cartel’s operations originally covered the area from Baja California to Sinaloa, but as a result of arrests, deaths, and the spread of the Sinaloa traffickers, their operations are now more limited.39 Despite this, elements of the cartel are present in the following states:

• Baja California Norte • Michoacán • Baja California Sur • Oaxaca • Sonora • Federal District of Mexico • Sinaloa • Puebla • Zacatecas • Quintana Roo • Nayarit • Chiapas (U//FOUO) • Jalisco

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States of Mexico

The group grows poppies in Sinaloa, Nayarit, Jalisco, and Michoacán, and processes the gum into heroin.40 (U//FOUO)

The Gulf Cartel controls most drug trafficking along the Gulf Coast of Mexico. It has been involved in a “robust action” to take over territory in the state of Nuevo Leon and the city of Nuevo Laredo. In 2005, the Gulf Cartel had a presence in as many as 22 Mexican states,41 including:

• Tamaulipas • Chiapas • Nuevo León • Tabasco • Veracruz • Campeche • San Luis Potosí • Tabasco • Jalisco, Michoacán • Yucatán • Querétaro • Quintana Roo • Oaxaca • Coahuila. (U//FOUO)

For dealing pharmaceuticals, the cartel has a presence in Sinaloa and Tijuana.42 (U//FOUO)

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Cities of Mexico

The Gulf Cartel accounted for 15% of the cocaine coming into the United States from Mexico between 1999 and 2002.43 Around the same time, the Tijuana Cartel supplied more than 30% of cocaine in the United States, either directly or by allowing others to use its routes for a commission.44 (U//FOUO)

Both groups, like other traffickers, have been extending their operations southward to vertically integrate their operations and supply a growing population of drug users in Mexico. This alliance is believed to have a presence in at least 22 Mexican states (estimates vary). Their alliance enhances their strength in states and cities where each already had a presence, and eliminates a source of competition and strife, at least as long as the alliance structure can be maintained. (U//FOUO)

TACTICS AND OPERATIONS

As the battle of the cartels has grown, tactics formerly used infrequently against those perceived as enemies or detrimental to drug trafficking have become strategically important to expanding the cartels’ areas of operations. Several subgroups, including Los Zetas, engage in kidnapping and hostage taking, torture, assassination, arson, raids, disinformation operations (to make it appear other cartels have committed crimes), intimidation, and psychological operations (as byproducts of the other activities) for the Gulf Alliance. To date, the subgroups have not engaged in significant seizures or sabotage, nor have they used or indicated an interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). (U//FOUO)

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

This alliance has kept the two cartels alive, although at this point the Tijuana Cartel has been hard hit by recent U.S. and Mexican enforcement efforts, and the Gulf Cartel’s subgroup Los

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Zetas appears to be slowly increasing its range and effectiveness, perhaps aiming to overtake the original organizations. (U//FOUO)

Control in specific areas, like Nuevo Laredo, fluctuates periodically between this alliance and its primary foe, the Sinaloa Alliance.45 (U//FOUO)

However, during this period of combat between the alliances, the percentage of drugs in the United States that come from or through Mexico has increased dramatically, indicating that even as DTO dominance changes, the market expands to accommodate all, at least temporarily,46 and the DTOs have the manpower and other resources to fill any gaps in supply lines. The 2006 National Drug Threat Assessment suggested that although the amount of drugs coming into the United States was relatively stable, the purity of cocaine—the largest segment of the drug market—might have declined.47 This implied some success in interdiction, although far more members of the apparently weaker Gulf Alliance than of the Sinaloa Alliance have been arrested. The 2007 National Drug Threat Assessment, however, noted that coca production was higher than previously estimated; cocaine availability in the U.S. was essentially unchanged; methamphetamine production had migrated to Mexico as a result of domestic enforcement; Mexican heroin had made inroads in southeastern and Midwestern states; and marijuana potency has increased as a result of Mexican crops derived from California marijuana strains.48 According to the report, the amount of cocaine “lost or seized in transit toward the United States” has doubled from 2000 to 2005.49 This all suggests that interdiction efforts have had little effect. In addition, Mexican DTOs have “areas of influence” in at least 31 U.S. States, from California to New Hampshire and Texas to North Dakota.50 Their agents of influence may be domestic or local gangs with connections to the cartels, rather than actual cartel members. (U//FOUO)

According to Martínez, the Tijuana cartel had lost (as of early 2005):

• two leaders • seven financial operatives • 10 lieutenants • 43 hit men • 33 public officials • 7,367 collaborators and distributors.51 (U//FOUO)

These numbers have been augmented considerably with the recent arrests of several members of the Arellano Félix family. (U//FOUO)

At least 36,000 individuals associated with drug trafficking have been arrested in Mexico in recent years,52 many from this alliance. Undoubtedly more will be detained if the Mexican government continues the crackdown begun in early 2007. Despite the combined effects of the war between the DTOs and the crackdown by the Mexican government, the best possible result is likely to be ongoing disruption of trafficking (rather than elimination or significant reduction), making the drug business more difficult. However, such disruption appears to come with the cost of increased violence in the general society. (U//FOUO)

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RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT

Radicalization is not applicable to the Gulf Alliance. (U//FOUO)

Recruitment is effected through family and social bonds. In addition, those without primary contacts of this sort are “recruited” through the appeal of wealth and power, a potent combination in a country with an annual per capita income of approximately $10,000 (2005 estimate).53 (U//FOUO)

TRAINING

There is generally no formal training; “recruits” learn the ropes on the job. Los Zetas reportedly have operated training camps for their recruits. (U//FOUO)

LOGISTICS

Despite an essentially hierarchical structure, the cartels and alliance exhibit network characteristics in the growing use of the internet and electronic communications (cell phone, satellite phone, radio communications) to arrange and track deals and operations. Elements of the cartels monitor and intercept police electronic communications. (U//FOUO)

Imprisoned leaders can relay information through their visitors, including attorneys, fake attorneys, fake human rights workers, and family, and, until recently, through cell phones (Mexico is in the process of installing equipment to block cell phone calls in its major prisons).54 (U//FOUO)

Government interference is dealt with through bribery, intimidation, and execution (plata o plomo”— the choice offered to officials). (U//FOUO)

The wealth provided by drug trafficking allows purchases on the legal and illegal weapons markets, access to sophisticated communications and electronic surveillance equipment, and purchases of other necessary tangible supplies. It also allows the corruption of government officials through bribes and favors. (U//FOUO)

Vehicles used by the paramilitary groups may be purchased or obtained through car thefts in the United States.55 (U//FOUO)

“Gatekeepers” keep an eye on the border and control the flow of drugs across the border. The gatekeepers are basically ground traffic controllers, coordinating shipments with their knowledge of logistics and of enforcement tactics. They are also responsible for collecting any “taxes” on drug or other shipments using the routes they control.56 Presumably this is done via electronic communications (cell phones, radios), and from lookouts, scouts and operators on the ground. (U//FOUO)

Members of all cartels have gone to ground in the past, hiding out in safe houses, isolated properties, and even such natural settings as caves. (U//FOUO)

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Although not the primary means of moving drugs, small aircraft are sometimes used to transport cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine within miles of the U.S. border, where they are offloaded and transported overland57 or through tunnels. The Tijuana Cartel has used backpackers to transport marijuana across the desert into the United States. (U//FOUO)

Among the vehicles used by the alliance are SUVs, pickups, and other vehicles, some armored and some reportedly equipped with smoke dispensers. Weapons include blunt and edged weapons, handguns, automatic rifles, fragmentation grenades, rockets, and rocket launchers. One leader of Los Zetas was arrested with a number of weapons, including an FN Herstal rifle with cartridges capable of perforating the strongest armor. In 2005, Mexican Federal police in Baja California (where Tijuana is located) seized more than 1,100 illegal weapons. Most were smuggled from the United States.58 One unconfirmed report has suggested that Mexican DTOs may have SA-7 shoulder-launched missiles.59 (U//FOUO)

Repatriation and laundering of funds generated by drug trafficking, like the trafficking itself, adapts to changing circumstances. DEA estimates that $8.3−$24.9 billion in wholesale proceeds is generated, removed, and laundered via bulk cash and monetary instruments smuggling, wire remittances, and the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Bulk cash smuggling is the primary method used.60 Drug proceeds smuggled into Mexico are deposited into casas de cambios (exchange houses) and then wire-transferred to accounts at U.S. or other foreign banks, essentially legitimating the funds. Armored cars bring the cash back into Mexico, where it is deposited into a U.S. bank account on behalf of a casa de cambio or financial institution. (U//FOUO)

Wire transfers are generally done in amounts less than $3,000 to avoid reporting requirements. (U//FOUO)

Some funds, instead of being deposited at casas de cambios in Mexico, are smuggled into other Latin American countries and may enter the BMPE. In the BMPE, drug proceeds (dollars) are exchanged for pesos. The dollars are then sold to importers who use them to purchase legitimate goods which are then smuggled across international borders as contraband. Using this method, banking, tariff and tax requirements are thwarted, and the drug proceeds are repatriated. (U//FOUO)

Open-system stored-value cards, which are similar to credit and debit cards, are becoming increasingly popular, as they require no documentation or identification and can have value added or withdrawn at ATMs. Other electronic means, such as electronic gold, are also used. (U//FOUO)

PERSONALITIES

As indicated, through the decades during which the cartels have operated, no single leader is dominant or indispensable; many others are available to move in as gaps are created. Alliances are fluid and can be broken over a difference of opinion about how to proceed or over deliberate action by one faction against another. Decision making is centralized as long as a leader is seen as legitimate; if that perception dissipates, a multitude of factions may arise. (U//FOUO)

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GULF CARTEL

Osiel Cárdenas Guillen (“El Mata Amigos,” “El Senor,” “El Costroso”)

Cárdenas Guillen heads the Gulf Cartel. Born May 18, 1967, he was facing various U.S. and Mexican charges when he was arrested after a shootout at his home in Matamoros in 2003. Cardenas Guillen may have been a state police officer at one 61 time. He was brought into the Gulf Cartel by its Osiel Cárdenas Guillen founder, Juan Garcia Abrego. He continued to run the cartel from his prison cell, despite being moved from La Palma (where his ally from the Tijuana Cartel, Benjamin Arellano Felix, was also incarcerated) to the Almoloya de Juárez prison. He reportedly nearly escaped from La Palma twice, along with Benjamin Arellano Felix and a kidnapper named Daniel Arizmendi (“El Mochaorejas”).62 On January 19, 2007 he was extradited to Texas to face charges of drug trafficking and murder.63 (U//FOUO)

Cárdenas Guillen integrated Los Texas into his organization, and he has been a major factor in the development of the internal market for illegal drugs in the Mexican cities of Reynosa, Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo.64 (U//FOUO)

Also while in prison, Cárdenas Guillen was rumored to be the sponsor of celebrations of Children’s Day. At a bullfight ring in Piedras Negras in 2004, as a tape recording lauded Cárdenas Guillen’s role in the event, children were given drinks and gifts, including bicycles. A similar party was held in Reynosa. In Tamaulipas, 17,000 adults and children at a similar celebration in the baseball stadium received cards noting Cárdenas Guillen’s sponsorship, even as they enjoyed clowns, music, and a wrestling match. In 2006, there was yet another celebration. Publicity announcing the party made profuse use of the letter “Z,” which local papers interpreted as a reference to Los Zetas.65 (U//FOUO)

At a recent court appearance in Texas recently, a reporter described Cárdenas Guillen as short, balding, and known to favor “a gold-plated .45-caliber pistol whose grips were decorated with ruby-encrusted panthers and skulls.”66 He is scheduled to be tried in Brownsville, TX in late 2007. The United States had offered $2 million for his arrest. (U//FOUO)

Miguel Treviño Morales

Described as the Gulf Cartel’s regional leader or gatekeeper in the Nuevo Laredo area, Treviño Morales is said to control at least five cells of assassins, about 15 per cell. In January 2007, an

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arrest warrant was issued in Texas for Treviño Morales in connection with a double homicide.67 (U//FOUO)

Eduardo (or Jorge) Costilla Sanchez (“El Coss”)

Costilla Sánchez is the head of the cartel’s operation in Matamoros and leader of a band of sicarios (paid assassins) called Los Sierra, which murdered a local reporter.68 This may be the same person sometimes listed as Jorge Costilla Sanchéz, who is also known as El Coss and who reportedly does not get along with the head of Los Zetas, Heriberto Lazcano. He was born in 1971. The United States is offering a $5 million reward for his arrest.69 (U//FOUO)

Arturo Guzmán Decena (deceased) Jorge Castillo Sánchez

According to one account, Guzmán Decena was a Mexican soldier who was reportedly trained by the Israelis in paramilitary operations. He left the army in 1998 at the age of 41 and began recruiting other military experts to form Los Chachos. Los Chachos were located in Ciudad Miguel Alemán, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros, and Reynosa. Another account claims he was a commander of the Federal Judicial Police in Reynosa prior to signing on with the Gulf Cartel.70 He became Z-1, the first leader of Los Zetas. He reportedly killed a police lieutenant in Reynosa, a journalist in Matamoros, a lawyer for the Carrillo Fuentes family in Monterey, and the leader of Los Chachos, Dionisio Roman García, among others. He was killed by Mexican soldiers at a fast food restaurant in Matamoros in 2002. (U//FOUO) . Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano (“El Lazca,” “El Verdugo”)

The third leader of Los Zetas, Z-3, Lazcano is a former member of Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFES), the Mexican special forces from which many of the original Zetas came. He is currently tasked with battling for the drug market based in Nuevo Laredo and extending into the United States via Interstate 35, and he lives in Ciudad Miguel Aleman. Lazcano is believed to be responsible for the murder of Francisco Ortiz Franco, co-editor of the crusading weekly Zeta de Tijuana, which reported extensively on DTOs. His primary operators are Cipriano Mendoza (“El Remy”) and Ernesto Zatarain (“El Taca”), both also ex-military.71 “El Verdugo” (The Executioner) reportedly likes to feed his victims to lions.72 There was an as-yet unconfirmed report that Lazcano may have been killed in early March 2007 during a shootout at a racetrack in Santa Fe, Veracruz.73 (U//FOUO)

Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillen (“Tony Tormenta”)

Cárdenas Guillen ran the cartel after his brother Osiel was captured, but was regarded as inefficient. He has been involved in the war against the Sinaloa Alliance. His group is known as Los Escorpiones.74 (U//FOUO)

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Antonio Arcos Medina (“El Tonon”)

Arcos Medina is responsible for operations in the state of Michoacan. He was wounded in 2006 in a shootout.75 (U//FOUO)

Dionisio Román García (deceased)

Román García headed Los Chachos until he was killed by the leader of Los Zetas. Román García was kidnapped in Nuevo León and executed in Tamaulipas. He had been with the Judicial Police. (U//FOUO)

TIJUANA CARTEL/ARELLANO FÉLIX ORGANIZATION (AFO)

Arellano Félix Siblings

Benjamín Arellano Félix (“Alberto Arredondo Zazueta,” “Licenciado Zatarain,” “El Min”) Benjamin and Ramón, prior to Ramón’s death in 1992 Born in the early 1950s, Benjamin is currently in La Palma, a Mexican prison, and is a prime candidate for extradition to the United States. He describes himself as a housing contractor. He and his brothers ran the Tijuana Cartel for more than a decade; brother Ramón, killed in a police action in 2002, was the cartel’s enforcer for many years. The Arellano Felix family was accused of the 1993 murder of Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo of Guadalajara, who some claimed was mistaken for rival trafficker Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, and of the Tijuana chief of police in 1994. Benjamin’s wife and Benjamín Arellano Félix, under arrest four children were born in the United States and reportedly now live in San Diego, for their protection after a disagreement between Benjamίn and Cárdenas Guillen.76 The uncle of the Arellano Felix brothers and their sister Enedina is Miguel Ángel Felix Gallardo, who began as a trafficker in Sinaloa. Felix Gallardo was arrested in 2002 for involvement in the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena. Upon his arrest, the Arellano Felix brothers got the western half of his territory. Benjamin was arrested in March 2002 in Puebla, Mexico. In July 2003, Benjamin and his brothers Eduardo and Francisco were indicted in the United States for racketeering, conspiracy to import and distribute drugs, and money laundering. (U//FOUO)

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The Arellano Félix organization has also been accused of dealing with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the late 1990s.77 While it is logical that Mexican traffickers would deal with Colombian producers, and FARC’s involvement in drug production and trafficking has been well-documented, claims that the Tijuana Cartel provided weapons in exchange for cocaine have not been publicly substantiated. (U//FOUO)

Francisco Javier Arellano Félix (“El Tigrillo”)

The youngest Arellano Félix brother, born in 1969, Francisco has tried to take the place of Ramón as head of the enforcers, but is said not to have the right personality. However, he is still regarded as one of the organization’s leaders,78 if only by name. He has been called a “playboy with a vicious streak” and “imprudent and violent.”79 When he was arrested in August 2006 in international waters off of Baja California, he tried to claim Francisco Javier Under arrest, he was someone else. He has been linked to Arellano Félix August 2006 20 murders in the United States and Mexico, in addition to drug smuggling, money laundering, and bribery. He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

Enedina Arellano

Enedina is the financial chief of a chain of drug stores, construction companies, hospitals, and hotels in Tijuana, Guadalajara, and Morelia. She has been accused of money laundering and is married to Luis Raul Toledo Carrejo, who also is part of the organization.80 At least one observer believes she actually “holds the reins” of the Tijuana Cartel.81 (U//FOUO)

Eduardo Arellano Felix (“El Gualin”)

A surgeon who runs his own clinic and a graduate of the Autonomous University of Guadalajara, Eduardo was an adviser to Benjamín82 and is one of his brothers. In 1998, he and his wife and two children were burned when a propane tank on a grill exploded at their home in Tijuana. The wife and children drove to a hospital in San Diego. Eduardo got by with Mexican treatment, as he was unwilling to risk arrest by crossing the border.83 He is expected to take on a more active role in the cartel now that Francisco has been arrested. He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

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Efraín Pérez Arciniega (or Pasuengo) (“El Efra”)

Arrested in 2004, Pérez Arciniega “directed and supervised the AFO’s counterintelligence programs for the AFO and was involved in multiple kidnappings and assassinations.”84 He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

Efraín Pérez Arciniega Jorge Aureliano Felix

Arrested in 2004, he is “a former Mexican police officer who conducted security operations, coordinated acquisition of armored vehicles and weapons, and collected taxes on behalf of the AFO from independent drug traffickers operating in Tijuana.”85 He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

Jorge Aureliano Felix

Manuel Martínez Gonzaléz

Arrested in 2002 with Benjamín Arellano Félix, he was in charge of money laundering for the cartel and of security for the Arellano Félix family.86 (U//FOUO)

Manuel Aguirre Galindo (“El Caballo”)

Aguirre Galindo was a founder of the cartel, negotiator with other groups, and confidante of Benjamin. He is believed to be semi-retired now and one 87 account has him living with his family in San Diego. However, in September 2006 the United States targeted his long-term financial Manuel Aguirre associates, including his son, Manuel Francisco Aguirre Ramos, in a Galindo money-laundering scheme involving several front companies. This action froze their assets and prohibited U.S. citizens and companies from doing business with the identified individuals and companies. The press release announcing this action stated that Aguirre Galindo was a fugitive.88 He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges.89 (U//FOUO)

Humberto Rodríguez Bañuelos (“La Rana”)

He is a principal lieutenant to Aguirre Galindo, and was arrested in 2001. (U//FOUO)

Gilberto Camacho Valles and Francisco Beltrán

These men are Tijuana Cartel operators in Tijuana. (U//FOUO)

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Arturo Villareal Heredia

Villareal Heredia was arrested in 2006 with Francisco Javier Arellano Félix and is described as an assassin for the cartel. He was believed to be in charge of enforcement operations and the transport of drugs through Tijuana.90 (U//FOUO)

Arturo Villareal Heredia

Marco Villanueva Fernández

Fernández was arrested in 2006 with Francisco Javier Arellano Félix and is described as an assassin for the cartel.91 (U//FOUO)

Gustavo Rivera Martinez

A gunman and bodyguard for Enedina,92 Rivera Martinez graduated from Bonita Vista High School in California and has Marco Villanueva Fernández relatives in the United States. After the arrest of Francisco Javier Arellano Felix, a U.S. law enforcement official told a reporter that Rivera Martinez was likely to share operation of the cartel with Eduardo Arellano Felix. Rivera Martinez has been in charge of day-to-day operations.93 He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering Gustavo Rivera charges. (U//FOUO) Martinez

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Gilberto Higuera Guerrero (“El Gilillo”) and Ismael Higuera Guerrero (“El Mayel”)

These brothers are the sons of the man responsible for transporting cocaine via small aircraft or go- fast boats. Both have been in custody in Mexico, Ismael since 2000 and Gilberto since August 2004 at La Palma.94 Along with Francisco Javier Arellano Félix and Efraín Pérez Pasuengo, Gilberto, who was responsible for security for the cartel leaders, has Gilberto Higuero Guerrero helped lead the battle against the Sinaloa Alliance.95 (This may be the same person identified as Gilberto Figueroa Guerrero who, with Carlos Francisco Cázares Beltrán and Guillermo López Palomera, operated for the cartel in El Valle and Tecate.) He and Ismael were extradited to the United States in January 2007. They are charged “as co-defendants in the Arellano-Felix drug cartel case, for racketeering (RICO), drug trafficking and money laundering offenses.” Ismael allegedly served as a chief lieutenant and was responsible for the cartel’s day-to-day operations in Mexico, including the transshipment of cocaine and marijuana into Mexico and onward into the United States, and the Ismael Higuero collection of payment. Ismael allegedly supervised drug shipments Guerrero and from Mexicali, Mexico, into the U.S, and also acted as an enforcer, Gilberto Higuero engaging in kidnapping, torture, and murder.96 Both men were indicted Guerrero in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

Zataráin Family

These family members are Tijuana cartel operators in Mazatlán, la Noria, and Culiacán. An apparent member of this family (based on surname) is allegedly a Zeta.97 (U//FOUO)

Pedro Avilés (deceased)

The family of Avilés controls Sonora. Avilés, now deceased, was a major drug trafficker in the late 1960s and 1970s. (U//FOUO)

Luis Valencia (“La Mona Peinada”)

The Valencia family has been linked in news reports to both the Tijuana Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel. Luis and his cousin Armando Valencia run a smaller cartel from Michoacán called the Cártel de Los Valencia. (U//FOUO)

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Marcos Arturo Quiñones (“El Pato”)

Arturo Quiñones is a former member of the Logan Heights gang of San Diego who was reportedly recruited in the late 1980s or early 1990s. He was born in about 1969. In 2002, U.S. authorities believed he was a key enforcer for the Tijuana Cartel, running a hit squad.98 He was arrested in 2003 in Tijuana. (U//FOUO)

Jaime Ocampo

Arrested in 2004 in Rosarito Beach, Baja California after a police pursuit of suspects in the abduction of two police officers, Ocampo lived in Chula Vista, CA. He reportedly confessed to kidnappings and killings for the Arellano Felix family. Two other men, Jose Roque (also from San Diego) and Erick Ballesteros, were arrested with him.99 (U//FOUO)

Ivonne Soto Vega (“La Pantera”)

This mother of two lived in Bonita, CA for many years and was arrested in Tijuana in 2001 under suspicion of money laundering for the Arellano Felix family.100 Subsequent reports claimed she was part of an operation that laundered at least $120 million for the family.101 (U//FOUO)

José Manuel Ruelas Martínez

An alleged money launderer, along with Soto Vega, Ruelas Martínez had a home in Chula Vista, CA. He was arrested in Mexico in 2003. The pair’s method was to take cash profits to Mexico hidden in cars. The cash was brought to money exchange houses that were registered with the Mexican government but never operated other than for the DTO. A representative of the exchange house would bring the money back into the United States, declaring amounts over $10,000 as profits from that business. Once it was declared, it could be treated as legal.102 Ruelas Martínez reportedly was connected to a photo business and a restaurant supply business. (U//FOUO)

Sergio Rubalcava Sandoval

Rubalcava Sandoval is a former Baja California state police commander who was arrested in 2004. He was believed to be a senior San Diego link for the Tijuana cartel. His Bonita, CA home was seized, along with two cars and a boat.103 (U//FOUO)

CULTURE

Like members of organized crime, Mexican drug traffickers often lead double lives. They may be devoted to their families, yet have a string of mistresses and illegitimate children. Ruthless with traitors and incompetents, they can be exceedingly generous with friends and subordinates. Good and evil as understood by most people are concepts that do not apply in this setting. The good person is the one who serves the organization, whereas the evil person is the one who does not. The law, the government, the military, and the police are all things to be eliminated or

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coerced through fear or greed to serve the traffickers, as are competitors. Mexican drug traffickers have a strong work ethic within the context of their goals and are dedicated to the pursuit of dominance of their markets, increased power, and financial wealth. (U//FOUO)

As with other criminal and noncriminal organizations, family members often join the family business. This is true, as noted above, for both the Gulf and Tijuana Cartels. Beyond this, loyalty is fluid and depends on the extent to which it is seen as paying off in greater wealth, power, and influence. (U//FOUO)

MISCELLANEOUS DATA

The two major cartels in the Gulf Alliance have been seriously wounded in their war against the Sinaloa Alliance by virtue of arrests and extraditions. However, subgroups in the alliance continue to fight against elements of the Sinaloa Alliance and Mexican government forces. Despite the fact that the Gulf Alliance has had the special military expertise of Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Alliance has been quite effective in attacking the established bases and routes of its enemy along the border. However, the Sinaloa Alliance has not yet established control. The continuing importance of Sinaloa and Sonora for production and transshipment of an array of drugs means that the Sinaloa Alliance can continue its smuggling operations through Arizona, if necessary, while working to deny other areas to the Gulf Alliance. Government enforcement efforts have chipped away at the capabilities of the Gulf Alliance, but Los Zetas are likely to survive both the government and Sinaloa. (U//FOUO)

During this period of combat between the alliances, the percentage of drugs in the United States that come from or through Mexico has increased dramatically, indicating that the market has expanded enough to accommodate all DTOs, regardless of which one is dominant at any given time. (U//FOUO)

In addition, despite the fact that 36,000 individuals associated with drug trafficking have been arrested in Mexico, including thousands associated with the Gulf Alliance, no significant dent had been made in the level of trafficking as of the end of President Vicente Fox’s term of office, in December 2006. This suggests that despite their problems, the DTOs have found effective means to thwart governmental efforts to control them. Whether they will be able to regroup after the offensive initiated by President Felipe Calderón remains to be seen. (U//FOUO)

The recent arrests and extraditions of members of the Gulf Alliance, which may lead to additional information on individuals connected to the group, combined with the structure of Spanish names (which often include the father’s surname followed by the mother’s surname), make Social Network Analysis a potentially useful tool in tracking alliance members. Such tracking could well extend beyond Mexico’s borders to identify connections in the United States and other countries. (U//FOUO)

THREAT TO CONUS

Drug abuse and related crime constitute a significant public safety threat to the continental United States (CONUS). (U//FOUO)

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Drug abuse carries familial, social, and criminal costs. Families suffer the emotional and financial burden of dealing with a member who is abusing drugs, and they may also be the victims of criminal acts, as the abuser needs money to sustain the habit. Society is burdened by public health costs and issues, and the need for protection (with its concomitant costs) from both drug abusers and the criminal acts of traffickers at all levels. (U//FOUO)

Of greater significance in this analysis, however, is the possibility that the shipping and distribution systems of the Gulf Alliance and successor organizations could be used by terrorists, including radical Islamists, to smuggle people or materiel into the United States. Although there is no evidence to date that this has occurred, it is a potential threat to national and homeland security. The major smuggling routes along the southern border of the United States—and by inference the routes most likely to offer success—are controlled by the Mexican DTOs, who charge fees or commissions for their use by others. There has been no suggestion that any of the DTOs pick and choose among potential customers; rather, if an individual or group can pay the fee, what they transport appears to be of no concern to the DTO. (U//FOUO)

This situation is complicated, however, by the current crackdown by Mexican authorities and to a lesser extent by American authorities. The DTOs have stepped up their violence within Mexico, with more kidnappings and murders than ever. Many of these are directed at Mexican officials. It is legitimate to ask how far the DTOs are willing to go to ensure their survival. Would they risk the destruction of the Mexican state, directly or indirectly? The men and in some cases women who run the DTOs are criminals, but they are not stupid. It is doubtful that the violence has yet reached a level at which they have to consider whether their actions truly threaten the survival of Mexico as a sovereign nation, but should it reach that point, one factor in their decision must be the likely U.S. reaction to chaos and lawlessness on the border, potentially creating a breeding ground for logistical and support sites for criminal and terrorist activity against U.S. entities. (U//FOUO)

On 21 September 2001, in an address to Congress and the American people, President George Bush said, “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”104 Recently, one ship carrying methamphetamine precursors from China was seized off Mexico, and another with millions of dollars worth of drugs destined for Mexico was seized off Panama. No open source information is available as to the extent to which these systems, to get drugs into Mexico, are controlled by the DTOs and are also available to “clients” for a fee, and although it is logical to assume this is possible, it is not currently reasonable to assume it is likely. However, should these routes be used to transport weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction, any U.S. response is complicated immensely by the friendly relations between the United States and Mexico. (U//FOUO)

In conjunction with that relationship, the United States is providing radiation detection equipment for several Mexican ports. These ports are taking on more shipping headed for the United States, as many U.S. ports, including those in the Los Angeles area, are at full capacity. The DTOs have probably established international shipping connections (most likely including recognized shippers, customs brokers, dockworkers and others within the industry). Drugs

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brought in via legitimate shipping through Mexican ports still require transport through Mexico and across the border. This is another possible route for extremists and their materiel. (U//FOUO)

There have been claims that Islamic terrorists have already been smuggled over the border, although to date none of these claims has been substantiated in open sources and the limited evidence for such claims is not compelling.105 In 2005, the figures for illegal alien apprehensions along the southern border were as follows: • 86.1% were Mexican. • 12.8% were from elsewhere in Latin America • 0.3% from Canada and China • 0.8% (9,041 individuals), from other countries including but not limited to countries “of special interest,” those most likely to be the points of origin for Islamic terrorists.106

In FY2005, across the United States, apprehensions of individuals from special interest countries included: • 55 illegal aliens from Afghanistan • 291 from Egypt • 153 from Indonesia • 165 from Iran • 165 from Iraq • 309 from Jordan • 125 from Lebanon • 5 from Libya • 39 from Algeria • 238 from Morocco • 792 from Pakistan • 40 from Saudi Arabia.107 (U//FOUO)

Most illegal immigrants are seeking political freedom or economic betterment, yet these numbers suggest that the DTOs have the potential to provide a service, wittingly or unwittingly, to those who wish to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in terrorist acts. (U//FOUO)

There is no indication that there are ideological or religious incentives or obstacles for the DTOs to service terrorist operators. Pragmatically, there are incentives in the form of fees paid, whether DTO cooperation is witting or not. Assuming the DTO is aware of the nature of any cargo or materiel it transports, the potential reaction of the U.S. government to any act of terrorism that had connections to Mexico might be a disincentive, although this is difficult to judge. (U//FOUO)

But what about terrorist organizations, particularly radical Islamic groups—would they be likely to operate outside of their own networks of small, trusted, compartmentalized groups? Are the Mexican DTOs likely partners for them? It may be improbable that there would be direct contact in which the Mexicans would be aware of the identity or ultimate goal of the extremists. What may be the most likely scenario is one in which any arrangements with a Mexican DTO are

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However, in early 2007, it is questionable whether any of the Mexican DTOs would be appealing to extremists. Enforcement efforts by both the Mexican and U.S. governments and the warfare between the DTOs make using any DTO a questionable proposition. Just as there is no evidence that such cooperation has occurred in the past, it is at least for the moment not likely to occur. (U//FOUO)

Developed for the United States Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Task Force, Preparedness Directorate, by Applied Marine Technology, Inc.’s Intelligence and Terrorism Analysis Group

Please contact Ms. Magdalena Bajll, Department of Homeland Security, at [email protected], with any feedback, comments or questions.

Endnotes

Composition 1 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf. 2 Ibid. 3 Stratfor, “Mexico: The New Kingpin’s Rise,” February 21, 2005, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/ read_article.php?id=244486. 4 “U.S. Official Cites Anti-Drug Strategy Progress in the Americas,” NewsBlaze, March 31, 2006, http://newsblaze.com/story/20060331090808tsop.nb/newsblaze/TOPSTORY/Top-Story.html. 5 Sara Carter, “Of Special Interest,” Inland Valley Daily Bulletin, December 29, 2006, http://www.dailybulletin.com/ beyondborders/ci_4917114.

Target Selection 6 “McCaffrey – Drug Lords Kill ‘Hundreds’ of Mexican Cops, Spend $6 Billion to Bribe Others,” Reuters, March 25, 1997, http://www.pdxnorml.org/032797.html. Also in “Drug War in the United States,” Congressional Record, March 9, 1999, quoting then-head of the Drug Enforcement Administration Tom Constantine. 7 Thomas S. Davidson II, CW4, “Operation Secure Mexico,” Foreign Military Studies, June 2005, Ft. Leavenworth, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/op-secure-mex/op-secure-mex.htm. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Letta Taylor, “Land of Outlaws,” Newsday, April 16, 2006. http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-wolare104704661apr16,0,3751762.story?coll=ny-worldnews- print 11 Diego Cevallos, “Mexico – Reporters Targeted by Drug Related Violence in Nuevo Laredo,” IPS, February 7, 2006, http://www.alterinfos.org/spip.php?article229.

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12 “3 police killed in northern Mexico,” Associated Press/MySA.com, April 21, 2006. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/MEXICO_VIOLENCE?SITE=TXSAE&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE= DEFAULT 13 James C. McKinley, Jr., “A War in Mexico: Drug Runners Gun Down Journalists,” The New York Times, November 6, 2002, http://www.periodico26.cu/english/features/war021106.htm. 14 Laurence Iliff, Alfredo Corchado, “Sour notes in drug-turf war: Mexican musicians targeted,” Seattle Times. December 19, 2006, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003484546-narcosongs19.html. 15 http://youtube.com/watch?v=v57bwSsUtjI. 16 Iliff and Corchado, op. cit. 17 It is unclear why singers and musical groups would continue to record songs that put them in jeopardy. A brief discussion of narcocorridos as information warfare is available at “INFO WARFARE, NARCOCORRIDOS, AND YOUTUBE,” April 9, 2007, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2007/04/info_warfare_na.html, It may be that some are receiving payments or threats from DTOs to continue their musical efforts. 18 Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, “Border Police Chief Only Latest Casualty in Mexico Drug War,” The Washington Post, June 16, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/15/ AR2005061502553.html. 19 http://www.impunidad.com is an outgrowth of the Inter American Press Association’s Unpunished Crimes Against Journalists project. http://www.impunidad.com/toplevel/fenixEn.htm. 20 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Armed group challenges Mexico’s police and army,” Special Warfare, May 2004, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_4_16/ai_n6361555.

Internal Structures and Organizational Dynamics 21 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf. 22 Ibid. 23 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf. 24 Mario A. Rodríguez, “El poder de los ‘zeta,’” Monografías.com, October 2006. http://www.monografias.com/ trabajos28/poder-zetas/poder-zetas/shtm. 25 Ibid. 26 Sara A. Carter, “Here we are prisoners,” San Bernardino Sun, December 8, 2006, http://www.sbsun.com/news/ci_4911458.

Training 27 Information on Los Zetas is slowly becoming available. This section was developed primarily from the following sources: Kaitlin Bell, “Long-sought Zetas gang ‘crony’ now behind bars,” The Monitor, December 2, 2005, http://www.themonitor.com/SiteProcessor.cfm?Template=/GlobalTemplates/Details.cfm&StoryID=10418&Section =Valley. Karen Black, “New Generation of Drug Lords Takes to Streets of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico,” Ft. Worth Star- Telegram, September 7, 2003. Jesse Bogan, “Guatemala troops tied to border drug war,” San Antonio Express-News, August 18, 2005, http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/crime/stories/MYSA081805.1A.cartel_trainers.17cd4a8d.html. Brendan M. Case, Alfredo Corchado, Laurence Iliff, “Officials develop clearer picture of Zetas,” El Universal, March 21, 2005, http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=9851&tabla=miami. Gustavo Castillo, David Carrizales, Martin Sanchez Treviño, Javier Valdez Cardenas, “Capturan en Monterrey a uno de los lideres de Los Zeta y a 25 personas mas,” La Jornada, August 17, 2005, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ 2005/08/17/005n1pol.php. Alfred Corchado, “Mexican Zetas Extending Violence Into Dallas,” Dallas Morning News, February 20, 2005, http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dws/news/longterm/stories/022005dnnatzetas.869f0.html. Alfredo Corchado, “Cartel enforcers operate in Dallas,” Dallas Morning News, December 13, 2005, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/longterm/stories/061905dnmetmimicourtsider1.222c83b4.html Alfredo Corchado, Lennox Samuels, “Video offers brutal glimpse of drug cartels,” Dallas Morning News, December 7, 2005, http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dws/news/world/stories/ DN-dvd_01int.ART.North.Edition2.13b62772.html. 25 UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Jorge Alejandro Medellin, “Ve EU in ‘Zetas’ gran amenaza,” El Universal, March 24, 2005, http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=123289&tabla=nacion. Juan Arvizy Arrioja, “Mexican Drug Commandos,” KPHO-News5, May 19, 2005, http://www.kpho.com/global/ story.asp?s=3366962&ClientType=Printable. “Mexican Soldiers Becoming Drug Cartel Hit Men,” Associated Press, June 21, 2005, http://www.newsmax.com/ archives/articles/2005/6/21/142208.shtml. Alberto Najar, “La tierra de nadie, la tierra de los narcos,” La Jornada, June 19, 2005, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ 2005/06/19/mas-najar.html. Claudio F. Orenday, “Operan en Baja California,” El Observador Diario, September 8, 2005, http://elobservadordiario.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=126. Silvia Otero, “Kaibiles entrenan a sicarios, confirman,” El Universal, October 31, 2005, http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=25140&tabla=primera. Manuel Pineda, “La hidra del narco ajusta cuentas,” Contralinea, 2005, http://www.contralinea.com.mx/c14/html/ sociedad/la_hidra.html. Jerry Seper, “Ex-Troops aiding drug traffickers,” The Washington Times, February 24, 2005, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050224-123713-6092r.htm. Mark Stevenson, “AP Exclusive Interview: Mexican Army Deserters Start War for Control of Border City,” Associated Press, October 11, 2003, http://www.rr-bb.com/archive/index.php/t-111517.html. Mark Stevenson, “Mexican police arrest alleged hitman in huge border town shootout,” Associated Press, October 29, 2004, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/10/30/news/nation/17_29_1910_29_04.txt. “Testimony of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims,” November 17, 2005, http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/ swecker111705.pdf. Bernard R. Thompson, “Mexican drug lords, influence and violence,” Mexidata.info, November 7, 2005, http://www.mexidata.info/id667.html. 28 “El costo de la ‘pacificación,” El Diario de Coahuila, December 3, 2006. http://www.eldiariodecoahuila.com.ms/ newsadmin/preview.php?id=12842. 29 Sam Logan, “The Curse of Methamphetamine in Western Mexico,” International Security Network, December 11, 2006, http://www.mexidata.info/id1165.html. 30 “Factbox – Facts about Mexico’s growing drug war,” Reuters AlertNet, November 30, 2006. 31 Timothy J. Ogden, Drug Enforcement Administration, “Fighting Meth in America’s Heartland: Assessing Federal, State, and Local Efforts,” Testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, June 27, 2005. http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct062705.html 32 Robin Emmott, “More women rule, and die, in Mexico’s drug gangs,” Reuters, April 20, 2007. Retrieved from signsonsandiego.com.

External Relationships and Inter-Organizational Ties 33 “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” March 2006, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/ inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/pdf/index.htm. 34 “Drugs and Gangs, Fast Facts,” U.S. Department of Justice, 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/13157/ index.htm. 35 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf. 36 Reuters, “Mexico police seize 20 tons of meth ingredient,” CNN, December 7, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/ WORLD/americas/12/07/mexico.meth.reut/index.html. 37 Alfredo Corchado, “Mexican drug cartels move into Peru,” Dallas Morning News, January 8, 2007. For additional background on Mexican drug traffickers in Peru, see also Angel Paéz, “Mexican Cartels Dig In Their Heels,” Inter Press Service News Agency, August 28, 2006. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34489 38 It is unclear from news reports whether the prison from which the orders to kill the judge came was in Peru or Mexico, although based on additional details derived from several reports it appears the prison was in Peru. If this inference is accurate, it raises questions about communications between the prisoners and other members of the cartel, whether in Mexico or Peru: why would it have been necessary for the orders to come through prisoners? The political situation in Peru at the time must also be considered. Vladimiro Montesinos, former top aide and spymaster for disgraced former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori, had been accused of accepting payments from Mexican 26 UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

cartels in exchange for allowing the uninterrupted flow of cocaine (see, for example, Paéz, op. cit.). It is possible that ascribing drug-related criminal activities to non-Peruvians and indicted former officials served political purposes of the current Peruvian administration. Without additional information, it is difficult to determine if the Tijuana Cartel in particular, and Mexican DTOs in general, are establishing their own operations in Peru or dealing with local operators.

Geographic Location and Strength 39 Robert J. Caldwell, “Winning the long battle against the Tijuana Cartel,” San Diego Union-Tribune, June 20, 2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040620/news_mz1e21caldwe.html. 40 Martínez, Abraham G., “Quién es quién en el narco en México,” La Critica, January 10, 2005, http://www.lacritica.com/mx/index2.php?option=content&do_pdf=1&id=837. 41 Gustavo Castillo Garcia, “La Guerra entre carteles, sin cuartel; 800 ejecutados en lo que va del año,” La Jornada, August 7, 2004, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/08/07/006n1pol.php. 42 Martínez, op. cit. 43 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf. 44 Ibid.

Tactics and Operations 45 James Pinkerton and Ioan Grillo, “The fight for Nuevo Laredo,” The Houston Chronicle, May 8, 2005, http://www.americas.org/item_1943.

Tactics and Operations 46 “National Drug Threat Assessment,” U.S. Department of Justice, February 2005, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/ pubs11/12620/index.htm. 47 “National Drug Threat Assessment,” U.S. Department of Justice, January 2006, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/ pubs11/18862/index.htm. 48 National Drug Intelligence Center, US DOJ, “National Drug Threat Assessment 2007,” October 2006. 49 Ibid, p.4. 50 Ibid., p.33. 51 Abraham G. Martínez, “Quién es quién en el narco en México,” La Critica, January 1, 2005. 52 Danna Harman, “Mexicans take over drug trade to US,” Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0816/p01s03-woam.html.

Radicalization and Recruitment 53 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/ 2004rank.html.

Logistics 54 E. Eduardo Castillo, “Federal agents take over second top-security prison to stem corruption, jailhouse crime,” San Diego Union Tribune, January 26, 2005, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/ 20050126-1521-mexico-prisonproblems.html. 55 Alberto Najar, op. cit. 56 Adam Beam and John Monk, “Drug pipeline flows from Mexico to S.C.,” Charlotte Observer, April 15, 2007. http://www.charlotte.com/115/story/86369.html; “Mexico: The Vital Role of ‘Gatekeepers’ in the Smuggling Business,” Stratfor, December 22, 2006. 57 Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency, “DEA Congressional Testimony,” U.S.House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, March 29, 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ pubs/cngrtest/ct032901.htm. 58 Oakland Ross, “Border No Barrier To Weaponry,” Toronto Star, April 24, 2006, http://www.mapinc.org/tlcnews/ v06/n514/a08.htm. 59 David Aponte, Juan Arvizy Arrioja, “Zetas might have missiles,” El Universal, February 12, 2005, http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=9397&tabla=miami. 60 National Drug Intelligence Center, “National Drug Threat Assessment 2007,” October 2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs21/21137/mlaund.htm. 27 UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Personalities 61 Alberto Najar, op. cit.; Associated Press, “Key Players in the Americas’ Drug Trade,” November 7, 2004, http://www.wtopnews.com/indes.php?nid=389&sid-613675. 62 Martínez, op. cit. 63 A list of those extradited on January 20, 2007 and some background on each individual is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/January/07_ag_030.html. 64 Ibid. 65 Frontera NorteSur, “Drug Dealers Sponsor Children’s Day in Mexico,” Mexidata.info, May 8, 2006, http://www.mexidata.info/id885.html. 66 Juan A. Lozana, “Boldness, violence kept drug kingpin atop Mexican cartel,” Dallas Morning News, February 9, 2007, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/APStories/stories/D8N6D3AO0.html. 67 Alfredo Corchado, “Drug turf war advances into ‘safest city in Mexico,” Dallas Morning News, February 12, 2007, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/021307dnintmonterrey.f933dd.html. 68 Alberto Najar, op. cit. 69 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Se busca por la FBI,” http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/fugitives/cei/costilla_j_spanish.htm 70 J.Jesús Blancornelas, “Arturo y Osiel,” Zeta, December 2002, http://www.suracapulco.com/mx/anterior/2002/ diciembre/03/opinion.htm. 71 Brendan M. Case et al, op. cit.; Alberto Najar, op. cit. 72 Alfredo Corchado, “Mexico vows to keep fighting drug trade,” Dallas Morning News, January 21, 2007. 73 “Indigan posible muerte de El Lazca, líder de Los Zetas,” El Milenio, March 6, 2007. http://www.milenio.com/tampico/milenio/nota.asp?id=472088 74 Alberto Najar, op. cit. 75 Ibid. 76 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/rewards/8707.htm; Deborah Amos, “How Officials Jolted a Cocaine Cartel,” ABCNews Nightline, September 28, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128536. 77 This has been reported by a number of media outlets but there has been limited evidence made public. On November 29, 2000, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher released a statement saying “The Office of the Attorney General in Mexico announced on November 23 that Mexican and Colombian officials have exposed a major link between the Arellano Felix Organization in Mexico and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The link was announced after Colombian Dr. Carlos Ariel Charry Guzman and Mexican Enrique Guillermo Salazar Ramos were ordered held for arrest and transferred to the Almoloya de Juarez federal prison in Mexico. Evidence shows FARC guerrillas supplied cocaine to the cartel in exchange for cash and possibly weapons.” (Statement at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/112901.htm) Note the word “possibly” regarding weapons. Although the arrest and subsequent investigation were announced with some fanfare, there have been no public updates; indeed, there is no report of the current whereabouts of Charry Guzman. 78 Alberto Najar, op. cit. 79 Onell R. Soto, Anna Cearley, Otto Kriesher, “Mexican cartel’s leader is seized off Baja coast,” San Diego Tribune, August 17, 2006. 80 Alberto Najar, op. cit. 81 Martínez, op cit. 82 Ibid. 83 Media Awareness Project, excerpt from Robert Caldwell, “Silver or Lead,” San Diego Union Tribune, July 9, 2000, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n961/a06.html?298676. 84 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “Major Cartel Lieutenants Arrested in Mexico,” June 7, 2004. 85 Ibid. 86 “Criminal Organization of the Arellano Felix: Main Arrests,” Government of Mexico, March 10, 2002. http://www.pgr.gob.mx/cmsocial/press02/mar/b21402.html 87 Media Awareness project, op. cit. 88 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Exposes Fronts for the Arellano Felix Drug Kingpin Organization,” September 28, 2006. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp120.htm and Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Recent OFAC Actions,” Sept. 28, 2006. http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20060928.shtml 89 Department of Justice, “12 Leaders of Mexican Narcotics Cartel Indicted,” July 8, 2003. http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/July/03_ag_403.htm 28 UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

90 Soto, Cearley, Kriesher, op. cit. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Soto, Cearley, Kriesher, op. cit 94 Ibid. 95 Martínez, op. cit. 96 U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzalez on Extradition of 15 Mexican Drug Traffickers and Other Criminals,” January 20, 2007. http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/January/07_ag_030.html 97 The Minneapolis Star Tribune ran an article on July 9, 2006, by Paul McEnroe, “The Route to Minnesota,” that profiled Alberto Zatarain. Zatarain is described as a Minnesota contact for a Mexican drug cartel who took delivery every few months of methamphetamines from Mexico, collecting as much as $25,000 a month. Arrested at age 23, he allegedly controlled Minnesota and North Dakota. Although the article suggests he was affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel, it is likely that he was actually connected with a part of the Gulf Alliance that was involved in methamphetamine production in Sinaloa state. The full article is available at http://www.drug- rehabs.org/content.php?cid=3879&state=Minnesota. 98 “Local Gang Member Rises in Drug Cartel,” NBCSanDiego.com, November 18, 2002. www.nbcsandiego.com/ news/1791807/detail.html. 99 Anna Cearley, “Leading lives of quiet desperation,” San Diego Tribune, June 28, 2004. 100 Ibid. 101 Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Mexican Money-Laundering Cell Named Foreign Narcotics Kingpin,” Washington File, January 12, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/ news/2005/01/sec-050112-usia01.htm. 102 Anna Cearley, “U.S. freezes assets tied to cartel,” San Diego Union Tribune, January 13, 2005. 103 Cearly, June 28, 2004. 104 Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001. http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ 105 For example, see “Return to Terrorist Alley,” a report on TV station KVOA in Arizona, http://kvoa.com/Global/story.asp?S=2545055, in which a Muslim prayer rug and a diary in Arabic found near the border are implied to be evidence of possible terrorist infiltration. Similar charges were made repeatedly by Representative Solomon Ortiz (D, TX). However, to date no indictment, convictions or evidence presented in other trials has supported such charges. 106 Amy Wu, “Border Apprehensions: 2005,” DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, November 2006. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_apprehensions_fs_2004.pdf 107 “Deportable Aliens Located by Region and Country of Nationality: Fiscal Year 2005,” DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk05En.shtm

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