Victor KOGAN-IASNYT

c ~~ "I :~r·.

1,! ~! ' ,S - --_; s CHECHEN­ R 0 s s

Essays Articles Documents

Moscow THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 1995 I f IN LIEU OF A FOREWORD

The essays and articles we venture to publish here were written on the heels of events at different times since the outbreak oflarge-scale military operations in Chechnya. Much of what you see is in the nature of a sketch and requires additional material of a factual nature which we plan to provide in subsequent issues. Much of this may appear excessively emotional or declarative. We are fully aware that this publication in a way presumptuous and somewhat clumsy.· But we hope that our readers will understand our gesture. modest as it may be. We did not seek a place in the relevant events, and did not want involvement, but, to be sure, neither did we evade it. We stayed away from danger, we often fell behind, and were often wrong. But we were never indifferent. ***

During my latest visit to Chechnya I was treated to tea by very calm and reasonable people from among those who had in the short period of hostilities lost absolutely everything, their families and homes, They were not aggressive. They were not embittered. They were not even suspicious, though they did take all the requisite security measures. To put it simply, they were ready fbr anything. In any case, they were not sony for themselves. And since they were not sorry for themselves, they were not sorry for anyone else either. We spoke of life in Moscow and about the Russian political scene. I maintained that Published under the auspices of the Right to Life and Human Dignity Association. quite a bit was being done against the war in Chechnya, that many of our people were taking Louchnikov lane, 4 #19, 103982 Moscow, Russia. risks by joining in the antiwar campaign, and that they should not expect Moscow's public leaders to show the degree of understanding and courage that they would have liked, that quite With gratitude to the European Human Rights Foundation and to the Danish Peace Foundation enough was being done, and that they should make allowances, and so on. They did not contradict me, and when I said that yes, Russia was at fault, they corrected me, "It's the Russian leadership ... " A seemingly quiet dinner, an almost Moscow-style political get-together © Victor.Kogan-Iasnyi that even resembled what we once called Moscow Kitchen Talk. I was allowed to relax and almost forget that they and me were in fairly disparate situations. © The Right to Life and Human Dignity Association Thereafter, almost imperceptibly, they changed the tenor of our conversation to give me to understand that they would be altogether in their rights if they shot me on the spot without any logical excuses and explanations, I was asked. In contrast to the preceding tonality of our conversation, I was asked: "We have no illusions about the government and the politicians, but what about the Russian people and you personally -- what have you done for the whole affair to end?" What could I say? Could I evade the issue? ***

Our main purpose in publishing this collections of diverse material which may initate various quarters rather than be accepted with understanding, was to remind people of our collective responsibility, our national guilt for the aggression -- regardless of the regime and the nation, whether good or bad, against which we committed this aggression and against which the leadership, which, too, was installed not without our involvement, started a large­ scale war. The Russian soldiers and officers who went to war in Chechnya much against their will, are not guilty. They atoned for their guilt by suffering and death. The soldiers fought dutifully - - not for the Fatherland but for those who were at their side in the trenches.

2 3 We who took no part in the hostilities-- we are the ones who are guilty, We are guilty not regarding our passivity as guilt and, what is worse, for taking pride in it. We shut our and eyes to everything that might have helped to understand and accept the facts as they and thereby oped floodgate to slaughter and bloodshed. Even now, even criticizing the THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL g0,,en:unl~nt. we are prepared to identify ourselves with it, our own, the Russian government, readily than with the victims of the war on either side. On television we prefer to see the AUTORITIES' RELATIONS WITH THE CHECHEN g;o'ver:nment rather than its victims. We are with the goven:unent. We steer clear of everything REPUBLIC IN 1990-1994 may to the last extent indicate our utter disagreement with it, we avoid the requisite and terms, and shin any sense than we dread bloodshed and death -- someone else's, of The Checheno-Ingush Republic became sovereign in short order, and at many levels. not our own. First, the will of the people, above all the ethnic Chechens who had suffered terribly and Will we finally understand and finally feel after it is too late, when words will lose tragically at the hands of the authorities of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, to me:aru.ug, when attitudes will be meaningless, when gestures will by futile, when it is much too establish their special political status in order to overcome the tragic historical consequences and no choice will be left? Or will we reject truth to the end and simply accept our fate, the that are contrary to their national identity. Second, this was consistent with the political the situation? But what is the good of understanding when it is too late? declarations made by Boris Yeltsin, who was conceived by the mass of the people as leader of the struggle against the crumbling communist system. Third, whose who intended to politically *** resist Yeltsin's plans of enhancing the status of the RSFSR as a state, we able to use his own weapons against him: to promote the status of the territories within the RSFSR and redoubling One more thing. the direct influence on them of the Soviet Union's power structure, thereby weakening the At all times and in all things one must thing of the consequences. And we are afraid that none-too-powerfullevets of power of the leadership of the Russian Federation. sorneGrozny captain of industry, deputy manager of the Domremstroi independent state", which was proclain1ed by Stalin and Lenin personally in the Declaration of building trust and people's deputy of the Checheno-Ingush Republic, was elected deputy the Right of Peoples of Russia of November 15th, 1917, which was later incorporated in chairman of the EC ChNC and in fact became its real leader. The part of Chairman with merely international law, but was so general and so declarative in substance that no one would, in formal functions was given over to a man from afar, a division commander and Afghan war effect, venture to be guided by it in real politics.) For the above reasons -- above all political, veteran, Djokhar Dudayev, who was then serving in Estonia. The division commander was of course -- the parade of sovereignties within Russia proper was far more dual and vague than evidently not suspected of being able to influence the situation in the Republic. And there is no that which occurred at Unionwide level. evidence whatever that his impending election as head of the ChNC was ever discussed in any In practice, this duality and vagueness surfaced in the fact that some leaders of ethnic official circles in Moscow. territories in Russia, and on their heels also the leaders of "ordinary" territorial and political Soon, a split occurred within the EC ChNC. It broke up into a nationalist radical and a elites, saw fit to act in a dual capacity -- as independent from Russia one day, and as liberal democratic one. Thus, Dudayev accomplished his first little revolution. He sided with incorporated it another day stressing now one and now another manner of securing their more the nationalist radicals and secured for them a moral and organisational victory over the local political and econonric goals, depending on the concrete situation and falling short of reformist industrialists, turning overnight from a purely symbolic figure into opposition leader actual political independence, if only at ritualist level. The Russian leadership, eager above all. and chief actor on Chechnya political scene. And one of the frrst independent statements he to secure the political support of the leaders of all territories it was accustomed to calling made (1990!) called for the dissolution of the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet which, he "subjects of the federation," and being sure of its ability to exert all the requisite pressure if the said, had. consummated its political predestination by issuing the Declaration of Sovereignty need arises, did not bother to establish a tangible politico-econonric status of these highly and no longer conformed to the status of parliament in the new sovereign state. In March diverse territories that would not lead to nrisconceptions and shakeups either in the near or 1991, Dudayev retired from the Soviet Army and settled with his family in Grozny. Following distant future. a number of reorganisations, the name of his post changed. He became Chairman of the Chechnya quickly became the place where this duality went farthest. Executive Comnrittee of the General National Congress of the Chechen People (EC In any case, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush GNCChP). Republic, chaired by Doku Zavgaiev, who was First Secretary of the Communist Party's In the spring of 1991, Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Checheno-Ingush Regional Comnrittee until September of that year, adopted a Declaration of presidential candidate, visited Checheno-Ingushetia during an election tour. Among those who the republic state sovereignty, importing to the Republic all the attributes of an independent accompanied him was G_ V. Starovoitova. Y eltsin voiced his support of the Republic's state, while adroitly evading any direct mention of the RSFSR and the Soviet Union (excepting sovereignty in general terms, and repeated his already well-known aphorism: "Take as much its article 10, where it denounced "genocide ofChechens and Ingushes and other people of the sovereignty as you can swallow." But he did not see Dudayev and any other leaders of the RSFSR" and stated the following: "The Republic claims the right to receive material and moral GNCChP. Evidently, he did not think they were sufficiently important force on the politico­ compensation for the damage done to the Republic and its people in 1944-1957".) As far as we social hmizon. Shortly before the presidential elections in Russia, the highly cautious Zavgaiev know, not protests of any kind resounded at the time from either the Russian or the Soviet came out publicly in support ofYeltsin's candidacy, while the GNCChP stood aloof. authorities. A sharp political about-face occurred during the August 1991 events. The cautious The adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty did not in effect, and was not Zavgaiev was in Moscow on the 19th and 20th August, arrived in Grozny on August 21st, and expected to, alter anything in the life of the Republic. On Zavgaiev's part as a "centrist" who did not undersign a sharp statement against the putschists until that late hour. Meanwhile, the declared his support for the political principles ofNarsultan Nazarbaiev, leader ofKazakl1stan, GNCChP and its leaders lost no time to come out against the putschist State Emergency supporting the Declaration was in all respects an adroit "move" both as a concession to the Comnrittee. and rallied a powerful popl.!lar movement against it. The days following the failure anti-communist opposition of all hues and as a chance to balance between the two Moscow ofthe putsch saw a devastating attack shift from the putschists to Zavgaiev and the Checheno­ centres of power in the Kremlin (the executive) and the White House (legislative). (Let us ass Ingush Supreme Soviet and against their slow and hesitant moves (save for a few exceptions, here that the second person after Yeltsin in the White House was Ruslan Khasbulatov who had which is a special subject) in Grozny. shortly before won the elections as people's deputy of the RSFSR from Chechnya against the Naturally, the signals immediately reached Moscow, but were not duly understood there Second Secretary of the Checheno-Ingush Regional Comnrittee of the CPSU, P.N.Gromov.) and failed to trigger the due reaction in the frrst few days and weeks after the abortive putsch. The Declaration was a direct and formal act backed by Zavgaiev and designed to play a Unlike candidates in other capitals and administrative centres of the Russian Federation, the substantial and stabilising role in the Checheno-Ingush Republic in the framework of his revolutionary claimants of power in Grozny did not belong among people trusted by the "conservative-liberal" conception. A Chechen National Congress took place in Grozny on the Moscow men in power to vote "as they wanted." -- 23rd through 25th November, 1990. It was attended by a majority of moderate informal Representatives of the top RSFSR leadership were urgently dispatched to Grozny one leaders, a group of liberals representing the Communist Party, government functionaries, and a after another. segment of nationalist radicals usually described as the "constructive" opposition. The A Aslakhanov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Comnrittee for legal Affairs, Congress called for radical reforms and for loyalty to Zavgaiev and Iris closest associates. The Law and Order and the Fight against crime, and I.Grebeshev, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Congress and the standing bodies it formed, above all the Executive Comnrittee of the Chechen Council of Ministers, arrived in Grozny on August 26th. At an emergency meeting of the National Congress (EC ChNC) were led by a group of level-headed people who were widely Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet Presidium they warned Zavgaiev on behalf of the Russian known, enjoyed prestige, and, by and large, had their feet firmly planted on the ground. The leadership that use of force in settling the political crisis was intolerable. style and authority of the Congress was capable of diverting the mass of people from Thus, at the very end of August, the national guard formed by the GNCChP seized spontaneous open-air meetings and demonstrations of an unpredictable nature, which had control of republican television and buildings of the executive administration, including the Checheno-Ingush Council of Ministers. 6 7 State Secretary of the RSFSR G.Boorboulis and M. Poltoranin, Press and Information Minister of Russia, arrived in Grozny on September 11th. For four days they negotiated with nationality were recalled from the Armed Forces of the USSR, and all male persons of 15 to 55 representatives of the conflicting parties. As is often the case in such situations, divergent were conscripted, with the national guard being put on an emergency footing. concepts of how to end the crisis were voiced, some of which no one refuted but which were On October lOth, Rutskoi addressed Dudayev in a stylistically inarticulate letter and not accepted as obligatory. then, acting on the information he received daily about what was happening in Chechnya, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Acting Chairman ofthe RSFSR Supreme Soviet, flew to Grozny on gravitated ev~r more towards ideas of an extraordinary nature. Spurning the objections of his September 14th. The following day a session of the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet was closest assoctates, her ordered an ukaze to be prepared on the introduction of a state of convened. It was the last ever, and proceeded in effect under his leadership. The building emergency. where the session was held was surrounded by guardsmen of the GNCChP. On Khasbulatov's Still, it would probably be a mistake to consider the Vice-President's behaviour the sole insistence, the deputies resolved to dismiss Zavgaiev from the chairmanship and dissolved the and decisive reason that originated in Moscow for the crisis of the autumn of 1991. Supreme Soviet. New parliamentary elections were scheduled on November 17th with powers The almost altogether unnoticed Address to the Leaders of the Executive Committee of for the transitional period being delegated to the Provisional ·Supreme Council (PSC) of the the GNCChP, which was made public on October 19th over the signature of the President of Checheno-Ingush Republic of32 deputies who had in the framework of the dissolved Supreme the RSFSR, merits to be quoted in full below. Soviet been essentially considered as belonging to the liberal-democratic wing. On the same day, Khasbulatov flew back to Moscow. ADDRESS Under steady pressure of the GNCChP, a series of reductions and splits occurred in the to the Leaders ofthe Executive Committee of the General National Congress ofthe PSC, with the result that different groups began acting on the latter's behalf. Four followers of Chechen People the Dudayev groups issued a number oflaws and decisions in the name of the PSC as a whole '!I I conceived as a legal basis for the activity of the GNCChP 1S Executive Committee as th~ In the past few weeks the peaceful land of the Chechens and Ingushes became ari arena supreme authority. Another group, this one of five members, protested on October 1st and of mass disturbances and armed clashes, accompanied by seizure of state institutions, by declared the adopted documents unlawful. Meanwhile, the Group ofFour referred on that day pogroms, disorders, and carnage. The reason for this is rooted in the outspokenly anti­ II to a decision of the Congress of Ingush Deputies of all levels of September 15th on the constitutional and unlawful actions of the Executive Committee of the General National creation of an "Ingush Autonomous Republic in the Framework of the RSFSR", and Congress of the Chechen People and its leaders, who are bent on destabilising the situation in proclaimed that Checheno-Ingush Republic was divided into a sovereign Chechen Republic the Republic and seize power, through use of the armed detachments of the so-called "national .,I• and an Ingush Republic within the RSFSR. guard", I• All measures taken in the course of political negotiations failed to restore peace and civic I This division provoked numerous protests. Seven members of the PSC who gathered on October 5th, repealed the ruling of the Group of Four by a majority vote. In response, the EC accord. On the contrary, the situation is becoming ever more unpredictable and is fraught with GNCChP ruled that the dissolution of the PSC was "a treasonable and provocative act" and highly serious consequences for the present and future of the Republic. This is intolerable. assumed the functions of what it described as "a revolutionary committee for the transitional Proceeding in the interests of the security of citizens and protecting the constitutional period with full powers." system of the Checheno-Ingush Republic, acting in conformance with the powers vested in me During the night of the 5th/6th October, a Russian delegation headed by the then Vice­ under the Constitution and the Laws of the RSFSR, and in furtherance of my responsibility for Pres~dent A. Rutskoi came to Grozny, and met representatives of different segments of the the destiny of the peoples and the lives of individuals, I demand that the leaders of the EC public and of political groups, naturally including the Chechnya Congress. The PSC, too, was GNCChP and the groups that support them cease their unlawful activity and unconditionally able to convene under Rutskoi patronage, but only for one day. abide by the law. A period of lasting diarchy began in Chechnya, threatening to grow into a civil war. I call on them to :ful:fi1 the following within three days: The GNCChP announced elections of the President and Parliament on October 27th (the a) carry out the Decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium "On the Political Situation in the Checheno-Ingush Republic" No. 1723-1 of October 6th, 19~1, and the II I date was orally approved by I.Luchinsky, a guest from the Russian Supreme Soviet). After Rutskoi's departure the succession of personal meetings, which took place on the Decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet "On the Situation in the Checheno-Ingush Republic" No. 1733-1 ofOctober lOth, 1991; 'II I initiative of the Chechens, was terminated. Eye-to-eye talks gave place to extremely immoderate decisions and written statements. b) withdraw from all seized buildings and premises belonging to state organs and public II I Speaking before the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on October 8th, Rutskoi shed the organisations; moderation he had displayed in Grozny for sharp and unrestrained rhetoric. c) surrender all available weapons to Republic's law-enforcement authorities; The following day, the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet came out with a d) to dissolve unlawfully formed armed detachments. II I On November 17th, 1991 they shall hold democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet of •II statement on the political situation in the Checheno-Ingush Republic. It contained the demand '11 I that all unlawful paramilitary groups be disarmed and recognised the PSC as the sole lawful the Checheno-Ingush Republic jointly with the Provisional. Supreme Council of the Republic, I \ ~ I organ of power in the Checheno-Ingush Republic. · on the political structure of the Checheno-Ingush Republic in conformance with the operative Later that day, the GNCChP came out with a statement which contained the following legislation of the RSFSR. 1 11 I words: "The behaviour of A. Rutskoi and his team during their stay in the Chechen Republic Let me warn you that if these demands are not met, all measures provided for by Laws II I (of the RSFSR) shall be taken to normalise the situation and ensure the security of the 'II 1 was a provocative act on an international scale conceived by the Russian government against II I population and the constitutional system. II the Chechen people"; this "gross provocative intervention in the internal affairs of the Chechen 'II Republic shall be considered a declaration of armed confrontation." All servi~emen of Chechen - B. Y eltsin, 'II :)1 'II •II II 8 9 President of the RSFSR Moscow, Interior Ministry of the USSR, NR 1175, Top Secret, a telegram from Grozny to the President of the RSFSR Comrade Yeltsin B.N. and Vice-President of the RSFSR On the heels of this on October 20th, the President of the RSFSR took a most important Comrade Rutskoi A.V. step 2 to pave the way fo~ a possible armed solution: he signed Ukaze No. 146 "On putting the Considering the extremely complicated and explosive situation in the city of Grozny and internal troops of the Ministry oflnternal Affairs of the USSR stationed in the territory of the · the Republic as a whole, and in view ofthe continuing attempts of CNCChP fighters to seize RSFSR under the jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic". :tally important objectives and the escalation of armed terrorism, please take steps to protect On October 24th, the RSFSR President appointed A. Arsanov, people's deputy of the the objectives and the population immediately upon receipt of this cable, and to restore the RSFSR, to represent the President of the RSFSR in the Checheno-Ingush Republic. Arsanov constitutional system. was member of the Communists of Russia faction and was unpopular in Chechnya. But his Failing this, the developments in the Republic may become unpredictably complicated. family had deep historical roots, which could in terms of numbers give him substantial support. Again I insist on measures provided for by Law for such situations not later than zero But looked at seriously, his appointment could hardly be considered fortunate. This initial but, hour (00) of November 8th of this year. Representative of the RSFSR President in the alas, not last attempt to exploit sernireviving clan relationships and contradictions, put the Checheno-Ingush Republic A. Arsanov Russian President in a somewhat dual and ridiculous political position both in the ideological Later, Arsanov denied having ever sent the above cable. It is indeed incomprehensible context and in personal terms. how a person who had permanently resided in Checheno-Ingushetia and was deputy ~nister As it says in an announcement of the Central Electoral Commission formed under the ofForestry before his "promotion", and who was moreover morally depressed by the plight of auspices of the GNCChP, the elections of the Chechen President and of the Chechen the communist faction after the failure of the putsch of August 1991 in Moscow - it is Parliament took place on October 27, 1991. Out of the four presidential nominees, Dudayev, incomprehensible how this person c.ould e~ploy ~e above styl~ and im~erative wording. in 'II Chainnan of the EC GNCChP, was elected President ofChechnya. addressing his distant and very high-ranking chiefs. And this at a tune when nothing The PSC did not recognise these elections and continued to prepare for elections extraordinary, nothing transcending the prevailing general climate, was happening and or was I I according to its own scheme on November 27th. Arsanov becanw leader of public meetings about to happen in Chechnya, while the main, even though complicated and consuming task, II!! against Dudayev. task was to try and hold the November 27th elections, if only as a sort of ceremony. !J, ,, The Extraordinary 5th Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR elected Ruslan Less than a day and a night later, Arsanov sent another cable, which we reproduce in full 'li!! Khasbulatov Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. This was preceded by long drawn-out political below: ;: ,,I I manoeuvring. Thereupon, the Congress passed a resolution "to declare the elections of Grozny 247145?1616 7_11.91 1500= October 27th, 1991, to the supreme body of state power (Supreme Soviet) in the Checheno­ I' I I Moscow Interior Ministry for President Yeltsin B .N. = I I Ingush Republic and the President of the Republic unlawful, and to invalidate all acts passed by I'' Esteemed President I' them. '' According to your Ukaze I have during my stay in the Checheno-Ingush Republic fi·om It is hard to say how the situation could develop from there but the problem was the 25th of October 1991 as your personal representative accomplished certain work, namely: I conclusively settled in favour of the GNCChP and Dudayev by ukaze no 178 of the RSFSR have taken patt and spoken at organised meetings in Chechnya and Ingushetia to explain Your President of November 7th, 1991 proclaiming a state of emergency throughout the territory of policy and that of the Russian Parliament; and have supported the PSC, today the sole lawful the Checheno-Ingush Republic from November 9 to December 9, 1991. Among other things, body in the territory of the Checheno-Ingush Republic. The Republic'~ S~viets of Peo?~e's point 6 of the presidential ukaze, confomring with Article 38 of the RSFSR Emergency Act Deputies do not recognise the policy of the GNCChP. All the same, constdenng the prevail~~ ruled out elections during the state of emergency, thus calling off the elections planned on situation and the ever deeper crisis, we regard it essential that You or Khasbulatov should VISlt November 27th by the pro-Russian elements under the sign-board of the PSC --the impending the Republic in person before November 9th, the say General Dudayev is to enter upon his results of which could have seriously substantiate non-recognition of the GNCChP scenario office and that You should address the people on local television and directly at a public and the Dudayev regime. 11 meeti~g. Respectfully, your representative in the Checheno-Ingush Republic, People's II There is good reason to assume that only a small group of people took part in one or Deputy. another capacity in working out the final decision concerning the ukaze, whose names will 11 But the mechanism had already been set in motion. II probably never become known to the public. It is needless to describe the well-known general details of the well-known military '' O.Lobov, for example, who was then still First Deputy Chairman of the Council of 11 operation...... tl Ministers of the RSFSR, and hence still effective in political decision-making, and the Army '' As for its political aspects, the attitude of certam key offictal figures to the opera~on ts I' II and Interior ministry, wrote to Khasbulatov on November 4th that it would be desirable "to " of doubtless significance both at the stage of its operational planning, the stage when tt was send a group of RSFSR people's deputies headed by the Supreme Soviet's Council of carried out and its subsequent evaluation. Nationalities and some high-ranking functionaries of the Council of Ministers and the State Two \nt1uential chiefs -- the then USSR Minister of the Interior V. Barannik:ov and the Nationalities Committee to the Checheno-Ingush Republic and assist in normalising the then KGB RSFSR Chairman V. Ivanenko - were strongly opposed to the operation. situation there and maintaining interethnic peace. In so doing, he referred to utterances made Barannikov let it be known that he would not take part in enforcing the state of emergency, ,,, ,, by S.Bekov, Chairman of the Checheno-Ingush Republic's Council ofMinisters who was then which was received by all concerned as an indirect indication of the stand-point of the political ;, ,, still recognised in Moscow. It was ineffective, but in any case harmless, suggestion_ II 11 leadership of the USSR in connection with the prevailing situation. -lvanenko, too, cam~ .out Jl II The fom1al reason for the presidential ukaze was a coded cable received from Grozny in with a warning about the probable exceedingly painful consequences of the adopted posttton. ':: :: the evening ofNovember 6th over Arsanov's signature. He did so at a conference called by Vice-President Rutskoi. (On November 9th the RSFSR 'II 1: Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a resolution condemning Barannikov and KGB USSR ~11 \: I Jl ::: ,,11 10 'II II 11 Chairman Bakatin's inaction and called on the RSFSR President to state his viewpoint on that In the name index ofB.N.Yeltsin's Notes of a President publishe~ in 1994, Dudayev is ~~) . d President and Government Chairman of the Chechen Repubhc on page 417. The The President's state of emergency ukaze ·and Rutskoi position was, according to the ~a::~sting point here is that in the text of the book Dudayev is_ mentioned. only If.ndhirect~y~ba s minutes, backed at Rutskoi's said conference by P. Grachev, then USSR Deputy Minister of . b'ect of a complaint Khasbulatov addressed to Yeltsm at t 11 e time o t e VIS! 1e Defence and Chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defence; A Dunaiev, RSFSR the 0 ~ "R' estrangement between the two top persons m ussia. b . . , b k: il d b Minister of the Interior, and, in the framework of his competence, by V. Stepankov, Dudayev was named President of the Chechen Repu hem~ r~terence oo c?m~ e ~ procurator-General of the RSFSR , G.Vachnadze and published by the Russian government's publishing house Rosstskie Vestl A real political battle erupted over the ukaze at the November lOth sitting of the RSFSR . dated 1995. . h . Y Supreme Soviet. Rutskoi came out publicly in fervour of the ukaze and its earliest An inconspicuous but meaningful event occurred in the meantime. S ru:P _usupov was consummation, and was quite resolutely supported by Stepank:ov. Khasbulatov, too, was active accredited by the Russian Government as Dudayev's personal representative m Mos~ow. throughout the sitting in support of the ukaze. S.Shakhrai was also resolutely in favour of the all Dudayev appointed him as such long before -- on October 29, 1991.) A senous uk:aze, admitting in effect that he had contributed to its being issued. Probably quite (Fonn y, f negotiation began behind closed doors from that moment on, sometimes process o . unexpected by those who favoured the uk:aze was that its resolute opponents proved capable ccompanied by offictal talks open to the press. . of coming out jointly against it (for various reasons). The uk:aze was repealed, and it said in the a A number of practical issues was settled. Among other things, the Cent~ Bank of Supreme Soviet resolution to that effect that a parliamentary investigation was in order of the Russia released funds of the Chechen Republic Bank for transfers of cash essential for t~e entire set of relevant circumstances. Subsequently, however, as should have been expected, payment of pensions and the social maintenance. The Government of ~e Chechen Repubhc this point was not put into effect. was permitted to issue Russian passports for travel abroad to Chechen restdents. . . Out of the other little known documents, coded telegram no. 12366 sent by Negotiations open to the press began in Sochi (Dagomys). The style of the unpendmg G.Kantemirov, interior minister of Northern Ossetia, to RSFSR Interior Minister Dunaiev on 'II understanding is best illustrated by the published official protocols and communiques, some of November 9th deserves special mention. Kantemirov complained to his chief that the relevant which we are reproducing below. ,, officials who think themselves subordinate to Barannik:ov were not fulfilling the presidential •! ukaze, and that the "Ingushes ... have built concrete road-blocks". The document is of little Protocol on Results of the Meeting of Russian and Chechen Groups of Experts in Soch.i, interest as concerns its content, but of considerable consequence because of the fact that the 12-14 March 1992 person who signed it is still in his former office and continues to call for extraordinary measures everywhere in the Northern Caucasus. The Russian and Chechen groups of experts who examined :he questions that are to. be discussed by official plenipotentiary delegations of the said republics, agree on the followmg *** recommendations: · . . · I. Official delegations of the two parties could gold negotiat10ns m the last ten days of In the beginning of 1992, the situation changed abruptly. April in Sochi (Dagomys). . Moscow accepted the somewhat ambiguous and not wholly explicable stance taken by The delegations should be headed by Deputy Chairm~n of the Supreme Sov1et of the Dudayev, and even went so far as to accentuate the ambiguity. Russian Federation and the Parliament of the Chechen Repubhc. It recognised Chechnya's "right to exist" and recognised Dudayev de facto as President Each delegation should consist of 15 to 20 persons. . . of the Chechen Republic. Other official persons and institutions in control of the situation n. The experts of the two sides suggest that th~ followmg Item~ should be. put on the within the borders of the Chechen Republic they had demarcated, were also recognised do agenda of the impending negotiations between delegatiOns of the Russtan FederatiOn and the facto. No objections were voiced to the laws passed by the Chechen Parliament which started Chechen Republic: to function in November 1991. Mass media close to Russia's official circles evaded dotting the i's as concemed Chechnya's status, but the accents were so made as to imply that Chechnya ,, !.Political: iJ! was part ofRussia, but a somewhat special part. To be sure, the Republic was accorded much less space than, say, Tatarstan. Its name was altogether avoided in official speeches and on recognition of the political independence and the state s?vereignty of the Chechen statements at summit level. Republic; on determining the political and Juridical form of relattons between the Chechen ,, It stands to reason that the new authorities who had by then taken root in Chechnya Republic and the Russian Federation. II I declared that the Republic would take no part in the federative agreement of the Russian ' •' I 'II Federation. "' ,, 2. Juridical: .::::: A group of people opposed to Dudayev announced that an organizing committee have II I been formed to restore constitutional rule of law in the Republic. One of its members was U. Formalisation of inter-state and inter-parliamentary relations: protection of_ the rig~ts, )1 '11 1 Abturkhanov. But this had little or no effect at that time, nor could it have had. "' freedoms and lawful interests or citizens residing in the territory of ~he two. states rrresp~~tve Documentary gestures recognising Dudayev and his regime as the official leadership of of their nationality and in accordance with universally recogrused mtemat10nal and Jundtcal the Chechen Republic were made at top level in the Russian Federation right up to the end of standards. 1994, but they were inconspicuous and, indeed, incidental. For example, the governmental telephone book of republics, territories, regions and areas 3.Economic: of the Russian Federation listed Dudayev as President of the Chechen Republic.

12 13 . f of the . on th e econ~llllc space of the .Russi~ Federation and the Chechen Republic; on the f endorsement by the plenipotentiary delegations banking and fill~c1al .systems;. on social, pnce and customs policy; on scientific, ~echnical and Jhem f~r c~ltu:al ~ooperat10~; informatiOn ex~hanges; on transport and communication, including trunk two republics. p1pehnes, on electnc power production and supply; on establishing the share or the Ch h Yandarbiev, .. h" s· · ecen v.zhigulin, 'I R epubl tc m t e .ormer oVJet Umon's gold, diamond and foreign-exchange reserve. Head of the group of experts of the Russian Head of the group of expetts i of the Chechen Republic Federation 4. Collective Security: May28th, 1992 .On Jo~t military security o~ .armed forces and military formations, and their material and technicaland on other mailltenance; matters related on the to llllht~collecttve command; security. on protection and defence of state borders ' •, We have no evidence that drafts of official Russo-Chechen documents were examined by 'the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. But according to some data, including an hnterview given to the Russian television programme "Utro" on December 28th, 1992, by ll!· Prior to the official negotiations of the plenipotentiary delegations of the Russian \Yaraga Namadaev, then First Deputy Chairman of the Chechen Republic's government, a F ederat1on and t?e Chechen Republic, groups of experts of the two sides shall meet at the end :version of an Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic approved of March 1992 ill Moscow to work out draft documents on the issues on the agenda. ~by high-ranking officials of legislative as well as executive power structures of the Russian , Federation, was ready by the end of December 1992. IV. We rec?mmend t~ for:nalise settled issues included on the agenda of negotiations But neither the Agreement nor any other accords were ever signed, and no summit between the offi~1al delegatiOns m an Agreement between the Russian Federation and th meeting ever took place. This coincided in time with Vice-President Rutskoi transfer from the ,,, 1111 Chechen Republic. e political scene to supervising agriculture, and with the incident over the "black box" of the . Korean liner shot down in 1983, which took so much time and effort during President Yeltsin's V. The date of the m~etings and the list of members of the official delegations and the • visit to the Republic of Korea, on the one hand, and aggravation of the conflict between top gro~p~ of experts ofb?t~ stdes shall be provided by the respective sides seven days before the representatives of Russia's executive and legislative authorities after the 7th Congress of begillmng of the negot1at1ons. People's Deputies. At the same time, the 7th Congress of People's Deputies issued an Address to the VI. Representatives of the two sides shall meet three days before the negotiations peoples, and the bodies of power and administration of the Chechen Republic, which laid the to agree protocol procedures. open groundwork, if only in most general terms, for continuing the process of negotiation. The Done in two copies, each having equal legal force. process was continued at a fairly high level in the beginning of 1933. This is confirmed by another two wholly official documents given below. F d H.ead of the group of experts of the Head of the group of experts Russian. e eratton. of the of the Chechen Republic: Communique :I: II V.Zhigulin, Z. Y andarbiev, on results of a meeting between delegations of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Deputy Chainnan, Council of Committee Chairman, Parliament Republic the Republic, Russian Federation of the Chechen Republic Delegations of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic met in the city of March 14th, 1992, Sochi Grozny on January 14th, 1993, comprising from the Russian Federation S.M.Shakhrai, Deputy Chairman of the Council ofMinisters of the Russian Federation and Chairman of Russia's State Protocol Committee for Nationalities, R. G.Abdulatipov, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the on Results of the Meeting of Groups of Experts of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, V.AShuikov, Deputy Chairman of the State

1 li Chechen Republic, Moscow, 26-28 May, 1992 Committee for Nationalities, and, from the Chechen Republic, Kh.S.Akhmadov, Chairman of •" the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, BAMezhidov, First Deputy Chairman of the In ~ognisance. of the powers :rested in them by the leaderships of the Su reme Soviet of Parliament of the Chechen Republic, Y.E.Soslambekov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs the Russ1an Federation and the parliament ofthe Chechen Republic and reaffi p · th Committee of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, and S.T.Yusupov, representative of the Protocol on the results of their meeting in So chi on March 14th of,this ea flllld e d "th "t th R · Y r, an ~gm accor ance Chechen Republic in Moscow. Wl . l , . e uss1an and Chechen. groups of experts see fit to suggest the following oints for The delegations of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic signed a protocol dehberatwn by t~e Supreme SoVJet of the Russian Federation and the Parliament ofth on drawing up and concluding an Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Chechen Repubhc: e Republic on mutual delegation and delimitation of powers. Working groups have been a) on adopting a political declaration on relations between the two parties· instructed to prepare a package of proposals for a Draft Agreement by the 31st of January, b) on drafts of agre.ements between the Russian and Chechen parties 'analysed in th 1993. course of the present meetmg. e An understanding has been reached for the delegations to meet next in February 1993 to The. ex~erts shall agree the draft documents examined by the legislative bodies at their initial the Agreement. next meetillg ill the last ten days of June 1992 in Groz.ny or in Kislovodsk, and shall submit

14 15 Much attention was devoted to the situation in the Northern Caucasus, and note was taken of the constructive resolutions of the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of the In the beginning ofFebruary 1993 the delegations of the two parties shall meet and draw Russian Federation designed to stabilise the situation in the region. The Chairman of the , the text of the Agreement on Determination and Mutual Delegation ofPowers. Chechen Parliament was handed the Address of the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of up For the delegation ofthe Russian Federation: the Russian Federation to the peoples, authorities and administration of the Chechen Republic. · Abdulatipov, R.G.. Participants in the meeting noted the special role played by the Chechen Republic in Shakhrai, S.M. resolving the Ossetin-lngush conflict. The delegations were unanimous in calling for Shuikov, V.A negotiations between the antagonistic parties essential in order to settle the conflict peacefully For the delegation of the Chechen Republic: and to norn1alise the situation in the region. Akhrnadov, Kh.S. Soslambekov, Y.E. Signed by Abdu!atipov, Ak:hmadov, and Mezhidov Yusupov, S.T.

Protocol In legal and political terms, and considering the powers of the persons who signed it, the above document could only mean that 1) Russia officially recognised the Chechen Republic as On results of the meeting of delegations of the Russian Federation and the Chechen subject of law, and its political institutions operating de facto, as a subject of negotiations Republic in Grozny on January 14th 1993 ~with an open outcome", with no one contesting the possible recognition of the Chechen Republic's independence, and that 2) any possibility of any sort of forcible solution of political The delegation of the Russian Federation consisting of: issues related to the status of Chechnya is rejected. . . ill' Very soon, however, domestic political cataclysms made it possible to spurn previous Abdulatipov, R.G. - Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, commitments, the conception of which, is not unfortunately deeply enough instilled in .Russian Federation; countries with underdeveloped juridical traditions. Shakhrai, S.M. - Deputy Chairman or the Council or Ministers of the Russian .'Federation, and Chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities; *** · Shuikov, V.A-Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities; In the spring of 1993, the confrontation of the executive (presidential) and parliamentary and the delegation of the Chechen Republic consisting of: branches of power began to build up in both Moscow and Grozny. In the circumstances, political affairs slowly but surely lost their outlines...... Ak:hmadov, Kh. S. - Chairman of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic; As we see it, it would be out of place to examme the details of the mternal colllSlons and Mezhidov, B.A. First Deputy Chairman of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic; in some measure related external demarches of an unofficial or semi-official and in any case Soslambekov Y.E. - Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament non-systemic, nature, between these covers. the Chechen Republic; Let me only say that prior to the April Referendum in Russia (to determine the measure Yusupov, Sh. T.- Representative of the Chechen Republic in Moscow of support commanded by Yeltsin), the Central Bank once again, and for the last time, issued a subsidy to cover Chechnya's debt to pensioners and beneficiaries of other allowances for 1992. Stressed during the negotiations that it was vitally necessary to normalise relations Two letters from Dudayev to Yeltsin followed, in one of which the Chechen leader suggested between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic and to maintain a single economic, discussing the final recognition of his country's sovereignty, and in the other decl~ed that he defence, information, and cultural space, to continue the progressive traditions would deem it right on the Russian President's part to dissolve the Supreme SoViet after the

Ill I that prevail between the peoples and states, and to protect freedoms and human rights of referendum and hold a referendum concerning a new Russian constitution. 1 II nationalities wherever they may reside. Chechnya took no part in the April Referendum, but on April 25th, the day of the

I The Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic are aware of their responsibility Referendum, the newspaper Trud published the following report: "The Chechnya President I'' stabilising the situation and joining efforts in combating lawlessness and crime. jl :~~: 1 commended the Russian President's desire to secure mutual understanding on the basis of fair~

111' Expressing their mutual commitment to the above, the patties have agreed minded and good-neighbour relations. Speaking directly over the Moscow Echo. ~adio ~tatiot~ 1 il following: ill' he declared that he would not prevent any Chechen citizens who had not giVen ttp the1r I' 111 1 L To recognise the vital need for, and practicability of, settling mutual Russian citizenship if they want to take part on April 25th. I am indeed prepared to vote "' filii exclusively by peaceful political means. myself. I have not yet lost my Russian citizenship." .:: ~:::: 1 '11 " 2. To form working groups which will draw up an Agreement on delimiting powers and In the spring and summer of 1993, Dudayev dissolved those Chechen branches of po":er 1:'1 ;nil mutual delegation of powers between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, in that were not loyal enough to him. Among other things, he dissolved the parliament Wtth I which it is envisaged to have the following sections: Chairman Kh.Akhrnadov at its head, and suspended Vice-Premier Y.Mamadaiev, who. w~s - on powers jointly practised by the Republics; officially backed by the parliament. Shortly before this, he stripped Sh.Beno, ~ expert m - on exclusive powers of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic. international law of his office of foreign minister, and appointed Shasuddin Yusef, a 3.The working groups shall work until January 31st, 1993, and draw up the list businessman and' Jordanian citizen, in his place. Although the dismissed Chechen officials powers for each section, taking into account, among other things, of the results of protested against the unlawful acts of their president and declared t~eir resolve to co?-tinue previous meetings (Dagomys- Moscow- Grozny). performing their functions, this was in fact no longer possible. All this was accomparued by

16 17 grave social turmoil within Chechnya, which witnessed a revival of mob demonstrations and pickets, with signs of a brewing civil war. . d exclusively by P. eaceful means. In the context of the subsequent developments this reso1 ve . And since some of the dismissed were earlier key figures in the "open" part of the Russo­ a most important pomt. . . . I! Chechen negotiations and contacts, this also served as one of the main reasons fo the was In the meantime, Filatov's statement that the Dudayev regrme had become fascist m !' suspension of the process of negotiation. It will be remembered that Dudayev had from the and that the Dudayev people were guilty or brutal tortures and executions (which was start refused to back the Grozny Protocol and, in effect, repudiated the Chechen delegation. natur:Uy immediately denied by Dudayev and a number of independent experts) was a signal But as long as members of the delegation were still vested with formal and effective political natur disguised support of the Provisional Council of Chechnya headed by U.Avturkhanov, powers, one could still speak of continuing negotiations, or at least consultations, on the part fo~ u: was vested with all the attributes of a Russian governmental structure. Need one say of that Chechen delegation in spite ofDudayev's personal opinion. Since the simmer of 1993, ; t rmaments appeared in the Provisional Council's possession, opening the doors to a full- however, this was no longer possible. Let me repeat here that all notions of the legal continuity ~ a civil war in Chechnya in which Moscow backed Dudayev's opponents~ A confrontation of commitments are inconclusive under political systems with an indeterminate legal base and sc d ecivil war also developed in the sphere of symbols and political style: Dudayev adopted a skimpy juridical traditions. :w official name, the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, which was not recognised either by The reaffirmation of the validity of the Grozny Protocol by members of the former Moscow or the Provisio~al Council . . . . . delegations in May 1993 no longer had any meaning. Negotiation and the development of a The latest joint act10n of the Russtan and Dudayev authonties took place m May 1994, system of relations had, in effect, to be started from scratch. Meanwhile, most of the backers of hen an operation against a terrorist group was carried out in Chechen territory, with t~e Grozny Protocol line had naturally become more or less resolute opponents ofDudayev in ;.Baturin, the Russian President's assistant, coming to Grozny to personally thank Dudayev VIew of the split that occurred in Chechen society. fur his cooperation. Russia's participation in the petroleum "agreement" between Kazakhstan and Middle Throughout the summer, Russia's mass media and television laboured intensively to East states only added fuel to the fire, for it affected Chechnya's interests, with Dudayev created a positive image of the Provisional Council as a law-abiding structure about to publicly refusing to concede any ground whatever. overthrow the politically unpredictable "Dudayev regime" which was refusing to accept the This did not prevent him, however, to send Yeltsin a message on October 7, 1993, Russian formula oflegitimacy. approving "the suppression of the communist and fascist mutiny in Moscow". On October 19, Close to autumn 1994, no high-ranking official in Moscow ventured to suggest that however, the Chechen government publicly warned the peoples of the Northern Caucasus concessions be made in the controversy with Dudayev. The choice now was between two that Russia was plotting Caucasian war. approaches: to mount powerful political pressure, coupled with · econo~c road-blocks and Prior to this, hardly compatible attitudes were registered in a telegram that Shakhrai sent possible armed actions of a local nature, on the one hand, and "restormg order" by purely Duday~v on. Jul~ 2nd, a letter that Shakhrai sent to Y eltsin on July 16th, calling on the latter to military action, on the other. To be sure, the second approach was not overly advertised. stop ml dehvenes from Chechnya, a resolution of the Congress of the Chechen Nation on Generally right up to the events in late November, Chechnya was essentially in the shade as Au~st 12th, the negotiations between V. Yarov, Deputy Chairmen of the government of the regards political discussions and, indeed, on the_ periphery of the information_ space despite ~e Russtan Federation and Yusef, the Chechen Foreign Minister. heightened public interest. All the same, and this was attested by S.Khadzhiev, the last aenal . .on November 5th, Shakhrai handed Yeltsin his proposals for a political settlement of the photographs for the future large-scale military action in Chechnya were taken as early as mid- sttuatton arou~d Chechny~,to suit the prevailing new conditions. On the following day, Yeltsin, August. . ·· . who agreed w1th Shakhrats approach, asked the State Committee for Federation Affairs to It will not be amiss to say than only a very small ctrcle of people had at the time draw up a proposal for concrete action. anticipated the gravity of the oncoming events. The statements to that effect made by A month later, on December 8th, the Chechnya government issued a statement of spokesmen of the federal Democratic Russia Party in Moscow and the warnings a few not too prates~ against forcible pressure. And in another week, on December 16th, a Provisional well known journalists were a voice in the wilderness. In Grozny, too, despite the rising fear of Council of the Chechen Republic was formed, with a Statement on the provisional Council of military violence, the attempts of a number of independent public organisations to build bridges flj)il'l the Chechen Republic being issued on December 26th. were unsuccessful and were defeated by general statements of official Dudayev spokesmen to I,., T~oughout 1994, high-ranking members of the Russian administration made highly the effect that the people of Chechnya were able to defend themselves in all circumstances and contradictory and mutually exclusive moves and utterances. This was accompanied by slow in face of all threats. but sure preparations for a large-scale armed solution. The feeling that the threat of war was real was rudely brought home by the abortive Dudayev's representatives came to Moscow time ahd again and insisted on a Yeltsin­ stonning of Grozny on November 26th and the subsequent exposure of the secret elements of ':;:::,, Dudayev meeting without preliminary strings attached. S.Filatov, Moscow's representative that operation. Almost all political forces in Moscow condemned it. Meanwhile, the empowered to conduct negotiations about negotiations, rejected this approach in no uncertain exceedingly caustic utterances ofV. Zhirinovsky at a press-conference in the Duma were given tenns, add~1g that any talks with th~se who regard themselves as the rulers of Chechnya can be in full in the Dudayev government's newspaper Ichkeria as a sample of how to defend peace held only if they formally and offictally recognise that Chechnya is a subject of the Russian and advocate Chechen interests. But the many Duma deputies visiting Grozny at that time Federation and must abide by the provisions of the Constitution and laws of Russia. Dudayev's turned a deaf ear to the appeals and proposals of various public organisations to establish a spokes~en rejecte~ this ~pproach. ~hey had pro~ably expected a more tactful attitude, hopes standing mission of observers in Grozny. And when G.Y avlinsky finally came to Grozny with for which Shakhra1 contmued to vmce at that time (the spring of 1994), and for "influential what was in substance the same plan, it was rejected by Dudayev's people for formally stylistic sympathy" on the part of such figures as V.Shumeiko, who in fact had publicly backed motives. Dudayev's patter of negotiations in May. The last official contacts of the· representatives of the Russian Federation and the The Russia~ Duma pass~d a numbe~ of evasive documents that could not satisfY the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria took place in December 1994 shortly before the outbreak of Dudayev leadership, but contamed the pomt that all controversies over Chechnya must be hostilities.

18 19 And the main event in this context was the preliminary unplanned meeting between Dudayev and Russian Defence Minister P. Grachev in township of Ordzhonikidzevskaya in the territory of the Republic oflngushetia. The most complicated circumstances of the meeting call PEACEKEEPING AND F ACTFINDING MISSIONS IN for meeting call for a detailed and thorough description . But one point should be emphasised most firmly: tentative understandings were reached to settle all issues concerning Chechnya CHECHNYAIN 1994-1995 exclusively by peaceful and political means. This could certainly have been a good basis for a settlement and later became the authoritative basis for the world community to demand that the war in Chechnya be terminated and that the process of full-scale realistic and productive negotiations be resumed (see the December 1994 resolution of the European Parliament). The Beginning The other official contact, the last one of all before the outbreak of the war, were the talks in Vladikavkaz. These, too, we are sorry to say, were in all respects more than clumsy. The moment the edge of the situation around Chechnya was clearly becoming sharper The Russian delegation confronted the Chechen negotiators with too imperative and (spring-early summer 1994), the group of journalists permanently stationed in Grozny, the stylistically. unreasonable proposals deliberately worded to be unacceptable, especially under Ukrainians Andrei Bazavluk and Elena Petrova among them, set out to prevent and armed pressure of time. Still, a discussion did begin, because all the negotiators, including many of the solution of Chechnya's political status. They used their ties with Russian military circles and Russian federal spokesmen, were sincerely eager that the regime of the non-use of force with the Chechen leadership. would continue during the time of the negotiations. After the Russian federal forces entered In September 1994, International Non-Violence (Andrei Kamenshchikov) and Omega Chechnya on December 13th however, the Vladikavkaz negotiations, broken off by the (Victor Popkov, Vladimir Sukhov) came forward with offers to monitor the situation and Chechens for consultations with Dudayev, were resumed. mediate, for they had reportedly visited Chechnya. · Formally, the war in Chechnya began on the strength of the unpublished official ukaze of After the abortive attack on Grozny on November 16, 1994, organized by Russian the Russian President on disarming unlawful armed detachments in Chechnya. It was issued in special services with the help of mercenaries from among Russian servicemen, other spite of the Resolution of the Council of the Federation on the day before which said -- for organizations and private persons joined in the peacekeeping drive ion Chechnya. the nth time -- that use afforce should be ruled out. ' A second attempt to attack Grozny was evidently thwarted early in December, when All subsequent developments belong to a fundamentally different stage of the historical Major-General Johar Dudaev and Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Pavel and political situation. Grachev agreed to meet though the good services of the above-mentioned joumalists in Sleptsovskoe, a place in Ingushetia. The latter came to Mozdok, the field headquarters in *** Northern Ossetia (135 km distant from Grozny) directly after this, evidently to take charge of the armed operation. He had no instruction of meeting Dydaev. The effective meeting of the Analysis of the history and nature of the Russian federal authorities' and the 'hechen two generals was probably facilitated at that time by the arrival in Grozny of Grigory ,,II leadership's political relations from August 1991 to December 1994 leads to the following Yavlinsky, leader of the Duma faction Yabloko, who publicly declared that he wished by his tentative conclusions: presence in Grozny to avert any possible attack on that city. Yavlinsky was accompanied by a 1. A change of political leadership as a force and a structure that controlled the situation large group of members of his factions, and by Sergei Yushenkov, member of the Vybor Rossii de facto occurred in Grozny in August-November 1991 contraty to the operating legislation parliamentary faction, a resolute adversary of Grachev's who had earlier visited Grozny and of the RSFSR. was chairman of the State Duma's Defense Cotnrnittee. The fact that Premier Chernomyrdin 2. Th~. ins~allation of political, military and legislative attributes of independence by the refused official permission for Yavlinsky to go to Grozny (a heretofore unprecedented act) was new authonttes m the Chechen Republic also occurred contrary to the operating Constitution clearly evidence that the situation was highly serious. Yavlinsky and his group were compelled and legislation ofRussia. to travel unofficially by a private plan. 1 11111111 3 .. T~e attempt to settle the problem of reinstalling Chechnya within the legislative space On returning to Moscow, as far as we know, Grachev was severely reprimanded by ?fRussta m November 1991 yielded the very opposite results and made the situation insoluble President Yeltsin, the reprimand being compounded with orders to prepare an anned action. m narrowly formal legal terms. Admittedly, the behaviour of the Duma group in Grozny was not particularly consistent . 4: Neither t~e various branches of Russia a federal administration nor the Dudayev and considered. Despite repeated requests of the local democratic organizations and journalists re~~me 111 Grozny displayed a systemic approach to a realistic solution ofthe prevailing political to establish in Grozny permanent observation and mediation centre of State Duma deputies, cnsts, and whe~eve: the faintest possibility of working out such an approach did appear, it was many of the deputies concerned were unprepared for it for reasons of personal nature. As for scuttled by vanous mternal developments. Yavlinsky, who saw the gravity of the situation and was willing to stay, he alienated Dudaev 5. The "secret" armed a~~ions s~ctioned .by the fe~eral authorities in Chechen territory and his close retinue by what seemed to them to have been a lack of modesty, and he was we:e an e~r~mely grave pohttcal mtstak:e which comphcated Russia's ability to settle any compelled on their demand to leave Chechnya. (In general, one cannot help thinking that the senous pohttcal problems in its relations with Chechnya in strategic terms that would work policy of the Chechen leadership was of a rhetorical than practical nature, which did not best to eliminate the critical situation. contribute to the constructive attempts at mediation.) . . 6. A military solution of the crisis is intolerable under any circumstances and cannot be On returning from Grozny, the group of deputies were a target of ferocious attacks by justified either in political military terms or in terms of morality. The decision to make war in the press for the afore-mentioned "immodesty" and accused of having merely wanted to win Chechen territory has done irreparable harm to the peoples ofRussia and Russian state. political capital. This press reaction helped power the public importance of their action and, consequently, their influence on the decision-making in the Kremlin.

20 21 Grachev, too, was ridicule_d after his ~eeti~g V.:ith Dudaev, which certainly did no add to colonel, "Where's he from?" "The Duma," said the colonel. The man moved the Kalashnikov closer to me. "Quick, make_ tracks," whis~ered the excited voice of the man who was standing his desire, weak as it was, to reststs the Prestdent sWill. beside me. Before I knew 1t, the locals literally dragged me off the road. A strict, somewhat excited lecture: "Guy, you're too emotional. Don't be like that. They'll make mince meat of you ... They they'll tell the world that we did it... Hey, looks like you haven't eaten today. Let's 2. Insert. My Own Remembrances go to someone's house, they'll feed you." It was quiet in the house of the Ingush stranger, a on December 8, the Council of the Federation of Russia's Fed~ral Assembly (the staid old man. The troops and my own clumsy daring faded into the past. "Senate") came forward with a resolution favouring a cle~r peaceful s~lutlon of the Chech~n Meanwhile, Volodia Sukhov had quietly followed the same road and saw what was not crisis. On the same say a Congress of Members of Nat10ns of Russta repr~ssed b~ Stahn intended for his eyes: men in black were holding several soldiers with tied hands beside an gathered in Nazran, the provisional administrative cent:e of the In~ush Repubhc, a n~tgh?our armed troop-carriers. of Chechnya and the closest to it ethnically. Fol!owmg the cl~smg of the Counc~l of t~e We spent the evening with Sleptsovsky at the administration premises of Sunzhen Federation of Russia, its deputy of Chita Oblast, V tctor Kurochkin, flew to :he Congt ess wtt? district. Kurochkin, too, dropped in. He had spent the whole say with the troops, and was now a peaceful resolution. For those present at the Congress, th~ peac~ful resolut10n o~the Counc1~ on his way back to Grozny. The administration was hard at work: unarmed people -- mostly of the Federation meant an end to violence, and was rece1ved wtth great enthus1a~m. Andret women -- were to line the road by morning in order to plead with the armed forces to halt. It Kurochkin, who had been in Grozny for more than two weeks, was aim?~: certam that the was important to avoid any incidents and rule our armed counter-initiatives. Everything was Council of the Federation could want nothing but an end to the hostilities, a success~! being done for the people to feel the strength of their courageous unity. The Ingushes were conclusion of the peacekeeping effort commonly secured. Neither he nor J?eputy Kuro~hki.tt, telling us enthusiastically that both local Russian Orthodox priests, one of whom was gravely ill not the two men Oleg Mustafin and Bekhan Khabriev, who had ~ccompamed the d_eput~es ~s and kept his house close to visitors, had also come out with the demonstrators. their assistants, nor Victor Popkov and Vladinlir Sukhov repr~se.ntmg Omega, could tmagme m By the middle of the night we found ourselves in the residence of Ruslan Aushev the their wildest dreams what events would unfold before them w1thin hours. President oflngushetia. I heard that Kovalev was calling from Moscow and asked a word 'with Kurochkin, Mustafin and Khabriev set off fo Grozny with the text o! the C~un~il of the him. Audibility was poor, and I decided that he was calling from his car en route to the airfield. Federation resolution, accompanied by representatives of various democratiC orgamzat1~ns .. "Are you on your way here?" I shouted. "No," he said, "I'm in the office, but I do hope to fly in Early in the morning of December 9, planes roared ceaselessly ov.er the pres1dent1al the course of the day" This "course ofthe day" for reasons known to the whole world, lasted palace in Grozny. Ordinary telephone connections with Moscow were practically ~roken off as fo yet another week. before. The governmental line was functioning. It was cleat that none of the tension had been In the morning of December 13, I was for yet another week. Council of Ministers of Ingushetia. I had just had a conversation with a Russian official who was negotiating with a relieved. · d' 1 I got through to Moscow by phone and asked that Sergei Kovalev should be 1mme tate Y spokesman of Dudaev in Vladikavkaz. "While you're talking," I said to them "hostilities have already begun. Do what you can to make the fighting stop." They promised to do so. A few infom1ed of the situation. A few hours later, after nightfall, I learned that Kovalev had been located, that he was at an official reception, while those of his assistants _who had been hours later, quite unexpectedly, I heard the voice of Andrei Kamenschikov. He was in the reached, did not see anything particularly alarming in my reports. In the meantlffie, everybody neighbouring room on a direct Moscow line: ".. .I have just seen Russian troops cross the was talking about a big attack on Grozny after nightfall. . . Chechnya border without any visible provocation .. " Then he set forth numerous details, But the night passed. There was no attack. The sky was tranquiL The planes vamshed. including the fact that just five minutes before the troops moved, officers of the frontline Ordinary telephones at the palace were functioning. I learned that Kov~lev had_ finally been vehicles were hoping nothing of the sort would happen. reached, that he took the information seriously, and that he had succeeded m reaching someone Kovalev, Borschev, Molostov, Petrovkyn and Orlov arrived on the night 14/15 important (by nightfall "sources" other than myself had also set Mo~cow on edge.) I_ called December. In the morning their conversation with Ruslan Pliev, the Ingush President's aide, Kovalev, thanked hint, and promised to tell him everything that day m Mos~ow (as fl1ght to followed, It lasted many hours. They decided to visit the Ingush village where Russian Moscow from Ingushetia was leaving in a few hours). Good Heavens,_how nat~e we :vere. helicopters had shot up a few houses with a loss in lives. Thereupon, possibly, we would call at To the airport by car: Sukhov and me were in a hurry. The dnver was 1~ a st1ll gr~ater the hospital in Nazran. Once the decision was made we had lunch. Kurochkin and Bekkhan hurry. But we did not reach the airport, and the driver did not get home untt! late at mght: Khabriev made their appearance at this point; they had just come from Grozny and were on troops were on the move, blocking our way. their way to Moscow to attend the next day's sitting of the Council of the Federation. Bekkhan They were stopped. But for Heaven's sake don't think it was done by force of arms. They raises an unexpected and resolute toast: for Kovalev's safe trip to Grozny. Confusion at the halted at the Ingushetian village ofBarsuki. table. Kovalev kept silent. Bekkhan repeats his idea. Pliev opposes it. Suddenly he let the cat Makeshift negotiations at the roadside. Locals shouting something very excitedly _to the out of the bag: "Grozny will be attacked tomorrow at five in the morning." Kovalev still had colonel who had stepped out of his car. But I see no one armed. Th~ colonel rephed by nothing to say. But his silence was highly eloquent. Another hour of to and fro with Pliev and accusing the crowd of "provocations" and demanded that they go home. I m:e~ened and show Boris Agapov (both responsible for the safety ofKovalev, the Human Rights Plenipotentiary of my accreditation card of the Federal Assembly of Russia. The colonel was w1llmg to send us to the Russian Federation), and they made up their mind to move. True, this applied exclusively the command point, but insisted that I first get the crowd to move off the road. I consented. to the official delegation. Neither me nor Kamenshchikov were allowed to come along. On my behalf, several Ingushes ask the crowd to shift some 50 meters, w?ere we held an Kan1enshchikov and me had foreseen this, we decided it would be best for me to return to improvised public meeting. People promised each other to stand together agamst any outbreak Moscow where I could usefully communicate with Duma deputies and the corps of lawyers, of violence. while he would at all costs secure permission to go on to Grozny. When members of the I returned to the colonel, asked about the promised command point. He didn't reply. delegation emerged from Agapov's office, I responded to their announcement with a very firm, Instead, I saw a masked man in black pointing his Kalashnikov at me. Brusquely, he asked the "you must take Kamenshchikov." Petrovsky responded with a resolute, "Yes, we'll take him."

22 23 respond to the frightening challenge? Who are those who, often alone and hopeless, went into the fray with just one weapon -- the word of truth, and who wanted just one thing -- to stop THE DIED SOLDIER KNOWS NOT the bloodshed? Maybe it will really stop, and then one of those whom you love, whom you HOW THEWAR ENDED hold dear, one you no loner hope ever to see again will look from behind the peak of the Black Mountain and you will run to him as :fust as you can, and you will never again tum away from each other. People became accustomed to the killing of other people in the spring of 1991. One of To A. D. the first to die was Cossack leader Ataman Podkolozin. One of the local clashes that took a toll of life was the Cossack village ofTroitskaia (not in Chechnya at the time it true and now too on the border oflngushetia; but in 1991 no such clear demarcation exlsted). The first t~ fall The Chechen war has been dragging on for months. It is now living history and a never was CPSU City Committee secretary Kutzenko in not entirely clear circumstances at the height to be forgotten tragedy for many people and many ethnic groups. of revolutionary wave. December 11 is no more than a conventional date. The main Russian forces were still on It is not true that Dudaev shot up opposition meetings. But he did damage the resident of the territory of neighbouring lngushetia on December 11 and 12. Not until the early morning of "opposition" leader adventurer Bislan Gantemirov, and did so in line with his peculiar logic December 13 did they cross the border into Chechnya along Rostov-Bak:u highway at 8 in the even though it was in the very centre of Grozny. The bombardment was to have been at six in morning, which means that scrupulous historians should, in effect, start counting from this the morning when the building was empty. Unfortunately -- and this no one had known -­ more accurate date. But on the other hand, the history of blood and tears, the story of exultant Chechen police recruits were spending the night there before leaving for their destination. Or cynicism, cowardice and boundless cruelty, the history of defeats an of the death of those who, maybe there had been second thought that if someone did happen to be in the building, it must alone, by one, backed exclusively by the truth and integrity, tried to avert the horror of war, have been someone of the anti-Dudaev guard and there was no ...... in getting rid of them. began long before and, quite clearly will not end with the last of shots even if some fired shot The police recruits died for nothing. Gantemirov's guardsmen came away with their lives. will in effect gain the right to be called the last. Dmitry Krikoriants, Express-Chronika correspondent, was shot to death in the presence The root of the evil, as we know, goes back to prehistoric times. But speaking in terms of his parents in April 1993 in Grozny. The obituary was short and restrained, and there was of history, and the very latest history at that, we must admit that the safety-catch was released little talk about the case, so that only few people still remembered it. The day before his by the over-confidence of the initiators of the grand reforms of the 1980s as they happened to murder Krikoriants had spoken to some guests from Britain. What had he told them? And who see the situation and their own strength. The matter should be traced to the reckless had learned about it? None of us knows nothing about it, an any case, the British guests could adventurism of the men who happened to find themselves leaders of nations, and lastly, to the hardly have publicly revealed what he seems to have told them in the hope that it would reach cynicism and boundless cruelty of those who in all circumstances want nothing but power and the desired quarters. money. Much is to be found in trifles, in what was, in effect, a matter of political style. The There was much shooting in Chechnya in Dudaev's time. Very much shooting. Just as promise to withdraw our army from Germany and Central Europe before making a scrupulous much as in Moscow, perhaps. A little more, a little less, perhaps, and everybody said there study was made of what to do with the troops. the weaponry and infrastructure was highly would be war, that Russia would attack. Absurd. What for? Why would Russia attack questionable. How little respect and consideration must the leaders have had for their blood Chechnya? That would be out of all proportion. Dudaev people thought, was simply whipping brothers and sisters, for their well-being and freedom, to brandish the slogan that a nation's up tension and building himself a political rear in case another violent action would occur. liberation was more precious than the value of each human individual? What cause was True, the Russian armed force could be ruthless and cruel. We saw it in Ingushetia in 1992. pursued by the insane GKChP (State Emergency Committee) and its abortive putsch in August And they had then been on the point of moving into Chechnya. But that no more than a 1991? By what twist of fortune did the seeds planted by the GKChP stage managers bloom misunderstanding in the "Extremely difficult conditions of the Ossetino-Ingush conflict." forth in political ugliness, an insult to common sense and mass suicides of those who has just But a real war did begin. Nor did it pursue the aim of overthrowing the Dudaev regime risen to the political top by swearing loyalty to freedom, humanism and civilisation, and, on the which appeared somewhat less legitimate than some of the others, or restore the integrity of other hand, by charging their enemies in rejecting these values? We happened to escape a third state destroyed by Dudaev, or to disarm someone who had earlier been armed. The war was world war, the iron curtain and perpetual communist undernourishment and shortages and and is still needed such as it is. And the events in Ingushetia in 1992 and the Moscow upheaval appeared to have come to the labyrinth of gold and concrete, where killers shoot from behind of October 1993 were rehearsals, for it also abounding in violence. every comer, where people do not believe each other, and need humanitarian aid from abroad Following the reckless political overturn inside Chechnya in November 1991 ended, to survive. What were all these reforms for if there is so much more shooting? This is the Dudaev and his regime were used differently at different times, depending on how useful it was question all of us must answer; in Chechnya today it fills the atmosphere totally bereft of any to the needs of the moment. In the Moscow-Grozny axis, Russia rather than Chechnya was nostalgia. People have no time for it where everything breathes death and vexation and pain for much like a Soviet republic that did not exactly know what to do with the sovereignty it had the senseless casualties and entirely inexplicable cruelty. "Once it was quiet here," they say, and just proclaimed. Dudaev backed the President (Yeltsin), politically and showed his strong this woo without any hint of nostalgia for the past. dislike for the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (Khasbulatov). It seemed wiser to Yeltsin, Dictatorship -- freedom -- democracy -- rule of law -- nihilism, and freedom to shoot, to therefore, to come to some terms with him; but no money should go to Checlmya banks, even start gunfights -- demands to restore order -- war -- dictatorship. Who were the first to fell money to pay old-age pensioners, because aU fmances there were controlled by the mafia. victims to this uncontrolled love of freedom? Who has joined them so far and who will fall this There was the sort of relationship that seemed to prevail. All agreements were renounced. very minute, adding to the immeasurable mountain of cannon-fodder? Who has laid down his Chechnya was one-sidedly declared a subject of the Russian Federation in Aprill993, but even life, who is still dying for the honour of the little land condemned by a country whose citizen he then the accounts were not unfrozen and the budget allocations released. That's the kind of still remains and not particularly cared for by those under whose comn1and he ventures to picture evolved.

24 25 Much depended on episodes. Dudaev would not admit Shakhrai to see him. That was A bomb exploded at 1 p.m. sharp on October 17, 1994 in the editorial office of the bad. But he declared that he sided with Y eltsin in the referendum. That was good. In October. above-mentioned Moskovsky Komsomolets, whose morning issue reported the death of nearly 1993 he, Dudaev, also backed Yeltsin and that was welcome and valuable. But then the people a dozen people without any special intonations and in close detail This, indeed, was the general of Chechnya began praying for Khasbulatov's release from prison, and Dudaev did not forbid tenor in which the paper informed it large mass of readers on that subject. So no rational it, and that was not good at all. reasons seemed to exist to lament the death of its journalist, Dmitry Kholodov, more To be sure, the Chechens are a freedomloving nation, but generally sensible, even emotionally than a thousand other killings. But the disaster came and seized us by the throat. pragmatic, and this despite their favourite song about Zelimkhan who gave the unfortunate He was all but a toy who looked down at us with warm, caressing eyes from a portrait in a Russian officers no respite years and years after Sharnil. In sum, may Chechen friends forgive black frame of mourning, and one was seized by the thought somehow that he was assassinated me, remove Dudaev from the political scene and do it so that Chechnya should after all before, finishing some most important story, and that something had happened in his life that recognize. itself part of Russia if that is what someone in the Kremlin is so eager to do it -- by, his paper was now unable to report. It was desolate all round. I was sorry -- sorry for him -­ as I see 1t, the cleanest possible political means. To say nothing more, it was very likely and sorry that I had not met him before, not even for five minutes. Besides, there was Dudaev would lose the presidential elections he had himself scheduled in March 1995 to some something profoundly strange about the murder. civilian person with a highly moderate programme who would promise to improve the But life follows its own course, and after attending the funeral and living through its economic situation in Chechnya through close ties with Russia. The rest would then belong to strangely mystic atmosphere, I did not tum to any recent issues of the paper with journalist the sphere political tact and elementary politesse (the Chechens are not the only ones who do K.holodov's article. I care little about the reports he wrote on army and army-related affairs, not like to be offended or humiliated, even if their mayor is not entirely legitime and has and was, indeed afraid of being disappointed the image he would produce. That was probably a connections with some suspicious bankers. Neither do Muscovites.) Pro-Russian-minded good thing. I would not have understood what it was all about. An unprofessional style, can~idates win presidential elections more often than not in the former Union republics, so why scrappy ideas, contradictory thoughts, and all this about Chechnya -- monotonous, not entirely n?t m Chechnya? Though it quite possible that in the light of Russia's true political interests it comprehensible, why and what for. "Chechen petrodollars march across Freedom Square;" d1d not at all have to wait for Dydaev's departure: of late he had himself faced an internal "Dudaev will be blown up;" "Can't ride into the Palace on a 'Crocodile';", or "The Golden Key situation requiring a substantial change of course toward close ties with Russia True here to the Big Caucasus." one may have had to reconcile oneself with certain realities that in no way depended o~ The story about Soviet wartime spy Stirlitz and one Krylov was funny enough, of course, Mosco"':. Well, for one thing, Ruslan Khasbulatov could have become head of Chechnya, or, descriptions of boring inner-Chechen quarrels were over-stretched and intensive. Besides, all of worse still, could have been elected to the Council of the Federation of Russia. this mingled with not altogether discernible items about the Western Army Group, army True, all that is now beside the point. The objective is the military stean1-roller. The intelligence, and even -- of all things -- about the military-industrial complex. I'll gainsay that a count-down began in February 1994, when Dydaev's official spokesman rejected Moscow's fifth-year girl student of a journalism school would have produced easier reading on the very resol~te statement that it would not negotiate until Chechnya recognized itself a subject of the same subjects. To be sure, I would have caught the drift of things to a point, and the R:uss1an Federation. The Russian negotiators responded by breaking off the talks: a vicious uncertainty would have left a mark of enchantment. At least, I would have been more Circle that led to endless bloodshed: "You set us ultimatums" and "won't compromise." inquisitive about the scandalous now that broke put after the boy's killing and not in passing Whereupon, as you may recall, Sergei Filatov, the presidential aide, told the press about with friends only, but publicly, giving voice to my observations about the strange emphasis of chopped off heads: Chechen terrorists were called into play. True, in May Yuri Baturin went to some of the items and Grachev's foolishness, and the main point, about the bomb itself, Grozny to thank ~udaev to ca~ture them. ~ut then terrorists proliferated and were no longer brought from Chechnya. Possibly all those things were not half as stupid as they sounded if we bearable. The tact1~s of combatmg them which had never failed before, had now to be changed, admitted the boy's ability to think allegorically and not always act as a devil with horns. thou8!1: alas, not wtthout loss of life among hostages. Chechnya territory was photographed by The town ofKlimovsk is two stations-- Grivno and Vesennaia -- after Podolsk. Where ~he ~!ita'!' planes (as we learned from an open sitting of the Russian State Duma commission the first one is today there had once probably been an ancient village; the name of the second mvest~gatmg the causes and circumstances of the Checlmya crisis). Umar Avturkhanov who speaks for itself: factories, housing developments, and the like. Out of this melancholy h~~ d1rect teleph_one connecti~n with Moscow, took political Charge of hopelessly d;omed sameness, Dtnitry Kholodov travelled all over Russia to places that were the nation's pillars. nuhtary acts agamst Dudaev, _Jumpin? off from the Nadterechny District. The word "teip", But that was all but furtively done -- for there was the usual daily round of things, crowded Chechen for clan, became fashionable m Moscow's political circles. suburban train, the school of journalism, his job and newspaper he had begun writing for. And . I remember very well how excited, mainly elderly Chechens, pushed their way into everything in the paper was essentially fenced off from subjects and topics usual for the vanous Moscow goverume~t offices in August and September oflast year, and said in their for newspaper crows of 25- and 30-year olds. A bit irritating. And who could have guessed what many of us strangely emotiOnal and unsubstantial style, "Can't you see, or don't you want to temperament lay behind the inconspicuousness of that young man and what a deep, even se_e, that there will soon be a terrible war in Chechnya? Enormous quantities of anns though plainly journalistic, talent inlbued his unstriking publications. For never did Kholodov Withdrawn from the former West German garrisons are being concentrated around us. The follow the ordinary pattern in work which he thought truly serious; the most important for him newer stuff had been peddled away, but will have to be written off in a war along with the old was not the text but the people involved he was fond of people and knew how to reach down rubble, and not at the cheapest prices either." They spoke of drug trading, of surrealistic to their essence in sometimes most extraordinary situations. And they became sources of far transplants, ~nd a lot about oil and oil interests. Most of us would not believe it; we were more serious impressions and reflections that just the one-day fabric of newspaper material. As r_eluctant to hsten to all the "sound effects"- As for the newspapers, we activists read them too for the Chechens, the mountain people of 1994, the stories about them were troubled, anxious, httle and too inattentively, especi~lly those several scandal sheets like the Moskovsky and filled with premonitions of advancing tragedy. They were not reluctant to speak of it to Komsomole:s. We were engrossed wtth our own problem analyzing the instability created over others, spoke of their sense of impending trouble -- as people are always want to do -- with the Mavrodt_"~" case in Moscow, the "Black Tuesday" slide of the ruble. and rumours of those who understood them and penetrated their soul. And since he had been a journalist, they Chernomyrdm's retirement. probably told him much more than of their feelings and impressions. What then? If you want to

26 27 avert advancing trouble, you must make it public at precisely ~he right moment, n~ sooner and The storing of Grozny was seriously expected early on the 15th. But it did not take no later. You will be ridiculed if you do it too early; well, and 1fyou are late, what IS th~ use .. place. Instead, they established a Peace Zone at Samashki. Entire units refused to act in excess No one will ever learn and certainly not be able to prove the identity of the sem1-maruac If anything envisaged in official decrees on the disarmament of unlawful armed detachments. and semi-gambler who thought Dmitry Kholodov was his enemy No. 1 an~ may have teased One night, the Peace Zone was bombarded. Fire was opened on the Russian troops from him before his hostility to its logical and after failing to win him over. He will never learn that somewhere on the flank, and then also against the Chechens too. The return fire, fortunately, Dmitry may have succumbed to purely human vanity and had been more outspoken. than he was aimed accurately against the flank. In the morning, furious both sides showed each other should have been -- carelessness that was not his usual quality. But let these who had m purely the mines that reached their targets. "We had no mines like that, and could not have had any." utilitarian self-defence or some political designs gone against their usual pragmatism an? saw "Neither did we have any ofthan kind ... " fit to impart pomp and petty scandal to tragedy whose profundity was apparent and obv10usly The war was then delayed for another two weeks. deserved a different, non-banal treatment. Let them tell us about the whereabouts of the Someone said that A.Maskhadov later referred to the Peace Zone as a big mistake. I'll children's stories that Dmitry used to write in secret in his spare time. . . take the liberty to disagree with the divisional general. If the Chechnya army had mover first at There is only one thing that can be said of the murdered or murderers: astde posstble that time it would never have beaten Russian in the battlefield. Yet there would have been no from something else, they wanted war; they wanted tangible control and influence on .the moral victory, enormous and probably much more important for all future history. in the situation, and were frightened of the thought that nothing would come of it, and mainly absence of those tension-filled and hopeless fifteen days, those still few days of the unplanned because of the boy Dmitry with his inconspicuous and affectionate smile. peace. Why did Dmitry open the parcel at 1 p.m. sharp on October 17? Didn't he know? If you can call it peace when bombs were dropped selectively on Grozny all that time. Couldn't he guess? He had been warned by friends after all. I have no idea and will not venture Yet, they were selective, and that is dead serious. One can see that the military call things to judge, but I think that partly he did understand and possibly guessed. Judge for yourself, much more accurately than human rights fighters. To see that take a close look at present-day really, how he was to have acted? Let someone else take the chance of" opening" the parcel?_ Grozny, at what is left of its central district built mainly at the end of the 19th century in the Forward, away with the obstacles. Warplanes of an unidentified country began flymg old South-Russian style. unimpeded over Chechnya, part of a great, united and indivisible Russia. The air defence While the work force has not yet completed the demolition of the semi-destroyed elegant service was silent. After Mathias Rust all monitors have been switched over to Sessnas and buildings, you can still see 250- and 500-kg bombs where they aimed unerringly on selected directed to St.Basil's Cathedral on Red Square. targets, including the University building Kavkaz Hotel, a few of the bank buildings, and many Then the tank assault on Grozny on November 26. It was doomed to failure in advance. dozen unnamed building with purposes we did not know. The walls, at least their foundations, And we with our everlasting "it wasn't us" confined ourselves to bitter sarcasm in between our still stand, but everything inside is demolished from top to bottom. And not a single bomb daily occupations and would never have properly learned about those who list their lives and crater is to be seen on the road. So do not be over-hasty, dear democrats, with your charges of those who survived if it had not been for people who took a chance out of a thousand to save indiscriminate bombing. someone and halt the steam-roller. A few captured tankmen with documents confirming their I still remember the last few pre-war era phone calls from Grozny. They abounded in membership in elite units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were shipped to moderate optimism. "Don't trust all those frightful reports. You'll see, soon things will settle Moscow where they made revealing statements at their press-conference in the State Duma. down. Threats are mere ritual." It was Christmas time, and they said: "We're putting up a (By the way, I have been told that when Imayev, the Chechen Procurator-General, offered to a Christmas tree." Then come a cry of despair and expression of absurdly last hope: "Rallo, Duma member, and not one of the worst, to release two captured Chechens from Nadterechny d'you hear me? Tell them to stop bombing us." Pardon me, I said, but who are you? (I was District together with a few Russian officers and send them mo Moscow on the grounds that expecting a call and could not make out who was speaking). "I'm the exchange operator in both were citizens of Russian and both were in the same boat -- the Duma member refused. Grozny, Lena's my name, the Grozny operator." Then among others, I had a call at 5 a.m. on That is not an easy story to invent, but even if it was invented, it gives more than enough food January 1; New Year's greetings: "Don't worry, everything will be alright." for thought about the future part ofChechen epos.) Then, there were no more calls. After everything that happened, hemmed in from all sides, Grachev deigned to agree to Followed by that horrendous thing which army people call street fighting. They fought negotiate with Dudaev. The talks stumbled along; the "delegations" did not want to look at for nearly every house, every block every piece of road. The railway station changed hands each other in the eyes, to assume commitments, to leave witnesses and evidences. They were four times. Then the ruins of what had been the presidential palace. The space cleared in front weighed down by the burden of attendant circumstances. Still there was a glimmer of hope. It of it. Pervomaiskaya Street. Minutka. Chemorechye. The pit beside the canning factory, a pit faded on the following day, however, at a sitting of the Security Council of the Russian for those dead men and women tho had that tiny bit ofluck to be buried. For those who had no Federation. Again war came forward. such luck lay unburied in the street for a month or a big longer. All that is common knowledge. The roads of Ingushetia, the village of Barsuki. A troubled red-faced Russian colonel K.i11 or be killed. Head on or from behind. They'll kill all the same. You're totally unprotected. Quiet crowds of people day and night. Someone had already been killed, but that made the But I wish to live just a little longer. Or maybe die now, this very instant, because I can't take it silence still more depressing: death has no liking for noise. Tears in the eyes of the Ingushetian anymore. cabinet minister. Everybody wondered what legitimate armed unit these unidentified masked It is an endless battle, without respite, a battle that is still being fought, and in which no men who emerged from the Russian war machines belonged, aiming their Kalashnikovs at the living being can even dream of repose. backs of our soldiers or at someone's Duma accreditations. It was on December 13, a day later than planned, the formal border of Chechnya crossed *** along the Rostov-Baku highway at 8 in the morning to the refrain of talks in Vladikavkaz about ultimatums and compromises. The final decision of what to do in the circumstances did not come easy to many of our officers. Following the vacillations in December, a few refused categorically: no, do what you

28 29 want, but I won't fight, it isn't my business to fight in Chechnya. Others decid~d the contrary: no pity for and in Grozny to show pity for Vedeno, Shatoi, Barnut, Nazran, the Crimea, I'm not going to desert my men; a butcher may be put in my place. And tf I manage to Kbarkov, New York or Moscow. But here they should be reminded of their responsibility withdraw my unit from here, they'll send others who will lay down their lives in our place. imposed by the laws of nature and of the spirit that is bound to occur and that occurs all the Different decisions of one and the same issue may lead to many more honest solutions than more suddenly and all the more irreversibly the longer it takes to occur, and, believe me, it is may appear at first glance. And these honest decisions include the one where the division better not to let matters go so far. commander wrote his report refusing to fight, but led his men in the umighteous, destructive How to start the peace process? That is simple enough: recognize that the Dudaev and cruel battle in Grozny, and who died himself hoping to provide cover to other involved in regime is also human, to resolve that we want peace with the Dudaev people as with all others the slaughter. What troubles me, however, is that we often take decisions for unscmpulous at the head of any nation (for it is owing to the people that statesmen deal even with the worst reasons, that we neglect our real duty and think of revenge, personal gain, power, promotion, of government that rule them), and thereupon follow the path of compromise, whatever they prestige and glory. are, maintain an elementary polite, patient and respectful tonality, with the awareness that today -- precisely today -- this tonality of respect addressed to, say, Dudaev, is in fact *** addressed to a very large portion of the Chechen nation. It it not a Chechen custom, by the way, to create idols and leaders; there will always be Chechens who discommend the One more thing. Let us at least show a sense of responsibility despite our naivety. Loving government and the president, whoever he is, ever during a war. But they will never fail to our sons, how can we say Grachev is to blame for sending the poor young poorly trained men respect their honour, and will not let anyone spurn it. However hard they may want the to fight to Chechnya. Think of the Chechen mother, and one need not even think of replacing nightmare of war to end, they will never fail to disobey centralized military orders. Late as it one frightening evil with another. It is hard on all of us, but why let ourselves be divided, fall may be, we must begin looking for a way to peace and pass a decision that all stmctures should for lies, indifferently let ourselves be burn. and tell oneself you own house isn't burning and word for a compromise peace, and stop at last to pose cynically as winners. hopefully will not bum. Ruslan Aushev, President of lngushetia, invited all heads of all the Sign a peace up there amidst the mountains and rocks of Teng-Chu where so many of subjects of the Russian Federation in January to mount an attempt at using their prestige and our Chechen and Russian boys have laid down their lives. influence to counteract the war and set the peace process moving. Yet no one carne. Still, we And do not ever again, please, put to use long since stored away stocks of weapons. keep saying Russia is great, united and indivisible. *** ***

Chechnya is unusually beautiful land; I know of no other place where Nature steps so What to do? Is there no return? Will the steam-roller roll to the edge of Chechnya, and quietly and steadily into the depths of eternity. It will attract anyone who ever had a glimpse of then roll on, and will we of Russia bring the plague of war to the 21st century while our it. Chechnya is not Russia (and to avoid charges of unfriendliness at this general point, let me adversaries (our allies) across the Ocean will smile indifferently, thinking in earnest that they note that I am speaking exclusively on the cultural plane), but the Russian language has far have a universal vaccine to protect them against all evils? greater meaning there than the tongue of the several main ethnic groups of the population. In many ways, the Chechens themselves use and will continue to use Russian. They write poetry May 13, 1995 and songs in Russian, and are writing very fine martial songs this very moment. Hearing them you are still more proud of your own Russian language and the diverse culture tied up with it. And it is mots indescribably painful to see a Russian soldier kill the Russian songs of the Chechens, while the Chechens are compelled -- and no other more suitable words can be found --to kill the Russian soldier to the tune of his Russian song.

***

The Chechen war cannot end by militaty means. Any number of people can be killed on . either side, bit it is impossible to win the war. Paradoxically, there can be no victor in that war either as in a superpowers' nuclear war. One can try to over-run all Chechen territory by means of endlessly difficulty and bloody battles (look closely at the map of the Shatoi, Nozhai-Yurt and Vedensky districts, picture the canyon, and you will understand. And then see the Bamut Canyon in the haze). The casualties and suffering would be incalculable. And victory on either side impossible. Each say of the conquest will reduce the outlook of even the quietest men and women in Chechnya to distinct images and a considered system of views as concerns its political independence. The deep­ going radicalisation of public opinion in the territory usually occurs here in response to acts of force of a cruel nature of people in general, not Dudaev or Yandarbiev or Maskhadov, or anyone else. It is serious for the future of all Russia and for its present and future rulers. No one wants war aside from those who benefit from it, but each say of war there will be war against war and resistance to war. Surely, it is hard to expect those who have already shown

30 31 (At this point it may apposite to note that the Russian armed structures do don always behave in the same way toward the Chechentsy, which is naturally most evident at local level.) ABOUT THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION The Lita-M group won the trust of the Russian authorities and Chechens alike for good results in research and recovering missing persons on both sides. On our initiative, the hospital has now been converted into the Humanitarian Mission of Democratic Organizations of Moscow, among whom co-founders are the International Non­ Violence Organization and the Right to Life and Human Dignity Society, which were throughout informed about the work of the hospital and had rendered it fairly considerable Clearly the value of peace, law and humanitarian work depends on what it is aimed at, on lasting results rather than a temporary superficial affect. informal aid. It is now emphasized that all who want to aid in the work of the organization need an The Chechnya affairs is of the utmost complexity if looked at from the humanitarian information infrastructure, elementaiy communications with the outside world. The efforts to angle. For one thing, tens of thousands of people are crowded in a restricted area in the vicinity reduce to a minimum the number of persons, to help relatives fmd their kin outside Checlmya, of semi-demolished Grozny. Militarily, it is controlled by Russian federal armed forces, but its and thereby facilitate the on-going tnigration process and the dissemination of humanitarian aid population is in no way being supported -- nor can it be -- by any special government service and supply system. Water supply and the food and medical supply situation could hardly be along private channels, will proceed more successfully. We appeal to all those who can in any way assist our Humanitarian mission as a worse. Emergency medical aid is highly ineffective. Services to counter emergencies lack structure, on the one hand, and thereby effectively help the war victims, and those, on the other requisite means and equipment. Besides, they are not conversant enough in local conditions hand, all those can on different planes constructively relieve tensions in the hostility zone, and and, more, lack the essential contact with and trust of the local population who, indeed, are by those, too, who in the long run could help overcome its frightful consequences. definition the recipients of this aid. The role played by the International Red Cross Committee is incontestably great. But the rigid restrictions of the Red Cross Committee Mandate under the International Convention prevent it from doing what it could well have done with its technical and financial resources. Moscow, May 11, 1995 Despite their practically complete absence of means and finances, democratic organizations like the Memorial, International Non-Violence, the Committee of Soldiers' Moth~rs, ~me~a, ?ivil Action, and the Right to Life and Human Dignity, have been gathering and ~Isserrunatmg information about casualties in Chechnya, availability and need for medical supphes and other humanitarian aid, and, furthermore, helped evacuate people from danger zones. Great work was done in Grozny and elsewhere by members of the independent Lita-M Telecompa~w, two of whom, Andrei Bazavluk and Elena Petrova, citizens of Ukraine, happen to be medical doctors. In August-December 1994, Lita-M was among the most important gatherers and disseminators of often highly sensitive information about the situation is an arou.~d. Chechnya. and its reports might indeed have somewhat delayed the outbreak of the h~~tthties. ~~plorably it was unable to exert more decisive influence on the political and milttary decisiOn taken at the highest level. On January 2, 1995: Bazavluk and Petr~va and a number of their associates who had by then grouped themselves informally round their offices, ceased their purely journalistic activity and c~nce~trated themselves on offering providing whatever aid they could while continuing supplymg informatio~ to vict~s ~f the hostilities. An independent hospital was set up in the basement of Hotel Dmamo with SIX beds, a modest operation theatre and a first-aid ward. On ~he lOth of April the hospital moved to ground-level premises at l/3 Prospekt Pobedy. All that IS done there, and it is work in stressful conditions, was and is still being done on a voluntary and unpaid basis. In the critical month of January, the centre treated some 400 casualties; besides it helped evacuate. more than 700 people to safer points. In due course the mass of beneficiaries grew. Meanwhile t~e ~o': o~ severely wounded victims declined, for it became possible to transfer them ~o official mstitutwns that were being reopened in Grozny. The months of word done by them m Chechny~ won the staff the affection and confidence of different groups of the Chechnya populatiOn regardless of political orientation and official status. The organization also established much the same relations of trust with members of some Russian federal army structures for the same reasons.

32 33 less _ the blame for the whole tragedy of the Chechnya war falls on such rootless homet as Baturin and Filatov and their like who work for Russian's enemies abroad We peoprvee the ri

Read the following carefully The above document appeared quite long ago, but was disseminated only to specially picked addresses, almost clandestinely. ~o_r t~s reason, we .l~amed ofhi~t muhchttoo late.frFor ththat matter, some of our friends asked us 1f 1t 1s any use noticmg anyt ng 1 a comes om e State Duma LDPR? · · h Press service of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia's parliamentary faction. But now, after Budyonnovsk, it is quite clear that this document, which determmes t e Address: Moscuw, 103009, ul Okhotny Ryad, 1, tel 292-3852,fox 292-5338. style of our political life, is a state document, the. quintessen~e of the ne:w sta~e .ideolo~. The LDPR Faction Press Service Statement. old communist ideology was a brutal and cynical he; the new IS worse sw1ll- 1t 1s not stmply a lie it is a werewolf. The last and decisive assault on all Dudayev fortifications in the foothills and ' It will take too long to set out all the facts, but at least believe us, dear reader, about the mountains was planned on June 1. 1995. As a result of this assault there would have been style. Here we have the gist of the style of the men wh? perfonned !he abortiv:e p~tsch of final appeasement throughout the Caucasus. All hostilities in the region would come to an 1991 of October 1993, those responsible for the success10n of mystenous assassmat10ns, for end The army of the Russian Federation had successfully prepared for this decisive assault: the Chechen war, and for Budyonnovsk. Make noise, then hide, play and kill. That's the sty!~. the Dudayev bandits had been driven from the lowland to the mountains, their retreat was cut What matter who wins and who loses, as long as there is force and violence, as long as there IS off. This, indeed had been the whole purpose of the war, the purpose of all casualties and bloodshed. Because ultimately it will be "us" who win. losses. But at the very hour when the assault which ripened all these months of a brutal was This semi-nameless werewolf who runs the country, a werewolf of lies and violence is about to begin, orders to desist - not a step forward, as they say -- came from the Szpreme sure to be condenmed, and not only for the killing, not only for the war, but for high treason, Commander, Colonel Yeltsin. for acts against the country, for betrayal of its h'lterests. The army was dumbfounded The army was shocked It was, as it were, robed of victory The treacherous werewolf will not succeed in destroying Russia, as no enemy ever and therefore of the opportunity to end the bloody slaughter. All the sacrifices were in vain? succeeded to destroy Russia in its thousand years. The war against Dudayev was another trick against the army? Who was to blame now for the God, life and the truth will triumph for sure in Holy Russia. dead, for the gutted towns and villages? Was it another provocation against the army of the Russian Federation? Our count1y has again been portrayed as barbarian and bloodthirsty. 17.06.1995 The press service of the LDPR parliamentary faction is in possession of the facts: the Supreme Commander's order to desist was authorised by two democrat figures: Baburin and P.S. The above was written during the night of the planned storming of the hospital in Filatov. They concocted the order and placed it before Yeltsin without even showing it to Budyonnovsk by Russian special purpose troops. Happily, the assault did not take place. But Ilyushin. And Yeltsin, as everybody knows, signs things without even looking. the issues touched above are still, to our mind, as urgent as ever. By forbidding the last and decisive assault against Dudayev's bandits entrenched in the mountains, the war in the Caucasus was made endless. Now it will drag on for many generations. Coffins will continue to arrive from that region ten and twenty years from now. Meamvhile, our military intelligence knows for a fact that the aforesaid Baturin, the President's adviser for national security spends most of his time abroad There he constantly meets ~epresentatives of the CIA and Massad. The army knows about it. The main intelligence admmzstration is only a subdivision of the army. The army is incensed by Baturin's voyages and .contacts. In no country can the president's adviser for national security show himself outside the country, whereas ours has practically settled there for permanent residence. So, whose adviser for national security are you, Baturin? We have been approached by representatives of the army. They demand of their Supreme Commander to take drastic measures against Baturin and Filatov. They demand that all foreign intelligence and special services agents be removed from president's team After all, he is our Supreme Commander. The LDPRfaction in the State Duma wholly supports the army's demands and shares its righteuus anger and indignation over the undisguised betrayal of the interests of the Motherland. All the dead and crippled in the Chechnya war, all the unfortunates who lost their homes and property, all those wandering about as refugees in foreign lands, all the

34 35 "subject of the federation" to "subject of international law" is purely political by nature and not at all constitutional or juridical. THE QUESTION OF CHECHEN SOUVEREIGNTY We were continuously witnesses of how the question of Chechnya's sovereignty drifted towards political intrigue and gave place to the question of whether or not General Dudayev's AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POWER STRUCTURES regime was good or bad and whether it was beneficial for the federal authorities of Russia. OF THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC ICHKERIA Certainly, this is a perfectly legitimate question, but it has no bearing whatsoever on the basic matter and stands quite apart on the political plane, just as the question of whether or not the Russian federal political regime is good or bad has no relation to Russia's status under international law. Now, a few words about the legitimacy of the various structures claiming power in Ve~ many territorial units of the former USSR proclaimed state sovereignty in 1990 and Chechnya. We can say apriori that none of them has complete and full legitimacy. Meanwhile, 19~~, usmg bodies of rep~esentative authority elected according to Soviet procedure whose the idea of partial legitimacy is unquestionably more than controversial and always legltlmacy was never questtoned in the context of our history after 1917. accompanies revolutionary processes and departures from the judiciary field with extremely T~e Che.chen-Ingush R~publi~ was no exception. Its Supreme Soviet issued the negative effects on the legal thinking and mentality of the people, and on the moral atmosphere Declaratton of 1ts State Sovereignty m November 1990. The Declaration was drawn up in the in the country concerned. A13 for the structures that exist at present in Chechnya, the are, alas, ~tyle a~cepted under in~~mational law and was not challenged by anyone. But at the time it was either entirely illegitimate or only partially legitimate. The answer here depends on the extend tssued It evoked no political repercussions for purely political reasons. of recognition by the people of Chechnya. It is therefore absolutely clear that no structure . The one-sided proclamation of the Chechen Republic in September 1991 with the claiming power aside from the power of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria possesses nor can mdep~nd.e~t status of ~he Ingush Republic changing from de facto to de jure, coupled with possess the least amount of legitimacy because it is "power" imposed and implanted from from mdistmct mechamsm u~ed in forming the pow~r structures of the Chechen Republic in • outside. This applies entirely to the various direct Russian federal missions in Chechnya and October-Nov~mber 1991, netther repealed nor questtoned the validity of the Declaration ofthe also the so-called government of national re-birth whose headship was unwillingly assumed by Supreme Sovtet of Checheno-Ingushetia. Salambek Khadzhiyev. ~er their a~ortive attempt to change the political and juridical situation in the Chechen All this time since the autumn of 1991, President Dudayev and his structures treated Rep~bhc by declann~ a state ?f emergency there in November 1991, the federal authorities of many aspects of their own legal and political commitments more than carelessly, but in the Rus~ta adop.ted a policy oftac1t de facto recognition of the legitimacy of the regime headed by absence of a sweeping juridical field in the Russian Federation itself, they alone, that is, the Pres1dent DJ ..Du~ayev and of the independence of the Chechen Republic. De jure the matter structures of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, can be rightfully named bodies of power, at least was left hangmg m the air. On the one hand, the Congress of the People's Deputies of Russia for the transitional period, for the simple reason that they alone have some measure of declared the Chechen Republic a subject of the Russian Federation while on the other hand in independence and recognition of the Chechen people not imposed from outside. Dagomys and Grozn~ a plenipotentiary Russian delegation n~gotiat~d with the Chechen The peace settlement in Chechnya today does not depend on finding each party a place in delegati~n as a ~~legat1on of a sovereign state. Nor is it a secret that representatives of Russia's the sun and holding elections without a choice on the Tajik model- even if Dudayev agrees top-ra~ng. political leadership were instrumental in providing the leaders of the Chechen to it. Power in Chechnya must be put into the hands of one side for the transitional period, ~epublic With army weaponry, a crucial attribute under international law of recogruz· ed namely, into the hands of the leadership of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, and the order and mdependence. character of the transitional period must be distinctly defined on a mutually acceptable basis. The ~onstitution. of the Russian F e~era~ion proclaimed the Chechen Republic a subject This should be followed by a move overlooked throughout the preceding four-year period, of .the Russia~ Federatton. But the Const1tutwn's section entitled "Federal Arrangement" its namely, a referendum on the status of Chechnya and free elections to its new power structures, a.rticles 66ff, mterpret the concept of subject of federation to mean that it in fact retains' the among which there should probably be a Provisional or Constitutional Assembly that would nght to define the level of its status under international law finalize the juridical refonn in precise conformance with the expressed will ofthe people and in Article 73 of the ~onstitutio~ says: "Outside the authority of the Russian Federation and fullest detail. All the above processes must be accompanied by a guaranteed cease-fire and the po":'ers of the Russi~ Federatwn as concerns matters under joint authority of the Russian direct control by any requisite number of authorized international observers. Federa~~on .and the subjects of th~ ~ussian Federation possess the entire fullness of state By the way, something of this kind would be highly desirable in Russia itself. power. This means that the ConstitutiOn recognizes that the subjects of the Federation have ~tate status, a~d therefo.re also the right to be subjects of international law. Besides the . Feder~ Relatmns" sectton of the Constitution is drawn up in the form and spirit ~f an mternational agreement. It follows. t.h~t the ~ussian leadership's refusal since March 1994 to recognize the Chechen Republics mternat10nal-law status, ant its rigid contaposition ofthe concept of Statement made at a round table discussion in the Journalists' House in Moscow July I~ 199~ '

·Statement made at round table dicussion on July 15, 1995. 36 37 APROPOS THE CONDITIONS FOR A PUBLIC WHERE WE LANDED WIH OUR BID TO ORDER IN TRIBUNAL TO TRY CRIMES COMMITED IN THE CHECHNY A AND AROUND IT CHECHENWAR

During the past year the political and legal fields an the realms of information as concerned our country shrank to what may be described as signs and symbols. Swallowing true . It is imperative for peace to be achieved by honest and truthful mea.ns barring and false signs of what and about what was happening we have in effect agreed to renounce provocation and opening up the truth about political and war ~ri~es whoeve.r c?ffiffiltted them. reality, including military, political and moral, and began to reproduce the well-known But we will make a big mistake if we exaggerate the significance of msJstent exposures totalitarian formula, "All against, all for.". And our cynicism and moral indifference is far of high-ranking persons, especially if these exposures are not backed?~ impeccable pr?o~s and greater that it was at the time when we denounced dissidents for their non-communist the requisite deep analysis and consideration for those who rna~ unw!llingly become vtctnns of convictions. their own informedness if the high-ranking persons have therr backs to the wall and have They symbol and sign of the officially pronounced quasi-truth was the appearance on nothing more to lose. Besides, however cynical this may sound, some aspects of the truth may Russia's main TV newscast, "Vremia", of the head of the expedition controlling the radiation even scuttle the peace process. But you are aware, I am sure, that this is not a call to overlook safety of the Komsomolets, a submarine that sank near Norwegian shores. Smiling (within the truth, only to be tactful and to have a sense of proportion, and to remember that reach of the innnured remains of dozens of our drowned seamen), he declared that "in the next responsibility can be many different things. . . . . twenty or thirty years there will be no plutonium leaks from the fore part of the submarine." I The main condition for a valid and effective pubhc tnbunal, as I see 1t, 1s a complete and wonder if this attitude will satisfy the Norwegian side during the discussion of the matter as universal amnesty of all without exception, all who may be charged with crimes related to. the summit level. It Chechen war. And here is why. would be childish of us to think that anyone of the high­ Another political symbol of this kind is the negotiation process over a peaceful settlement ranking men can be called to account in a court of law. No, the blow will hurt the least ofthe Chechen conflict now under way in Grozny, Provocation- violence- negotiations - fresh protected the scapegoats those in fact who landed unwittingly in a dubious situation, and are provocation - fresh violence - fresh negotiations ... This is the scheme followed by the events in culpable because of thlngs better left untold. The assault will and is already ~nly th~y kne~ Chechnya ever since August 1991. It led to the current war, and is now the object of the talks being aimed at those who are bearers of information, and here all means are good: arrests, which are accompanied by monstrous bloodshed. We are told the negotiations are in earnest, terrorism, and provocation. I am alarmed over the report that criminal proceedings have been but nothing is said of who exactly is negotiating, of the extent of the powers of the negotiating started against ten persons who took part in the actions led by Shamil Basayev. I am afraid that sides and, lastly, of the exact object of the negotiations. All that is a secret of the many actually this is only the first step of the drive to eliminate those inconspicuous people who may know functioning parties, and a far greater secret, too, than all the Soviet-American secrets at the something about the events in the Budyonnovsk area that we do not happen to be aware of. disarmament negotiations. It is altogether incomprehensible who is to put a full stop in the Members of government and criminal generals will go scot free, while those who know negotiations after the many commas of the now customary changes in the preliminary plans. more than they should will be incarcerated. This must be not be allowed to happen. The How will the settlement sidestep all the legal and stylistic intrinsic contradictions? And finally, victims of provocation, such as Dmitry Kholodov and the Chepanov family, are much too how can we expect it to be fulfilled if the two sides, and above all Russia, do net seem to be numerous in this terrible Chechen war. able to ensure the basic condition- a cease-fire, a stop to the bloodshed. There is all to much To distinguish between provocation and the true cause and effect, we must see who reason to believe that again, despite hopeful statements, nothing will be secured, and there will benefits from the events. Take Budyonnovsk. It seems to me that it was contrary to Chechen be again be the former deceit, the endless cheating. interests however the events may have developed. Contrary to Chechen interests, too, was We are fully aware that we cannot at this point influence the events in Chechnya; we taking the war into the territory of Russia. Anything of this sort was most likely to have just venture to set out a few ideas that may turn out useful today and in the future, for we do one outcome: an abrupt escalation of the hostilities and vengeful retaliation against Chechnya believe that all things considered a future does exist. and the Chechens. Doubly so in the Budyonnovsk context. What we got, however, were peace What is needed for the negotiations to proceed successfully? negotiations. Why? No need to fix attention on this now. May the negotiations proceed First, a "trifle" like the executive powers of the heads ofthe two delegations. The head of successfully. But on one condition: that those who know a little more of the truth should not the Russian delegation, like the head ofthe Chechen for that matter, must have the authority to be made to pay for their knowledge. May the laurels of peacemakers go to those who want issue all lawful instructions, orders and recommendations to all executive bodies of power in them. But on the condition that the price of these laurels should not be anyone's life and Russia on all matters concerning Chechnya. His orders should be subject to innnediate freedom. execution, and, of course, above all as concerns military matters. The head of government. Or else the truth that has accumulated from various sources will come to light. This does not mean that the head of state, the president of Russia or the premier should at once In conclusion, I call once more for a universal anmesty. come to Grozny; what it means is that the head of delegation, appointed from among prominent and responsible politicians, should be delegated all those powers that we have Statement made at a round table dicussion in the Journalists' House in Moscow, July 14, earlier listed and should be able to use them without any consultations with anyone. Any of the 1995 ministers heading the armed forces and the forces of the Interior Ministry should be apprised

38 39 that they will be inunediately relieved of their post of they pennit any violation of the cease-fire withdrawal is abolished for we want to kill the wolf in its own den. We set no price on our by our side, even if appointed to that post just the day before. wn lives nor on yours and that of most people. We hate the enemy, and the dirty 0 The next point is the maximum openness of the negotiations. Whatever is not eacemak~rs who called us names. We will finish them off and show no mercy." And, confidential should be articulated loudly and clearly, with no right to take back premises. And ~etrically, the question why .we let them ~o? So ma~y of ~s were kill.ed. They cannot be what is really a secret should be indicated, and the authorities responsible for safe and mutually trusted. They will never leave us m peace. Besides, there IS nothing left to live for. We have no acceptable resolution should be made known. There must be no points whose secrecy cannot families, and no homes. We are few, but dedicated, r~solved to finish ~hem off. Now we:[~ find be justified in the context of concrete and lawful state interest. Personal secrets of statesmen h m wherever they hide - we'll find them, and finish them off. If 1t won't be them, 1t 11 be cannot be an object of negotiation and a state secret. The higher benefit of the state has the e who are like them. We'll treat them as they treated us. We will also flnish off the nothing to do with it: the goal does not justify the means. t OS d . I h ?" I . peac emakers , who are nothing less than. spies. .An m genera, w o wants peace. t 1s. very Next. And this is absolutely obvious from the moment the large-scale hostilities began: difficult, practically impossible, to shift the attnbutes of human n~~re from the ~estruct~ve to any and aU negotiations cannot from that moment on be anything but equal, and must be the constructive plane, especially if the thing concerns some cnttcal moment m the hfe ~f conducted with the official leadership of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria. By starting a war society. Neither can there be any shift from war to peace by a me~ order'rult c~ot.happen m against the people of Chechnya with the avowed purpose of wiping out the Dudayev regime, the prevailing situation. In addition to an order, th~re must e rnor motw~tton, on a Russia has, first, forfeited the right to address it as a subordinate entity, a "whole" addressing a . ·de scale a motivation for peace at all levels. Uruversal amnesty, therefore, IS necessary na t!OnW1 , • h · d . "part", because the "whole" never makes war against its own part. This has never been known as that very motivation. Amnesty is able to relieve the tenston t at IS to ay govermng to occur in history, and is entirely inconceivable. And, second, however reluctantly, we must everybody's behavior. "All is forgiv~n!" That is. :".hat should resound ~o~d and clearhin~or those admit that by waging a full-scale war against the people of Chechnya we made the Dudayev who were in some way involved m the hostd1ttes as combatan~,hvJctlm, for ~thnyt ,g e1 ~ e. regime a participant, the opposite number. The Russian leadership has thereby recognized the Thereupon, each one of us will have a chance to come to te1ms Wit onese1 , w1 on~ s gu1 1t, Dudayev as the only real authority at present on the territory in question. Any other authority, one's trouble with the guilt and troubles of Russia, of Chechnya, of all the protagoru~ts and however it may be named, may be considered an occupying power in this context, and cannot actors. One ~ust on no account consider oneself entirely right. That is important. For if there therefore be the subject of negotiations - at least until it integrates with none other than the is anyone entirely right at this juncture of~s~ory, it is th~ dead. . . Dudayev structures. (The aforesaid naturally refers to the procedure of the negotiations and The question over which the negot1atmg delegations are at loggerheads, wording their not the question of the political future of any of the structures of persons concerned.) formulas with a tenacity worthy of better use, namely over Ch~chnya's status, though of The fourth point concerns the level and style of the agreements that will materialize in obviously very great emotional thrust, is somewhat more abstract m the legal.sense than may the course of the negotiations. We must all be aware that what is at stake in Chechnya today is seem at first glance. That is why, it seems to me, no one should try and settle It _off the bat. A not simply the outcome of the local, event though most brutal, conflict, but essentially a mechanism must be found for the transitional period that would rule out con~lstons and leaps settlement of the conflict once and for all. What is at stake is the peaceful future for the of a political or economic, to say nothing of a military nature, whatever t~e ~ltunate ?utcome.ts foreseeable future not only for Russia but for many European and ABiatic countries. Possibly, and whatever the final formula in the future Russian and Chechen const1tuttons. It Js essential the issue was as acute as now only twice in our century. What is needed on the Chechen issue to strip the question ofintrinsic contradictions. And, naturally, the ~ecis}ve role must belong to is not simply an agreement, not simply a treaty. What is needed is a Peace Charter that could the people of Chechnya, who must be given a chance to express thetr will through the ac.cepted best be universal in nature. Its first point should be a cease-fire under dependable international democratic procedure under official international control. It ~o~ld probably be a.go~d tdea ~o control. Its second point, and this is absolutely essential, is a universal amnesty,] buttress the mandate and practical capability of the OSCE Mission m Chechnya, Ill v!ew of1ts The latter point calls for an explanation. Any war ends either in victory for one of the highly effective activity in the past few months. This could, indeed, serve. as a most unporta~t combatants or, if it cannot have a victor, in a peace agreement when a certain stage of mutual precedent for subsequent acts preventing wide-scale conflicts on the contments wherever the1r exhaustion is reached (we do so far avoid speaking of complete and guaranteed mutual threat may arise. . . destruction). In the first case, whoever the victor, he always declares himself right and uses In conclusion, I would like to return to the plan of conceptuahzmg current de.velopments some way or other to remove people of the defeated side whom, he wants out of the way, that we touched upon earlier. The war in Chechnya was never a local war. Today, Its far-flung namely, those who suffered a military defeat and those who had publicly disapproved the fact consequences are ever more obvious. Anything that concerns Chechnya concerns everyo~e of of war. In the latter case, both sides to the conflict are in a dual position. On the one hand, they us. One hundred percent. In no way or another, we are all participants in. tllis war, eve~ tf we sununoned the political resolve and a high degree of statesmanship to correct the mistakes and do not even suspect it. There are no non-combatants or mere onlookers m a war of this sort. restore what had been fmfeited, and thereby avoid further loss of life, which the vast majority Everyone occupies his own position in it. But the front line does n~t run where we ru:e of the public will approve of a hundred percent. On the other hand, however, the burden of accustomed to draw it. It runs in an entirely different direction. The war ts not between Russia responsibility for the past, and not just personal responsibility, remains. What remains are the and Chechnya, between Chechnya and Russia. It is a war between peace and war, a war for countless and lawful claims and grievances, even of only on the part of the formal minority of peace, for Russia's future, for the peaceful fhture of our state. It is not ?;achine-guns and tanks society: "Pardon us, but what have we fought for, why did we shed blood, and why did we and guns that are firing at each other. It is different outlooks and moraht1es. And may God he~p bury so many of our best young men? Why all that? So you ca withdraw with honor and we us not to Jose this war. We have lost Chechnya today, but may God help us not to lose Russia must withdraw in disgrace? So we should again love our proud mountain brethren who fired tomorrow. on us and stabbed us in the back? So as to face tribunals for obeying your orders in the thick of the fighting, in dirt and dust, while you washed your hands, or maybe for relaxing with their girls while you were sleeping in comfort in your constitutional apartments? Is that what you *** want? We are few, and maybe it is undemocratic, inhuman and uncivilized, but we will go our own way and will take the situation under our own control: any and all peace and any

40 41 When the above essay was ready, a scandal broke out ever the publication on behalf of private persons supporting the intelligence service of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff of various "texts" of an obviously provocative content with threats against some, blackmail ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ~gainst others, and complete su~port of still others. Like Shamil Basayev, they are completely COURT RULINGS ON THE "CHECHEN" UKAZES AND mdependent and ready for anything- not for the sake of "ending the war" but, quite openly to prolong it to infinite. DECISIONS It may not be right to att.ach. too mu.ch .im~o~ance to the ~uccession of challenging statements; they deserve to be dlS!mssed as mdtscnmmate provocatiVe moves. If not for one fact: the excessive claims that the authors· of the "texts" lay to being fully informed about everything that happens in the country, and to influencing the course of events. We do not want to compete with them as concerns information and as concerns influence. All we want is to clarifY our own position. The rulings of the Constitutional Court on the ukazes and decision that served as the All the officials mentioned by the authors in one context or another, are directly related formal reason for war were incompetent and immoral (one cannot escape this notion even in to what has come to be known as the "war party". How seriously that party has split and how constitutional law); what is more, they are highly dangerous for the entire future of our serious are the new intentions of those who now declare their firm desire for peace is 'not for us judiciary system, though, luckily, poor decisions are in general just as quickly forgotten to judge. The future will tell. The concrete results in Grozny, in Moscow, in Chechnya and hereabouts as good ones, and entirely different factors influence life. evetywhere in Russia, will tell. Let me begin with the moral side of the matter, though what I am about to say has no In our vie-w, only a sincerely devoted "peace party" can really and dependably establish direct relation to the Judgment passed by the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Chairman peace. The door to peace is still open. But to secure peace there must be readiness to admit Toumanov held a press-conference, at which he cited arguments like a full-fledged politician: one's mistakes and to operate in the interests of the country and of peace, and not with object the Russian leadership, he said, had no other choice but to send troops into Chechnya, and of concealing new wrong doings. added with a smile that, of course, things did not come off as they should have, and gave this example, with a condescending smile: "Bombing cities is not good." And all of us swallowed it July 30. 1995. hook, line and sinker. But what, for heaven's sake, if, say Shamil Basayev should without a previous appointment enter the esteemed Mr. Toumanov's office for a few minutes and, say, give him a bottle of Coca-Cola and a bunch of white carnations as a souvenir and then disappeared just as he had appeared? If that ever happened, we would all rise as one man and vent our indignation over the insult inflicted on our very own Constitutional Court. And who of the very experienced jurists would in half an hour draw a competent judgment concerning commission of a concealed act of state terrorism. And Toumanov would be severe and would not smile at all. Pardon me for this sideshow, but how else could I react to the smile of a highly placed official concerning the death of thousands of plain citizens which, so it seems, is not at all important to him. Now about the substance of the legal judgment. The judges who opposed it to the end, noted rightly that it gave the "green light" to the so-called "concealed powers" of top statesmen - that is, powers which they may assume on the strength of the constitution because it says nothing directly about their absence. In other words, a broad interpretation of powers, unrestricted authority, and absence of responsibility for any adopted decision or, in other words, license of arbitrary rule. In a normal state, the authorities differ from the plain citizen or a public organization in that, unlike the latter, it may not follow the principle that "everything which the law does not forbid is allowed." The authorities are bound by far greater restrictions than they and even the rest of society may think in the context of here-and-now advantages. Why? Because of those very advantages, for the sake of stability, for a dependable and continuos long-term harmony. Power is entitled to be tough, an official may pass tough decisions, but any abuse of power is not just something one may criticize or discuss; it is a crime punishable under the Criminal Code as an especially dangerous act. And since it is punishable under Criminal Law, since it is contrary to law, it is also contrary to the Constitution, as we may see in its Article 90. Unlike the Constitution, ukazes and rescripts have no direct action above the Law. Why is abuse of power and arrogation of concealed powers so dangerous? Why does it differ from a plain tough governmental decision? How to draw the line between them? First take this quote from the now still valid Criminal Code. Even though it will soon cease to be valid because the Duma has adopted a new one, no cardinal change will occur on this issue.

42 43 So, take Article 171: "Abuse of power or official functions, that is, deliberate commission by an official person of actions that obviously exceed the bounds of rights and powers gral'!ted JOURNALISTS' CERTIFICATES that person by Law, if these actions inflicted tangible harm to state or public interests or to the rights and interests of citizens protected by Law, are punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to three years or corrective labor of up to two years, or dismissal from office. Abuse of power of official authority, if accompanied by force, use of arms of painful acts and acts insulting the personal dignity of the victim, is punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to ten years." The publication of ukazes, rescripts and orders can hardly be qualified Journalists, those fine men and women who have for so many months with danger to as uninte~tional actions. Then the criterion is in terms of the consequences. And here, indeed, tlteir lives informed us of the bitter truth about and around the Chechen war, are now being people w1ll say, is the most subtle factor of all: issuing orders in most general terms no one had persecuted for failing to reveal in what specific point on the map they obtained their most deliberately and intentionally planned or anticipated, nor could anticipate, the consequences hardest-to-get information. But though this is not so far entrenched in the Law, journalists that ?ccur:ed after and only as effect of the circumstances that in no way depended on the will cannot combine two such widely divergent functions. Their life's work is to inform the public and mtenttons of the authors of the orders. But that is wrong. First of all, it is wrong in terms ofwhat the latt~r does not know, to speak the tmth loud and clear of what had happened, and of the fac~s. It is clearly evident from the government's Instruction no 1887-p of December 1, to let us know just as loudly and clearly what we can expect to happen, what awaits us (or is 1994,, which says that a large number of residents ofChechnya should be urgently evacuated, likely to await us) in what are tangible figures and facts,· and not from the realm of estimates meanmg that everything had been anticipated and everything had been, in general outline, and guesses we are accustomed to accept because it relives the tension or, conversely, irritates foreseen. The second point, however, is probably more general but fundamental by nature as and angers us. Here is the truth, says a decent journalist. I'm not imposing it on you, I'm simply ~oncems the earlier mentioned "concealed powers", namely, the failure to define in the official warning, the rest is up to you - take it or leave it. And he amplifies: But you'll be wrong to m~truction issued for a specific and unmistakable group of people to whom it is addressed think that anything can be done with the tmth, even if you join hands one and all to try and without the slightest chance of mutual contradiction, means of execution, ultimate twist it. You'll never succeed to hide from the facts even if you destroy the messenger together consequences provided by Law (e.g. arrest of specific persons found to have broken the law), with his message. The tmth will out. ~s well. as concrete limits of rime and a complete list of those responsible for executing the Pity we are so unpardonably indifferent, and tum our backs angrily to what is happening, mst~ct10n ~ all this, and any lieutenant knows this perfectly well, automatically means that hoping to avoid being involved. That will not relieve us either of the consequences and the the mstructwn cannot be fulfilled, on the one hand, and that the consequences for those to responsibility for them. We substitute self-indulgence or anger for readiness to see the tmth. In whom they were issued are bound to be destmctive. The task as such cannot be fulfilled response to honest warnings, instead of accepting the truth and taking an honest warnings, Forgive me for making the following comparison, but issuing orders to disarm unlawful armed instead of accepting the tmth and taking and honest stand, we hide behind half-tmths and detachments in Chechnya or elsewhere is the same as ordering some nth border squad to repair charges of betrayal, and accusations of adventurism. We refuse our aid to the least culpable. the heat an~ power facility in Moscow. Orders cannot be disobeyed. For that reason, even if We may criticize our leaders, but we are still with them because it is so much cozier to see the m~n have no idea about heat and power facilities, they will abandon the border to its fate them on television instead of something frightening like raid on Budyonnovsk, for and w11l have to hasten to Moscow. Here they will be told they are not wanted. But an order is Bud~onnovsk is here, in Russia, a Russian town, and Grozny - no, Grozny isn't quite an order, a~~ _they will take control of some suitable location and defend it against, say, the Russtan. And whatever you say, Grachev is a pleasanter sight than Basayev, the fiend of Moscow lllilitla. And later it will be possible to say that no one could have anticipated the consequences. · · Budyonnovsk. Still, we should know and understand. Because we must make our choice between the Yes, besides, it is high time to restore order in Moscow. And if in this context and executioners and the victims, and the choice must be of a moral order. So let me offer this ?rde~ will be iss_ued "for the militia and the internal troops to carry ~ut an operatio~ and quotations: Identify and d~tam, and thereupon tum over to the investigative authorities within a fortnight The air in Grozny is laden with thunder. The loudspeakers installed in the such per~ons m w_hose regard there are strong grounds to suspect them of having organized center of the town emit mountain hymns. And every time, I, a Russian sense grave cnmes (a list f~llows), and do so strictly within the bounds of the Law," this will pride for Chechnya, which is "facing up to imperial ambitions." Everybody P_robably be controversial from the operational point of view but sufficiently lawful. But orders hereabouts is sure that any day now Russia will send its troops into Chechnya. s1mply "to restore. or.der in Moscow" or to "render harmless criminals", however impressive Any mmor about Russian tanks on the move is accepted in good faith. I can't th~t may sound, Wlllm fact be nothing but outright terrorism against law-abiding citizens, and help thinking that even if Russia doesn't become involved, will stay out of the Will amount to a crime by the authorities. fray, the blood shed in any internecine strife here will anyway be blamed on the . ~ conclusion, speaking of the circumstances around Checlmya, please do not take this Russians. With all the ensuing consequences. When you come to Freedom v1ewpomt of ours as a call to prevent specific officials from escaping criminal responsibility. On Square in Grozny it really sinks in that the Russian government bears a the contrary: the concrete circumstances considered, we are in favor of complete and universal ,,, tremendous responsibility. amne~ty. It ts. only that the question of the Constitutional Court's judgment is, I am sorry to 11: say, tted up wtth a broader range of questions. It is entirely safe to say that Chechnya is at present the most independent of all the republics of the former Soviet Union. It is more independent, I should say, that any of the Baltic republics. The Chechen Republic Ichkeria is the only one with an army that is ready to fend off the Russian rangers. It has no fewer special-purpose troops that even Russia: the Abkhaz group under Sharnil Basayev, the terrorist and sabotage battalion, a regiment of mountaineers, a

44 45 special purpose militia (OMON), and last, nut not least, the President's personal guard. I'll venture to say that the Russian special services - the Federal OPINION ON USE OF FORCE IN CHECHNYA Security, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the GRU, the army intelligence - feel uncomfortable and, more, do not at all feel safe on Chechen soiL One gets the impression Moscow must at all costs regain control over the republic and reincorporate it in the Russian Federation. Some observers feel the matter centers on geopolitics. In 1994 it became quite clear that Russia is slowly moving back to within In accordance with Article 2 of the Concluding and Transitional Provision, Laws and its old borders. This does not mean that it will devour the states of the other legal acts that functioned in the territory of the Russian Federation before the validation Transcaucasus. But Russia will be boss there. of the Constitution of December 12, 1993, are operative to the extend to which they do not How will we, Moscow intellectuals and politicians, receive this public statement? What conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. will we say ifthe Procurator's office will start criminal proceedings against the author, charging Hence, the functions of the Armed Forces and the conduct of servicemen are governed him with treason, breaking a state secret, conducting enemy propaganda, and, to boot, by the operative laws "on defence", "on military conscription and service," "on the state of espionage in favor of D.M.Dudayev, a citizen of the Russian Federation? At best, we will emergency," and "on additional guarantees and compensations to citizens doing military probably say that no one can be prosecuted for speaking his mind; but we will lament that such service in the territories of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic countries, and the Tajik Republic, and a hooligan happened to surface at this most unpropitious time. No, we will say nothing, much protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in state of emergency and in armed conflicts." less mutter anything: the. author of the above quotation is Dima Kholodov (Moskovsky The Criminal Code is applicable to servicemen as it is to all other citizens. The immediate Komsomolets, September 16, 1994), and we have not yet learned to start criminal proceedings guide to servicemen in the performance of their military duty is the Manual of Internal Service posthumously, thank God. of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation endorsed in the Presidential Ukaze of How easily do we confuse signals, how often see only what we wish to see, how often December 14, 1993. let ourselves be led up a false trail. Article 10 of the Defence Act says: "The purpose of the Armed Forces of the Russian And by the way, the national-chauvinist newspaper Zavtra has now very actively began Federation is to repulse aggression and to defeat the aggressor, and also to carry out task in to use arguments which were used last autumn by those who warned of the impending war and accordance with the international commitments of the Russian Federation. Engagement of hoped to avert it. It is using them now, post factum, when, it seems that in spite of all units and detachments and other formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in obstacles, the peace process appears to have begun. the performance of tasks umelated to their purpose is allowed only in accordance with the Law." In specific terms, this is allowed only in one case: a state of emergency and in July 30, 1995 accordance with the pertinent state of emergency. It may be assumed that the Armed Forces may also be engaged for measures aimed at defeating the constitutional system by virtue of what is said in the title of the Law on additional guarantees and compensations to citizens doing their military service in the territories of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic countries, and the Republic of Tajikistan, and also defending the constitutional rights of citizens in a state of emergency and armed conflicts." But, to begin with, the Law is substance deals with issues other than the conduct of armed actions, and, second, its title refers to the constitutional rights of citizens among which the first and basic right is the right to life and not restoration of the constitutional order in any territory, and, third, Article 3 of that Law mentions the President's duty to define the zone of armed actions. Nothing in any way flowing from Law had any relation to the introduction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation into the territory of the Chechen Republic and to the air strikes against Grozny and other towns and villages. The Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Duty and Service in the Armed Forces" on February 11, 1993, says (Art. 35. c1.3) that "the serviceman may not be given orders or instructions, or set any tasks, aimed at violation of the Law." The Ukaze of the President is not a law; it is a sub-legal act and must not come into collision with the law. The manual of internal service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation also says that "the commander bears responsibility for the orders he issues and for their consequences, and for the order's conformance with the legislation, and also for abuse of power or service authority in the order he issues" (art 38) and that "the serviceman may not be given orders or instructions, or set any tasks that have no relation to military service or are directed to violating the Law (Art. 40)."

47 46 The exceedingly complicated circumstances in which Russian servicemen find themselves today in connection with the situation in Chechnya compel them to resolve many legal issues on their own. We reckon that above all they must today take account of the following: "An obviously criminal order is not to be obeyed: (Manual of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of the APPENDIX I Russian Federation). What is an obviously criminal order? It is an order aimed at the commission of a crime provided for in the Criminal Code. In the event of its commission, the serviceman bears STATEMENTS, DECLARATIONS AND ADDRESSES cJiminal responsibility for it on an equal footing with the person who issued that order, though the fact that the serviceman only obeyed orders may be considered. by the court as an OF extenuating circumstance. THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY

December 20, 1994 SOCIETY ON EVENTS IN CHECHNYA

49 48 STATEMENT AT PRESS-CONFERENCE OF APPEAL TO THE PROCURATOR-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC ON THE OFFICE EVENTSAROUNDCHECHNYA OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

We citizens of the Russian Federation of different religious faiths and different To the Acting Procurator-General of the Russian Federation, A.N.Il'yushenko nationalities, are following closely the development of events in Chechnya. Many of us have paid visits to the zone of the military conflict. . Esteemed Aleksei Nikolayevich, Our grounds of what we saw, we want to declare the followmg: We beg you to start criminal proceedings concerning the mass killing of civilians in the l. The conflict in Chechnya is in now way a conflict between Russians and territory of the Chechen Republic on the strength of Article 3 of the Code of Criminal Chechens or between Mohammedans and Christians. It is a purely political conflict, and the Procedure. only way to settle it is by political means. 2. Dzhokhar Dudayev and his team had on many occasions really taken postures that may be interpreted as provocative in relation to the Russian leadership. But this cannot justifY the war started against the multinational people of Chechnya, the mass slaughter of civilians, the tragic and senseless casualties among Russian servicemen, and especially among conscripts. 3. Any armed resolution of the Chechen problem is profoundly erroneous, and indeed criminal. It has no future, unless we take this future to be the establishment of all over Russia of a new totalitarian military regime. 4. We are deeply convinced that in the present situation the question of the status of the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation, the disarmament of so-called unlawful armed f01mations, and new elections of representative and executive bodies, must be dealt with at a person to person meeting B.N.Yeltsin and D.Dudayev. 5. We call on all belligerent sides, and above all on the Russian army and internal troops to halt their offensive actions. We call for a stop at once to the criminal air strikes on Grozny and other towns and villages. 6. We, representative of public organizations, are prepared to do everything we can possibly do to help the peacekeeping actions and rendering the necessary humanitarian aid to all those who have suffered from the conflict. International Non-Violence Association The Memorial Society Peace-keeping Omega Society Order ofMercy and Social Protection The Right to Life and Civic Dignity Association

50 51 STATEMENT MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADDRESS TO ALEXIS II, THE PATRIARCH OF AGREEMENT IN DEFENCE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM MOSCOW AND ALL RUSSIA AND AGAINST BLOODSHED IN CHECHNYA

'.':'o His Holiness Alexis II, Patriarch ofMoscow and all Russia.

Your Deeply Honoured Holiness, We must clearly understand and admit, and this above all in the framework of our civic I address You in connection with the tragedy that has seared our country as a result of responsibility, that the war did not begin today, We inspired our presidential authority to take the events in Chechnya as a witness as a person authorized to do so by other witnesses. the path of abuse and war when, on the wave of the "revolutio~ary enthusiasm". ~f 1991 :ve What is happening there, as I see it, calls for Your most serious judgment. People are allowed and encouraged it to adopt absolutely closed, IVory-tower dec1s1on-making dying, God's greatest creation and his divine temple (this, as we know very well, irrespectively mechanisms whether in relation to the economy, the autonomy oflongtime German residents in of philosophical 9r confessional distinctions of any concrete human being); violence that the Volga country, or armaments for Dzhokhar Dudayev. Solution of these issues belon~ng to transcends all human notions, is being committed. That is why the developments cannot be such different spheres had a single common feature: they were closed to the public and considered as something that is beyond the province of the Church. simplistic in approach. Further, we built up a conflict between the branches of power in 1992 Violence has, in fact, already reached within the boundary of the Church in the literal and 1993, and thereupon accepted the October events of 1993 without pain, horror ~d. ~he sense: yesterday, on January 15, on a Sunday, an annex to the Church of St. Michael.the least desire to learn all the truth behind them and thereby proclaimed our support of prnruttve Archangel ofGrozny was destroyed by a direct hit (and I venture to say with assurance that it unpublicised forcible solutions taken by the authorities where, in actual fact, delicate and was not a Chechen shell). Father Anatoly, the senior priest of the church and his parishioners, sensitive work was called for with the help of the burgeoning institutions of civic society. Not who are mainly elderly women, are hiding in the basement of the church. until now, alas, but for how long, have we begun to admit that complicated problems cannot be Your judgment on this score, as I see it, is becoming all the more necessary, the more solved simply. tragic the events become, because you, above all, are not a politician working for a result and a Lastly. The decisions taken by our higher political authorities in relation to Chechnya put compromise (though that, too, would be extremely important on your part), but by the grace our army in a disastrous situation both in physical terms and politically. We must be fair to the of your High Order and Patriarch's Calling - the custodian and defender of the Truth, of end and not succumb to the temptation to reduce the moral and political issues over Chechnya goodness and verity. And for tllis reason it is you, I think, who must in most serious terms and the future of Russia to just an appraisal of the activity of the army and the leadership of the prevent in this socially important case any substitution of confusion of moral notions. Defence Ministry, though such an appraisal, too, among others, is doubtlessly called for. When It is essential, I hold, to pronounce an uncompromising censure of the decision to resort I heard what is said about the competence of our minister of defence, I see a very strong to force, to mass violence, and this against our own people. I know how difficult it must be, underlying text that if he, the minister, had been a little more successful in Chechnya, and, what and unsafe from the spiritual point of view, to pass judgment on the actions of others. But the is more, a little more polite in dealing with well-known public leaders, he would not have got errant, whether deliberately or not, must now be firmly and clearly enlightened by the himself into the foolishness that we are now trying to take advantage of. As far as I am Patriarch's word. And the victims must by this word be justified and saved from vilification. By concerned, Grachev lacked the civic courage to refuse to obey the in substance criminally victims I naturally mean those who have laid down their lives and those who survived to suffer bloodthirsty order and to step down from his job or even submit to a tribunal. Everything else, without their dear ones, without a roof over their heads, with organizing fear for the morrow. I daresay, is the effect of his moral choice: a fighting officer, Hero of the Soviet Union, agreed But probably to a still greater extent, the victims of sin are those who are being made to fulfill to obey orders and become executioner - a role, indeed, in which he proved totally the criminal order, those who rise to the unrighteous attack under the prodding of rearguard incompetent, like the army as whole. When we speak of externlination and a state decision to police detachments. And you are probably the only one who can by making all the right accents exterminate a people it is immoral to speak of competence or incompetence. relive soldiers and officers of their frightening and murderous feeling that comes with the We the public we the people, must once and for all renounce the idea of being anyone's shedding of innocent blood. While those who )irrespective of their confession) are at their own executioners or to look for executioners to do a dirty job at whatever lever of competence. risk saving people and trying to reduce the bloodshed and suffering, will be profoundly Without this attitude there can be no hope of Russia's rebirth. What is worse, Russia will in the consoled by Your blessing. end stop to exist if it does not give up this image of executioner. There has been more than one precedent in Your past activity. You did not hesitate to firmly and immediately pronounce the bloodshed in Vilnius in 1991 a mistake and a sin. The January 26, 1995 case today concerns exactly the same thing, only on a far greater, and I think, spiritual, scale. Very many people are at present waiting with all humility but with hope for Your Spiritual power, for Your human and Patriarch's word, and I, deeply unworthy that I am, dare count myself one of them. With faith in Your prayers and Your word, and kneeling at feet of your Holiness. January 16, 1995

53 52 STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT ON THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN SITUATION IN BUDYONNOVSK BUDYONNOVSK

A forcible solution of the tragic situation in Budyonnovsk is categorically intolerable. The still surviving hostages must be released, and the detachment under Shamil Basayev We are deeply troubled and indignant over the ceaseless deceit of the overt and covert must be allowed to go home to Chechnya. advocates of brute force, and insist that For this guerrilla action to be the first and last action of its kind, the Russian leadership 1. a peaceful solution to be found for the crisis in Budyonnovsk and Chechnya; must take a difficult and only correct decision: 2. that Basayev's detachment should not be shot from behind the comer upon reaching first, in no connection with the situation over Shamil Basayev, to adopt a decision on and agreement with Basayev and after the release of hostages on some convenient or specially starting constructive negotiations with D.Dudayev, and to stop resorting to force in furthering construed pretext. the strategic interests ofRussia; All the responsibility for the bloodshed disconcerting that a gallery of advocates of second, to assure Shamil Basayev that peace on Chechen soil will be restored and to bloodshed are brazenly speaking on behalf of the Russian federal authorities. These people allow him and his detachment to return home unobstructed. deserve to be charged with treason. It is time to end the vicious circle of peacemaking and retribution. It is high time to end the war in which there can be no victor. June 17, 1995 The act of retribution against Shamil Basayev and his detachment, like any continued acts of force against Chechnya, will be treason vis- -vis Russia, betrayal of the interests of our Fatherland, and betrayal of people in general.

June 16, 1995

55 54 APPEAL TO THE MAYOR OF MOSCOW Y.M.LUZHKOV APPENDIX

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE ACTIVITY OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY SOCIETY Esteemed Yuri Mikhailovich, Tens of thousands of people lost their lives during the tragic events of the war in Chechnya, including vety many peaceful residents of Grozny and other towns and villages. They include Orthodox Christians, Mohamedans, Hebrews, people of other confessions, and unbelievers. They, too, no less at all than the victims of the events in Budyonnovsk, need their memoty to be perpetuated as victims of the war. In the same capacity, too, we should perpetuate the memoty of all the Ichk:er volunteers who laid down their lives in Chechnya defending her freedom and dignity, and also of all the Russian soldiers and officers who laid down their lives there. The memoty of those members of peacemaking actions and those journalists who did not live to see the day of peace they had worked for - their memoty, too, must be perpetuated. We propose that a memorial to victims of the Chechen war should be erected in the city of Moscow, and beg you to issue orders that a place for such a memorial be set aside, and want to launch a public collection of funds for its construction. We also most fervently beg you to come forward on behalf of the city of Moscow with the legislative initiative of a complete and universal anmesty on all facts and actions connected with the Chechen war without any exception, because without it, we hold, it will never be possible to end that war. This should be done without delay. July 24, 1995

57

56 STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OSSETIAN TO DEPUTIES OF THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

E.T.Gaidar (The Choice ofRussia) S.Y.Glaz'ev (Democratic Party ofRussia) We who represent the public of Ossetia angrily protest against the Russian leadership's G.A.Zyuganov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) armed violence against the Chechen nation. A.V.Fedulova (The Women of Russia) Regardless of the attitude towards Dudayev regime, it is essential to admit that the G.A.Yavlinsky (Yabloko) clumsy actions of the Russian leadership have resulted in casualties among peaceful citizens and our young men in military uniforms, and that the army has been involved in a fratricidal Deeply esteemed Egor Timurovich, Sergei Yur'yevich, Gennady Andreevich, Alevtina venture. Vasil'evna and Grigory Alekseevich, We grieve deeply over the losses borne by the Ingush people in the course of this You and the parliamentary factions which you head had the civic. courage to totally unjustifiable violence. condemned the tragic resort to force in Chechnya. The Russian leadership has once more shown that it is quite incapable of understanding Unknown 18-year-old conscripts will probably face a military tribunal for expressing a and settling the existing complicated interethnic problems. civic attitude identical to yours and refusing to shoot at their compatriots. Instead of respect for the rights and interests of the Chechen people and a number of I plead with you to adopt legislative acts in their defence as quickly as possible. other peoples of the Caucasus, it is receiving the Stalinist policy of violence. Meanwhile, it With deep respect, should better be remembered that the Russi-Vainakh relations are tainted by the grave heritage of a more distant and recent past. It is this very heritage that causes the national self-identity of Elena Bonner the Vainakhs to take such contradictory and often extremist forms. It is intolerable for new Russia to create a precedent of resolving a delicate and By telephone from Washington, December 20, 1994, 2 a.m. intricate national question by resort to arms. We fumly protest against this. We know the Chechens and we are sure that given goodwill and the due respect for their national and human di~ty the crisis could long since have been settled by peaceful means. For this it is necessary that Moscow should renounce the tactics of diktat and take the path of respectful dialogue. We consider it desirable that the Chechen problem should be raised before a representative forum of heads of state, regions, territories and autonomies of the Grand Caucasus under the chairmanship of the country's leadership. This way of multiparty negotiations rather than the way of force, will lead to a solution of controversial issues that concern everybody. We appeal to all those who are troubled by the fate of democracy in Russia and the situation in the Caucasus, to demand of the Russian leadership 1. Inunediate withdrawal from Chechnya of all Russian armed formations introduced there; 2. Convocation in Grozny of an all-Caucasian conferences of the heads of subjects of the Federation and states under the leadership of President B.N.Yeltsin and devote it to an examination of the situation in Chechnya. Prof S.S.Dzarasov, chief of the chair of economics and enterprise of the Russian Academy of Sciences E.D. Degkayev, President of the International Billiards Federation Prof KN.Salamov, Chief of the Department ofProctology, Dr. Med Prof A.M Torzinov, Chief of the chair ofobstetrics and gynecology, MMSI, Dr. Med RA. Chemegav, entrepreneur.

59 58 May 19, 1995 APPEAL OF THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE OF THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC TO THE STATE DUMA OF THE To VictorKogan-Yasny FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND Chairman of the Board of the Right to Life and Human Dignity Society TO ITS FACTIONS AND COMMITTEES 4, Luchnikov pereulok, Moscow

Dear Victor,

I am very grateful to you for taking seriously my. ~e~uest for info~ation a~ out the situation in Chechnya from the very beginning of the host!l~ties there. Your mformat10n was Deeply Esteemed Deputies of the State Duma, especially useful to me as I prepared for my meet!ng With Mr. Stro~ Talbot, US State Secretary Warren Christopher's Assistant for CIS Affarrs, and for the hearmgs on Chechnya at We appeal to you because we know how much each one of you has done to .prevent the OSCE Cornnrittee of US Congress which took place~ February and. May 199~. and then to stop the war in our long-suffering land. The thoroughness and reliability of the informatiOn you s~pphed ~e w~th was al~o Now, signs of peace have appeared over our land. exceedingly inlportant in connection with my appearance at the U~ted Nation~, 111 Geneva 111 To our enormous and boundless grief this was ties up the tragic action in February 1995; representing the International League of Hu~an Rights, .r :estdied about the Budyonnovsk. We mourn over the dead and wounded in Stavropol Territory and are situation in Chechnya at the latest session of the UN Human Rights Comnusswn. concerned that the peace negotiations are making progress in spite of and no thanks to that Once again, my sincere thanks for your efforts and help. action. It pains us deeply that Chechens were involved in this action aimed at changing the With the very best wishes, entire style of the defensive war that was being fought until then. At present, the Russian Government wants the extradition of Shamil Basayev and the Elena Bonner members of his detachment. The demand is fair from the point of view oflaw and legality. But we know one thing: for people joined the detachment our of despair or even against their will, this means death. Thereafter, it will mean an endless continuation of war in defiance of all negotiations, because the death of even a single member ofBasayev detachment will be definitely exploited by provocateurs. We plead with you, dear and deeply esteemed deputies, to firmly condemn terrorism in all its forms, but to see to it that this war should end on a note of forgiveness rather than revenge. We want no endlessly closed circle of retribution. May everyone repent for himself, and may no hair fall off the head of any Russian and any Chechen. Justice and rule of law must triumph, but in the present circumstances peace any anyone's punishment are incompatible. We beg you to anmesty all to the last men who broke the law in the course of this horrible war. May that be the price of peace.

COMMITTEE OF WOMEN OF THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC

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