EURO PEA N G RA N D STRA TEG Y

I N TH E A G E O F W EA PO N I Z ED M I G RA TI O N

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Abstract

Around two years ago, the Finnish government established a Unit, after suspicion due to the sudden influx of Asian and Middle Eastern asylum seekers across the arctic Russo- Finnish . Weaponized mass migration – so-called sociological warfare – has become a recent addition to the hybrid warfare arsenal, whereby masses of civilians are displaced to enemy territory to cause mass confusion. This is part of a current trend of blurring the line between and peace. Alongside the rise of modern Hybrid Warfare, the EU has become an important global and regional actor, but largely lacks a traditional . Meanwhile, the Grand Strategies of its member states often vary. In this landscape, Europe and the EU must craft a modern Grand Strategy to address the merging of war and peace into a state of constant security threats.

To complicate matters, the 21st Century has admitted violent non-state actors, with strategies and ambitions of their own, onto the global stage. Hybrid tactics level the playing field, allowing the traditionally weak to take on the traditionally strong. In this new reality, the EU must fashion a new, complete, and modern Grand Strategy. In this landscape, Europe and the EU must reshape their Grand Strategy in order to address the new realities of the 21st century. Warfare is no longer a ‘simple’ matter of clashing armies, nor is it limited to the battlefield. Modern hybrid tactics have brought warfare out of the battlefield and made it an almost ubiquitous circumstance in our world. Warfare is virtual almost as much as it is physical, and it is becoming increasingly civilian in nature.

Weaponized migration is an intersection between Hybrid Warfare, Europe, and development. On the one hand, Europe needs a Grand Strategy that can adapt to the 21st Century. Hybrid Warfare is the new normal, which drags the world into a state of perpetual Hybrid Conflict. This negatively impacts human and economic development. Finally, migration is likely to increase, putting more pressure on migrant destinations – among which Europe ranks at the top – who must update their strategies to address this. Thus, it seems clear: Europe needs a Grand Strategy that is civilian as much as , as the line is blurred. Only with a 21st Century Strategy can Europe protect itself, be a responsible global actor, and promote development abroad.

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Keywords: Grand Strategy; ; Weaponized Migration Introduction

In a rather surprising turn of events, Middle Eastern migrants appeared on the arctic of , entering into Norway and Finland in 2015 and 2016. Alarm bells were immediately sounded, for while the flow of migrants itself was not threatening, the location was. Allegations have since been made that this is part of a Russian hybrid warfare tactic – weaponized migration.

By directly impacting the flow of migrants into Europe, it has been suggested, Russia is seeking to indirectly influence Europe.

Weaponized migration fits into the broader arsenal of hybrid warfare, which has become a salient military and political issue – especially in the 21st century. Russia’s annexation of the

Crimea and alleged electoral intervention in the US stand out as prominent recent examples. The use of hybrid tactics challenges a state’s ability to respond, for they are large and rigid structures.

When migration is weaponized, migrants are trapped between those exploiting them and the states trying to cope – between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

In this landscape, it is important that Europe – a common destination for migrants – craft a coherent and comprehensive Grand Strategy that can strive toward European aims in a way that takes migrants out of the line of fire, even when others try to weaponize them to elicit concessions or inflict harm.

1. Grand Strategy

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Classicists, one of the major schools of thought, view Grand Strategy in more military terms. Liddell Hart views it as a coordination of state resources toward the aims of war.1 Posen describes it as a “political-military means-ends chain.”2 Kennedy characterizes it as a long-term

“evolution and integration of policies.”3 Another component is outlined by Martel, who argues that a central aspect of Grand Strategy is its articulation. For a Grand Strategy to be effective, there must be articulated ends, means, threats, and strategies.4

The other major school, the International Relations school, takes a broader view, admitting a larger variety of methods into the definition of Grand Strategy. Murray et al. include state resources beyond, but including, military means in peacetime as well as wartime.5 Brands offers the elusive definition of Grand Strategy as “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy.”6 Rather than being a formalized and detailed document, Grand

Strategy can also be a set of guiding ideas.7 Another definition is that of Luttwak, describing Grand

Strategy as the employment of a state’s resources in interaction with other states’ employment.8

In this article I will rely on a definition of Grand Strategy along the lines of those discussed by Luttwak and Martel. Indeed, Grand Strategy should not be confined to the military sphere, nor to government white papers and reports. Nevertheless, it is difficult for Grand Strategy to exist without some kind of intellectual architecture – an articulation – to guide it. In the 21st century, agility has become one of the most important qualities of a state, and the freedom to continuously

1 Hart, 1967: 322. 2 Posen, 1984: 13. 3 Kennedy, 1991: 3. 4 Martel, 2015: 339, 353. 5 Murray et al. 1994: 1 - 23. 6 Brands, 2014: 3.

7 Ibid. 6. 8 Luttwak, 2009: 409.

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evaluate the global and domestic landscapes, and update beliefs, methods, and threats vis-à-vis other states is vital to foreign policy success.

2. Hybrid Warfare

While the idea of Hybrid Warfare is as old as warfare itself, the nomenclature and will to disseminate it are more recent. In short, it concerns the use of non-conventional and tactics in war, such as cyberattacks, , fake news, electoral interventions, or so-called weaponized migration. These tactics are designed to be flexible and complex, and intended to deter attribution and retribution.9

Historical examples of these practices are many, ranging from and catapulting infected corpses into besieged cities, to propaganda campaigns, electoral interventions, and weaponized migration. This is one of its chief qualities: constant change. The hybrid tactics used by the Romans or the Byzantines were very different from the tactics used by Hezbollah in

2006. This lack of definition and constant change make it harder to defend against hybrid tactics, which renders their use more tempting.

3. Weaponized Migration

Weaponized migration refers to the use of a ‘mass exodus of ’ to a hostile state as a non-conventional .10 This fits well into the ever-expanding arsenal of Hybrid Warfare strategies. The migrant flows stemming from the Syrian and unrest in the Middle East

9 Pindjak, 2014. 10 Der Welt, 2016.

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have been labelled a “” in Europe. Governments and people alike have often reacted negatively to this. Based on these experiences, the threat of mass migration – migrant coercion – as an unconventional weapon becomes credible to most. Broadly, seven main categories can be identified: coercive, dispossessive, exportive, economic, fifth column, militarized, and political.11

Kelly Greenhill identifies at least 56 attempts at the above between 1951 and 2006, so despite its saliency today, it is not a new phenomenon.12 In these cases, the threat of a mass exodus has been used to coerce an adversary to acquiesce to the “aggressor’s” aims. Greenhill further finds that in 73% of cases, some of these aims were achieved, and in 57% most/all of them were achieved.13

Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has accused Russia of weaponizing Syrian migration in order to weaken Europe.14 He accused Russia of “creating a massive, and continuous, wave of people desperate for food, shelter and safety,”15 in an effort to overwhelm, discourage, and distract Europe. This is the most important and recent example of

(alleged) weaponization of migration and fits into a broader conflict in Europe. It illustrates one of the many ways Hybrid Tactics are changing conflict.

4. Grand Strategy and Hybrid Threats in Europe

Europe is in a rather peculiar position when it comes to Grand Strategy. In the same space one has a selection of states, the European Union, and NATO, each with shared and different

11 Steger, 2017: 9 – 45. 12 Greenhill, 2011. 13 Ibid. 14 Der Welt, 2016. 15 Ibid.

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agendas. European countries are of various sizes, with different Grand Strategies. NATO has operated in Europe since 1949, and since then it has expanded. What is more, its main perceived threat – the USSR – no longer exists. The EU is trapped in-between, working toward political and economic integration in Europe, while balancing itself against concerns about sovereignty. This is a complicated landscape, and the EU must navigate it carefully when crafting its Grand Strategy.

The EU is the vehicle for this European Grand Strategy for the future, albeit not without challenges or drawbacks. In 2003 the European Security Strategy was drawn up and adopted, outlining the EU security strategy for the present and future.16 This was followed by the EU Global

Strategy in 2016.17 There is a will in Europe to unify strategy and form a stronger collective security bloc, but sovereignty concerns remain an issue. European defense planning has produced few to no results since 2016.18 Given members’ reluctance in investing in solutions, this is unlikely to change in the present system. Frédéric Mauro further assesses that the European Defense Fund will sweeten the pot, but the issue of sovereignty remains a hitherto insurmountable summit in

European integration.19

The EU also suffers from institutional clashes with the mandate of NATO. The Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can be traced back to 1970, with its current condition being consolidated in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. It is apparent in the CFSP that the EU has long desired to carve out a position for itself on the global stage, but with a transatlantic military alliance – involving the US, no less – the CFSP becomes less prominent and effective. There is significant institutional overlap, with many EU members also being NATO members, and both lack clear

16 Council of the European Union, 2003. 17 Council of the European Union, 2018. 18 Mauro, 2018: 64. 19 Ibid.

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strategies for the future.20 Duke and Vanhoonacker make the argument that both the EU and NATO are plagued by “pragmatism and ad hockery”, which will impair their ability to respond to emerging threats.21

This is not to say that nothing has been done. A think tank, the European Centre of

Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)22, was launched by Finland in 2017 as a response to the rise of hybrid threats. The joint venture was launched following the allegations of weaponization of migration by Russia in 2015 and 2016, which triggered alarms in both Helsinki and Brussels. This is, however, only a think-tank. It is supported by the EU and NATO, but

European modernization and defense unification are still lagging behind. The tendency to “ad hockery” is illustrated here, where a think-tank is established to address emerging threats, while the EU defense strategy itself remains largely unaltered.

Europe needs a European approach. This has already been acknowledged: Macron has already proposed a European Intervention Initiative, and Merkel established that the US cannot be relied upon by Europe – it is time for Europe to seize the day.23 A move away from NATO and toward increased EU autonomy will allow for a simultaneous move away from strictly toward a more wholesome Grand Strategy in line with the definitions of Luttwak and

Martel et al. The 21st century requires agile actors, be they states, organizations, or otherwise, and a Grand Strategy consisting of guiding principles and ideas can deliver just this. Nevertheless, it is important to articulate this strategy and the EU Global Strategy shows the EU’s willingness to do this.

20 Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2015: 17. 21 Ibid. 22 European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats 23 Vaské, 2018.

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The EU is now in a unique position to craft its own Grand Strategy for the future. American commitment to NATO is wavering, and European leaders are waking up to the need and possibility of a stronger European alliance.24 Despite the CFSP, the EU has had a habit of following

Washington, writes the Carnegie Council.25 The CFSP is also disproportionately influenced by a relatively small number of European leaders. This means there is a growing space for a European

Grand Strategy by and for Europe. However, this space is also riddled with division, and more so over migration than anything else.

Conclusion:

Migration has developed from largely absent in the 2003 Security Strategy, to a salient issue in the 2016 Global Strategy. As Ceccorulli and Lucarelli point out, the latter is broader, and thus a better foundation for a Grand Strategy.26 An apt point is made, however, regarding the so- called crisis. The perceived refugee crisis has impacted both the member states and their citizens, and through these citizens and member states, it has become a more important item on the EU agenda.27 The very unity of the EU is being challenged in a time when the Union has been accused of neglecting its responsibilities abroad, thereby aiding and abetting the creation of the refugee crisis.28 Meanwhile, the best strategy for the EU would undoubtedly be to nip the crisis in the bud, and address issues where the migrants are coming from. With a progressive move from

24 Vaské, 2018. 25 Ibid. 26 Ceccorulli and Lucarelli, 2017: 97 - 98. 27 Ibid. 28 Ceccorulli and Lucarelli, 2017: 98.

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common security policies to common global policies, the EU is exhibiting a willingness to assert itself as a global actor that can play a larger part in the events that affect migration to the EU.

It goes without saying that the optimal outcome for migrants in this context would be that they had little to no incentive to migrate in the first place. Or, at the very least, that migrants migrate because they want to, not because they feel a need to.29 This needs to be a core aspect of

European Grand Strategy in the realm of foreign policy. Given the mixed feelings about migrants in Europe (at least in large numbers) and the success with which they have been leveraged in the past, Europe should aim to remove them from that situation.

Where the army can be called on to adapt to many emerging hybrid threats, addressing threats like electoral intervention and weaponized migration requires civilian mobilization as well.

Not just the armed forces, but the entire government apparatus, must craft sensible policy to tackle these “composite” issues. The Global Strategy shows a willingness within the EU to adapt to this reality, even if it is merely a step in the right direction. Indeed, one could argue that little has been achieved since 2016, often due to concerns over sovereignty. This, however, reduces neither the need for a more united Grand Strategy, nor the EU’s potential to develop one.

The issue of weaponized migration is but one way in which one can observe the transformation of conflict. Leaders recognize the potential challenges of migration, but also the ways in which it can be exploited. As Greenhill explores, this has been done numerous times in the 21st century alone. NATO remains a far too military-centered alliance that shifts authority and autonomy from Europe to the US. The EU – at the forefront of European politics – must realign itself and seek more autonomy, craft a comprehensive Grand Strategy that favors agility, and assert itself as a global actor to address the different forms of Hybrid Warfare at home and abroad.

29 Mortera-Martinez and Oppenheim, 2018.

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