China's Evolving Green Planning System: Are Targets the Answer?
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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kostka, Genia Working Paper China's evolving green planning system: Are targets the answer? Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, No. 201 Provided in Cooperation with: Frankfurt School of Finance and Management Suggested Citation: Kostka, Genia (2013) : China's evolving green planning system: Are targets the answer?, Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, No. 201, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt a. M. This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80338 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. 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Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Frankfurt School – Working Paper Series No. 201 China’s evolving green planning system: Are targets the answer? by Genia Kostka Department of Economics, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt, Germany June 2013 Sonnemannstr. 9 – 11 60314 Frankfurt an Main, Germany Phone: +49 (0) 69 154 008 0 Fax: +49 (0) 69 154 008 728 Internet: www.frankfurt-school.de China’s evolving green planning system: Are targets the answer? Abstract China’s national leaders have recently set ambitious goals to restructure and diversify the economy towards a more resource-efficient and sustainable growth path. To address the grow- ing national environment and energy concerns, leaders introduced several binding environ- mental targets for government departments and large enterprises. The heavy reliance on a target-based implementation approach raises questions about the effectiveness of this strategy in the short and long run for environmental governance in China. Based on fieldwork in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Shandong provinces in 2012, this paper studies the desirable and unde- sirable outcomes of binding environmental targets in China’s evolving green planning system. This paper argues that environmental targets have a signaling function that has resulted in ecological issues movement onto local governments’ core policy agendas. However, in the nascent green planning system, classic planning problems have generated undesirable conse- quences such that that environmental targets are not always achieving their intended goals. Strategic and cyclical behavior by local government officials in leadership positions often lead to short-term maximization actions instead of long-term innovative environmental man- agement. This analysis of local leaders’ responses to top-down targets aims to generate a more realistic picture of what binding environmental targets can and cannot achieve. Keywords: environmental policy implementation, regulation, command and control instru- ments, targets, China, authoritarian environmentalism JEL classification: Q48, Q28, Q00, P21, O21, R58 ISSN: 14369753 Contact: Prof. Dr. Genia Kostka Frankfurt School of Finance and Management Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt am Main Germany [email protected] +49 163 50 666 66 Acknowledgements: The author is grateful to Sarah Eaton, Thomas Johnson, Andrew Kipnis, Ran Ran, Benjamin van Rooji, and Ji Xi for helpful comments. Special thanks are also due to Li Bo and Yu Hang for excellent research assistance. The paper benefited from feedback gen- erated in workshops at the University of Amsterdam’s China Law Centre, the German Asso- ciation for Social Science Research in China, and at the Balsillie School of International Af- fairs. Funding from the Dr. Werner Jackstädt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 2 Working Paper No. 201 China’s evolving green planning system: Are targets the answer? Content 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4 2 Environmental Green Planning, State Capacity, and Policy Outcomes ................................ 6 3 Anticipated and desirable outcomes ...................................................................................... 9 4 Anticipated but undesirable outcomes ................................................................................. 11 5 Unanticipated but desirables outcomes ................................................................................ 12 6 Unanticipated but undesirables outcomes ............................................................................ 13 7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 20 Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 22 References ................................................................................................................................ 26 Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Working Paper No. 201 3 China’s evolving green planning system: Are targets the answer? 1 Introduction Mounting global environmental crises have fed debate about what types of policy instruments and strategies are most conducive to addressing resource scarcities and environmental degra- dation. Within this debate, the relative merits of command and control versus market-based approaches have attracted particular scrutiny. Analyses of both types of instrument have tend- ed to focus on the requisite political scaffolding in democratic systems, especially legislators’ choice of policy instruments as well as the character of legal structures necessary for effective environmental enforcement (e.g., Goulder and Parry, 2008, Keohane et al. 1998, Wiener, 1999). Authoritarian systems operate by different rules and, as yet, very little is known about how command and control and market-based instruments actually function (or do not) in au- thoritarian contexts. Recent innovations in China’s approach to environmental management make it a par- ticularly relevant case to study how command and control mechanisms work in authoritarian regimes. China’s two most recent national Five Year Plans (FYPs), the 11 th (2006-2010) and 12 th (2011-2015), outline China’s ambitions to change lanes from a heavily polluting, growth- at-any-cost model to a resource-efficient and low carbon model. 1 China has employed a mix of top-down command and control and market-based mechanisms to propel the switch to a resource-efficient and low carbon growth path. 2 Since 1972, the central government has very noticeably deployed more and more administrative instruments to enhance compliance with national environmental rules and standards. In the last four decades, more than 28 environ- mental and resource laws, 150 national administrative environmental regulations, 1300 na- tional environmental standards, and 200 departmental administrative regulations have been issued (Chang, 2008 quoted in He et al., 2012, p.31). Since 1999, China has also experimented with a variety of market-based instruments to supplement existing command and control tools, including piloting a dozen sub-national voluntary emission cap-and-trade schemes, rolling out a three-tiered electricity pricing sys- tem, promoting energy service companies (ESCO) and introducing numerous payment for eco-system services to improve water, air, forest, and soil management (Kostka and Shin, 2013; Liang and Mol, 2013; Shin, 2013). Yet the majority of these market-based instruments have not scaled up to nation-wide programs due to the lack of market preconditions and ex- cessive state intervention in emission trading formats, allocation methods, and pricing ap- proaches (Lo, 2013; Shin, 2013). With market based instruments still in their infancy, China’s environmental governance system continues to rely primarily on top down command and con- trol instruments. Among the many different command and control instruments, setting binding envi- ronmental targets has become the key environmental management tool in China. Environmen- tal targets are incorporated into the target responsibility system ( mubiao zeren zhi ), wherein the central government sets a national target for a policy or program and then assigns specific targets for particular areas. Central leaders’ priorities are communicated by differentiating between “soft”, expected ( yuqixing ), and “hard”, literally restricted ( yueshuxing ) binding en- vironmental targets in the national FYPs. The majority of these “hard” binding targets have been accorded “veto power” ( yipiao foujue ) status, meaning that, if these targets are not met, all other achievements of a local leader will be rendered null