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Conflict and Protection Analysis – Lower Shabelle, June 2016

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CONFLICT AND PROTECTION ANALYSIS – LOWER SHABELLE, JUNE 2016 Lower Shabelle is a region of Southwest State of the Federal Republic of Somalia. It is the second most populated region of Somalia and situated at the Indian Ocean bordering with Middle Juba, Bay, Bakool, Hiraan, Banadir and Middle Shabelle regions. Marka, Afgoye, Wanlaweyn, Sablaale, Kurtunwarey, Qoryoley, Barawe and Awdhegle are the main towns. Lower Shabelle is home to a multitude of clans, mostly sub-clans of the Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyne, as well as minority clans, mostly coastal people, such as the Somali Bantu, the Gibil’ad in Marka and the people of Barawe. The conflict in Somalia, including in Lower Shabelle, is recognized as non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with international influence between the Federal Government coalition with support of foreign troops against Al Shabaab. Conflict layers The multi-clan composition of Lower Shabelle and the intertwining of clan dynamics with the non-international armed conflict adds a complex layer, involving a wider range of armed actors. Clan conflicts and other situations of violence are frequent in Lower Shabelle and influenced by political processes. Clans and multiple clan militia, Federal Government and SNAF, South West Main Administration, AMISOM (UPDF), increasingly ENDF, US Forces, Al Shabaab, possible stakeholders foreign fighter influence Housing, land and property rights violations, including destruction of civilian property, Main protection sexual and gender-based violence, forced recruitment, violations of freedom of issues movement in safety through illegal checkpoints and explosive hazards, limited access to health facilities From January 2015 to May 2016, Displacement from Lower Shabelle over 40’000 people were 18000 internally displaced from Lower 16000 Shabelle. 14000 12000 Main causes of displacement New 10000 8000 from Lower Shabelle are clan displacement in 6000 conflict and insecurity. 2015/2016 4000 Displacement is usually 2000 responsive, rather than pre- 0 emptive. Jan 15 Jan 16 Jan Oct 15 Oct Apr 15 Apr 16 Mar16 Feb 15 Feb 15 Sep 16 Feb July 15 July Dec 15 Dec Aug 15 Aug Nov 15 Nov Mar 15 Mar Marka is the main place of May 15 May 16 June 15 June departure for flight. Somalia Protection Cluster Brief! June 2016. Conflict and protection analysis aim at providing a short overview of the layers of conflict, conflict patterns and dynamics as well as conflict potential, and associated protection concerns facing the civilian population. CONFLICT AND PROTECTION ANALYSIS – LOWER SHABELLE, JUNE 2016 Conflict dynamics Hotspot in focus: Marka The complex clan makeup of the region is the key Over the past two decades, Marka experienced factor in the prevailing conflict dynamics in Lower rapid urbanisation, a shift in clan demographics, Shabelle. authority of Al Shabaab and the subsequent Clan dynamics in Lower Shabelle are not static. AMISOM/SNAF military recovery. The federalism Clan migration, conflict, external armed influence, process has also significantly influenced clan political processes, urbanization and displacement allegiances with different parties to the conflict, i.e. have changed clan relations and alliances, as well SNAF and Al Shabaab, in Marka. as allegiances to Al Shabaab. This has created new The shift in clan demographics is fundamentally conflict dynamics. due to the migration of the Hawiye sub-clan Habr Particular clan constellations prevail in all the Gidir (Ceyr) to Marka, from across South Central region’s districts and distinctly relate to the broader Somalia particularly Mogadishu during the 1990s non-international armed conflict and the engaged civil war and later from Galgaduud region. The armed forces and groups. These two interwoven substantial increase of the Habr Gidir resulted in streams of conflict are manifested as a conflict competition over land and trade notably with the between the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), locally predominant Dir sub-clan Biyamal. In the AMISOM (UPDF), pro-Government militias and absence of an overarching governance system, other forces against Al Shabaab, rooted in, the resource competition was mostly mediated exacerbated and driven by clan oriented violence through violence. and conflict, and further influenced by political While the Biyamal saw a significant encroachment processes affecting the local power balance into their space and resources by the Habr Gidir, among clans. the political representation remained largely with The SNAF present in Lower Shabelle are composed the Biyamal due to pre-recognised clan of clan militias. Their respective clan relations and constituencies. The Habr Gidir have been vying for allegiances affect the chain in command in the greater political representation and to move out of force and accelerate the clan-related drivers of the peripherals of the South West Administration’s conflict. This is further influenced by international political fora. In order to assert their authority and armed forces operating alongside or in support of allow for safe passage of trade and civilians, the SNAF, notably AMISOM (UPDF). Habr Gidir in Marka formed an opportunistic allegiance with Al Shabaab, while providing clan Lower Shabelle remains a stronghold for Al protection for their activities. Shabaab regarding both, influence and territorial control. While the group’s factions were pushed out The Biyamal are perceived to be associated with of most of the main towns, they continue to control local government and AMISOM (UPDF), mostly due the immediate surroundings and main roads to proximity as they are situated close to AMISOM’s accessing those towns, effectively besieging them. base in Marka. This proximity has resulted in a The severity of the siege in a given location conflation of AMISOM and the Biyamal. The Habr depends on the respective clan relations and Gidir view AMISOM as a pro-Biyamal force that is in allegiances with Al Shabaab. direct opposition to them. This perceived clan association fosters a binary armed conflict line US armed interventions against Al Shabaab in between government forces/AMISOM and Al Lower Shabelle have reportedly been Shabaab. implemented in isolation and with little consideration to the wider political security The Federal Government has made many efforts to landscape and clan dynamics. mediate the conflict between these two clans. Most recently, in June 2016, a delegation of MPs, Reports of other foreign armed influence in Lower Government officials and clan elders held peace Shabelle surged notably during the last cycle of talks under the protection of AMISOM (UPDF). An conflict in Marka, when communities ascribed the agreement remains yet to be announced. targeted killing of vulnerable civilians to foreign Communities fear that due to external and foreign influence. The direct targeting of civilians as well as armed influence in Marka, the clan conflict’s the nature of the killings added a new dynamic to resolution may not be attained. the conflict situation in Lower Shabelle. Somalia Protection Cluster Brief! June 2016. Conflict and protection analysis aim at providing a short overview of the layers of conflict, conflict patterns and dynamics as well as conflict potential, and associated protection concerns facing the civilian population. Protection concerns for civilians for less and do normally not double tax the same vehicle. Clan alliances and allegiances with Al Shabaab Safe access to health services are often opportunistic, very fluid and can change Closure and scale down of health facilities has suddenly. Very few clans are inherently aligned been a feature of Al Shabaab’s authority, mostly as with one party to the conflict, rather it is the a result of organisations not being willing to pay the dynamics of the broader conflict that compel imposed taxation. With few exceptions, most clans to maximize their security, mobility and health facilities in Al Shabaab controlled towns resources in any given context. remain closed. Movement impediments further hinder the safe access to health care in Lower In such a fluid, complex, multi-faceted and layered Shabelle, which is already constrained by the armed conflict in Lower Shabelle, protection of limited functional health facilities available. civilian concerns are numerous: The Marka district hospital is the main referral Freedom of movement in safety hospital for Lower Shabelle. However, due to the Civilian’s safe and free movement is severely clan conflict in Marka, the hospital had to constrained by the presence of the diverse armed significantly scale back since February 2016. forces and groups, checkpoints imposed by them Hospital staff were caught in cross fire and the as well as explosive hazards. hospital’s war wounded kit reportedly is almost Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have exhausted. The location of the hospital near the commonly been frontline of the clan violence makes access used along the difficult. main roads from Child rights violations and gender-based violence Mogadishu to Gender-based violence is allegedly widely Afgoye, from perpetrated by different parties to the conflict. Of Afgoye to particular concern is the limited service capacity in Barawe and also Lower Shabelle, especially with regard to access to from Wanlaweyn health services for GBV survivors. towards Baidoa. IEDs pose a Reports of forced recruitment of children in Lower particular threat Shabelle are second highest across Somalia. to civilians, Notably in the first quarter of 2016, a steep increase especially when
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