A Liberalism Without Liberals
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1 The London School of Economics and Political Science A Liberalism Without Liberals Carlo Argenton A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, June 2015 2 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 93,237 words. 3 Abstract Over the course of (roughly) the past three decades, much of contemporary liberal political theory has followed John Rawls and taken a ‘political’ turn. Liberalism, it is now generally supposed, is a ‘political’ doctrine, not a philosophy of life. The most influential account of such a liberalism is public reason liberalism. According to public reason liberals, political rules and decisions have to be justified by appeal to ideas or arguments that those subject to them (at some level of idealisation) endorse or accept. Public reason is the standard by which moral or political rules can be assessed. In this thesis I do two things. First, I offer a critique of public reason liberalism. I argue that it fails to live up to the ideal of liberal reason, that it fails to take diversity seriously, and that it is based on a problematic account of political institutions. Second, I articulate a genuinely ‘political’ alternative, which I call a liberalism without liberals. I develop this alternative on the basis of a re-interpretation of David Hume’s critique of the social contract and of his account of pluralism, the moral order and social criticism. I argue that Hume understands political society as the product of shared interests and not (as social contract theorists suppose) as an embodiment of a common will. I also argue that Hume offers a compelling, non- sectarian account of the standards for moral and political evaluation and that he is capable of accommodating foundational pluralism. In sum, a Hume-inspired liberalism without liberals is a combination of (a) a specific idea concerning the nature of political society, (b) an attempt to take pluralism more seriously than has so far been countenanced by liberals, (c) a specific view concerning the distribution of authority in moral deliberation and the nature of social criticism, and (d) scepticism about political institutions. 4 Acknowledgments I first of all wish to thank my supervisor, Chandran Kukathas. ‘Supervisor’ doesn’t quite feel like the appropriate word, though. Working with Chandran turned out to be an extraordinary personal journey as much as an academic one. If this thesis turned out to very different from what I had originally planned, if the past four years have turned out to be transformative on a personal level in so many different ways, I owe it largely to him. Thanks to our conversations and his reading suggestions, I now see the world very differently. Looking back at the road travelled, I now see that Chandran’s confidence that this transformation was going to eventually lead somewhere worthwhile was enough to make this doctoral experience one worth pursuing. Alas, I have unfortunately been able to metabolise nothing more than a small fraction of what he had to offer. But being profoundly dissatisfied with oneself is necessarily part of what it means to be a disciple of Chandran. I owe a great deal to Mr. Walter Grinder, whom I have not yet had the pleasure to meet in person and yet whose influence on this work is second only to Chandran’s. I hope I’ll one day be able to meet him and stand in awe in front of his library. I am immensely indebted to four dear friends: Ed Hall, Laura Lo Coco, Pietro Maffettone and Enzo Rossi. There are many things I have to thank them for: the conversations, the advice, the laughs, the lunches, all those great comments on my work. Their graceful ways and their intellectual rigour was a daily reminder of what thinking and arguing philosophically looks like at its best. LSE is an extraordinary place for thinking about political theory. It is a place overflowing with intelligence and warmheartedness. Presenting papers at our weekly seminars was an invaluable way of identifying thoughts unworthy of a doctoral dissertation. I am greatly indebted to all those who showed up to my talks. I would like to thank Leigh Jenco and Lea Ypi in particular. They helped me in innumerable ways throughout these years. One is able to work much better when one knows one has the support of extraordinary people like Leigh and Lea. Yet all these debts pale in comparison to the ones I owe to my family. Without the love and support of my parents Michela and Toni, and Marco none of this would have been possible. I can’t put into words how much they meant to me; I won’t even try. And the same goes for Evis. Her patience and forbearance were not of this world. She’ll never admit it, but I’m sure – deep down – she’s happy it is all over. For now. 5 Contents Introduction 7 I. Public Reason Liberalism 11 II. Towards a Liberalism Without Liberals 19 III. David Hume’s Contribution 23 IV. Thesis Outline 29 Part I: Against Public Reason 32 Chapter One: (Public) Reason, Diversity and Authority 33 I. Rawls, Political Liberalism and Public Reason 34 II. Reason and Diversity 46 III. Reason and Authority 58 Conclusion 72 Chapter Two: Religion and Public Reason 75 I. Public Reason and Religion 76 II. Assessing the Inclusivist Challenge 82 III. What is “Religion” Anyway? 95 Conclusion 108 Chapter Three: Creating Liberals 110 I. Creating Liberals: The State of Contemporary Political Liberalism 111 II. Bringing the State Back In 119 III. Displacing Politics 132 Conclusion 137 Part II: David Hume 139 Chapter Four: Common Will or Shared Interests? David Hume on Political Society 140 I. Public Reason and the Social Contract Tradition 141 II. The Social Contract as Common Will 148 6 III. David Hume’s Critique of the Social Contract 155 Conclusion 165 Chapter Five: Hume on Revolution 167 I. The Social Contract Tradition and Revolution 168 II. Hume on Revolution 191 Conclusion 199 Chapter Six: Hume on Pluralism and Moral Deliberation 200 I. Hume’s Pluralism 201 II. Pluralism, Human Nature and Moral Deliberation 205 III. Authority and Moral Deliberation 213 Conclusion 225 Part III: A Liberalism Without Liberals 227 Chapter Seven: How to (Really) De-Sectarianise Liberalism 228 I. Public Reason and the Quest to De-Sectarianise Liberalism 229 II. An Alternative Tradition 234 III. ‘Planning’ Humean Orders 242 Conclusion 251 Chapter Eight: A Liberalism Without Liberals 254 I. Varieties of Modus Vivendi Liberalism 255 II. Hume and MVLs 263 III. Interests and the Moral Life of a Liberalism Without Liberals 276 Conclusion 282 Concluding Remarks 284 Bibliography 291 7 Introduction The internal diversity of liberalism is nothing short of bewildering. Yet when Judith Shklar writes, in her much-celebrated essay “The Liberalism of Fear,” that “liberalism refers to a political doctrine, not a philosophy of life” what she is identifying is an interpretation of the liberal project that is now widely shared and taken for granted by most contemporary theorists of liberalism. It is certainly shared by the most influential among them.1 The theoretical enquiries of thinkers as diverse as John Rawls, Judith Shklar, Jeremy Waldron, Charles Larmore, Gerald Gaus, and Stephen Macedo all occur against a common backdrop: a consensus on the necessity of emancipating liberalism from the fetters of any specific ethical, metaphysical or philosophical doctrine. Liberalism’s distinctiveness, from this perspective, rests precisely in its normative focus on the terms of peaceful and mutually beneficial coexistence between individuals and groups that disagree over ethical, metaphysical and philosophical questions. It is the “political” and not the ethical or the metaphysical that liberalism should be concerned with. John Rawls’s later work is usually credited with having reminded liberals that “liberalism” (in its most plausible version) has always in reality been but shorthand for “political liberalism.”2 In A Theory of Justice (henceforth TJ) Rawls starts from a broadly Kantian belief that only an autonomous life can be a good life.3 This supposition allows him to argue, in Part III of that work, that justice as fairness would be a stable 1 Judith Shklar, ‘The Liberalism of Fear’, in Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press, 1998), pp. 3–21. 2 In Political Liberalism Rawls notes that other authors, such as Charles Larmore and Bruce Ackerman, reached that conclusion independently of his work. 3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971). 8 conception of justice in a well-ordered society. By characterising it as stable what Rawls means is that the conception would be one citizens would be motivated to endorse. The solution to the problem of the stability of a regulative conception of justice is one Rawls answers by means of the “congruence” argument. If it were possible to show, Rawls argues, that principles of right ‘fit’ comfortably in citizens’ conceptions of the good then the problem of stability would be solved.