1 Liberty in Crisis: from Berlin's Division to Contemporary Practical

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1 Liberty in Crisis: From Berlin’s Division to Contemporary Practical Challenges

1. All throughout the book, I understand “liberalism” as signifying the political theory that emerged in the seventeenth century, emphasizing the protection of basic liberty, which should not be confused with the modern American political distinctions between conservative and liberal political perspectives. Hence, this rather generic term encompasses versatile and sometimes competing conceptions of liberalism: classical liberalism, welfare-state liberalism, libertarianism, liberal-culturalism, liberal-egalitarianism, democratic-liberalism, political-liberalism, etc. Accordingly, in referring to “liberal-democratic states,” I mean to imply any form of democratic government that is committed to the protection of basic liberties, however extended or limited the definition of “basic liberties” may be. See: Gutmann (2001). 2. In fact, some of the interpretive accounts offered to the Two Concepts of Liberty have argued that Berlin’s stance there against “positive” liberty is not as extreme as it has been depicted by other commentaries. See for example: Megone (1987); Renick (1990); Ryan (1965). 3. The republished edition of the essay to which I am referring here is included in Berlin’s Four Essays on Liberty 11 years after the original lecture was delivered and published. Most of the works referring to Two Concepts of Liberty and that were published after 1969 are based on and refer to this version of the essay, and the current chapter is no exception. With respect to the differences between the original publication and the one found in the latter source see for example the following works: McBride (1990: 300); Renick (1990: 2). 4. Some notable commentators such as Claud Gaipeau and William Galston claim that it is impossible to understand Berlin’s criticism of “positive” liberty when it is detached from his advocacy of “value pluralism.” Thus, the general claim here is that Berlin’s support for “negative” right stems from the need to allow individuals the freedom of choice between multiple and incommensurable values, since there cannot be any theory, let alone a government, that can justifiably make these choices for them. Hence, from this perspective, Berlin’s support of “negative” liberty is not so much due to his rejection of “positive” liberty as an illiberal stance, but rather a result of the reality depicted by “value pluralism” (Galipeau 1994: 109–11, Galston 1999, Lukes 1994, Weinstock 1997). However, such an explanation certainly faces one major difficulty. The problem is that while it is true that the last portion

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of Berlin’s essay revolves on “value pluralism,” insisting that his stance is primarily based on the discussion at this section ignores the rest (and vast portions) of the essay. 5. For representative works of the various modes of criticism mentioned here, see the following sources: Christman (1991); Colie (1965); Kaufman (1962); McBride (1990b); Megone (1987); Renick (1990); Simhony (1993); Skinner (1984, 1998); Taylor (1985). 6. For a list and reference to some of the more renowned accounts of criticism written against the Two Concepts of Liberty see: Harris (2002). 7. Tim Gray, for example, states that: “Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ … was a landmark in the history of attempts to elucidate the meaning of freedom …. MacCallum’s article, “Negative and Positive Freedom,” published 9 years later [1967], was a second landmark, at least as important as the first …” (Gray 1990: 11). 8. I therefore, object Claude Galipeau criticism of Taylor’s article, stating that “there is a misunderstanding on Taylor’s part in that his criticisms do not focus on this issue of civil liberties which is Berlin’s target …. None of … [his] examples deal with the relationship between citizens and government, rather the focus is on autonomy instead of civil liberty.” (Galipeau 1994: 95). Although Galipeau is right with respect to the examples used by Taylor in the course of his arguments, his fundamental claim is based on an example clearly linked to the political liberties realm. 9. I’ll be referring here to two works by Skinner that directly pertains to his critique about Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty, though there are 14 years separating between the two works by Skinner. These are his article “The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives” from 1984 and his book (or rather booklet, insofar as its length is concerned), Liberty before Liberalism from 1998 (Skinner 1984, 1998). Additionally it should be noted that I’ll be using the terms “neo- Roman” and “republican” together or interchangeably, though Skinner uses the former in the later research and the latter in the earlier study. Still his switching from one term to the other one does not indicate two different theories, but rather the wish on Skinner’s part to use what he perceives to be a more accurate term (“neo-Roman”) in order to depict the same theory (usually referred to as “republican”). In his own words: “I have previously spoken not of the neo-Roman but the republican theory of liberty. But this usage now seems to me liable to mislead” (Skinner 1998, 11 [footnote no. 31]). 10. It is worth noting that in the later study, developed in Liberty before Liberalism, Skinner focuses the attention to English writers advocating the neo-Roman (or republican) thought in the second half of the seventeenth century. While John Locke’s thought is (almost) completely absent from Skinner analysis, as Locke is mainly and fundamentally linked with classical liberalism, as we shall see on Chapters 3 and 4, Locke’s emphasis on political participation and its vital connection to liberty resembles 124 Notes

Skinner’s interpretation of a stance he ascribes to republican or neo- Roman philosophy. See: Skinner (1998: 12–16). 11. The search was conducted on the string “Berlin Two Concepts of liberty” and resulted in 59,600 entries. See: http://scholar.google.com/scholar? start=0&q=Berlin+Two+concepts+of+liberty&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5. 12. For example, see Tim Gray’s book, Freedom, in which he suggests seven different conceptions of liberty, rather than merely two, as Berlin does. Yet it is precisely Berlin’s model that constitute the initialization of Gray’s argument (Gray 1990: 7–11, 15–16, 19–30). 13. I am using the term “right-libertarians” instead of just “libertarians” (almost) all throughout the book because there are also “left-libertarians” who usually reach the opposite stance of their fellow “right-libertarians.” See also Chapter 3. 14. This is of course hardly the only depicted division within liberal theory. Interestingly, William Galston offered a somewhat parallel distinction between seemingly older and newer streams of liberalism, yet his emphasis was less directly linked to the two concepts of liberty (“positive” and “negative”). Thus, Galston contrasts between “reformation liberalism,” associated with classical liberals like Locke that stress toleration and diversity, as opposed to “enlightenment liberalism” that he links to the philosophies of Kant, and Mill who emphasize the value of personal autonomy. Galston’s distinction is of particular interest because he claims that it is the older Lockean model of liberalism, emphasizing toleration and diversity that is more suitable to one of the main contemporary challenges to and within liberal theory, namely the topic of multiculturalism. While the interpretation that is offered in the current book will demonstrate why and how the Lockean conception of liberty is specifically relevant to the latter topic, our analysis will show that it is precisely due to the value of liberty (or autonomy in Galston’s terms) that such toleration and fostering of diversity is promoted. See Galston (1995). 15. These discussions are particularly vibrant within the realm of bioethics research. See for example: Beauchamp and Faden (1979); Daniels (2010). 16. One notable exception to this alienation of neo-liberals and right- libertarians from the discourses about multiculturalism is of course Chandran Kukathas’ extensive writings in this subject matter. See: Kukathas (1992); Kukathas (2003). 17. Chapter 4 of this book discusses this topic in details.

2 Empowering Liberty: Liberty as Interrelated Self and Societal Empowerment

1. I shall refer to Nozick’s theory in more detail in the next chapter. 2. Henceforward I shall refer to this work as the Second Treatise. 3. The following sources, for instance, refer to the problems in understanding and interpreting Locke’s “state of nature”: Aarsleff 1969b; Ashcraft 1968; Goldwin 1976. Notes 125

4. “Of the many qustiones disputatae roiling the fast-moving waters of Locke scholarship, few have evinced a more persistent capacity to stimulate disagreement than the matter of his natural-law teaching—its status, significance, coherence, consistency” (Oakley 1997: 624). 5. The list of works on these themes is very extensive, but here are some varied and notable examples: Forde 2001; Forster 2005; Fortin 1996; Seliger 1968; Waldron 2002. 6. Indeed, in an attempt to examine the original criticisms of Strauss’s interpretation, Michael Zuckert has claimed that they could be divided into four main issues, all of which concern different aspect of attributing to Locke an “esoteric writing.” I’m referring to a combination of two articles that were originally written by Zuckert in 1975 and 1977 and which were republished in his 2002 book Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy (Zuckert 2002a, 2002c). These articles are as follows: “Problematic Perspectives on Locke” (originally published under the title: “The Recent Literature on Locke’s Political Philosophy” in Political Science Reviewer, 1975); and “Of Wary Physicians and Weary Readers: The Debates on Locke’s Way of Writing” (originally published under the same title in Independent Journal of Philosophy, Fall 1977). Henceforward I will refer to these articles as they appear in the aforementioned edited book. 7. Arguably, of course, Straussians are hardly a monolithic group, as substantial differences exist among them regarding the manner in which they refer to Locke’s “esoteric writing” and the extent to which they ascribe to him a Hobbesian stance. For instance, while supporting the idea of “esoteric writing” in Locke’s political thought, Michael Zuckert and Patrick Coby argued (separately) against Strauss’s attribution to Locke a Hobbesian stance (Zuckert 1997; Coby 1987). Still, my point is that the aforementioned and possibly over-simplified depiction of Straussians’ viewpoint regarding Locke’s natural law teaching does represent the manner by which this viewpoint is usually grasped by their non-Struassian “rivals.” 8. Henceforward I will refer to this source as the Essay. If not otherwise explicitly stated, all references to this book are to sections in Chapter 21 of Book II. 9. “The power of perception is that which we call the understanding” (Locke 1975, Sec. 5). In addition, it should be noted that from other sections in the Essay we can deduce that Locke views the thought as a type of perception (Locke 1975, Book II, Chap. 6, Sec. 2 and Chap. 9, Sec. 2). 10. “I have said above, that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion and thinking. … [But] if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due consideration, will be found rather passions than actions. … For, in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought receives the impression, whereby it is put into that action, purely from without, and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent; and such power is not properly an active power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject” (Locke 1975: Sec. 72 [emphasis added]). 126 Notes

11. Except for the first example (the tennis ball movement that cannot sig- nify liberty owing to the absence of understanding and will, on the part of the tennis ball). 12. I’m not describing in detail each of the examples that are used by Locke to demonstrate the validity of the three reasons for distinction between the will and liberty because it is less significant for the purpose of the current discussion. At any rate these examples can be found in Locke 1975: Sec. 9–11. 13. In this matter there is no overall consensus among Locke’s interpreters. Nevertheless, for the purpose of my interpretation about “internal” liberty it doesn’t really matter. This is because the controversy here is with regard to concepts that are not part of Locke’s liberty path (uneasiness and desire); see Bennett 1991: 95–7; Lowe 1995: 134–5; Yolton 1970: 144–8. 14. “If we inquire into the reason of … why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will, and determines it in its choice, we shall find that … the present uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions. For, as much as while we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy” (Locke 1975: Sec. 36). 15. “The mind has a different relish, as well as the palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavor to delight all men with riches or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in) as you would to satisfy all men’s hun- ger with cheese or lobsters; which, through very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive” (Locke 1975: Sec. 55). 16. Notice that the argument is not that “liberty” and “action” are synony- mous terms in Locke’s philosophy. For a person can commit certain acts freely, rendering them as “actions,” while other acts might not be done freely, rendering them as “passions.” Therefore, in such cases, the person (agent) cannot be described as having fully achieved liberty, despite the fact that some of his deeds can be described as “actions.” 17. It could be argued that “suspension” is not part of the general definition of liberty that was offered in Section 8; however, as was demonstrated in the course of the current chapter, suspension is merely important as “means” for enabling the use of the understanding. Therefore, suspension is already included in the use of the understanding, and consequently, Locke’s referral to the understanding within Section 8 implies the exist- ence of the ability to suspend desires, as well. 18. I am well aware of contemporary Lockean scholarship concerning the Essay, which renders his conception of liberty in the discussed chapter as philosophically self-contradictory owing to the alleged shift in Locke’s stance regarding the “freedom of the will” (Chappell 1994: 108–16; Colman 1983: 212–15; Jolley 1999: 131–6; Lowe 1995: 132–6). Fully tack- ling these allegations is beyond the limited scope and space of the current study. However, the question with which this study grapples is whether Notes 127

Locke’s political liberty can make sense without natural law. This question, then, does not pertain to the “freedom of the will” controversy. 19. See the notes that were added by Peter Laslett, the renowned editor of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, for Sections 22 and 57: Locke 1967: 301, 324 (note for lines 8–9 and 22, respectively). 20. Numbers indicate the order of the various elements in the Essay’s path to liberty. 21. See note 18 above. 22. “We have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire; as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will” (Locke 1975: Sec. 47). 23. Additionally, Richard Colie had already noted the important role that Locke ascribed to language in offering a form of communication that is vital in constructing political societies (i.e., “civil society”): “The plain historical fact was, in Locke’s eyes, that language had been given to man in order that he might live the social life essential to him as a man. … It is by communication, and that largely through language, that a man gives warranty of being part of society: language itself is the medium and sign of human society … language binds men together in the social structure which they try to understand” (Colie 1965: 44–5). 24. H.L.A. Hart uses and stresses the term “choice” (as opposed to “benefit”), whereas Richard Tuck speaks of “active rights” (in contrast to “passive rights”). Do not confuse, though, Tuck’s distinction with David Lyon’s usage of these terms in order to reach a very different conclusion regarding the relations between “choice” and “rights.” See Hart 1955; Lyons 1970; Tuck 1979. 25. Zuckert, as it may be recalled from previous discussion in the current chapter, is a Straussian. However, this need not matter since we merely use his “blueprint” as a general guiding principle to determining the expected attributes of natural rights. 26. It should be noted that Zuckert uses this natural rights’ “blueprint” in order to argue for a different fundamental natural right than the pursuit of happiness in Locke’s political philosophy (Zuckert 1997; see above note 6). 27. See Locke 1975, Book III, Chapter X. 28. Italics in the original text, indicating a quotation from 1 Corinthians 2: 9. 29. It is impossible, of course, to cite here all the contemporary works that refer to Mill’s liberty in this attempt to cope with or reconsider the various issues relating to questions of a specific individual’s liberties. Nevertheless, the following is a list of some of the most notable sources: B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Bruce Baum, “Feminism, Liberalism and Cultural Pluralism: J. S. Mill on Mormon Polygyny,” Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (3) (1997): 230–53; Fred R. Berger, Freedom of Expression (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1980); David O. Brink, “Millian 128 Notes

Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech,” Legal Theory 7 (2) (2001): 119–57; Nicholas Capaldi, “John Stuart Mill’s Defense of Liberal Culture,” in Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism, ed. Eldon J. Eisenach (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1998): 77–114; David Dyzanhaus, “John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography,” Ethics 102 (3) (1992): 534–51; Frances E. Gill, “Mill on Censorship,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World (1999); Jill Gordon, “John Stuart Mill and the ‘Marketplace of Ideas’,” Social Theory and Practice (1997); Alan Haworth, Free Speech (New York: Routledge, 1998); Paul Kelly, “The Long Shadow of John Stuart Mill: Brian Barry on Culture and Freedom,” Contemporary Politics 8 (2) (2002): 117–28; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); J. Raz, “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, ed. R. Gavison (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Evan Simpson, “Responsibilities for Hateful Speech,” Legal Theory 12 (2) (2006): 157–77; John Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today? (Oxford: Routledge Taylor Francis, 2006). 30. This contention is “by implication” because it is not stated directly by Mill, but can rather be inferred from his claims. Thus, the ability to choose is associated with the other two elements that are explicitly attributed to the concept of “individuality” (i.e., the uniqueness of the individual, as opposing social tradition and customs; and the self-development of the individual). 31. Compare with Jonathan Riley’s interpretation (Riley 1991: 17–23). Similar to his interpretation, this mechanism emphasizes that, according to Mill, limiting the individual’s liberty merely on the grounds of personal opinion or taste will not do. Nevertheless, the offered mechanism here goes beyond Riley’s contention because this mechanism entails a broader definition of the essence of liberty. 32. For examples of accusing Mill of paternalism, see Arneson 1980; Berlin 1969b: 148–9; Dworkin 1997; Feinberg 1971; West 1965, Such claims are usually linked with the wider debate about the validity of Mill’s distinction between “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” acts. For discussion about this larger debate, see note 30 above, and Brown 1986; Honderich 1986.

3 Empowering Liberty and Debates about Redistributive Policies

1. A somewhat similar argument was employed by James Sterba, using a distinction between two types of libertarianism: the Spencerian vs the Lockean. The former type of libertarianism, according to Sterba, is marked by a primary concern with (“negative”) liberty, while the latter one is linked with setting the focus on property rights. While I understand Lockean classical liberalism to be mainly revolving around the theme of liberty, the important issue to note here is that when Sterba addresses what he thinks to be an unsupported libertarian notion of disallowing a welfare state, eventually, he precisely criticizes the implausibility of governmental Notes 129

non-interference from what he perceives to be a libertarian viewpoint (Sterba 1994, 2000). 2. See, for example, Barber 2011; Corlett 1991; Paul 1981; Schaefer 2007. 3. “To avoid this state of war […] is one great reason of mens [men] putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature. For where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power” (Locke 1967, II, Sec. 21). 4. I follow here Ron Becker’s interpretation with respect to immediate conse- quences of the dissolution of government (i.e., return to political society). However, in contrast to Becker, who uses such an interpretation to under- mine Richard Ashcraft’s depiction of Locke as a (revolutionary) democrat, I understand the “immediate consequence” to be leading to practical support of democracy. See Becker 1992: 634 [note 27]. 5. This is a merely a partial list of contemporary scholarship that is engaged in these debates. In fact, the controversy over Locke’s support of democracy revolves around many issues (e.g., explicit vs tacit consent and their use by Locke, the right of resistance, the identity and quantity of the “franchise,” etc.). 6. It should be noted that in reverting to the Lockean proviso, it might seem, eventually, as if the current chapter merely repeats the already existing “tradition” of left-libertarians’ attempts to legitimize redistributive policies in varying degrees. For, such a resolution complies with the tendency of left-libertarians to make an extensive and versatile use of the Lockean proviso in order to legitimize these policies (Fried 2004: 67, 84–91). However, as it will be demonstrated in the remaining paragraphs of the current section, since my use of the Lockean proviso is based here on our previous discussion concerning the theme of political participation, the depiction of this proviso is entirely different.

4 Empowering Liberty in a Multicultural Society: A Liberal-Democratic View

1. In using the term “democratic-majoritarian,” I do not mean to necessarily imply a “winner takes it all” system of political participation, but rather any representation mechanism in which decisions and votes reflect the majority’s choice. A proportional system would fit this category as well. Also, by using the term “democratic-majoritaian” it is easier to contrast it with Locke’s other idea of political participation that will be extracted in the following section, which is not based on the majority’s rule. 2. Notice that I refer here to the term “constitutionalism” alone. Hence, recently, there have been alternative accounts of constitutionalism with a “longer” title (e.g., “political constitutionalism,” “new constitutionalism”) to indicate their opposition, at least to a certain extent, to the “original” liberal concept. I refer to two of these alternative accounts in note no. 14. 130 Notes

3. I am well aware of Iris Marion Young’s reservations with respect to deliberative democracy. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that within the tension between the two viewpoints about citizenship, she “belongs” to the deliberative-multicultural end, rather than the liberal constitutionalist pole (Beiner 2006). In addition, Young’s qualifications regarding deliberative democracy do not result in a definite objection to the whole concept of deliberative democracy, but rather to her questioning the ability to employ it in the current setting(s) of the liberal-democratic polity (Fung 2005). 4. I use here the word “liberty” in very broad terms, so as to encompass “liberty as autonomy” (as used by Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz and Emiliy Gill), and “liberty as freedom of association/disassociation (right to exit) (as used by Jeff Spinner-Halev, and Chandran Kukathas). 5. For varied discussions of the Rushdie Affair see: Piscatori (1990); Parekh (1990); Asad (1990); and Modood (1990). 6. Detailed description of the Danish Cartoon in the context of Danish politics can be found in Mouristen 2006, while a more comprehensive discussion relating this case to broader issues are found in Modood et al. 2006, and further details about the threat of murder can be found at the Spigel International website: http://www.spiegel.de/international/ europe/0,1518,534859,00.html. 7. Short summary of the dispute within the Dutch legal system regarding “Fitna” can be found at the official Dutch judicial system website: http:// www.rechtspraak.nl/Actualiteiten/Amsterdam+Court+of+Appeal+orders+ the+criminal+prosecution+of+the+Member+of+Parliament+of+the+Dutch+ S.htm 8. For a detailed description and analysis regarding the evolution of the “Hijab Affair” in France, see: Adrian (2006); Kastoryano (2006); and Mazher Idriss (2005). 9. Rapport au Président de la République, 2004. Quoted from: Kastoryano 2006, 60. 10. See summary coverage of those debates at the Canadian Broadcast Company (CBC), CTV and the BBC websites:http://www.cbc.ca/ news/background/islam/shariah-law.html; http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1126181967010_31/?hub=Canada; http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4236762.stm. 11. With regard to ascribing Locke a democratic approach, see discussion in the previous chapter. As for the issue of private property and redistribution, see Brooks-Colburn 2000; Buchanan 1981; Kramer 1997; Otsuka 2003; Steiner 1981; Sterba 1994, 2000; Tully 1993: 71–136; Vallentyne and Steiner 2000: 23–175, Sec.1; Van Parijs 1995; Winfrey 2007; Wolf 1995. 12. The controversy regarding Locke’s commitment to a liberal constitutionalism due to his stance regarding executive power and its prerogative is well beyond the limited scope of the current chapter. Nonetheless it should be noted that in the context of this chapter this dispute is less Notes 131

relevant. This is because our interest in his “constitutionalist” stance is specifically with respect to his advocacy of liberal individual rights, an attribute that is less disputed by most contemporary Lockean scholars. For an interesting discussion about the controversy and a possible argument defending his obligation to the “rule of the law.” See: Ward (2005). 13. The controversy regarding Locke’s commitment to a liberal constitutionalism due to his stance regarding executive power and its prerogative is well beyond the limited scope of the current chapter. Nonetheless it should be noted that in the context of this chapter this dispute is less relevant. This is because our interest in his “constitutionalist” stance is specifically with respect to his advocacy of liberal individual rights, an attribute that is less disputed by most contemporary Lockean scholars. For an interesting discussion about the controversy and a possible argument defending his obligation to the “rule of the law,” see: Ward 2005. 14. Using the term “political” in this context may seem to resonate with some contemporary liberal philosophers’ stress on “political constitutionalism ” (Richard Bellamy) or “new constitutionalism” (Simone Chambers). However, as the next section of the paper demonstrates, Locke stance noticeably differs from these contemporary accounts of a “hybrid constitutionalism” since his allowance of discursive politics is not introduced at the expense of either a traditional representative democracy, or a substantial a-priori prioritization of individual rights. See: Bellamy (2007); Chambers (2001). 15. Henceforward I will refer to this work as Conduct. 16. For the intentions of Locke with respect to incorporating the Conduct in the Essay see: de Beer (1976: 87 [no. 2243]); Schuurman (2001: 45–6). References

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A D Aarsleff, Hans, 36–37, 124, 132 Democracy, democratic, 1, 3–5, 7–9, Action(s), 3, 8, 10, 20, 31, 34, 38–42, 19, 21–24, 27, 70, 83, 85–86, 45, 47, 49–50, 53–55, 57, 61–65, 88–91, 93–103, 106, 110–113, 70, 77–78, 81–82, 93, 99, 104, 116, 118, 120, 122, 129–134, 106, 125–126, 141 136–137, 139–142 Alienation, 4, 7, 21, 25, 93, 101, Deliberative democracy, 3–5, 7, 115–116, 120, 124 19, 21, 23, 94–97, 99, 100, 103, Aquinas, St. Thomas, 36, 49–50, 73 106, 110, 112–116, 118, 130, Ashcraft, Richard, 36–37, 83, 124, 133 129, 132 Desire(s), 40–44, 51, 58, 62, 78–79, Autonomy, Autonomous, 3, 20, 29, 126–127 69–70, 74, 79, 123–124, 128, Despotism, despotic, See: Tyranny 130, 135, 139–140 Dworkin, Ronald, 20, 70–71, 95–96, 128 B Barry, Brian, 22, 36, 71, 96, E 127–128, 132 Education, 60–61, 132, 134, Beiner, Ronald, 95, 130, 132–133 138–141 Bellamy, Richard, 70, 131–132 Egalitarianism, see: Liberal- Berlin, Isaiah, 4–6, 8–20, 22–26, egalitarianism 28–29, 56, 78–80, 119, 122–124, Elite (Lockean), 55, 105–107, 109 128, 132–133, 135–137, 139, Empowering liberty, 6–7, 30–31, 33, 141 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, C 65–69, 71, 73, 75–77, 79–83, 85, Carens, Joseph, 96, 133, 138 87, 89, 91–95, 97, 99–101, 103, Choice(s), making of, 10–11, 20, 44, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 48 50, 57–58, 60–61, 64, 66, 115–117, 120–121, 124, 78–79, 82, 122 128–129 Citizenship, 7, 21, 94–95, 97, Enhancement, 46, 52, 59, 60, 63–64, 99–101, 117, 130 67, 79, 94 Classical liberalism, 4–7, 19, 21, 24, Equality, 3, 20–22, 25, 27, 70–71, 28, 30–31, 66, 70, 73, 76, 83, 79, 95–99, 127, 132–134, 141 86, 91–94, 99, 101, 115–116, Essay Concerning Human 119–120, 123–124, 128 Understanding, 4, 8, 12, 31, 37, Constitutionalism, 7, 21, 94–95, 43–46, 49, 51–53, 61, 77–78, 101, 103, 110, 112–116, 103–104, 107–108, 122–123, 129–133, 137, 139–141 125–127, 131, 133, 135, 137, Crowder, George, 22–23, 69, 133 142

143 144 Index

Estate(s), 31, 33, 76, 82, 89, 90, 102, L 104. See also: Property rights Laïcité, 98–99, 132, 137 External liberty, 30, 39–40, 42–47, laissez fair, 4, 19, 70 50–51, 64–66, 81 Laslett, Peter, 35–36, 127, 137 Law of nature, see: Natural law F Left-libertarianism, 75, 124, 129, 135, Fairness, fair, 3, 20, 70, 79, 139 141 Fitna, film, 97–98, 130 Liberal-culturalism, 97, 99, 122 Freedom, See: Liberty Liberal-egalitarianism, 4, 19–21, 70, 118–119, 122 G Liberalism Galipeau, Claude, 122–123, 135 Cleavage(s), 18–19, 27, 69, 80, 91, Galston, William, 22–23, 122, 124, 93, 98, 118–120 135 Types, see particular types Gray, John, 22–23, 55, 135 of liberalism (e.g. liberal-egalitarianism) H Libertarianism, see: particular types Hart, H.L.A., 47–48, 127, 136 (Left-libertarianism, Spinner-Halev, Jeff, 22, 97, 130, Right-libertarianism) 140–141 Liberty Happiness, 30–31, 40–44, 46–52, Path to, 26, 31, 38, 41, 43, 45–46, 54–56, 62–67, 78–80, 113, 120, 51, 78, 126–127 126–127 Two concepts of, 4, 8–10, 14–19, Hayek von, Fridrich, 20, 70, 136 21–22, 24–29, 39, 80–81, 119, Hijab (headscarf), 98, 130, 136, 137 122–124, 132, 135, 137 Healthcare, 4, 20 Two spheres of, 6, 30, 43–44, 47, Hobbes, Hobbesian, 36–37, 125 52, 56, 58, 61, 63–66, 76, 80, 115 I Types, see particular types (e.g. Individuality, 54–64, 79, 128, negative, positive, internal, 136–137 external) Internal liberty, 42–47, 50–52, 58–59, Locke, John, 5–7, 13–14, 29, 31–52, 61–66, 78–79, 82, 113–115, 121 56, 58, 61, 64–66, 68, 73, Islam, Islamism, 97, 130, 136, 75–80, 82–94, 99–117, 119–121, 138. See also: Muslims 123–141

J M Justice, 27, 32, 50, 71–73, 96, 133, MacCallum, G.C., 14–17, 123, 137 137–141 Machan, Tibor, 31, 70–71, 136–138, 140 K Min-Max, see: Fairness Knowledge, 2–3, 32, 35, 45, 49–50, Mill, John Stuart, 5–6, 13–14, 60, 103–110, 114 28–30, 53–66, 68, 74–80, 82, Kukathas, Chandran, 97, 124, 130, 115, 119, 124, 127–128, 136 132–139, 141 Kymlicka, Will, 20, 22, 70, 97, 130, Minority Groups, 24, 95, 97–98, 136–137, 141 103, 109, 113, 121 Index 145

Modern liberalism, 5–6, 19, 24–25, Property rights, 4, 20, 25, 27, 31, 71, 27–28, 52, 66, 70, 76, 119 77, 87–91, 128, 140, 142. See Multiculturalism, 3–5, 7–8, 19, also: Estate(s) 21–25, 27, 29, 53, 93–101, Proviso (Lockean), 90–91, 129 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115–118, 120–121, 124, 127, R 129–130, 132, 136–139 Rawls, John, 20, 28–29, 70–72, 79, Muslims, 97–98, 136, 138 96, 133, 139 Raz, Joseph, 20, 22, 70, 72–75, 79, N 97, 128, 130, 139 Natural law, 32–37, 45–48, 50–52, Rebellion, revolt (Lockean), 82–86, 56, 125, 127, 134–135, 138, 102, 111 140–141 Redistribution, redistributive policy, Negative liberty, 6, 10, 12, 16–20, 5–6, 19, 21–25, 27, 68–71, 24, 69, 72–74, 81, 93, 119–122 73–77, 79–81, 83, 85, 87–92, Neo-liberalism, 4, 7, 19–21, 31, 117, 120, 128–129 70–71, 76, 91, 93–94, 101, Republican, Republicanism, 14–15, 116–120, 124. See also: 17–18, 36–37, 123–124, 132, Republican, Republicanism 134, 139 Non-interference, 8, 10, 18, 20, Republic, The, 105, 139 71–72, 74, 77, 87, 118, 129 Right-libertarianism, 4, 7, 19–21, 31, 70–71, 76, 91, 93–94, 101, O 116–120, 124 Of the Conduct of the Understanding, Rushdie, Satanic Verses affair, 97, 94, 103–104, 106–110, 112–113, 130, 132, 138 116, 131, 137, 140 On Liberty, 27, 29, 39, 52–54, 56, 61, S 77, 122, 132–134, 136–139 Second Treatise, 31, 34, 36–37, 44–45, 51, 77, 79, 82, 94, 103, 104, P 110, 112–113, 116, 124 Parekh, Bhiku, 100, 130, 138 Self-development, 30, 54, 58, 63–65, Paternalism, 54, 60–61, 128, 132, 67, 115, 120–121 134 Self-mastery, 11–12 Plato, 11, 105, 108, 139 Shachar, Ayelet, 96, 99, 140 Pluralism, 12, 22, 95, 122, 127, 132, Skinner, Quentin, 17–18, 123–124, 135, 140 140 Political liberty, 1, 18–19, 37, 44–47, Squires, Judith, 95–96, 101, 140 50–53, 56, 111–114, 127 State of nature, 31–35, 75, 83, Political participation, 7, 17–18, 68, 85, 101, 124, 129, 132, 135, 80, 82–91, 94, 100, 102–103, 140 105–107, 110–117, 121, 123, 129 State of war, 33, 77, 82, 86, 102, Polity, 33, 35, 71, 77, 83, 88, 100–101, 111, 129 103, 105–106, 114–115, 130, 135 Sterba, James, 76, 128–130, 140 Positive liberty, 5–6, 10, 12, 14, 16, Strauss, Leo, 36, 45, 125, 127, 135, 18–20, 22–24, 26, 28–29, 68–69, 140 73, 78–81, 87, 91–92, 94, Sunstein, Cass, R., 95, 101, 141 115–118, 120, 122 System of Logic, 62, 138 146 Index

T Volition, 31, 34, 38–41, 45–46, 53, Toleration, 23, 69, 100, 124, 128, 62–63, 126, 133 134, 136, 139, 141 Tuck, Richard, 47–48, 127, 141 W Tully, James, 76, 83, 130, 141 Waldron, Jeremy, 69, 95, 125, 141 Tyranny, 13, 69, 84–86 Welfare, 3–6, 8, 19–21, 24, 29, 53, 68, 70, 73, 118–119, 122, 128, U 133–134, 137–138, 140 Understanding, 38, 41–43, 52, 59, Welfare-liberals, 4, 20–21, 70, 78, 94, 103–104, 105, 107, 118–119 110–111, 125–126, 136 Will, the: see: Volition Utilitarianism, 55, 61–64, 134, 138 Y Yolton, John, 35–36, 126, 132, 134, V 139, 142 Value-pluralism, 22–23, 122–123, 133, 135. See also: Z Pluralism Zuckert, Michael, 35, 37, 48–49, Van Parijs, Phillip, 75, 130, 141 125, 127, 142