Baku Dialoguesbaku Dialogues Policy Perspectives on the Silk Road Region
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 Silk Road Region as Global Keystone? Geopolitics & Connectivity in the Heart of the World Between Eurasia and the Middle East Geopolitical Keystone Svante Cornell Nikolas K. Gvosdev Against ‘the Blob’ Not A Top European Priority Michael A. Reynolds Amanda Paul Five-Star Hubs Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the Three Sovereigns Taleh Ziyadov Pepe Escobar Silk Road Pathways Completing the Southern Gas Corridor Yu Hongjun Akhmed Gumbatov Taking Stock of Regional Quandaries The Karabakh Peace Process Dennis Sammut Iran’s Longstanding Cooperation with Armenia Brenda Shaffer The OSCE and Minorities in the Silk Road Region Lamberto Zannier Profile in Leadership Zbigniew Brzezinski: My Friendship with America’s Geopolitical Sage Hafiz Pashayev Baku Dialogues Interview Strategic Equilibrium: Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Hikmat Hajiyev 1 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES [e]specially in Azerbaijan and almost always puts pragmatic in- Iran’s Longstanding Turkmenistan republics, with terests above ideology in instances the ultimate objective of brew- ing discord among the Iranian where Islamic solidarity conflicts Cooperation with Armenia Azeris and Turkmen by insti- with primary geopolitical interests. gating ethnic and nationalistic In the specific case of the war -be sentiments. tween two of its northern neigh- Domestic Azerbaijani Opposition During the period of the Soviet bors, the clash between ideological collapse, all-out war emerged be- and pragmatic considerations was May be Rising tween two of Iran’s new neighbors: unmistakable: Christian-populated Armenia and Azerbaijan, which Armenia had invaded Shia majority Brenda Shaffer created a critical security and po- Azerbaijan (the only majority- litical challenge for Tehran. This Shia former Soviet republic), cap- was not some faraway conflict like tured close to 20 percent of its terri- hen the Soviet Union Union and the establishment those in the Gaza Strip or Lebanon; tory, and turned almost one million collapsed in De- of six new states populated by this war was taking place directly Azerbaijani Shia into refugees W cember 1991, Iran’s Muslim-majorities in the Caspian on Iran’s borders, and at times cre- and Internally Displaced Persons stable northern boundary suddenly region as an opportunity to expand ated refugee flows into Iran. Thus, (IDPs). became a shared border with five its influence and “export the revolu- Iran’s own national security and states: land borders with Armenia, tion.” Rather, Tehran’s position was domestic stability was seen to be However, the devastation created Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and defensive: protecting against this directly threatened by the conflict. by the war and occupation in Azer- maritime borders with Kazakhstan new potential source of threats. The The danger was especially sensitive baijan in the early years of the con- and Russia. Tehran viewed this officially-sponsored Tehran Times, since over one third flict served a main momentous change as a source of wrote in late December 1991 that of the population of Iranian policy several new security challenges. the first ground for concern Iran is ethnic-Azer- Tehran almost always goal by dimming Among these were maritime de- from the point of view in Teh- baijani; the regions puts pragmatic inter- the new coun- ran is the lack of political sta- of northwest Iran ests above ideology in try’s attraction to limitation in the Caspian Sea and bility in the newly independent the establishment of Azerbaijan republics. The unstable condi- that are contig- instances where Islamic Iran’s Azerbaijani and Turkmenistan, two states that tions in those republics could uous to the con- solidarity conflicts with minority. Thus, be serious causes of insecuri- shared ethnic ties with large num- flict zone—East primary geopolitical Tehran adopted a ty along the lengthy borders Azerbaijan, West policy in support of bers of Iranian citizens. (over 2,000 kilometers) Iran interests. shares with those countries. Azerbaijan, and Yerevan in the war Consequently, Tehran did not Already foreign hands can be Ardebil—are pop- with Azerbaijan view the breakup of the Soviet felt at work in those republics, ulated primarily by and has continued ethnic-Azerbaijanis, many of whom to engage in close cooperation with share family ties with co-ethnics in Armenia until the present day. Brenda Shafferis a faculty member of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and a Senior Fellow the Republic of Azerbaijan. n January 2008, Mahmoud at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center who has provided testimony to both While the ruling regime in Iran for- Vaezi, Iran’s then-Deputy houses of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. She is the author of, most I notably, Energy Politics (2009), a standard textbook in over 200 university courses mally asserts that its foreign policy is Foreign Minister responsible for around the globe. based on Islamic solidarity, Tehran the former Soviet region (he now Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 142 143 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES serves as chief of staff to the coun- regime protests in Iran since late considerations as one of Iran’s first post-independence govern- try’s president) wrote the following 2017, have increased opposition major factors in its policy toward ments reinforced Tehran’s fears that about how Iran had approached to Iranian-Armenian cooperation the Karabakh conflict. According Baku would engage in irredentism. the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict among Iran’s ethnic-Azerbaijani to an Armenian official I inter- During the late 1980s and the initial during the early war period: community, both at grassroots and viewed in winter 2000, Tehran independence period, the Popular Iran was in the neighborhood elite levels. Iran’s tilt may thus be- put pressure on Front of Azerbaijan of the environment of the con- come domestically costly and diffi- Armenia to re- political move- flict. Karabakh is situated only cult to sustain. ject U.S.-initiated 40 km distance from its bor- While officially Tehran ment campaigned ders. At that time, this possibil- This essay will examine the ac- peace proposals remained neutral, Iran for language and ity raised that the boundaries of tivity and attitudes of Iran’s eth- (the “Goble Plan”) served as Armenia’s main cultural rights and conflict extended to the beyond that would have eventual reunifica- of Karabakh. Since then, Iran’s nic-Azerbaijani population as it supply route during most led Armenia to tion with ethnic- consideration was based on relates to Iranian cooperation of the war. security perceptions. [...] Iran with Armenia and Tehran’s tilt to- cede back to Azer- Azerbaijanis re- could not be indifferent to the ward Yerevan in its conflict with baijan control of siding in north- developments occurring along territory bordering its borders, security changes of Azerbaijan, beginning with a dis- eastern Iran, to the borders and their impact on cussion of Iranian policies toward Iran. The Islamic Republic pre- which they referred as “South Iran’s internal developments. the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. ferred to preserve a large de facto Azerbaijan.” Prior to the Soviet col- Tehran’s policy tilt toward border with Armenia to limit ties lapse, beginning in December 1989, Armenia—for reasons of security, Iran’s Policy between Azerbaijan and Iran’s eth- large-scale protests of Azerbaijanis nic-Azerbaijani population. Vaezi as Vaezi made clear—was predi- rom the beginning of the emerged in the border area between also stated Iran’s preference for a cated on the assumption that Iran’s FArmenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Iran and Soviet Azerbaijan, in the domestic Azerbaijani community the main factor weighing on Iran’s border with Armenia (and opposi- region of Nakhchevan. Activists would not mount policy toward the tion to direct links between Turkey from Baku, together with local vil- significant op- war was the per- and Azerbaijan): lagers, held rallies in the border area, position to this Iran’s main concern ceived impact on Iran expressed its opposition to and attempted to communicate with was preventing identi- the change of political geogra- co-ethnics and family members in policy. For most its security. Tehran phy of the region. If this plan of the period since fication of its domestic held no special could have been somehow im- Iran. The protestors also destroyed the emergence Azerbaijani community sentiments for plemented it would have had some of the border posts. of the Armenia- wide political, economic and with the new Republic of Azerbaijanis as co- security effects on the region. After the renewal of Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijan con- Azerbaijan. religionists. Iran’s Linking Nakhchevan to Azer- independence, President Abulfez flict, Tehran’s bet main concern baijan would have reduced the Elchibey (1992-1993) elevated the had paid off. importance of Iran’s unique was preventing and distinctive position in campaign for language and cultural However, growing awareness of identification of its domestic the Caucasus and interrupted rights for ethnic-Azerbaijanis in Iran the extent of cooperation and ties Azerbaijani community with the Iran’s linkage with Armenia. to the level of state policy. For in- between Tehran and Yerevan, vi- new Republic of Azerbaijan. In 1992, The activities of the main po- stance, the new state’s new elementary olent flare-ups between Armenia Mahmoud Vaezi (the country’s litical actors in Azerbaijan during school textbooks’ covers displayed a and Azerbaijan that caused signifi- aforementioned then-deputy for- the Soviet collapse and the poli- map of historical Azerbaijan that in- cant casualties, and a wave of anti- eign minister), pointed to internal cies of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s cluded territories in present-day Iran. Vol. 4 | No.