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Home , Azerbaijani population, Brenda Shaffer, Hamshahri, Shusha

BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020

Silk Road Region as Global Keystone? Geopolitics & Connectivity in the Heart of the World Between Eurasia and the Middle East Geopolitical Keystone Svante Cornell Nikolas K. Gvosdev Against ‘the Blob’ Not A Top European Priority Michael A. Reynolds Amanda Paul

Five-Star Hubs Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the Three Sovereigns Taleh Ziyadov Pepe Escobar Silk Road Pathways Completing the Southern Gas Corridor Yu Hongjun Akhmed Gumbatov

Taking Stock of Regional Quandaries The Peace Process Dennis Sammut ’s Longstanding Cooperation with Brenda Shaffer The OSCE and Minorities in the Silk Road Region Lamberto Zannier

Profile in Leadership Zbigniew Brzezinski: My Friendship with America’s Geopolitical Sage Hafiz Pashayev

Baku Dialogues Interview Strategic Equilibrium: ’s Foreign Policy Hikmat Hajiyev

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[e]specially in Azerbaijan and almost always puts pragmatic in- Iran’s Longstanding republics, with terests above ideology in instances the ultimate objective of brew- ing discord among the Iranian where Islamic solidarity conflicts Cooperation with Armenia Azeris and Turkmen by insti- with primary geopolitical interests. gating ethnic and nationalistic In the specific case of the war- be sentiments. tween two of its northern neigh- Domestic Azerbaijani Opposition During the period of the Soviet bors, the clash between ideological collapse, all-out war emerged be- and pragmatic considerations was May be Rising tween two of Iran’s new neighbors: unmistakable: Christian-populated Armenia and Azerbaijan, which Armenia had invaded Shia majority Brenda Shaffer created a critical security and po- Azerbaijan (the only majority- litical challenge for . This Shia former Soviet republic), cap- was not some faraway conflict like tured close to 20 percent of its terri- hen the Union and the establishment those in the Gaza Strip or Lebanon; tory, and turned almost one million collapsed in De- of six new states populated by this war was taking place directly Azerbaijani Shia into refugees W cember 1991, Iran’s Muslim-majorities in the Caspian on Iran’s borders, and at times cre- and Internally Displaced Persons stable northern boundary suddenly region as an opportunity to expand ated refugee flows into Iran. Thus, (IDPs). became a shared border with five its influence and “export the revolu- Iran’s own national security and states: land borders with Armenia, tion.” Rather, Tehran’s position was domestic stability was seen to be However, the devastation created Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and defensive: protecting against this directly threatened by the conflict. by the war and occupation in Azer- maritime borders with new potential source of threats. The The danger was especially sensitive baijan in the early years of the con- and . Tehran viewed this officially-sponsored Tehran Times, since over one third flict served a main momentous change as a source of wrote in late December 1991 that of the population of Iranian policy several new security challenges. the first ground for concern Iran is ethnic-Azer- Tehran almost always goal by dimming Among these were maritime de- from the point of view in Teh- baijani; the regions puts pragmatic inter- the new coun- ran is the lack of political sta- of northwest Iran ests above ideology in try’s attraction to limitation in the and bility in the newly independent the establishment of Azerbaijan republics. The unstable condi- that are contig- instances where Islamic Iran’s Azerbaijani and Turkmenistan, two states that tions in those republics could uous to the con- solidarity conflicts with minority. Thus, be serious causes of insecuri- shared ethnic ties with large num- flict zone—East primary geopolitical Tehran adopted a ty along the lengthy borders Azerbaijan, West policy in support of bers of Iranian citizens. (over 2,000 kilometers) Iran interests. shares with those countries. Azerbaijan, and in the war Consequently, Tehran did not Already foreign hands can be Ardebil—are pop- with Azerbaijan view the breakup of the Soviet felt at work in those republics, ulated primarily by and has continued ethnic-, many of whom to engage in close cooperation with share family ties with co-ethnics in Armenia until the present day. Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and a Senior Fellow the Republic of Azerbaijan. n January 2008, Mahmoud at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center who has provided testimony to both While the ruling regime in Iran for- Vaezi, Iran’s then-Deputy houses of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. She is the author of, most I notably, Energy Politics (2009), a standard textbook in over 200 university courses mally asserts that its foreign policy is Foreign Minister responsible for around the globe. based on Islamic solidarity, Tehran the former Soviet region (he now

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 142 143 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES serves as chief of staff to the coun- regime protests in Iran since late considerations as one of Iran’s first post-independence govern- try’s president) wrote the following 2017, have increased opposition major factors in its policy toward ments reinforced Tehran’s fears that about how Iran had approached to Iranian-Armenian cooperation the Karabakh conflict. According Baku would engage in irredentism. the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict among Iran’s ethnic-Azerbaijani to an Armenian official I inter- During the late 1980s and the initial during the early war period: community, both at grassroots and viewed in winter 2000, Tehran independence period, the Popular Iran was in the neighborhood elite levels. Iran’s tilt may thus be- put pressure on Front of Azerbaijan of the environment of the con- come domestically costly and diffi- Armenia to re- political move- flict. Karabakh is situated only cult to sustain. ject U.S.-initiated 40 km distance from its bor- While officially Tehran ment campaigned ders. At that time, this possibil- This essay will examine the ac- peace proposals remained neutral, Iran for language and ity raised that the boundaries of tivity and attitudes of Iran’s eth- (the “Goble Plan”) served as Armenia’s main cultural rights and conflict extended to the beyond that would have eventual reunifica- of Karabakh. Since then, Iran’s nic-Azerbaijani population as it supply route during most led Armenia to tion with ethnic- consideration was based on relates to Iranian cooperation of the war. security perceptions. [...] Iran with Armenia and Tehran’s tilt to- cede back to Azer- Azerbaijanis re- could not be indifferent to the ward Yerevan in its conflict with baijan control of siding in north- developments occurring along territory bordering its borders, security changes of Azerbaijan, beginning with a dis- eastern Iran, to the borders and their impact on cussion of Iranian policies toward Iran. The Islamic Republic pre- which they referred as “South Iran’s internal developments. the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. ferred to preserve a large de facto Azerbaijan.” Prior to the Soviet col- Tehran’s policy tilt toward border with Armenia to limit ties lapse, beginning in December 1989, Armenia—for reasons of security, Iran’s Policy between Azerbaijan and Iran’s eth- large-scale protests of Azerbaijanis nic-Azerbaijani population. Vaezi as Vaezi made clear—was predi- rom the beginning of the emerged in the border area between also stated Iran’s preference for a cated on the assumption that Iran’s FArmenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Iran and Soviet Azerbaijan, in the domestic Azerbaijani community the main factor weighing on Iran’s border with Armenia (and opposi- region of Nakhchevan. Activists would not mount policy toward the tion to direct links between from Baku, together with local vil- significant op- war was the per- and Azerbaijan): lagers, held rallies in the border area, position to this Iran’s main concern ceived impact on Iran expressed its opposition to and attempted to communicate with was preventing identi- the change of political geogra- co-ethnics and family members in policy. For most its security. Tehran phy of the region. If this plan of the period since fication of its domestic held no special could have been somehow im- Iran. The protestors also destroyed the emergence Azerbaijani community sentiments for plemented it would have had some of the border posts. of the Armenia- wide political, economic and with the new Republic of Azerbaijanis as co- security effects on the region. After the renewal of Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijan con- Azerbaijan. religionists. Iran’s Linking Nakhchevan to Azer- independence, President Abulfez flict, Tehran’s bet main concern baijan would have reduced the Elchibey (1992-1993) elevated the had paid off. importance of Iran’s unique was preventing and distinctive position in campaign for language and cultural However, growing awareness of identification of its domestic the and interrupted rights for ethnic-Azerbaijanis in Iran the extent of cooperation and ties Azerbaijani community with the Iran’s linkage with Armenia. to the level of state policy. For in- between Tehran and Yerevan, vi- new Republic of Azerbaijan. In 1992, The activities of the main po- stance, the new state’s new elementary olent flare-ups between Armenia Mahmoud Vaezi (the country’s litical actors in Azerbaijan during school textbooks’ covers displayed a and Azerbaijan that caused signifi- aforementioned then-deputy for- the Soviet collapse and the poli- map of historical Azerbaijan that in- cant casualties, and a wave of anti- eign minister), pointed to internal cies of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s cluded territories in present-day Iran.

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Tehran developed relations In April 1992, two cargo planes of continued to forge ahead with trade years. Iran’s official media shows and trade with Armenia during aid funded by ethnic- in and cooperation with Yerevan. no special feelings toward the ref- the height of the battles between Iran arrived in Yerevan. The planes Considering that the Armenians ugees and IDPs in Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1992- were dispatched to Armenia by sought to change existing borders Azerbaijan’s loss of control of its 1994. During the war period, the Iranian Red Crescent. Iranian between Armenia and Azerbaijan lands, nor special identification Armenian and Iranian officials con- Armenians also reportedly contrib- and occupied a significant amount or solidarity with Azerbaijan as ducted regular high-level visits and uted funds to the construction of a of Azerbaijan’s internationally Muslims or Shiites. However, a cordial exchanges. bridge linking Armenia and Iran, recognized territory, the lack of small shift in the official Iranian hile officially Tehran which was inaugurated in May Iranian criticism and the adoption messaging took place around 2012: Wremained neutral, Iran 1992. During the war, the sides in- of a “balanced” approach to the Iranian officials and official media served as Armenia’s main supply augurated direct flights between sides in actuality favored Armenia. began to add that Iran supports route during most of the war. In Tehran and Yerevan. Iranian official media often adopts “Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” which would imply return of the 1992 and 1993, supply routes Armenian officials thanked Iran the Armenian official practice of re- territories captured by Armenia. from all of Armenia’s neighbors a number of times for the supplies ferring to the occupied territories as except for Iran were closed or un- and for serving as a supply route. the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” ne of the best indications of reliable: for example, a civil war For instance, Armenian Prime despite the fact that the Iranian OIran’s conciliatory position in neighboring hindered Minister and Vice President Gagik government does not recognize toward Armenia is the fact that Russia from using land routes to Harutyunyan remarked in May the occupied territories as a state Armenian representatives in the supply Yerevan. Armenia was able 1992, in a ceremony opening a or recognize Armenia’s sovereignty 1990s repeatedly praised Iran’s to continue the war effort due to bridge over the Araz river that this over these territories. role in the negotiation process, ex- critical fuel and food supplies that would contribute to his country’s In regional fora with Mus- pressed their preference for Tehran reached it through Iran. For in- economic stability by providing lim-majority state membership, over many other foreign represen- stance, in April 1992, at one of the alternatives to transport routes such as the Economic Cooperation tatives, and called for the deploy- most critical points in the con- blocked as a result of the war. Organization, Tehran has refrained ment of Iranian observers along flict, Iran agreed to supply fuel to The bridge was opened just after from criticizing Armenia. Iranian the borders between Armenia and Armenia and improved transporta- Armenian forces had captured the representatives and Iranian of- Azerbaijan. Armenia’s first post- tion links with Armenia. Moreover, pivotal of Shusha, the histor- ficial media reserved their criti- independence president, Levon Russian fuel was often delivered to ical capital of Azerbaijanis in the cisms in the early 1990s for “colo- Ter-Petrosyan, stated in May 1992 Armenia by way of Iran. Iranian Karabakh region. Shusha was cap- nial powers” and other external that “the Iranians have proved their fuel supplies critical for the war tured by Armenia’s forces while agents, such as Russia, Turkey, the complete impartiality in this issue, effort included oil for heavy vehi- Tehran was holding a peace summit , and occasionally the respecting the rights of both sides cles and coal for heat and cooking. of the leaders of Armenia and Azer- “Zionists,” and even blamed and striving for a just solution, and Hrant -Shahnazaryan, an baijan. Despite the embarrassing Elchibey for the conflict with therefore the sides trust Iran.” Armenian specialist on Iran’s timing, Tehran offered no condem- Armenia, while refraining from During his September 2011 visit policies in the South Caucasus, nation of Yerevan: Iranian reac- pointing a finger at Yerevan. to Iran, Armenian foreign min- claimed in May 2011 that “Iran [had] tion was limited to an expression Tehran’s rhetoric toward the ister Eduard Nalbandyan praised provided Armenia’s food safety of “concern over the recent devel- Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has Tehran’s position on the conflict during the war.” opments in Karabakh.” Tehran not changed significantly in recent with Azerbaijan, stating that he

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“appreciated the Islamic Republic On a visit to Yerevan in late its recognition of Azerbaijan’s sov- cooperation with Armenia, but of Iran for presenting proper and January 2015, Iranian foreign min- ereignty over the territory. Tehran the opposition was not sufficient balanced views on the Nagorno- ister Javad Zarif remarked that “Iran also agreed that the Armenian to impose a constraint on Iranian- Karabakh issue, and expressed is ready to cooperate with Armenia side could not display any national Armenian cooperation. the hope that Tehran would in different areas, including tele- symbols, such as flags, at the plant Since late 2017, as open public maintain the same stance and communications, railway, energy, and dam.) Moreover, products in opposition to the Iranian regime continue presenting such posi- gas, electricity and the cleaning of Iran are supplied directly to the has grown, so has open opposition tive views in future.” the river.” occupied territories and Iranian to Iran’s cooperation with Armenia. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s repre- Iran and Armenia also continue companies and in- In parallel, Iran’s sentatives voiced critical statements to engage in energy trade: Iran dividuals conduct ethnic-Azerbaijani regarding Iran’s role in the negoti- supplies natural gas to Armenia, direct trade with Since late 2017, as open community has re- ations, illustrating their perception while Armenia supplies Iran with entities there. Iran public opposition to ceived through so- also supports a cial media a better that Tehran was not promoting electricity from its nuclear power the Iranian regime has their interests. As Elchibey re- plant. During Prime Minister radio station that picture of the ex- broadcasts in the grown, so has open op- tent of Iranian- marked in May 1992: Pashinyan’s February 2019 visit to position to Iran’s cooper- Iran, the sides expressed support Talysh language Armenian coop- Unfortunately, there was no ation with Armenia. benefit from the activity of for the establishment of an addi- (a Persian dialect) eration, including Iran’s peacemaking mission, tional electricity line between the from the occupied Iran’s direct aid for example. Khodzhaly fell af- city of Shusha, to the occupation ter their first visit to Karabagh, countries to expand Armenia’s elec- and Shusha fell after their sec- tricity exports to Iran. During the targeting the Talysh minority in forces in the Armenian-occupied ond visit, and the fall of same visit, Pashinyan expressed Azerbaijan. Iranian companies territories of Azerbaijan. Flare-ups is the sequel to this. support for Armenia serving as a have also conducted restoration in the conflict that resulted in sig- In 1994, Iranian officials also transit state for Iranian natural gas work on in the occupied nificant Azerbaijani casualties stated that early in his term as pres- supplies to Europe. territories, such as the Govhar aga have also galvanized opposition in Shusha. among ethnic-Azerbaijanis in Iran. ident of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev Iran is even involved in infra- Since late 2017, several events had complained to Tehran about its structure projects located in the The Role of Ethnic- cooperation with Armenia. Azerbaijani territories occupied have sparked a significant ethnic- ran openly advocates for ex- by Armenia. For instance, in 2010 Azerbaijanis in Iran Azerbaijani response in Iran: the Ipanding its cooperation with Iranian and Armenian company ehran’s close cooperation visit of Armenia’s prime minister Armenia, including in infrastruc- officials inaugurated a hydroelec- Twith Armenia is grounded to Iran (February 2019), appear- ture projects that traverse the oc- tric dam on the Araz river near the on the assumption that Iran’s do- ance on social media of clips of cupied territories. Iranian president Khoda Afarin Bridge in an area mestic Azerbaijani community Iranian aid and trade convoys to the remarked that straddles Iran and the occu- will neither actively nor strongly Armenian occupation forces during Nalbandyan’s September pied territories. (It should be noted, oppose this policy. For most of (spring 2020), and the recent reig- 2011 visit that “Tehran-Yerevan however, that in 2016 Iran and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, nition of the conflict (July 2020). ties could be enhanced promptly as Azerbaijan signed an agreement have ex- During the initial war period Iran considers no limits on its rela- allowing Iran to use the occupied pressed support for Azerbaijan and (1992-1994), Iranian ethnic- tions with Armenia.” territories, thus Iran reconfirmed some criticism of Tehran’s close Azerbaijani activists publicly

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 148 149 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES criticized Tehran’s policy to- of Iran also expressed views on in urged Tehran to support n addition, ethnic-Azerbaijanis ward the conflict. The activ- the conflict that contradicted Azerbaijan in this struggle during a Iin Iran have been involved in ists distributed petitions, held Tehran’s official policy that did not march that was marked by “nation- providing aid to their co-ethnics in demonstrations, and ethnic- criticize Armenia. In a September alist fervor and slogans.” Salam re- Azerbaijan. In 1992-1993, much of Azerbaijani members of the Iranian 2010 interview for a news service ported that the demonstration was the humanitarian and refugee as- parliament condemned Armenia’s in Azerbaijan, Iran’s Vice-President held “despite the opposition of the sistance from Iran to the Republic occupation of Azerbaijan’s lands for Parliamentary Affairs, Sayyed authorities.” The next year, Tehran of Azerbaijan was organized di- and Tehran’s support for Armenia. Mohammad-Reza Mir-Tajeddini, University students held a demon- rectly from Iran’s majority ethnic- In addition, during the war pe- stated that stration in front of the Armenian Azerbaijani provinces. Beginning riod, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Nagorno-Karabakh is Azer- embassy to show their support for in summer 1992, some of the baijani territory. We cannot Azerbaijanis wounded in the war Abdulkarim Mousavi Ardebeli, support an Armenian policy Azerbaijan in the conflict. During an ethnic-Azerbaijani cleric, often of aggression and occupation the demonstration, the embassy was with Armenia were treated in mentioned the Nagorno-Karabakh that aims to separate the region stoned, and subsequently the Ira- Tabriz hospitals. Throughout from Azerbaijan. [...] As part conflict in his Friday sermons and nian ambassador in Yerevan was 1992-1993, and initially organized of my activities as an MP from by ethnic-Azerbaijani representa- frequently expressed solidarity with Tabriz, I wrote an article about summoned by the Armenian foreign tives from the Iranian provinces, the Azerbaijani side. Iranian depu- the situation with the minister to explain the incident. ties from its majority ethnic-Azer- and denounced this convoys of supplies and other aid fact. Several other members Iran allows the publication of a baijani provinces led campaigns were sent directly from these prov- joined me. Naturally, we con- limited number of literary jour- aimed at limiting Iranian relations demn any disrespect to Islam. inces to the needy and refugees in with Armenia, openly called for A mosque is a symbol of reli- nals in the languages of its ethnic Azerbaijan. For instance, a del- Tehran’s assistance to Azerbaijan, gion and faith. The mosques in minorities. Varliq is a bilingual egation from in June Karabakh are not an exception. Azerbaijani-Persian publication and participated in demonstra- Our theologians condemn the 1992 set up a refugee center in tions against Armenia. Ethnic- desecration of mosques. produced in Tehran, and it is the Nakhchevan and Iran’s East only Azerbaijani-language journal Azerbaijan Province opened a Azerbaijani parliament mem- In addition, in several pro- that has been published since refugee camp within the ter- bers distributed petitions. In April tests, Iranian ethnic-Azerbaijanis 1993, Kamel Abedinzadeh, an eth- expressed their solidarity with the revolution in 1979. It has fre- ritory of the Republic of nic-Azerbaijani deputy from , Azerbaijan and criticized the quently published articles on the Azerbaijan in September 1993. even spoke in the Azerbaijani lan- Iranian government’s support for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, often In May 2006, mass demonstra- guage in the Iranian Majles when Armenia in the conflict. In May expressing solidarity with Azer- tions broke out in Tabriz, Tehran, he condemned Armenian actions 1992, 200 students demonstrating baijan. In spring 1994, the journal’s and other in Iran with large against Azerbaijan. He also issued at Tabriz University chanted editor, Javad Heyat, addressed an ethnic-Azerbaijani populations in press releases for publication in “Death to Armenia” and, alluding article to then Turkish President Sü- response to a caricature in an offi- Hamshahri and other Iranian jour- to Tehran, described the “silence leyman Demirel, calling on Turkey cial Iranian that equated nals on this issue. of the Muslims,” in the face of the to come to Azerbaijan’s aid. Varliq Azerbaijanis to cockroaches. Ira- ranian officials of ethnic- Armenian “criminal activities” as has frequently carried articles about nian security forces killed dozens IAzerbaijani origin and parlia- “treason to the Quran.” According Azerbaijani victims of this conflict, of protestors and arrested hun- ment members from the ethnic- to the Iranian newspaper Salam, the as well as poems written in memory dreds and many were convicted of Azerbaijani populated regions ethnic-Azerbaijani demonstrators of fallen Azerbaijani soldiers. violations and sent for long prison

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 150 151 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES sentences. During the demon- Republic of Azerbaijan and chanted according to Supreme Leader Ali None of these events—taken in strations, support for Azerbaijan “Karabakh is and will be ours.” Khamenei, “Karabakh is an Islamic their own—have been significant regaining control of the occupied Reportedly, Iranian security forces ar- land. Now I ask, what is the difference enough to change Iran’s policy on territories was also expressed. rested 29 ethnic-Azerbaijani citizens between Palestine and Karabakh?” the conflict; but through the policy In mid-January 2008, the Iranian for participation in this activity during Hezretpur also read a nationalist of arrests, it is clear the regime fears government approved the opening the soccer match. poem in the further activity. Moreover, should of an Armenian consulate in Tabriz, ashinyan’s visit to Iran in and was booed by Majlis members. wider protests against the ruling re- a city in northern Iran populated PFebruary 2019 was a trigger ost recently, Azerbaijanis gime take place, Tehran’s policy of primarily by ethnic-Azerbaijanis. for ethnic-Azerbaijanis in the Min Iran reacted to the April cooperation with Armenia will in- This decision was reportedly pro- country. During his visit, in meet- 2020 open appearance of evidence crease the incentive of Iran’s domestic tested by a petition campaign among ings with Pashinyan, the Iranian of Iran’s aid to Armenia in the occu- Azerbaijani population to protest. Azerbaijanis in Armenian commu- pied territories of Azerbaijan. While Coming to an End? Iran. Nevertheless, nity hung banners Iranian trade and cooperation with Tehran continued stating that “Kara- the Armenian occupation forces has ran’s policy on the Armenia- Azerbaijanis in Iran re- Azerbaijan conflict strongly illus- to encourage Ar- bakh is Armenia,” been taking place since the war pe- I acted to the April 2020 trates the interconnection between menia to open the and the prime min- riod, the surfacing of clips and films open appearance of evi- Iran’s foreign policy and domestic consulate. ister posted pictures verifying this cooperation spurred dence of Iran’s aid to Ar- issues. More than half of Iran’s citi- In the last two de- with these banners, public complaints from ethnic-Azer- zens are of non-Persian origin, be- cades, Iranian soccer menians in the occupied all uninhibited by baijanis in Iran and in various media. longing to ethnic groups that share matches have also territories of Azerbaijan. Pashinyan’s Iranian Some suggested blowing up the gas ties with groups in bordering states: become a venue hosts. Ethnic-Azer- pipeline to Armenia or sabotaging the Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, for frequent ex- baijanis in Iran re- bridges between Armenia and Iran, all Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghani- pression of ethnic sentiments among sponded with protests in front of the which run through areas of Iran in- stan. These groups can put pressure on ethnic-Azerbaijani fans of Tabriz’s Armenian embassy in Tehran and habited by ethnic-Azerbaijanis. Tehran’s ties with neighboring states main soccer team, Traktor Azerbaijan stuck posters on the embassy’s walls Ethnic-Azerbaijanis also called for and some of those states pay close (formerly Traktor Sazi), and of eth- stating that “Karabakh is an integral protests against Armenia in front of attention to Tehran’s policies toward nic-Azerbaijanis in Tehran. Teams part of Azerbaijan.” the Armenian embassy in Tehran and co-ethnics in Iran. This creates not and their fans from Persian-majority In an Iranian parliament session many Azerbaijani populated cities so simple policy challenges for Iran. centers also often unfurl Armenian following Pashinyan’s visit, Ruhulla in Iran in response to a July 2020 To date, the ruling regime in Tehran flags at games in attempt to incite the Hezretpur, a deputy from the ma- flare-up of conflict between Armenia has been able to weather domestic ethnic-Azerbaijani players. jority ethnic-Azerbaijani city of and Azerbaijan that led to many ca- Azerbaijani opposition to its close co- In recent years, anti-Armenian Urmia, denounced the visit and sualties. Iranian security forces ar- operation with Armenia. Continued sentiment has been expressed reg- Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani rested dozens of ethnic-Azerbaijani flare-ups in the conflict between ularly at matches. A few days after lands. He also condemned the fact activists on the eve of the planned Armenia and Azerbaijan may lead Pashinyan’s February 2019 visit to that the visit had taken place during demonstrations to preempt them. to increased domestic pressure on Iran, for instance, Traktor fans burned the anniversary of the mas- Consequently, only small numbers of Tehran to end its support for Armenia an Armenian flag during a match. sacre of Azerbaijanis in the hands of protestors managed to demonstrate. in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.BD They also waived the flag of the Armenians. He pointed out that

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