Dennis J. Dunn. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998. xii + 349 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8131-2023-2. Reviewed by Laura A. Belmonte Published on H-Pol (March, 1999) For over ffty years, historians have debated former USSR have only complicated scholarly dis‐ the legacy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. putes about FDR. While critical of Roosevelt's poli‐ While many scholars praise Roosevelt's domestic cies in Central and Eastern Europe, Edward Ben‐ policies,[1] analyses of FDR's foreign policies are nett praises FDR for defeating fascism and laying less laudatory. As early as 1947, journalists and the groundwork for an enduring postwar peace. former FDR advisors assailed Roosevelt's naivety Remi Nadeau and Amos Perlmutter, however, use in failing to counter Soviet expansionism.[2] similar Soviet sources to blast Roosevelt for sub‐ Through the late 1960s, Cold War political reali‐ mitting to the ruthless Stalin and consigning mil‐ ties compelled even defenders of FDR's wartime lions to decades of repression.[6] diplomacy to criticize his dealings with Soviet pre‐ Dennis J. Dunn's Caught Between Roosevelt mier Josef Stalin.[3] In the past twenty years, and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow more nuanced interpretations of Roosevelt's polit‐ continues this assault on Roosevelt's diplomacy. ical principles and foreign policies have ap‐ Dunn, a professor of history at Southwest Texas peared. While still critical of Roosevelt's accom‐ State University, has drawn upon Soviet, British, modation of the Soviets, these works stress the and American sources to produce a well-written enormous domestic and international constraints account of Roosevelt's policies toward the Soviet impeding FDR's diplomatic and strategic initia‐ Union and his relationships with U.S. diplomatic tives.[4] envoys in Moscow.[7] While Dunn's treatments of Despite this abundant literature, no consen‐ Eastern European politics, wartime conferences, sus on Roosevelt's foreign policy has emerged. In and American diplomats are thoughtful and per‐ the late 1980s, Frederick Marks and Robert Nisbet suasive, his analysis of FDR is often unfair. Care‐ released scathing critiques of Roosevelt's charac‐ less use of secondary literature, unsupported ter and attempts to cooperation with the Soviet claims, and omissions of newer approaches to for‐ Union.[5] Recently-released documents from the eign policy also weaken Dunn's argument. H-Net Reviews Throughout the text, Dunn views Roosevelt's poli‐ other Americans who visited Stalinist Russia (p. cies through the prism of the Cold War rather xiii). One gains no sense of how U.S. journalists, than assessing them within their own historical workers, businesspeople, or tourists viewed the context. USSR. Did the impressions of these individuals dif‐ The book is organized into fve parts. Each fer from those of the American diplomatic core? section examines the relationship between Roo‐ Did their opinions affect U.S. foreign policy? Dunn sevelt and an American ambassador to Moscow: leaves such questions unanswered.[9] William Bullitt (1933-36); Joseph E. Davies Dunn frames his analysis with a clash be‐ (1936-38); Laurence A. Steinhardt (1939-41); tween "Rooseveltians" and "Traditionalists." Roo‐ William C. Standley (1942-43); and W. Averell Har‐ seveltians accepted Wilsonian tenets of democra‐ riman (1943-1946). Dunn also includes material cy, human rights, self-determination, and collec‐ on chief diplomatic advisors including George F. tive security, but they "added a revolutionary and Kennan, Loy Henderson, Charles Bohlen, and paradoxical twist to Wilsonianism when dealing Philip Faymonville. In the preface, Dunn briefly with the Soviet Union." Adopting the "pseudopro‐ surveys the historiography on FDR's foreign poli‐ found theory of convergence," Rooseveltians cy. He disputes notions that Roosevelt's deteriorat‐ claimed that the Soviet Union "was moving in‐ ing health prompted him to appease Stalin. He eluctably toward democracy" (pp. 3-4). The author challenges those who argue that the imperative of alleges that "moral relativism" prompted Roo‐ defeating Nazi Germany overshadowed America's sevelt to mislead the American public and ignore wartime relationship with the USSR. Dismissing his foreign policy advisors in order to prove that the idea that Roosevelt was merely naive, Dunn Stalin was an evolving democrat, not "a genocidal asserts that FDR actively and consciously courted megalomaniac guided by the higher power of rev‐ the "evil" Stalin (pp. ix-x). olutionary inevitability ..." (p. 4, 6). Dunn accords special significance to the U.S. In contrast, "Traditionalists" rejected the theo‐ Embassy in Moscow. Ambassadors in this post, ry of convergence. Although they shared Roo‐ Dunn claims, did far more than their colleagues sevelt's hope of improved U.S.-Soviet relations, elsewhere. Their "stature and independence of they viewed Stalin as "a murderer, a liar, and a vi‐ mind allowed them to go beyond policy execution cious opponent of the United States and of plural‐ and political reporting to actually affect [sic] poli‐ ism generally." Imbued with "absolute morality," cy ..." (p. xi). The implication is that other ambas‐ Traditionalists wanted Roosevelt to compel the So‐ sadors achieved little--an assertion belied by the viets to adopt democracy and "the minimum stan‐ experiences of Josephus Daniels and Sumner dards of moral behavior that were outlined in the Welles, among others. FDR's ambassadors to Mex‐ world's principal religions and moral codes." ico and Cuba respectively, both Daniels and These pleas, however, went unheeded as Roo‐ Welles instituted substantial changes in their pre‐ sevelt remained intent on pursuing "his policy of decessors' policies. uncritical friendship toward Stalin" (pp. 8-9). By focusing mainly on ambassadors, Dunn Such Manichean constructs demonstrate the obscures the importance of other participants in lack of subtlety marring Dunn's narrative. The foreign relations. He does not examine the role of book's overriding theme is that Roosevelt was im‐ mid-level bureaucrats in the implementation of moral --a rather disturbing and inaccurate allega‐ foreign policy.[8] In addition to distorting the rela‐ tion that does not square with many of FDR's do‐ tive importance of U.S. high-level diplomats in mestic policies. Because Dunn does not address Moscow, Dunn also excludes the perspectives of Roosevelt's attempts to alleviate the Great Depres‐ 2 H-Net Reviews sion, one gains little sense of the esteem in which an imminent Soviet democracy. In 1934, Bullitt large sectors of the U.S. population held FDR. and his new staff hoped to resolve quickly con‐ Americans who placed their portraits of Roosevelt flicts over debts, housing for diplomats, money ex‐ alongside pictures of Christ will not recognize the changes, and restrictions on air travel. But the So‐ Roosevelt portrayed here. viets rudely dismissed Bullitt's overtures. Dumb‐ Dunn is on more solid ground when tracing founded, Bullitt searched for explanations and f‐ the events in U.S.-Soviet relations. After briefly de‐ nally blamed Commissar of Foreign Affairs Max‐ scribing the aftermath of World War I and the on‐ im Litvinov. Dunn writes, "Bullitt suspected that set of the Great Depression, Dunn explores Roo‐ Litvinov's Jewishness made him obstinate. He sevelt's decision to pursue diplomatic recognition similarly viewed the head of press relations for of the USSR. In 1933, an exploratory committee the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Constantine Ouman‐ recommended that America recognize the Soviet sky, who was also Jewish and who eventually took Union only if the Soviets frst agreed to a number Alexander Troyanovsky's place as Soviet ambas‐ of conditions including compensation for default‐ sador in Washington in 1939" (p. 43). ed loans and expropriated property, cessation of Lest one get the impression that only Ameri‐ communist propaganda activities in the United cans voiced anti-Semitic complaints, Dunn later States, and guaranteed civil and religious rights includes a Soviet evaluation of U.S. Ambassador for Americans residing in the USSR. Significantly, Laurence Steinhardt as "a wealthy, bourgeoisie the committee did not comment upon the Ukrani‐ Jew ... permeated with the foul smell of Zionism" an purges. But Roosevelt, hoping to foster eco‐ (p. 107). Racism also factored into U.S.-Soviet rela‐ nomic opportunities and to stymie Japanese ag‐ tions. Remarking upon the "Oriental" racial make‐ gression, did not insist that the Soviets comply up of the Soviet authorities, Steinhardt wrote, with the committee's recommendations prior to "They are utterly indifferent to outside opinion recognition. On November 16, 1933, Roosevelt es‐ and do not follow the lines of reasoning of the tablished relations with the Soviet Union. He left west. Their standards of ethics are diametrically resolution of outstanding Soviet-American con‐ the opposite of those which prevail in occidental flicts to his new Moscow-based diplomats (pp. countries. As a result it is impossible to deal with 1-37). them as one would deal with westerners (p. 106). Dunn asserts that Roosevelt was entranced by Amazingly, Dunn does not analyze these Stalin and consistently overlooked the Soviets' ab‐ provocative statements. Throughout the text, he horrent human rights violations. But even Dunn's consistently fails to assess how cultural assump‐ "moral" Traditionalists engaged in this myopia. tions and distortions affected American-Soviet re‐ The author does not explore the fact that the com‐ lations. One is left wondering how factors of race, mittee overlooking the Ukranian purges included gender, religion, and culture influenced U.S. per‐ Robert Kelley, the head of the State Department's ceptions of the Soviets. Dunn also could have ex‐ East European Division. The notoriously anti-Sovi‐ amined the provincialism imbued in the ambas‐ et Kelley trained most of the "Traditionalist" Sovi‐ sadors' assumption that they could recreate their et specialists for whom Dunn evinces such admi‐ comfortable American lifestyles in the USSR.