Dennis J. Dunn. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998. xii + 349 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8131-2023-2.
Reviewed by Laura A. Belmonte
Published on H-Pol (March, 1999)
For over ffty years, historians have debated former USSR have only complicated scholarly dis‐ the legacy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. putes about FDR. While critical of Roosevelt's poli‐ While many scholars praise Roosevelt's domestic cies in Central and Eastern Europe, Edward Ben‐ policies,[1] analyses of FDR's foreign policies are nett praises FDR for defeating fascism and laying less laudatory. As early as 1947, journalists and the groundwork for an enduring postwar peace. former FDR advisors assailed Roosevelt's naivety Remi Nadeau and Amos Perlmutter, however, use in failing to counter Soviet expansionism.[2] similar Soviet sources to blast Roosevelt for sub‐ Through the late 1960s, Cold War political reali‐ mitting to the ruthless Stalin and consigning mil‐ ties compelled even defenders of FDR's wartime lions to decades of repression.[6] diplomacy to criticize his dealings with Soviet pre‐ Dennis J. Dunn's Caught Between Roosevelt mier Josef Stalin.[3] In the past twenty years, and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow more nuanced interpretations of Roosevelt's polit‐ continues this assault on Roosevelt's diplomacy. ical principles and foreign policies have ap‐ Dunn, a professor of history at Southwest Texas peared. While still critical of Roosevelt's accom‐ State University, has drawn upon Soviet, British, modation of the Soviets, these works stress the and American sources to produce a well-written enormous domestic and international constraints account of Roosevelt's policies toward the Soviet impeding FDR's diplomatic and strategic initia‐ Union and his relationships with U.S. diplomatic tives.[4] envoys in Moscow.[7] While Dunn's treatments of Despite this abundant literature, no consen‐ Eastern European politics, wartime conferences, sus on Roosevelt's foreign policy has emerged. In and American diplomats are thoughtful and per‐ the late 1980s, Frederick Marks and Robert Nisbet suasive, his analysis of FDR is often unfair. Care‐ released scathing critiques of Roosevelt's charac‐ less use of secondary literature, unsupported ter and attempts to cooperation with the Soviet claims, and omissions of newer approaches to for‐ Union.[5] Recently-released documents from the eign policy also weaken Dunn's argument. H-Net Reviews
Throughout the text, Dunn views Roosevelt's poli‐ other Americans who visited Stalinist Russia (p. cies through the prism of the Cold War rather xiii). One gains no sense of how U.S. journalists, than assessing them within their own historical workers, businesspeople, or tourists viewed the context. USSR. Did the impressions of these individuals dif‐ The book is organized into fve parts. Each fer from those of the American diplomatic core? section examines the relationship between Roo‐ Did their opinions afect U.S. foreign policy? Dunn sevelt and an American ambassador to Moscow: leaves such questions unanswered.[9] William Bullitt (1933-36); Joseph E. Davies Dunn frames his analysis with a clash be‐ (1936-38); Laurence A. Steinhardt (1939-41); tween "Rooseveltians" and "Traditionalists." Roo‐ William C. Standley (1942-43); and W. Averell Har‐ seveltians accepted Wilsonian tenets of democra‐ riman (1943-1946). Dunn also includes material cy, human rights, self-determination, and collec‐ on chief diplomatic advisors including George F. tive security, but they "added a revolutionary and Kennan, Loy Henderson, Charles Bohlen, and paradoxical twist to Wilsonianism when dealing Philip Faymonville. In the preface, Dunn briefy with the Soviet Union." Adopting the "pseudopro‐ surveys the historiography on FDR's foreign poli‐ found theory of convergence," Rooseveltians cy. He disputes notions that Roosevelt's deteriorat‐ claimed that the Soviet Union "was moving in‐ ing health prompted him to appease Stalin. He eluctably toward democracy" (pp. 3-4). The author challenges those who argue that the imperative of alleges that "moral relativism" prompted Roo‐ defeating Nazi Germany overshadowed America's sevelt to mislead the American public and ignore wartime relationship with the USSR. Dismissing his foreign policy advisors in order to prove that the idea that Roosevelt was merely naive, Dunn Stalin was an evolving democrat, not "a genocidal asserts that FDR actively and consciously courted megalomaniac guided by the higher power of rev‐ the "evil" Stalin (pp. ix-x). olutionary inevitability ..." (p. 4, 6). Dunn accords special signifcance to the U.S. In contrast, "Traditionalists" rejected the theo‐ Embassy in Moscow. Ambassadors in this post, ry of convergence. Although they shared Roo‐ Dunn claims, did far more than their colleagues sevelt's hope of improved U.S.-Soviet relations, elsewhere. Their "stature and independence of they viewed Stalin as "a murderer, a liar, and a vi‐ mind allowed them to go beyond policy execution cious opponent of the United States and of plural‐ and political reporting to actually afect [sic] poli‐ ism generally." Imbued with "absolute morality," cy ..." (p. xi). The implication is that other ambas‐ Traditionalists wanted Roosevelt to compel the So‐ sadors achieved little--an assertion belied by the viets to adopt democracy and "the minimum stan‐ experiences of Josephus Daniels and Sumner dards of moral behavior that were outlined in the Welles, among others. FDR's ambassadors to Mex‐ world's principal religions and moral codes." ico and Cuba respectively, both Daniels and These pleas, however, went unheeded as Roo‐ Welles instituted substantial changes in their pre‐ sevelt remained intent on pursuing "his policy of decessors' policies. uncritical friendship toward Stalin" (pp. 8-9). By focusing mainly on ambassadors, Dunn Such Manichean constructs demonstrate the obscures the importance of other participants in lack of subtlety marring Dunn's narrative. The foreign relations. He does not examine the role of book's overriding theme is that Roosevelt was im‐ mid-level bureaucrats in the implementation of moral --a rather disturbing and inaccurate allega‐ foreign policy.[8] In addition to distorting the rela‐ tion that does not square with many of FDR's do‐ tive importance of U.S. high-level diplomats in mestic policies. Because Dunn does not address Moscow, Dunn also excludes the perspectives of Roosevelt's attempts to alleviate the Great Depres‐
2 H-Net Reviews sion, one gains little sense of the esteem in which an imminent Soviet democracy. In 1934, Bullitt large sectors of the U.S. population held FDR. and his new staf hoped to resolve quickly con‐ Americans who placed their portraits of Roosevelt ficts over debts, housing for diplomats, money ex‐ alongside pictures of Christ will not recognize the changes, and restrictions on air travel. But the So‐ Roosevelt portrayed here. viets rudely dismissed Bullitt's overtures. Dumb‐ Dunn is on more solid ground when tracing founded, Bullitt searched for explanations and f‐ the events in U.S.-Soviet relations. After briefy de‐ nally blamed Commissar of Foreign Afairs Max‐ scribing the aftermath of World War I and the on‐ im Litvinov. Dunn writes, "Bullitt suspected that set of the Great Depression, Dunn explores Roo‐ Litvinov's Jewishness made him obstinate. He sevelt's decision to pursue diplomatic recognition similarly viewed the head of press relations for of the USSR. In 1933, an exploratory committee the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Constantine Ouman‐ recommended that America recognize the Soviet sky, who was also Jewish and who eventually took Union only if the Soviets frst agreed to a number Alexander Troyanovsky's place as Soviet ambas‐ of conditions including compensation for default‐ sador in Washington in 1939" (p. 43). ed loans and expropriated property, cessation of Lest one get the impression that only Ameri‐ communist propaganda activities in the United cans voiced anti-Semitic complaints, Dunn later States, and guaranteed civil and religious rights includes a Soviet evaluation of U.S. Ambassador for Americans residing in the USSR. Signifcantly, Laurence Steinhardt as "a wealthy, bourgeoisie the committee did not comment upon the Ukrani‐ Jew ... permeated with the foul smell of Zionism" an purges. But Roosevelt, hoping to foster eco‐ (p. 107). Racism also factored into U.S.-Soviet rela‐ nomic opportunities and to stymie Japanese ag‐ tions. Remarking upon the "Oriental" racial make‐ gression, did not insist that the Soviets comply up of the Soviet authorities, Steinhardt wrote, with the committee's recommendations prior to "They are utterly indiferent to outside opinion recognition. On November 16, 1933, Roosevelt es‐ and do not follow the lines of reasoning of the tablished relations with the Soviet Union. He left west. Their standards of ethics are diametrically resolution of outstanding Soviet-American con‐ the opposite of those which prevail in occidental ficts to his new Moscow-based diplomats (pp. countries. As a result it is impossible to deal with 1-37). them as one would deal with westerners (p. 106). Dunn asserts that Roosevelt was entranced by Amazingly, Dunn does not analyze these Stalin and consistently overlooked the Soviets' ab‐ provocative statements. Throughout the text, he horrent human rights violations. But even Dunn's consistently fails to assess how cultural assump‐ "moral" Traditionalists engaged in this myopia. tions and distortions afected American-Soviet re‐ The author does not explore the fact that the com‐ lations. One is left wondering how factors of race, mittee overlooking the Ukranian purges included gender, religion, and culture infuenced U.S. per‐ Robert Kelley, the head of the State Department's ceptions of the Soviets. Dunn also could have ex‐ East European Division. The notoriously anti-Sovi‐ amined the provincialism imbued in the ambas‐ et Kelley trained most of the "Traditionalist" Sovi‐ sadors' assumption that they could recreate their et specialists for whom Dunn evinces such admi‐ comfortable American lifestyles in the USSR. In‐ ration. Kelley's apparent willingness to overlook corporation of material on cultural transmission the Stalinist purges suggests that Roosevelt was and receptivity would have greatly enriched not alone in placing political expediency over Dunn's work.[11] morality.[10] William C. Bullitt, America's frst am‐ Politics, not culture, remains Dunn's focus. Af‐ bassador to Moscow, shared Roosevelt's belief in ter the resumption of the purges in 1935 and the
3 H-Net Reviews announcement of the Popular Front strategy, Bul‐ Roosevelt, Davies "simply refused to criticize, litt grew disillusioned with the Soviet system. Con‐ challenge, or confront the Kremlin" (p. 75). He ig‐ vinced that cooperation with Stalin was now im‐ nored police harassment of the local diplomatic possible, Bullitt pushed Roosevelt to adopt a quid community. He did not press for resolution of the pro quo attitude toward the Soviets. When Roo‐ debt issue and other fnancial conficts. Davies sevelt ignored his pleas, Bullitt resigned and nev‐ and Faymonville even insisted that the purge tri‐ er returned to the Soviet Union (pp. 48-58). als were fair and justifed persecutions of traitors Roosevelt found Joseph E. Davies, Bullitt's suc‐ and conspirators. Unlike Bullitt, Davies did not re‐ cessor, a much more suitable envoy to the Soviets. sign out of disgust with Stalinism. Davies depart‐ Dunn nicely evokes the Soviets' perceptions of ed because of his wife's displeasure at the dismal Davies and his wealthy wife Marjorie Merri‐ living conditions in Moscow. Davies would be the weather Post Davies, the heiress to the General only one of FDR's ambassadors to Moscow who Foods fortune. "For the Soviet leaders Davies and unconditionally supported Roosevelt's accommo‐ his rich wife were quintessential capitalists-- dating policies toward Stalin. Distracted by the greedy, hypocritical, narcissistic, indiferent to hu‐ rise of Hitler and convinced that U.S.-Soviet rela‐ man sufering and need inclined to measure life tions were in fne shape, Roosevelt spent months by ledgers, and, above all, naive about the revolu‐ fnding a successor for Davies. In August 1939, al‐ tionary direction of society" (p. 62). Dunn is much most a year after Davies's resignation, Laurence more successful in portraying how class and polit‐ A. Steinhardt reached the USSR. ical diferences infuenced Soviet-American rela‐ Almost immediately, Steinhardt learned of the tions than he is examining race, gender, culture, secret territorial agreements in the Nazi-Soviet or religion. Pact. Roosevelt apparently did not know that When Dunn describes how the Davies cruised Steinhardt rejected the theory of convergence. their yacht in the Gulf of Finland, went on shop‐ When Steinhardt began denouncing Stalin's du‐ ping sprees throughout Europe, and hoarded Rus‐ plicity and the shabby treatment of the American sian art, one easily sees why the Soviets resented delegation in Moscow, Roosevelt initially ignored American diplomats. But, in Stalin's eyes, Davies's him. With the world in crisis, the president was in fawning attitude made up for his capitalist stu‐ no hurry to complicate his relationship with his pidities. For the same reason, Roosevelt admired new ambassador. But Steinhardt persisted. He Davies. Davies, according to Dunn, was "every‐ complained about potholed roads, gas shortages, thing Stalin wanted in a foreign representative and police surveillance. short of being an actual spy. He was also the per‐ Throughout Caught Between Roosevelt and fect person from FDR's point of view" (p. 65). De‐ Stalin, Dunn includes wonderful depictions of the termined to have diplomats who shared his posi‐ deplorable living conditions endured by Ameri‐ tive appraisal of the Soviets, Roosevelt and Davies can diplomats in Moscow. These descriptions and removed George F. Kennan from the Moscow em‐ his excellent biographical sketches of each ambas‐ bassy and tried to isolate the anti-Soviet contin‐ sador are among the strongest elements of Dunn's gent in the State Department (p. 68). book. Repeatedly, Dunn demonstrates how each Such tactics did not endear Davies to the Sovi‐ ambassadorial appointee's excitement at receipt et experts remaining in the Moscow embassy. Iso‐ of the "prestigious" Moscow post dissipated upon lated, Davies relied on the pro-Soviet military aide grasping the realities of life in Moscow. Philip Faymonville, foreign reporters, and short- Steinhardt's experience refects this trend. Af‐ wave radio broadcasts. Determined to support ter receiving opened personal mail, Steinhardt be‐
4 H-Net Reviews gan calling for the State Department to treat the Soviets' continued refusal to share military infor‐ Soviet delegation in Washington as poorly as the mation. The State Department fnally removed the American contingent in Moscow was treated. Ei‐ irritating Faymonville and the Soviets publicly ac‐ ther oblivious to or ignoring Roosevelt's reaction knowledged American charitable help (pp. to Bullitt's demand for a reciprocal American-So‐ 175-80). viet partnership, Steinhardt began to press for a Cheered by this minor victory, Standley con‐ harder line against the Soviets. But the president tinued pressuring the Soviets and abandoned his ignored Steinhardt's demands. Even after the So‐ support of unconditional aid. He pushed for the viets invaded Poland, the Baltic States, and Fin‐ release of the interned American pilots and called land, Roosevelt's resisted demands for harsh U.S. for Finnish independence. Confronted by yet an‐ sanctions against the USSR. As FDR embarked on other ambassador criticizing his policies toward a public relations blitz to sell the Soviets as proto- the USSR, Roosevelt dispatched the always reli‐ democrats, Steinhardt lost infuence. In Novem‐ able Davies to Moscow. Disgusted, Standley re‐ ber 1941, he resigned. signed. William H. Standley, Steinhardt's successor, W. Averell Harriman also found the role of attempted to resolve conficts over Lend-Lease U.S. Ambassador to the USSR a trying one. Harri‐ aid, to obtain the release of American pilots who man proved unable to persuade Stalin to meet landed in Siberia after bombing Japan, and to im‐ privately with FDR. He watched in dismay as the prove the exchange of military and technical in‐ Soviets consolidated their hold on the Baltic States formation between the Americans and the Sovi‐ and began moving into Eastern Europe. By late ets. Movement of the seat of government to Kuiby‐ 1944, Harriman shared George F. Kennan's belief shev, an isolated city 500 miles east of Moscow, that the United States should check Soviet expan‐ worsened the already-abysmal living conditions sionism. When even the Soviets' abandonment of the diplomatic community endured. Nonetheless, Polish Home Army did not compel Roosevelt to Standley remained an advocate of unconditional get tough with Stalin, Harriman held out the faint aid to the Soviets and attempted to make headway hope that postwar reconstruction aid and the on unresolved issues (pp. 150-56). United Nations could control Soviet behavior. By Following American entry into the war, Stan‐ January 1946, the depressing reality of Soviet dley found himself stonewalled by both the Sovi‐ domination of Eastern Europe shattered Harri‐ ets and Roosevelt. Lend-Lease aid proved particu‐ man's last illusions. He left Moscow in January larly troublesome. While requesting enormous 1946 (pp. 210-59). amounts of equipment, the Soviets refused to pro‐ Dunn concludes that Roosevelt erred in ignor‐ vide information about its use. The U.S. supervi‐ ing the warnings of his anti-Stalinist ambas‐ sor of the Soviet Lend-Lease program, Colonel sadors. Had Roosevelt done so, Dunn believes the Faymonville, did not help matters by freely shar‐ United States could have stopped or prevented So‐ ing intelligence with the Soviets. Unable to control viet domination of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, either the Soviets or Faymonville, Standley lashed Roosevelt could have persuaded the American out publicly. On March 8, 1943, Standley told re‐ people to make World War II in a crusade against porters of his irritation at the ingratitude shown "all inhuman ideologies" (p. 271). Instead, Dunn by the Soviets for Lend-Lease materiel and pri‐ concludes, Roosevelt's alliance with Stalin "cheat‐ vate relief aid. He blasted the Soviets for creating ed the American war of a democratic vision" (p. the impression that they were fghting alone and 270). without foreign assistance. He also criticized the
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I fnd these allegations particularly troubling. dimensions of U.S. wartime diplomacy and post‐ Earlier in the text, Dunn asserts that the Soviet- war planning.[12] Dunn's examination of the deci‐ American partnership "undercut the Roosevelt's sion to exclude the Soviets from the Manhattan proclaimed goals in fghting the war. The Four Project is underdeveloped. Decolonization, Anglo- Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter seemed to be American tensions, and mobilization also receive empty words after the Soviet Union became an little attention. American ally" (p. 157). Given that the United The author consistently ignores issues beyond States and Britain forged the Atlantic Charter the parameters of the U.S.-USSR partnership and alone and prior to joining forces with the Soviets, engages in conjecture. Stalin, Dunn claims, this charge is particularly mean-spirited. One "would have been minimally satisfed with con‐ does not even have to be a Roosevelt apologist to trolling eastern Poland, the Baltic States, the disagree with Dunn. One could point to the exis‐ Finnish lands that he annexed after the Winter tence of racial segregation in the United States War, and the Romanian regions of Bessarabia and and British colonialism as evidence that the At‐ northern Bokovina. The rest of East Central Eu‐ lantic Charter was already hollow--the Soviet- rope could theoretically have been free of Stalin‐ American alliance notwithstanding. Whatever the ism by prior agreement" (p. 136). Similarly, Dunn hypocrisy imbued in the Atlantic Charter, most contends, "Stalinism might have been contained, Americans were committed to defeating Hitler, and possibly with no extension of the Soviet em‐ Mussolini, and Tojo. Having evinced little interest pire into East Europe as justifcation for its legiti‐ in either the Stalinist purges or Hitler's atrocities macy and as a reward for the sacrifces of the Rus‐ against the Jews throughout the 1930s, it is unlike‐ sian people, it would collapsed in the Soviet Union ly that the American public would have waged much earlier than when it fnally did in the war to rid the world of all democracy's foes. 1990s" (p. 196). Given how freely the Big Three in‐ Dunn's suggestion that they would have leapt at terpreted wartime deals, Dunn's speculation is un‐ the chance to do so is wishful thinking. persuasive.[13] Furthermore, such sweeping In the end, Dunn's arguments are only par‐ proclamations refect Cold War triumphalism and tially convincing. While I do not think that the presentism, not objectivity and sound methodolo‐ United States could have prevented Soviet domi‐ gy. nation of Eastern Europe, I accept Dunn's con‐ A fnal quibble is Dunn's occasionally careless tention that American inaction enabled Stalin to use of secondary literature. One glaring example gain additional territory and to retain disputed is his citation of Roy Cohn's biography of Joseph territories. Dunn's analyses of Eastern and Central McCarthy to support the claim that Henry Dexter European politics and the regions' wartime expe‐ White was a Soviet spy. Surely, Dunn could have riences are top-notch. His treatment of the com‐ used a less-biased source (FN 75, p. 320). The plicated Polish issue is outstanding. His narratives omission of references to secondary literature of the various diplomatic conferences and battles about George F. Kennan is also notable. over the opening of the second front are also per‐ In summation, Dunn's Caught Between Roo‐ suasive and cogent. sevelt and Stalin is a mixed bag. While its Dunn's work is less successful as an assess‐ strengths make it a worthwhile addition to Roo‐ ment of Roosevelt's foreign policy. He underesti‐ sevelt historiography, its weaknesses ensure that mates the impact of the Great Depression on this analysis will not be the last word. American diplomacy. He downplays the global di‐ Notes: mensions of World War II. He omits the economic
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[1]. The literature on Franklin D. Roosevelt is 1991); John Lamberton Harper, American Visions enormous. For positive appraisals, see William M. of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Ken‐ Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New nan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge: Cam‐ Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); bridge University Press, 1994), 7-131; and Warren Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Age of Roosevelt 3 F. Kimball, Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, vols.., (Boston: Houghton Mifin, 1957-60); James and the Second World War (New York: William MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Morrow & Company, 1997). Fox (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956); and Frank [5]. Frederick W. Marks, III, Wind Over Sand: Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt 4 vols., (Boston: Lit‐ The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens: tle-Brown, 1952). University of Georgia Press, 1988); Robert Nisbet, [2]. John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: the Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship (New Story of Our Eforts at Wartime Co-Operation York: Simon & Schuster, 1989). with Russia (New York: The Viking Press, 1947); [6]. Edward Bennett, Franklin D. Roosevelt William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Rela‐ the Peace," Life 25 (30 August 1948); and Hanson tions, 1939-1945 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Re‐ W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (London: sources, 1990); Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, A. Redman, 1950). and Roosevelt Divide Europe (New York: Praeger, [3]. See, for example, Herbert Feis, Churchill, 1990); and Amos Perlmutter, FDR & Stalin: A Not Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the So Grand Alliance, 1943-1945 (Columbia: Universi‐ Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton Universi‐ ty of Missouri Press, 1993). ty Press, 1957); Gaddis Smith, American Diploma‐ [7]. Dunn cites documentation from several cy during the Second World War, 1941-45, 1st ed. major archives including the Library of Congress, (New York: Wiley, 1965); and Robert A. Divine, the Public Record Ofce, the Archive of Foreign Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Johns Afairs (Moscow), the National Archives, the FDR Hopkins Press, 1969). For an excellent examina‐ Library, records of the Comintern and the Second tion of this historiography, see Mark A. Stoller, "A World War, and the Russian Center for the Preser‐ Half-Century of Confict: Interpretations of U.S. vation and Study of Contemporary Historical Doc‐ World War II Diplomacy," in America in the uments (Moscow). World: The Historiography of American Foreign [8]. See J. Garry Cliford, "Bureaucratic Poli‐ Relations Since 1941 ed. J. Michael Hogan, (Cam‐ tics" in Explaining the History of American For‐ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), eign Relations eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas 165-205. Paterson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University [4]. Robert Dalleck, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Press, 1991), 141-150; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: "Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art: Culture, Oxford University Press, 1979); John Lewis Gad‐ Propaganda, and the Neue Zeitung in Germany, dis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Ap‐ 1944-1947," Diplomatic History 23 (Winter 1999): praisal of Postwar American National Security 21-43. Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), [9]. For a broader interpretation of U.S.-Soviet 3-16; Gaddis Smith, American Wartime Diplomacy relations, see Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: during the Second World War, 1941-1945 2nd ed., Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); Warren F. Kim‐ Union, China, and Cuba (Lanham, MD: University ball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Press of America, 1991); Peter G. Filene, Ameri‐ Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, cans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933 (Cam‐
7 H-Net Reviews bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); 1941-1971 (Austin: University of Texas Press, Sylvia R. Marguilies, The Pilgrimage to Russia: 1975). The Soviet Union and the Treatment of Foreigners, [13]. The Yalta Accords are an excellent exam‐ 1924-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin ple. See Melvyn P. Lefer, "Adherence to Agree‐ Press, 1968); David Engerman, "America, Russia, ments: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold and the Romance of Economic Development" War." International Security 11 (Summer 1986): (U.C. Berkeley, Ph.D.diss., 1998). 88-123. [10]. On Robert Kelley and other U.S. special‐ This review was commissioned for H-Pol by ists on the Soviets, see Hugh De Santis, The Diplo‐ Lex Renda
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Citation: Laura A. Belmonte. Review of Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow. H-Pol, H-Net Reviews. March, 1999.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=2924
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