What Turkey's Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations

What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations By Max Hoffman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz July 31, 2018 Te July 9 swearing-in of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for his second term as Turkey’s president#and his subsequent decree1 thoroughly restructuring the Turkish government# have inaugurated a new phase in the country’s political history. Erdoğan will preside over a new system in which power is even more centralized in the ofce of the presi- dency than it was previously. Of course, this structure represents the institutionalization of what had been a de facto reality: Erdoğan was already the unassailable top decision- maker, and he will remain so. Tis continuity means that there may be litle visible change in many areas of government. But the shif is emblematic of Turkey’s transformation over the last decade from an institutional, bureaucratic state into a highly personalized one. Tis personaliza- tion will afect Turkey’s foreign policy management, which may become even more unpredictable than it was before, with ramifcations for U.S. and EU policy. As just one element of this change, Western diplomats may fnd that long-time Turkish diplomatic or military contacts have diminished authority and responsibility as foreign and security policy development is centralized in the presidential palace.2 Given his complete personal control, it is time to take seriously President Erdoğan’s apparent desire for Turkey to chart a more independent course, one that shows less deference to the ties that have long bound Turkey to the Western security architecture. During the swearing-in ceremony in Ankara, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro hailed his Turkish counterpart as the “leader of the new multi-polar world.”3 Erdoğan and his advisers certainly share this view: Tey believe that the United States is in decline, that the world is fundamentally multipolar, and that Turkey deserves to be a center of gravity in its own right.4 Tey further feel that the West is hypocritical in its espousal of democratic values and human rights. Terefore, they have concluded that Turkey’s traditional, Western-oriented foreign policy is obsolete.5 Tis worldview has led Erdoğan to adopt a transactional approach toward the United States and Europe and cultivate ties with Iran, China, and#especially#Russia.6 1 Center for American Progress | What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations Alongside this understanding of a changing world, President Erdoğan has built his domestic political legitimacy on an aggressive nationalism that includes at its core deeply anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric.7 Tis was on full display in Erdoğan’s recent electoral campaign, which relied heavily on anti-Western resentment, conspirato- rial thinking, and the cultivation of a sense of national threat#all staples of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) politics in recent years. Meanwhile, the election empowered the extreme nationalists of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Tis will only reinforce the negative trends in the government’s political orientation, given the MHP’s deep suspicion toward the United States and hostility toward any reopening of dialogue with Kurdish populations in eastern Turkey and northern Syria. Tis issue brief considers the ramifcations of these changes for U.S. policy, providing recommendations for how the U.S. government should approach bilateral relations with Turkey in the months ahead. It is a policy designed to maintain the viability of U.S.- Turkish relations while seeking to restore Turkish respect for U.S. interests. The effects of Turkish nationalism on U.S. policy Previously, U.S. policy sought to weather turbulent periods in U.S-Turkish relations by investing in institutional ties between the two governments. President Erdoğan’s complete control over the Turkish state means that once-authoritative institutions have been vastly weakened, while Erdoğan himself is the source of much of the bilateral tension. In the absence of strong institutions, Erdoğan’s worldview and perceived domestic political imperatives are decisive; these instincts and pressures, along with the well-documented policy disagreements of the last fve years,8 have led him toward confrontation with the United States and Europe. Te main stresses on relations between the United States and Turkey are well-known. Washington is angered by Turkey’s planned purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system; its drif toward authoritarianism; and the arbitrary arrests of American citizens and local employees of U.S. consulates in Turkey. Meanwhile, Ankara is angered by ongoing U.S. support for the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia and the presence in the United States of Fethullah Gülen, a religious leader and former Erdoğan ally now accused of orchestrating the 2016 military coup atempt. Even if Turkey were to release its most prominent political prisoner, American citizen Andrew Brunson#as some continue to believe is a near-term possibility#there is litle reason for optimism on the other subjects.9 American policymakers have long sought to adjudicate these issues through traditional government contacts, with some feeling that limited concessions will placate Turkey. Tis approach is increasingly outdated, because the problems are rooted in Turkey’s domestic political transformation rather than in the discrete bilateral issues outlined 2 Center for American Progress | What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations above. Te aggressive nationalist strain that has emerged#assiduously cultivated by Erdoğan#is pushing the Turkish government toward confrontation rather than toward conciliation. Te AKP’s political interests are served by rhetorical atacks on the United States; geopolitical hedging with Russia and other non-Western powers; and an aggres- sively anti-Kurdish security policy both at home and in Syria.10 Tis structural dynamic is unlikely to change in the midterm. Te recent election results are likely to strengthen these tendencies, having afrmed to Erdoğan the nationalist mood of the elector- ate. Even if Erdoğan were inclined toward greater pragmatism on Kurdish issues, the MHP#and the nationalist right, more broadly#would likely have enough political leverage to sink any such initiative. Tese domestic political imperatives leave litle room for rapprochement. Recommendations for the U.S. administration and Congress On a basic level, it remains clear that U.S.-Turkish relations are not likely to improve signifcantly unless the later halts and reverses its drif toward authoritarianism, however unlikely that may be. Te functional end of competitive politics in Turkey has transformed Western perceptions of that country as a fellow democracy. Still, the United States has very limited ability to shape Turkey’s domestic course, and the Trump administration is unlikely to prioritize human rights and democracy in Turkey. Nevertheless, this section ofers recommendations as to how the U.S. government can realistically approach bilateral ties in President Erdoğan’s second term. Tis approach focuses on rebalancing bilateral relations and beginning to insulate the Western security architecture from a potential worst-case scenario; it would be imprudent not to prepare for a potential rupture in relations with Turkey. Re-establish balance in bilateral security ties It is time for Washington to try a new approach in U.S.-Turkish relations. For several years, Turkey has pursued a more independent and, increasingly, militarily aggressive foreign policy at odds with the interests of its Western allies#while continuing to enjoy the benefts of NATO membership in terms of know-how, technology, protection, and prestige. Te centerpiece of this more independent line has been the cultivation of closer ties with Moscow.11 Te military aggressiveness, meanwhile, has been in evidence along Turkey’s volatile southern border, with multiple large-scale, long-term ground incursions into Syria and Iraq and a violent crackdown on Kurdish insurgents in south- eastern Turkey.12 Indeed, the longevity of Turkey’s military presence in both its southern neighbors#as well as the nonmilitary government infrastructure it is building in Syria#could be fash- points for future confict. Turkey might even request NATO support were Syria, Iran, 3 Center for American Progress | What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations or Russia to atack its forces in Syria or Iraq, though it could have litle hope of receiving such support for unilateral operations taken outside its borders. For the sake of long- term bilateral ties, NATO cohesion, and regional security, the United States should try to halt this trend toward military and foreign policy assertiveness. Atempts at conciliation and concession are not working, so the United States should determinedly pursue its interests and hedge against continued Turkish drif. Continue the U.S.-SDF partnership in northern Syria Te U.S. military relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)#including the Kurdish-dominated YPG#in northeastern Syria should continue for the foreseeable future. Tis relationship is essential to preventing the return of the Islamic State group (IS) in the region, as well as to allowing for the rebuilding of basic infrastructure and for the provision of essential services locally. Tese steps are necessary to help alleviate humanitarian sufering and stabilize one of the most volatile regions on the planet. In addition, continuing U.S. support should

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