Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Strike Weapons: Adapting the Hcoc to Address the Dissemination of Conventional Ballistic Missiles

Home , Emad (missile), Sejjil, Zulfiqar (tank)

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons: Adapting the HCoC to address the dissemination of conventional ballistic missiles

The Hague Code of Conduct aims at curbing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of HCOC RESEARCH PAPERS mass destruction. Today, with an important increase in ranges, these weapons are more and more used for a NO. 6 conventional mission, by a variety of states. This dissemination illustrates the fact that many stakeholders master the technologies necessary to build and sustain JANUARY 2020 these weapons. But it also raises questions on the possible destabilising effects of these arsenals, even when they are not linked to WMDs.

This paper develops the factors that have led to a reconsideration of the use of ballistic missiles for conventional strikes, and evokes possible ways for the Stéphane Delory HCoC to react to this evolution. Specifically, it proposes three options for the HCoC. First, it could continue to draw attention to the proliferation of missiles, regardless of their vocation. Second, an extension of the scope of the Code could be considered, which could extend its field of action to include regional security and stabilisation. Third, the

Code could focus less on the delivery vehicle itself and more on the payload, enabling it to refer to all missiles carrying WMDs. This final proposition is described as more complex but potentially interesting as it would provide for regulation of emerging technologies such as hypersonic glide vehicles.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

DISCLAIMER

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

2 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

CONTENTS

Introduction 5

The main initiators of conventional ballistic strikes 7

The proliferation and dissemination of conventional ballistic missiles: Technological aspects 9

The utility of conventional ballistic systems 11

Integrating conventional ballistic missiles into the HCoC 15

3 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

4 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

Introduction any ballistic missile2 is capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.3 We must The Hague Code of Conduct was designed attempt to define the parameters involved at a time when the proliferation of ballistic in conventional applications of ballistic missiles was closely associated with that of missiles and decide how to take these into weapons of mass destruction. However, the account. HCoC is now faced with changes in ballistic By making no reference to payload or technology which fundamentally alter the range, the Code differs from the initial link between ballistic missiles and weapons approach of the Missile Technology Control of mass destruction. Over short ranges, Regime (MTCR). By defining minimal criteria ballistic missiles are increasingly used for (a range of 300 km and a payload of 500 conventional strike missions. The same kg), the MTCR distinguished between development holds true, more gradually, for 1 missiles subject to regulation and those longer-range missiles. weapons or technologies that could be The Code aims to prevent the proliferation freely exported. These criteria were heavily of ballistic weapons ‘capable of delivering inspired by the technical features of the SS- weapons of mass destruction’, and not 1c Scud and first-generation nuclear ballistic missiles per se. This phrasing weapons. They applied to the main types of suggests a possible distinction based on the missile proliferated by states in search of purpose of the missiles and, therefore, that delivery systems for weapons of mass no anti-proliferation mechanism exists for destruction, and were therefore probably missiles whose purpose is exclusively sufficient to halt the proliferation of such conventional. In this regard, the Code could systems in the 1980s and 1990s. However, be adapted to take into account these criteria have turned out to be poorly conventional ballistic missiles. But this suited to subsequent technological distinction is clearly specious: by definition, developments. They now apply to a majority

1. In this paper, very short-range missiles are defined these systems and ballistic missiles (in terms of as those with a range of less than 300 km, short- range, trajectory, and type of guidance system) is range missiles as those with a range of less than 800 fading. km, and long-range missiles as those with a range of 3. In fixing the payload limit for regulated missiles at over 1,000 km. In terms of conventional strikes, mis- 500 kg, the MTCR was guided by the minimum car- siles with ranges greater than 1,000 km are rare, and rying capacity of a first-generation nuclear missile. the majority are not precise enough to generate a However, proliferating nuclear powers and those predictable military effect on the target. Instead, they who are not members of the Treaty on the Non- are primarily used for “political” strikes—that is, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are now those aimed at civilian targets which are meant to capable of designing weapons whose mass is likely force the targeted political power to change its mili- lower. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict reminds us tary position in a conflict. that the use of chemical weapons remains a current 2. In speaking of ballistic missiles here, we include problem. The increasing precision of missiles makes those with manoeuvrable warheads and quasi- it possible to reduce the quantity of chemical agents ballistic missiles (which spend the majority of their needed to produce a significant military effect. We flight within the atmosphere). Guided heavy rockets should take heed of cases in which low-payload (missiles of 600 mm and above) are treated as ballis- delivery systems are used to carry chemical weapons. tic missiles, as the traditional distinction between

5 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

of weapons and technologies whose programmes to acquire weapons of mass purposes are primarily conventional. By destruction. Resolution 1540, whose scope leaving the MTCR’s range and payload is more general, requires states to establish criteria unchanged, the Code has diverged measures to control the proliferation of fundamentally from the MTCR, whose both weapons of mass destruction and their implicit objective is to regulate the delivery systems. Like the Code and proliferation of missiles in their own right, previous resolutions, it makes a distinction and not just delivery systems for weapons between delivery systems in their own right of mass destruction. and delivery systems associated with weapons of mass destruction. Since there is The Code and the MTCR may reflect no international treaty prohibiting the different methodological approaches, but design, development, acquisition, and they face the same problem: How can export of ballistic weapons, all of these prevention and anti-proliferation measures actions are legal as long as they are carried take account of weapons and technologies out in conformity with the respective whose applications are primarily commitments of states to non-proliferation conventional? And how can these be agreements and international standards. distinguished from delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction? Until the 1990s, the acquisition of ballistic missiles for conventional strike purposes The question is far from merely rhetorical. was merely a theoretical issue, since such By focusing solely on ‘ballistic missiles weapons were extremely imprecise. But capable of delivering weapons of mass many examples of conventional ballistic destruction’, the Code emphasises a strikes have been recorded since 1973 (the fundamental principle: that states are date of the first use of an SS-1c, during the permitted the equipment of their choice in Yom Kippur War). In particular, these strikes order to defend themselves, as long as this occurred during the War of the Cities is not prohibited or restricted by between Iran and Iraq, by the Afghan forces international treaties. The MTCR does not of the Najibullah government to break the go against this principle, nor do the United siege of Jalalabad in 1989, during US Nations Security Council resolutions passed operations in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and, during proliferation crises. The member more recently, in Yemen. These examples states of the MTCR voluntarily undertake to showed the partial political and, in some regulate certain types of exports, with no situations, military utility of ballistic missiles, normative consequences under even if they were imprecise and poorly international law. Security Council suited to a role as conventional strike resolutions, which ban particular states from weapons.4 Nonetheless, conventional acquiring ballistic missiles, establish a direct ballistic strikes were still primarily seen as a link between such missiles and illegal

4. The political utility is only partial because the use effects are real: most of the states concerned are of specifically conventional delivery systems only required to adapt their military strategies, both rarely requires targeted states to radically modify during and after the conflict.. their declaratory stances. However, the strategic

6 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

costly and militarily ineffective substitute for proliferation: many states see the airstrikes. Therefore, analysts generally view acquisition of such systems as part of a North Korea’s success in exporting Scud Bs protection and deterrence strategy and not and Cs5 and No Dong missiles after the Gulf necessarily as a strategy of aggression. War in 1991 as an attempt by purchasing states to acquire delivery systems for The main initiators of weapons of mass destruction (Pakistan, Iraq, conventional ballistic strikes Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iran), or as the result Until the end of the 2000s, ballistic missiles of a politics of prestige. were primarily thought of as delivery systems for nuclear weapons (for powers that possessed them) or for weapons of mass destruction (for proliferating countries). Since the late 1980s, however, cases emerged of such weapons being developed for conventional purposes. Thus, the Soviet SS-21 was designed to be used for nuclear operations, but also for conventional deep strikes in the theatre. The US ATACMS, a heavy guided rocket, was developed exclusively for conventional strikes. The operations against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 highlighted the utility of these systems for US forces, in spite of the absolute air superiority they enjoyed. The reactivity and precision of the ATACMS allowed US ground forces to attack high- Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles, derived from the SS-1c value tactical targets, but also to produce (1989) massive effects against the targets engaged, particularly using cluster munitions.6

Remarkably, the value of ballistic weapons From the mid-1980s, China began to as an anti-access system—clearly convert some of its nuclear delivery systems recognized in the United States since into conventional delivery systems. It 1991—has been heavily underestimated. attempted to increase their precision by But this is an important factor in modernising the traditional inertial

5. Recall that the Scud B is derived from the Soviet 6. ATACMS missiles currently use unitary munitions. Scud 1c, with a roughly identical range and payload Versions that use guided cluster munitions have (300 km, 980 kg), but with lower precision: the CEP of been developed but are not deployed. The versions the Scud 1c is 300 m, compared to 500 m or more that use unguided cluster munitions are no longer for the Scud B. The long-range version (500 km for operational. Each rocket can launch 300–950 submu- 750 kg of payload) has an even higher CEP, generally nitions. estimated at over 700 m or even 1 km.

7 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

guidance systems and by developing new develop long-range missiles that are closely technologies for manoeuvrability and associated with its nuclear programme, terminal guidance. China was exempt from developing conventional strike systems was the restrictions of the INF (Intermediate- also a priority. This allowed the country to Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, but faced the pass a number of important milestones. The extreme air superiority of the United States single-stage Fateh-110 missile did not allow and its allies. It settled on ballistic systems for precision strikes beyond 800 km.7 Iran as its preferred means of ensuring that it therefore attempted to develop could carry out strikes early in conflict. Its manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles for longer- aim was to neutralise enemy defences and range Shahab-3/Ghadr-type systems (from air and port infrastructures, to destroy 1,500 to 2,000 km) and for Qiam missiles enemy command and control (C2) facilities, (from 800 to 1,000 km). The system, which is and to ensure air dominance. In the absence known as Emad for Shahab-3/Ghadr of restrictions from the INF Treaty, and with missiles, is undoubtedly still too imprecise its mastery of precision technologies, China to enable very deep conventional strikes was able to gradually develop strike with high precision. It nonetheless systems of increasing ranges (from 300 km demonstrated a clear desire to master the originally to more than 3,000 km currently technologies involved in such operations. for the DF-26). Yet, at shorter ranges, Iran has operationally demonstrated its ability to conduct highly- Other states quickly recognised the precise strikes on military assets. The advantages ballistic weapons could offer for January 2020 strike in Iraq reportedly conventional strikes. In 1998, Iran carried employed Fateh-313 and Qiam. out its first conventional deep strikes against opposition forces in Iraq. Tehran was already deploying its missiles alongside drones, which were used to evaluate the effects of the strikes. During the 2000s, Iran developed short-range solid-propellant systems (Fateh-110), which were exclusively designed for conventional deep-strike operations. A series of modernisation programmes enabled Iran to deploy systems with a range of over 600 km. Iranian Emad/Shahab-3/Ghadr, For a long time, analysis of Iranian ballistics Credits: Tasnim News Agency, programmes has conflated them with Iraqi and North Korean programmes—that is, with the search for strategic capacities that The Iranian approach is different from that can deliver weapons of mass destruction. of North Korea. Pyongyang is also very While Iran has worked intensively to interested in such technologies, but still

7. Beyond a range of 800 km, the speed of a single- re-entry. stage missile is typically too high to allow for stable

8 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

sees the development of its ballistic 400 systems also shows the growing weapons as closely associated with nuclear interest that even the smallest military weapons. However, the launches it powers have in these weapons systems. performed in August 2019 may mark an important turning point, as the systems tested seem to be designed for The proliferation and conventional strikes on the battlefield and dissemination of conventional the theatre.8 ballistic missiles: Technological Other countries have also driven the dissemination of conventional ballistic aspects weapons. Turkey and South Korea are Proliferation during the 1980s was based on developing their own short-range systems the spread of a particular type of missile based on a single-stage missile with (the SS-1c Scud and its derivatives)9 from, terminal guidance. Like China, South Korea effectively, a single source (the USSR, then sees ballistic systems as an excellent way to later North Korea), and on the acquisition of carry out strikes against hardened targets, the technologies specific to this type of one that is more reactive and that missile. The spread of conventional ballistic guarantees a greater effect than airpower. missiles is now taking place in a different Turkey is reproducing the American model context. Most of the countries developing by developing short-range systems to them today already have the technological directly support ground forces. and industrial resources to produce ballistic The United States is now free from the INF weapons. For instance, many have mastered Treaty and has relaunched successor the production of the solid composite programmes to the ATACMS. Their aim is to propellants required for medium-diameter combine metre-scale precision with a range rockets and missiles (300–600 mm), which of 500 km or more. Meanwhile, Russia has make up the majority of short-range 10 an excellent conventional strike system in systems currently exported and deployed. the SS-26. Its range can be increased by Many have access to (or themselves adapting it to an aerial platform, as the produce) the chemical components Kinzhal system can be connected to a (particularly binders), special steels, and fighter jet or a heavy bomber. This version composite materials necessary for solid- also enables a greater number of axes of propellant rockets. Another distinctive penetration with complex flight trajectories, aspect of the current phenomenon is that limiting the effectiveness of defences. emerging ballistic powers can rely on Qatar’s acquisition of very short-range SY- existing technological flows to modernise both their systems and their industrial 8. The images available show missiles whose charac- 10. Short-range systems are primarily used for deep teristics resemble the SS-26 and the ATACMS. strikes on the battlefield, and are generally developed around solid propellants, which offer greater 9. I.e., the Scud B, Scud C, and Scud D, as well as the reactivity and safety than liquid propellant systems. No Dong, which adopts the Scud propulsion system.

9 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

resources. As well as intangible trade warheads. Similarly, North Korea offers an between states (or industries), which example of the particularly rapid encourages cooperation and the transfer of development of solid-propellant missiles expertise, current calculation methods without any previous expertise. facilitate the modelling and simulation of Industrialised states like South Korea are prototypes. High-technology components capable of developing their existing produced by civil industry can be used to capacities relatively quickly and, by using improve navigation and guidance systems. earlier imports of foreign expertise, of Industrial precision tools allow for higher- developing highly competitive national quality assembly, and special materials industries. We should emphasise that, for a (steels and composites) and the dual nature large number of states, greater weapons of certain civil industries (chemistry, precision is highly dependent on the use of ceramics, composites) provide easier access GPS-like systems, as they lack the industrial to materials that can substantially improve and technological capacities to design and missile performance. Furthermore, additive build high-precision navigation systems printing is likely to accelerate the process of (inertial measurement units, stellar tracking dematerialising trade.11 systems). The increasing vulnerability of GPS The proliferation model of the 1980s, which systems to signal jamming or disruption was based on the physical transfer of limits their long-term value for missile components of missiles and/or the navigation and guidance systems, which production line, is largely a thing of the past. operate in increasingly hostile Industrial and technological developments electromagnetic conditions. For this reason, make the engineering involved considerably despite the fact that emergent ballistic easier, in terms of weapon propulsion, powers are increasingly able to produce steering, and guidance. The case of Iran is relatively precise missiles, such development particularly striking. Since the late 2000s, is still only partial and must be made more Tehran has demonstrated its capacity to concrete through the acquisition of more develop large-diameter solid-propellant robust industrial capacities for producing launchers (Sejjil),12 to guide quasi-ballistic navigation systems. missiles,13 to install terminal sensors on However, the role of technology is not relatively fast missiles (Khalij Fars), and, restricted to the modernisation of delivery more recently, to develop manoeuvrable systems; it also involves the transformation 11. On these issues, see Mark Bromley and Giovan- 12. The manufacture and casting of large-diameter na Maletta, “The Challenge of Software and Tech- rocket motors (approximately one metre or more in nology Transfers to Non-Proliferation Efforts,” SI- diameter) presents a number of technical difficul- PRI, April 2018; Arnaud Idiart, “The Role of Intan- ties that most proliferating countries have not been gible Transfer of Technology in the Area of Ballistic entirely able to overcome. Iran’s ability to produce Missiles: Reinforcing the Hague Code of Conduct such missiles is yet to be fully explained. and the MTCR,” Food-for-Thought Paper, FRS, 13. Quasi-ballistic flight within the atmosphere December 2017; and Kolja Brockmann and Sibylle requires permanent guidance of the missile during Bauer, “3D Printing and Missile Technology Con- its flight, and therefore real-time calculation of the trols,” SIPRI Background Paper, SIPRI, November vehicle’s aerodynamic behaviour. 2017.

10 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

of C4ISR (Computerized Command, Control, in cases where the payload is a weapon of Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, mass destruction. The search for greater Reconnaissance) resources, which make it precision therefore goes hand in hand with possible to make full use of the precision the development of ballistic weapons. It and reactivity of missiles by identifying does not mean that the missile is meant for targets precisely. Only a decade ago, conventional use, but it is crucial if the surveillance and targeting capacities were missile is to be used in conventional highly dependent on national satellite missions and if a predictable military effect resources and heavy airborne platforms. is expected.14 The spread of modern ISR methods For systems derived from Scud technology, expands the range of targets, particularly the near-impossibility of significantly against military objectives (troop increasing the precision of missiles concentrations, mobile targets, vulnerable originating from North Korea (Scud B, Scud military infrastructure, etc.). The C, and No Dong) has prevented the states combination of strike methods and that possess them from using them in targeting does not only expand the range conventional strike scenarios beyond terror of potential missions that may employ or harassment strikes (for example, by Iraqi ballistic weapons, but also clearly reinforces forces against the United States in 2003, or the conventional deterrence capacity of the by the Houthis), with unpredictable results. states that possess them. Until the deployment of the Iranian Qiam The utility of conventional missile in the 2010s, most Scud-type systems proliferated had a CEP greater than ballistic systems 500 m. As a result, they could not provide a The actual utility of ballistic systems for guaranteed military effect except when conventional strikes depends on a number coupled with weapons of mass destruction of factors. Traditionally, ballistic weapons or used en masse (as with the strikes to enable a combination of speed, range, and defend Jalalabad). Understandably, in payload, distinguishing them from cruise developing Scud-type systems, proliferating missiles, whose speed and payload are far states have privileged range over precision, lower, and which are typically used for to the detriment of payload, and in most different missions. cases have tried to couple them with weapons of mass destruction. The military effect of the payload depends on the precision of its delivery system, even The dissemination of ballistic technologies

14. Similarly, it is important to emphasise that range North Korean case shows that deterrence capacity is not an indicator that a missile has a conventional does not depend on the range of the delivery system purpose. The archetype of the deterrent role of a but solely on its capacity to target a very high-value short and very short-range arsenal coupled with objective using weapons of mass destruction. There- weapons of mass destruction is given by North Ko- fore, a short-range delivery system whose technical rea: by keeping Seoul under the threat of chemical characteristics fall below the limits established by the strikes, it has been able to block any possible South MTCR may perfectly well deliver weapons of mass Korean or US action for nearly thirty years. Some of destruction. the systems used for this are artillery systems. The

11 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

has profoundly changed this approach. the battlefield, deep within the theatre. By Except for North Korea, which is still generating deep vulnerabilities in the primarily focused on the development of systems deployed, they create an long-range missiles and has only recently interdiction bubble that can prove a major begun developing conventional strike obstacle to force projection. systems, most states with ballistic weapons With the exception of China, which is now possess systems whose precision is developing ballistic missiles with under 100 m over short ranges. More conventional payloads for ranges between advanced states possess missiles that are 500 and 3,000 km, most ballistic powers precise almost to the metre, even over long only use shorter-range systems. The United distances. States, which currently only has a system The reduction of CEPs to below 100 m, and with a range of 300 km (the ATACMS), is even to below 50 m for a growing number likely to move towards developing one with of short-range systems, has important a range of 500–600 km. With the SS-26, military implications. The combination of Russia should be able to reach targets up to the ballistic missile’s terminal velocity and 600–700 km away. Following changes to the its payload, which can easily be over 500 kg, Fateh-110, Iran now possesses systems with can cause devastating blast and ranges of between 300 and 700 km, overpressure effects on insufficiently although the Emad (manoeuvrable-warhead hardened infrastructure. Improving Shahab-3) is probably still insufficiently precision to below 50 m makes it possible precise for conventional strikes. The to engage hardened targets and to make difference in approach between China and targeted use of cluster or area-effects the other ballistic powers is largely munitions (thermobaric explosives). The explained by geography and the kind of improvement in the precision of short- targets involved. The aero-naval dimension range ballistic missiles poses a complex of the Pacific theatre requires China to plan problem, as it considerably increases the for strikes over long distances (above 1,500 vulnerability of the infrastructure required km) against hardened or naval targets for military operations (air bases, troop (Japan, Guam, carrier battle groups).15 stationing zones, logistics centres, etc.). Furthermore, China’s decision to develop When used alongside a powerful C4ISR long-range capacities is fairly recent, and architecture, the range of potential targets has more to do with a conventional expands to include military units and mobile deterrence approach than a purely systems, making it possible to target high- operational one. By contrast, the value military objectives (C2, radar systems, development of ballistic systems against vehicles, units being assembled, etc.). Taiwan, far closer to Chinese shores, meets Depending on the quality of C4ISR, short- a strictly operational objective. range ballistic systems encourage Conventional ballistic strikes are intended to systematic interdiction missions far beyond have a decapitation effect on Taiwanese 15. In particular, carrier battle groups may be tar- meant to prevent the access of US carrier battle geted by ASBMs (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles), inclu- groups to the South China Sea or close to the Ja- ding DF-21D and possibly DF-26 missiles, which are panese coast.

12 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

military infrastructures, and so to facilitate desire to intensify a conflict and widen the either a political resolution to the conflict or range of targets engaged, moving from the an invasion. strictly military to the economic, political, or social domains. We find this operational approach among the Russians as well as the Americans, although each implements it differently. The United States typically uses ballistic missiles or heavy guided rockets as deep-strike artillery, targeting high-value military targets, anti-air defence systems, or the command forces accompanying land manoeuvres. Since 1991, the United States has fired more than 500 ATACMS missiles during operations, with long-range strikes primarily being provided by cruise missiles and aviation. During the Chechen and Georgian conflicts, Russia tested different ballistic strike methods, both to support ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System, ground forces and to eliminate high-value US Army, 2006 targets. These operational experiments have Very deep strikes on strategic objectives become part of a body of doctrine that sees have a considerable political dimension. deep strikes as the core of Russian capacity Often, the presence of strategic strike development. The suspension of the INF means within a nation’s arsenal contributes treaty will likely push Russia and the United to conventional deterrence by increasing an States to develop ballistic, quasi-ballistic, adversary’s political, economic, and societal and hypersonic strike systems capable of costs of entering into conflict. It helps to operating very deep within the theatre—an protect their territory from potential approach relatively close to that currently adversaries, irrespective of the real military taken by China towards its own ballistic effect these weapons may produce. The systems. Iranian case appears to demonstrate the Very deep ballistic strikes raise questions importance of this deterrence approach. But about the cost and durability of the desired we should not overestimate the political military effects. While certain types of effect. Many examples show that, once objectives need only be targeted once, conflict has begun, conventional strategic many can only be neutralised by multiple strikes with a political goal do not have a strikes. The unit cost of long-range ballistic significant impact on states’ determination missiles and, in general, the limits of to pursue military operations. available stockpiles mean that missions Conversely, when they are or may must be highly specialised, relative both to potentially be coupled with weapons of the desired military effects and political mass destruction, these missiles continue to considerations. Depending on the objective, have a major deterrent effect. The decision very deep strikes may indicate a state’s by a state to develop long-range

13 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

conventional ballistic weapons remains an but may develop towards more ambitious important signal, one that may suggest a strategies. shift towards using them as delivery Tehran initially developed these systems for systems for weapons of mass destruction— carrying out battlefield strikes, before even if these missiles are designed to carry making them more advanced in order to out precision strikes. In this particular case, provide a deep-strike capacity which could increasing their range is generally done in pose a credible threat to enemy military order to make it possible to target the infrastructures. The development of Zulfiqar major actors protecting hostile regional systems, which are derived from the Fateh powers. systems but have a range of 600–800 km However, it would be overly restrictive to (compared to 300–500 km for the different only view the development of the use of Fateh variants), allows Iran to use strike conventional ballistic systems in terms of strategies that are specifically adapted to its increasing range or political deterrence of conventional needs. These missiles also hostile powers. Most of the states currently reinforce its deterrence capacities. Two acquiring or developing conventional strikes against militias close to the so-called ballistic missiles are above all seeking short- Islamic State in Syria, in 2016 and 2017, range capacities in order to increase their using modernised versions of the Fateh- ability to carry out deep strikes on the 110, show these increasing capacities. The battlefield. The limits imposed by the MTCR strikes conducted by Iran in January 2020 are not, in most cases, particularly against military infrastructures in Iraq restrictive. An operational range limited to provide further evidence that Iranian 300 km is sufficient in most cases for strikes ballistic capabilities are now battlefield on the battlefield and the theatre, and the weapons. Similarly, the development of the 500 kg payload limit allows for significant ASBM Khalij Fars, also derived from the military effects as long as the missile is Fateh-110, allows Tehran to threaten precise enough. For smaller military powers, maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. In short-range ballistic systems are an South Korea, we can observe an identical important force multiplier, particularly trend to develop national strike concepts because the availability of simple but associated with very specific programmes, relatively high-performance C4ISR in order to respond to different aspects of architectures makes it possible to optimise North Korean military threats. effects. The deployment of such capacities Technological developments, the also figures in zone denial strategies: the modernisation of military arsenals, and the existence of strike systems makes it more transformation of strike concepts all risky for adversaries to deploy troops, increase the speed at which ballistic missiles limiting their military options. are spreading. Other more contingent On the other hand, the development of the factors have also contributed to this spread. Fateh systems by Iran demonstrates the Recent improvements to air defences, which ability of states to adapt their industrial place increasing constraints on the use of capacities to their specific strategies, which aviation for interdiction missions, offer a may initially be restricted to the battlefield reason to acquire strike systems capable of

14 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

neutralising and/or penetrating defences. In between member states of the regime, and parallel, on a more global scale, the spread the spread of civilian technology which, of anti-missile defences and their constant even if not considered dual-purpose, improvements provide strong incentives for facilitates the design and production of states to modernise their weapons (quasi- ballistic missiles: all of these mark a shift ballistic missiles over short ranges, and from proliferation to dissemination. Ballistic hypersonic missiles over longer ranges). The weapons and their related technologies are modernisation of anti-missile defences, both no longer rare, and their acquisition or at the terminal stage and in terms of exo- development is sustained by a growing atmospheric interception, may have other number of technological and industrial consequences. In the long term, it could sources, and by states. We are witnessing counteract the current trend of developing the democratisation or even the ground-to-ground ballistic systems, normalisation of the ownership and use of favouring air-to-ground systems with short-range systems, which may extend to greater manoeuvring capacity, range, and longer-range systems. The increased range terminal velocity.16 It may also provide the and improved precision of heavy rockets, conditions for the systematic development whose characteristics increasingly resemble of hypersonic weapons, initially using glide very short-range and short-range SRBMs vehicles and, in the longer term, scramjets. (from 150 km to over 300 km), are also The transfer of hypersonic glide vehicle making the use of ballistic weapons more technology should be treated as a serious normalised. issue in the dissemination of conventional More generally, the dissemination of strike systems. ballistic weapons reflects a technological Integrating conventional and doctrinal transformation of military operations. These are characterised by a ballistic missiles into the HCoC substantial increase in combat distances, Since there is no difference between a from the tactical level to the theatre, and conventional ballistic missile and one even the strategic level. Operative capable of delivering a weapon of mass engagement distances within the theatre destruction, how should the Code deal with have also become far longer. From this the likely spread of ballistic missiles used for point of view, the popularisation of the conventional purposes, and take future concept of A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) developments into account? reflects the increasing spread of weapons systems capable of operating over several There are a number of elements to consider. hundred kilometres. In parallel, current First, the emergence of industrial actors operational concepts based on speed give operating outside the MTCR, violations of ballistic systems and their derivatives an the MTCR by certain exporters belonging to important place in military funding. the regime, technological exchanges

16. The Russian Kinzhal system, a ground-to-air likely development. The concept has already been version of the SS-26, is a typical example of this adopted by China, Israel, and the United States.

15 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

Finally, the development of hypersonic and those which, currently, are not. technologies using glide vehicles, which will likely represent the main development in ballistic weapons in the decades to come, forces us to reconsider the definition of what counts as a ballistic system. Over long ranges (3,000 km and over), such weapons are deployed using a space launcher or a ballistic missile. But the glider performs much of its flight within the atmosphere or at its limits. It is therefore tempting for states developing these technologies to distinguish hypersonic weapons systems from ballistic weapons systems, since the majority of the flight of a hypersonic missile is non-ballistic. However, drawing a distinction within the weapon system Prototype of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle between the launcher (ballistic propeller) (HTV-2), DARPA, U.S. and the hypersonic weapon itself (glide vehicle) would undermine the credibility of While the Code covers all ballistic systems, the Code. Possessing a hypersonic weapons most of the issues under discussion have to system is effectively equivalent to do with the arsenals of states whose ballistic possessing a ballistic weapons system. missile programmes involve weapons of Conversely, including hypersonic missiles in mass destruction (or programmes for such the Code without modifying its goal is hard weapons), in violation of their international to accept, as the Code could only refer to commitments and UN restrictions. But while vehicles coupled with launchers or ballistic this question remains a crucial one, it missiles. This would exclude hypersonic neglects the growing impact of the spread systems propelled by scramjets. In the of conventional ballistic weapons on the medium term, however, such systems will security of states. On the other hand, this approach or surpass the speed of SRBMs, stance makes it more difficult to even while using an entirely non-ballistic accommodate new technologies involving trajectory. ballistic systems, particularly for hypersonic programmes which, with the exception of Given these different elements, the options the Russian strategic programme, remain available to states who subscribe to the associated with conventional strikes. Code are relatively simple. Firstly, they can maintain the stance adopted in recent years A slightly different approach could include and continue to make member states more the problem of conventional arms systems aware of the question of ballistic missiles in more systematically within discussions and their own right, without drawing a debates. Currently centred on non- distinction between systems effectively proliferation, the Code could extend its field coupled with weapons of mass destruction of action to include regional security and stabilisation. The aim would not be to

16 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

change the focus of the Code, and the issue technically capable of adapting it to deliver of delivery systems for weapons of mass chemical weapons. destruction would remain central. Rather, This final approach would be complex to this extension would make states more negotiate among the members of the Code, aware of the destabilising impact of the but it would likely offer a number of long- spread of conventional strike systems, term advantages by providing a more which can encourage pre-emptive precise definition of ‘proliferating’ delivery approaches and even decapitation strikes. systems, without thereby giving carte Therefore, member states could pay closer blanche for the acquisition of all attention to the spread of heavy rockets conventional systems. In the absence of a and SRBMs. States should also be made distinction between conventional and non- aware of the need to report their launches conventional missions, the Code risks losing and to demonstrate transparency about this all relevance. The connection between type of arsenal. By specifically including ballistic delivery systems and weapons of conventional delivery vehicles, the Code mass destruction was natural when the could better address hypersonic systems, Code was created, but it can no longer be whether aerobic or not, because of their maintained except if ballistic carriers remain potentially destabilising nature. an exceptional weapon, rather than an There is a potential link between this ordinary part of military arsenals. second approach and a third one, less Categorising missiles more precisely may widely agreed upon and more complex to also allow us to evaluate and potentially implement, which focuses more closely on integrate technological developments, the payload rather than the ballistic missile particularly for hypersonic systems, which, alone. A number of missiles currently in terms of their mission, are only produced and exported were designed marginally distinct from ballistic systems, exclusively as conventional systems, not whether conventional or coupled with dual ones. While they retain a dual capacity weapons of mass destruction. by definition, they can only be adapted to carry weapons of mass destruction under the following double condition: the state that possesses the delivery system must have a weapons of mass destruction programme, and the ballistic missile itself must be adapted, a potentially complex process. For instance, the sale of an SS-26 to Armenia or Algeria may represent a military risk for neighbouring countries, but does not for the moment represent a proliferation issue. By contrast, the export of Fateh-110s from Iran to Syria is far more problematic. The Fateh-110 is documented as exclusively conventional, but Syria is

17 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

18 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stéphane Delory is a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Straté- gique. He conducts research on missile defence, balistic proliferation and security policy in the Black sea.

19 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

20 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

Previously published

HCOC RESEARCH PAPERS

Opening HCoC to cruise missiles: A proposal to overcome political hurdles, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 5, by Stéphane Delory, Emmanuelle Maitre and Jean Masson, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, February 2019.

The role of intangible transfer of technology in the area of ballistic missiles – reinforcing the Hague Code of Conduct and the MTCR, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 4, by Arnaud Idiart, Group French Export Compliance advisor, Airbus, July 2017.

The use of the existing WMD free zones as an exemple and a potential Framework for further initiatives banning ballistic missiles, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 3, by Benjamin Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June 2017.

Limiting the proliferation of WMD means of delivery: a low-profile approach to bypass di- plomatic deadlocks, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 2, by Renaud Chatelus, collaborator and PhD candidate at the University of Liège, May 2017.

The HCoC: current challenges and future possibilities, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 1, By Dr Mark Smith, Defence & Security Programme, Wilton Park, 2014.

Papers can be downloaded on the https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/ website.

21 Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT

The objective of the HCoC is to prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. Although non- binding, the Code is the only universal instrument addressing this issue today. Multilateral instrument of political nature, it proposes a set of transparency and confidence-building measures. Subscribing States are committed not to proliferate ballistic missiles and to exercise the maximum degree of re- straint possible regarding the development, the testing and the deployment of these systems.

The Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, with the support of the Council of the European Union, has been implementing activities which aim at promoting the implementation of the Code, contrib- uting to its universal subscription, and offering a platform for conducting discussions on how to further enhance multilateral efforts against missile proliferation.

CONTACTS

Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE) EEAS Building, Rond-Point Schuman 9A 1040 Bruxelles, Belgique https://eeas.europa.eu

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 4 bis rue des Pâtures 75016 Paris, France www.frstrategie.org

USEFUL LINKS www.hcoc.at www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc

This project is financed by the This project is implemented by the Fondation pour la European Union Recherche Stratégique