Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Faculdade De Ciências Econômicas Programa De Pós-Graduação Em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais

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Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Faculdade De Ciências Econômicas Programa De Pós-Graduação Em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS ECONÔMICAS PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ESTUDOS ESTRATÉGICOS INTERNACIONAIS BRUNO KERN DUARTE XI JINPING E O SISTEMA POLÍTICO DA CHINA Porto Alegre 2018 BRUNO KERN DUARTE O IMPACTO DE XI JINPING NO SISTEMA POLÍTICO DA CHINA Dissertação submetida ao Programa de Pós- Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais. Orientador: Prof. Dr. André Moreira Cunha Porto Alegre 2018 BRUNO KERN DUARTE O IMPACTO DE XI JINPING NO SISTEMA POLÍTICO DA CHINA Tese submetida ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais. Aprovada em: Porto Alegre, 13 desetembro de 2018. BANCA EXAMINADORA: Prof. Dr. André Moreira Cunha – Orientador UFRGS - PPGEEI Prof. Dr. André Reis UFRGS - PPGEEI Prof. Dr. Andrés Ferrari Haines UFRGS - PPGEEI Profa. Dr. Diego Pautasso CMPA RESUMO O presente trabalho tem por objetivo entender o funcionamento do sistema político da China, como o partido tem enfrentado os desafios para a institucionalização da RPC e quais foram os impactos de Xi Jinping no sistema político desde que ele assumiu o poder. Para isso, analiso as três instituições mais importantes do sistema político: o Partido Comunista da China, o Governo, as Forças Armadas e como Xi tem impactado estas instituições. Em relação ao PCC, é analisado como o fim da URSS impactou dentro do partido, também é examinada a adaptação do discurso ideológico e das “linhas gerais”, a mudança no padrão de recrutamento e o papel do sistema de escolas do Partido dentro da formação dos seus quadros. A respeito do governo, explico a relação entre governo e partido, entre o nível central e os níveis locais. Sobre as Forças Armadas, analiso as relações civis-militares, examino a relação entre os militares e a sociedade e discuto a questão dos gastos de defesa da China. É visto os principais impactos de Xi Jinping em cada uma destas instituições, é descrito como as coalizões dentro do partido funcionam, como a campanha contra corrupção de Xi tem sido usada politicamente e as reformas feitas nas forças armadas. Finalmente, são os critérios para institucionalização desenvolvidos por Huntington (1968) para avaliar o grau de institucionalização que se encontra o sistema político da China. Palavras-chave: Xi Jinping. China. Partido Comunista da China. Exército de Libertação Popular. Institucionalização. Sistema político da China. ABSTRACT This study aims to understand how the political system of China works and how the party has faced the challenges for the PRC’s institutionalization. Therefore, it is analyzed the three most important institutions of the Chinese political system: the Communist Party of China, the Gov- ernment, the Armed Forces and how Xi Jinping is affecting this institutions. Regarding the CCP, is analyzed how the end of the USSR impacted within the party, how was the adaptation of the ideological discourse and "General Lines”, furthermore the changes in the pattern of recruitment of new members and the role of Party schools system in the training of its cadres are also ex- plained. With regard to the government, it is explained the relationship between government and party, between the central level and local levels. About the Armed Forces, I analyze the civil- military relations, examine the relationship between the FA and the society and discuss the issue of China's defenses spending. It is analyzed the main impacts of Xi Jinping in each of these insti- tutions, first we see the role of coalitions and factions in the Communist Party, then it is seen how Xi's anti-corruption campaign has been politically used for his grab of power, later we discuss how the reforms made in the military address the problems seen in the third chapter. Finally, I use the criteria for institutionalization developed by Huntington (1968) to assess the degree of institu- tionalization of the political system of China. Keywords: Xi Jinping. China. Communist Party of China. People’s Liberation Army. Institutio- nalization. Political System of China. LISTA DE FIGURAS Figura 1 - Mudança nas Características dos Membros do PCC .................................................... 36 Figura 2 - Estrutura do Sistema de Escolas do PCC...................................................................... 39 Figura 3 - Estrutura do Sistema Político da China ........................................................................ 44 Figura 4 - Níveis Administrativos da RPC .................................................................................... 47 Figura 5 - Estrutura Organizacional das Forças Armadas ............................................................. 64 Figura 6 - Mapa das Regiões Militares .......................................................................................... 66 LISTA DE QUADROS Quadro 1 - Avaliações de Analistas Chineses sobre os Fatores que Contribuíram para o Colapso da União Soviética ......................................................................................................................... 22 Quadro 2 - Maiores Mudanças de Pessoal desde o 19º Congresso do Partido .............................. 77 Quadro 3 - Criação de Pequenos Grupos de Liderança ................................................................. 87 Quadro 4 - Principais Mudanças de Xi Jinping no Sistema Politico da China ............................. 98 LISTA DE ABREVIATURAS E SIGLAS ACCS – Academia Chinesa de Ciências Sociais CCID – Comissão Central de Inspeção Disciplinar CID - Comissões de Inspeção Disciplinar CIISS – Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais da China CMC - Comissão Militar Central CNP - Congresso Nacional do Povo DFU – Departamento para Frente Unida DO – Departamento Organizacional DP – Departamento de Propaganda DRE – Departamento de Relações Exteriores ECP - Escola Central do Partido ELP – Exército de Libertação Popular ENA - Escola Nacional de Administração da China EUA - Estados Unidos da América FISS – Fundação de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais IISS – International Institute for Strategic Studies LJC - Liga da Juventude Comunista (Tuanpai) MSE – Ministério de Segurança do Estado MSP – Ministério de Segurança Pública OTAN - Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte PAP – Polícia Armada do Povo PCC – Partido Comunista da China PCUS – Partido Comunista da União Soviética RM - Região Militar RPC - República Popular da China NOTA SOBRE AS GRAFIAS DO CHINÊS O chinês não possui um alfabeto fonético como é o caso do alfabeto romano. Assim, o significado e a pronúncia de uma palavra só podem ser aprendidos por memorização. Além disso, o fato da língua ser tonal cria dificuldades extras para reduzir o sistema a outro alfabeto. Consequentemente, a comunicação em mandarim com qualquer versão sua em alfabeto romano irá ter problemas. Como ao longo deste trabalho é feita referências frequentes a nomes e termos em chinês, optei por usar caracteres (汉字) quando julgasse necessária a menção de uma expressão na língua local. Desta forma, o texto fica mais fluente e, se alguém estiver interessado em pesquisar mais informações sobre o tema, saberá também a palavra no alfabeto romano com qualquer dicionário. Se optasse por usar os termos em pinyin, a informação não seria completa, já que podem existir diversos caracteres para a mesma escrita. Há dois métodos de transliteração do mandarim para o alfabeto romano: o Wade-Giles, usado pela maior parte do mundo até os anos 1980; e o pinyin, oficial na República Popular da China a partir de 1979. Em alguns casos, ao referir a nomes próprios em chinês optei por utilizar o alfabeto romano. Nestas oportunidades, adotei o método pinyin, entretanto no caso de nomes consagrados pelo método Wade-Giles, como Kuomintang (Guomindang, em pinyin), usei a opção mais tradicional. SUMÁRIO 1 INTRODUÇÃO ................................................................................................................ 11 2 O PARTIDO COMUNISTA DA CHINA ...................................................................... 18 2.1 AVALIAÇÃO INTERNA DO PCC .................................................................................. 20 2.2 LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS ................................................................................................... 24 2.3 REFORMAS NO PARTIDO: BUSCANDO INSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO? .................... 25 2.4 ADAPTAÇÃO DO DISCURSO IDEOLÓGICO ............................................................. 26 2.5 A REFORMA ORGANIZACIONAL DO PARTIDO ...................................................... 34 2.5.1 Os Membros do Partido .................................................................................................. 34 2.5.2 O Sistema de Escolas do Partido .................................................................................... 37 3 OGOVERNO .................................................................................................................... 42 3.1 A ESTRUTURA DO PCC ................................................................................................. 43 3.2 A ESTRUTURA DO GOVERNO ..................................................................................... 45 3.3 RELAÇÃO GOVERNO CENTRAL E GOVERNOS LOCAIS: DESCENTRALIZAÇÃO E CONTROLE ..................................................................................................................
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