The Omagh Bombing: Some Remaining Questions
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Irish News: NEWS: Mckevitt to Delay Defence
Irish News: NEWS: McKevitt to delay defence Wednesday, 10 December 2008 HOME NEWS SPORT BUSINESS LIVING AN TEOLAS SEARCH SUBSCRIBE LOGIN POLITICS | EDUCATION | COLUMNISTS | LETTERS | RSS FEEDS Most PopularMost Emailed BreakingSportBusinessWorldGossip Issue Changer: NEWS > McKevitt to delay defence 09/12/08 CONVICTED terror chief Michael McKevitt is to delay his defence in the Omagh bomb civil action until an IRA informer gives evidence against him. Lawyers for McKevitt (58, were due to begin attempts this week to counter allegations that he was among five http://www.irishnews.com/articles/540/5860/2008/12/9/604971_365989909842McKevittt.html (1 of 3)10/12/2008 11:05:45 Irish News: NEWS: McKevitt to delay defence men responsible for the atrocity which killed 29 people and unborn twins. Those plans have been put on hold until after Sean O’Callaghan, a former republican jailed for two murders, testifies at the High Court trial in Belfast. O’Callaghan is due to be called next month to try to prove a series of claims he has made against McKevitt. One of these involves allegations that the pair attended a meeting with other senior Provisionals in the mid- 1980s to discuss buying deer-hunting rifles to kill soldiers and police officers. O’Callaghan, a special branch agent who says he was once in charge of the IRA’s southern command, is also to be questioned about his claims that he issued instructions for McKevitt to stop taking vehicles from a Provisional IRA car pool without permission. A further issue which lawyers for the Omagh victims families have been given permission to explore with him centres on allegations that a former IRA chief of staff told him he wanted McKevitt voted onto the paramilitary organisation’s executive. -
Omagh Support and Self Help Group Guide for Victims and Survivors
Omagh Support and Self Help Group Guide for Victims and Survivors Contents Page Number Foreword from the Chairman i General Information: 1 Victims Unit 1 Trauma Advisory Panels 2 Public Enquiries 3 Evacuation & Bomb Threat 7 Procedure Procedure for Telephone Bomb 9 Threat The Media 12 Practical Directory: 13 Financial & Welfare Advice 13 Legal Advice and Mediation 15 Housing Advice/Adaptations 17 Form Filling & General Advice 19 Transport 21 Health Directory: 23 General Information on PTSD 23 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 24 Counselling and Mediation 25 Therapeutic Directory 36 Support and Representation: 45 Victims/Survivor Groups 45 Disclaimer: This Guide is intended to direct individuals towards possible sources of information, help and support. The inclusion of an organisation in this Guide should not be seen as an endorsement of the quality of services offered by that organisation. All information is correct at time of publication. QE5 and the Omagh Support and Self Help Group have taken every care in the preparation of the contents of this Guide, but cannot accept any liability for errors or omissions within. Foreword The Omagh Support and Self Help Group was formed in the aftermath of the 1998 Omagh bomb. The families themselves who came together and formed this group shared a common suffering and came from all shades of religious and political opinion. I believe it is our diversity that is our strength, and not our weakness. We have co-operated with QE5 Consultants to help create this guide. The last six years have seen a prolific growth of interest in Victims and Victims-related issues. -
John F. Morrison Phd Thesis
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by St Andrews Research Repository 'THE AFFIRMATION OF BEHAN?' AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICISATION PROCESS OF THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT THROUGH AN ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SPLITS FROM 1969 TO 1997 John F. Morrison A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2010 Full metadata for this item is available in Research@StAndrews:FullText at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3158 This item is protected by original copyright ‘The Affirmation of Behan?’ An Understanding of the Politicisation Process of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement Through an Organisational Analysis of Splits from 1969 to 1997. John F. Morrison School of International Relations Ph.D. 2010 SUBMISSION OF PHD AND MPHIL THESES REQUIRED DECLARATIONS 1. Candidate’s declarations: I, John F. Morrison, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 82,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. I was admitted as a research student in September 2005 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in May, 2007; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2005 and 2010. Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of candidate 2. Supervisor’s declaration: I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. -
The RUC Handling of Certain Intelligence and Its Relationship with Government Communications Headquarters in Relation to the Omagh Bomb on 15 August 1998
Investigation Report The RUC handling of certain intelligence and its relationship with Government Communications Headquarters in relation to the Omagh Bomb on 15 August 1998 Public Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland arising from a referral by the Chief Constable, in accordance with Section 62 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 On 4 May 2010, I received a Referral from the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) concerning a number of specific matters relating to the manner in which the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch handled both intelligence and its relationship with Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in relation to the Omagh Bombing on 15 August 1998. The referral originated from issues identified by the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. 1.2 In 2013 the Chief Constable made a further Referral to my Office in connection with the findings of a report commissioned by the Omagh Support and Self Help Group (OSSHG) in support of a full Public Inquiry into the Omagh Bombing. The report identified and discussed a wide range of issues, including a reported tripartite intelligence led operation based in the Republic of Ireland involving American, British and Irish Agencies, central to which was a named agent. It suggested that intelligence from this operation was not shared prior to, or with those who subsequently investigated the Omagh Bombing. 1 1.3 On 12 September 2013 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers M.P. issued a statement explaining that there were not sufficient grounds to justify a further inquiry beyond those that had already taken place. -
Report of Sir Peter Gibson
REVIEW OF INTERCEPTED INTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO THE OMAGH BOMBING OF 15 AUGUST 1998 [Extracts from full report] Sir Peter Gibson, the Intelligence Services Commissioner 16th January 2009 Terms of Reference by Gordon Brown, then British Prime Minister, 17 September 2008: “Review any intercepted intelligence material available to the security and intelligence agencies in relation to the Omagh bombing and how this intelligence was shared” These extracts from the full report were made available by Shaun Woodward, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, on 20 January 2009 16th January 2009 REVIEW OF INTERCEPTED INTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO THE OMAGH BOMBING OF 15 AUGUST 1998 CONTENTS Introduction 2 Context 3 Background to the bombing 5 The Investigations and Actions taken after the Bombing 6 Roles and relationships 9 Sources of information relating to my review 12 Conclusions 13 Acknowledgments 16 1 of 16 Introduction 1. Following the BBC Panorama programme broadcast on 15 September, the Prime Minister invited me, as the Intelligence Services Commissioner, to “review any intercepted intelligence material available to the security and intelligence agencies in relation to the Omagh bombing and how this intelligence was shared”. 2. In preparing my Report, which I presented to the Prime Minister on 18 December 2008, I drew on a range of very sensitive and highly classified material made available to me by those agencies involved in the production of intercept intelligence. Some of this material is subject to important legal constraints on its handling and disclosure. Such material, if released more widely, would reveal information on the capabilities of our security and intelligence agencies. -
Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern
SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT BBYY TTHHEE PPOOLLIICCEE OOMMBBUUDDSSMMAANN FFOORR NNOORRTTHHEERRNN IIRREELLAANNDD OONN HHEERR IINNVVEESSTTIIGGAATTIIOONN OOFF MMAATTTTEERRSS RREELLAATTIINNGG TTOO TTHHEE OOMMAAGGHH BBOOMMBBIINNGG OONN AAUUGGUUSSTT 1155 11999988 The persons responsible for the Omagh Bombing are the terrorists who planned and executed the atrocity. Nothing contained in this report should detract from that clear and unequivocal fact. Wednesday 12 December 2001 STATEMENT OF THE POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND IN RELATION TO THE OMAGH BOMB INVESTIGATION REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Under the provisions of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 (the Police Act), Section 55(6)(b), the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (the Police Ombudsman) may, without a complaint, formally investigate a matter in accordance with Section 56 of the Act if it is desirable in the public interest. 1.2 A Report has been presented to the Secretary of State, the Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) under Regulation 20 of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2000. The public interest relates to material issues preceding and following the Omagh Bomb on 15 August 1998. 1.3 This Statement in relation to the Report on the Omagh Bomb is published under Section 62 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 2. THE OMAGH BOMB 2.1 On Saturday 15 August 1998 at approximately 3.05 p.m. a terrorist bomb (the Omagh Bomb) exploded in the small county town of Omagh, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. Three telephone calls were made, the first of which was at 2.29 p.m. warning that a bomb was going to detonate in the town. -
Northern Ireland) Bill Which Is Due to Be Debated on Second Reading in the House of Commons on Wednesday 13 December 2006
RESEARCH PAPER 06/63 The Justice and 7 DECEMBER 2006 Security (Northern Ireland) Bill Bill 10 of 2006-07 This paper discusses the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill which is due to be debated on second reading in the House of Commons on Wednesday 13 December 2006. A key part of the normalisation programme in Northern Ireland, following the paramilitary ceasefires and subsequent improvements in the security situation, is the expiry by July 2007 of counter-terrorist legislation specific to Northern Ireland, currently set out in Part 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Part 7 includes provisions currently enabling non-jury “Diplock courts” to try “scheduled offences”. The Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill contains measures designed to re-introduce a presumption in favour of jury trial for offences triable on indictment, subject to a fall-back arrangement for a small number of exceptional cases for which the Director of Public Prosecutions will be able to issue a certificate stating that a trial is to take place without a jury. Amongst other things the Bill also seeks to reform the jury system in Northern Ireland, extend the powers of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, provide additional statutory powers for the police and armed forces and create a permanent regulatory framework for the private security industry in Northern Ireland. Miriam Peck Pat Strickland Grahame Danby HOME AFFAIRS SECTION HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY Recent Library Research Papers include: 06/44 Judicial Review: A short guide to claims in the Administrative -
Missing IRA Files Branded 'Totally Unsatisfactory'
Missing IRA files branded ‘totally unsatisfactory’ - Local & National, News - Belfasttele... Page 1 of 3 Belfast 4° Hi 4°C / Lo 2°C LOCAL & NATIONAL Search INTERACTIVE CRIME MAP OF NORTHERN IRELAND: EVERY CRIME IN YOUR AREA News Sport Business Opinion Life & Style Entertainment Jobs Cars Homes Classified LocalServices & National World Politics Property Health Education Business Environment Technology Video Family Notices Crime Map Sunday Life The CT The digital gateway to Northern Ireland news, sport, business, entertainment and opinion Home > News > Local & National Missing IRA files branded ‘totally unsatisfactory’ In Pictures: All Our Yesterdays Saturday, 7 February 2009 Police have so far failed to locate records on debriefing sessions Print Email with a convicted IRA murderer due to testify at the Omagh bomb civil action. Search A lawyer for the PSNI confirmed yesterday that files on Sean O’Callaghan, which are being sought by jailed dissident Bookmark & Share republican leader Michael McKevitt, have still to be tracked down. Digg It del.icio.us Ulster under snow With McKevitt’s legal team also demanding access to notes kept Facebook Stumbleupon by any Garda officers who handled O’Callaghan after he turned informer, his planned evidence at the High Court on behalf of the What are these? victim’s relatives could be in doubt. Change font size: A A A O’Callaghan is to be called to answer questions about claims he made in a statement to the multi-million pound compensation case brought by relatives of some of the 29 people killed in the August 1998 Real IRA atrocity. He has made a series of allegations about McKevitt, one of five men being sued over the bombing, which the convicted terror chief’s lawyers will attempt to demolish. -
The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland: a Fair Trial?
Studie- en lnformatiecentrum Mensenrechten Netherlands Institute of Human Rights Institut Neerlandais des Droits de l'Homme The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland: A Fair Trial? An analysis of the law, based on a study commissioned by Amnesty International by Douwe Korff SIM Special No. 3 Studie- en • e ourts 10 Mensenrechten orthem Ire a •• Netherlands Institute of Hu~an Rights lnstitut Neerlandais des Drotts de air Trial? l'Homme lnstituto Holandes de Derechos Human<lS Stichting Studie- en An analysis of the law. hased on a study commissioned lnfot matiecentrum Mensenrechten hy Amnesty International Nieuwegracht 94, 3512 LX UTRECI-IT, hy Douwe Korff The Netherlands, tel. 030 - 33 15 14 telex: 70779 SIM NL Cable Adress: SIMCABLE Bank: RABO-Bank Utrecht No. 39.45.75.555 Chairman Foundation: Professor P. van Dijk Director Institute: Mr. J.G.H. Thoolen The following analysis of the non-jury (" Diplock") couns in Northern Ireland was prepared in 1982 by Dutch lawyer, Douwe Korff, as a commissioned study for Amnesty International. ~ -' The text reproduced here has been shortened slightly (for reasons of economy). '' Amnesty International submitted the full text of the study in 19M3 to an official re view, then in progress, of the legislation and procedures governing such courts, as background to a recommendation that the organization's concerns he taken into ac count. SIM is grateful to Amnesty International for making the text available for independ ent publication. All rights for further reproduction are vested in Amnesty Interna tional. Table of contents Preface 7 Background note 9 List of references 14 Introduction 17 ' PART I The Pre-Triallnquiries and Proceedings 19 Chapter l The Legal Basis for Arrest and Detention for Questioning 20 (i) Ordinary Powers of Arrest 20 (ii) Common Law Essentials for a Valid Arrest 21 ( iii) Detention for Questioning 21 . -
How New Is New Loyalism?
HOW NEW IS NEW LOYALISM? CATHERINE MCGLYNN EUROPEAN STUDIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY OF SALFORD SALFORD, UK Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, February 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Page 1 Chapter One Hypothesis and Methodology Page 6 Chapter Two Literature Review: Unionism, Loyalism, Page 18 New Loyalism Chapter Three A Civic Loyalism? Page 50 Chapter Four The Roots of New Loyalism 1966-1982 Page 110 Chapter Five New Loyalism and the Peace Process Page 168 Chapter Six New Loyalism and the Progressive Page 205 Unionist Party Chapter Seven Conclusion: How New is New Loyalism? Page 279 Bibliography Page 294 ABBREVIATONS CLMC Combined Loyalist Military Command DENI Department of Education for Northern Ireland DUP Democratic Unionist Party IOO Independent Orange Order IRA Irish Republican Army LAW Loyalist Association of Workers LVF Loyalist Volunteer Force NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association NIHE Northern Ireland Housing Executive NILP Northern Ireland Labour Party PUP Progressive Unionist Party RHC Red Hand Commandos RHD Red Hand Defenders SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party UDA Ulster Defence Association UDP Ulster Democratic Party UDLP Ulster Democratic and Loyalist Party UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters UUP Ulster Unionist Party UUUC United Ulster Unionist Council UWC Ulster Workers' Council UVF Ulster Volunteer Force VPP Volunteer Political Party ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my PhD supervisor, Jonathan Tonge for all his support during my time at Salford University. I am also grateful to all the staff at the Northern Irish Political collection at the Linen Hall Library in Belfast for their help and advice. -
Murder of Innocents – the IRA Attack That Repulsed the World
Newshound: Daily Northern Ireland news catalog - Irish News article Murder of innocents – the IRA attack that HOME repulsed the world This article appears thanks to the Irish History (Diana Rusk, Irish News) News. Subscribe to the Irish News NewsoftheIrish The IRA bombing at a Remembrance Day commemoration in the Co Fermanagh town of Enniskillen 20 years ago this week killed 11 people, injured 63 and repulsed the world. Book Reviews & Book Forum Amateur video footage of the aftermath of the explosion on November 8 1987 was broadcast internationally, vividly Search / Archive portraying the suffering of innocent victims. Back to 10/96 Half were Presbyterians who had inadvertently stood the closest Papers to the hidden 40lb device so that they could be convenient to their place of worship. Reference There were three married couples – Wesley Armstrong (62) and wife Bertha (55), Billy Mullan (74) and wife Agnes (73), Kit About Johnston (71) and wife Jessie (62). The others who died were Sammy Gault (49), Ted Armstrong Contact (52), Johnny Megaw (67), Alberta Quinton (72) and the youngest victim, Marie Wilson (20). A 12th person, Ronnie Hill, who slipped into a coma days after the explosion, never woke up and died almost 14 years later. For the first time in the Troubles, the IRA admitted it had made a mistake, planting the device in a building owned by the Catholic church to, they said, target security forces patrolling the parade. The bombing is believed to be one of the watershed incidents of the Troubles largely because of the international outcry against the violence. -
1 BBC Panorama Response to the “Review Of
BBC Panorama response to the “Review of intercepted intelligence in relation to the Omagh bombing “1by the Intelligence Services Commissioner Sir Peter Gibson arising from transmission of Panorama: “Omagh - what the police were never told.”2 SUMMARY 1. The failings of the intelligence gathering services (which for the purposes of this document include Special Branch) in helping to deliver the solemn promises by ministers that no stone would be left unturned in the efforts of the security forces to catch the perpetrators of the Omagh bombing lay at the core of Panorama as embodied in the title: “Omagh – What the police were never told.” 2. Yet this was not the issue on which the Intelligence Services Commissioner Sir Peter Gibson and the Northern Ireland Secretary concentrated. 3. A close reading of Sir Peter Gibson’s Review shows that he has, in fact, provided confirmation of the heart of the programme - that GCHQ were monitoring the mobiles of some of the bombers during the bomb run,3 though he has avoided saying so in terms. Instead Sir Peter has criticised the way Panorama addressed a different issue: whether the intercepts could have helped prevent the bombing in the first place. 4. Both Sir Peter and the Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward have misrepresented what Panorama said about the degree to which the bombing could have been prevented. No assertion that the bombing was preventable was made by the programme or anybody taking part in it. 5. Sir Peter does not challenge Panorama’s allegation that the CID were never told about the fact that interception had taken place, or that they were never provided with intercepted telephone numbers used by some of those involved in the bombing.