University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1978 Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions Geoffrey R. Stone Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Geoffrey R. Stone, "Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions," 46 University of Chicago Law Review 81 (1978). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions Geoffrey R. Stonet Governmental restrictions of expression may be divided into two general categories-content-neutral restrictions and content- based restrictions.' Content-neutral restrictions restrict communi- cation without regard to the message conveyed. Laws prohibiting noisy speeches near a hospital, banning the erection of any bill- boards in residential communities, or requiring disclosure of the names of leafleteers are examples. In judging the constitutionality of such restrictions, the Supreme Court engages in a balancing of first amendment interests against competing government con- cerns. 2 Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, restrict com- munication because of the message conveyed. Laws prohibiting the publication of specific types of "confidential" information, for- bidding the hiring of teachers who advocate the violent overthrow of the government, or banning the display of the swastika in certain 3 neighborhoods illustrate this type of restriction.