How Can the British Army Improve Its Personnel Management System?

HOW CAN THE BRITISH ARMY IMPROVE ITS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALASDAIR HEMPENSTALL

JCSP 46 PCEMI 46

Service Paper Étude militaire

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Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 46 – PCEMI 46 2019 – 2020 SERVICE PAPER - ÉTUDE MILITAIRE

HOW CAN THE BRITISH ARMY IMPROVE ITS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM?

Lieutenant Colonel Alasdair Hempenstall

“This paper was written by a candidate « La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfillment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l’une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L’étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l’auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l’opinion opinion of any agency, including the d’un organisme quelconque, y compris Government of Canada and the le gouvernement du Canada et le Canadian Department of National ministère de la Défense nationale du Defence. This paper may not be Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de released, quoted or copied, except with citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la the express permission of the Canadian permission expresse du ministère de la Department of National Defence.” Défense nationale. »

Word Count: 2,478 Nombre de mots : 2.478

HOW CAN THE BRITISH ARMY IMPROVE ITS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO BETTER MEET THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY AND THE INDIVIDUAL?

AIM

1. The aim of this paper will be to prove that the Career Management (CM) of

Officers1 in the British Army must be improved to better meet the needs of the Army and the needs of its personnel. This should be done in three specific areas: (1) improving the structure of the Army to minimize the number of vacant or gapped posts;2 (2) earlier identification and management of the most talented officers; and (3) better alignment of an individual’s knowledge, skills and experience (KSE) to the five career fields (CFs).3

INTRODUCTION

2. The Military Secretary’s (MS’s)4 Binding Principle is that the “needs of the Army must come first, with the needs of the individual a close second. But to be worthy of its pre-eminence the Army must be seen to give due consideration to the best interests and preferences of each individual”.5 As the Army undergoes a significant change programme to modernise its structures,6 the risk is that the needs of the Army and the needs of the individual will move further apart. The British Army currently consists of

1 Specifically, Majors (OF3) to Colonel (OF5). The CM of other ranks is beyond the scope of this paper. 2 “Vacant posts” are positions that are currently unfilled but where an officer has been selected to fill it in due course. “Gapped posts” are posts that have deliberately been left unfilled at an Appointments Board. 3 The five Career Fields available to Staff Officers in the British Army are as follows: Operations (Ops); Operation Support (Op Sp); Management of Defence / Defence Engagement (MD/DE); Personnel (Pers); and Capability and Acquisition (C and A). 4 MS is the senior officer in the British Army charged with the Career Management of its personnel. 5 Military Secretary, Policy, Precedent and Rules (PP&R) for MS Boards, No 4, (Army Personnel Centre, Glasgow, 2019). https://army.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/regionalcommand/MSWeb/SitePages/Home.aspx 6 British Army, “Future of the Army,” https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/future-of-the-army/, this change programme is referred to as: Army 2020 (Refine) (A2020(R)). 1/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

82,000 personnel of which 12,870 are officers.7 The majority of Young Officers (YOs)8 are employed at Regimental Duty (RD)9 but from the rank of Major and above most are employed in Staff Appointments across the wider Army. They are selected for these posts by an Appointments Board10 sitting in the Army Personnel Centre (APC) in

Glasgow. In recent years the No 5 Appointments Board11 has achieved a fill rate of circa

60% (see Annex A for details)12 of which a high number are “Directed Postings”.13

These directed postings are not good for the individual officers who are being posted against their wishes, or for the employers receiving personnel who don’t want to be there.

Furthermore, the staff branches must also endure challenging operating circumstances due to the high number of gapped posts, which impacts on the health of the organisation as a whole. These circumstances all lead to low morale and poor retention; poor retention because inevitably both the officers who are posted against their wishes, and those who have to take on extra responsibility for gapped posts, will eventually lose faith in the system and the Army’s ability to meet their individual needs. The bottom line is that it can and must be done better.14

7 https://www.statista.com/statistics/579987/number-of-officers-in-british-army-uk/. 8 Second Lieutenant (2Lt), Lieutenant (Lt) and junior Captain (Capt). 9 Regimental Duty involves serving with a Battalion or Regiment in a Command Appointment or as a member of the Commanding Officer’s staff in the Headquarters. 10 An Appointments Board consists of Officers at least two ranks higher than the rank of candidates running to the Board. 11 The No 5 Board selects Majors (OF3) for staff appointments across the British Army. 12 This statistic is based on analysis of recent Board Results, obtained via MS Web on Defence Gateway, https://army.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/regionalcommand/MSWeb/SitePages/Home.aspx 13 Directed Postings are appointments that are not on the individual’s Posting Preference Proforma (PPP). 14 Results from UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey Results 2018 showed that only four in ten personnel are satisfied with the way that their careers are managed, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716976/ AFCAS_2018_Main_Report_FINAL.pdf, 10. 2/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

Reducing the structure of the British Army to avoid gapping posts

3. As a result of Army 2020 Refine (A2020R)15 the British Army has been directed to reduce in size, however the reduction of its structure16 has not kept pace with the reduction of its liability.17 Therefore, the demand for personnel to fill posts in the structure outstrips the liability and in turn, due to under recruiting and poor retention, the liability outstrips the actual strength.18 The inevitable result is that more and more posts are going unfilled at Appointments Boards.19 The situation is also exacerbated lower down the rank structure20 because too few posts are gapped at the top.21

4. Over the last year, despite being aware of this problem, the No 2 Board22 has only gapped 2% of its posts. Meanwhile it has also made 119 promotions from Lieutenant

Colonel (Lt Col) to Colonel (Col) to fill 425 posts. In turn the No 4 Board23 gapped 20% of its posts and has promoted well above its quota for the last five years.24 Therefore the

15 A202R is the implementation of the recommendations in the Government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015. 16 The Army’s “structure” refers to the number of posts that the Chain of Command require to be filled. 17 The Army’s “liability” is the number of posts that it is established (and therefore paid) to hold by the British Government. 18 The Army’s “strength” is the actual number of Service Personnel currently employed by the Army. 19 According to a Freedom of Information (FoI) request by The Guardian Newspaper some units are as much as 40% under strength, “British army recruitment shortfalls may be symptom of changing times,” last modified [or accessed] 9 Aug 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/09/british-army- recruitment-shortfalls-may-be-symptoms-of-changing-times. 20 Major (OF3) rank. 21 Colonel (OF5) rank. 22 This Board is responsible for Colonel (OF5) appointments. 23 This Board is responsible for Lieutenant Colonel (OF4) appointments. 24 Promotable Majors (OF3) are selected at the start of the year at a Promotion Board using a quota based on the Army’s structural requirements. Those not selected for promotion but otherwise eligible and above the Quality Line remain on a Reserve List (RL), available for promotion into an appointment as the opportunity arises. RL promotion therefore exceeds the Army’s structural requirement. There were 71 RL 3/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

pain runs downhill to the No 5 Board, who have to gap up to 40% of their posts (see

Annex A for details of this analysis).

Comparison of fill rates across Boards 2018 - 19 2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 No 5 Bd No 4 Bd No 2 Bd

Appointments Not Filled

5. The obvious solution is that the Army must reduce the size of its structure.

However, there is no quick fix and it will take time to realign the Army’s structure with its liability. There are however a number of short terms solutions that should be considered.

a. Reservists employed on Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) can fill key

staff appointments at less cost than a Regular.25 In areas where continuity is

sought an FTRS officer may even provide a better solution than a Regular who

will be posted every 24 or 36 months. A Reservist who lives locally to an HQ and promotions in 2017; 73 RL promotions in 2018 and 50 RL promotions in 2019 (with one Board remaining in December). 25 This is because they are non-deployable and do not receive “X-Factor” payments as a result. X- Factor is currently worked out as 14.5% of Basic Pay (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293512/ A_review_of_the_X-Factor_components_IDS__FINAL_.pdf) FTRS personnel are also not entitled to Service Families Accommodation (SFA) and other allowances like Continuity of Education Allowance (CEA). 4/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

therefore does not want to move, could fill an otherwise unpopular staff

appointment for longer than 3 years, thus gaining genuine continuity and

expertise.

b. Late Entry (LE) officers26 should also be considered for more staff

appointments. LEs are now encouraged to attend Intermediate Command and

Staff College (ICSC)27 and as such they are as qualified as their Direct Entry

(DE)28 counterparts. In fact, many are more suitable to certain appointments as

they bring a good deal more experience in certain areas and specialisms.

6. Longer term, the Army can start to solve the problem by improving the boarding process. The current system requires employers to categorise the appointments that they are running to a Board as Critical; Must; Should; and Could Fill.29 As the analysis at

Annex A shows the No 5 Board struggles to make selections for all the Must Fill appointments before running out of officers. Currently employers are allowed to reprioritise their posts before each Board, this allows them to work the system by holding posts back or pushing them forward to increase their chances of a fill rather than being open and providing a genuine timeframe and grading for the overall priority of the job.

Some posts can therefore vary in priority considerably between boards and others can go unfilled for several boards, even several years, creating a very unbalanced picture of what

26 LEs are commissioned having already achieved Warrant Officer rank from enlistment. The British Army does not normally allow LEs to take Command Appointments and it currently does not promote LEs above the rank of Lt Col. 27 ICSC has previously been for DE officers on promotion to Major (OF3). 28 Graduates and Non-Graduates who commission into the Army after 12 months at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). 29 Critical Fill appointments are the top 10% of staff appointments within a 1* Branch or 2* Directorate. Must Fill appointments are the next 40% of appointments, Should Fill the next 25% and Could Fill the bottom 25%. 5/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

is actually needed. It is therefore recommended that employers should establish their post prioritisation on an annual basis rather than before each board, allowing greater continuity and transparency in the Boarding Process. It would also help identify which posts are surplus to requirements and which really are critical to the organisation, whilst being a more efficient use of time. This would also allow post prioritisation to be advertised further in advance, meaning applicants could target jobs that have a genuine chance of being filled, rather than wasting a preference30 on a job that is unlikely to be filled at all. This in turn means that candidates are more likely to get an appointment that is one of their preferences and are less likely to receive a directed posting, all of which is good for the overall health of the organisation. In addition, making this simple procedural amendment would help the Army identify which posts can be removed from its structure completely.

Maximising Talent

7. The British Army has traditionally been bad at harnessing the potential of its most talented junior officers31 especially when compared to the Police Force and the Civil

Service, both of which have a “fast track” process for such individuals. The Army has shied away from this approach, perhaps worried that to identify talent early will alienate those who don’t make the cut and possibly missing those who would be considered “late bloomers”.

30 Applicants can apply for up to eight posts on the Posting Preference Proforma (PPP). 31 ICSC is the first time in an Army Officer’s career that they are ranked across their peer group, pan Army. On average it takes 8 – 10 years for an officer to get to ICSC. 6/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

8. Whilst some officers who are not initially identified as “talented” may take this badly, it can simply be seen as a more realistic and better management of their expectations and careers. Ultimately this will allow the individual to move on through their career with more realistic goals from the outset.

9. Consider what motivates an officer in the Army. Initially it might be the excitement and challenge that is delivered from junior command appointments, but at some point this is likely to switch to achieving further advancement in their careers, before finally being replaced by a desire for greater domestic and professional stability.32

Only one person ever “wins” the Army and gets all the way to the top, therefore everyone else will reach their ceiling at some point, and their desire for stability will replace their desire for advancement. If an officer is told at a relatively junior stage in their career that their ceiling may only be 1* as opposed to 3* or 4* will that really have a detrimental effect on retention? It is better to provide realistic Career Management from an earlier stage, and therefore a cohort of officers who understand their place in the scheme of things.

10. Those who are identified early can be sponsored and groomed for the top of the organisation. They will continue to be motivated by advancement for longer and will move through appointments more rapidly as they rise through the ranks, but they will

32 This statement is based on an analysis of UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey Results 2018, which shows that job security remains the highest factor influencing personnel to stay in the military whilst the impact on family life and spouses’ careers remains the highest factor influencing personnel to leave. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169 76/AFCAS_2018_Main_Report_FINAL.pdf, 13. 7/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

forfeit stability. Forewarned, these individuals can prepare their families and make appropriate domestic arrangements for housing and children’s education.

11. Meanwhile the remainder, not identified as the top 10% (the ‘talent’), do not need to feel quite as burdened by the pressure to compete for promotion at the earliest opportunity and the desire to try and attain a rank that is for some, beyond their ability.

They can choose appointments that better suit their domestic needs, whilst still competing for Unit Command and other career opportunities, with potential career progression as far as 1*.

Matching Individuals to Career Fields

12. The next requirement is then to better match all personnel to the available appointments. The answer to this issue is in ensuring earlier engagement of all individuals with the five Career Fields (CF). In the first instance, the pool of officers undergoing talent management will need to dip in and out of several CFs in order to gain a broad understanding of how Defence works, therefore preparing them to lead the institution in the longer term. The remainder should be allowed to specialise in a CF earlier, thus supporting their requirement for stability, whilst also allowing them to gain meaningful subject matter expertise in a field that still provides advancement to 1* (in CF terms this is a Branch Head). To achieve this, officers should be introduced to the CFs earlier in their careers; educating YOs and identifying those with suitable backgrounds or

specialist capabilities.33 Having completed an initial staff appointment in a CF they would then be encouraged to return for subsequent staff tours throughout their careers.

The encouragement could come in the form of a clearly articulated career path taking them through the next two or three ranks in one particular CF. This has the added advantage of tying them geographically to fewer locations34 which brings with it all the many benefits of domestic stability for individuals and families.35 And happy families mean greater retention!36

13. If potential CFs are identified early enough37 then ICSC could even offer relevant modules to those officers going to the different staff specialisms afterwards. On appointment as a junior Major, officers would then be exposed to the relevant doctrine, policy and academic theories that will assist them in their future career development.

14. The final key to success is to ensure that once officers have been assigned to a

CF, and selected for a staff appointment, they must be given time to develop real expertise in their fields. The current 24-month duration for a staff tour is too short. It takes several months to develop expertise and it is human nature for an officer to start to reprioritise their outputs once their next appointment has been announced;38 which can also be several months before their current assignment ends. This means that there is

33 For example, those with technical degrees will be particularly suited to the C and A field and could be steered towards attending the Battlefield Technology Course (BTC) that would subsequently line them up for staff appointments in capability development and procurement. 34 For example, MD in the South East; C and A in the South West; Pers in Glasgow. 35 Continuity of education for children and the possibility of spouses being able to invest in their own careers. 36 UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey Results 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169 76/AFCAS_2018_Main_Report_FINAL.pdf, 13. 37 This might require Reporting officers to include specific CF recommendations in YO’s appraisals. 38 Arguably this will effect some more than others but the domestic upheaval alone (housing, children’s education, spouse’s career, etc) serves to distract personnel from focusing on their jobs. 9/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

only a short “sweet spot” of optimum output in the middle of an appointment that might last just over 12 months. Those not in the talent management pool have the advantage of being able to spend longer in a staff appointment and therefore gain real mastery of their brief. Thus meeting the needs of the Army for continuity and expertise in staff appointments, and the needs of the individual for stability and a rewarding career.

CONCLUSION

15. The Army requires a three pronged approach to improve its Personnel

Management system. First, it must align its structures with its liability to alleviate gapping and remove unnecessary posts from the organisation. This is both a more efficient use of personnel, and a positive move for retention. Second, it must identify talent early; those officers who are the top 10% of their peers and who will eventually lead the institution. These officers will move between appointments more rapidly, gaining experience across a wide breadth of Defence organisations before filling the top jobs. Finally, the remainder will understand from an earlier stage in their careers that, whilst they are not going to be the CGS, they can still have a full, successful and productive career. Their expectations will also be better managed as a result; the career path open to them would still be varied and challenging, with opportunities to command at Unit level.39 Less constrained by the pressure of achieving rapid career advancement they can spend longer in staff appointments in one particular CF, allowing them to become specialists in their chosen CF through appointments at OF3, OF4 and OF5 ranks, following a career path that could still lead as far as 1*. What they lose in promotion

39 Anecdotally, the possibility of Unit Command remains a key driver for officers up to the rank of Lt Col. 10/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

opportunities they will gain in stability both domestically and professionally40. These recommendations therefore ensure that both the needs of the Army and the individual are better met than they are currently.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. Spread the pain of gapped posts. Gaps in Staff appointments must be more evenly shared across the ranks from OF3 to OF5 to remove the pressure on the No 5

Board, better serve the institution and ultimately increase the retention of Majors in the

Army.

17. Alternative solutions to fill staff appointments. FTRS and LE officers should be used to fill gaps in the short term until the structures are realigned.

18. Further employment of LEs. It is recommended that a separate work strand should consider the further employment and career progression for LEs, including promotion beyond Lt Col (OF4).

19. Reprioritisation of Staff Appointments. The division of appointments into

Critical, Must, Should and Could fill priorities ahead of Appointments Boards should be conducted at the start of the year and remain extant for 12 months, alleviating a tendency for short-termism.

40 Which is a key reason for retention according to the UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey Results 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169 76/AFCAS_2018_Main_Report_FINAL.pdf, 13. 11/14 © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

20. Reduce numbers promoted to Colonel (OF5). To begin the process of reducing the Army’s structure there must be fewer promotions to Colonel (OF5). This would mean an increase to the amount of time that most officers will spend as Majors (OF3) and

Lieutenant Colonels (OF4) in line with the recommendation to manage talent better.

21. Talent Management. The top 10% of “talented” officers should be identified early in their careers based on academic qualifications, performance AOSB, RMAS and

RD. They should be removed from the mainstream and managed accordingly, given high profile staff appointments and mentored for the higher echelons of the institution. This cohort can be revaluated at ICSC in order to catch any “late bloomers” and filter out those no longer suitable.

22. Match Staff officers to Career Fields earlier. Officers not in the Talent

Management system should be placed into a CF that suits their personal interests, educational background and professional aptitude. They will be nurtured in their respective CFs so as to grow into genuine SMEs providing greater value to the Army in their staff output. Their staff tours will be longer (minimum 3 years) and they will gain increased domestic and professional stability as a result.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Army 2020 Explained”, video 17:04, Future of the Army, https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/future-of-the-army/.

Dan Sabbagh, “British army recruitment shortfalls may be symptom of changing times,” The Guardian, 9 August 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2019/aug/09/british-army-recruitment-shortfalls-may-be-symptoms-of- changing-times.

United Kingdom. Army Headquarters. Army General Administrative Instruction (AGAI) 35 Promotions. Andover, Army HQ Reprographics, March 2015.

United Kingdom. Army Personnel Centre. Policy, Precedent and Rules for Appointments Boards 2019. Glasgow, Kentigern House Reprographics, September 2018.

United Kingdom. Defence Statistics. UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey Results 2018. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac hment_data/file/716976/AFCAS_2018_Main_Report_FINAL.pdf, 13.

United Kingdom. House of Commons. Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. London, OGL, 23 November 2015.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. “Army chief sets out vision for ‘inclusive’ future.” Last accessed [or modified] 3 August 2015. https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2015/08/03/army-chief-sets-out-vision-for- inclusive-future/.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. The Promotions and Appointments Warrant 2009. Royal Warrant, 24 April 2009.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. The Queen’s Regulations for the Army 1975 (amendment number 37). Open Government Licence v3.0, 20 August 2019.

United Kingdom. Military Secretary. Board Proceedings 2018 -19. MS Web, 3 October 2019. https://army.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/regionalcommand/MSWeb/SitePages/ Home.aspx.

ANNEX A TO DS545 SERVICE PAPER DATED 25 OCT 19

ANALYSIS OF APPOINTMENT BOARD RESULTS (OCT 18 – OCT 19)

This analysis has been conducted on the results of the following three Appointments Boards41 over a 12-month period.

1. No 2 Board. Colonel (OF5) Staff Appointments 18/19.

No 2 Bd Sep 19 Jul 19 Jun 19 May 19 Apr 18 Feb 19 Nov 18 Total Appointments 68 101 66 13 43 67 67 425 Not Filled 2 0 1 0 0 3 2 8 Promotions 16 42 5 2 17 24 13 119 % Not Filled 3% 0% 2% 0% 0% 4% 3% 2%

2. No 4 Board. Lieutenant Colonel (OF4) Staff Appointments 18/19.

No 4 Bd Sep 19 Jun 19 Mar 19 Dec 18 Total Appointments 153 214 217 309 893 Not Filled 37 46 55 42 180 Promotions 26 8 17 29 80 % Not Filled 24% 21% 25% 14% 20%

3. No 5 Board Results. Major (OF3) Staff Appointments 18/19.

No 5 Bd Jul 19 Jun 19 Apr 19 Oct 18 Total Appointments 349 431 474 767 2021 Not Fill 225 125 187 243 780 % Not Filled 64% 29% 39% 32% 39%

4. Comparison of No 2, No 4 and No 5 Board Fill Rates and Percentages.

No 5 Bd No 4 Bd No 2 Bd Appointments 2021 893 425 Not Filled 780 180 8 % Not Filled 39% 20% 2%