: Th e quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping ISS Head Offi ce Block D, Brooklyn Court, Veale Street New Muckleneuk, Pretoria Research seminar report Tel: (27-12) 346 9500 Fax: (27-12) 346 9570 E-mail: [email protected]

ISS Addis Ababa Offi ce First Floor, Ki-Ab Building, Alexander Pushkin Street, Pushkin Square, Addis Ababa Tel: (251-11) 372-1154/5/6 Fax: (251-11) 372 5954 E-mail: [email protected]

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ISS Nairobi Offi ce 5th Floor, Landmark Plaza Argwings Kodhek Road, Nairobi, Tel: (254 -20) 300 5726/8 Fax: (254-20) 271 2902 E-mail: [email protected]

ISS Pretoria Offi ce ISS Conference Report Block C, Brooklyn Court, Veale Street New Muckleneuk, Pretoria Tel: (27-12) 346 9500 Fax: (27-12) 460 0998 ISBN 978-1-920114-81-7 E-mail: [email protected] www.issafrica.org

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The publication of this report has been made possible by the generous support of the UK Department for International Compiled by Solomon A Dersso Development (DFID), and the Federal Foreign Offi ce of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, general Institute funding is provided by the Governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Hilton Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, 10 and 11 December 2008 Somalia: Th e quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping Research seminar report

Compiled by Solomon A Dersso Hilton Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, 10 and 11 December 2008 Contents

Acknowledgements ...... iii

Acronyms ...... iv

Introduction ...... 1

Aims and objectives ...... 2

Organisation and structure of the seminar ...... 3

Opening session ...... 4

Session I Background – history and current state of the Somali crisis ...... 5

Session II Current eff orts for peacemaking in Somalia ...... 7

Session III Keeping the peace where there is no peace to keep – the case of AMISOM ...... 9

Session IV Internal and external challenges for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia ...... 11

Session V International norms and their application to the Somali confl ict – normative imperatives versus practical realities ...... 14

Session VI

Lessons learned ...... 16 Response to the crisis ...... 16 The peace process ...... 16 International norms and modern peacemaking ...... 17 Mission planning and development ...... 17

Closing session ...... 18

Annexure A ...... 19

Research Seminar Report i Acknowledgements

Th e seminar and the publication of this report has and the Federal Foreign Offi ce of the Government of the been made possible by the generous support of the UK Federal Republic of Germany. Department for International Development (DFID),

Research Seminar Report iii Acronyms

AMISOM AU Mission in Somalia APSTA African Peace Support Trainers Association ASF African Standby Force (of the African Union) DDRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations, EASBRIG Eastern Africa Standby Brigade ESBRICOM Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism IGASOM Regional Military Mission, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) ISS Institute for Security Studies LECIA Legon Centre for International Aff airs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SADC Southern African Development Community TFG Transitional Federal Government, Somalia TFP Training for Peace Programme, ISS UNITAF United Nations International Task Force UNAMID United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur UNITAF Unifi ed Task Force UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia

iv Institute for Security Studies Introduction

One of the aims of the African Peace Support Trainers probably the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with more Association (APSTA) is to undertake applied policy than three million people in need of humanitarian aid. Th e research that facilitates debate and information exchange country’s civilians, but especially vulnerable groups such as among APSTA member institutions on current develop- children, women and the elderly, require protection from ments in the fi eld of peacekeeping in Africa, and to the violence. As there is no authority in Somalia capable of examine the application of emerging norms and concepts providing such protection, it is incumbent upon members such as the responsibility to protect. of the international community to provide this. Considering the formidable challenge that the ongoing Although the adequacy and eff ectiveness of interna- confl ict in Somalia poses to peacekeeping, and the degen- tional eff orts are open to debate, there has lately been in- erating humanitarian situation in that country, a research creased activity by the UN and the AU to try and achieve seminar was held by APSTA in Nairobi, Kenya, on 10 and a peaceful resolution to the confl ict. Th e AU deployed a 11 December 2008 to focus on peacemaking and peace- peacekeeping mission in Somalia known as AMISOM, keeping in Somalia. while the UN initiated a peace process that resulted in Since the failed US-led UN intervention in early 1990s, the Djibouti Agreement of June 2008 and culminated in the Somali confl ict received marginal attention. eTh situ- the establishment of a national unity government in late ation changed dramatically following Ethiopia’s armed January 2009. intervention in late 2006. In the subsequent period the Notwithstanding the serious humanitarian crisis that country experienced the worst fi ghting following the col- has unfolded in Somalia and the new peace initiatives, lapse of law and order in 1990. According to a BBC report the implications of that country’s volatile security situ- entitled ’24 hours in Somalia’, broadcasted on 6 October ation on peacemaking and peacekeeping have not been 2008, about 8 000 people had lost their lives in the confl ict explored adequately. Th ere is insuffi cient research to since late 2006 . Th ousands more were injured, assaulted inform policy-makers and other interested actors. Th ere and raped. At least 10 per cent of the population of is also little, if any, research on the process that has led Somalia were displaced or became refugees. South-central to the deployment of AMISOM and the composition of Somalia was aff ected the worst. that force. It is important to draw out lessons from the As the confl ict escalates, each day adds to the number peacemaking and peacekeeping eff orts currently under- of deaths, injuries and displacements. Today, Somalia is way in that country.

Research Seminar Report 1 Aims and objectives

The seminar, organised under the title ‘The quest for ■ Current eff orts at peacemaking and peacekeeping, and peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia’, had the the internal and external dynamics and challenges for purpose of offering researchers from APSTA member peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia. institutions and policy-makers from the AU, AMISOM ■ Lessons to be learned from the deployment of AMISOM. and other actors an opportunity to deliberate on the ■ Th e application of relevant international norms and challenges and prospects for successful peacemaking concepts/doctrines. and peacekeeping in Somalia. A further aim was to ■ Th e role and current state of AMISOM. identify lessons learned from past and current peace- making and peacekeeping efforts in order to guide Based on discussions in these areas, the seminar sought to peacekeeping training and inform the doctrine on make recommendations for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping of the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF). peacekeeping in Somalia, ways of preventing the failures The research seminar thus set itself the task of examin- of AMISOM, and the possibilities of its replacement by a ing the following topics: UN mission.

2 Institute for Security Studies Organisation and structure of the seminar

Th e event was held in Nairobi on 10 and 11 December 1. Opening Session: Welcome and introduction 2008 and was organised by the APSTA Secretariat, hosted 2. Session I: Background: history and current state of the by the Institute for Security Studies. Th e seminar brought Somali crisis together 25 participants from diverse backgrounds. Th ey 3. Session II: Current peacemaking eff orts in Somalia included representatives from APSTA member institu- 4. Session III: Peacekeeping where there is no peace tions, the AU, AMISOM, the Eastern African Standby to keep – the case of the AU Mission in Somalia Brigade Coordination Mechanism (ESBRICOM), the (AMISOM) Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the Southern 5. Session IV: Internal and external dynamics and chal- African Development Community (SADC) and the North lenge for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 6. Session V: International norms and their application Th e seminar was structured into eight sessions, as to the Somalia confl ict: Normative imperatives versus listed below. Th e six main sessions were arranged around practical realities a presentation, a response to tease out the various issues 7. Session VI: Lessons learned from the presentation, and structured discussion on the 8. Closing Session topic of the presentation.

Research Seminar Report 3 Opening session

Th e seminar was opened by Peter Edopu, Nairobi a touch-and-go approach. Th e third factor was what she Offi ce Director, ISS, who welcomed the participants. He called ‘too little, too late’. Some of the interventions had expressed the hope that the seminar would contribute not been made in time and in most instances they had towards ongoing eff orts for peacemaking and peacekeep- been inadequate. Even in the face of mounting catastro- ing by identifying policy recommendations that are phes, members of the international community had failed practicable and relevant to the situation in Somalia. to deliver on their promises to protect, had deployed Dr Linda Darkwa from the Legon Centre for poorly-equipped missions with inadequate numbers of International Aff airs (LECIA), University of Ghana, de- personnel and, most importantly, had provided weak and livered the keynote address on behalf of APSTA member problematic mandates. institutions. Dr Darkwa spoke about the importance of Th e last reason identifi ed by Dr Darkwa was lack of the seminar and how it fi tted into APSTA’s mission and focus and failure to address root causes. Somalia had objectives. She observed that Somalia is a country that become a theatre for many activities, including the fi ght has been described with many adjectives, none of them against terrorism and piracy, humanitarian assistance etc, favourable. Although confl ict was endemic to human and this had resulted in a lack of focus and coordination. nature, violent confl ict was not. When confl ict degenerate Most important, in her view, was the fact that much of the into violence, as had happened in Somalia, there were focus had been on addressing the symptoms of the con- approaches to be followed for their resolution. However, fl ict rather than the root causes. Current eff orts to resolve the Somali situation had defi ed resolution, despite various the Somali confl ict should avoid repeating these mistakes international initiatives. She identifi ed four reasons why in order to achieve success. this situation had arisen. Dr Darkwa informed participants that as part of its Th e fi rst was what she called the ‘same prescriptions objectives, APSTA sought to contribute to high-quality syndrome’. Some of the eff orts had failed because they did peacekeeping eff ectiveness in Africa by facilitating re- not take adequate account of the peculiarity of the Somali search. Th e seminar was a key vehicle in APSTA’s eff ort to confl ict, which called for new approaches. Th e second understand the underlying causes of confl ict, the impact reason was a lack of political will. Dr Darkwa pointed of confl ict on Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, and the out that there had not been a co-ordinated, concerted eff orts required to resolve such confl ict. Th is, she said, and sustained eff ort on the part of the international com- would assist training institutions to provide relevant and munity to address the Somali crisis. Rather, most eff orts up-to-date training that would contribute signifi cantly to had been characterised by piecemeal attempts involving the resolution of confl icts.

4 Institute for Security Studies Session I Background History and current state of the Somalia crisis

In the fi rst session, Solomon Dersso, Senior Researcher, understanding of the mandate by forces coming from ISS, dealt with the background to the Somali confl ict. By diff erent countries, which led to contradictory approaches outlining the historical, political and social processes that towards the confl icting parties. led to the genesis of the confl ict, his presentation laid the In his conclusion, Mr Dersso indicated that one of foundation for the subsequent, more specialised sessions. the most important factors that had continued to fuel the He pointed out that the confl ict in Somalia did not have Somali confl ict was rivalry between various warlords that its origin in a sudden eruption of hostilities, but was the purported to represent the diff erent clans and sub-clans. result of an interplay of long-term historical, political and In his view, all peacemaking and peacekeeping eff orts in socio-economic factors. Somalia had to be informed by the historical, social and Th e confl ict had its roots in the colonial history of political processes underlying the confl ict if they were to the country, in particular the division of the people of be successful. All the dynamics and facets of the confl ict Somalia into diff erent sovereign units and the institu- and their changing character should be appreciated fully, tionalisation of unequal relations between various groups be analysed individually and comprehensively, and be and the state. Th e most important factors for the outbreak approached in an integrated manner. He emphasised the of hostilities included the inequality between diff erent need to understand the nature of the confl ict adequately Somali clans, perpetuated and exacerbated by Siad Barre’s and to design solutions suited to the particular circum- regime; the rise of an authoritarian and corrupt system stances pertaining to Somalia. of governance; the eff ects of the Cold War, including the Th e complexity and peculiarity of the confl ict were failure of the socialist economic policy and the militarisa- recognised and deliberated upon during the discussion. tion of Barre’s government; the resultant proliferation Th ere was consensus that the history of the country of small arms and light weapons in the country; and the (the colonial legacy), socio-economic conditions (clan longstanding rivalry and confl ict with neighbouring system and inequalities), political factors (post-colonial states, in particular Ethiopia. governance), deep mistrust and the north-south divide Concerning early attempts by the international com- had all contributed to the current situation. Some argued munity to resolve the confl ict, Mr Dersso made reference against the utility of describing Somalia as a failed state, to the UN intervention in the form of the United Nations maintaining that it was only the government that was dys- Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the US–led, functional, while Somalia existed as a state. It was noted, UN-approved force, known as the Unifi ed Task Force however, that this was a matter of defi nition and its utility (UNITAF). He highlighted the weaknesses of these lay in identifying what had to be fi xed in Somalia if peace interventions, including UNOSOM’s failure to contain was to be achieved. the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation Participants pointed out that the approach of the despite the force having been enlarged to 5 000 personnel, international community to the crisis in Somalia had and UNITAF’s focus on the humanitarian side of the been seriously fl awed. Th e focus had been on reconciling confl ict without having an appreciation of the context of warlords, who carried responsibility for the protracted the confl ict. Another weakness was the lack of common confl ict, and on mitigating the suff ering of the Somali

Research Seminar Report 5 Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping

people. Little attention had been given to the role of the suggested that while putting in place mechanisms to many other important Somali actors, including religious address inequalities and rivalry among Somali clans, con- leaders, civil society organisations, businesses and siderable focus should in addition be placed on identify- Somalis living abroad. Th ere was a need for the peace ing and institutionalising the commonalities that unifi ed process to be all-inclusive and participatory. It was also Somalis as a people.

6 Institute for Security Studies Session II Current eff orts for peacemaking in Somalia

In this session, Ibrahim Farah, a Somali scholar at the Th e Djibouti Agreement presented Somalis and University of Nairobi, delivered a presentation on current the international community with an opportunity to peacemaking eff orts in Somalia. His presentation in- resolve the Somali issues. According to Mr Farah, it cluded an analysis of the ongoing UN-led Djibouti peace brought a glimmer of hope, though not light at the end process. It highlighted the dynamics of this initiative of the tunnel, and should encourage cautious optimism. and the issues at play. Mr Farah also put the Djibouti However, the Somali confl ict itself was far from over as process in context by referring back to the many previ- the actors in Djibouti were incapable of ending it. Peace- ous, unsuccessful initiatives. Based on the interest the building and state-formation required reconciliation, Djibouti process had attracted and the wide support it mending of relations and restoration of trust. But state had received, it was argued that this new initiative was the formation was at the same time characterised by competi- only game in town and that it had to be given a chance by tion, anxiety and tension. all. Even more so as there was no alternative process on Th e Djibouti process faces many challenges, includ- the table beside the Djibouti peace process. ing implementation of the transitional plan, which Mr Farah’s overview on the Somali peace talks required the draft ing of a new constitution acceptable to looked at the major peace initiatives. Th e fi rst was the all Somalis, the taking of a census, and the holding of a UN initiative (1991 to 1994), which ended with the with- referendum and elections, as well as peace building and drawal of UN forces from Somalia, leaving the country post-confl ict reconstruction activities such as disarma- in a state of anarchy. Th is was followed by the European ment, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration Commission initiative (1995 to 1996), the Arta peace (DDRR), security-sector reform and, critically, reconcilia- process (1999 to 2000) and the Eldoret/Mbagathi peace tion. Other challenges included political Islam, which had process (2000 to 2004). become increasingly dominant in the current confl ict, and Mr Farah identifi ed various reasons for the failure the challenge of maintaining the continued engagement of of these initiatives. In the fi rst instance, most of the the international community. processes focused on warlords to the exclusion of Th e responses to Mr Farah’s presentation raised impor- other Somali actors. Th is legitimised the position of tant points that opened the way for a lively discussion on warlords in the country, resulting in fragmentation and issues such as the role of various Somali actors, the impor- a multiplication of the number of warlords over the tance of involving key external players, and the question of years. Th en there was the problem of peace processes what distinguished the Djibouti peace process from others being limited to achieving the reconstitution of state and the chances of success. Th ere was also a provocative structures, and hence failing to deal with the social and question on whether Somalis were really interested in peace relational dimensions of the confl ict. Some of the peace or whether peace was being imposed on them. processes, such as the Djibouti-initiated Arta process, Mr Farah pointed out that the lessons learnt from failed because of lack of support by some Somali actors previous peace initiatives indicated that unless the and infl uential countries in the region, in particular process was inclusive it could not win support and might Ethiopia. even face opposition, a factor that would contribute to

Research Seminar Report 7 Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping

its failure. Also, without the support of countries in the the region and from major powers in the international region and major powers in the international community community, including the US, the AU, the EU and the the peace initiative would not succeed. Although there Arab League. If the momentum and strong engagement were many challenges facing the Djibouti process, which of the international community were sustained, there made it susceptible to suff ering the same fate as previous chances were strong that the Djibouti process would initiatives, the many positive factors this time round succeed. Mr Farah pointed out that it was not a lack of increased the chance of success. Th e actors involved in interest in peace on the part of Somalis that led to the the process had displayed a reasonable degree of commit- failure of previous initiatives. Like other peoples, Somalis ment. Despite opposition from key actors, in particular wished to live in peace and security. It was the actions al-Shabab, the process had the backing of many Somalis. and inactions of certain internal and external actors that Moreover, unlike other previous initiatives, the frustrated peace from returning to Somalia. Djibouti process was attracting wide support from within

8 Institute for Security Studies Session III Keeping the peace where there is no peace to keep The case of AMISOM

In this session on AMISOM’s peacekeeping eff orts there by AMISOM, with focus on localised peace-building were two presentations, the fi rst by Xavier Ejoyi of ISS TFP initiatives. In his view there were three viable options, Nairobi and the second by Commander Frank Hanson namely pursuit of the Djibouti peace process, a multina- of the UN/AU Planning Team of AMISOM. Mr Ejoyi ad- tional peacekeeping successor that included Morocco, dressed the issue of keeping peace where there is no peace Jordan, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the ‘blue-hating’ of to keep, while Cmdr Hanson discussed the challenges that AMISOM, that is a UN Somali mission. Th e latter option the new dynamics of the confl ict, including roadside and was to be considered by the UN in June 2009. suicide bombings, posed to the peacekeeping eff ort. During the discussion participants talked about the Mr Ejoyi provided a concise background to the confl ict dilemma that a possible withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, briefl y presenting an overview of the peace would create. Th e resulting security gap would expose processes in Somalia, from UNOSOM to AMISOM. He AMISOM to increasing attacks from opposition forces. examined the mandate of AMISOM and highlighted the Concerning the deployment of a UN force, it was felt following factors aff ecting its mandate: that, given the high level of insecurity in Somalia, it was unlikely that the Security Council would agree to such ■ AMISOM’s force-generation challenges. a step. Even if such an agreement was secured, it was ■ Th e question of legitimacy – the limited leverage of the unlikely that UN member states would be willing to Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and various contribute the necessary forces, especially in the light of armed groups over the security situation in Somalia. lack of consensus on action to be taken in Somalia and the ■ Th e prevalence of a war economy – security, piracy risks involved. Even in Darfur, the (UNAMID) has yet to and clan-based economic empires. achieve its mandated size. It was one of the unfortunate ■ Weak central authority – centres of power that lie with facts of peacekeeping operations that their implementa- clan leaders and businessmen. tion depended on the willingness of states to contribute ■ External actors – Ethiopia and its support for the TFG. forces, the availability of logistical support and the provi- ■ Major challenges faced by AMISOM – limited sion of the necessary mandates. funding, complexity of the political process, insecurity Cmdr Hanson then addressed AMISOM’s opera- and attacks on the AMISOM base. tions, the Djibouti Agreement and its implications for AMISOM. AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Mr Enjoyi posed the question whether AMSOM was Mandate IGASOM (Regional Military Mission of the engaged in peacekeeping or in ‘peace courting’. As Intergovernmental Authority on Development – IGAD) things stood, there was no peace to keep in Somalia and of 12 May 06 and PSC Mandate AMISOM of 19 Jan 07 AMISOM was unable to fulfi l its peacekeeping mandate. provided the legal basis for AMISOM’s operations. Th e As the Somali confl ict was not a conventional confl ict, mandates permitted AMISOM to conduct peace support there was no need to look at conventional confl ict operations in Somalia for a limited period of six months resolution approaches. Mr Enjoyi suggested that it was to stabilise the situation and to create conditions for the necessary to broaden the role currently being played conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate

Research Seminar Report 9 Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping

take-over by the UN. Th e activities undertaken by and the challenges facing AMISOM. It was indicated AMISOM ranged from providing VIP protection to the that AMISOM’s mandate to provide protection to TFG TFG leadership and others involved in the peace process, institutions should not normally be a problem, but under to protecting key Transitional Federal Institutions and the prevailing conditions created diffi culties for AMISOM installations so that humanitarian assistance, such as as it gave the perception that AMISOM was siding with medical care for the wounded and sick, could be provided. the TFG. It tended pull AMISOM into the confl ict and However, for AMISOM to implement its mandate signifi - its forces had already suff ered multiple attacks from cant progress would have to be made in the peace process. al-Shabab forces. Th e failure of contributing countries to Cmdr Hanson then listed the parties to the confl ict and provide the personnel promised by them placed a limita- identifi ed the threats that aff ected AMISOM in the execu- tion on AMISOM’s presence in the country. Because of tion of its mandate. Parties to the confl ict included the TFG this, AMISOM was deployed only in key sectors of some police, the TFG military force, the Ethiopian forces and of the areas in which it was mandated to have a presence. hostile or insurgent groups, including the Alliance for the According to Cmdr Hanson, the low pace of force Re-Liberation of Somalia, al–Shabab, al-Itahad al-Islamiya, generation, lack of operational equipment and the absence various groups involved in criminal activities, Old Guards, of mission infrastructure and unpredictable funding, loose militias and undisciplined troops. Th e threats include coupled with the military threats it faced, made it diffi cult insurgent actions in the form of roadside bombs, mortar for AMISOM to execute its mandate eff ectively. Even so, and RPG attacks, and piracy. Th e general insecurity created AMISOM continued to win the hearts and minds of the by these threats had made it very diffi cult for humanitarian Somali population by providing urgently needed medical agencies to operate eff ectively. and humanitarian assistance. In addition, despite the A range of questions were asked and discussed aft er unprovoked attacks on it, AMISOM continue to hold the the presentation. Th ese include the nature of the mandate, most vital footprint for operations in Somalia. According particularly with respect to the protection of TFG institu- to him, the development of a strategy for force generation tions, the implications for peacekeeping, the importance and the holding of a donor conference for AMISOM of increasing the AMISOM force to its mandated size, would go a long way towards easing its path forward.

10 Institute for Security Studies Session IV Internal and external challenges for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia

Th e fourth session was devoted to an analysis of the also indicated that there are studies that show that coun- internal and external factors and actors of the Somalia tries with homogeneity can also be prone to confl icts as confl ict that have a critical bearing on peacemaking the example of Rwanda (one of the least diverse countries and peacekeeping eff orts. Dr Abdulahi Osman of the in Africa) shows. University of Georgia, USA, introduced his topic by Building on the presentation by Mr Dersso, Dr Osman quoting the Serbian politician, Vesna Pesic, who said: discussed the factors underlying the confl ict in Somalia, ’Ethnic confl ict is caused by fear of the future, lived highlighting the historical, political and socio-economic through the past’. Th is set the tone of his presentation dynamics of the confl ict. Th ese included the eff ects of and contextualised the Somali confl ict. According to the country’s colonial experience, social inequalities, him, the central question of the Somali confl ict, as economic decline and authoritarian rule under General expressed by Professor Ahmed I. Samatar (1993) is: ’… Barre. He further identifi ed militarisation of Somali why and how could this society, one of the few nations society and the roles of warlords and al-Shabab as relevant in the continent with one ethnic group, one culture, one internal factors. language, and one religion, fi nd itself in such parlous Concerning militarisation of the society, he made the circumstances – verging on self-destruction?’ following shocking revelations about military expendi- Dr Osman identifi ed two schools of thought that seek ture during the country’s long history of internal con- to explicate the linkages between social dynamics and fl ict. In pursuit of a Greater Somalia at independence, confl ict in Somalia. Th e ‘homogeneous’ school maintains the country embarked on an unprecedented military that homogeneous societies experience less confl ict than build-up. Because of its strategic location there was no heterogeneous ones. With respect to the Somali confl ict, it shortage of suppliers. Between 1960 and 1990 Somalia assumes that the Somali people originated from southern spent an average of 20,45 per cent of its budget on the Arabia, share the same language and culture, have a military and had an average of eight soldiers per 1 000 common ancestry, subscribe to Islam, engage in camel population, well above the regional average of 3,4 sol- nomadism and, most important of all, unlike the rest of diers per 1 000 population. Th e military expanded from Africa, regard themselves as a nation. As expressed by the 5 000 troops in 1960 to 165 000 in 1990. In the 1960s, quotation of Prof. Samatar, this school fi nds it diffi cult to Western countries provided arms to the value of US$10 explain how and why Somalia slipped into confl ict. million, but under the treaty signed with the Soviet Dr Osman questioned this notion of homogeneity on Union in 1974 arms to the value of $30 million were to two counts, thereby conveying the thoughts of the second be supplied. However, between 1980 and 1989 the US school. First, Somalis were not as homogenous as many provided military aid worth $390 million in the form of people might think. Somalis were composed of settled grant aid, credit sales, military training and security- and unsettled communities, agriculturalists on the one related ’Economic Support Funds’, plus a further $200 hand and nomads on the other, who between them spoke million in cash sales. Th e total US expenditure of $600 six languages, including various Bantu languages. Second, million equated to about $100 per Somalian. Between he argued that homogeneity tended to lead to confl ict. He 1980 and 1985 Somalia was the fourth highest recipient

Research Seminar Report 11 Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping

of US military aid, and from 1986 onwards it was the ■ Addis Ababa conferences, 1993 to 1995 biggest recipient in sub-Saharan Africa. ■ Cairo conference, 1996 According to Dr Osman, this excessive military ■ Arta Djibouti conference, 2001 to 2004 spending was one of the contributing factors to Somalia’s ■ Nairobi, Kenya initiatives, 2004 to present internal wars. As Siad Barre’s government weakened and ■ Djibouti 2008 initiative (Islamic Courts, TFG) eventually collapsed, the weaponry accumulated over the ■ Somewhere soon (Islamic Courts, TFG, al-Shabab etc.) years ended up in the hands of various players, whose rivalry for power immersed the country into the abyss Dr Osman identifi ed various external factors that had con- of anarchy and war. With the ousting of Siad Barre in tributed to the failure to resolve the Somali confl ict despite January 1991, clan-based warlords began to jockey for so many initiatives having been undertaken. According political power. Th e focus of international initiatives to to him, the problem with many of the initiatives lay with reconcile those Somalis with the most weapons led to the the misguided assumption of a panacea of Western-style legitimisation of warlordism, leading to the fragmenta- democracy for Somalia. Th is led to an uncritical focus on tion of Somali political forces and a multiplication of the building democratic institutions. Another problem lay with number of warlords. In 1991 there were four warlords; the division and rivalry among neighbouring countries today there are more than 100, and more warlords are that backed one group against another. In addition, Egypt, emerging every year. Libya and other Middle Eastern countries provided support Looking at the Somali calamity critically, Dr Osman to Islamic groups that were currently opposed to the gov- argued that war in Somalia was more about growth and ernment and the Djibouti process. protection of entrenched economic interests than about In his concluding remarks, Dr Osman submitted people’s interests. Th e key features of the Somali confl ict that ‘the Somali war is a zero-sum game where warring were now war-making, war-profi teering and the suff ering factions are fi ghting either to become Siad Barre, or of the silent majority. He identifi ed the following patterns not to allow others to become Barre.’ Peace would not in the confl ict: be achieved by merely bringing the war to and end, but rather by a holistic approach to human wellbeing. Th e ■ Th e concentration of the war in the southern part of focus of those striving to end the confl ict in Somalia the country. Th e inhabitants of this area continued to should not just be on ‘negative’ peace initiatives, the suff er the bulk of death and destruction. achievement of which was limited to diplomatic and ■ Th e inhabitants of the most fertile parts of the country military eff orts, but on ‘positive’ eff orts that dealt with had become the main victims of starvation. First, their underlying structural factors, e.g. injustices, prejudices, food stores had been looted, then they were kept from marginalisation etc. Dr Osman suggested the following productive activity and, fi nally, they were blocked three approaches to resolving the Somali confl ict: from receiving food and medicine from the interna- tional donor community, or it was taken from them. ■ Engaging the diaspora community that has money, Th is resulted in the disproportionate death of tens of infl uence and is educated thousands of southern Somalis. ■ Enhancing the roles of clan and religious leaders ■ Th e overwhelming majority of warring factions, within the country including the Islamic Courts and the TFG, stemmed ■ Punishing the wrongdoers, e.g. the warlords from the nomadic clans of the central and north- eastern regions. Broad recommendations were then made by Dr Osman:

In an attempt to demonstrate the role of external actors ■ Control the fl ow of weapons and the challenge of peacemaking and peacekeeping ■ Put into place a truth and reconciliation commission eff orts being completed successfully in Somalia, he listed ■ Conduct a census to expose the myth of majority, e.g. the eff orts that had been made towards resolving the the unfair 4.5 formula for power sharing confl ict from 1991 onwards, as follows: ■ Rebuild state institutions ■ Attracting Somalis living outside the country ■ UNITAF, 1992 to 1993 ■ Send in peace-making forces ■ UN Security Council Resolution 733 (weapon’s ■ Rebuild the country’s economic infrastructure embargo), January 1992 ■ Educate the Somali people ■ UNOSOM I & II, 1992 to 1995 ■ , 2001 An issue raised in response to Dr Osman’s presentation ■ Djibouti conferences, 1991 to 1992 concerned the link between heterogeneity and confl ict. It

12 Institute for Security Studies Compiled by Solomon A Dersso

was argued that the theory that heterogeneous societies sustainable peace, and that for any process to gain the are more prone to confl ict than homogenous ones was support of the international community it needed to based on the understanding that although diversity by conform to established democratic standards. itself was not a source of confl ict, the existence of ethnic The other issue discussed was the priority to be or other divisions in a society created the foundation on given to negative peace and positive peace processes. which confl ict could occur. On the basis of this, some It was argued that in the absence of negative peace, questioned the validity of the view that homogenous positive peace could not be pursued since it was only societies were more prone to confl ict than heterogeneous when the guns were stopped and a certain degree ones. Rather, it was the historical, political and socio- of stability was achieved that institution-building, economic conditions, coupled with triggering factors, that post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation, DDR and occasioned confl ict. other initiatives could be implemented. Nevertheless, Addressing a question on the relevance of democracy, there was agreement about the importance of working Dr Osman argued that for Somalia democracy was a on positive and negative peace initiatives in tandem. luxury. Th e focus should rather be on creating stability In this regard, it was noted that although the deploy- and achieving peace. Attention should be paid to proc- ment of AMISOM was a highly commendable move, esses, including traditional and religious processes that its role was of a military nature with only a limited led to stability and peace, even if these were not based on humanitarian component, and that regrettably it has accepted Western democratic principles. Some argued, no peace building and reconstruction components. For however, that in the contemporary world it was widely the peacekeeping operation to have more substantive accepted that democracy was the only basis for organis- impact on the ground, it should increasingly focus on ing political power in society as well as for achieving these components.

Research Seminar Report 13 Session V International norms and their application to the Somalia confl ict Normative imperatives versus practical realities

Th e fi ft h substantive session addressed the relevance of responsibility to protect, as articulated in various UN international normative frameworks and their applica- resolutions and reports, and as legally established within tion to the Somali confl ict. Mr Solomon Dersso of the the framework of the AU Constitutive Act (Article 4 ISS outlined existing and emerging international norms (h)), called upon the international community to take that are of particular importance to the current Somali certain measures, including direct intervention, in order crisis, in particular norms pertaining to human rights law to avert a humanitarian crisis, ensure human security and humanitarian rules, and to human security and the and thereby establish international peace and security in responsibility to protect. the aff ected country. Th ese measures included preventive Mr Dersso maintained that the current security and diplomacy and peacekeeping, with the latter having to be humanitarian situation in Somalia was of such a nature implemented according to certain principles relating to that it imposed an obligation on members of the inter- impartiality and legitimacy, among others. national community to take the measures called for by Echoing a statement by the AU Panel of the Wise, Mr international norms. Somalia was going through a war the Dersso argued that the reality of the Somali situation violence of which had not been seen since the war started made it clear that there were few countries in the world 1990s. As a consequence of war, insurgency and state where there was such an acute need to translate into failure, international human rights and humanitarian law action the much heralded principle of the responsibility had been violated on a large scale. A humanitarian catas- to protect. He said that when examining the actions trophe had been occasioned in which tens of thousands of the international community through the prism of had perished, hundreds of thousands had been displaced stated norms, it left much to be desired. Th e conclusion and about 3,1 million people were in need of emergency to be drawn was that the international community had food aid, with children in particular being exposed to failed the Somalis, beginning with a failure to recognise malnutrition. and categorise the situation in Somalia and ending with From the perspective of established international failure to call for the application of the principle of the human rights and humanitarian norms, it was incumbent responsibility to protect. Some went as far as to argue on the parties to a confl ict not to violate international that the international community was standing on the humanitarian norms. When there was such violation, sidelines while Somalia was bleeding. Mr Dersso posited however, it was expected that mechanisms put into that the debacle surrounding AMISOM and the failure place by the international community for the purpose to achieve a limited force strength of even 8 000 person- of redressing the situation were implemented by the nel showed that despite important changes having been international community. Such mechanisms could achieved under the AU, the organisation still suff ered include the establishment of a judicial inquiry and, in from many of the same institutional and political limita- the worst case, the instituting of a legal case against the tions as its predecessor, the OAU. Its paper promises perpetrators within the framework of the Rome Statute on the responsibility to protect had yet to be translated of the International Criminal Court. In addition, emerg- into action to end the violence that millions of Africans ing new normative concepts on human security and the continued to endure.

14 Institute for Security Studies Compiled by Solomon A Dersso

During the discussion, participants underscored the the principles regulating peacekeeping operations. Some importance of international norms, but noted that in argued that the principle of impartiality, in particular, terms of their application the international community limited the eff ectiveness of peacekeeping forces as it lacked consistency. Although applied in some parts of forced them to stand by and watch while violence raged the world, these norms were not implemented in Africa around them. However, it was pointed out that this was consistently. Somalia was not the fi rst instance on the a common perception among members of the general continent where the international community had failed public resulting from the confl ation of impartiality and to honour its promise to protect. Delegates expressed neutrality. As long as the right mandate was in place, their regret at this double standard, noting that Africa modern peacekeeping forces were generally expected continued to be aff ected as it was not yet in a position to to protect civilians against attacks and take appropriate fi ll the gap because of the AU’s institutional weakness and measures against combatants that target civilians. Th e resource and capacity constraints. principle of impartiality did not require them to be Other issues raised by delegates related to the diffi cul- neutral in the face of such violence, but merely committed ties or limitations being experienced in applying some of them not to side with any particular group in the confl ict.

Research Seminar Report 15 Session VI Lessons learned

Th e sixth session, presented by Mr Andrews Atta- from the international community. Th is has implications Asamoah of the ISS and Dr Linda Darkwa of LECIA in for the impunity with which they commit atrocities in Ghana, looked at the lessons learnt during the seminar. Somalia. Th e most important lessons identifi ed included the pe- culiar character of the Somali confl ict and the need for THE PEACE PROCESSES approaches that took these particularities into account, including the form disarmament should take, the Internal historical, economic, political and social factors training required for peacekeepers, the nature of state- and external geo-political and strategic-interest factors building and the imperative of changing the roles of underlie the Somali crisis and the dynamics of the con- warlords and civil society actors in the peace processes. fl ict. Any realistic eff ort for peace in Somalia must take More specifi c lessons could be summarised under four these factors into account. headings, namely: Somalia is not a homogeneous society, although ho- mogeneity in itself, as has been demonstrated elsewhere, ■ Response to the crisis has not proved to be a guarantee for stability. Principles ■ Th e peace processes of peaceful co-existence that harness diversity should be ■ International norms and modern peacekeeping promoted to improve the possibility of confl ict resolu- ■ Mission planning and deployment tion. Th e clan system is an important point of divergence among the Somali people and an attempt should be made RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS to identify areas where the various clans converge as a point of entry to fi nding a solution to the clan factor in Th ere is a need for a well-coordinated, sustainable, the confl ict. multifaceted and comprehensive approach in response to Clan politics, nepotism and inequality are at the centre protracted and complex confl icts such as in Somalia. Th e of the Somali confl ict and it is imperative that mecha- international community should move away from its fi re nisms capable of addressing these problems form part of fi ghting approach of responding to situations that are only the solution to the confl ict without making clan member- symptomatic of the Somali crisis such as the deployment ship the basis for access to power and resources. of naval forces to fi ght off piracy and the provision of Th e fact that formal diplomacy and resolution eff orts humanitarian assistance, and adopt an approach that both in Somalia have generally focused on warlords to the stabilizes the situation and responds to the root causes of exclusion of actors such as civil society organisations, who the confl ict. also matter in the political dynamics of the country, has Th e massive increase in the number of warlords resulted in failure. Th e Arta peace initiative failed in part involved in the Somali confl ict is partly the result of the because it focused on institutional processes instead of the international community until now not having taken any underlying causes of the confl ict. decisive action with regard to the warlords and warring Th e current Djibouti Agreement should be supported factions, who still enjoy their freedoms without sanction and eff orts should be made to make it more inclusive.

16 Institute for Security Studies Compiled by Solomon A Dersso

What is needed is coordinated and strong international the peace before keeping it. Th is was the case of ECOMOG engagement in the peace process, not only during the in Liberia and it is the case of AMISOM in Somalia. negotiation stage, but also and most importantly during AMISOM’s experience indicates the challenges that the the implementation stage. ASF will face when it becomes operational in 2010. Th e fi rst Peace building and state rebuilding are interrelated diffi culty it will need to overcome will be to generate and in the Somali context and should not be treated as mutu- deploy a mission with the necessary capability in the time ally exclusive. Th ey should be pursued side by side, not stipulated. Although AMISOM is mandated to have a force sequentially. of 8 000, aft er two years it is operating with less than half Th ere have been attempts to impose western solutions this force. Other serious challenges will include funding, to the Somali crisis, but these have not succeeded and are management capability and the provision of logistics. not likely to succeed without a formidable political space Th ere is also the issue of implementing peace-building within which such solutions can thrive. programmes at the same time as keeping the peace. Peace will not be achieved by merely bringing the war to and end, but rather by a holistic approach to human MISSION PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT wellbeing. Negative peace can be accomplished through diplomacy, but positive peace can be achieved only by Understanding the culture of the people in a mission area addressing atrocities, administering justice and con- is critical to appreciating the underlying historical, politi- fronting the underlying causes of confl ict. An holistic cal and social processes that underpin the confl ict. approach to the quest for peace, which incorporates both A realistic assessment of force requirements and the military and diplomatic eff orts as well as peace-building capacity to meet that requirement is important for the initiatives, is required. success of any peacekeeping mission. Th e force strength of Th e Somali diaspora, clan elders and religious leaders UNISOM I had to be beefed up when it became clear that have an important part to play in the realisation of peace the number of troops deployed aff ected its performance. in Somalia. Th ere is a need to create space for their active UNISOM and UNITAF failed in Somalia partly and genuine involvement in the initiatives. because of their lack of strategic response to the root Attempts need to be made to bring to the realisation causes of the Somali confl ict. Th ese forces had a limited of warlords the need for peace and the fact that they can purpose and did not intend to stay in Somalia for long. realise their economic interests in a peaceful Somalia Integrated peace support operations should be planned to as well. In addition, eff orts should be made to reduce extend over a suffi cient period of time to permit a realistic the warlords’ incentives for building economies around impact to be made. Somalia’s insecurity or peace processes. Hurried deployment without operational plans and management structures in place subjects a peace mission to INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND unnecessary challenges and lessens its impact. In the case MODERN PEACEKEEPING of AMISOM, for example, troops were deployed before the planning and management unit was established. Not only contemporary international human rights law, Th e AU should develop a permanent structure and the but also the emerging norms relating to human security capacity for mission management and support along the and the responsibility to protect, defi ne the basis for lines of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations international action and the nature of such action. Th ese (DPKO). Th is will enable the AU to plan new missions should address a confl ict that engenders a serious hu- properly and provide the necessary technical leadership manitarian crisis and poses a threat to international peace and support for missions already established. and security. Th ere needs to be eff ective implementation of the However, the international community appears UN Program on Small Arms and Light Weapons, to have diffi culties with the principled application of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (or these norms, as illustrated by the case of Somalia. Th e Reinsertion or Rehabilitation) as this will build a popula- community has failed to honour its promise with regard tion’s confi dence by creating an environment of security. to the responsibility to protect, since its actions do not Eff orts should also be made to demilitarise the population. match that which is required. Th e AU needs to achieve Good understanding of the local context of confl ict the required level of capacity in terms of the operation- and the factors that drive the opposition, as well as the alisation of the ASF to make attainment of these norms a reasons for opposition to and attacks on peacekeepers is reality on the African continent. essential. Th e response to such opposition and attacks From peacekeeping experiences across the continent it should be adequately informed by a constant analysis of is evident that sometimes a peacekeeping force has to fi nd the local situation based on accurate information.

Research Seminar Report 17 Closing session

Th e seminar concluded with closing remarks by Mr will in addition contain recommendations for all those Solomon Dersso. He thanked the participants and involved in the Somali peace process. expressed the wish of ISS to see a stable Somalia in the Based on the richness of the presentations, the not to distant future. He also acknowledged the fi nancial diverse composition of the presenters and the depth and support of the Foreign Offi ce of the Federal Republic quality of deliberations, the seminar could be considered of Germany, which had made the seminar possible. Mr very successful. Th e participants looked forward to Dersso indicated that a seminar report would be pub- seeing the seminar report and in having a follow-up for lished and distributed to the participants and APSTA integrating the recommendations and lessons learnt in member institutions, as well being presented to various the on going eff orts for peacemaking and peacekeeping stakeholders. In addition to this seminar report, the in Somalia. presentations will also be developed into papers that

18 Institute for Security Studies Annexure A

Attendance at the APSTA seminar on peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia, Nairobi, 10 and 11 December 2008

Country/ SRL Rank/Title Name E-mail address Organisation

Regional Peacekeeping Training 1. Colonel G Milanzi [email protected] Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe

SADC Planing Element (PLANELM, 2. Brigadier General/ Director Thobeka Jozi (Mrs) [email protected] Gaborone, Botswana

3. LECIA, Accra, Ghana Research Fellow, Dr Linda Darkwa (Mrs) [email protected]

4. AU/AMISOM, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Police Commissioner Hudson Benzu [email protected]

5. IPCS, Dar es Salaam Tanzania Programme Offi cer Severine S Allute [email protected]

6. APCOF, Cape town, South Africa Director, Dr Elrena Van der Spuy (Mrs) [email protected]

7. Environmental Aid, Lagos, Nigeria Programmes Director David Azutori [email protected]

8. ISS, Pretoria, South Africa Senior Researcher Solomon Dersso [email protected]

9. ISS, Pretoria , South Africa Junior Researcher Thembani Mbadlanyana [email protected]

10. KAIPTC, Accra, Ghana Deputy Commandant Albert Bentil Addison [email protected]

11. NDC, Abuja, Nigeria Research Fellow Henry Okotie [email protected]

12. AU/AMISOM, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Wing Commander Frank Hanson [email protected]

13. University of Nairobi, Kenya PhD Candidate Ibrahim Farah [email protected]

14. Farah Sheik [email protected]

15. ISS, Nairobi, Kenya Researcher Xavier Ejoyi [email protected]

16. ISS, Nairobi, Kenya Researcher Andrews Atta-Asamoah [email protected]

Brigade Commander, [email protected], osman_ 17. ESBRICOM Osman Soubagleh Standby Brigade HQs [email protected]

University of Georgia, 18. Dr Abdulahi A Osman [email protected] of America

Research Seminar Report 19 Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping

Country/ SRL Rank/Title Name E-mail address Organisation

19. Embassy of Morocco, Nairobi, Kenya Counsellor Bouchaib Zair [email protected]

20. IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya Research Analyst Marco Jowell [email protected]

21. IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya Head of Research Jason A Steeves [email protected]

22. Joint Force Commander, NATO LTG ITD Giorgio Pantarelli [email protected]

23. AMISOM, Nairobi, Kenya Chief of Staff Samson E Isaac [email protected]

Ambassador, Head of [email protected] 24. EASBRICOM, Nairobi, Kenya Teferra Shiawl Administration [email protected]

25. EASBRIG HQ, Addis Ababa Major General Hason Mohamed [email protected]

20 Institute for Security Studies Research Seminar Report 21