89 Meadowcroft Douglas Coalition and 2015 Election

TheC lastOA Journal of Liberalli History (issueT 88, autumnION 2015) was a special AN issue on the 2010–15D coalition T and theH LiberalE Democrats. 2015 Unsurprisingly, it triggered E a rangeL of responses,EC includingT a numberION of letters (see page 25). Here, Michael Meadowcroft considers the implications of the party’s targeting strategy for the outcome of the 2015 election, and Roy Douglas queries the decision to enter coalition in the first place. Targeting: its effect on Liberal Democrat performance in the 2015 general election Michael Meadowcroft y concern that the Autumn 2015 issue of the MJournal of Liberal History would be too close to the end of the coalition, and to the general election just a handful of months ear- lier, to enable a rigorous analysis of governmental decisions and of the Liberal Democrats’ strategy made me predisposed to be critical of the editorial decision. I was largely wrong, and the articles under the rubric ‘Coalition and the Liberal Democrats’ provide valuable mate- rial for the record and for further research. Remarkably, however, all these accounts of the past five years wilfully ignore the consequences on the Liberal Democrats’ performance of its targeting strategy. It is a remarkable omission when, argu- ably, it had a pervasive and malign was thereafter unchallenged and it viable party. We do not just have effect on the party’s vote generally could be applied unilaterally from a constituency targeted but also and was a major cause of the mas- the centre with increasingly dra- individual wards within other con- sive reduction in votes almost eve- conian selection and support meas- stituencies. What is more, when a rywhere and of the derisory vote in ures. As far as I can ascertain there previously Liberal-Democrat-held many constituencies. was no review of the principle of ward loses its councillors, unless it Put at its simplest, twenty years the strategy and of its effects over can demonstrate its massive com- of targeting, under which, year the twenty years from its introduc- mitment to winning it back, pref- by year, the party’s financial and tion up to last May’s election. The erably with one of the previous campaigning resources were con- disastrous results suggest that, even ward councillors, it gets struck off centrated on fewer and fewer con- on its own terms, the strategy had, the target list so that the party constituencies (and local government at best, failed to deliver and at worst tracts more and more and areas that wards) has left the party with just it had so hollowed out the party in had previously had a significant eight MPs and 8 per cent of the the 550 plus seats that were not tar- number of activists are written off popular vote. Whilst vividly true gets that its base vote was minimal and lose any party presence. The in its own terms, this statement and that the party, no longer hav- City of Leeds is a good example of ignores a host of other factors that ing a presence in some 85 per cent the problem. There is, of course, impinged significantly on the strat- of the country, could not withstand the Leeds North West constituency, egy and its effects. the adverse icy wind that blew brilliantly held by Greg Mulhol- The figures show clearly that fatally as a consequence of a coali- land in May. However, in 2004, the introduction of targeting prior tion with the Conservatives. in addition to the four wards in to the 1997 general election coin- this constituency, there were eight cided with an increase in the num- other target wards, six of which ber of MPs elected from twenty in The consequences of were won. By 2014 there were only 1992 to forty-six in 1997; and the continued targeting four such wards, just two of which one was assumed to be so self-evi- Targeting applied to individual were won. Thus in the run up to dently a consequence of the other wards for local elections has added last May’s general election 75 per that the efficacy of the strategy to the problems of maintaining a cent of the city was written off by 20 Journal of Liberal History 89 Winter 2015–16 TheC lastOA Journal of Liberalli History (issueT 88, autumnION 2015) was a special AN issue on the 2010–15D coalition T and theH LiberalE Democrats. 2015 Unsurprisingly, it triggered E a rangeL of responses,EC includingT a numberION of letters (see page 25). Here, Michael Meadowcroft considers the implications of the party’s targeting strategy for the outcome of the 2015 election, and Roy Douglas queries the decision to enter coalition in the first place. the party and only in Leeds North elections – welcome to be sure but and in working men’s clubs etc. East and Leeds East, where some achieved at great cost. My conclu- as well as producing a great colleagues disobeyed central party sion is that there was an argument deal of coverage in the local instructions, were there even one for targeting for a single election newspapers. Also, there is at constituency-wide election address, but not thereafter. least a minimal value in tying (they just held on to their deposit in up activists of the other parties Leeds North East.) It is no wonder to inhibit them from work- that we poll derisory votes in most The issues ing against the party in its key of the city. Perhaps the most seri- There are seven questions that need seats. ous consequence of such targeting to be addressed in the light of recent 3. Does targeting produce sig- is that it does not hold out the pos- elections, and particularly that of nificant extra workers in key sibility of revival. If party instruc- May 2015: seats? Some additional workers tions are followed, no one gets any 1. Does the party wish to be a certainly transfer their activ- support whatever in working sac- national party with at least a ity to help in key seats but it rificially in a non-target ward with minimum active presence in is only the dedicated party the determination to win it – as was every constituency? If so this members that do so, as most a key method of success before the is incompatible with target- local activists only see a need strategy. ing as practised up to the 2015 to be involved in their own general election. Unless there patch. Also, there is a dimin- is a widespread national pres- ishing return as the lack of Statistics ence there is no point of con- local activity causes activists to The national statistics for the six tact for potential members, for become inactive. elections, 1992 to 2015, are reveal- the media, for campaigning 4. Is there a value in having as ing (see Table 1). to change illiberal local poli- large a national vote as pos- It would appear that apply- cies, or for applying national sible? I certainly believe that ing targeting after the 1992 gen- policies and campaigns locally. there is. I would not dispute eral election achieved what it set At the very least, the Liberal that winning seats and hav- out to do: it traded a reduction in Democrats cannot be a politi- ing a significant parliamen- the party’s national vote for a large cal party making the argument tary presence is crucial, but the increase in the number of MPs for Liberalism and seeking to extended influence of the par- elected. However, the results in the recruit and sustain those who ty’s MPs, their moral authority following three elections hardly have a personal allegiance to and the political legitimacy of justify the risk of ending campaign- that philosophy unless there Liberalism is underpinned by a ing in a majority of constituencies is a party locally to join and massive national vote. It is also in order to release party activists in to participate in, and this important to the advocacy of them to go and work in the desig- applies to ensuring that there electoral reform. nated seats. Clearly there was still a are activities for surges of new residual perception of a widespread members such as after the lead- party presence in that the total poll ers’ debates in 2010 and post- Table 1: Liberal Democrat performance, 1992–2015 remained roughly the same in 2001 election in 2015. Year LD votes LD % MPs elected and actually increased in 2005 and 2. What is the value to seats that (million) 2010. This had disappeared by 2015 are designated as target con- 1992 6.0 17.8 20 after thirteen years of a widespread stituencies in activity across 1997 5.2 16.8 46 lack of local campaigning activity the board? In Leeds, over the and faced with the adverse political fifteen years it took to win 2001 4.8 18.3 52 circumstances of that election; but the West Leeds seat it was cer- 2005 6.0 22.0 62 even before 2015, the trade-off of tainly helpful that there was 2010 6.8 23.0 57 ‘presence’ for seats only produced activity across the city that was eleven additional MPs over four commented on in workplaces 2015 2.4 7.9 8 Journal of Liberal History 89 Winter 2015–16 21 COAliTION AND THE 2015 ELECTION 5. Is there a viable alternative Can Liberals learn from history? to targeting? Historically, an Roy Douglas example is provided by West Leeds over the long years the Liberal Party took to win it in n the Autumn 2015 issue of coalition of 1918–22, even though 1983.

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