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Doctrine for Joint Special Operations Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 17 December 2003 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides the overarching doctrinal guidance for the conduct of joint special operations (SO) across the full range of military operations. It describes the characteristics of special operations forces (SOF), joint SOF core tasks; the typical organization; and command and control of SOF. It further provides a joint force commander (JFC) the guidance and information necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for SOF. This publication summarizes support requirements necessary to conduct SO missions and defines the training and education responsibilities of the United States Special Operations Command, geographic combatant commanders, and the Services. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. 3. Application a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine i Preface and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: T. J. KEATING VADM, USN DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF ii JP 3-05 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, DATED 17 APRIL 1998 • Adds a discussion of special operations and principles for military operations other than war • Adds a discussion on the nature of special operations warfare • Revises discussion of special operations missions to special operations core tasks • Deletes special operations collateral activities • Changes mission of “civil affairs” to core task of “civil affairs operations” and mission of “combatting terrorism” to core task of “counterterrorism” • Clarifies command and control of special operations forces within a theater • Adds a discussion of subordinate command and control organizations • Adds a discussion on the Special Operations Command and Control Element • Deletes the chapter on planning for joint special operations • Adds coverage of air support, geospatial information and services support, and fire support of special operations forces • Adds an appendix on special operations forces education and training iii Summary of Changes Intentionally Blank iv JP 3-05 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ vii CHAPTER I OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS • Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1 • Special Operations ..................................................................................................... I-1 • Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations ........................................... I-2 • Characteristics of Special Operations ......................................................................... I-4 • Special Operations and the Principles of War ............................................................. I-5 • Special Operations and Principles for Military Operations Other Than War ................ I-7 • The Nature of Special Operations Warfare ................................................................. I-7 CHAPTER II SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE TASKS • Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1 • Designated Special Operations Forces ..................................................................... II-1 • Characteristics of Special Operations Forces ............................................................ II-2 • Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks..................................................................... II-3 CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES • Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1 • Assignment of Special Operations Forces ............................................................... III-2 • Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater .............................. III-3 • Special Operations Forces Command and Control, Coordination, and Liaison Elements ............................................................................................... III-10 • Joint Special Operations Area ............................................................................... III-13 CHAPTER IV SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES • Introduction ............................................................................................................ IV-1 • Intelligence Support of Special Operations Forces .................................................. IV-1 • Logistic Support of Special Operations Forces ........................................................ IV-2 • Medical Support of Special Operations Forces ........................................................ IV-4 • Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of Special Operations Forces ................................................................................... IV-5 • Public Affairs Support of Special Operations Forces ............................................... IV-6 v Table of Contents • Legal Support of Special Operations Forces ............................................................ IV-6 • Combat Camera Support of Special Operations Forces ........................................... IV-7 • Air Support to Special Operations Forces ............................................................... IV-7 • Space Support of Special Operations Forces ........................................................... IV-7 • Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of Special Operations Forces .............. IV-7 • Geospatial Information and Services Support of Special Operations Forces ............ IV-8 • Fire Support to Special Operations Forces .............................................................. IV-9 APPENDIX A Special Operations Forces Education and Training ............................................. A-1 B References ......................................................................................................... B-1 C Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ C-1 GLOSSARY Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-4 FIGURE I-1 Principles of War ............................................................................................ I-5 I-2 Principles for Military Operations Other Than War.......................................... I-8 II-1 Special Operations Forces Truths .................................................................. II-4 II-2 Special Operations Core Tasks ...................................................................... II-5 II-3 Civil-Military Operations Relationships ....................................................... II-11 III-1 Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control ................. III-3 III-2 Special Operations Forces Subordinate Joint Force Command and Control ................................................................................................. III-5 III-3 Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component Command and Control ................................................................................................ III-6 III-4 Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Elements ...............................
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