Joint Publication 3-05
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
17 December 2003 PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides the overarching doctrinal guidance for the conduct of joint special operations (SO) across the full range of military operations. It describes the characteristics of special operations forces (SOF), joint SOF core tasks; the typical organization; and command and control of SOF. It further provides a joint force commander (JFC) the guidance and information necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for SOF. This publication summarizes support requirements necessary to conduct SO missions and defines the training and education responsibilities of the United States Special Operations Command, geographic combatant commanders, and the Services.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.
3. Application
a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine
i Preface and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
T. J. KEATING VADM, USN DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
ii JP 3-05 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, DATED 17 APRIL 1998
• Adds a discussion of special operations and principles for military operations other than war
• Adds a discussion on the nature of special operations warfare
• Revises discussion of special operations missions to special operations core tasks
• Deletes special operations collateral activities
• Changes mission of “civil affairs” to core task of “civil affairs operations” and mission of “combatting terrorism” to core task of “counterterrorism”
• Clarifies command and control of special operations forces within a theater
• Adds a discussion of subordinate command and control organizations
• Adds a discussion on the Special Operations Command and Control Element
• Deletes the chapter on planning for joint special operations
• Adds coverage of air support, geospatial information and services support, and fire support of special operations forces
• Adds an appendix on special operations forces education and training
iii Summary of Changes
Intentionally Blank
iv JP 3-05 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... vii
CHAPTER I OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
• Introduction ...... I-1 • Special Operations ...... I-1 • Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations ...... I-2 • Characteristics of Special Operations ...... I-4 • Special Operations and the Principles of War ...... I-5 • Special Operations and Principles for Military Operations Other Than War ...... I-7 • The Nature of Special Operations Warfare ...... I-7
CHAPTER II SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE TASKS
• Introduction ...... II-1 • Designated Special Operations Forces ...... II-1 • Characteristics of Special Operations Forces ...... II-2 • Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks...... II-3
CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
• Introduction ...... III-1 • Assignment of Special Operations Forces ...... III-2 • Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater ...... III-3 • Special Operations Forces Command and Control, Coordination, and Liaison Elements ...... III-10 • Joint Special Operations Area ...... III-13
CHAPTER IV SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
• Introduction ...... IV-1 • Intelligence Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-1 • Logistic Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-2 • Medical Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-4 • Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-5 • Public Affairs Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-6
v Table of Contents
• Legal Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-6 • Combat Camera Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-7 • Air Support to Special Operations Forces ...... IV-7 • Space Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-7 • Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-7 • Geospatial Information and Services Support of Special Operations Forces ...... IV-8 • Fire Support to Special Operations Forces ...... IV-9
APPENDIX
A Special Operations Forces Education and Training ...... A-1 B References ...... B-1 C Administrative Instructions ...... C-1
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ...... GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ...... GL-4
FIGURE
I-1 Principles of War ...... I-5 I-2 Principles for Military Operations Other Than War...... I-8 II-1 Special Operations Forces Truths ...... II-4 II-2 Special Operations Core Tasks ...... II-5 II-3 Civil-Military Operations Relationships ...... II-11 III-1 Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control ...... III-3 III-2 Special Operations Forces Subordinate Joint Force Command and Control ...... III-5 III-3 Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component Command and Control ...... III-6 III-4 Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Elements ...... III-7 III-5 Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions ...... III-12 IV-1 Examples of Special Operations Forces Intelligence Requirements ...... IV-2 IV-2 Strategic Special Operations Forces Patient Movement ...... IV-4 IV-3 Space-Based Support to Special Operations Forces ...... IV-8
vi JP 3-05 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
• Provides an Overview of Joint Special Operations
• Discusses the Forces and Core Tasks Used in Joint Special Operations
• Describes Command and Control of Joint Special Operations
• Discusses the Support of Joint Special Operations
• Describes Education and Training of Special Operations Forces
An Overview of Joint Special Operations
Special operations (SO) The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relies on have become an integral individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of part of a theater campaign specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with across the range of adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The military operations. small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of special operations forces (SOF) operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate military responses. These responses may not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces. Although SO may be conducted as a single-Service operation, they routinely require joint support and coordination. In addition to being conducted across the full range of military operations, SO may be focused on the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war. SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. Alternatively, SO may be principally offensive, of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, and often time- sensitive targets. The principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity) and the principles of military operations other than war (objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) apply to SO in the same way they apply to conventional operations. Commanders and SO planners must understand these principles and how they relate
vii Executive Summary
to SO. They must also understand the importance of integrating and synchronizing SO with conventional missions.
Forces and Core Tasks
Success by a small force The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or against a strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of special operational objective units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities. The demands usually requires units with of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them combinations of special from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with equipment, training, these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are people, or tactics that go compatible with their capabilities. SOF are not a substitute for beyond those found in conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional units. conventional capabilities.
SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and information operations.
Command and Control
Successful execution of Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all SOF SO requires clear, based in the United States are under the combatant command responsive, command and (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander, US Special control (C2) by an Operations Command. SOF assigned to a theater are under the appropriate special COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. Within a operations forces (SOF) geographic combatant command, command and control (C2) C2 element. of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command. Normally, C2 of SOF is executed through either the theater special operations command (TSOC) or a joint special operations task force. Although designated as SOF, PSYOP and civil affairs support both SO and conventional operations; their C2 relationships will reflect this. Deconfliction and coordination with conventional forces are always critical concerns for SOF commanders. To fully integrate SO and conventional operations, SOF must maintain effective liaison with all components of the joint force to ensure that unity of effort is maintained and risk of fratricide is minimized.
viii JP 3-05 Executive Summary
Support of Joint Special Operations Forces
SOF require equipment The joint character of SO requires support arrangements across and support that are Service lines in order to sustain operations that are often tailored to specific mission independent and remote. Further, SOF must be able to exploit requirements, yet are the full range of available national support systems such as those flexible enough to offered by emerging technologies and space-based assets. respond to changing employment parameters. Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in determining SO mission objectives, identifying relevant targets, and mission planning and execution. The nature of many SO objectives and tactics requires intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional operations. Counterintelligence support must also be considered in protecting sensitive SOF missions. The TSOC commander (or, when a joint task force is established, the joint force special operations component commander) determines logistic requirements for in-theater SOF for the geographic combatant commander. Logistic support for SOF can be provided through one or more of the following: Service support, joint in- theater support, nonstandard support, SO-peculiar support or host- nation support. SOF medical support is characterized by an austere structure and a limited number of personnel with enhanced medical skills. Provision of medical support beyond SOF capabilities depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning with the conventional medical support structure. Command, control, communications, and computer support to SOF must be global, secure, jointly interoperable, and flexible so that it can be tailored to any SO mission. The sensitivity of many SO mandates thorough and accurate public affairs guidance and legal support. Combat camera support to SOF is used to portray the true nature of US operations. Air support is provided to SOF to facilitate effective and responsive operations. Space support ensures SOF commanders understand the capabilities available to support them and facilitate or enable effective operations. Meteorological and oceanographic support services are critical to the success of SO missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental information should be included in the decision-making process.
ix Executive Summary
Education and Training
SOF require education SOF require a combination of education, basic military and training that are training, and specialized skill training to achieve operational tailored to specific proficiency. SOF-specific training includes both individual skill requirements. training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness.
CONCLUSION
This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution of joint special operations across the range of military operations. It also provides guidance for commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare SOF to conduct the tasks herein described. Further, it provides commanders information necessary to identify, nominate, and select objectives and missions appropriate for SOF.
x JP 3-05 CHAPTER I OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
“Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coups d’état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug traffickers as well) across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects in surrounding (and even distant) countries. Thus a “many small wars” scenario is compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call “special operations” or “special forces” — the niche warriors of tomorrow.”
Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century 1993
1. Introduction
This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for and conduct special operations (SO). It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control (C2) of special operations forces (SOF) when assigned to a geographic combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or a joint task force (JTF) commander. Specific SO operational guidelines are provided in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
2. Special Operations
a. These are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.
b. SO are an integral part of theater campaigns. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. SO must complement — not compete with nor be a substitute for — conventional operations.
I-1 Chapter I
Special operations forces are made up of individuals highly proficient in specialized combat skills.
c. The successful conduct of SO relies on individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of SOF operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate military responses. These responses may not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces.
d. SO can be conducted directly against an adversary by forces acting in a single engagement such as a raid against a critical communications node, or indirectly, for example, by organizing, training, and supporting an indigenous force for unconventional warfare (UW), or a host nation (HN) force for foreign internal defense (FID), or through the use of psychological operations (PSYOP) to influence the opposing military or the local civilian populace. In all cases, the results are normally disproportionate to the size of the units involved.
e. SO are inherently joint. Although they may be conducted as a single-Service operation, most are planned and executed as a joint operation. SO routinely require joint support and coordination.
3. Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations
Military operations are conducted across a range consisting of two general states: war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). This model assists the geographic combatant commander in articulating strategic situations within a theater that are described by a variety of political,
I-2 JP 3-05 Overview of Joint Special Operations
economic, and military conditions. Although each state within the range of military operations is described in discrete terms, in actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins. The model gives the JFC the ability to describe any situation in clear terms and allows the JFC to define needs, devise strategies, and project resources to meet the threat. SO are not bound by any specific environment. The principles by which SO are planned and conducted apply equally to both war and MOOTW.
a. War. SO can be conducted across the range of military operations at all levels of war and throughout all phases of a joint campaign. Commanders and planners should focus SO at strategic and operational levels to maximize efficiency. SO can also be applied tactically although the greatest utility is at the strategic level.
(1) The President designates national objectives and sanctions the military means to achieve them. In pursuit of these objectives, SO may be conducted under the direct supervision of the President or Secretary of Defense.
(2) Theater objectives are established by geographic combatant commanders, based on national objectives, and are an integral part of a theater campaign plan. The integration of SO through the theater special operations command (TSOC) can help the commander attain these objectives.
(3) Operational objectives established by subordinate JFCs support theater objectives and lead directly to theater success. SO provide the JFC with a selective, flexible deterrent option or crisis response capability to achieve operational objectives.
(4) SO may be conducted in support of a conventional force’s tactical objectives when doing so will be critical to the achievement of strategic or operational objectives by that conventional force.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS STRATEGIC UTILITY
1942, World War II, the German command ordered an increase in production of “heavy water” at the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork, in occupied Norway. This was the world’s only facility capable of manufacturing sufficient quantities of the element essential to the development and production of an atomic bomb. Churchill and Roosevelt were aware they were in a race with Hitler for possession of a strategic weapon powerful enough to determine the fate of the free world, accordingly the plant was ordered destroyed.
The reinforced construction of the plant and location of its critical processing machinery in the basement eliminated attack by bomber because of the lack of aircraft capable of the mission. The plant was built on a cliffside in a remote mountainous area and almost impregnable to ground attack.
I-3 Chapter I
In November 1942, after a glider-borne commando operation failed and its survivors were executed by the Gestapo, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) took over the project. A four-man SOE Norwegian advance team parachuted in several months prior to receiving a six-man assault force also inserted by parachute. The assault force, using cover as students on a skiing vacation, reconnoitered the plant from a safe distance and located a lightly secured point of entry. On the night of 27/28 February 1943, the assault team slipped into the plant, destroyed the heavy water production machinery, and quickly retired into the surrounding mountains. The Germans, with great difficulty, restored limited heavy water production. In November 1943, the US 8th Air Force launched an unsuccessful raid on the plant, causing casualties and loss of property in the nearby civilian community. In February 1944, a member of the SOE assault team sabotaged and sank a ferry carrying two railway cars of heavy water across a deep lake en route to Germany.
The effect of the operation put an end to Germany’s strategic atomic bomb program. Hitler then redirected his scientists to concentrate on the V1 and V2 rockets, which history has shown had little effect on Great Britain’s ability to wage war other than increase the resolve of the British people.
Thomas Gallagher Assault in Norway. 1975
M.R.D. Foot SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946. 1984
b. MOOTW. MOOTW encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States with the overarching objectives of deterring war and promoting peace, they also can include military support to US civil authorities. Especially when conducted outside the US, SO may be the best means of achieving certain objectives, and commanders and their staffs should be familiar with SOF capabilities when developing theater plans.
4. Characteristics of Special Operations
a. SO are characterized by certain attributes that distinguish them from conventional operations. SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. This may involve a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. Alternatively, SO may be principally directed at high-value targets of strategic significance. Such operations are often time-sensitive and rely on surprise, security, and audacity, and frequently employ deception to achieve success. These missions can be overt, clandestine, or covert in nature. Some operations may involve high physical and political risk, and can offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first attempt fail.
I-4 JP 3-05 Overview of Joint Special Operations
b. SO normally require tactical-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the area where the mission is to be conducted. Rigorous training and rehearsals of the mission are integral to the conduct of all operations.
c. SO are often conducted at great distances from operational bases employing sophisticated communication systems and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.
d. SO frequently require a high degree of discriminate and precise use of force. SOF require unique training and may also require the development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other Armed Forces of the United States.
5. Special Operations and the Principles of War
The principles of war apply to SO in the same way they apply to conventional operations. However, in some cases, specific principles have different emphases in the conduct of SO, primarily because SO are conducted by small units that seldom work with large formations or sizable reserves. Commanders and staffs must understand the principles of war — and how they relate to SO. The principles are an important doctrinal foundation and are essential to understanding and mastering warfare (see Figure I-1).
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Objective Offensive Mass
Economy of Simplicity Force
Surprise Maneuver
Security Unity of PRINCIPLES Command OF WAR
Figure I-1. Principles of War
I-5 Chapter I
a. Objective. SO are best employed in support of JFCs’ strategic or operational objectives. Many missions are characterized as limited, surgical, physically challenging, low profile, and sometimes separate from the immediate battlefield.
b. Offensive. The lethal application of SO is inherently offensive in nature because they seek to strike or engage an adversary to compel or deter his actions. The unique manner of application of SOF offensive capabilities assists JFCs in achieving results that may be unattainable by larger conventional forces.
c. Mass. SO concentrate combat power at critical times and in discriminate places to achieve decisive results. Massing combat power while avoiding concentration of forces can enable numerically inferior SOF to achieve decisive results while minimizing both human loss and the wasting of resources. SOF’s ability to strike at key nodes may create results equivalent to those achievable by large force concentrations.
d. Economy of Force. Economy of force is critical to the successful conduct of SO given the small size and lack of redundant capabilities inherent in SO tactical units.
e. Maneuver. SOF capability to maneuver allows them to strike adversaries where and when they are most vulnerable and to avoid their strengths.
f. Unity of Command. Unity of command fosters unity of effort and allows the JFC to integrate and synchronize SO with every aspect of the campaign. SOF C2 architecture is often tailored for each mission to achieve this end.
g. Security. SO planning and execution require high levels of security integrated fully with operations security (OPSEC) and force protection to protect the clandestine/covert nature of missions. Due to operational and political sensitivities the planning and execution of many SO are compartmentalized and limited only to personnel with a need to know. SO must balance security concerns with the need to rehearse and to integrate operations with other committed forces to facilitate unity of effort and help avoid fratricide. In addition, proper security planning and execution is essential to SOF force protection. Given their operating size, SOF are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their presence than larger conventional units.
h. Surprise. Surprise is often the most important principle in the conduct of successful SO and the survivability of employed SOF. Even if complete strategic surprise is unattainable, an SO must achieve operational and tactical surprise to the extent that the adversary cannot react effectively.
i. Simplicity. Although SOF may require sophisticated and often unorthodox methods and equipment, the plans that drive their employment must be simple and direct in order to facilitate understanding, withstand the stress of operational environments, and adapt to changing situations.
I-6 JP 3-05 Overview of Joint Special Operations
OPERATION JUST CAUSE
On the night of 19-20 December 1989, special operations forces (SOF), organized into a 4,400-man joint special operations task force (JSOTF), spearheaded Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. US Army Rangers conducted pre-dawn airborne seizures of critical airfields. Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) were employed to block possible escape routes of Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega, by denying him the use of his Learjet at Paitilla Airport and disabling a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) patrol boat in Balboa Harbor. Air Force Special Operations aircraft provided aerial insertion, pinpoint target interdiction, and aerial fire support. Army special forces (SF) set up a surveillance and antiarmor blocking position at the Pacora River bridge and conducted other operations to disable critical Panamanian telecommunications sites. SF and SEALs also conducted direct action raids and roll-up operations against Noriega’s infrastructure. The JSOTF accepted Noriega’s surrender at the Papal Nunciatura after an 11-day standoff. Subsequent to the initial assaults, Spanish-speaking SF soldiers — often backed up by Air Force Special Operations Forces gunships, Rangers, and conventional forces — were used to convince scattered PDF quartels to surrender peacefully. Army and Air Force psychological operations units communicated a call for surrender to PDF units, “dignity battalions,” and other hostile parties via radio, television, print, and loudspeaker. As Operation JUST CAUSE gave way to Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, civil affairs and other SOF units were employed to reconstitute the country’s political, economic, and security infrastructure.
SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
6. Special Operations and Principles for Military Operations Other Than War
SOF and their unique capabilities are valuable assets when conducting MOOTW. SOF are area oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the cultures and languages found in an operational area. SOF units can provide liaison to facilitate multinational and interagency interoperability. The principles for MOOTW are shown in Figure I-2.
For further details see JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
7. The Nature of Special Operations Warfare
The following apply to SO across the range of military operations:
a. Tempo. Tempo is critical to SOF’s ability to conduct SO. Rapid execution of a mission allows SOF to mass combat power at the critical place and time, accomplish the mission, withdraw before the adversary can react, and then attack again. A high tempo offsets small numbers and limited firepower by never allowing the adversary to bring his main strength (weight of numbers) to bear on committed
I-7 Chapter I
PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
OBJECTIVE Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective UNITY OF EFFORT Seek unity of effort in every operation
SECURITY Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage RESTRAINT
Apply appropriate military capability prudently
PERSEVERANCE Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims LEGITIMACY Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable
Figure I-2. Principles for Military Operations Other Than War
SOF. At the same time, a high tempo provides security through speed, allowing acceptance of a higher degree of risk than would be otherwise possible.
b. Preemption. SOF preempt the adversary by neutralizing its capabilities before the fight — either directly or in support of conventional forces. SOF do this through FID and UW efforts to build indigenous defense and intelligence capabilities; PSYOP directed at the adversary’s leadership, armed forces, and populace; civil-military operations (CMO) in areas brought under friendly control; counterproliferation activities to slow or inhibit development of a capability; direct action (DA) missions against an adversary’s critical operational or strategic targets; and counterterrorist operations. Deployed SOF often provide the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC with first-hand information regarding local population perspectives, intentions, and other information.
c. Dislocation. SO dislocate the adversary force from chosen positions either by forcing it to move from these positions or by rendering its strength useless or irrelevant to the fight. DA missions may force the adversary to reposition combat forces away from the main battle area to protect lines of communications (LOCs) and other vulnerable areas. PSYOP as part of information operations (IO) may create diversions or deceptions that will cause the adversary to deploy in a manner favorable to friendly forces. SOF possess the capabilities to organize and direct large indigenous
I-8 JP 3-05 Overview of Joint Special Operations forces that cause the adversary to spread its forces thin (through UW) or assist an HN in creating a military shield (through FID), behind which other government agencies can operate to remove the causes of insurgency.
d. Disruption. SO disrupt the adversary through attacks against strategic and operational targets and centers of gravity. This may preclude the adversary from conducting successful countermoves. SO can disrupt the adversary through special reconnaissance support of operational actions by conventional forces, DA strikes against critical operational targets, IO to disrupt adversary decision makers, and PSYOP directed at civilian and military leaders, military forces, and the adversary population – as well as an adversary’s political, economic, or military allies. Indigenous forces, trained through UW operations, can attack an adversary directly, thus disrupting its operations. When employed, SOF seek to avoid adversary strengths, and create and attack adversary vulnerabilities.
e. Exploitation. SO can provide the conventional force commander multiple means to attack the adversary’s will to resist. Exploiting psychological vulnerabilities can demoralize adversary troops, weaken the resolve of adversary leaders, separate the civilian population of an adversary nation from its leadership, and reduce or eliminate any external source of support. DA and UW can create the impression that there are too many forces for the adversary to counter effectively. With no safe areas, and adversary forces in rear areas subject to attack at any time, adversary morale can be significantly weakened.
f. Main Effort. The commander will designate a main effort for every operation. The activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. The commander should be prepared to change a main effort as the situation develops in order to exploit opportunities or to deal with crises as they arise. Generally, the main effort should be aimed at some critical adversary vulnerability (object or characteristic) which if attacked will contribute most directly to accomplishment of the mission.
g. Intelligence. SOF require timely, responsive, and accurate intelligence support to overcome their relative lack of size and firepower. Initially, SOF commanders use intelligence to find adversary weaknesses/vulnerabilities and avoid adversary strengths. Perfect intelligence is rarely if ever obtainable, but adequate, timely intelligence is a prerequisite for successful operations. Leaders must be able to act with less than perfect intelligence.
h. Decentralization. While SO personnel should be included in centralized planning at the combatant commander and subordinate JFC levels, successful SO requires decentralized planning and execution for individual missions. Independent judgment and effective coordination by SOF leaders at every echelon are vital to successful SO.
i. Initiative. SOF encourage an ability and willingness to make independent, time-critical decisions using all available information and guidance presented in higher headquarters (HQ) commander’s intent.
j. Operational Mission Criteria. The employment of SOF in support of the joint force campaign or operation plan is facilitated by five basic criteria. These criteria provide guidelines for both conventional
I-9 Chapter I and SOF commanders and planners to use when considering the employment of SOF.
(1) Is this an appropriate SOF mission?
(2) Does the mission support the JFC’s campaign or operation plan?
(3) Is the mission operationally feasible?
(4) Are required resources available to execute the mission?
(5) Does the expected outcome of the mission justify the risk?
I-10 JP 3-05 CHAPTER II SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE TASKS
“The modernization goal is a joint special operations forces (SOF) capability, quantitatively and qualitatively manned, trained and equipped to react swiftly to conduct a wide range of special operations missions worldwide, across the full spectrum of conflict and crisis, . . . This capability must be founded on comprehensive joint doctrine, inclusion of SOF in all joint plans and, wherever feasible, in joint exercises, and the provision of dedicated and augmenting units forward deployed in, or immediately deployable to, all unified commands.”
Casper Weinberger Secretary of Defense 1981-1987
1. Introduction
a. Throughout history, success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually has required units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units. These characteristics have allowed such units to be employed in unconventional ways for which the adversary often was unprepared.
b. Conventional units are not normally trained, equipped, nor organized to conduct SO; any wholesale change to do so would restrict their ability to conduct their own mission-essential tasks. The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drive the formation of special units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities.
c. SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 167 or those units or forces that have since been designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.
2. Designated Special Operations Forces
a. US Army. Special forces (SF), Ranger, Army special operations aviation (ARSOA), PSYOP, and civil affairs (CA) units, both of the active and reserve components.
b. US Navy. Sea-air-land team (SEAL), SEAL delivery vehicle team, and special boat team units, both of the active and reserve components.
c. US Air Force (USAF). SO flying (does not include USAF rescue/combat search and rescue units), special tactics, combat weather, and FID units, both of the active and reserve components.
d. Conventional units conducting or supporting SO. Designated SOF are the force of choice for the conduct of SO. However, under certain circumstances, conventional forces may be tasked to conduct limited SO on a mission-specific, case-by-case basis. Commanders should base this decision on the availability of SOF, the mission requirements, and the capabilities of available conventional forces. In addition, certain conventional forces receive enhanced
II-1 Chapter II training and/or equipment to support SO and have developed habitual relationships with SOF units to conduct these missions.
3. Characteristics of Special Operations Forces
a. SOF are inherently joint. SOF conduct joint and combined training regularly, both within the SOF community and with conventional forces. SOF and their command elements routinely plan and execute joint operations. The SOF C2 structure is capable of and should be used to integrate SOF into joint force plans easily and effectively. SOF can conduct a wide range of operations in war and MOOTW, including a surgical, rapid, worldwide strike capability. Additionally, SOF routinely operate closely with other US Government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nations’ military forces.
b. SOF are distinct from conventional forces. The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities.
(1) Most SOF personnel undergo a careful selection process and mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities.
(2) SOF are composed of mature and experienced personnel, many of whom maintain a high level of competency in more than one military specialty.
(3) Selected SOF are regionally oriented for employment; cross-cultural communications skills are a routine part of their training.
c. SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF should not be used for operations whenever conventional forces can accomplish the mission. When fully integrated into the joint campaign plan, SOF can complement conventional forces allowing the JFC to achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise, and focused use of force.
d. SOF Capabilities. SOF can be formed into versatile, self-contained teams that provide a JFC with an extremely flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing scenarios. They can:
(1) Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations.
(2) Gain access to hostile or denied areas.
II-2 JP 3-05 Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks
(3) Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they support.
(4) Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.
(5) Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.
(6) Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly.
(7) Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.
(8) Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.
(9) Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces.
(10) Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.
e. SOF Limitations
(1) Improper employment of SOF could result in the depletion of forces. SOF require a long lead-time to be effectively fielded. SOF cannot be quickly replaced/reconstituted nor can their capabilities be rapidly expanded. Improper employment of SO resources in purely conventional roles or on inappropriate/inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of depleting these resources rapidly (see Figure II-1).
(2) SOF should normally be employed against targets with strategic or operational relevance. Such employment is congruent with the use of limited SOF resources.
(3) SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. In most cases SOF are neither trained nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations, and therefore should not be substituted for conventional units that are able to effectively execute that mission.
(4) SOF logistic support is austere. A large number of SOF units generally cannot maintain themselves for extended periods of time without significant support from a conventional support structure.
4. Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks
SOF perform two types of activities. They perform tasks that no other forces in the Department of Defense (DOD) conduct, and they perform tasks that other forces in Department of Defense conduct but do so to a unique set of conditions and standards. By performing these tasks, SOF offers Department of Defense an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives. SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the following nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological
II-3 Chapter II
SPECIAL OPERA IONS FORCES R S
Humans are more important than hardware
Competent special operations forces Quality is better cannot be created after than quantity emergencies arise
Special operations forces cannot be mass produced
Figure II-1. Special Operations Forces Truths operations, and information operations (see Figure II-2). These core tasks represent the collective capabilities of all SOF rather than those of any one unit.
a. Direct Action. These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. Activities within DA include the following:
(1) Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults. These are operations designed to achieve specific, well-defined and often time-sensitive results. They are sometimes beyond the effective strike capabilities of conventional force elements. Such operations typically involve attacks on critical targets, interdiction of LOCs or other target systems, capturing designated personnel or material; or the seizure, destruction, or neutralization of adversary facilities or capabilities.
(2) Standoff Attacks. These are attacks by weapon systems or through IO. Standoff attacks can be conducted by air, maritime, or by ground platforms or units. When targets can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat forces, these attacks can be performed as independent actions.
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SPECIAL OPERA IONS CORE ASKS
Direct Action Special Reconnaissance
Foreign Internal Defense
Unconventional Warfare Counterterrorism Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Affairs Operations Psychological Operations
Information Operations
Figure II-2. Special Operations Core Tasks
(3) Terminal Attack Control and Terminal Guidance Operations. These are actions to identify and precisely report the location of targets, and with global positioning systems, laser designators, beacons, or other means, conduct either terminal attack control (TAC) or terminal guidance operations (TGO) to effectively engage them. TAC involves actions to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. TGO includes any electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides approaching aircraft or weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target. TAC differs from TGO in that TAC includes the authority to clear aircraft to release ordnance and TGO does not. Because of this, TAC requires individuals to be qualified as joint terminal attack controllers, but TGO does not.
(4) Recovery Operations. These are operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. SO recovery missions are characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine search, possible indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.
(5) Precision Destruction Operations. These are operations in which collateral damage must be minimized, requiring highly sophisticated weapons and/or timed detonation of specific amounts of explosives placed in exact locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision destruction operations
II-5 Chapter II can be conducted against targets where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first strike success or when the contents of a facility must be destroyed without damage to that facility.
(6) Anti-Surface Operations. These are operations conducted against adversary maritime surface targets, including combatants. These include, but are not limited to, visit, board, search, and seizure operations which are shipboarding operations to board and seize cooperative, uncooperative, or hostile contacts of interest.
b. Special Reconnaissance (SR). These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Even with today’s sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be obtained only by visual observation or other collection methods in the target area. SOF’s highly developed capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other forces or assets. Activities within SR include the following:
(1) Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations conducted to collect and report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information.
(2) Armed Reconnaissance. These are operations that involve locating and attacking targets of opportunity, e.g., adversary materiel, personnel, and facilities in assigned general areas or
Special operations forces have a highly developed capability to get in and out of hostile or denied areas.
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along assigned LOCs. Armed reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific identified targets.
(3) Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment of weapons. This type of operation might include the assessment of the potential effects (to include collateral damage) of a strike or an attack on a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or toxic industrial material site.
(4) Poststrike Reconnaissance. These operations are undertaken for the purpose of gathering information used to measure results of a strike.
c. Foreign Internal Defense. These are operations that involve participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Both conventional and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct FID missions. SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity is to assess, train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that require their unique capabilities. The goal is to enable these forces to maintain the HN’s internal stability, to counter subversion and violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability. Internal stability forms the shield behind which a nation-building campaign can succeed. Successful FID missions can lead to strategic successes for US foreign policy. FID activities include the following:
(1) HN Military Assistance. These are operations that train HN military individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills, provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills.
(2) Population Security. These are operations that strengthen population security by providing supervision of tactical operations conducted by HN military units to neutralize and destroy insurgent threats, isolate insurgents from the civil population, and protect the civil population. As a subset of FID, designated SOF units may also train select HN forces to perform counterterrorist missions.
For more details on FID, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
d. Unconventional Warfare. These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander’s overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements.
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UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required, accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set of circumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited to, the following activities:
(1) Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.
(2) Subversion. These operations are designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.
(3) Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.
(4) Intelligence Activities. These activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.
(5) Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control.
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
In early November, 2001 Army Special Forces teams (often reinforced with Air Force Special Tactics Team members) infiltrated Afghanistan via Special Operations Forces (SOF) aircraft and linked up with anti-Taliban Afghan forces. Their unconventional warfare (UW) mission was to facilitate the overthrow of the Taliban regime. These SOF teams immediately gained the confidence of the Afghans, and between the intelligence they received from the Afghans and what they were able to determine themselves, the arrival of the SOF teams produced an immediate and exponential increase in the number of Taliban targets that could be identified to conventional strike aircraft. In addition to radically increasing the effectiveness of United States airpower, the UW teams also improved the effectiveness of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces they joined. Less than a month after the first UW team arrived in country, the fall of the Taliban had begun, and in the weeks that followed, the last regions under Taliban control were liberated by anti-Taliban Afghan forces.
Source: United States Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office
e. Counterterrorism (CT). These are operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. SOF’s role and additive capability is to conduct offensive measures within DOD’s overall combatting terrorism efforts. SOF conduct CT missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means. SOF’s activities within CT include, but are not limited to, intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and non-kinetic activities aimed at the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism.
(1) Intelligence Operations. These are operations to collect, exploit, and report information on terrorist organizations, personnel, assets, and/or activities. SOF have the capability to conduct these operations in an overt, covert, and/or clandestine manner.
(2) Network and Infrastructure Attacks. These are operations that involve preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations with the objective of destroying, disorganizing, or disarming terrorist organizations before they can strike targets of national interest.
(3) Hostage or Sensitive Materiel Recovery. These are operations conducted to rescue hostages and/or recover sensitive materiel from terrorist control, requiring capabilities not normally found in conventional military units. The safety of the hostages and preventing destruction of the sensitive materiel are essential mission requirements.
(4) Non-Kinetic Activities. These are actions that are focused on defeating the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism by non-kinetic means. These could include, but are not limited to, PSYOP, IO, CA operations, UW and/or FID.
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f. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Major objectives of CP are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and their delivery systems; roll back proliferation where it has occurred; deter the use of WMD and their delivery systems; and adapt US military forces and planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. The continued spread of WMD technology can foster regional unrest and provide terrorist organizations with new and potent weapons. The core capabilities of CP include counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. SOF focus on counterforce tasks and conduct CP missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.
For more details on CP, see JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations.
g. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). These consist of CA activities and other tasks conducted by CA to support commanders conducting CMO.
(1) Commanders have an inherent responsibility to maintain proper, prudent and lawful relations with the indigenous population, authorities, and government within their operational areas. These relations are facilitated through CMO.
(2) Specialized CMO support is provided by CA personnel assigned as staff who plan, coordinate, and oversee CMO while implementation is performed by other elements of the joint force (i.e., other SOF, engineers, health services support, transportation, military police, security, and maneuver units).
(3) CA support to CMO enhances military effectiveness by focusing efforts to minimize civilian interference with military operations and limit the adverse impact of military operations on civilian populations and resources. CA give commanders the capability to coordinate and provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of a civilian population.
(4) CA activities include, when directed and by operational necessity, establishing and conducting a military government or civil administration within operational areas until civilian authority or government can be restored or transitioned to other appropriate authorities. These activities are planned and conducted by CA and involve application of functional specialty expertise in civil sector disciplines normally the responsibility of civil government (see Figure II-3).
(5) CA operations are predominantly joint, interagency, and multinational in nature and are conducted through or with indigenous populations, authorities and institutions, international organizations, and NGOs.
For more detailed information on CMO and CA activities, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil- Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
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CIVIL - MILI ARY OPERA IONS RELA IONS IPS
JOIN FORCE MILI ARY OPERA IONS