The Modernized Principles Of

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Modernized Principles Of Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S. Air Force O UNIVERSAL TRUTHS about war exist? short, the aim is not wholesale replacement of the DWhen does the immutable become, well, traditional principles, per se, but rather a renovation mutable? Rethinking warfighting fundamentals that is conscious of the lasting value of the old. like the principles of war raises such questions. Perceived worthiness. Why men fight and why Sadly, what is enduring about war is its relentless, they stop fighting are the classic inquiries of military tragic horror. thinkers. Ultimately, the answer is about worthiness. Other aspects of the human dimension also What makes it worthwhile for people to risk their remain unchanged. The apprehension and determi- lives in armed combat? What persuades them to nation a young Marine feels on the battlefield today make the enormous sacrifices war can require? For are the same as the young Athenian felt on the Plain some, it is high-minded purposes such as achiev- of Marathon in 490 B.C. Yet it is equally true that ing or preserving freedom. For others, it concerns social, economic, political, and technological fac- personal honor, comradeship, or simply survival. tors evolve war’s practice if not its essence. Worthiness goes to the fundamental mindset of The traditional principles of war describe, as one people both individually and collectively. document puts it, “those aspects of warfare that are Assuming that worthiness necessarily equates to universally true and relevant.”1 Today they typically moral good is a mistake, however. Various groups include unity of command, objective, offensive, might conclude that ethnic hatred, Lebensraum mass, maneuver, economy of force, security, sur- (living space), or any number of malevolent ration- prise, and simplicity.2 Over the ages the list has ales add up to acceptable motivators for violence. varied somewhat because what is common in one Worthiness is a matter of subjective perspective, not era might be rare or absent altogether in another. The objective merit. What is important is what a bellig- necessity for recalibrations from time to time simply erent believes warrants war. Hence, this principle reflects the humanness (if not humanity) of war. appends “perceived” to the idea of worthiness. Thoughtful theorists suggest that the related The Modernized Principles concept of will should become a principle of war of War because overcoming an opponent’s resolve is the Modernizing the traditional principles of war for central task of war.3 In key respects, it is always a 21st-century conflicts does not render older versions center of gravity. Although will has ready touch- irrelevant. To the contrary, the intent of modern- stones in military literature, perceived worthiness izing the principles of war is to capture the spirit peels it back to address its underpinnings. For the of existing ones. For example, informed insight, warfighter, it literally asks the right question, the when properly understood, incorporates elements “why” of an antagonist’s hostility. Opportunity lies of security and surprise. Likewise, the modernized in the answer. Sufficiently erode the perception of principles of war such as perceived worthiness, worthiness among decisive elements of an adver- informed insight, strategic anchoring, engage- sary’s combat power, and the effort disintegrates, ment dominance, unity of effect, adaptability, and even if the physical capability to continue remains culminating power strive to capture the essential intact. Conversely, when it collapses among friendly objective, among other traditional principles. In forces, defeat likely follows. 42 March-April 2006 MILITARY REVIEW NEO-STRATEGICON Most opponents of the United States no longer pursue traditional military victory, per PRINCIPLES OF WAR se. Instead, they try to get us to perceive that Traditional Modernized the goal no longer justifies the anticipated sac- Unity of Command Perceived Worthiness rifice of American blood and treasure. This is why managing perceptions among friend and Objective Informed Insight foe is so important to 21st-century conflicts. Offensive Strategic Anchoring To create the right perceptions, leaders need Mass Durability informed insight. Informed insight. Informed insight seeks Maneuver Engagement Dominance to make sense of the cacophony that swirls Economy of Force Unity of Effect around concepts like information superiority and dominance. Suffused with the notion that Security Adaptability more is always better, investments pour into Surprise Culminating Power various collection capabilities in an insatiable Simplicity drive to accumulate information. While it is necessary to cast a wide net to ensure one is fully informed, warfighters need more than verifies the legitimacy of information will have a raw data, however voluminous. significant edge. A new-style fog of war will mark Fusing information is the real challenge. It is not modern conflicts as vast quantities of cleverly mis- just gleaning relevant data from the mass; it is appre- leading data and outright disinformation flood deci- ciating the human factors of information convey- sion centers and threaten to bury genuine facts. ance. How much can a commander usefully absorb The true asymmetric advantage does not come and at what rate? Unless information is digested, it is from information accumulation, but from the cog- as if it does not exist. That said, even comprehensive nitive component of the warfighter. The insights and well-fused reports will not, alone, produce the drawn from information make the real difference. winning information differential. Data, no matter how all-encompassing, well-fused, The reasons are several. Digitization of data of all or timely, cannot provide insight, which is not just kinds makes plenty of militarily useful information knowing what the enemy is thinking and saying, freely available on the Web. In the future if anything but intuiting what he will think and do even before exists in an electrical form, we must assume it is he knows. Thus, informed insight can capture a in the hands of the adversary. Moreover, technol- conventional principle like surprise and employ it ogy such as Web crawlers, intelligent robots, and offensively or defensively. other relatively inexpensive autonomous means How does one acquire insight? The answer is will likely do much of the fusing work. Third-party experience and native talent combined with a wide- corporations already exist to fuse information for scoped liberal education, formally or informally anyone for a price. acquired. These, coupled with a solid technologi- All of these developments will level the battlefield cal orientation and complemented by exhaustive informationwise. Consequently, in many situations, study of all aspects of a foe’s specific situation, warfighters should not waste time on the quixotic can produce, if not wisdom, at least more astute task of trying to achieve information superiority or evaluations. dominance. Rather, they ought to develop doctrines The ability to focus matters. Napoleon spent and strategies for fighting in an environment of hours alone deliberating about his battle plans. Time complete information transparency. and again, this technique produced brilliant military Authenticity will be the critical feature of infor- insights. Obviously, the speed of modern warfare mation in 21st-century warfare. Manipulating and limits emulation of Napoleon’s technique, but tech- altering data, including images that exist electroni- nology and behavioral studies might produce useful cally, is just too easy. Although technology itself approaches. A distributed analytical process that might provide some solutions, the side that quickly links and synergizes the mental muscle of disparate MILITARY REVIEW March-April 2006 43 leadership elements is yet another possibility for endorsing passivity. An active defensive that inflicts exploration. Nonetheless, the innate military genius persistent stress on challengers while shrewdly of individuals still counts. That genius, however, avoiding unintended consequences deserves equal must have firm strategic anchoring. billing with the offensive. Linking all actions to Strategic anchoring. Strategic anchoring means their strategic anchor best accomplishes that aim. consciously anchoring every action in a strategic con- Durability readily informs the efficacy and relevance text. The principle recasts the objective to highlight of strategic anchoring. the potential the information revolution gives to all Durability. Much of the value of durability as combatant actions. The traditional notion of objec- a modernized principle of war resides in its exqui- tive is constituent to strategic anchoring because site lucidity. Durability reflects the basic idea of activities so connected automatically coalesce on the continuing utility for the intended purpose despite right goal at any level of war. In the Information Age, hard use. In the military context, durability extends few objectives are exclusively tactical or operational, from the immediately practical to entire strategic or even military. Each has latent strategic implica- themes. Along the way, the tenet subsumes several tions, some of profound importance. traditional principles. For example, modern com- General Charles C. Krulak’s conceptualization of manders who are thinking durability will naturally the strategic corporal epitomizes this phe- incorporate security into their planning. nomenon.4 Actions at the tactical
Recommended publications
  • Strategy and Strategic Management 1
    CHAPTER STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 1 For the past decade, Texas Health has been executing a strategic plan called the Ascent to the Summit. As the organization nears the end of that climb with a stronger strategic footing in place, the THR Promise continues to unify and strengthen us as we move into a journey toward becoming a high-reliability organization transforming the way healthcare is delivered. In the past decade, Texas Health has shifted from an acute care hospital company to an integrated health system. In 2009, Texas Health Physicians Group was formed, creating a base of employed physicians who work with Texas Health on numerous objectives. Today, the group includes more than 830 physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and medical pro- fessionals dedicated to providing safe, quality care for its patients. The Texas Health Physicians Group’s primary care and specialist network represents more than 50 medical specialties, with more than 250 locations spanning 11 North Texas counties. Because of our culture, Texas Health was rec- ognized in 2015 as the number one healthcare organization to work for in the United States by Fortune. We also were recognized as the number two workplace for women and the number three workplace for diversity in the nation, with one-third of our nurses from ethnically diverse backgrounds. We’re proud to say we reflect the diversity of the communities we serve. —Barclay Berdan, 2016, “Climbing the Healthcare Summit” Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you will • comprehend that strategy has many definitions, and its meaning depends on one’s perspective; • understand the role of strategy in moving a healthcare organization to achieve its goals, increase its business, and improve its performance; • recognize the use of prospective and emergent strategies; and • be aware that business strategies evolve over time as a result of changing circumstances and managerial modifications.
    [Show full text]
  • Axis Blitzkrieg: Warsaw and Battle of Britain
    Axis Blitzkrieg: Warsaw and Battle of Britain By Skyla Gabriel and Hannah Seidl Background on Axis Blitzkrieg ● A military strategy specifically designed to create disorganization in enemy forces by logical firepower and mobility of forces ● Limits civilian casualty and waste of fire power ● Developed in Germany 1918-1939 as a result of WW1 ● Used in Warsaw, Poland in 1939, then with eventually used in Belgium, the Netherlands, North Africa, and even against the Soviet Union Hitler’s Plan and “The Night Before” ● Due to the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, once the Polish state was divided up, Hitler would colonize the territory and only allow the “superior race” to live there and would enslave the natives. ● On August 31, 1939 Hitler ordered Nazi S.S. troops,wearing Polish officer uniforms, to sneak into Poland. ● The troops did minor damage to buildings and equipment. ● Left dead concentration camp prisoners in Polish uniforms ● This was meant to mar the start of the Polish Invasion when the bodies were found in the morning by Polish officers Initial stages ● Initially, one of Hitler’s first acts after coming to power was to sign a nonaggression pact (January 1934) with Poland in order to avoid a French- Polish alliance before Germany could rearm. ● Through 1935- March 1939 Germany slowly gained more power through rearmament (agreed to by both France and Britain), Germany then gained back the Rhineland through militarization, annexation of Austria, and finally at the Munich Conference they were given the Sudetenland. ● Once Czechoslovakia was dismembered Britain and France responded by essentially backing Poland and Hitler responded by signing a non-aggression with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 ● The German-Soviet pact agreed Poland be split between the two powers, the new pact allowed Germany to attack Poland without fear of Soviet intervention The Attack ● On September 1st, 1939 Germany invaded Warsaw, Poland ● Schleswig-Holstein, a German Battleship at 4:45am began to fire on the Polish garrison in Westerplatte Fort, Danzig.
    [Show full text]
  • Blitzkrieg: the Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht's
    East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 8-2021 Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era Briggs Evans East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Evans, Briggs, "Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3927. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3927 This Thesis - unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era ________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History ______________________ by Briggs Evans August 2021 _____________________ Dr. Stephen Fritz, Chair Dr. Henry Antkiewicz Dr. Steve Nash Keywords: Blitzkrieg, doctrine, operational warfare, American military, Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, World War II, Cold War, Soviet Union, Operation Desert Storm, AirLand Battle, Combined Arms Theory, mobile warfare, maneuver warfare. ABSTRACT Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era by Briggs Evans The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II.
    [Show full text]
  • Law of Armed Conflict
    Lesson 1 THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Basic knowledge International Committee of the Red Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 19 Avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57 E-mail: [email protected] www.icrc.org Original: English – June 2002 INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT BASIC KNOWLEDGE LESSON 1 [ Slide 2] AIM [ Slide 3] The aim of this lesson is to introduce the topic to the class, covering the following main points: 1. Background: setting the scene. 2. The need for compliance. 3. How the law evolved and its main components. 4. When does the law apply? 5. The basic principles of the law. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE SCENE Today we begin a series of lectures on the law of armed conflict, which is also known as the law of war, international humanitarian law, or simply IHL. To begin, I’d like to take a guess at what you’re thinking right now. Some of you are probably thinking that this is an ideal opportunity to catch up on some well-earned rest. “Thank goodness I’m not on the assault course or on manoeuvres. This is absolutely marvellous. I can switch off and let this instructor ramble on for 45 minutes. I know all about the Geneva Conventions anyway – the law is part of my culture and our military traditions. I really don't need to listen to all this legal ‘mumbo jumbo’.” The more sceptical and cynical among you might well be thinking along the lines of a very famous orator of ancient Rome – Cicero.
    [Show full text]
  • Developing Strategy Leaders
    Developing Strategy Leaders Randall Rollinson, President LBL Strategies, Ltd. 6321 N. Avondale, Suite A‐214 Chicago, Illinois 60631 (773) 774‐0240 www.lblstrategies.com Developing Strategy Leaders Randall Rollinson, President, LBL Strategies, Ltd. The size and complexity of modern organizations operating in turbulent, even chaotic, environments has put a premium on competent strategy leaders. This is particularly true in midsize and larger organizations who must prepare the next generation of leaders well in advance to take the organization forward. Looking at this challenge from a longer term perspective it is clear that managerial excellence alone is no longer sufficient for sustainable success. Military schools long ago recognized rapidly changing events on the battlefield required leaders not managers. Remember the old adage: Would you rather be managed or led into battle? They recognized that leadership development could not be left to chance. The West Point Military Academy curriculum and the full range of 24/7 campus life activities are designed to develop future officers that have the ability to lead upon graduation. This is hardly the case in business schools, where the emphasis is on understanding a body of knowledge and developing skill in how to use it. Of course, managerial and interpersonal skills are developed, but there is scant attention to the development of leadership attributes and skills. This is left to the graduating students and the organizations that hire them. This pattern of education results in the development of a world full of excellent managers, with little or no substantive strategic leadership experience, and no organized approach to developing leadership qualities in their management team‐‐ and certainly not strategy leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Case Study: the Uberisation of Supply Chain
    ISSN (Print) : 2249-1880 SAMVAD: SIBM Pune Research Journal, Vol X, 26-31, June 2016 ISSN (Online) : 2348-5329 Case Study: The Uberisation of Supply Chain Venkatesh Ganapathy* Associate Professor, Presidency School of Business, Bangalore, India; [email protected] Abstract Uber, a technology company, provides a platform for customers who wish to source a taxi ride on their smart phones. This case study analyses the impact of Uberisation on supply chains and addresses the risk Uberisation entails for traditional necessitated innovations across the supply chain. firms that are unable to leverage the smartphone app technology. This development based on app technology has Keywords: Innovations, Supply Chain, Technology, Uber, Uberisation 1. Introduction 2. Literature Review Uber is a well-known taxi aggregator that is famous across The objective of this review is to trace the evolution of the globe for its path-breaking service process innova- technology based apps. tion. Uber, a technology company, provides a platform for The World Bank’s “ICT for Greater Development customers who wish to source a taxi ride on their smart Impact” strategy seeks to transform delivery of public phones. Due to digital matching of demand and supply, services, generate innovation and improve competitive- capacity utilization of the vehicle is optimum and this ness2. leads to an affordable pricing mechanism for the services. Software development has flourished along with the This creates a win-win situation for the taxi aggregator development of smart phone technology. Transportation services, customers and drivers. industry has benefited from this new smart phone app The Uber model has become so popular that it has technology.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategy and the Strategist: How It Matters Who Develops the Strategy
    Strategy and the Strategist: How it Matters Who Develops the Strategy Eric Van den Steen Working Paper 14-057 December 14, 2013 Copyright © 2013 by Eric Van den Steen Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2383972 Strategy and the Strategist: How it Matters Who Develops the Strategy Eric Van den Steen∗ December 14, 2013 Abstract This paper studies how strategy – formally defined as ‘the smallest set of (core) choices to optimally guide the other choices’ – relates to the strategist, for example, whether an op- timal strategy should depend on who is CEO. The paper first studies why different people may systematically consider different decisions ‘strategic’ – with marketing people developing a marketing-centric strategy and favoring the marketing side of business – and derives two ra- tional mechanisms for this outcome, one confidence-based and the other implementation-based. It then studies why it matters that it is the CEO and important decision makers (rather than an outsider) who formulate the strategy and shows that outsider-strategists often face a trade- off between the quality of a strategy and its likelihood of implementation, whereas the CEO’s involvement helps implementation because it generates commitment, thus linking strategy for- mulation and implementation. In some sense, the paper thus explains why strategy is the quintessential responsibility of the CEO. Moreover, it shows that the optimal strategy should depend on who is CEO.
    [Show full text]
  • Leadership and Organizational Strategy Matthew R
    The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, Volume 14(1), 2009, article 3. Leadership and Organizational Strategy Matthew R. Fairholm, Ph.D. Political Science Department and W. O. Farber Center for Civic Leadership University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD 57069 Abstract Strategic planning, an umbrella term used to include and summarize such activities as planning, performance measurement, program budgeting, and the like, has proven to be very useful but limited. It is a technical fix that gets at only part of the question of organizational effectiveness and only deals with some of the dilemmas organizations face. The efforts of public administrators to control organizational endeavors are essential, necessary, and aligned with current best practices. But the control mechanisms ultimately prove to be only part of the puzzle. In the face of such realities, the notion of strategic thinking emerges to fill the gaps and overcome the limitations that experience with strategic planning has proven to exhibit. This paper presents an integration of leadership ideas, strategic thinking and traditional planning activities in an effort to make important connections and important distinctions. The result is an outline of the foundations of strategic thinking. Key Words: Leadership, Strategic Planning, Strategic Thinking, Organizational Philosophy, Management 1 The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, Volume 14(1), 2009, article 3. Leadership and Organizational Strategy Introduction A city struggles to ensure the lowest bid to repave downtown’s Main Street is the most efficient use of tax dollars during a tight budget year. A state agency tries to verify that its type and level of services delivered is what the citizens need and is consistent with current political mandates.
    [Show full text]
  • Qualified, but Unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930S
    QUALIFIED, BUT UNPREPARED Qualified, but unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s EDWARD SMALLEY University of Kent Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT This article aims to show the Staff College at Camberley was an elite establishment for officer training in name only; it failed to select the best candidates for entry and it failed to teach students how to undertake either routine duties or operations relevant to continental conflict. The syllabus lacked clarity of purpose whilst the learning environment was largely devoid of pressure. This compounded the institution’s small output which prevented the army developing a pool of elite officers which could monopolise command within future expeditionary forces. Consequently, in 1939, both Camberley and its individual graduates were unprepared for war. The passed Staff College qualification (PSC) was considered the pinnacle of an Army officer’s education. Recipients were expected to gain sufficient skills to perform all future command and staff duties to an unparalleled level of excellence. This article explores how these same elite officers were individually ill-equipped for future first- class conflict and, collectively, were even unable to dominate command positions within the small British Expeditionary Force sent to France in 1939-40. The Camberley Staff College was established in 1858 to address the obvious deficiencies in British Army staff work witnessed in the recent Crimean War. The institution was deliberately called the Staff College to emphasise its primary function of providing a formal staff education. The potential benefits of having qualified staff officers providing capable administration for the needs of a modern army were notably revealed by the success of the Prussian General Staff in the 1870s.
    [Show full text]
  • War Theory: the Evolution of War and Military Thought Syllabus Ay 20
    WAR THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF WAR AND MILITARY THOUGHT SYLLABUS AY 20 JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE MAXWELL AFB, AL FOREWORD This syllabus for the War Theory course at the Air Command and Staff College, August-October 2019, provides an overview of the course narrative, objectives, and questions, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and seminar. Included herein is information about course methods of evaluation, schedule, and the fulfilment of Joint professional military education core goals. James D. Campbell, PhD Course Director, War Theory APPROVED James Forsyth, PhD Dean of Academic Affairs 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE FOREWORD 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 COURSE DESCRIPTION, QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 3 COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE 3 JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES 5 AY 2019-2020 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS 8 COURSE REQUIREMENTS 9 COURSE ADMINISTRATION 10 COURSE SCHEDULE DAY 0 12 DAY 1 15 DAY 2 17 DAY 3 19 DAY 4 21 DAY 5 22 DAY 6 25 DAY 7 28 DAY 8 29 DAY 9 31 DAY 10 34 DAY 11 36 DAY 12 38 DAY 13 40 DAY 14 43 DAY 15 45 APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY 47 2 WAR THEORY COURSE OVERVIEW COURSE DESCRIPTION War Theory introduces military theory, addressing both the nature and character of war. It examines the theoretical writings of classical military theorists, as well as the evolution of warfare and military thought over the last two centuries.
    [Show full text]
  • Heavy Division Tactical Maneuver Planning Guides and the Army's
    Tactical Alchemy: Heavy Division Tactical Maneuver Planning Guides and the Army’s Neglect of the Science of War A Monograph By Major Vincent J. Tedesco III United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas First Term AY 99-00 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPROVAL Major Vincent J. Tedesco III Title of Monograph: Tactical Alchemy: Heavy Division Tactical Maneuver Planning Guides and the Army’s Neglect of the Science of War. Approved by: ______________________________________________ Monograph Director James J. Schneider, Ph.D. ______________________________________________ Director, School of Advanced COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS Military Studies ______________________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. Program Accepted this 13th Day of December, 1999 ABSTRACT Tactical Alchemy: Heavy Division Tactical Maneuver Planning Guides and the Army’s Neglect of the Science of War. In the wake of the Cold War, the Army increasingly finds its institutional focus shifting away from preparing for sustained mechanized land combat. This trend serves the Army’s immediate operational needs and addresses its perceived need to demonstrate relevancy, but it also raises an important question. How can the Army preserve for future use its hard won expertise in combined arms mechanized warfare? The art of these operations is well documented in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, but the science of time, space, and combat power in heavy division operations is not. In effect, the Army is already lapsing into what J.F.C. Fuller described as “military alchemy,” denying the science of war in favor of theorizing on its art.
    [Show full text]
  • Principles of War and Their Application to Strategy and Tactics G
    Naval War College Review Volume 3 Article 3 Number 8 October 1950 Principles of War and Their Application to Strategy and Tactics G. K. Carmichael U.S. Navy Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Carmichael, G. K. (1950) "Principles of War and Their Application to Strategy and Tactics," Naval War College Review: Vol. 3 : No. 8 , Article 3. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss8/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Carmichael: Principles of War and Their Application to Strategy and Tactics RESTRICTED PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICATION TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS A lecture delivered by Captain G. K. Carmichael, USN at the Naval War College. August 17, 1950 The task of the Naval War College mission is to further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with. emphasis on their application to future naval warfare. Accordingly, it is my purpose this morning to examine some of the fundamental truths of war and to indicate how these so-called principles of war are ap­ plicable to strategy and tactics. Although exact definitions of the fields of war-strategy, tac­ tics, and logistics-are difficult to arrive at, and may create futile discussion as to semantic distinctions, some definitions are desirable as a basis for study and discussion.
    [Show full text]