Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S. Air Force
o universal truths about war exist? short, the aim is not wholesale replacement of the DWhen does the immutable become, well, traditional principles, per se, but rather a renovation mutable? Rethinking warfighting fundamentals that is conscious of the lasting value of the old. like the principles of war raises such questions. Perceived worthiness. Why men fight and why Sadly, what is enduring about war is its relentless, they stop fighting are the classic inquiries of military tragic horror. thinkers. Ultimately, the answer is about worthiness. Other aspects of the human dimension also What makes it worthwhile for people to risk their remain unchanged. The apprehension and determi- lives in armed combat? What persuades them to nation a young Marine feels on the battlefield today make the enormous sacrifices war can require? For are the same as the young Athenian felt on the Plain some, it is high-minded purposes such as achiev- of Marathon in 490 B.C. Yet it is equally true that ing or preserving freedom. For others, it concerns social, economic, political, and technological fac- personal honor, comradeship, or simply survival. tors evolve war’s practice if not its essence. Worthiness goes to the fundamental mindset of The traditional principles of war describe, as one people both individually and collectively. document puts it, “those aspects of warfare that are Assuming that worthiness necessarily equates to universally true and relevant.”1 Today they typically moral good is a mistake, however. Various groups include unity of command, objective, offensive, might conclude that ethnic hatred, Lebensraum mass, maneuver, economy of force, security, sur- (living space), or any number of malevolent ration prise, and simplicity.2 Over the ages the list has ales add up to acceptable motivators for violence. varied somewhat because what is common in one Worthiness is a matter of subjective perspective, not era might be rare or absent altogether in another. The objective merit. What is important is what a bellig- necessity for recalibrations from time to time simply erent believes warrants war. Hence, this principle reflects the humanness (if not humanity) of war. appends “perceived” to the idea of worthiness. Thoughtful theorists suggest that the related The Modernized Principles concept of will should become a principle of war of War because overcoming an opponent’s resolve is the Modernizing the traditional principles of war for central task of war.3 In key respects, it is always a 21st-century conflicts does not render older versions center of gravity. Although will has ready touch- irrelevant. To the contrary, the intent of modern- stones in military literature, perceived worthiness izing the principles of war is to capture the spirit peels it back to address its underpinnings. For the of existing ones. For example, informed insight, warfighter, it literally asks the right question, the when properly understood, incorporates elements “why” of an antagonist’s hostility. Opportunity lies of security and surprise. Likewise, the modernized in the answer. Sufficiently erode the perception of principles of war such as perceived worthiness, worthiness among decisive elements of an adver- informed insight, strategic anchoring, engage- sary’s combat power, and the effort disintegrates, ment dominance, unity of effect, adaptability, and even if the physical capability to continue remains culminating power strive to capture the essential intact. Conversely, when it collapses among friendly objective, among other traditional principles. In forces, defeat likely follows.
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Most opponents of the United States no longer pursue traditional military victory, per Principles of War se. Instead, they try to get us to perceive that Traditional Modernized the goal no longer justifies the anticipated sac- Unity of Command Perceived Worthiness rifice of American blood and treasure. This is why managing perceptions among friend and Objective Informed Insight foe is so important to 21st-century conflicts. Offensive Strategic Anchoring To create the right perceptions, leaders need Mass Durability informed insight. Informed insight. Informed insight seeks Maneuver Engagement Dominance to make sense of the cacophony that swirls Economy of Force Unity of Effect around concepts like information superiority and dominance. Suffused with the notion that Security Adaptability more is always better, investments pour into Surprise Culminating Power various collection capabilities in an insatiable Simplicity drive to accumulate information. While it is necessary to cast a wide net to ensure one is fully informed, warfighters need more than verifies the legitimacy of information will have a raw data, however voluminous. significant edge. A new-style fog of war will mark Fusing information is the real challenge. It is not modern conflicts as vast quantities of cleverly mis- just gleaning relevant data from the mass; it is appre- leading data and outright disinformation flood deci- ciating the human factors of information convey- sion centers and threaten to bury genuine facts. ance. How much can a commander usefully absorb The true asymmetric advantage does not come and at what rate? Unless information is digested, it is from information accumulation, but from the cog- as if it does not exist. That said, even comprehensive nitive component of the warfighter. The insights and well-fused reports will not, alone, produce the drawn from information make the real difference. winning information differential. Data, no matter how all-encompassing, well-fused, The reasons are several. Digitization of data of all or timely, cannot provide insight, which is not just kinds makes plenty of militarily useful information knowing what the enemy is thinking and saying, freely available on the Web. In the future if anything but intuiting what he will think and do even before exists in an electrical form, we must assume it is he knows. Thus, informed insight can capture a in the hands of the adversary. Moreover, technol- conventional principle like surprise and employ it ogy such as Web crawlers, intelligent robots, and offensively or defensively. other relatively inexpensive autonomous means How does one acquire insight? The answer is will likely do much of the fusing work. Third-party experience and native talent combined with a wide- corporations already exist to fuse information for scoped liberal education, formally or informally anyone for a price. acquired. These, coupled with a solid technologi- All of these developments will level the battlefield cal orientation and complemented by exhaustive informationwise. Consequently, in many situations, study of all aspects of a foe’s specific situation, warfighters should not waste time on the quixotic can produce, if not wisdom, at least more astute task of trying to achieve information superiority or evaluations. dominance. Rather, they ought to develop doctrines The ability to focus matters. Napoleon spent and strategies for fighting in an environment of hours alone deliberating about his battle plans. Time complete information transparency. and again, this technique produced brilliant military Authenticity will be the critical feature of infor- insights. Obviously, the speed of modern warfare mation in 21st-century warfare. Manipulating and limits emulation of Napoleon’s technique, but tech- altering data, including images that exist electroni- nology and behavioral studies might produce useful cally, is just too easy. Although technology itself approaches. A distributed analytical process that might provide some solutions, the side that quickly links and synergizes the mental muscle of disparate
Military Review March-April 2006 43 leadership elements is yet another possibility for endorsing passivity. An active defensive that inflicts exploration. Nonetheless, the innate military genius persistent stress on challengers while shrewdly of individuals still counts. That genius, however, avoiding unintended consequences deserves equal must have firm strategic anchoring. billing with the offensive. Linking all actions to Strategic anchoring. Strategic anchoring means their strategic anchor best accomplishes that aim. consciously anchoring every action in a strategic con- Durability readily informs the efficacy and relevance text. The principle recasts the objective to highlight of strategic anchoring. the potential the information revolution gives to all Durability. Much of the value of durability as combatant actions. The traditional notion of objec- a modernized principle of war resides in its exqui- tive is constituent to strategic anchoring because site lucidity. Durability reflects the basic idea of activities so connected automatically coalesce on the continuing utility for the intended purpose despite right goal at any level of war. In the Information Age, hard use. In the military context, durability extends few objectives are exclusively tactical or operational, from the immediately practical to entire strategic or even military. Each has latent strategic implica- themes. Along the way, the tenet subsumes several tions, some of profound importance. traditional principles. For example, modern com- General Charles C. Krulak’s conceptualization of manders who are thinking durability will naturally the strategic corporal epitomizes this phe- incorporate security into their planning. nomenon.4 Actions at the tactical level, Pundits quip that amateurs talk strategy including even those of the ordinary and professionals talk logistics. What corporal, overlooked in previous is clearly axiomatic is that durabil- conflicts, can have far-reaching ity depends on logistics. Conse- effects. The stunning strategic quently, the side that solves the effect of the misconduct of a vexing logistical issues intrinsic few low-ranking soldiers at Abu to modern warfare will reap Ghraib prison amply illustrates a huge return. Consider how Krulak’s point. The scandal influential a scientific break- was a defeat in every sense of through that provides power the word except, perhaps, the sources to quench burgeoning traditional kinetic one. Intention- (and burdensome) fuel demands ally organizing actions around could be. If human-nourishment strategic purposes is essential. requirements are lessened, possibly In 21st-century conflicts, how we through advances in biotechnology, fight can determine if (and what) we force durability would be dramatically win. Unfortunately, absent firm strategic enhanced. Of course, seeking to disrupt the anchoring, concentration on the objective encour- often-voracious logistics of militaries endures as ages an unproductive fixation on short-term ends in a feature of modern conflicts. isolation from other imperatives. The notion of “we Durability is more than mere physical sustain- had to burn the village in order to save it” typifies ment, however; it extends to strategy. Military the problem. Globalized information systems can commanders from Xenophon to George Washington rapidly create adverse political effects from military to Mao Tse-tung appreciated that a force durable actions, even actions that fit customary notions of enough to maintain existence is, in itself, a strategy victory. Accordingly, leaders must consciously that precludes one’s rival from attaining victory. shape even seemingly minor actions to account for Adversaries, especially irregulars, continue to the strategic potential each possesses. attempt to draw out conflicts in the hopes of exhaust- Strategic anchoring takes issue with the promi- ing seemingly more powerful foes. nence of the offensive in popular military thought. Nevertheless, past successes of similar strategies Unbridled obsession with an undifferentiated view will be increasingly difficult to replicate. In a netted of the offensive is dangerous.5 Of course, restraining world that illuminates virtually every phone call, undisciplined offensive impulses is not the same as every financial transaction, and every plane flight,
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Ultimately, war is still an art, and like bowmen destroyed the flower of French knighthood all artistic endeavors, human imagination from long distance at Crécy; and during the first Gulf War, American tanks simply outranged Iraqi T-72s to will continue to drive inventive forms and win a crushing victory at the Battle of 73 Easting. executions of its subject. In a sense, the most Obtaining engagement-dominating technol- basic of the principles of war is the need to ogy is complicated, however. Although everyone constantly challenge, reevaluate, and mod- intuitively appreciates that advanced warfighting hardware can separate winners from losers, too ernize all of them. The job is never done. many assume that all technology is an unqualified “good.” The result? Confusion about such critically anonymity is becoming harder to achieve. Covertly important but intricate concepts as transformation, sustaining logistics even for relatively low-demand system of systems, battlespace awareness, and insurgent operations will not be easy. In particular, more. Worse, research and development (R&D) obtaining advanced medical care surreptitiously efforts diffuse wastefully into solutions in search might be nearly impossible. Carefully studying the of problems. Replicating engagement dominance’s implications of durability on an adversary might past triumphs requires orienting sufficient R&D be the greatest source of fresh solutions to thorny toward the overarching problem of war: preempt- military problems. ing or disrupting an opponent’s ability to bring his Another important durability consideration is weapons to bear. that technology of all kinds now reaches even the Another aspect of the engagement-dominance remotest areas of the world and is quickly spawning solution is methodological. Employing weaponry generations addicted to it. Accordingly, a “death at the right time is as, or more, important than the of a thousand cuts” strategy might profit those sophistication of the equipment itself. This calls who exploit such a habituation because even small for processes that allow commanders to get inside techno-encumbrances can accumulate into debilitat- the enemy’s observe, orient, decide, act cycle that ing friction. Taking advantage of superior resources applies combat power.6 Using superior capabilities to produce redundancies and alternatives, as well as effectively to seize the initiative and to deny it to the steeling one’s own forces to technology loss, is fast foe produces engagement dominance. Furthermore, becoming essential to force durability. engagement dominance incorporates and simplifies In modern conflicts, durability requires extraor- maneuver and can impose or oppose surprise. It even dinary mental toughness. Persevering in the face results from the actions of third parties through the of the enormous stress the lethality of modern orchestration of unity of effect. battlefields produces, withstanding increasingly Unity of effect. The traditional principles of war sophisticated psychological warfare, and tolerating speak of unity of command with its implicit assump- extreme deprivation place a huge premium on pro- tion of direction and control. What really counts in fessionalism, especially discipline. Winning forces war, however, are effects, however obtained. While must be disciplined and confident, and few things putting available resources into a workable chain of enhance troop confidence more than engagement command always helps, leveraging that which is dominance. beyond command and control is especially valuable. Engagement dominance. The theory behind Unity of effect, therefore, reinterprets economy of engagement dominance is not complicated. Begin- force and even mass and maneuver by accentuat- ning with David’s defeat of Goliath, military history ing results. graphically demonstrates the value of this often Examples of leveraging the uncontrollable are overlooked principle. The concept calls for striking many. Weather has long created effects with military an opponent with impunity by outranging, outgun- implications. For example, during the second Gulf ning, or even outwitting him through deception and War commanders destroyed Republican Guard units surprise. The fearsome 14-foot pikes of Alexander’s by exploiting the fatal assumption by Iraqi leaders phalanxes killed thousands of short-sworded infan- that sandstorms made armor movements invisible trymen before they could land a blow; English to airpower. Throughout history, warfighters have
Military Review March-April 2006 45 also obtained positive results from the savvy use of the skillful use of Internet appeals for action is but geography, even though they enjoyed no dominion one example of how they might form. over it. Consensus-building optimizes unity of effect. Deriving operational effects from third-party activi- Even where a unified command structure allegedly ties is especially important in modern conflicts. The exists, pragmatic commanders might still find per- Madrid train bombings, which occurred shortly before suasive skills the most valued implement in their the Spanish elections in 2004, represent a clever warfighting toolkit. Modern warfighting effects, not (albeit heartless) illustration. The bombings influ- the niceties of wiring diagrams, are the coins of the enced voters as intended, and the new government realm. Achieving unity of effect will require a great withdrew its troops from Iraq. The practical effect deal of forward-thinking adaptability. was indistinguishable from a traditional defeat: The Adaptability. Adaptability is a hallmark of the combat power of 1,400 Spanish soldiers was lost. American way of war. During World War II, inno- Obtaining advantage from the actions of dispar vative American Soldiers bolted homemade plows ate, proxy groups is a force multiplier. Proxies in onto tanks to cut through hedgerows frustrating modern warfare might not always realize their role. the breakout from Normandy. During the Korean For many reasons, warring groups might have no War General Douglas McArthur’s Inchon landings formal or even informal connection with entities were an operational-level adaptation to a battlefield that produce effects that nevertheless serve their impasse. The spirit lives on: During the second Gulf interests. Alliances of the unknowing will exist, and War, Soldiers adapted to the threat of improvised explosive devices and small arms fire by welding “hillbilly armor” to their vehicles. Adaptability better explains commonly miscon- strued concepts like asymmetric warfare, which is nothing more than adapting warfighting means and methods to apply one’s strengths against an oppo- nent’s weakness. Adaptability presupposes flex- ibility, but it does not mandate simplicity. Indeed, complexity breeds lucrative opportunities. Adapta- tion that employs high technology and requires trained, disciplined troops is difficult to counter. Linking a handful of Special Forces with aircraft overhead to produce real-time precision bombing NA R A An M-4 Sherman tank with a “rhino plow” attached in front is a complicated adaptive response that broke years has just punched its way through a Normandy hedgerow. of stalemate on Afghanistan battlefields. Note the infantrymen riding on the back of the tank. Nutter, U.S. Army U.S. Nutter, U.S. Army U.S. BG Courtney Whitney; GEN Douglas MacArthur, Com- SGT Clay O’Dell, 3-112th Armor Battalion, 56th Brigade mander in Chief of U.N. Forces; and MG Edward M. Combat Team, 36th Infantry Division, welds a 3/8-inch Almond observe the shelling of Inchon from the U.S.S. steel armor plate on a HMMWV in southern Iraq. Mt. McKinley, 15 September 1950.
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Encouraging the creative instincts of subordinates could not offset the investment needed to acquire is vital, as is an organizational culture friendly to enough culminating power to win. (Given the dismal rapid implementation of adaptive ideas. At the same economic performance of most former colonies, the time, however, inappropriately reflexive adaptations calculations were largely accurate.) fail. Some out-of-the-box ideas are deservedly off- Even in conflicts driven by ideology, such as Viet- the-table; others need more development. Consider nam, a party will eventually objectively compute what the Jeune Ecole’s (young school’s) advocacy of tor- it would have to do to conclude the conflict success- pedo boats as the French Navy’s adaptive response fully. When it became clear that South Vietnam was not to the capital ships of other European powers of moving toward an effective democratic government, the late 19th century. Despite presaging submarine the American people calculated that the effort was not warfare, the movement prematurely dismissed the worthy of continued support given the costs.7 importance of battleships and did not anticipate the Regardless, when the stakes are higher, the emergence of aircraft carriers. arithmetic of culminating power differs radically, In modern conflicts, prized leadership qualities which is important in the zero-sum game of national include the ability to rapidly sort through propos- security budgetary battles. Of significance is that als as well as tolerance for the risks inherent to neither Iraqi insurgents nor Al Qaeda terrorists can adaptation. Naturally, adaptability aims to produce acquire sufficient culminating power to threaten the culminating power. United States’ basic security interest—America’s Culminating power. The concept of culminating continued existence as a free nation. power answers the question: What type and measure Terrorists can wreak savage injury—especially of military (or other) power is needed to attain satis- using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—but factory closure at a given level of conflict? Ordinarily, only a peer competitor with a sizeable WMD capa- the answer would be “enough,” either to annihilate bility can imperil America’s survival. This should one’s adversary or to make him perceive that contin- give pause to those who ridicule so-called legacy ued resistance is not worthwhile. Culminating power systems such as attack and ballistic missile subma- encompasses elements of the traditional principles of rines, nuclear-capable bombers and missiles, and war, such as offensive, mass, maneuver, and economy show-stopping weapons like the F-22A. As impor- of force, without explicitly requiring any of them. tant as defeating terrorism and other low-intensity What constitutes adequate culminating power forms of warfare might be, considerations of the depends on the situation. Surprisingly, at the stra- larger context must guide decisionmaking. tegic level it could involve a classic decisive battle. Such engagements are not passé; the fall of Stanley Guideposts for the Future effectively ended the 1980 Falklands/Malvinas War, Modernized principles of war could serve as and the fall of Kandahar collapsed Taliban power guideposts (but not stop signs) for military and civil- in 2003. Future commanders might well impose a ian leaders embroiled in 21st-century conflicts. Such Dien Bien Phu effect on selected adversaries with principles could aid the conduct of war and assist great success. in organizing, training, and equipping for the same. Misunderstanding culminating power is easy When appropriately interrelated, the modernized today. Although conventional North Vietnamese principles suggest ways to strengthen friendly forces divisions led the final assault on Saigon in 1975, and indicate vulnerabilities in enemy operations. Of that conflict, along with many of the post-World course, the best commanders will deviate from the War II colonial wars, produced the widespread belief principles as the fortunes of war dictate. Moreover, that guerrilla operations render orthodox militaries the modernized principles will inevitably evolve. almost wholly irrelevant. Actually, low-intensity Ultimately, war is still an art, and like all artistic warfare usually succeeds only in the absence of endeavors, human imagination will continue to high-intensity risk to a major power’s fundamen- drive inventive forms and executions of its subject. tal security interests. True, insurgents in several In a sense, the most basic of the principles of war colonial conflicts did force their opponents to tally is the need to constantly challenge, reevaluate, and the worth of fighting. Typically, the potential gains modernize all of them. The job is never done.
Military Review March-April 2006 47 In security matters, intellectual stasis could be fatal. Finally, we must continue to search for peace The great danger today, for example, is assuming that the even as we prepare for war. We can hope that the irregular warfare of current conflicts is the inescapable melancholy belief that “only the dead have seen the template for future wars. (Is occupying another sullen end of war” is wrong, so long as we always realize and hostile population really the likeliest scenario?) that hope is not a principle of war.8 MR
NOTES
1. U.S. Department of the Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 November 2003), 23. the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His 2. Ibid., 24. actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will 3. See RADM John G. Morgan, Anthony D. McIvor, and the Secretary of the become . . . the Strategic Corporal.” Navy’s Action Team, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” Proceedings (October 2003): 5. Note that Dien Bien Phu began as an offensive operation. 34, 36-37, on-line at
Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S. Air Force (USAF), is the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Combat Com- mand, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. He received a B.A. from St. Joseph’s University, a J.D. from Villanova University School of Law, and is a graduate of the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, the Air War College, and the National War College. He has served in various staff positions in USAF and joint commands in the continental United States, Africa, and the Middle East. His article “Military Justice System and Command Accountability” appeared in the February 1985 issue of Military Review.
Early Risers
Across the dim parade field that foregrounds the vista, crows in fir trees wrought like spires watch barracks wake in synchronous lighting where young men rouse to demands for order.
They move out in rows of compliant minds, their last letters from home held close in thought— each caring word faithful to cadenced steps as crows rise, scatter, and merge into clouds.
—Major Jeffrey Alfiers, USAF U.S. Army photo by Martin Greeson U.S.
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