“Ai Weapons” in China's Military Innovation Elsa B

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“Ai Weapons” in China's Military Innovation Elsa B “AI WEAPONS” IN CHINA'S MILITARY INNOVATION ELSA B. KANIA APRIL 2020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY fielded — cannot be assessed with high confidence at this point. However, as technological competition As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks emerges as an ever more prominent element of to become a “world-class military,” its progress in great power rivalry, it is clear the Chinese military and advanced weapons systems continues to provoke defense industry have undertaken active initiatives intense concern from its neighbors and competitors.1 in research, development, and experimentation. Yet The Chinese military and China’s defense industry China’s progress will remain contingent upon the have been pursuing significant investments in capacity to operationalize emerging weapons systems, robotics, swarming, and other applications of artificial which will require overcoming current technological intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML).2 Thus far, and organizational challenges in testing, training, and advances in weapons systems described or advertised concepts of operations.7 as “autonomous” (自主) or “intelligentized” (智能化) have built upon existing strengths in the research Chinese advances in autonomy and AI-enabled and development of unmanned (无人)3 systems and weapons systems could impact the military balance, missile technology.4 While difficult to evaluate the while potentially exacerbating threats to global security sophistication of these emerging capabilities,5 this and strategic stability as great power rivalry intensifies.8 initial analysis concentrates on indicators of progress In striving to achieve a technological advantage, the in weapons systems that may possess a range of Chinese military could rush to deploy weapons systems levels of autonomy.6 that are unsafe, untested, or unreliable under actual operational conditions. The PLA’s strategic choices This paper reviews advances in the Chinese military about which capabilities could prove advantageous will and defense industry to date, evaluates the potential influence the direction of Chinese military innovation. implications of Chinese approaches to arms It is encouraging that Chinese military scientists and control and governance, assesses potential future researchers are starting to debate and engage with developments, and then considers the strategic safety issues and technical concerns, as well as legal implications, as well as policy options for the United and ethical considerations.9 Nonetheless, People’s States and likeminded democracies. Based on Republic of China (PRC) arms sales to potential publicly available information, the PLA’s trajectory adversaries to the United States, and to militaries with in the development and potential employment of little regard for the law of war, threaten U.S. values and AI/ML-enabled and autonomous weapons systems interests, while accelerating the proliferation of these remains uncertain. The maturity of these capabilities capabilities to non-state actors. Going forward, the — as well as if, when, and to what extent weapons United States should monitor these trends and pursue systems with greater levels of autonomy have been measures to mitigate such risks. IN PARTNERSHIP WITH: GLOBAL CHINA “AI WEAPONS” IN CHINA'S MILITARY INNOVATION INTRODUCTION decisive role in future warfare. They closely examine antecedents in U.S. strategy and capabilities to inform Advances in autonomy and AI-enabled weapons their own assessments.23 systems promise to increase the speed, reach, precision, and lethality of future operations.10 Today, militaries The PLA’s quest for innovation is an element of worldwide, including in the United States and Russia,11 the Chinese national strategy to leverage science are exploring and pursuing these capabilities.12 and technology in pursuit of great power status.24 Current definitions of autonomy and understanding In the process, the Chinese military is developing of the characteristics of “lethal autonomous weapons more traditional and emerging capabilities, while systems” (LAWS) vary greatly.13 The use of AI/ML concentrating on asymmetric approaches against the techniques, while not required to achieve autonomy, U.S. military. President Xi Jinping has emphasized, can enable these capabilities.14 In an era of high-tech “under a situation of increasingly fierce international warfare, the boundary between a “smart weapon” military competition, only the innovators win.”25 capable of great precision and a weapons system Moreover, on the importance of “aiming at the considered partly or fully autonomous can be complex frontier of global military scientific and technological and contested.15 No consensus exists on how to developments,” he urged: “We must attach great manage issues of law, ethics, and arms control that importance to the development of strategic frontier arise with the development of such capabilities, other technologies, striving to surpass the predecessor as than emergent agreement that existing elements of latecomers, turning sharply to surpass.”26 international law do apply, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC).16 Beyond this, the major militaries As early as 2011, the PLA’s official dictionary included remain unwilling to accept any serious constraints on a definition of an “AI weapon” 人工智能武器( ), development due to the potential for future operational characterized as “a weapon that utilizes AI to pursue, advantage.17 distinguish, and destroy enemy targets automatically; often composed of information collection and management systems, knowledge base systems, CURRENT CHINESE MILITARY decision assistance systems, mission implementation CAPABILITIES systems, etc.”27 Similarly, Chinese military strategists and scientists tend to discuss “AI weapons” or Chinese military initiatives in AI are motivated by “intelligentized weapons” (智能化武器) more often an acute awareness of global trends in military than “autonomous weapons” (自主武器) in academic technology and operations;18 concerns about falling and technical writings.28 This terminological difference behind the U.S. military, which is perceived and often is subtle but potentially significant, implying a focus characterized as the “powerful adversary” ( );19 and 强敌 on the “smartness” or “intelligence” of weapons recognition of potential opportunities inherent in this systems in selecting and engaging targets.29 For military and technological transformation.20 “China’s instance, techniques for adaptive or autonomous military security is confronted by risks from technology control can leverage a range of algorithms, including surprise and a growing technological generation neural networks. Even as the function of certain gap,” according to the official white paper on “China’s weapons systems becomes “unmanned” (无人化) and National Defense in the New Era,” released in July to some degree automatic (自动化), greater degrees 2019.21 “Intelligent(ized) warfare is on the horizon,” of autonomy or “intelligence” in function can remain the assessment finds, and the ongoing “Revolution in elusive. Military Affairs” will change the very mechanisms for victory in future warfare.22 Chinese military scientists While Chinese leaders have prioritized advances in AI and strategists, including from such authoritative as an important direction for military modernization, institutions as the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, China’s Central Military Commission has yet to release National Defense University, and National University any policy or official strategy that formally clarifies of Defense Technology, envision AI and intelligent such plans and priorities. However, in July 2017, the weapons playing an increasingly important if not New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development TECHNOLOGY 2 GLOBAL CHINA “AI WEAPONS” IN CHINA'S MILITARY INNOVATION Plan called for China to “strengthen the use of The Chinese defense industry can build upon AI in military applications that include command its apparent strengths in armed drones and decisionmaking, military deductions,30 and defense advanced missiles to introduce greater autonomy equipment.”31 In the fall of 2017, Xi, in his address to into operations.43 In particular, certain advanced the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist unmanned aerial vehicles could be modified to operate Party (CCP), urged, “accelerate the development of with greater autonomy instead of under remote military intelligentization, and improve joint operations control.44 Currently, China leads in export of medium- capabilities and all-domain combat capabilities based altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles on network information systems.”32 His remarks (UAVs).45 PRC UAVs, such as the Wing Loong platform, provided authoritative guidance to pursue military from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), applications of AI that could be integrated across the and the CH-4, developed by China Aerospace Science whole system for future operations.33 This emerging and Technology Corporation (CASC), are actively emphasis on “military intelligentization” (军事智能化), marketed for export.46 In fact, CASC has even opened or the “development of an intelligent military,”34 factories for the CH-4 platform in Pakistan, Myanmar, extends beyond AI-enabled systems and autonomy and Saudi Arabia.47 This prominent ranking in arms to include the development of weapons systems sales reflects the relative affordability of Chinese leveraging adaptive control or involving autonomy in drones over American ones, and that the Chinese various
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