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MA Thesis Culture and Politics
5184VCP01Y
* * *
Pyeongchang 2018 and Inter-Korean Relations
An analysis of inter-Korean relations and sports diplomacy leading up to, during and following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in South Korea
Thesis Research Paper
MA Culture and Politics
Thomas Roberts
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Word Count - 14,994
Examiner: Dr. E. Veldkamp
Submission Date 04/01/2019
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Contents Introduction ...... 3 Literature Review ...... 8 Section 1 – The Beginnings of Sports Diplomacy ...... 8 Towards a “New” Sports Diplomacy – Emerging Powers ...... 9 A “New” Sports Diplomacy ...... 10 Section 2 - Sporting Mega-Events ...... 12 Challenges of Hosting Sporting Mega-Events ...... 14 North Korea and Sporting Mega-Events ...... 15 South Korea and Sporting Mega-Events ...... 16 Section 3 - Sports Diplomacy and Political Breakthroughs ...... 18 Sports Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations ...... 20 Findings ...... 23 Analysis ...... 25 Section 1 - South Korea wins bid for 2018 Winter Olympics in 2011 ...... 25 2012 London Olympics ...... 27 2014 Incheon Asian Games ...... 29 2015 & 2016 - Rio Olympics ...... 31 2017 - Lead up to Pyeongchang 2018 ...... 33 Section 2 - North Korea agrees to participate in the 2018 Winter Olympics ...... 35 2018 Winter Olympics Opening Ceremony ...... 36 2018 Winter Olympics Competition ...... 38 Section 3 - Developments after Pyeongchang 2018 ...... 41 27 April – First Inter-Korean Summit ...... 43 26 May - Second Inter-Korean Summit ...... 43 18-20 September - Third Inter-Korean Summit ...... 44 China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations ...... 46 The US’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations ...... 48 Sporting Unity Continues ...... 50 Future Prospects ...... 52 Conclusion ...... 54 Further Research ...... 57 Bibliography...... 58
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Introduction
Since the end of the Korean War in July 1953, North and South Korea have remained divided nations, with seemingly little hope of reunification. Other divided nations such as Vietnam and Germany have set aside their differences and become one state. North and South Korea are divided politically, socially and economically and, thus, reunification appears to be the only objective they share.1 Although North and South Korea differ politically as the North employs an ideology based on Juche (self-reliance) and the South is democratic, the Koreans remain bound by ethnic roots.2 Since the 1970s, inter-Korean relations have thawed to a certain extent and there has been an increase in communication between the two states.3 However, for reunification to take place, South Korea, in combination with the US insist that denuclearisation must occur on the Korea Peninsula. Tensions in the region have continually been inflamed due to persistent missile testing since North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and the breakdown of the six-party reunification talks in 2008.4
Recently, the global public witnessed a joint march by the two Koreas in the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics held in Pyeongchang, South Korea, with the Korean Peninsula flag representing the two teams.5 This occurrence has not been uncommon in inter- Korean relations.6 The two nations marched together at the opening ceremonies in the 2000, 2004 Summer Olympics, and the 2006 Winter Olympics.7 Conversely, before and during the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, relations were tense and, as a result, a joint march was not held.8 Moreover, the 2002 Busan Games was the first time North Korea had participated in a
1 Udo Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. London & New York: Routledge, 2016). 2 Ibid. 3Armstrong, Charles K. Inter-Korean Relations in Historical perspective.’ International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 14, No.2 (2005):1. 4 Evan J.R Revere. ‘Korean Reunification and US Interests: Preparing for One Korea.’ Brookings (20/01/2015). https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/ Accessed 31/12/2018. 5 ‘Winter Olympics: Six incredible moments from opening ceremony.’ BBC News (09/02/2018). https://www.bbc.com/sport/winter-olympics/43005870 Accessed 14/10/2018.
7 Udo Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 31, No.3 (2014):383. 8 Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’
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sporting competition held in South Korea. 9 Previously, Pyongyang had conducted two terrorist attacks before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the second resulting in the deaths of 115 people on Korean Air Flight 858.10 Thus, historically, sport and inter-Korean relations have had a complex relationship with each other.
Previously, scholars such as Brian Bridges have played down the importance of sport in inter-Korean relations.11 However, following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in February, there has been an increase in communication between the two states. North and South Korea entertained three summits in 2018, whereas before, only two had been held since the end of the Korean War. 12 Moreover, these summits have led to North Korea agreeing to close one of its nuclear missile test facilities.13 The discourse between the two states has been one of harmony and cooperation. For example, the two leaders of North and South Korea, Kim Jong-Un and Moon Jae-In, were pictured hand-in-hand during the April summit of last year.14
Consequently, the relationship between sport and politics deserves a re-think. Sports diplomacy is a recent discipline which has been reintroduced by Stuart Murray.15 Murray envisaged a reanalysis of the relationship between sport and politics and eventually argued that sport diplomacy could be embedded into foreign policy by states. 16 Thus, sports diplomacy cannot be limited to one-off exchanges with politics, such as in the case of US- China’s ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy in 1971.17 18
9 9 Jung Woo Lee. ‘The Politics of Sports Mega-events in South Korea.’ in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. (London & New York: Routledge, 2016). 10 Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ 11 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p166. 12 ‘North Korea’s Kim Jong-un agrees to shut missile site.’ BBC News (19/09/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45569924 Accessed 14/10/2018. 13 Ibid. 14 ‘South Korea seeks to hold inter-Korean summit Sept. 18-20: reports.’ The Korea Times (04/09/2018). https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/09/103_254994.html Accessed 26/10/2018. 15 Stuart Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 8, No.3-4 (2013):192. 16 Ibid. 17 The ping-pong diplomacy involved a series of table tennis matches in China between the US and China. Eventually, US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing, helping to improve relations between the two states. ‘From Ping Pong Diplomacy to the Beijing Games.’ Team USA (12/06/2008). https://www.teamusa.org/News/2008/June/12/From-Ping-Pong-Diplomacy-to-the-Beijing-Games Accessed 04/01/2019. 18 Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ p192.
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In my paper, I intend to analyse the relationship between sports and politics in inter- Korean relations from 2011, when Pyeongchang won the rights to host the 2018 Winter Olympics, to the present day. It will be determined whether sports diplomacy during this period have directly influenced inter-Korean relations. My analysis will proceed with three sections. It will begin with an examination of inter-Korean relations from 2011 to the commencement of the 2018 Winter Olympics. Succeeding this will be an analysis of the opening ceremony of the Games and the sports and political happenings relating to inter- Korean relations during the competition. Finally, developments in inter-Korean relations following the Games will chartered and examined. The period of analysis provides ample scope to determine whether sporting mega-events19 have causally affected inter-Korean relations.
The first section of the literature review will cover sports diplomacy in the sense of “new” sports diplomacy versus traditional sports diplomacy. The second section of the literature review will then highlight the benefits and pitfalls when hosting a sporting mega- event. Historically, North and South Korea’s use of sporting mega-events will then be detailed to understand the context in which these two states view and use this form of sports diplomacy. Finally, the third section of the literature review concerns itself with the debate whether sport, in general, can truly make political breakthroughs for hostile nations and inter- Korean relations.
The research is a within-case analysis of inter-Korean relations before, during and after the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Primary and secondary sources will both be collected and analysed. Primary sources will include newspaper articles, academic discussions, websites, videos etc. I have endeavoured to avoid tabloid or sensationalist newspapers in order to reduce the amount of biased data. A large section of the data includes news websites such as Reuters, BBC News, Quartz and The Diplomat among others. South Korean news websites such as The Korean Times, The Korean Herald and The Chosun Ilbo have also been utilised. Moreover, other primary data includes scholars from institutes pertaining to the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example. Secondary data includes journal articles discussing the relevant topic.
19 Sporting mega-events are one-off multi-event competitions hosted by states such as the Olympics.
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The lack of available information from North Korea put limitations on the objectivity of the data. I was able to collect information second hand from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and first hand from the Rodong Sinmun. 20 However, I found that the Pyongyang Times did not archive information and the Rodong Sinmun had a dearth of available data as well. Furthermore, I was able to gather data from North Korean watch groups such as 38 North and North Korea Leadership Watch.
Academically my research is relevant as scholars have debated whether sports diplomacy can lead to political breakthroughs. A thorough critique of inter-Korean relations in the context of the 2018 Pyeongchang has not be theorised as of this present time. Several scholars such as Bridges, Lee and Merkel have written about inter-Korean relations and sport dating back to the 1980s and further; however, in the last decade sporting mega-events in regards to inter-Korean relations have been undertheorised. Moreover, whilst it is well known that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who replaced his father in 2011, is a sports fan21 there has not been research covering his period in charge determining his policy towards sports and inter-Korean relations. So far, research in this field has been related to one-off sporting mega- events such as 2012 London Olympics and 2008 Beijing Olympics. My research attempts to scrutinise the chain of events leading up to the 2018 Pyeongchang and the cause and effect relationship between sporting mega-events and inter-Korean relations.
Outside the academic context, my research is policy relevant as well. A divided Korea ensures that the border will remain heavily guarded by the military and we may continue to see missile tests from Pyongyang. Debate remains as to the extent of human right abuses in North Korea and food shortages for the people.22 Thus, even without reunification North Korea needs to remain on good terms with other states in order to receive food and economic aid. If sporting mega-events can provide an opportunity to improve relations, create dialogue between the two Koreas or even assist in the initiation of reunification talks then sports
20 The Rodong Sinmun is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. 21 Angela Moon. ‘North Korea Decision on Olympics Participation Seen as Last Minute: South Korea Official.’ Reuters (14/11/2017). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-northkorea/north-korea-decision- on-olympics-participation-seen-as-last-minute-south-korea-official-idUSKBN1DE2TS Accessed 09/12/2018. 22 Paul Chisolm. ‘The Food Insecurity of North Korea.’ NPR News (19/06/2018). https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/19/620484758/the-food-insecurity-of-north-korea Accessed 16/12/2018.
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diplomacy becomes relevant for foreign policy objectives in inter-Koreans relations and potentially other divided or warring nations as well.
Some of the questions that I will attempt to resolve include: has sports diplomacy facilitated cooperation between North and South Korea or have external factors played the more significant role? To what extent can sporting mega-events establish dialogue and communication between hostile states? How can we compare Pyeongchang 2018 to other, previous sporting mega-events in regards to inter-Korean relations? Finally, to what extent can sport diplomacy be embedded long-term as part of foreign policy?
Thus, my research question will be:
What role has sports diplomacy played in inter-Korean relations leading up to, during and following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games?
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Literature Review
Section 1 – The Beginnings of Sports Diplomacy The importance and relevance of the relationship between sport and politics has continually been debated. In the last 5-7 years, sports diplomacy has become more researched, primarily led by Stuart Murray.23 Murray argued that there are two components in adopting sports diplomacy.24 First, sport can help states achieve foreign policy objectives and, second, there are complex networks of exchanges involving international sporting committees, civil society organisations and leading government figures in which increased communication can occur.25 Essentially, the first theory limits sports diplomacy to the application of states and traditional concepts of power, whilst the second focuses on non-state and state interaction and leans towards the subtleties of soft power. Therefore, we can immediately identify two theories regarding sports diplomacy.
In the mid-20th century, early sports diplomacy scholars associated sport with Murray’s first theory. Sport was thought to be employed by states in order to gain prestige, as a vehicle for propaganda and to reinforce old rivalries. 26 Strenk’s historical research highlighted the Nazi’s use of sport as political propaganda, the US-Soviet Union’s Cold War rivalry and the determination of states in general to be top of the pile in Olympic medal tables.27 Moreover, in 1945, George Orwell argued that sport was equal to “war minus the shooting.”28 Orwell strongly maintained that sport evoked violent tendencies and merely reinforced state nationalism.29 Orwell’s article provided a deeply pessimistic view of sport in which he theorised that sport pertained to nationalistic pride and power over others, often through violent means. Thus, originally, sports diplomacy scholars concluded that states utilised sport for self-gain and achieving political power.
23 Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ p192. 24 Ibid p193. 25 Ibid. 26 Andrew Strenk. ‘What Price Victory? The World of International Sports and Politics.’ The ANNUALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 445, No.1 (1979):140. 27 Ibid 28 George Orwell. ‘The Sporting Spirit.’ The Tribune (December 1945) http://www.orwell.ru/library/articles/spirit/english/e_spirit accessed 27/11/2018. 29 Ibid.
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Towards a “New” Sports Diplomacy – Emerging Powers As previously demonstrated, the traditional theory of sport involved prestige, nationalism and power; however, with globalisation and the rise of international organisations, scholars have theorised that foreign policy objectives can also be achieved through soft power. Cornelissen advocates the importance of soft power with her example of South Africa, who since the end of Apartheid in 1994, have continually attempted to display new-found democratic values through sporting mega-events.30 In 1995, South Africa hosted and won the Rugby World Cup. This victory was followed by several other sporting mega-events hosted by South Africa, culminating in the 2010 South African World Cup.31 The World Cup was promoted by South Africa as ‘the African World Cup,’ in which the state attempted to bring together the African nations and bolster the African continent.32 South Africa also wanted to show the public the positive changes occurring in the state, far removed from the era of Apartheid.33 Therefore, the World Cup was identified as an opportunity to achieve South Africa’s idea of projecting their democratic values and African identity globally.
Moreover, sports diplomacy can bypass or negotiate traditional political challenges for emerging states. China, for example, hosted the Olympics in 2008 despite not adhering to traditional Olympic values such as peace, harmony, solidarity and fair play.34 Horton notes that the International Olympics Committee (IOC) knew about China’s poor human rights record but chose not to engage with the problem and allowed China to precede with the games, which became one of the most successful in history.35 To sum up, sports diplomacy appears to have had a positive influence on international affairs and is able to create dialogue between state and non-state actors even if their fundamental values do not agree.
Finally, Merkel argues that implementing sport as a foreign policy tool can be easier than going through non-sporting diplomacy.36 Engaging with the public can be a simpler
30 Cornelissen. ‘The Geopolitics of Global Aspirations.’ p3008. p3017. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid p3018. 33 Ibid p3017. 34 Zhang Qingmin. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 8, No.3-4 (2013):214. 35 Peter Horton. ‘Sport as Public Diplomacy and Public Disquiet: Australia’s Ambivalent Embrace of the Beijing Olympics.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 25, No.7 (2008):953. 36 Udo Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea: One Nation, Two Countries and Three Flags.’ International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 43, No.3 (2008):307.
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process than entering into complex, bureaucratically limited negotiations with political organisations and individuals.37 Merkel argues that using sport as a foreign policy tool can help rid a state of negative stereotypes, flatten seemingly insurmountable political barriers and help initiate dialogue between states.38 Sport provides the opportunity for states to implement soft power tactics in a more efficient and less cumbersome way. The earlier examples of the South African 2010 World Cup and Beijing 2008 demonstrates that engaging in public diplomacy is an effective strategy for changing global attitudes and attempting to move beyond past troubles.
Thus, the rise of emerging powers and the global communication between the different states and cultures hosting these mega-events dictates that perhaps sport is not solely about violence and one-upmanship. Sport can be about personal achievement or glory for the nation but perhaps a “new,” more cooperative and peaceful sports diplomacy has been emerging.
A “New” Sports Diplomacy A “new” sports diplomacy relates to Murray second theory regarding the multitude of actors involved. Murray notes the many actors involved in sports diplomacy range from states to civil society organisations and even sporting teams.39 Thus, communication and negotiation becomes normalised between different actors.
In an article regarding the world first sports diplomacy strategy, Murray notes that diplomacy is a “plural effort.”40 Murray argues that states seek to create networks as they recognise that they can achieve their foreign policy goals by more frequent engagement with other actors.41 Murray points to Australia’s first sports diplomacy strategy, which worked together with other Australian departments to showcase Australia on the world stage and connect with people from all walks of life in growing and enhancing sporting development.42
37 Ibid. 38 Ibid p290. 39 Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ p193. 40 Stuart Murray. ‘Sports Diplomacy in the Australian Context: Theory into Strategy.’ Politics and Policy, 45, No.5 (2017):845. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid p849.
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The strategy assisted Australia in connecting with other nations, such as an international football match with Brazil, in which a multitude of events surrounding the match involving Brazilian children, businesses and politicians were hosted.43 Implementing sports diplomacy in this way can strengthen relations between two nations, both publicly and politically.
In support of Murray’s theory, Rofe insists that sports diplomacy encompasses a multi- layered network of beneficial, complex interactions and arrangements. In particular, Rofe emphasises the role of the individual in sports diplomacy.44 Rofe refers to Chinese President Xi Jinping who visited Manchester City football team to conduct a business dealing, (where British Prime Minster David Cameron was also present) in which his presence became known worldwide through Manchester City player Sergio Aguero’s Twitter feed.45 Consequently, the whole world knew about the Chinese President’s visit and his business activity.46 The actors included state leaders, players, teams and the general public, emphasising the wide variety of actors involved.
Other scholars reinforce Rofe’s focus on the individual. Zhang proposes that sports diplomacy has moved beyond its original theories and into, what he refers to, as a “new” sports diplomacy.47 Zhang refers specifically to Yao Ming, the first Chinese basketball player to play in the National Basketball Association (NBA) in America. 48 Yao Ming was a great success in the NBA and the positive attitude shown towards him by Americans helped build bridges between China and the US.49 Furthermore, Goldberg, writing in 2000, advised the US to invite North Korean basketball star Michael Ri to play in the NBA, where he could potentially act in a facilitating role between the two states.50 Moreover, if the US sent a basketball team to North Korea, Goldberg suggested that this would replicate the Sino-
43 Ibid p851. 44 J. Simon Rofe. ‘Sport and Diplomacy: A Global Diplomacy Framework.’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 27, No.2 (2016):212. 45 Ibid p213. 46 Ibid. 47 Zhang. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ p231. 48 Ibid p228. 49 Ibid p228-9. 50 Jeremy Goldberg. ‘Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps.’ Washington Quarterly, 23, No.3 (2000):68.
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American ping-pong diplomacy.51 Evidently, the individual can play an important role in sports diplomacy as well.
In order to understand sports diplomacy fully, we must take on board the idea that sport diplomacy is not limited to state-state interaction, power and prestige. Sports diplomacy now encompasses more actors, which enables increased communication and flexibility when conducting diplomacy. Individual sports stars can be used as ambassadors, political leaders can be involved in social media stories and competition between two national teams can spread goodwill. It is from this framework that we can understand sports diplomacy.
Section 2 - Sporting Mega-Events Firstly, sporting mega-events can boost a state’s image. A state has the opportunity to showcase a positive image of their nation to the global audience. Sporting mega-events can be watched on television the world over and a successful event can transform the state’s image from negative to positive. The hosting of a sporting mega-event provides an emerging state with the opportunity to present itself as a modern, economically successful nation. In the last 20 years, we have witnessed an increase in the number of emerging nations hosting sporting mega-events. Last year we saw Russia host the 2018 Football World Cup, Brazil hosted the previous World Cup and the 2016 Olympics whilst China hosted the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Cornelissen discusses the BRICS nations52 and their reasons for hosting sporting mega- events. 53 Cornelissen focuses on Brazil, India and South Africa and concludes that sporting mega-events can be employed as an opportunity for states to display their vast improvements.54 China is a good example, as the 2008 Beijing Olympics highlighted their economic modernisation of the previous 30 years.55 Similarly, India has significantly improved
51 Ibid. 52 BRICS – A group of emerging nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 53 Scarlett Cornelissen. ‘The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration: Sport Mega-events and Emerging Powers,’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 27, No.16-18 (2010):3008. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid p3014.
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its economy in the last 20 or so years and, as a result, hosted the 2010 Commonwealth Games.56
Furthermore, hosting a sporting mega-event provides an opportunity for a state to engage with the public through public diplomacy, which encompasses an important part of sports diplomacy. Grix and Lee state that public diplomacy is the idea of attracting the public through hosting a sporting mega-event. 57 For example, opening ceremonies of sporting mega-events can win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the audience.58 Short el al agree with Grix and Lee in that the opening ceremonies are part of the spectacle in which the idealisation of the host country is presented through ambitious and spectacular routines to the global audience.59 Short et al argue that globalisation has had the effect where sporting mega- events are continually in the public eye and they refer to, specifically the Olympics as a “global media spectacle.”60 Short et al also state that the Olympics is “a vessel for conveying and enhancing the host’s cultural identity.”61 Sporting mega-events give the global audience the opportunity to learn about other cultures and broaden their view of the world, thus helping to banish negative stereotypes.62
To summarise, hosting sporting mega-events can be incorporated as a positive and simple tool of sports diplomacy. Sports diplomacy moves beyond traditional state-state interaction and involves the public. The public has access through the media to every occurrence that happens in a sporting mega-event. Thus, for emerging nations, hosting a sporting mega-event can provide an opportunity for showcasing the state in the public domain.
56 Ibid p3020. 57 Jonathan Grix & Donna Lee. ‘Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction,’ Global Society, 27, No.4 (2013):529. 58 Ibid. 59 John Rennie Short, Carrie Breitbach, Steve Buckman & Jamey Essex. ‘From world cities to gateway cities: Extending the boundaries of globalisation theory.’ Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 4, No.3 (2010):321 60 Ibid p320. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.
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Challenges of Hosting Sporting Mega-Events Hosting a sporting mega-event is a substantially useful tool for emerging nations; however, constant media exposure can emphasise negative aspects of a state. In Brazil, the mass protests surrounding their 2014 World Cup were broadcasted to the global audience, conveying a divided, unequal state.63 Sebastiao et al point out that the media control the information that the public views and that the sporting mega-events, amongst other forms of entertainment, merely divert the public’s attention away from what is really happening in the world.64
The media can control the information given to the audience and several discourse analysis studies have highlighted this. A significant number of scholars have implemented a discourse analysis study in order to examine the type of language used by the press regarding a particular sporting mega-event. For example, Hammett conducted a discourse analysis on British media representations of South Africa’s 2010 World Cup.65 In Hammett’s analysis, he concluded that the British press referred to the South Africans during the World Cup negatively, as exotic or barbaric, and that the issue of security threats were continually problematised by the British media.66
Other separate research by Mishra and then Osborne, Sherry and Nicholson also found similarities in the discourse of the 2010 Delhi Commonwealth Games. Mishra, in particular, determined that the Western press 67 negatively stereotyped Indians and also focused on the perceived inability of India to host the Commonwealth Games.68 Osborne et al expanded on Mishra’s work by conducting a larger study using Australia’s press and state that the themes covered by the Australian press include India’s incapability of hosting the
63 Sónia Pedro Sebastiao, Ana Isabel Lemos & Isabel Soares. ‘The Coverage of Opposing Events: Brazil’s Sporting Mega-Events Preparation and the Host Community Civil Protests.’ in Media Events: A Critical Contemporary Approach,’ eds. Bianca Mitu & Stamatis Poulakidakos (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016):89. 64 Ibid p88. 65 Daniel Hammett. ‘British media representations of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup,’ South African Geographical Journal, 93, No.1 (2011):63. 66 Ibid p67. 67 Mishra’s study included press from Australia, Canadia, New Zealand and the UK. 68 Suman Mishra. ‘” The Shame Games”: a textual analysis of Western press coverage of the Commonwealth Games in India,’ Third World Quarterly, 33, No.5 (2012):875.
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games and how an unsuccessful hosting of the games could harm the Commonwealth institution’s reputation.69
In their studies Hammett, Mishra and Osborne et al all highlight the perils that can come with hosting a sporting mega-event. Whilst sporting mega-events give the hosting state an opportunity to show off their culture and infrastructure, states need to be wary of domestic problems being highlighted to the world, particularly with the media.
Essentially, the media control, to a certain extent what the public view. Different media agendas mean that it can be difficult for a state to overcome negative stereotypes, and this can be a complex, lengthy process to change a public’s opinion of the state through hosting sporting mega-events. Furthermore, what the public view through the media and the sporting mega-events may not constitute the reality of the hosting state.
North Korea and Sporting Mega-Events North Korea has hosted sporting-events with the intention of boosting their nation’s domestic and global image but has also suffered from a critical Western media agenda. Whilst North Korea has not hosted any major international sporting mega-events such as the Olympics, it has however, hosted a couple of domestic mega-events. One of these is the Arirang festival, which Merkel has argued, has provided a platform for North Korea to display its achievements to the domestic and global audience.70 For North Korea, this is particularly important, as it is an isolated nation, which has been branded a “rogue state” or the “axis of evil” by Western states and their media.71 Moreover, more Western and Chinese tourists are now visiting North Korea and the Arirang festival, thus, increasing its visibility to the global world.72
The Arirang festival emphasises the importance of the Kim dynasty but also conveys that idea that eventual reunification will lead to prosperity for ethnic Koreans.73 Moreover, the festival is employed as a political tool as Lee and Bairner highlight the “Korea is best”
69 Angela Osborne; Emma Sherry; Matthew Nicholson. ‘The Delhi Dilemma: media representation of the 2010 Commonwealth Games,’ Sport in Society, 19, No.2 (2016):206. 70 Udo Merkel. ‘Bigger than Beijing 2008: Politics, Propaganda and Physical Culture in Pyongyang.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 27, No.14-5 (2010):2487. 71 Ibid p2468. 72 Ibid p2488. 73 Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ p382.
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slogan and the anti-American imperialist narrative, which conveys an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy.74 The event ‘Prosper our Motherland,’ a new mass event in 2008, highlighted similar themes as the Arirang Festival.75 The show’s narrative displayed 60 years of North Korea and celebrated the greatness of former leader Kim Il-sung in combination with political events such as nuclearisation and inter-Korean relations.76 Thus, these are two festivals which are employed as political tools of the North Korean state.
Similarly, the North Korean state-owned KCNA promotes a pan-Korean identity during international sporting mega-events.77 North Korean athletes’ achievements have been celebrated in combination with several South Korea athletes such as Park Ji-Sung, the South Korean footballer who scored an important goal against Iran which allowed the North Korean football team to advance to the 2010 World Cup finals.78 Park Ji-Sung was celebrated by players and fans in a similar fashion to how a North Korean national hero would be treated.79 This was not an isolated incident as South Korean medal winners in the 2010 Guangzhou Asian games were also praised by the KCNA.80 Therefore, North Korea’s narrative towards sports significantly focuses on the pan-Korean ethnicity, which demonstrates how sport can mould a nation’s identity. Domestically, North Korea focuses on positive branding of their nation and the Korean identity.
South Korea and Sporting Mega-Events In the last 30 or so years, South Korea has been able to host or co-host several international sporting mega-events to raise the position of the state in the global world.81 South Korea has risen from one of the world’s poorest countries in the 1950s to one of most developed presently.82 Lee refers to the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics Games in Seoul as a
74Lee & Bairner. ‘The Difficult Dialogue.’ p405. 75 Merkel. ‘Bigger than Beijing 2008: Politics, Propaganda and Physical Culture in Pyongyang.’ p2484. 76 Ibid p2485. 77 Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ p383-4. 78 Ibid p384. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid p385. 81 Jung Woo Lee. ‘A Game for the Global North: The 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang and South Korean Cultural Politics.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 33, No.12 (2016):1411. 82 Ibid p1415.
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“coming out party” in which South Korea’s rapid economic rise was celebrated by the South Korean government and public.83
Hosting these two sporting mega-events in the late 1980s also contributed to the democratisation of South Korea. The Olympics served as a democratising catalyst as the people demanded political participation and protested en masse on the streets.84 With this pressure, the South Korean government eventually gave in and announced several democratising reforms in June 1987.85 The IOC also leaned on the South Korean government by threatening to move the Olympics and South Korea felt the pressure to conform to the majority of the Western world.86
Sporting mega-events have also sent waves of national pride through South Korea. Tosa states that the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games provided South Koreans with a great sense of national pride.87 Following these two games, the South Korean public became more interested in international sporting mega-events than domestic ones.88 The 2002 joint South Korea-Japan World Cup provides a great example of South Korea’s interest in international sporting mega-events, in which South Korea reached the semi-finals. The South Korean public watched the games during the World Cup on public screens and seven million people cheered on their team in the streets for the semi-final against Germany. 89 The President Kim Dae-jung stated that it was South Korea’s greatest day since the creation of the Korean nation90 and the South Korean people reflected this sentiment by displaying great pride in the team’s success.91 The 2002 World Cup semi-final provided the opportunity for the South Korea to celebrate their nation’s achievement and demonstrated that they could compete with more developed states.92 For the South Korean public, sport formed part of their rapid rise to become an economically successful and democratic nation. Evidently, South
83 Ibid p1417. 84 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p77. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Tosa. ‘Sport Nationalism in South Korea: An Ethnographic Study.’ p6. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid p5. 90 Korean nation referring to the legend of Dangun, the god-king who is believed to have founded the Korean nation. 91 Tosa. ‘Sport Nationalism in South Korea: An Ethnographic Study.’ p6 92 Ibid.
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Korea has taken great pride in its hosting and participation at sporting mega-events and, as a result, has employed the competitions successfully in order to boost their nation.
Section 3 - Sports Diplomacy and Political Breakthroughs
Scholars have debated whether sport can truly make political breakthroughs. It has been argued that sports diplomacy can be used to lessen bilateral tensions. Zhang’s study on China shows that Sino-American and Sino-Korean relations have improved due to sports diplomacy.93 The ping-pong diplomacy in 1971 brought an end to the hostilities between China and the US, whilst support for each other’s Asian Games in Seoul 1986 and Beijing 1990 led to harmonious relations between China and South Korea.94 For China and South Korea, supporting the Games helped to build trust, particularly following China’s global isolation due to the Tiananmen Square massacre.95 Bridges observed that, in 1992, China recognised South Korea as a sovereign state and the South Koreans also began to build diplomatic relations with other socialist states in the early 1990s.96
However, Zhang is cautious when stating whether sport can really have a profound influence on international affairs.97 He states that the positive relations between two nations creates the environment in which sports diplomacy can effectively take place.98 For example, Zhang observes that Beijing and Washington were already planning to cool relations before the ping-pong diplomacy in the 1970s.99 Therefore, his argument is that sports diplomacy cannot produce political change on its own. The relations between the two states must be peaceful beforehand.
Moreover, sport has been argued to have little effect on reuniting divided nations. Bridges conducts his own analysis specifically on this topic.100 Bridges analyses East/West
93 Zhang. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ p221. 94 Ibid p221-223 95 Ibid p223. 96 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p74-6. 97 Zhang. ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective.’ p233. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid p221. 100 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p141.
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Germany, North/South Vietnam, North/South Yemen and China/Taiwan.101 Bridges attempts to find the role of sport on the reunification of these divided states and concludes that sport played a minimal role at best in all of the states’ reunification.102 Sport played a pacifying and uniting role but only following reunification.103 Bridges’ study supports Zhang in that sports diplomacy cannot make significant breakthroughs on its own in hostile bilateral situations.
However, sports diplomacy has the potential to pull isolated states more prominently into the global arena. Goldberg suggests that sport can help to break down barriers for isolated states.104 Goldberg cites the example of the US and Iran who played each other in the 1998 World Cup in France following previous tensions between the two states.105 The Iranians won, but there was no animosity between the Iranian general public and the US and, as a result, the Americans were able to regard the Iranians as fellow people.106 Goldberg advises that sport is the most effective way for the US to positively engage with isolated states such as Cuba and North Korea.107 Thus, sport can play a role in creating dialogue with isolated states.
Perhaps the most concrete example of sports diplomacy smoothing tensions between two warring states is the 2004 India-Pakistan cricket matches. Bandyopadhyay argues that these cricket matches broke down political barriers and created goodwill and harmony between India and Pakistan.108 Relations between India and Pakistan had been on edge over the conflict in Kashmir, terrorism and their nuclear arms race;109 however, the consensus in the media and by politicians and sportspeople alike was that the cricket matches in 2004 had created peace, temporarily at least.110 India and Pakistan provides an example of cooperation and peaceful relations between fundamental opposed neighbours through sport.
101 Ibid. 102 Ibid p157. 103 Ibid. 104 Goldberg. ‘Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps.’ p68. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid p69. 108 Kausik Bandyopadhyay. ‘Feel Good, Goodwill and India’s Friendship Tour of Pakistan, 2004: Cricket, Politics and Diplomacy in Twenty-First Century India.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 25, No.12 (2008):1664. 109 Ibid p1664. 110 Ibid p1659.
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To conclude, scholars agree that sports diplomacy can help to foster peace and harmony between opposing nations. Organising sporting events can help bring isolated nations out of their isolation and into the global arena. Even two states who despise each other such as India and Pakistan can reconcile through sports diplomacy. However, scholars maintain that sport cannot reunite two divided states on its own.
Sports Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations Scholars have debated the true level of influence sport can have towards political breakthroughs and this discussion has carried on to inter-Korean relations. Lee argues that sport cannot contribute significantly to eventual Korean reunification.111 Lee states that sport can play a role in resolving conflict between the two nations but cannot transform relations between the two states from hostile to peaceful or vice versa.112 Similarly, Bridges finds that sport follows political communication and interaction. 113 Thus, good relations precede positive sporting dialogue and, similarly with hostile relations and negative sporting dialogue. Sport cannot make significant political breakthroughs for Bridges and Lee.114
Merkel however argues that if sport diplomacy is implemented as part of a state’s foreign policy then it can be highly effective.115 Merkel says that sport can be a “powerful diplomatic tool” if the “systematic and lasting use of sport” takes place.116 Moreover, Merkel argues that inter-Korean dialogue is the best example of sport being effectively used to achieve foreign policy goals.117 Merkel does maintain that sport must be closely interlinked with the foreign policy agenda and highlights the ten years before the 2008 Beijing Olympic games as a period where sport played a huge role in inter-Korean relations.118 Therefore, Merkel is quick to emphasise that sport can be hugely effective in creating dialogue if it is part of long-term policy.
111 Jung Woo Lee. ‘Do the scale and scope of the event matter? The Asian games and the relations between North and South Korea.’ Routledge, 20, No.3 (2017):380. 112 Ibid. 113 Bridges. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. p67. 114 Ibid p166. 115 Udo Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid.
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Similarly, Goldberg argues that sports diplomacy is the optimum method for North and South Korea to facilitate dialogue.119 He highlights the example in December 1999 where the North Koreans sent their national basketball team to play South Korea in a four game series in which the North Koreans were received well by the public and South Korean President Kim Dae- jung.120
Moreover, sport has been successful in promoting a pan-Korean identity. Merkel argues that in both Koreas, a myriad of events promote the ethnic identity of the Korean people.121 Merkel contrasts this narrative with the ideological competition between East and Germany before their eventual reunification.122 For Merkel, sport has played a more pacifying role in inter-Korean relations than in the previously divided Germany.123 However, Merkel argues that North and South are unlikely to reunite as ethnic sentiment only highlights the fact that politically, the Koreans are fundamentally opposed and unable to reconcile.124
However, South Korean sporting mega-events have contributed to creating peace for inter-Korean relations, albeit in a peaceful environment. Following the World Cup, the 2002 Busan Asian Games brought about a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations as it was the first time North Korea had participated in a sporting mega-event held in South Korea.125 The North Koreans provided a delegation comprising 318 athletes and inter-Korean relations did not display any signs of hostility, showing a united front.126 The North Korea flag was raised and their anthem sung which had previously been banned in South Korea.127
This was a period where South Korean President Kim Dae-jung actively engaged North Korea with his “Sunshine Policy” which included South Korea contributing aid towards its neighbours who were suffering from severe famine.128 Two years previously, in 2000, the first ever inter-Korean summit took place and represented, at the time, a new beginning for the
119 Goldberg. ‘Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps.’ p68-9. 120 Ibid p69. 121 Merkel. ‘The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.’ p376. 122 Ibid p386. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid p387. 125 Jung Woo Lee. ‘The Politics of Sports Mega-events in South Korea.’ in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. (London & New York: Routledge, 2016). 126 Ibid. 127 Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ 128 Ibid.
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Korean Peninsula.129 Moreover, North Korea had boycotted the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the state infamously conducted two terrorist attacks before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the second resulting in the deaths of 115 people on Korean Air Flight 858. 130 Thus, this example, in combination with Busan 2002, demonstrates the close linkage between inter-Korean relations, the context of the external environment and sport.
As a result, it is evident from the literature that sport can create dialogue and open up avenues for communication. However, scholars doubt that sport will be able to reunify North and South Korea. Perhaps if sport is embedded as part of foreign policy in the long-term, it may be able to make a significant political breakthrough. Used as one-off tool, state-state sport diplomacy is not effective for achieving reunification.
129 Ibid. 130 Ibid.
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Findings Sporting mega-events and public diplomacy encompass what can be referred to as a “new” sports diplomacy. This was highlighted in section one where sports diplomacy now involves a wide variety of actors, helping to increase communication between state and non-state actors. Individual sportspersons, teams, political leaders and international organisations are examples of the types of actors who can be involved in sporting diplomacy. The increase in the number of emerging nations hosting sporting mega-events has propelled non-Western states such as China into the limelight and has provided an opportunity for them to engage with the public and more international organisations such as the IOC.
In section two, we concluded that sporting mega-events are an effective and simple tool of sports diplomacy. Public diplomacy can help to increase a state’s international standing whilst the media provides the medium from which the public can watch and discuss the games. The media can control the information that the public views which can work positively or negatively for a hosting state. North and South Korea both regard sport and sporting mega-events as crucial in creating a feel-good factor for their citizens. Moreover, the North and South Korean media often praise each other’s achievements in sporting mega- events and focus on their Korean ethnic identity and hopes for reunification.
Finally, in section 3 we discussed whether sport can truly make political breakthroughs. The literature suggests that sport on its own cannot reunite divided nations. However, sport can increase the communication between two opposing states, which can help to break down difficult barriers. For inter-Korean relations, sport appears to be the most viable and effective way for North and South Korea to communicate. Both states have a vested interest in the Korean identity and, thus, want to see athletes from both nations succeed. Sport may not provide reunification between the two states; however, it has to the potential to provide a working relationship between the North and South.
Through analysis before, during and after the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, I will attempt to scrutinise the effect that sports diplomacy has had on inter-Korean relations. Has the 2018 Winter Olympics created political breakthroughs for inter-Korean relations or has this been as a result of the external environment? How can a sporting mega-event contribute to ameliorating relations between the two hostile states? What role do non-state actors such as individuals, international sporting organisations and the media play in sports
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diplomacy? Finally, does sports diplomacy need to be embedded as part of long-term foreign policy to be effective?
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Analysis The analysis continues in three sections. Section one covers the period before the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, 131 section two analyses the opening ceremony and the sporting and political events during the Games and section three discusses inter-Korean relations after the games.
Section 1 - South Korea wins bid for 2018 Winter Olympics in 2011 South Korea won the rights to host the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics on the 6 July 2011, finally winning after narrowly missing out on three previous two Olympics by a few votes on each occasion.132 Upon the announcement of South Korea’s successful bid, the Chosun Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper, reported that North Korean IOC official, Jang Ung, welcomed the decision, declaring that Pyongyang would be open to hosting some events.133 Jang Ung pointed towards the poor state of inter-Korean relations and the need to ameliorate these tensions. 134 However, shortly after, discussions between North and South Korea regarding the possibility of sharing some of the skiing events broke down.135 Evidently, whilst there was some intention from both sides at this early stage to discuss joint ventures for the Olympics, nothing concrete was implemented.
Although reunification was a key theme of South Korea’s failed bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics, and a partial theme of their 2014 bid, South Korea did not employ the issue of reunification in their bidding application for the 2018 games.136 South Korea focused on the idea of advocating for itself, in combination with Asia, to be the new hub of winter sports.137
131 North Korea did not compete at the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi due to not having any qualifying athletes, thus will not be include in the analysis as North Korea would not have interest in the games and therefore, sporting diplomacy between the two Koreas would not occur. 132 Victor Cha. ‘South Korea Wins Bid to Host 2018 Winter Olympics.’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (07/07/2018). https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-wins-bid-host-2018-winter-olympics Accessed 07/12/2018. 133 ‘North Korean IOC Member Hails Pyeongchang Olympics Win.’ChosunMedia: The Chosun Ilbo (12/07/2011). http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/07/14/2011071400874.html Accessed 07/12/2018. 134 ‘Olympics-N.Korea Official Says Want to Co-host Games.’ Reuters (13/07/2011). https://uk.reuters.com/article/olympics-korea-north-idUKL3E7ID05L20110713 Accessed 07/12/2018. 135 Jeré Longman. ‘With the 2018 Olympics in South Korea, Will the North be Participant or Provocateur.’ The New York Times (23/05/2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/sports/2018-winter-olympics- pyeongchang-north-south-korea.html Accessed 07/12/2018. 136 Udo Merkel & Misuk Kim. ‘Third Time Lucky!? PyeongChang’s bid to host the 2018 Winter Olympics - Politics, Policy and Practice.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 28, No.16 (2011):2372-2376. 137 Ibid p2376.
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During the 2018 bid, inter-Korean political relations had been tense following the sinking of the Cheonan navy corvette and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in March and November 2010, both caused by North Korea and both leading to the deaths of a number of South Koreans.138 Thus, this may have contributed to the absence of a reunification theme for the bid.139
Finally, since the election of conservative Lee Myung-Bak as President on 25 February 2008, the political leadership of South Korea had adopted a tougher approach to inter-Korean relations.140 Lee Myung-Bak demanded an apology for Yeonpyeong island attacks but did not receive one from Pyongyang, thus tensions remained tense during the 2010-2012 period, after which, his presidency ended.141 Later in 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il passed away and his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, took over.142 The Western media had been unsure of Kim Jong-il’s health since he was thought to have cancer in 2009; however, the KCNA reported that his health was in good order.143 Thus, it cannot be certain whether Kim Jong-il was fully leading the country in its decision-making.
To conclude, in December 2011, the leadership passed to Kim Jong-un, resulting in a period of transition for North Korea. Furthermore, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak had adopted a stiffer approach in inter-Korean relations. At this early stage, issues with differing inter-Korean policy determined that peaceful relations were not possible. Therefore, the environment surrounding the period of South Korea’s bid for the 2018 Winter Olympics in 2011 was not conductive to the two Koreas being able to work together. The attack by North Korea on Yeonpyeong Island and the Cheonan vessel suggested hostile inter-Korean relations and any attempt towards sporting diplomacy was ineffective.
138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Daniel Wertz. ‘Inter-Korean Relations.’ The National Committee on North Korea (Last Updated January 2017). https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/inter-korean-relations Accessed 07/12/2018. 141 Ibid. 142 Justin McCurry. ‘Kim Jong-un declared ‘supreme leader’ in North Korea.’ The Guardian (29/12/2011). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/29/kim-jong-un-supreme-leader-north-korea Accessed 31/12/2018. 143 CNN wire staff. ‘North Korean leader Kim Jong-il dead after heart attack, state media reports.’ CNN (19/12/2011). https://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/18/world/asia/north-korea-leader-dead/index.html Accessed 31/12/2018. ‘Obituary: Kim Jong-il.’ BBC News (19/12/2011). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10745725 Accessed 31/12/2018.
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2012 London Olympics At the 2012 London Olympic opening ceremony, North and South Korea did not march together, reflecting Beijing 2008.144 Since Beijing 2008, inter-Korean relations had fractured considerably and at the London Olympics no agreement was put in place for a joint march.145 Tensions remained high due to the, aforementioned Yeonpyeong Island and Cheonan ship bombing in 2010 and South Korea was evidently still angered from this attack.146
In the 2012 London Olympics, the South Korean media, individual athletes and coaches displayed positivity towards their North Korean counterparts, particularly in the sport of table tennis. The North and South played a team table tennis match against each other, with the South Koreans winning overall 3-1.147 The coach of the South Korea team, Yoo Nam Kyu said after the match that whilst political relations were tense between the two countries, when they played each other they were “the same people” and that they also “speak the same language.”148 In contrast, the North Korean players did not attend any media briefings afterwards.149 Moreover, another inter-Korean table tennis match took place in the men’s singles between the favourite, Joo Sae-hyuk of South Korea, and underdog Kim Hyok-bong from North Korea. 150 Kim Hyok-bong won the match and again did not face the media afterwards whilst Joo Sae-hyuk maintained that the fact he was playing a North Korean had no bearing on the result and his poor performance.151 In the South Korean media, reports on the matches did not refer to a rivalry and instead expressed regret at the division of two nations.152
144 Justin McCurry. ‘North Korea v South Korea: the opening Olympics Skirmishes.’ The Guardian (02/08/2012). https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/aug/02/north-south-korea-olympic-table-tennis Accessed 08/12/2018. 145 Udo Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 30, No.15 (2013):1811. 146 Steve Slater. ‘Olympics - Table Tennis – South Korea Beat North in Tense Battle.’ Reuters (04/08/2012). https://www.reuters.com/article/oly-tabt-ttmtem-rnd1-day8-koreas/olympics-table-tennis-south-korea-beat- north-in-tense-battle-idUSL6E8J42RF20120804 Accessed 08/12/2018. 147 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’p1811. 148 Slater. ‘Olympics - Table Tennis – South Korea Beat North in Tense Battle.’ 149 Ibid. 150 이주희. ‘North Korea Beats South Korea in Men’s Table Tennis.’ The Korea Herald (30/07/2012). http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120730001323 Accessed 08/12/2018.
151 Ibid. 152 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p518.
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Hence, the individual players and coaches played a role in conveying the discourse of peacefulness, ethnic unity but also sporting rivalry between the opposing players. The media was able to convey the discourse to the public audience, thus engaging in public diplomacy. Politically, positivity shown towards each other ensures that inter-Korean relations can remain peaceful, for the time being at least.
The media of both North and South Korea also helped to lessen the North Korean flag blunder in one of the women’s football matches, ensuring inter-Korean relations remained cordial. Before the North Korea-Columbia match at Hampden stadium in Glasgow, the screen in the stadium displayed the South Korean flag, resulting in the North Korean players refusing to enter the pitch.153 After an hour of negotiations and apologies, the players arrived on the pitch eventually winning 2-0 against Columbia.154 The coach, Sin Ui-gun was reported to be extremely upset and even the British Prime Minster David Cameron made an apology, showing the political significance of such an error.155 However, the North Korea state media KCNA did not mention the incident156 and similarly, the South Korean media emphasised the mistake on the British part rather than suggesting that the issue was problematic.157 Thus, the North and South Korean media assisted in underplaying the incident, whereas the Western media and politicians anticipated a potential political disaster.
The North Korean media also reported positively regarding their athletes, reflecting the opportunity sport provides to celebrate achievements. North Korean success during the Games was unprecedented as they finish 20th in the medal table above such traditional sporting nations as Brazil, South Africa and Spain.158 The KCNA were keen to emphasise the success for the athletes and the nation in their reports159 and the same followed for the South Korean media who praised the achievements of the North Korea athletes.160
153 Ewan Murray & James Meikle. ‘London 2012 Organisers Apologise for North Korea Flag Blunder. ‘The Guardian (26/07/2012). https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/jul/26/london-2012-north-korea-flag Accessed 08/12/2018. 154 Ibid. 155 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ p1817. 156 Ibid. 157 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p516. 158 Ibid. 159 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ p1818. 160 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p512.
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In spite of the South Korea media reporting on the North Korean athletes’ achievements, the KCNA did not cover South Korea’s participation in the games at all.161 Politically, inter-Korean relations were indeed strained following North Korea’s frequent missile testing and the Yeonpyeong Island incident. 162 The discourse from the coaches, players and media from both sides suggests that they would have preferred politics to be kept separately from sport. The fact that North Korea refused to give any interviews or report on South Korea implies that they were politically lukewarm towards their neighbours but importantly did not inflame tensions. Similarly, from the South Korean side, they did not exacerbate any unwanted tensions by expressing unity for ethnic Korea. Consequently, London 2012 represented a highly tense political period for inter-Korean relations, but the Games provided an outlet to ease tensions. Therefore, it appears that during the Olympics both North and South Korea were keen to stray away from political issues, focusing instead on the Korean ethnicity and the actual competition itself.
2014 Incheon Asian Games Preceding the application process for the 2014 Incheon Asian Games, South Korean Incheon City Mayor Ahn Sang-soo announced that the North and South had agreed upon a deal to apply to co-host the competition. 163 However, attempting to find data relating the outcome of the statement reached a dead end and, as a result, it can only be concluded that the joint agreement fell through due to the fact that Incheon eventually competed with New Delhi, India for the Games.164
The 2014 Incheon Asian Games focused on South Korean culture, which, at the time was becoming globally popular165 and there was also an emphasis on Incheon as the city
161 Merkel. ‘Flags, Feuds and Frictions: North Korea and the London 2012 Olympics.’ p1819. 162 Yoon & Wilson. ‘”Nice Korea, Naughty Korea:” p521. 163 ‘Asian Games: Incheon, Pyongyang to conduct joint Asian Games bid.’ Asian Political News (06/06/2005). https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=1544444985608023689938348273576 Accessed 10/12/2018. ‘Incheon, Pyongyang to offer joint bidding of co-host of Asian Games.’ SINA English (02/06/2005). http://english.sina.com/sports/p/1/2005/0602/33334.html Accessed 31/12/2018. ‘North, South Korea bid to co-host games.’ China Daily (02/06/2005). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/02/content_448088.htm Accessed 31/12/2018. 164 ‘South Korea’s Incheon wins bid to host 2014 Asian Games.’ CCTV.com (18/04/2007). http://www.cctv.com/program/sportsscene/20070418/101018.shtml Accessed 31/12/2018. 165 Lee. ‘The Politics of Sports Mega-events in South Korea.’
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wanted to be a regional economic hub for northeast Asia.166 Moreover, South Korea also intended to boost the Asian region and support smaller nation’s efforts in winning medals by hosting the tournament.167 Thus, improving relations with North Korea were not considered as a reason for hosting the event.
North Korea sent a huge delegation to the games, 273 people strong, including 150 competing athletes with high medal hopes aiming to finish in the top 10 of the medal rankings. However, similarly to London 2012, the two Koreas marched separately. 168 South Korea welcomed the participation of the North Korea as they looked to strengthen the region but faced protests from the conservative wing of the public regarding the inclusion of North Korea’s flag on the streets and had to remove all 45 competing members’ flags as a result.169 However, in the closing ceremony both delegations took to the stage together in a show of unity with the North led by top political officer Hwang Pyong-so.170 Inter-Korean relations proved to continue to be a sensitive issue domestically, in particular for South Korea; however, the closing ceremony provided the opportunity to showcase Korean unity.
Following the games high-level officials involving Hwang Pyong-so and two other North Korean elites met with their counterparts to discuss the possibility of future cooperation.171 However, due to protests by South Korean citizens another meeting did not materialise despite both parties appearing to be enthused by the idea.172 Members of the South Korea public had been sending balloons filled with anti-North Korean messages over the border, angering Pyongyang.173
166 John Duerden. ‘Incheon Hopes Asian Games Help Put It on the map.’ The New York Times (19/09/2014). https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=154444514902506440787498989555 Accessed 10/12/2018. 167 ‘2014 Asian Games to promote regional harmony.’ The Korean Herald (7/06/2014). http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20100607001600 Accessed 10/12/2018. 168 Kim Boram. ‘(ASIAD) NK’s boxing coach named ASIAD flag bearer.’ YONHAP News Agency (19/09/2014). https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20140919005100320 Accessed 10/12/2018. 169 Duerden. ‘Incheon Hopes Asian Games Help Put It on the map.’ 170 S. Kannan. ‘Finish with a Whimper.’ Mail Today (05/10/2014). https://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=154444509824409939296341285273 Accessed 10/12/2018. 171 Nicholas Hamisevicz. ‘Inter-Korean Relations in 2014 and Impact for 2015.’ Korea Economic Institute of America http://keia.org/inter-korean-relations-2014-and-impact-2015 Accessed 14/12/2018. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid.
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Whilst the games ultimately led to more dialogue between the two states, the issue of reunification remained a sensitive issue on both sides. The South Korea public had the democratic right to protest demonstrating that the ordinary citizens should have some say in reunification. Clearly, the show of unity in the closing ceremony and the subsequent meeting of high-level officials would not have taken place without the platform of the 2014 Asian games. Thus, sporting diplomacy had some influence, certainly short-term, in creating an opportunity for communication between the two Koreas.
2015 & 2016 - Rio Olympics In the end, the success of sports diplomacy at Incheon 2014 was short-lived. During 2015, tension remained on the Korean Peninsula with the two Koreas engaging in several military skirmishes.174 In particular, North Korea continued to be angered by the South Korean public’s anti-North Korean propaganda and likewise South Korean soldiers had been wounded by landmines planted by the North.175 Poor relations throughout the year ultimately ended in lengthy talks in August followed by a truce agreement. Thus, the positive relations from the end Asian games became short-lived. 176 Sports diplomacy appeared to be a short-term solution with no long-term peacefulness or dialogue created between the two Koreas.
Leading into the Rio Olympics in 2016, the political environment in South Korea reached a level of instability as the first half of 2016 concerned the legislative elections and public protests at the leadership of Park Geun-hye.177 Protesters were concerned about the lack of transparency, the deployment of the US anti-missile THAAD system in their country, policy towards North Korea and the economic slowdown.178 South Korea was in political turmoil as Park Geun-hye’s party, Saenuri, not only lost their majority but also their status as the largest party in the assembly.179 It was during this time that President Park abandoned the policy of engagement with North Korea to impose some of the strictest sanctions on their
174 Ju-min Park & Tony Munroe. ‘North, South Korea reach agreement to ease tensions.’ Reuters (25/08/2015). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-idUSKCN0QR02D20150825 Accessed 14/12/2018. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Marco Milani. ‘Korean Peninsula 2016: The Never-Ending Crisis.’ Asia Maior, XXVII (2016):92. 178 Ibid p97. 179 Ibid p95.
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neighbours.180 North Korea had tested their fourth nuclear weapon on 6th January, which would eventually be followed by another test on 9th September,181 and, thus tensions were high in combination with the political turmoil leading up to the games.
In the opening ceremony of the Rio Olympics on 5th August 2016, the two Koreas marched separately as in the 2008 and 2012 Games.182 The selfie between the gymnasts Lee Eun-ju and Hong Un-jong from the South and North captured the Western media’s attention and Ian Bremmer, a political scientist, commented that “this is why we do the Olympics.183 Another show of unity by the athletes involved North Korean bronze medal winning shooter Kim Song-guk and South Korea’s Jin Jong-oh. Kim Song-guk said in an interview that if the two states had been one then the medals for both athletes would have been a “much bigger win.”184 However, these incidents did not appear to have any effect on inter-Korean relations. Indeed, in regards to the selfie, both governments did not comment or use the moment to thaw relations. 185 Thus, the ethnic unity demonstrated by the North and South Korean athletes in Rio 2016 mirrored London 2012 as the athletes expressed pride in representing their nation and ethnicity even across political lines. Moreover, the competitions provided the opportunity for competitors to meet and compete against their counterparts and, therefore, North and South Korean participants were able to interact with each other.
As with the South Korean leadership instability leading up to Games, a similar situation followed with potentially more seriousness. In the months succeeding the games, on 24th October, allegations were made of President Park’s collusion with a non-political colleague, a
180 Ibid p91. 181 Ibid p90. 182 Rio 2016 Opening Ceremony Flagbearers (05/08/2016). https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2016/08/2016-08-05-Rio-2016- Opening-Ceremony-Flag-Bearers.pdf#_ga=2.93306325.995238722.1544283721-1014087519.1544283721 Accessed 08/12/2018. 183 ‘North and South Korean Gymnasts Pose for Olympic Selfie.’ BBC News (09/08/2016). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37018914 Accessed 08/12/2018. 184 Chang May Choon. ‘North Korean Olympics shooter wins South Korean hearts for ‘one Korea’ comments.’ The Straits Times (12/08/2016). https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-korean-olympic-shooter- wins-south-korean-hearts-for-one-korea-comments Accessed 14/12/2018. 185 Choe Sang-hun. ‘Putting Politics Aside, Korean Gymnasts Pose for Olympic Selfie.’ The New York Times (10/08/2016). https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/world/asia/korea-gymnastics-selfie-olympics.html Accessed 14/12/2018.
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close personal friend, Choi Soon-sil, 186 who had been claimed to have access to documents and edit important speeches which was prohibited under the South Korean constitution.187 Subsequently, the period after the Rio Olympics produced an unstable political situation in South Korea.
Thus, a number of reasons could be argued to explain to failure to improve inter- Korean relations surrounding the Rio 2016. For example, the public from South Korea protested at the idea of reunification during this period and sanctions were put on the North by the South. Furthermore, North Korea conducted two nuclear weapons tests in 2016, forcing the adoption of the THAAD anti-missile system from the US by South Korea. Inter- Korean relations at the Rio Olympics were thus conducted surrounding a period of significant military tensions between the two. Evidently, a multitude of factors contributed to poor inter- Korean relations.
2017 - Lead up to Pyeongchang 2018 The year 2017, was a period in which South Korea expressed willingness to negotiate North Korea’s participation in the 2018 Winter Olympics. However, North Korea held the leverage as they delayed the confirmation of whether they would participate in the Games until the last minute.188 South Korea and the Olympic organising committee were conscious of security concerns and they wanted the events to be a commercial success as well as a success for South Korea and Asia.189 In mid-2017, ticket sales were poor and the Olympic organisers worried that inter-Korean tensions, in combination with North Korean missile launching would negatively affect the public’s decision to attend the Games.190 For example, on July 4th
186 The scandal later unravelled a larger net of corruption including the Samsung conglomerate amongst other powerful South Korean companies. President Park was eventually impeached on 10th March 2017 and is currently serving eight additional years on top of her original sentence of twenty-four years in prison Bryan Harris. ‘Timeline: downfall of Park Geun-hye.’ Financial Times (10/03/2017). https://www.ft.com/content/9e5b361e-bde8-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 Accessed 14/12/2018. ‘Park Geun-hye: More jail time for South Korea ex-leader.’ BBC News (20/07/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44897094 Accessed 14/12/2018. 187 Bryan Harris. ‘Timeline: downfall of Park Geun-hye.’ 188 Moon. ‘North Korea Decision on Olympics Participation Seen as Last Minute: South Korea Official.’. 189 Ibid. 190 Steve Mollman. ‘The 2018 Winter Olympics Will be Held 50 Miles from North Korea, and Ticket Sales are Slow.’ Quartz (14/09/2017). https://qz.com/1077182/to-be-held-near-north-korea-the-upcoming-winter- olympics-are-seeing-weak-ticket-sales/ Accessed 09/12/2018.
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2017, North Korea conducted a test with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which it claimed could reach Alaska.191 This test was the thirteenth of the year192 and in the whole of 2017 North Korea launched 23 missile tests including the ICBM.193 In this regard, engaging North Korea to participate seemed to be a security priority for the Olympic organisers.
In June 2017, South Korean Sports Minister, Do Jong-hwan, intimated that the country would inquire about the possibility of North Korea hosting some of the skiing events.194 North Korea had opened Masikryong ski resort in 2014195 and since Kim Jong-un’s rise to power, he had presided over building multiple ski resorts, perhaps with Pyeongchang in mind.196 Do Jong-hwan also said that South Korea would consider a joint women’s ice hockey team for Pyeongchang.197 Evidently, there was some intent to engage in dialogue by the organisers and South Koreans in 2017.
The willingness to communicate with North Korea pertained to not only security interests, but also to the election of President Moon Jae-in in early 2017. Less than a year before the Winter Olympics South Korea elected a new leader, Moon Jae-in. On 9th May 2017, Moon Jae-in won the election to replace Park Geun-hye thus ending around a decade of conservative leadership.198 President Moon Jae-in is the son of North Korean refugees who fled their home during the Korean War, and as a result, presents a connection to the old Korea.199 One of President Moon’s key policies stressed the easing of inter-Korean tensions
191 Steve Mollman & Isabella Steger. ‘North Korea Just Test-Launched a Missile Capable of Hitting Alaska.’ Quartz (04/07/2017). https://qz.com/1021100/north-korea-just-test-launched-a-missile-capable-of-hitting- alaska/ Accessed 09/12/2018. 192 Ibid. 193 Joshua Berlinger and Hilary Whiteman. ‘The pledge to halt missile tests comes after a busy year of launches by North Korea.’ CNN (07/03/2018). https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/06/asia/north-korea-missile-tests-2017- intl/index.html Accessed 09/12/2018. 194 Amanda Erikson. ‘North Korea Could Host Some 2018 Winter Olympic Events, Seoul Says.’ The Washington Post (21/06/2017). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/21/north-korea-could- co-host-the-2018-olympics-according-to-seoul/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bfa565f08000 Accessed 09/12/2018. 195 Ibid. 196 Adam Taylor & Nick Kirkpatrick. ‘North Korea’s long, complicated Olympic history.’ The Washington Post (18/01/2018). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/18/north-koreas-long- complicated-olympic-history/?utm_term=.9c80eef98ef8 Accessed 15/12/2018. 197 Erikson. ‘North Korea Could Host Some 2018 Winter Olympic Events, Seoul Says.’ 198 ‘Moon Jae-in easily wins South Korea’s presidential election.’ The Economist (13/05/2017). https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/05/13/moon-jae-in-easily-wins-south-koreas-presidential-election Accessed 13/12/2018. 199 ‘Moon Jae-in: South Korea’s president with humble roots.’ BBC News (26/04/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39860158 Accessed 13/12/2018.
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by engaging in communication and dialogue with North Korea.200 Indeed, after the election, the North Korean media expressed pleasure at the appointment of Moon Jae-in and argued that the tension of the past ten years were to be blamed on the conservative rule in South Korea.201
However, in his first 100 days, North Korea did not reciprocate President Moon’s policy of inter-Korean engagement.202 North Korea refused a meeting to commemorate the first inter-Korean summit or a family reunion and, thus inter-Korean relations did not make much progress in the first stages of the new South Korean leadership.203 In President Moon’s first 100 days, North Korea tested the ICBM on the July 4th and then once again at a later time. Therefore, Kim Jong-un appeared to be willing to wait as long as possible before declaring his intentions. Clearly, the Olympic organisers wanted North Korea to participate; however, sports diplomacy appeared to be ineffective.
Section 2 - North Korea agrees to participate in the 2018 Winter Olympics In January 2018, North Korea initiated talks with the Olympics organisers to discuss their participation.204 These discussions lasted around 11 hours in which all parties agreed upon future talks regarding inter-Korean relations.205 However, several political analysts argued that North Korea knew they had the upper hand in negotiations and so strived for the best possible deal.206 After the negotiations in 2018, it was decided that an inter-Korean women’s ice hockey team would indeed take part with all other events being participated in by separate teams.207 As well as North Korea sending 22 athletes to participate in the games, they also
200 K.J. Kwon, Pamela Boykoff & James Griffiths. ‘South Korea election: Moon Jae-in declared winner.’ CNN (10/05/2017). https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/09/asia/south-korea-election/index.html Accessed 13/12/2018. 201 Ibid. 202 John Delury. ‘Backseat Driver: Moon Jae-in’s Struggle to Revive Inter-Korean Relations.’ 38 North (29/08/2017). https://www.38north.org/2017/08/jdelury082917/ Accessed 13/12/2018. 203 Ibid. 204 Christine Kim. ‘Kim Jong-un says he’s open to dialogue with South Korea so North Korea can compete in the Olympics – and Seoul wants to talk.’ Reuters (02/01/2018). https://www.businessinsider.com/kim-jong-un- north-korea-south-korea-talks-2018-1?international=true&r=US&IR=T Accessed 13/12/2018. 205 Elise Hu. ‘North and South Korea Reach Breakthroughs in First High-Level Talks in 2 Years.’ NPR (09/01/2018). https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/01/09/576767432/north-and-south-korea-reach- breakthroughs-in-first-high-level-talks-in-2-years?t=1544353654810 Accessed 09/12/2018. 206 Ibid. 207 ‘North Korea at the Winter Olympics: All You Need to Know.’ BBC News (08/02/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42770887 Accessed 09/12/2018.
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agreed to send a 400 person non-competing delegation to Pyeongchang, 208 which, including the Winter Paralympics, eventually rose to around 550 members.209 The delegation included cheerleaders, more than 100 members of an orchestra, taekwondo trainers and ceremonial head of state, Kim Yong-nam, who would be the most senior member of the North Korean government ever to visit South Korea.210 Finally, the two Koreas agreed to march together under a unified flag,211 the first time since Turin 2006.
Therefore, the negotiations resulted in more joint ventures for North and South Korea than in previous sporting mega-events such as Incheon 2014 and Rio 2016. Clearly, the IOC and South Korea wanted to involve North Korea in the Games due to security concerns and pushed hard for this result. The election of President Moon also signified a change in South Korean policy towards North Korea. Finally, North Korea knew it could get a good deal out of the negotiations and, thus, it made sense to enter discussions in order to gain from any agreement. Thus, the lure of Pyeongchang and the persistence of the organisers demonstrates that sporting diplomacy played a significant role in easing relations between the two Koreas. However, external factors such as South Korean policy and the potential for North Korean gain also proved to be important.
2018 Winter Olympics Opening Ceremony In the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics, organisers agreed that Korean unity would be the key theme of the Games and, thus, North Korea would participate in the opening ceremony. The joint march occurred under the Korean Peninsula flag, together held aloft by North Korean ice hockey player Chung Gum Hwang and South Korean Won Yun-jong, a bobsledder.212 Another example of inter-Korean unity was President Moon’s handshake with Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong which demonstrated physical and symbolic confirmation of
208 Ibid. 209 Samuel Lovett. ‘Pyeongchang 2018: North and South Korea agree to march under unified flag at Winter Olympics.’ The Independent (17/01/2018). https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/pyeongchang- 2018-north-korea-south-unified-flag-winter-olympics-talks-relations-a8163921.html Accessed 01/01/2019. ‘Pyeongchang 2018: North and South Korea to march under ‘unification flag’ at Winter Olympics.’ ABC News (17/01/2018). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-18/pyeongchang-north-and-south-korea-agree-to-joint- team/9338032 Accessed 01/01/2019. 210 ‘North Korea at the Winter Olympics: All You Need to Know.’ BBC News. 211 Lovett. ‘Pyeongchang 2018: North and South Korea agree to march under unified flag at Winter Olympics.’ 212 Ibid.
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the intent by both states to cooperate.213 The next day, Kim Yo-jong delivered a handwritten note to President Moon from her brother Kim Jong-un, inviting the South Korean leader for an inaugural visit to Pyongyang.214
The IOC ensured that the discourse of the opening ceremony portrayed Korean unity to the global audience. Firstly, it must be noted that the opening ceremony primarily focused on South Korea, as it was their own Winter Olympics. The impressive visual opening ceremony took the audience through an historical journey of five South Korean children from the beginnings of ethnic Korea to the present technologically adept society and finally to a futuristic world in which the children had earned a career job.215 Breaking up the story of the opening ceremony were speeches from the President of South Korea National Olympics Committee (NOC), IOC President Thomas Bach, President Moon opening the games and, of course, the parade of nations, in which the joint march occurred. In IOC President Thomas Bach’s speech, he specifically highlighted the unity shown in the Korean joint march and indicated that the watching audience were “all touched by this wonderful gesture.”216 He also declared that the two Koreas “send a powerful message of the peace to the world” and demonstrated that unity was stronger than the dividing of the nation. 217 Moreover, throughout the ceremony, the commentators’ narrative on the official Olympic channel conveyed the message of peace, harmony and unity as well.218
Another significant moment for Korean unity came at the end of the opening ceremony wherein the Olympic flame was carried to the top of the ski slope to be lit in the cauldron219 by two 22 year-old North and South Korean athletes, Chung Su-hyon and Park Jong-ah, from the joint Korean women’s ice hockey team.220 Thus, the opening ceremony was centred around, not just the South Korea nation, but also unity of the two Koreas. The
213 Ibid. 214 ‘Winter Olympics 2018: North Korea invites South President to Pyongyang.’ BBC News (10/02/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- 43014269?intlink_from_url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/c40rjmqdwl3t/kim-jong- un&link_location=live-reporting-story Accessed 17/12/2018. 215 ‘Opening Ceremony: Pyeongchang 2018 Replays.’ Olympic Channel (09/02/2018). https://www.olympicchannel.com/en/video/detail/opening-ceremony-pyeongchang-2018-replays/ Accessed 16/12/2018. 216 Ibid (1:49:49). 217 Ibid (1:50:36). 218 Ibid. 219 The cauldron was then lit by South Korean figure skater Yuna Kim. 220 Ibid (2:15:39).
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IOC, in combination with the National Olympic Committee’s (NOC’s) from both Koreas wanted to promote traditional Olympic values and use the opening ceremony as a platform to display this unity to the global world. IOC President Thomas Bach was very specific in his message, which was also reinforced by the Olympic commentators. North Korea’s level of involvement in this ceremony surpassed that of previous sporting mega-events and, ensured that a legacy of peace had more opportunity to survive. Thus, the opening ceremony was unprecedented in the history of inter-Korean relations and sporting mega-events.
To conclude, similarly to the peace shown by North and South Korean athletes in Rio 2016, the discourse of peace provides definitive narrative of harmony for the watching audience. The Winter Olympics also provided an opportunity for Kim Jong-un’s sister to communicate with President Moon, thus becoming familiar with their counterparts. Although, the unity of the ceremony may be symbolic, it creates the environment of peaceful relations and increasing interaction between elites.
2018 Winter Olympics Competition Another example of the IOC’s determination in encouraging the North Koreans to participate is that some IOC rules did not apply for North Korean athletes. For example, in terms of event qualification, the IOC assisted North Korean athletes in their attempts to qualify by covering their travel costs and equipment.221 It was doubted whether any athletes would reach the required standard;222 however, in September 2017, North Korean figure skaters Tae Ok-ryom and Ju Sik-kim became the first athletes to qualify for the Games.223 In fact, these two athletes were the only ones to qualify as the IOC specially sanctioned other athletes to compete in the Games, highlight another lenient aspect of the IOC.224 For the competition, North Korean athletes were allowed to cross the demilitarised zone (DMZ) which usually prohibited the
221 Max Winters. ‘North Korean skaters qualify for Pyeongchang 2018.’ Inside the Games (29/09/2017). https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1055988/north-korean-skaters-qualify-for-pyeongchang-2018 Accessed 16/12/2018. 222 Jeré Longman. ‘With the 2018 Olympics in South Korea, Will the North be Participant or Provocateur.’ 223 Ibid. 224 Jane Chung. ‘No medals but plenty of cheers for North Korean athletes.’ Reuters (21/02/2018). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-northkorea-athletes/no-medals-but-plenty-of-cheers-for- north-korean-athletes-idUSKCN1G513H Accessed 16/12/2018.
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movement of people.225 The temporary lifting of this law was aimed to be a symbolic peace gesture towards North Korea by South Korea.226 Thus, every effort was made to ensure that North Korea would want to participate. The situation also highlights the importance of non- state sporting actors in sports diplomacy. The IOC assisted North Korea in a way that South Korea could not, due to their neutrality in inter-Korean relations.
President Moon and Kim Jo-yong, demonstrating inter-Korean solidarity, attended the joint ice hockey team’s first match.227 Although this unity were evident, the team lost every match, scoring two goals and conceding twenty-eight.228 In the end, Coach Sarah Murray was extremely proud of her players and stated “sports are breaking down the barrier,” echoing the discourse of peace and harmony.229
Success for the North Korean team proved to be difficult to come by and highlighted the reasons why the IOC gave them special dispensation to compete. North Korean athletes did not win any medals but were cheered on loudly by their cheerleaders.230 The athletes finished close to last in every event in which they competed, with the exception of the figure skaters who had met the qualifying standards.231 The North Korean athletes kept a low profile and, similar to London 2012 and Rio 2016, did not give many interviews for the media, any interaction contained just a few words.232 In contrast, South Korea, won five gold medals, seven silver medals and five bronze medals, placing them sixth overall, resulting in a successful Games.233 Therefore, whilst South Korea harboured realistic hopes of winning
225 ‘Pyeongchang 2018: Athletes to travel through demilitarized zone.’ BBC News (18/05/2017). https://www.bbc.com/sport/winter-olympics/39969809 Accessed 16/12/2018. 226 Ibid. 227 Jane Chung. ‘Ice hockey: Korean women score again but bid farewell with fifth loss.’ Reuters (20/02/2018). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-iceh-w-swe-cor/ice-hockey-korean-women-score-again- but-bid-farewell-with-fifth-loss-idUSKCN1G40VX Accessed 16/12/2018. 228 ‘How did North Korea fare with its last-minute Olympics bid.’ CBS News (22/02/2018). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-athletes-outclassed-at-2018-pyeongchang-winter-olympics/ Accessed 16/12/2018. 229 Ibid. 230 Chung. ‘No medals but plenty of cheers for North Korean athletes.’ 231 ‘How did North Korea fare with its last-minute Olympics bid.’ CBS News (22/02/2018). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-athletes-outclassed-at-2018-pyeongchang-winter-olympics/ Accessed 16/12/2018. 232 Upasana Bhat. ‘North Korea’s athletes at the Winter Olympics.’ BBC News (08/02/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42955834 Accessed 16/12/2018. 233 ‘South Korea: 2018 Winter Olympics Pyeongchang, South Korea.’ SBNATION https://www.sbnation.com/a/2018-olympics-schedule-medal-count/south-korea-medal-count-results Accessed 16/12/2018.
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medals, North Korea did not. It was crucial that the theme of inter-Korean unity and peace was conveyed as the Games concerned political matters as well as winning medals.
The closing ceremony also presented an opportunity to display unity and friendly political relations for the audience. North Korea sent General Kim Yong-chol as part of the delegation for the closing ceremony. Although a controversial figure in South Korea (he was suspected of authorising the sinking of South Korea warship Cheonan in 2010), the South Korean government welcomed his arrival.234
Moreover, the Winter Paralympics, which follows the able-bodied Olympics, continued on a similar trajectory. However, in the Paralympic opening ceremony the two teams did not march together. South Korea refused North Korea’s wish for the contested Dokdo Islands to be represented on the Korean peninsula flag, insisting that this would politicise the Paralympics, which was against the International Paralympic Committee’s (IPC) mandate.235 Ironically, the Winter Olympics had embodied the idea of politics; however, both sides respected the other decisions and the North Korean athletes received a huge cheer during the parade of nations.236
Finally, from a North Korean perspective, the media reaction in North Korea was one of pride for those who competed or performed at the Games. For example, the Rodong Sinmun reported that the North Korean art troupe was well received and that the North Korea delegation and President Moon were getting on well together.237 The Samjiyon Orchestra was also lauded over and the newspaper repeated that North Korea’s participation was received well by the South Koreans and other nations. 238 Moreover, the newspaper conveyed a discourse of ethnic bonding between the two nations during the women’s joint ice hockey match:
234 BBC Monitoring. ‘Kim Yong-chol: North Korea’s controversial Olympics delegate.’ BBC News (23/02/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43169604 Accessed 16/12/2018. 235 Lisa Marie Segarra. ‘North and South Korea Didn’t March Together at the Paralympics Because They Couldn’t Agree on a Flag.’ Time (09/03/2018). http://time.com/5192887/north-korea-paralympics-opening- ceremony-flag/ Accessed 17/12/2018. 236 Ibid. 237 ‘DPRK Delegation with S. Korean President Enjoys Performance of DPRK Art Troupe.’ Rodong Sinmun (13/02/2018). http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2018-02-13-0005 Accessed 02/01/2019. 238 ‘Kim Jong-un Has Photo Session with members of Samjiyon Orchestra.’ Rodong Sinmun (13/02/2018). http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2018-02-13-0019 Accessed 02/01/2019.
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“The appearance of the players and the impressive picture of the cheering groups once again made the spectators feel keenly that the Korean nation is a homogeneous nation which can't live separated from each other.”239
The Rodong Sinmun also praised the ice hockey players’ skill level and the fact that they were “calling each other by the same language and pooling efforts.”240 Thus, the Korean unity was well received by North Korea and its media. The media reflected idea of kinship and peace, the theme of the Games.
Section 3 - Developments after Pyeongchang 2018 Following the 2018 Winter Olympics, North Korea’s relationship with South Korea and the US has become more cordial. Three inter-Korean summits have been held in 2018 and Kim Jong- un has met US President Donald Trump once and the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also on one occasion.241 Moreover, Kim Jong-un has travelled to China to meet President Xi Jinping three times since Pyeongchang. The complex relations between these four states has resulted in increased communication and negotiations. North Korea has been extremely active in negotiations with South Korea, the US and China. First, a timeline on the next page will demonstrate the chronology of key meetings between these states in regards to inter-Korean relations in 2018 following the 2018 Winter Olympics:
239 ‘DPRK Delegation Watches Women’s Ice Hockey Match with S. Korea President.’ Rodong Sinmun (13/02/2018). http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2018-02-13-0015 Accessed 02/01/2019. 240 Ibid. 241 ‘Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.’ Arms Control Association (Updated December 2018). https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2018 Accessed 28/01/2018.
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May 26th - March 27th A surprise - Kim Jong- May 8th - second un meets Kim Jong-un inter- Chinese and Xi Korean President Xi Jinping summit of Jinping meet again the year
April 27th - May 22nd - June 12th - First inter- Presidents President Korean Moon and Trump and summit Trump meet Kim Jong-un since 2007 meet in Singapore
242
September 19th - Pyongyang June 19-20th - Declaration October 7th - US Secretary of Kim Jong-un signed State Mike and Xi Jinping primarily Pompeo meets meet for the pledging to with Kim Jong- third time in end militiary un in 2018 hostilities Pyongyang.
September September 24th - 18-20th - Presidents Third inter- Moon and Trump meet at Korean UN General summit of Assembly the year regarding third inter-Korean summit
243
242 David Choi. ‘A new era of diplomatic relations with North Korea is on the horizon – here’s what’s happened so far.’ Business Insider (12/06/2018). https://www.businessinsider.nl/north-korean-news-and-developments- us-south-korea-2018-3/ Accessed 28/12/2018. 243 ‘Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.’ Arms Control Association.
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27 April - First Inter-Korean Summit The first inter-Korean summit of 2018 on the 27 April progressed discussions between the North and South; however, a lack of specifics arose from the meeting between Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in. This was the first inter-Korean summit since 2007 and took place in the border village of Panmunjeom.244 Prior to the summit, a hotline was established, providing a direct telephone line for communication, thus enabling the leaders to contact each other immediately if needed. 245 At the summit, the two leaders agreed to denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and to work towards a peace treaty which would officially end the Korean War.246 The agreement was signed as the “Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula.”247 The agreement included phrases such as “more active cooperation, hold dialogue and negotiations” and it also agreed generally to a peaceful, demilitarised Korean Peninsula.248 However, specific details were not mentioned in terms of denuclearisation and led to worldwide scepticism towards the agreement.249 Thus, steps were made to secure relations following the Winter Olympics; however, no binding agreement to work together was signed. However, the summit became the first step towards further communication between the two Koreas.
26 May - Second Inter-Korean Summit The second inter-Korean summit provided more details for the two leaders to discuss. Noticeably, this summit was scheduled at short notice by Kim Jong-un for the 26 May250 and in the days preceding the event Kim invited a select number of international journalists to view the dismantling of its nuclear weapons test site in the mountainous northeast of the
244 ‘North and South Korea set date for leaders’ summit.’ BBC News (29/03/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43580819 Accessed 17/12/2018. 245 ‘North and South Korea set up hotline ahead of summit.’ BBC News (20/04/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43836144 Accessed 17/12/2018. 246 ‘Koreas make nuclear pledge after historic summit.’ BBC News (27/04/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43921385 Accessed 17/12/2018. 247 Adam Taylor. ‘The full text of North and South Korea’s agreement, annotated.’ The Washington Post (27/04/2018). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/27/the-panmmunjom- declaration-full-text-of-agreement-between-north-korea-and-south- korea/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.803523e26b55 Accessed 03/01/2019. 248 Ibid. 249 Ibid. 250 Benjamin Haas & Lauren Gambino. ‘North and South Korean leaders meet as US indicate summit may yet happen.’ The Guardian (27/05/2018). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/26/kim-jong-un-moon- jai-in-korean-leaders-hold-surprise-meeting Accessed 17/12/2018.
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country.251 Out with North Korea it was debated as to whether this symbolic gesture would truly affect change in North Korea’s nuclear testing policy; however, Kim Jong-un, without doubt visibly demolished areas of the test site.252 At the second summit, President Moon and Kim Jong-un discussed their original agreement in more detail and also, Kim’s impending meeting with US President Donald Trump.253 According to the KCNA, the two leaders agreed to establish more frequent dialogue.254 Another meeting was arranged for the 1st June, a few days later in which the states made a number of agreements. These agreements included future discussions with both militaries and the Red Cross to ease tensions, building a liaison office at Kaesong on the border, planned family reunions for Korean families displaced during the Korean War and initial talks about fielding joint teams at the 2018 Asian Games held later in the year.255 Both parties reiterated the need for trust on the Korean Peninsula.256 The announcement of family reunions was significant as the occasions were initially held annually from the first summit in 2000 but since have stalled due to tensions and had not been in place since 2015.257 Moreover, the Red Cross discussions concerned “humanitarian issues” which were being pursued by both sides.258 Thus, these negotiations advanced the implementation of specific inter-Korean policies, but still lacked set details on issues of reunification or denuclearisation.
18-20 September - Third Inter-Korean Summit
251 Benjamin Haas. ‘North Korea’s nuclear test site: is blowing up Punggye-ri just for show.’ The Guardian (22/05/2018). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/north-koreas-nuclear-test-site-is-blowing- up-punggye-ri-just-for-show Accessed 17/12/2018. 252 Ibid. 253 Haas & Gambino. ‘North and South Korean leaders meet as US indicate summit may yet happen.’ 254 Ibid. 255 ‘Rival Koreas agree to military, Red Cross talks for peace.’ CNBC (01/06/2018). https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/01/rival-koreas-agree-to-military-red-cross-talks-for-peace.html Accessed 17/12/2018. 256 Ibid. 257 ‘North and South Korea confirm family reunions will be resume in August for the first time since 2015.’ South China Morning Post (22/01/2018). https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2152091/north-and-south-korea-confirm-family- reunions-will-resume-august Accessed 17/12/2018. 258 Ibid.
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The fifth inter-Korean summit was a three-day event, from 18-20 September, and took place in Pyongyang, the first time a South Korean President had visited the capital.259 Noticeably, Pyongyang ‘put on a show’ for President Moon as his arrival was greeted by a welcome ceremony followed by large crowds cheering both the President and Kim Jong-un through the streets. The afternoon concerned some discussions and then, in the evening, President Moon attended a mass games at the May Day Stadium.260
On the second day, 19 September, President Moon and Kim Jong-un signed the Pyongyang Declaration. The Pyongyang Declaration included six agreements relating to inter-Korean relations.
1. “The two Koreas agreed to end hostility at fortified regions, including the Demilitarized Zone, and continue such momentum by seeking to remove all real risks of war on the Korean Peninsula and resolve hostile relations. 2. The two Koreas agreed to further boost exchanges and cooperation based on mutual reciprocity and co-prosperity as well as devise substantial ways to advance national economy in a balanced manner. 3. The two Koreas agreed to further strengthen humanitarian cooperation to fundamentally resolve the issue of separated families. 4. The two Koreas agreed to actively pursue cooperation and exchanges in a wide array of areas to promote the mood of reconciliation and unity as well as to boast the unyielding spirit of the Korean people both inside and outside of their countries. 5. The two Koreas agreed that the Korean Peninsula must become a place of peace that is free of nuclear weapons and nuclear threats and for that aim, the two Koreas shared the view that they must swiftly make necessary headway. 6. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un plans to visit Seoul at an early date at the invitation of President Moon Jae-in.261
259 Alex Ward. ‘5 powerful images from Kim Jong-un’s historic meeting with South Korea’s president.’ VOX (18/09/2018). https://www.vox.com/world/2018/9/18/17873832/photos-kim-jong-un-moon-pyongyang- north-korea-south Accessed 18/12/2018. 260 ‘5th Inter-Korea Summit Held.’ North Korea Leadership Watch (21/09/2018). http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2018/09/21/5th-inter-korea-summit-held/ Accessed 18/12/2018. 261 ‘[Full Text] Sep. 19th Pyongyang Declaration.’ KBS Radio (19/09/2018). http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=139465 Accessed 18/12/2018.
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Within the six agreements, further details of cooperation were released. Some notable details included:
1. “The two Koreas agreed to jointly take part in international competitions, including the 2020 Summer Olympics, and to seek to jointly host the 2032 Summer Olympics. 2. The two Koreas agreed to hold within this year ground-breaking ceremonies for connecting the Gyeongui and Yellow Sea railways and roads. 3. North Korea expressed intent to take further steps, including permanently dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear facility, if the United States takes corresponding steps in line with the spirit of the June 12th joint statement.”262
Evidently, Kim Jong-un and President Moon agreed to continue sporting ties on a longer-term basis. Thus, this represent a greater commitment to sporting unity than in London 2012 or Incheon 2014. Moreover, the idea of linking the railways and roads suggest that North Korea may be willing to open up, to South Korea at least. Furthermore, the intention for denuclearisation is a clear step towards harmony on the peninsula, if it is adhered to and could represent a significant breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. North Korea has taken steps that have been unprecedented in its history and demonstrates progress towards peace and perhaps reunification. Therefore, the unity at Pyeongchang 2018 has triggered a series of inter-Korean summits. Whilst non-sporting diplomacy has taken over, the events of the Winter Olympics have not been forgotten and the two Koreas recognise that maintain sporting ties are important for peaceful inter-Korean relations.
China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations China plays a crucial role in inter-Korean relations due to its geopolitical closeness with North Korea. Whilst it is not an official ally of North Korea, it does hold economic and security interests with its bordering nation.263 For example, China is North Korea’s largest trading
262 Ibid. 263 Fei Su. ‘China’s Potential Role as Security Guarantor for North Korea.’ 38 North (24/10/2018). https://www.38north.org/2018/10/fsu102418/ Accessed 29/12/2018.
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partner and the usage of key ports can make shipping to Japan and other states quicker and more convenient.264 In terms of the inter-Korean summits in 2018, China’s interest was to maintain their influence on the Korean Peninsula and, thus, play a significant role in the peace negotiations.265 China wanted North Korea to feel that it was on their side, for example for the US-North Korea summit, Kim Jong-un flew to Beijing on Xi Jinping’s governmental private jet.266
Following Pyeongchang 2018, Kim Jong-un scheduled his three meetings with Xi Jinping at crucial times. The instances occurred both before and after the first inter-Korean summit, and shortly following the US-North Korea summit. In the first Sino-North Korea summit, the two leaders emphasised the importance of a strong relationship between the states, which, in the last few years had been slightly sour.267 The importance of a strong economic relationship was discussed along with, more significantly, denuclearisation, which China advocates.268 Kim Jong-un stated:
“The issue of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula can be resolved, if South Korea and the United States respond to our efforts with goodwill, create an atmosphere of peace and stability while taking progressive and synchronous measures for the realisation of peace.”269
Thus, before the first inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong-un made it clear that China was on their side, by emphasising “our efforts.” With the US alignment towards South Korea, Kim Jong- un’s meeting with Xi Jinping provided the North Korean leader with leverage over the South. Evidently non-sporting state-state diplomacy was at the forefront in this situation.
264 Ibid. 265 Ibid. 266 Ibid. 267 Shannon Tiezzi. ‘China, North Korea Extol ‘Traditional Friendship’ After Kim Jong-un’s Beijing Visit.’ The Diplomat (29/03/2018). https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-north-korea-extol-traditional-friendship- after-kim-jong-uns-beijing-visit/ Accessed 29/12/2018. 268 Ibid. 269 Ibid.
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The second Sino-North Korean summit on 8 May presented an opportunity for Kim Jong-un to discuss the first inter-Korean summit with President Xi Jinping.270 Again, both sides reiterated their support for denuclearisation, commented on their own positive progress in terms of relations and further demonstrated commitment to peace on the Korean Peninsula.271 Yanmei Xie, a China policy analyst, surmised that China could help North Korean economic and diplomatic integration into Northeast Asia if it so wished.272 Again, the third Sino-North Korean summit from 19-20 June, one week after the US-North Korea summit in Singapore, was employed as a ‘catch up’ for the leaders, where President Xi Jinping expressed his support for the result of the Singapore summit, which will next be discussed.273 Kim Jung- un clearly is an experienced negotiator, and he recognised that he needed China’s support in the inter-Korean summits. Again, sporting diplomacy did not play a role here, as diplomacy was utilised by non-sporting actors.
The US’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations Due to the fact that President Moon needed to push the US into the equation in order to achieve denuclearisation, the September inter-Korean summit surrounded discussions relating to a second meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un.274 Kim Jong-un had already met President Trump in Singapore in mid-June and this summit was the first meeting between a North Korean leader and a US President275 but was more symbolic than policy active. North Korea agreed to the principle of denuclearisation but again, vaguely and only by reiterating their commitment to the 27 April Panmunjeom Declaration.276 President Trump did agree to halt joint US-South Korea military exercises and also expressed his wish of the
270 Shannon Tiezzi. ‘China, North Korea Hold Second Summit.’ The Diplomat (09/05/2018). https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/china-north-korea-hold-second-summit/ Accessed 29/12/2018. 271 Ibid. 272 Emily Rauhala. ‘North Korea’s Kim makes another trip to China. That complicates things for Trump.’ The Washington Post (19/06/2018). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kim-jong-un-makes-third-visit-to- china/2018/06/18/671e4e48-7368-11e8-be2f- d40578877b7b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.acbe17ca7c05 Accessed 29/12/2018. 273 Ibid. 274 Victor Cha, Sue Mi Terry, Michael J. Green. ‘The Ledger on the Third Inter-Korean Summit.’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (19/09/2018). https://www.csis.org/analysis/ledger-third-inter-korean- summit Accessed 18/12/2018. 275 Patricia Kim (Speaker) & Irina A. Faskianos (Presider). ‘US-North Korea Summit.’ Council on Foreign Relations (13/06/2018). https://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/us-north-korea-summit Accessed 29/12/2018. 276 Ibid.
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eventual withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.277 President Trump and Kim Jong-un signed a joint statement detailing four points:
1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.278
This joint agreement confirmed that negotiations between Pyongyang and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would follow the summit in order to further discuss these points.279 The first two points are particularly vague with mentions of “peace,” “prosperity” and building a “stable peace regime.” The third point continues in the same fashion as the 27 April Panmunjom Declaration, which also lacks specific details. Finally, the fourth cements an opportunity to increase communication between the two states and enable more interaction. It is evident that this meeting represented the birth of a potential relationship between the US and North Korea. More communication and negotiation need to occur before any significant breakthroughs for their relationship and inter-Korean relations.
Finally, in Mike Pompeo’s meeting with Kim Jong-un on 7 October, he declared that the Norther Korean leader would allow other nuclear inspectors to assess the destruction of
277 Josh Smith & Phil Stewart. ‘Trump surprises with pledge to end military exercises in South Korea.’ Reuters (12/06/2018). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-military/trump-surprises-with-pledge-to- end-military-exercises-in-south-korea-idUSKBN1J812W Accessed 29/12/2018. 278 ‘Trump and Kim’s joint statement.’ Reuters (12/06/2018). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea- usa-agreement-text/trump-and-kims-joint-statement-idUSKBN1J80IU Accessed 29/12/2018. 279 Ibid.
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the Punggye-ri testing site and that a second meeting between President Trump and his counterpart would be scheduled.280 Therefore, it is evident that any possibility of Korean reunification depends on denuclearisation of North Korea and with that, includes the US and China in the negotiations. US and China interests in the region could mean that any chance of reunification may rely on the interests of these states. Moreover, it has not even been considered the influence of Japan or Russia due to the constraints of the paper and the focus on sports diplomacy. Sports diplomacy has made the breakthrough for this series of summits; however, non-sporting, state-state diplomacy has taken precedence since then. It seems that the politics of the most powerful states remains integral in making political breakthroughs in regards to the divided states of North and South Korea.
Sporting Unity Continues Following Pyeongchang 2018, sports diplomacy between North and South Korea has gone from strength to strength. In contrast to events following the Incheon Asian Games in 2014, the two states agreed to continue to compete as a unified team in certain sporting competitions following the 2018 Winter Olympics.
Negotiations to arrange unified teams for the Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games 2018 concluded in June 2018,281 and resulted in unified teams in basketball, rowing282 and canoeing events.283 North and South Korean athletes marched together under a unified flag, held by South Korean basketballer Lim Yung-hui and North Korean footballer Ju Kyong-chol.284 Sixty athletes from both nations competed together in the aforementioned sports, and the unified team proved to be much more successful than the women’s ice hockey team at the Winter
280 Choe Sang-hun & David E. Sanger. ‘North Korea Agrees to Allow Inspectors Into Nuclear Testing Site, Pompeo Says.’ The New York Times (07/10/2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/world/asia/pompeo-north-korea-visit.html Accessed 29/12/2018. 281 Chris Riotta. ‘North and South Korea agree to joint teams for Asian Games.’ The Independent (19/06/2018). https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-peace-talks-south-korea-asian-games- team-basketball-pyongyang-a8405446.html Accessed 30/12/2018. 282 Rowing includes dragon boat racing. 283 ‘Asian Games: Unified Korea boating team win historic gold.’ BBC News (26/08/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45314674 Accessed 30/12/2018. 284 Chris Baynes. ‘Unified Korean athletes cheered by thousands as the parade together at Asian Games opening ceremony.’ The Independent (18/08/2018). https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/unified-korea-athletes-asian-games-opening-ceremony- north-south-kim-jong-un-a8497521.html Accessed 30/12/2018.
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Olympics. The unified Korean team won four medals, one gold, one silver and two bronze medals.285 The national anthem for the gold medal team in the women’s 500m dragon boat racing event was the traditional Arirang folk song, emphasising the Korean ethnicity and unity.286
Again, the discourse of the 2018 Asian Games was one of harmony. The organising chairman, Eric Thohir, declared, “we are all here to celebrate our diversity, to celebrate our differences, to celebrate our humanity.”287 Since the 2018 Winter Olympics, the inter-Korean summits and joint sports teams have demonstrated that the two Koreas have attempted to convey peace and harmony. Indeed, the South Korea Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon and officials from North Korea observed the opening parade of nations in which some of the athletes of the unified Korea held hands.288 Thus, the themes of unity and peace were prevalent in the 2018 Asian Games, as in the earlier Winter Olympics.
There were other instances of sporting unity with the two Koreas. Prior to the Asian Games, North and South Korea agreed to host a series of basketball matches from the 3-6 July in Pyongyang.289 The final two matches saw North Korea play South Korea; 290 however, for the first two games the teams mixed the players from both nations and were named “peace” and “prosperity.”291 “Prosperity” won the women’s match 103-102 and the men’s fixture resulted in a tie, presenting two exciting games for the 12,000 spectators.292 This was another prime example of the togetherness sporting diplomacy can bring and emphasises the ambition of the political elites in maintaining this sense of unity.
Moreover, the World Team Table Tennis Championship in May preceded the Asian Games and the basketball fixtures and further highlighted Korean unity. In the table tennis
285 ‘Jakarta and Palembang Asian Games 2018 Medal Table.’ Inside the Games https://www.insidethegames.biz/games/31/medals Accessed 30/12/2018. 286 ‘Asian Games: Unified Korea boating team win historic gold.’ BBC News. 287 Baynes. ‘Unified Korean athletes cheered by thousands as the parade together at Asian Games opening ceremony.’ The Independent. 288 Ibid. 289 Riotta. ‘North and South Korea agree to joint teams for Asian Games.’ The Independent. 290 Ibid. 291 ‘Two Koreas court peace in first basketball friendly in years.’ Reuters (04/07/2018). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-basketball/two-koreas-court-peace-in-first- basketball-friendly-in-years-idUSKBN1JU1BU Accessed 30/12/2018. 292 Clément Le Merlus. ‘North and South Korea host first friendly basketball game in 15 years.’ NZ Herald (05/07/2018). https://www.nzherald.co.nz/sport/news/article.cfm?c_id=4&objectid=12083701 Accessed 30/12/2018.
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competition, both the North and South women’s teams were due to play each other in the quarter-final, but did not want to compete against each other and requested that they formed a joint team for the semi-final instead.293 The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) accepted the request with the ITTF President Thomas Weikert announcing that the federation’s Board of Directors gave the request “a standing ovation.”294 Furthermore, the President of the South Korea Table Tennis Association, Jun Jong-chol said that “this is the result of the strong support provided by the ITTF and the IOC.”295 Again, the ITTF assisted the North Korea team to compete at the Korean open from the 17-22 July, further improving inter-Korean sporting ties.296 The involvement and persistence of these two organisations demonstrates the importance of non-state organisations to improving inter-Korean relations. Moreover, the organisations operated across different sports, thus enabling discussions regarding unified teams and allowing the ease of sporting diplomacy to succeed, as shown in this table tennis example.
Finally, as previously highlighted in the September agreement at the third inter- Korean summit, the two Koreas agreed to further sporting endeavours. In a subsection of the three main points, they agreed to consider a joint bid for hosting the 2032 Summer Olympics.297 Although this idea remains in its infancy,298 if the event were to happen it would represent another opportunity to cement peace and prosperity between the two Koreas.
Future Prospects
293 ‘North & South Korea Announce Unified Team at 2018 World Team Table Tennis Championships.’ ITTF.com (03/05/2018). https://www.ittf.com/2018/05/03/north-south-korea-announce-unified-team-2018-world- team-table-tennis-championships/ Accessed 30/12/2018. 294 Ibid. 295 Ibid. 296 ‘Ping-pong diplomacy: North Korea table tennis team heads South.’ The Straits Times (06/07/2018). https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/ping-pong-diplomacy-north-korea-table-tennis-team-heads- south Accessed 30/12/2018. 297 ‘[Full Text] Sep. 19th Pyongyang Declaration.’ KBS Radio. 298 Victor Mather. ‘North and South Korea Plan to Jointly Bid on 2032 Summer Olympics.’ The New York Times (19/09/2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/sports/olympics/north-south-korea-olympics.html Accessed 30/12/2018.
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Leading into 2019, Kim Jong-un expressed his enthusiasm for more inter-Korean summits.299 The North Korean leader wrote a letter to Seoul in which his conveyed his disappointment at being unable to visit the South’s capital in 2018 but also said that, by working together, he wanted peace and denuclearisation between the two states.300 Kim’s letter echoed President Moon’s declaration for peace on his visit to Pyongyang in September 2018.301
In the past few months, North and South Korean soldiers have passed through the DMZ into each other’s territory302 and North Korea has made a concerted effort to pursue development of its railway system by inviting South Korea engineers to examine their railway network, as agreed to in the September agreement.303 Moreover, the first remains of US servicemen from the Korean war have been found304 and, therefore, Kim Jong-un has lived up to the fourth point in the US-North Korea agreement from the Singapore summit regarding US war victims in Korea. Inter-Korean and US-North Korean relations have been productive suggesting that the summits have been fruitful to some extent and not solely symbolic.
However, despite insisting that denuclearisation continues to be a major priority for North Korea, Kim Jong-un conducted a “’high tech’ tactical weapon” test in mid-November of last year. 305 It was unknown whether this was a nuclear weapons test; 306 however, it contradicts Kim Jong-un’s denuclearisation rhetoric since the 2018 Winter Olympics. Evidently, developments over 2019 and the coming years may prove to define whether inter- Korean relations will continue to remain cordial and whether reunification will eventually occur.
299 ‘Kim Jong-un letter to Seoul asks for more summits in 2019.’ BBC News (30/12/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46714299 Accessed 30/12/2018. 300 Ibid. 301 Ibid. 302 ‘North and South Korea soldiers cross DMZ in peace.’ BBC News (13/12/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46548524 Accessed 30/12/2018. 303 ‘South Korean train crosses DMZ into North Korea.’ BBC News (30/11/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46395408 Accessed 30/12/2018. 304 ‘First soldiers identified from remains returned by North Korea.’ BBC News (21/09/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45604318 Accessed 30/12/2018. 305 ‘North Korea ‘tests new high-tech weapon.’” BBC News (16/11/2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world- asia-46231372 Accessed 30/12/2018. 306 Ibid.
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Conclusion From assessing the data, the first debate that can be concluded is that the sports diplomacy employed in inter-Korean relations represents a “new” type of diplomacy. Firstly, the influence of the IOC and those involved in organising the Olympics played a role in encouraging North Korea to compete for qualification and to join the games. In the literature, it was theorised that different actors communicate in a multi-layered network in which increased communication leads to familiarity and the better achievement of foreign policy goals. The IOC aided the North and South Koreans to ensure that the message of the 2018 Winter Games opening ceremony was one of peace. Essentially, the IOC acted as a bridge between the two nations in order to ensure the success and harmony of the sporting mega- event. Moreover, the ITTF has also worked in this role to accommodate inter-Korean political tensions. In this way, sporting diplomacy does not reflect initial theories of sports diplomacy in which states interact with each other to achieve greater power.
Along with the IOC and ITTF, individual athletes and coaches helped to foster the theme of peace between the two Koreas. We saw at London 2012, Incheon 2014, Rio 2016 and Pyeongchang 2018 instances of athletes talking positively about each other or taking selfies. Whilst the North Korean participants generally avoided giving interviews in the media, the South Korean delegation conveyed ideas of kinship and an ethnic bond throughout the competitions. Moreover, athletes holding hands, waving the Korean Peninsula flag together or ascending as one up the ski slope to light the Olympic cauldron demonstrated a symbolic unity most prevalent in the 2018 Winter Olympic opening ceremony. These individuals served as icons or actors for their nation and the representation of peace.
Secondly, sporting mega-events presented the perfect opportunity to displY a more peaceful inter-Korean relationship to the public. The opening ceremonies, which can win the ‘hearts and minds’ of an audience, determined whether inter-Korean relations were harmonious or fractious. In London 2012, for example, the two Koreas did not march together reflecting the Yeonpyeong Island attacks whereas in Pyeongchang 2018, they jointly paraded the flag as North and South Korea agreed to work together. Thus, the public would infer the change attitudes in inter-Koreans relations from hostility to harmony.
A potential challenge to the success of sporting mega-events highlighted in the literature review pertained to the information the media distributes regarding a sporting
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mega-event. In terms of Pyeongchang 2018, the media conveyed the message of peace, which was envisaged by the IOC and South Korea. London 2012 also exemplified the role the media has played in easing tensions between the two Koreas. Evidently, the visibility of sporting mega-events can create the space whereby the media is an outlet in which relations can be publicised. Thus, individuals can display ethnic solidarity in media interviews, which will then be broadcast globally. The media as a tool of sports diplomacy must not be underestimated in its potential of creating a narrative between two states. Moreover, the inter-Korean summits were broadcasted in the global and domestic media and emphasised Kim Jong-un and President Moon communicating effectively together. The summits appeared to be symbolic more than political in some respects as the leaders were photographed hand-in- hand and President Moon was pictured waving at the Pyongyang crowd. Thus, these incidents help to maintain the relationship between the audience and the event, keeping the summits in the public eye.
Thirdly, it was debated whether sports diplomacy could result in political breakthroughs for inter-Korean relations. Preceding Pyeongchang 2018, sports diplomacy did not help to ameliorate tension between the two nations. During the bidding process for the event, at London 2012, Incheon 2014 and at Rio 2016, sports diplomacy was either non- existent or did not achieve any long-term gains. For example, at Incheon 2014, whilst sports diplomacy increased interaction between elites, such as with Hwang Pyong-so, no long-term sports policies were put in place and, consequently, military tension continued between the two Koreas.
However, sporting diplomacy at the Pyeongchang Olympics was a success. Certainly, there appears to have been a bigger push from non-state actors such as the IOC and South Korea to engage North Korea. Nonetheless, the environment leading up to the Winter Olympics must not be ignored as a correlating factor for the improvement in inter-Korea relations. The KCNA declared pleasure at witnessing the ending of conservative rule in South Korea and President Moon envisaged more engagement with North Korea as part of his foreign policy. Therefore, if we compare these factors to the North Korean hard-line approach of South Korean Presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myun-bak for example then the external environment, on balance, did help the improvement in inter-Korean relations in 2017-8.
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Furthermore, sporting ties between the two states were cemented in the September agreement, connecting to Merkel’s idea that implementing sport as a long-term foreign policy tool could be effective. In the 2018 Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games, the two Koreas marched together and competed together, also mirrored in the women’s world team table tennis semi- final. North and South Korea has also agreed to consider a joint bid for the 2032 Summer Olympic Games.
In combination with this success of sports diplomacy, the series of inter-Korean and North Korea-China or US summits demonstrates that non-sporting diplomacy has also been integral for peaceful relations. Kim Jong-un has been very active in negotiating with the powerful states, the US and China. Furthermore, China and US involvement may be crucial in achieving denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
This bring us back to the original research question:
What role has sports diplomacy played in inter-Korean relations leading up to, during and following the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics Games?
In short, sports diplomacy cannot contribute to significant political breakthroughs on its own. In the seven years preceding the 2018 Winter Olympics, sports diplomacy was ineffective in inter-Korean relations due to the short-term nature of its implementation. There were no provisions put in place by the IOC or other organisations following each sporting mega-event and, thus as shown with Incheon 2014, tensions continued to persist. Moreover, the militarised environment and tough South Korean stance towards North Korea determined that sports diplomacy was ineffective.
Pyeongchang 2018 has demonstrated that sports diplomacy can be useful in regards to the positive discourse that emanates from the event. Opening ceremonies, media interviews and friendly sporting competition provides the most suitable platform for hostile nations to communication. Moreover, elites such as Kim Yo-jong and President Moon Jae-in were able to interact with each other, thus helping to normalise communication and become more familiar with each other.
Following the 2018 Winter Olympics, the North and South have attempted to introduce long-term sporting unity such as in the September Pyongyang Declaration. The two
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Koreas have fielded joint teams in the 2018 Asian Games, the 2018 World Team Table Tennis Championship and in a series of basketball matches and both intend to look into the possibility of a joint bid for the 2032 Summer Olympics. Thus, we can see the beginning of a long-term plan, which, in 2018, has helped to maintain peaceful relations.
To sum up, sports diplomacy is useful in terms of the influence of neutral international sporting organisations, positive discourse from the media, public diplomacy at sporting mega- events and increased interaction between leaders. However, sports diplomacy can only achieve so much. The external environment must be welcoming for significant improvements in inter-Korean relations to occur. This includes political leaders or parties who want to engage in dialogue, the influence of other states such as China and US, and finally progress towards demilitarisation and denuclearisation of the region.
Further Research It must be emphasised that it has been less than one year since Pyeongchang 2018. So far, inter-Korean relations seem to be improving, and indeed North Korean relations with the US and China. The situation must continue to be monitored and researched to determine the long-term effectiveness of sports diplomacy. I have highlighted the potential of a long-term sports policy between North and South Korea. More research into the processes that occur to implement a successful long-term sports policy between two hostile states would be policy relevant. Finally, further research needs to examine the relationship between the media, opening ceremonies, and the public in sporting mega-events. How does the media’s continual communication with the public affect the actions of the political decision makers? Can sporting mega-events publicise peace, helping to normalise positive relations between hostile states? To conclude, whilst sporting-diplomacy may not be enough on its own to reunify North and South Korea, the discipline of sports diplomacy has uncovered some potential avenues for future research. Further studies may enable a more complex understanding of the role of sports diplomacy in improving inter-Korean relations, which can become applicable to other cases of hostile states.
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