Aristotle's Ethics I. Main Lecture Topics
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Aristotle’s Ethics I. Main lecture topics: • Socrates/Plato/Aristotle • Aristotle’s chief issue: the good life • The notion of TELEOLOGY • Modern science and teleology • Teleology in Aristotle’s ethics • A’s remark about accuracy/precision • The good life and “ends” • The complete and the self-sufficient good • Happiness (Eudaimonia) • Different conceptions (criticized) • Happiness for “man” and “function” • A’s theory of moral development • Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean Vocabulary: Mean Teleology II. Bauer’s Aristotle overview Plan: (I) overview of Aristotle followed by (II) “close reading” I. Overview 1. A’s influence (re ethics) and “teleology” 2. Science and the fate of teleology First “scientists” (preSocratics): eschewing explanations making reference to gods and occult forces Instead: mechanical, material explanations: with reference to analysis and regularities E.g. Democritus (460 BCE – ca. 370 BC) His exact contributions are difficult to disentangle from his mentor Leucippus, as they are often mentioned together in texts. Their hypothesis on atoms, taken from Leucippus, is remarkably similar to modern science's understanding of atomic structure, and avoided many of the errors of their contemporaries. Largely ignored in Athens, Democritus was nevertheless well-known to his fellow northern-born philosopher Aristotle. Plato [428/427 BC[a] – 348/347 BC] is said to have disliked him so much that he wished all his books burnt.[1] Many consider Democritus to be the "father of modern science".[3] . The theory of Democritus and Leucippus held that everything is composed of "atoms", which are physically, but not geometrically, indivisible; that between atoms lies empty space; that atoms are indestructible; have always been, and always will be, in motion; that there are an infinite number of atoms, and kinds of atoms, which differ in shape, and size. Of the weight of atoms, Democritus said "The more any indivisible exceeds, the heavier it is." (Wikipedia) Thales of Miletus (624 BC – c. 546 BC) It is arguable whether the Greeks always invoked idiosyncratic explanations of natural phenomena by reference to the will of anthropomorphic gods and heroes. However, such explanations were common. Thales aimed to explain natural phenomena via a rational explanation that referenced natural processes themselves. He explained earthquakes by hypothesizing that the Earth floats on water, and that earthquakes occur when the Earth is rocked by waves. Thales, according to Aristotle, asked what was the nature (Greek Arche) of the object so that it would behave in its characteristic way. Physis (φύσις) comes from phyein (φύειν), "to grow", related to our word "be".[9] (G)natura is the way a thing is "born",[10] again with the stamp of what it is in itself. Aristotle[11] characterizes most of the philosophers "at first" (πρῶτον) as thinking that the "principles in the form of matter were the only principles of all things", where "principle" is arche, "matter" is hyle ("wood" or "matter", "matterial") and "form" is eidos. (Wikipedia) . What Aristotle is really saying is that the first philosophers were trying to define the substance(s) of which all material objects are composed. As a matter of fact, that is exactly what modern scientists are trying to do in nuclear physics, which is a second reason why Thales is described as the first western scientist. 3. The history of science: arguably, a whittling away of the set of phenomena to be explained, in each case offering material explanations instead of “teleology.” The case of “natural selection”: 18th century observations (fossils, how to explain?) Attempted theories to account for apparent phenomenon of evolution (Lamark, et al.) Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations): explaining what appears to be the product of design (management) without reference to anyone pursuing that management (the “invisible hand”) . By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.[5] (Wealth of Nations) Malthus: nature, red in tooth and claw Wallace and Darwin: the theory of natural selection Using three uncontested assumptions, NS predicts gradual evolution, but of a particular character: those species that survive will change and they will do so in the direction of becoming better suited to their environments. The plausibility (and confirmation) of this mechanism provided the missing “mechanism” for evolution. Hence evolution could be regarded as a fact, an observation. (Compare with: cell phones causing brain cancer. Sure, we’ll consider it, once you can provide any mechanism that could explain such causation. But no such mechanism has emerged.) The UPSHOT: A stunning array of natural phenomena that appear to be the product of intelligent design are accounted for without reference to intelligence or design—rather, through mindless processes. The NONTELEOLOGY of Darwinian natural selection: • No “progress.” No goal. Just a mindless process that can “look” like teleology. • No hierarchy: no higher or lower. • Not even (says Gould) is there a general tendency toward complexity. At this point, the burden is on the teleologist to explain what entitles him/her to insert teleology into the discussion of explanations, given: The overwhelming trend of scientific explanation to succeed without reference to teleology The consistent erroneousness of teleological assumptions of explanation/causation The “dead end” quality of teleological explanations 4. ARISTOTLE: chief goal What is the “good life”? (Asking both, what is the excellent, impressive, noble life? And: What is the enjoyable, satisfying, happy life?) Arist. will seek answer in teleology 5. ARISTOTLE: a point about precision "It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits." (NE 1094b24) 6. ARISTOTLE: popular views re the “good life” • The life of the senses • The life of honor • The life of virtue 7. ARISTOTLE: The logic of “ends” Often, we do something for it’s own sake. Sometimes, we do something for the sake of some end. And sometimes, we seek that end for the sake of a more basic end. But this process cannot go on forever. In any effort or activity, there must be an end that we seek for itself. Aristotle hopes that we can find a final and complete end that explains all other ends. Something we seek for its own sake, that we don’t seek for any further thing, and that is in no sense incomplete. Is there a final and complete end of human activity? If so, we need to know what it is 8. ARISTOTLE: we seek the good life. We disagree about its nature. But we all agree on its name: EUDAIMONIA: happiness. III. Nicomachean Ethics Excerpts Aristotle’s writing called “Nichomachean Ethics” Book I Chapter 1 [Seeking the ultimate good, end:] Every art and every scientific inquiry, and similarly every action and purpose, may be said to aim at some good. Hence the good has been well defined as that at which all things aim. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends; for the ends are sometimes activities, and sometimes results beyond the mere activities. Also, where there are certain ends beyond the actions, the results are naturally superior to the activities. As there are various actions, arts, and sciences, it follows that the ends are also various. Thus health is the end of medicine, a vessel of shipbuilding, victory of strategy, and wealth of domestic economy. It often happens that there are a number of such arts or sciences which fall under a single faculty, as the art of making bridles, and all such other arts as make the instruments of horsemanship, under horsemanship, and this . as well as every military action under strategy, and in the same way other arts or sciences under other faculties. But in all these cases the ends of the architectonic arts or sciences, whatever they may be, are more desirable than those of the subordinate arts or sciences, as it is for the sake of the former that the latter are themselves sought after. It makes no difference to the argument whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else beyond the activities as in the above mentioned sciences. If it is true that in the sphere of action there is an end which we wish for is own sake, and for the sake of which we wish everything else, and that we do not desire all things for the sake of something else (for, if that is so, the process will go on ad infinitum and our desire will be idle and futile), it is clear that this will be the good or the supreme good. Does it not follow then that the knowledge of this supreme good is of great importance for the conduct of life, and that, if we know it, we shall be like archers who have a mark at which to aim, [and] shall have a better chance of attaining what we want? But, if this is the case, we must endeavour to comprehend, at least in outline, is nature and the science or faculty to which it belongs.